Findings Of Fact Maribel Mackey is the sole proprietor of Petitioner Maribe1 Mackey Landscaping. As a woman of Hispanic heritage (Cuban), she falls into two of the presumptive categories of socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Petitioner is a landscaping company started in April, 1990, by Maribel Mackey as its sole owner. The company does not itself perform either irrigation or sod work as was sworn to on its application; rather, it subcontracts those items of work when they are required under a contract. Petitioner conducts business out of the home of Maribel and Robert Mackey at 5032 S.W. 121 Avenue, Cooper City, Florida. Robert and Maribel Mackey were married in March, 1988. Maribel Mackey had no prior experience in the landscaping business prior to starting her business. Robert Mackey is the sole shareholder of a landscaping company known as Robert Mackey Landscaping, Inc., incorporated in 1988. Prior to the formation of that business entity, Robert Mackey was the sole proprietor of Robert Mackey Landscaping from approximately 1982 to 1988. In total, Robert Mackey has been in the landscaping business for approximately 17-18 years. Robert Mackey also conducts his 1andscaping business out of the home he shares with Maribel. Both businesses share the same office in the Mackey home and share the same office equipment, which includes: a desk, a phone (which doubles as their home phone), a file cabinet, a copying machine and a fax machine. Robert Mackey acts in more than an advisory capacity with Petitioner. Robert Mackey also assisits Maribel Mackey with bid estimating and in the supervision of field operations. Robert Mackey has also helped Maribel Mackey Landscaping to obtain credit for the purchase of landscaping supplies at nurseries and in the leasing of equipment used in the landscaping business. Robert Mackey performed and/or assisted Maribel Mackey in putting together a Proposal on the Kathcar Building. The original of this Proposal was done on a form of Robert Mackey Landscaping and was signed by Robert Mackey. The copy forwarded to the Department and admitted as an exhibit during the final hearing had been altered to reflect Petitioner's name and the signature of Maribel Mackey had been added to that of Robert. Robert and Maribel Mackey maintain a line of credit in the amount of $100,000. This line of credit is available to both of them for either personal or business purposes and requires both signatures. This line of credit is secured by a mortgage on the Mackeys' personal residence. Maribel and Robert Mackey have an informal, oral agreement not to compete with each other in the landscaping business. Maribel Mackey is prepared to forfeit substantial profits on behalf of Petitioner by referring potential landscaping jobs to her husband's company. Maribel and Robert Mackey, as part of this agreement, have agreed that Petitioner will concentrate exclusively on public or government projects, while Robert Mackey Landscaping will concentrate exclusively on private projects. Petitioner has, however, done private work, and Robert Mackey Landscaping has done public work and currently has a bid in on another public project. In addition, Maribel Mackey's business card states on its face that Petitioner performs "residentia1 and interior" work. Petitioner is currently certified as a Women's Business Enterprise and/or a Minority Business Enterprise with the following governmental entities: Broward County, The School Board of Broward County, and Palm Beach County. Broward County, in its evaluation of Petitioner's application to be certified as a WBE/MBE, did not visit Petitioner's place cf business to conduct an on-site interview with Maribel Mackey. Broward County, when it certified Petitioner as a WBE/MBE, did not know that Petitioner shared the same office space and equipment with Robert Mackey Landscaping. Broward County also did not know that Robert Mackey had his own landscaping business or that he had been in the landscaping business for approximately 17-18 years.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner Maribel Mackey Landscaping certification as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of January, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officeer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-5830 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 and 5 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 6-8 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 9-11 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-15 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: William Peter Martin Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. #58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Maribel Mackey 5032 Southwest 121 Avenue Cooper City, Florida 33330 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. #58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether Petitioners’ installation of ditch plugs on their property qualifies for an agricultural exemption from the requirement to obtain an environmental resource permit pursuant to section 373.406(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Paul and Kathleen Still (Petitioners), own a parcel of property comprised of 118 acres located within Section 33, Township 6 South, Range 21 East, in Bradford County, Florida, approximately six miles southwest of Starke, Florida (the Property). The Department is the state agency authorized under section 373.407, Florida Statutes, to make binding determinations at the request of a water management district or landowner as to whether an existing or proposed activity qualifies for an agricultural-related exemption from environmental resource permitting, pursuant to section 373.406(2). The Property is classified as agricultural by the Bradford County Property Appraiser. A county-maintained dirt road, Southwest 101st Avenue, forms the western boundary of the Property, and Lake Sampson forms the eastern boundary of the Property. Petitioners have owned the Property since 1996, and currently reside on the Property. A drainage ditch runs through the Property from Southwest 101st Avenue to Lake Sampson. The evidence suggests that it was originally constructed in the 1960s, was dug through wetlands and uplands, and serves to drain the area west of Southwest 101st Avenue. The ditch had the effect of draining some of the wetlands that had previously existed on the Property. The drainage ditch ends in the Northwest corner of the wetland above ditch plug 3, at which point water flows east and then north, eventually flowing into Lake Sampson north of the Property. The wetland above ditch plug 3 was a natural wetland which was likely part of Lake Sampson before Lake Sampson was partially drained in 1887. At some point, a low berm was pushed around parts of this wetland. Prior to Petitioners’ ownership, the berm was breached and the wetland drained. Ditch plug 3 was installed in this breach. Ditch plug 3 restored water to the same level as was present when the wetland was part of Lake Sampson. The Property contains stands of planted and naturally- regenerating pine, natural cypress, and a stand of cypress trees planted by Petitioners. Cypress is present on 43 acres of the Property, with more than 50 percent of that area having been planted. The density at which the cypress was planted will require that the stand be thinned. Most of the thinned cypress trees will be sent off to be turned into mulch. Some will be of a size that it can go into saw timber. Silviculture has been defined in several ways: The United States Department of Agriculture and the Department have, on their websites defined silviculture as “the art and science of controlling the establishment, growth, composition, health, and quality of forest and woodland vegetation to meet the diverse interests of landowners and a wide variety of objectives.” The United States Forest Service website defines silviculture as “the art and science of controlling the establishment, growth, composition, health and quality of forests and woodlands to meet the diverse needs and values of landowners and society on a sustainable basis.” Florida Administrative Code Rule 5I-2.003(29) defines silviculture as “a forestry operation dealing with the establishment, development, reproduction, and care of forest flora and fauna.” The Department’s Silviculture Best Management Practices, adopted in rule 5I-6.002, defines silviculture as “a process, following accepted forest management principles, whereby the trees constituting forests are tended, harvested and reproduced.” Production of cypress for lumber and mulch is a silvicultural and agricultural activity. Petitioners’ production of cypress for lumber and mulch constitutes a silvicultural operation. The production of cypress is enhanced by periodic inundation to control hardwood species of competing trees. Starting in 2004, Petitioners began to plan for the installation of ditch plugs on the Property, and shortly thereafter installed ditch plug 3, which is not in wetlands. That plug was short-lived, being removed prior to 2006 when Petitioners started getting groundwater infiltration into their shallow drinking water well. At some time in 2006 or 2007, Petitioners reinstalled ditch plug 3. In 2009, at the request of Petitioners, a preliminary field review was conducted by staff of the District to discuss the potential to install ditch plugs on the Property. Based on the preliminary investigation, it was determined that additional analysis would be needed to make sure that the proposed plugs would not have offsite and upstream drainage problems. Ditch plugs 1 and 2 were installed in stages beginning in 2011. Construction of the ditch plugs was done in stages to ensure that no offsite impacts would occur. There is no evidence in this case to suggest that the ditch plugs have resulted in any offsite and upstream drainage problems. Petitioners assert that the ditch plugs were installed to return water to wetlands that had been drained so as to enhance the production of cypress in those wetlands. Petitioners also admit that the ditch plugs will also have the effect of mitigating for sediment eroding from Southwest 101st Avenue. On November 5, 2014, the District notified Petitioners that it had come to the attention of the District that the ditch plugs may have been installed on the Property without proper authorization. At some time after November 5, 2014, Petitioners requested that the District provide notification of the applicability of one or more of the exemptions in section 373.406 to the installation of the ditch plugs on their Property. On April 24, 2015, the District requested additional information in support of Petitioners’ request, and advised Petitioners that the ditch plugs were not exempt under section 373.406(2) because the predominant purpose of the ditch plugs was to impede or divert the flow of surface water. The District further advised Petitioners that the ditch plugs may be eligible for exemption under section 373.406(9), which exempts measures having the primary purpose of environmental restoration or water quality improvement on agricultural lands where these measures have minimal or insignificant adverse impact on the water resources of the state. On June 4, 2015, as a result of the District’s April 24, 2015, letter, Petitioners requested a binding determination as to the applicability of the section 373.406(2) agricultural exemption. On June 18, 2015, the Department conducted a site visit. According to Mr. Lamborn, the county forester for Baker and Bradford counties, who wrote the Stewardship Forest Management Plan for the Property and has visited the Property several times, the Property is not a typical timber operation. Mr. Lamborn noted that Petitioners were the only landowners during his time as a county forester that identified soil and water conservation as their primary management goal for a forest stewardship plan. Mr. Vowell has never seen ditch plugs used in a silvicultural operation in the manner that Petitioners have used them on their Property. Mr. Bartnick testified that the Department has never issued an agricultural determination providing an exemption for ditch plugs in wetlands. In coming to its Binding Determination, the Department reviewed, among other information, correspondence between the District and the Petitioners; the Silvicultural Best Management Practices manual (2008); current and historical aerial photography of the Property; a USDA Soil Survey map; the 2015 Bradford County Property Appraiser Information Card; the National Wetland Inventory Map; and the Florida Forest Service Stewardship Management Plan. The review of the request for a Binding Determination substantially complied with the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 5M-15. On September 14, 2015, the Department applied the three-part test in rule 5M-15.005, and issued its Binding Determination which concluded that Petitioner’s activities did not meet the requirements for an agricultural exemption. Under the heading "Application of Statutory Criteria,” the Binding Determination provided that: Pursuant to Section 373.406(2) F.S., all of the following criteria must be met in order for the permitting exemption to apply. "Is the landowner engaged in the occupation of agriculture, silviculture, floriculture, or horticulture?" YES. FDACS-Florida Forest Service finds that Mr. Paul Still is engaged in the occupation of silviculture. "Are the alterations (or proposed alterations) to the topography of the land for purposes consistent with the normal and customary practice of such occupation in the area?" NO. FDACS-Florida Forest Service finds that the construction of the ditch plugs are not a normal and customary practice for silviculture being conducted in the area. Normal and customary silviculture would typically not include the plugging of existing ditches. In fact, silviculture in Florida often necessitates some level of drainage to make wetter sites more accessible and therefore more productive. Based on his experience, Mr. Lamborn explained that “conservation of soils and water resources”, as the main component of a Stewardship Plan is not customary. Moreover, the 2008 Silviculture Best Management Practices manual does not list ditch plugs installed in wetlands or in large ditches connected to wetlands, as a viable practice. The reference to ditch plugs in the 2008 Silviculture Best Management Practices manual is for “road-side” ditches and has to do with the entrapment and dispersion of sediment and the reduction of ditch- flow velocity, not hydrologic restoration. "Are the alterations (or proposed alterations) for the sole or predominant purpose of impeding or diverting the flow of surface waters or adversely impacting wetlands?" Because the exemption in section 373.406(2), F.S., requires an affirmative answer to all these criteria, and we have already found that the alterations are not consistent with normal and customary practice of such occupation in the area (see (b) above), there is no need to address this issue. In sum, the Binding Determination concluded the installation of ditch plugs in Petitioners’ particular circumstance did not qualify for the agricultural exemption under section 373.406(2), because such is not a normal and customary practice for silviculture being conducted in the area. Petitioners asserted that the Department’s determination reflected a “bias” towards pine production, and did not consider the requirements of cypress production. Much of the testimony regarding customary silvicultural practices was provided by Mr. Vowell. Mr. Vowell has worked with hundreds of small, private, non-industrial forest owners, and was clearly well-versed in pine production. He described his experience with the production of cypress as “very little.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order finding that the activities on Petitioner’s Property addressed in this case are not exempt pursuant to section 373.406(2), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Lauren Brothers, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Suite 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Paul Still Kathleen Still 14167 Southwest 101st Avenue Starke, Florida 32091 (eServed) Lorena Holley, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Honorable Adam Putnam Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rosario and Vito Strano d/b/a Strano Farms (Strano Farms), is a grower and shipper of fresh produce in Florida City, Florida (Dade County). Respondent, Mager Corporation d/b/a Gulf Provision Company (GPC), is an agricultural dealer in Jacksonville, Florida, subject to the licensing requirements of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (agency). As such, GPC is obligated to obtain a dealer's license from the agency and to post a surety bond executed by a surety corporation to ensure that payment is made to producers for agricultural products purchased by the dealer. To meet this latter requirement, GPC has obtained a surety bond in an undisclosed amount from respondent, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. This controversy involves a dispute over payment for a shipment of tomatoes purchased from Strano Farms by GPC for further sale to retail vendors. The origins of the dispute began on or about February 2, 1987, when a salesman for Strano Farms accepted a telephone order from Neil R. Sandler, president of GPC, for two lots of "Poppa's Famous" tomatoes. The order was later memorialized by petitioner in a memorandum dated February 7, 1987 reflecting the following: Quantity Description Pkq. Grade Size Price Amount 176 Tomatoes 20# Poppa's Famous 5x6 5.60 $985.00 176 Tomatoes 20# Poppa's Famous 6x6 3.80 528.00 Palletizing .15 52.80 352 Total Due: 1566.40 In addition, Strano Farms prepared a broker's memorandum on February 5, 1987 reflecting that GPC ordered two lots of "breakers," a specific grade of tomato. However, Strano Farms contended the reference to "breakers" was a typographical error by the clerical employee who prepared the document and that actually a different grade had been ordered. According to Rosario Strano, a partner and owner of petitioner, Sandler ordered 176 cartons each of light pink and pink tomatoes. This was corroborated by the fact that in early February, 1987 petitioner had no breaker tomatoes in stock. Sandler could not dispute this since more than fifteen months had passed since the order was placed, and he had no independent recollection of the transaction. The United States Department of Agriculture has established a color classification for tomatoes that sets forth the color of tomatoes by stage of maturity. In ascending order of maturity and color, they are green, breakers, turning, pink, light red and red. Homestead Tomato Packing Company, Inc. (Homestead) is the exclusive packer and shipper for Strano Farms. Homestead processed GPC's order and shipped the tomatoes to GPC on February 3, 1987. Prior to the shipment, sub-lot inspections of the produce from which GPC's shipment was drawn were made by an agency inspector on January 28 and February 2, 1987. The inspector's report indicates that the produce had a "mixed color", that there was no decay and the produce was within the tolerance limits for defects. It reflected further that the shipment met the pink and light pink standards. When the tomatoes arrived in Jacksonville on February 4 or 5, Sandler inspected the produce but was not satisfied with the condition of the tomatoes. He ordered a federal inspection the same day. The report reflected that the 6x6 lot of tomatoes was within federal standards while the 5x6 lot deviated slightly because of bruising and decay. However, the tomatoes conformed to pink and light pink standards. Sandler telephoned Strano Farms and requested that a price adjustment be made. When no agreement could be reached, GPC unilaterally adjusted the amount due to $894.80 and tendered Strano Farms a check in that amount. This amount was based upon a total price of $880.00 for both lots of tomatoes, $52.80 for pelletizing, less $38.00 spent by GPC for an inspection. The total payment was $618.80 less than originally agreed upon by the parties, or the amount being claimed by petitioner. Petitioner contends the adjustment made by respondent is "excessive" and not justified by the actual condition of the tomatoes. Strano Farms is willing to allow an adjustment of up to $1.15 per box for that percentage of boxes in the 5x6 lot that failed to meet standards. This adjustment is consistent with the quality of the tomatoes reflected in the federal inspection report. It is also consistent with the industry practice that any price adjustments should correspond with the condition of the produce as reflected on the federal inspection report. Because the adjustment proposed by petitioner is reasonable and consistent with the report, it should be made. Therefore, respondent should deduct $1.15 per box for those boxes in the 5x6 lot that failed to meet federal standards because of bruising and decay. It should also deduct the cost of the inspection report ($38) and pay petitioner all other amounts due.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent pay petitioner the additional amount due within thirty days from date of final order. In the event payment is not timely made, the surety company should be required to pay this amount. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1988.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $2,295.00 for agriculture products, plus $50.00 filing fee, totaling $2,345.00.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that, at all times material hereto, Horizon Nursery was a producer of agriculture products. No dispute exists that, at all times material hereto, Designing Women Landscaping was a dealer in agriculture products. No dispute exists that, at all times material hereto, Designing Women Landscaping purchased agriculture products from Horizon Nursery. Linda Esposito testified on behalf of Horizon Nursery. She is the Office Manager of Horizon Nursery. Beth Best testified on behalf of Designing Women Landscaping. She is the Vice President of Operations for Designing Women Landscaping. No dispute exists that Horizon Nursery and Designing Women Landscaping began their business relationship in February 2005. Horizon Nursery has a form titled “Terms and Conditions of Credit” for dealers in agricultural products who desire to do business with it on credit. Horizon Nursery also refers to the form as a credit application. The Terms and Conditions of Credit contains a section at the end of the form for the date, the name of the firm, the signature and title of the person executing the form on behalf of the firm, the printing of that person’s name, and the social security number of that person. The Terms and Conditions of Credit provisions provide in pertinent part: Charges are due 30 days from invoice date. All past due accounts are subject to a service charge of 1.5% per month. * * * The undersigned applicant does hereby certify that the information given is correct . . . it is agreed and understood by HORIZON NURSERY . . . and the undersigned that all purchases made on an open account will be paid in full according to the terms of sale on each invoice and this application. Horizon Nursery possessed a Terms and Conditions of Credit form dated February 8, 2005, with the firm name of Designing Women Landscape. Further, the Terms and Conditions of Credit form contained the signature of the owner of the firm, however, the name of the owner was not printed. The social security number was redacted. Designing Women Landscaping admitted that the signature appears to be that of its President, Susan Hallett.1 An inference is drawn and a finding of fact is made that the signature is that of the President of Designing Women Landscaping. Designing Women Landscaping did not possess a copy of the Terms and Conditions of Credit. A finding of fact is made that Designing Women Landscaping executed, agreed to, and was subject to the Terms and Conditions of Credit. Regarding payments on an account, Horizon Nursery’s standard operating procedure is to apply a payment first to service charges on the account and then to the oldest outstanding invoice of the account. Designing Women Landscaping received specific invoices from Horizon Nursery, regarding agricultural products ordered by and shipped to it, and paid the specific invoices for agricultural products from Horizon Nursery. However, several payments by Designing Women Landscaping were made beyond 30 days of the date of the invoices. When a payment was not made within 30 days of an invoice date, Horizon Nursery added a service charge to the balance owed in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of Credit; and, in accordance with its standard operating procedure, applied the payment first to the service fee owed and then to the oldest outstanding invoice. However, when Horizon Nursery sent a subsequent invoice to Designing Women Landscaping for agricultural products that were ordered by and shipped to Designing Women Landscaping, the invoice reflected, among other things, the cost for agricultural products ordered by and shipped to Designing Women Landscaping, but did not reflect the service charge that had been added to the Designing Women Landscaping’s account for the late payment. Moreover, none of the invoices for agricultural products ordered by and shipped to Designing Women Landscaping reflected service charges that had been added to the Designing Women Landscaping’s account for late payments. Horizon Nursery’s AR Dated Invoice/Payment Report reflects a beginning balance of $-0- for Designing Women Landscaping as of April 3, 2006. Subsequent to April 3, 2006, according to the AR Dated Invoice/Payment Report, Designing Women Landscaping began to accrue service charges. Throughout the business relationship between Horizon Nursery and Designing Women Landscaping, no dispute exists that Designing Women Landscaping received specific invoices totaling $168,622.96 for agricultural products ordered by and shipped to it by Horizon Nursery; and that Designing Women Landscaping paid $168,622.96 to Horizon Nursery. The last specific invoice submitted to Designing Women Landscaping was invoice no. 115783 dated April 8, 2008, in the amount of $2,295.00. Horizon Nursery’s AR Dated Invoice/Payment Report reflects that a payment of $2,295.00 was received by Horizon Nursery on May 15, 2008. The payment was received beyond 30 days of the date of the invoice. In accordance with its Terms and Conditions of Credit, Horizon Nursery added a service charge to Designing Women Landscaping’s account. Additionally, in accordance with its standard operating procedure, Horizon Nursery applied the payment first to service charges and then to the oldest outstanding invoice. Applying the two aforementioned procedures, Designing Women Landscaping’s account resulted in a balance owed. By a statement dated December 15, 2008, Horizon Nursery notified Designing Women Landscaping that it had an outstanding balance of $2,460.99, representing two outstanding invoices: invoice no. 115542 dated December 17, 2007, in the amount of $450.00, with a balance of $165.99, and invoice no. 115783 dated April 8, 2008 in the amount of $2,295.00, with a balance of $2,295.00, which was the last specific invoice to Designing Women Landscaping. Because Horizon Nursery had applied payments from Designing Women Landscaping first to service charges and then to the oldest outstanding invoice, the two invoices remained outstanding even though Designing Women Landscaping had paid the amounts indicated in the invoices. Horizon Nursery’s employee responsible for accounts receivable had several telephone conversations, regarding the late payments, service charges, and how Horizon Nursery applied the payments received, with Designing Women Landscaping’s bookkeeper, who was the employee responsible, among other things, for paying the invoices approved by Ms. Best. Designing Women Landscaping’s bookkeeper was employed with it for nine to 12 months. At no time did Horizon Nursery discuss with or communicate to an officer of Designing Women Landscaping regarding the service charges, late payments, and how Horizon Nursery applied the payments received. Even though Horizon Nursery’s statement dated December 15, 2008, and ledger reflects a balance of $2,460.99, Horizon Nursery is claiming $2,295.00, the amount of the invoice dated April 8, 2008. Additionally, Horizon Nursery is claiming $50.00 for filing the Amended Claim with the Department. No appearance was made by the casualty company, Nova Casualty Company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order finding that Designing Women Landscaping, Inc., d/b/a Designing Women Landscaping and Nursery is indebted to Horizon Nursery of Florida, LC in the amount of $2,295.00 and ordering the payment of same, plus a filing fee of $50.00 for filing the Amended Claim. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2009.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this bid protest matter is whether Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s, intended award of funding under Request for Applications 2017- 108, entitled “SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments To Be Used In Conjunction With Tax-Exempt Bond Financing And Non-Competitive Housing Credits” was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Its purpose is to provide and promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. As such, Florida Housing is authorized to establish procedures to distribute low income housing tax credits and to exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of these credits. § 420.5099, Fla. Stat. For purposes of this administrative proceeding, Florida Housing is considered an agency of the State of Florida. To promote affordable housing in Florida, Florida Housing offers a variety of programs to distribute housing credits. (Housing credits, also known as tax credits, are a dollar-for-dollar offset of federal income tax liability.) One of these programs is the State Apartment Incentive Loan program (“SAIL”), which provides low-interest loans on a competitive basis to affordable housing developers. SAIL funds are available each year to support the construction or substantial rehabilitation of multifamily units affordable to very low- income individuals and families. See § 420.5087, Fla. Stat. Additional sources of financial assistance include the Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bond program (“MMRB”) and non- competitive housing credits. Florida Housing administers the competitive solicitation process to award low-income housing tax credits, SAIL funds, nontaxable revenue bonds, and other funding by means of request for proposals or other competitive solicitation. Florida Housing initiates the competitive application process by issuing a Request for Applications. §§ 420.507(48) and 420.5087(1), Fla. Stat.; and Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.009(4). The Request for Application at issue in this matter is RFA 2017-108, entitled “SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments to Be Used in Conjunction with Tax-Exempt Bond Financing and Non-Competitive Housing Credits.” Florida Housing issued RFA 2017-108 on August 31, 2017. Applications were due by October 12, 2017.6/ The purpose of RFA 2017-108 is to distribute funding to create affordable housing in the State of Florida. Through RFA 2017-108, Florida Housing intends to award approximately $87,000,000 for proposed developments serving elderly and family demographic groups in small, medium, and large counties. RFA 2017-108 allocates $46,279,600 to large counties, $32,308,400 to medium counties, and $8,732,000 to small counties. RFA 2017-108 established goals to fund: Two Elderly, new construction Applications located in Large Counties; Three Family, new construction Applications located in Large Counties; One Elderly, new construction Application located in a Medium County; and Two Family, new construction Applications located in Medium Counties. Thirty-eight developers submitted applications in response to RFA 2017-108. Of these applicants, Florida Housing found 28 eligible for funding, including all Petitioners and Intervenors in this matter. Florida Housing received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked applications pursuant to the terms of RFA 2017-108, Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67- 48 and 67-60, and applicable federal regulations. RFA 2017-108 provided that applicants were scored based on certain demographic and geographic funding tests. Florida Housing sorted applications from the highest scoring to the lowest. Only applications that met all the eligibility requirements were eligible for funding and considered for selection. Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to review and score each application. On November 15, 2017, the Review Committee announced its scores at a public meeting and recommended which projects should be awarded funding. On December 8, 2017, the Review Committee presented its recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors for final agency action. The Board of Directors subsequently approved the Review Committee’s recommendations and announced its intention to award funding to 16 applicants. As a preliminary matter, prior to the final hearing, Florida Housing agreed to the following reassessments in the scoring and selection of the applications for funding under RFA 2017-108: SP Lake and Osprey Pointe: In the selection process, Florida Housing erroneously determined that SP Lake was eligible to meet the funding goal for the “Family” demographic for the Family, Medium County, New Construction Goal. (SP Lake specifically applied for funding for the “Elderly” demographic.) Consequently, Florida Housing should have selected Osprey Pointe to meet the Family, Medium County, New Construction Goal. Osprey Pointe proposed to construct affordable housing in Pasco County, Florida. Florida Housing represents that Osprey Pointe is fully eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. (While Osprey Pointe replaces SP Lake in the funding selection for the “Family” demographic, SP Lake remains eligible for funding for the “Elderly” demographic.) Sierra Bay and Northside II: In the scoring process, Florida Housing erroneously awarded Sierra Bay proximity points for Transit Services. Upon further review, Sierra Bay should have received zero proximity points. Consequently, Sierra Bay’s application is ineligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. By operation of the provisions of RFA 2017-108, Florida Housing should have selected Northside II (the next highest ranked, eligible applicant) for funding to meet the Elderly, Large County, New Construction Goal. Florida Housing represents that Northside II is fully eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. Harbour Springs: Florida Housing initially deemed Harbour Springs eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108 and selected it to meet the Family, Large County, New Construction Goal. However, because Harbour Springs and Woodland Grove are owned by the same entity and applied using the same development site, under rule 67-48.004(1), Harbour Springs is ineligible for funding. (Florida Housing’s selection of Woodland Grove for funding for the Family, Large County, New Construction Goal, is not affected by this determination.) The sole disputed issue of material fact concerns Liberty Square’s challenge to Florida Housing’s selection of Woodland Grove to meet the Family, Large County Goal. Liberty Square and Woodland Grove applied to serve the same demographic population under RFA 2017-108. If Liberty Square successfully challenges Woodland Grove’s application, Liberty Square, as the next eligible applicant, will be selected for funding to meet the Family, Large County Goal instead of Woodland Grove. (At the hearing on December 8, 2017, Florida Housing’s Board of Directors awarded Woodland Grove $7,600,000 in funding.) The focus of Liberty Square’s challenge is the information Woodland Grove provided in response to RFA 2017-108, Section Four, A.5.d., entitled “Latitude/Longitude Coordinates.” Liberty Square argues that Woodland Grove’s application is ineligible because its Development Location Point, as well as the locations of its Community Services and Transit Services, are inaccurate. Therefore, Woodland Grove should have received zero “Proximity” points which would have disqualified its application for funding. RFA 2017-108, Section Four, A.5.d(1), states, in pertinent part: All Applicants must provide a Development Location Point stated in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place. RFA 2017-108 set forth scoring considerations based on latitude/longitude coordinates in Section Four, A.5.e, entitled “Proximity.” Section Four, A.5.e, states, in pertinent part: The Application may earn proximity points based on the distance between the Development Location Point and the Bus or Rail Transit Service . . . and the Community Services stated in Exhibit A. Proximity points will not be applied to the total score. Proximity points will only be used to determine whether the Applicant meets the required minimum proximity eligibility requirements and the Proximity Funding Preference ” In other words, the Development Location Point identified the specific location of an applicant’s proposed housing site.7/ Applicants earned “proximity points” based on the distance between its Development Location Point and selected Transit and Community Services. Florida Housing also used the Development Location Point to determine whether an application satisfied the Mandatory Distance Requirement under RFA 2017-108, Section Four A.5.f. To be eligible for funding, all applications had to qualify for the Mandatory Distance Requirement. The response section to Section Four, A.5.d., is found in Exhibit A, section 5, which required each applicant to submit information regarding the “Location of proposed Development.” Section 5 specifically requested: County; Address of Development Site; Does the proposed Development consist of Scattered Sites?; Latitude and Longitude Coordinate; Proximity; Mandatory Distance Requirement; and Limited Development Area. Section 5.d. (Latitude and Longitude Coordinates) was subdivided into: (1) Development Location Point Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place In its application, Woodland Grove responded in section 5.a-d as follows: County: Miami-Dade Address of Development Site: NE corner of SW 268 Street and 142 Ave, Miami-Dade, FL 33032. Does the proposed Development consist of Scattered Sites? No. Latitude and Longitude Coordinate; Development Location Point Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place: 25.518647 Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place: 80.418583 In plotting geographic coordinates, a “-” (negative) sign in front of the longitude indicates a location in the western hemisphere (i.e., west of the Prime Meridian, which is aligned with the Royal Observatory, Greenwich, England). A longitude without a “-” sign places the coordinate in the eastern hemisphere. (Similarly, a latitude with a negative value is south of the equator. A latitude without a “-” sign refers to a coordinate in the northern hemisphere.) As shown above, the longitude coordinate Woodland Grove listed in section 5.d(1) did not include a “-” sign. Consequently, instead of providing a coordinate for a site in Miami-Dade County, Florida, Woodland Grove entered a Development Location Point located on the direct opposite side of the planet (apparently, in India). At the final hearing, Florida Housing (and Woodland Grove) explained that, except for the lack of the “-” sign, the longitude Woodland Grove recorded would have fallen directly on the address it listed as its development site in section 5.b., i.e., the “NE corner of SW 268 Street and 142 Ave, Miami-Dade, FL 33032.” In addition to the longitude in section 5.d., Woodland Grove did not include a “-” sign before the longitude coordinates for its Transit Services in section 5.e(2)(b) or for any of the three Community Services provided in section 5.e(3). Again, without a “-” sign, the longitude for each of these services placed them in the eastern hemisphere (India) instead of the western hemisphere (Miami-Dade County). In its protest, Liberty Square contends that, because Woodland Grove’s application listed a Development Location Point in India, Florida Housing should have awarded Woodland Grove zero proximity points under Section Four, A.5.e. Consequently, Woodland Grove’s application failed to meet minimum proximity eligibility requirements and is ineligible for funding. Therefore, Liberty Square, as the next eligible applicant, should be awarded funding for the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017-108.8/ Liberty Square asserts that a correct Development Location Point is critical because it serves as the beginning point for assigning proximity scores. Waiving an errant Development Location Point makes the proximity scoring meaningless. Consequently, any such waiver by Florida Housing is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to competition. At the final hearing, Woodland Grove claimed that it inadvertently failed to include the “-” sign before the longitude points. To support its position, Woodland Grove expressed that, on the face of its application, it was obviously applying for funding for a project located in Miami-Dade County, Florida, not India. In at least five places in its application, Woodland Grove specified that its proposed development would be located in Miami-Dade County. Moreover, several attachments to Woodland Grove’s application specifically reference a development site in Florida. Woodland Grove attached a purchase agreement for property located in Miami-Dade County (Attachment 8). To satisfy the Ability to Proceed requirements in RFA 2017-108, Woodland Grove included several attachments which all list a Miami-Dade address (Attachments 9-14). Further, Woodland Grove submitted a Local Government Verification of Contribution – Loan Form executed on behalf of the Mayor of Miami-Dade County, which committed Miami-Dade County to contribute $1,000,000.00 to Woodland Grove’s proposed Development (Attachment 15). Finally, to qualify for a basis boost under RFA 2017-108, Woodland Grove presented a letter from Miami-Dade County’s Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources, which also referenced the address of the proposed development in Miami-Dade County (Attachment 16). In light of this information, Woodland Grove argues that its application, taken as a whole, clearly communicated that Woodland Grove intended to build affordable housing in Miami-Dade County. Nowhere in its application, did Woodland Grove reference a project in India other than the longitude coordinates which failed to include “-” signs. Accordingly, Florida Housing was legally authorized to waive Woodland Grove’s mistake as a “harmless error.” Thus, Florida Housing properly selected the Woodland Grove’s development for funding to meet the Family, Large County Goal. Florida Housing advocates for Woodland Grove’s selection to meet the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017- 108. Florida Housing considers the omission of the “-” signs before the longitude coordinates a “Minor Irregularity” under rule 67-60.002(6). Therefore, Florida Housing properly acted within its legal authority to waive, and then correct, Woodland Grove’s faulty longitude coordinates when scoring its application. In support of its position, Florida Housing presented the testimony of Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s current Director of Multifamily Allocations. In her job, Ms. Button oversees the Request for Applications process; although, she did not personally participate in the review, scoring, or selection decisions for RFA 2017-108. Ms. Button initially explained the process by which Florida Housing selected the 16 developments for funding under RFA 2017-108. Ms. Button conveyed that Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to score the applications. Florida Housing selected Review Committee participants based on the staff member’s experience, preferences, and workload. Florida Housing also assigned a backup reviewer to separately score each application. The Review Committee members independently evaluated and scored their assigned portions of the applications based on various mandatory and scored items. Thereafter, the scorer and backup reviewer met to reconcile their scores. If any concerns or questions arose regarding an applicant’s responses, the scorer and backup reviewer discussed them with Florida Housing’s supervisory and legal staff. The scorer then made the final determination as to each application. Ms. Button further explained that applicants occasionally make errors in their applications. However, not all errors render an application ineligible. Florida Housing is authorized to waive “Minor Irregularities.” As delineated in RFA 2017-108, Section Three, A.2.C., Florida Housing may waive “Minor Irregularities” when the errors do not provide a competitive advantage or adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67- 60.002(6) and 67-60.008. Such was the case regarding Woodland Grove’s application. Heather Green, the Florida Housing staff member who scored the “Proximity” portion of RFA 2017-108, waived the inaccurate longitude coordinates as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Green then reviewed Woodland Grove’s application as if the proposed development was located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Florida Housing assigned Ms. Green, a Multifamily Loans Manager, as the lead scorer for the “Proximity” portion of RFA 2017-108, which included the Development Location Point listed in Exhibit A, section 5.d. Ms. Green has worked for Florida Housing since 2003 and has scored proximity points for Request for Applications for over ten years. At the final hearing, Florida Housing offered the deposition testimony of Ms. Green. In her deposition, Ms. Green testified that she is fully aware that, to be located in the western hemisphere (i.e., Miami-Dade County), a longitude coordinate should be marked with a negative sign or a “W.” Despite this, Ms. Green felt that the longitude coordinates Woodland Grove used without negative signs, particularly its Development Location Point, were clearly typos or unintentional mistakes. Therefore, Ms. Green waived the lack of a negative sign in front of the longitude coordinates in section 5.d. and section 5.e. as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Green understood that she was authorized to waive “Minor Irregularities” by rule under the Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Green felt comfortable waiving the inaccurate longitude coordinates because everywhere else in Woodland Grove’s application specifically showed that its proposed housing development was located in Miami-Dade County, not India. Accordingly, when scoring Woodland Grove’s application, Ms. Green corrected the longitude entries by including a negative sign when she plotted the coordinates with her mapping software. Ms. Green then determined that, when a “-” was inserted before the longitude, the coordinate lined up with the address Woodland Grove listed for the Development Location Point. Therefore, Woodland Grove received proximity points and was eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. (See RFA 2017-108, Section Five.A.1.) However, Ms. Green acknowledged that if she had scored the application just as it was presented, Woodland Grove would not have met the required qualifications for eligibility. Ms. Button relayed that Florida Housing fully accepted Ms. Green’s decision to waive the missing negative signs in Woodland Grove’s response to section 5.d. and 5.e. as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Button opined that Woodland Grove’s failure to place a “-” mark before the longitude was clearly an unintentional mistake. Ms. Button further commented that Florida Housing did not believe that scoring Woodland Grove’s development as if located in the western hemisphere (instead of India), provided Woodland Grove a competitive advantage. Because it was evident on the face of the application that Woodland Grove desired to develop a housing site in Miami-Dade County, Ms. Green’s decision to overlook the missing “-” sign did not award Woodland Grove additional points or grant Woodland Grove an advantage over other applicants. Neither did it adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. However, Ms. Button also conceded that if Ms. Green had scored the application without adding the “-” sign, Woodland Grove would have received zero proximity points. This result would have rendered Woodland Grove’s application ineligible for funding. Ms. Button also pointed out that Ms. Green waived the omission of “-” signs in two other applications as “Minor Irregularities.” Both Springhill Apartments, LLC, and Harbour Springs failed to include negative signs in front of their longitude coordinates. As with Woodland Grove, Ms. Green considered the development sites in those applications as if they were located in Miami-Dade County (i.e., in the western hemisphere). Ms. Green also waived a mistake in the Avery Commons application as a “Minor Irregularity.” The longitude coordinate for the Avery Commons Development Location Point (section 5.d(1)) was blank. However, Ms. Green determined that Avery Commons had placed the longitude in the blank reserved for Scattered Sites coordinates (section 5.d(2)). When scoring Avery Commons’ application, Ms. Green considered the coordinate in the appropriate section. According to Ms. Button, Florida Housing felt that this variation did not provide Avery Commons a competitive advantage. Nor did it adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. Finally, Ms. Button explained that the application Florida Housing used for RFA 2017-108 was a relatively new format. In previous Request For Applications, Florida Housing required applicants to submit a Surveyor Certification Form. On the (now obsolete) Surveyor Certification Form, Florida Housing prefilled in an “N” in front of all the latitude coordinates and a “W” in front of all the longitude coordinates. However, the application used in RFA 2017-108 did not place an “N” or “W” before the Development Location Point coordinates. Based on the evidence presented at the final hearing, Liberty Square did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Florida Housing’s decision to award funding to Woodland Grove for the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017-108 was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Florida Housing was within its legal authority to waive, then correct, the missing “-” sign in Woodland Grove’s application as “Minor Irregularity.” Therefore, the undersigned concludes, as a matter of law, that Petitioner did not meet its burden of proving that Florida Housing’s proposed action to select Woodland Grove for funding was contrary to its governing statutes, rules or policies, or the provisions of RFA 2017-108.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order dismissing the protest by Liberty Square. It is further recommended that Florida Housing Finance Corporation rescind the intended awards to Sierra Bay, SP Lake, and Harbour Springs, and instead designate Northside II, Osprey Pointe, and Pembroke Tower Apartments as the recipients of funding under RFA 2017-108.10/ DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent Employer committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of his race, color, disability/handicap, and/or age.1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male who was 66-68 years of age at all times material. Petitioner worked successfully, in a variety of positions, for Respondent from March 20, 1999, until July 29, 2007. By all accounts, he was an excellent employee in each position. He has, at his own expense, trained for, and received, a security guard license and education as a fork lift operator. The published job description for employment as a Wal- Mart Garden Center Sales Associate, has, since May 2005, required, among other "essential functions," that one be able to: While moving within the department over uneven surfaces and moving up and down a ladder, frequently lifting, sorting, carrying, and placing merchandise and supplies of varying sizes, constantly lifting up to 50 pounds without assistance and over 50 pounds with team lifting. On March 3, 2006, Petitioner signed this job description, signifying that he possessed the ability at that time to perform all its essential functions. On a Saturday in July 2007, Petitioner was still working for Respondent as a Garden Center Sales Associate. Early that day, Petitioner and a cashier were alone in the garden center of Respondent's store at 13th Avenue, Gainesville, Florida. Upon her request, Petitioner loaded 83 bags of top soil into a customer's truck without assistance. Later that same day, Petitioner's wrist began to hurt. The following Monday, Petitioner’s hand was swollen. He approached Store Manager Thomas Horton, and told Mr. Horton that he needed to see a doctor. Petitioner did nothing to alert Mr. Horton that he might have had an on-the-job injury. Mr. Horton orally authorized Petitioner to go to a doctor. Petitioner unilaterally selected Dr. Youssef W. Wassef to treat his wrist. There is no evidence of the workers' compensation process, pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, ever being invoked. On or about August 2, 2007, Dr. Wassef provided a note that said: Patient should not allowed [sic] to lift more then [sic] 15 lb. This note was provided to Respondent’s store personnel office by Petitioner at or about the same time he got it. According to the August 2, 2007, restrictions placed on Petitioner by his treating physician, Petitioner was unable to perform the essential functions of the Garden Center Sales Associate position. Petitioner testified that he last worked on July 29, 2007. On or about September 6, 2007, Petitioner delivered to his store’s personnel office another note from Dr. Wassef, stating: Patient should continue until further notice on full-time, light duties, no lifting or pushing. This note also placed medical restrictions on Petitioner which made him unable to fulfill the essential functions of his Garden Center Sales Associate position. It is unclear whether Petitioner was working or was on the equivalent of sick leave from Monday, July 30, 2007, until September 7, 2007. It is most probable, based on the evidence as a whole, that at least after receiving the August 2, 2007, doctor’s note, Wal-Mart did not allow Petitioner to work in the capacity of a Garden Center Sales Associate. Specifically, Mr. Horton testified that he “called back” Petitioner sometime during the back-to-school/college season, which “season” would have been in late August or early September, to work in a temporary position. The temporary position assigned Petitioner was described by Ms. Chewning, the store's Personnel Manager, as a “May I assist you?” position. In this temporary position, which lasted only a few weeks, Petitioner was only required to walk around and point out to inquiring shoppers their requested back-to-school/college materials. Wal-Mart did not require Petitioner to work outside his medical restrictions. When the back-to-school/college season ended, so did the temporary position. When the back-to-school/college season ended and the temporary sales associate position was eliminated, there were no positions available at Petitioner’s store that he could perform with his medical restrictions on lifting and pushing. Also, at that point in time, Mr. Horton began to lay off people in some positions. However, Petitioner remained on leave and was not laid off. Although Petitioner referred to a People Greeter position in his November 20, 2007, discrimination complaint before FCHR, there is no credible record evidence that Petitioner requested a Wal-Mart People Greeter position as an “accommodation” of his condition prior to filing his discrimination complaint or that a People Greeter position was vacant at any time material to this case. However, the published job description for employment as a Wal-Mart People Greeter has, since May 2005, required, among other "essential functions" that the incumbent be able to: Provide shopping carts to customers by pushing or pulling up to 10 pounds of pressure . . . Frequently lifting, placing and deactivating items weighing up to 10 pounds without assistance, and regularly lifting merchandise over 10 pounds with team lifting. Petitioner documented at hearing, via an old doctor’s report, that in 1991, he had severe arthritis in both his elbows and that surgery was contemplated at that time. However, there is no clear evidence that he had the surgery or, if he had the surgery, what was its outcome. There also is no persuasive evidence that Respondent’s personnel office or any Wal-Mart employee material to the instant case knew about this doctor’s report prior to the present litigation. Petitioner demonstrated at hearing that his elbows are visible in the short-sleeve shirts worn by Wal-Mart employees. He believes his elbows stick out farther than other people’s elbows, and he speculated that his superiors and store personnel office employees decided visually that he had a handicap because “my arms stick out” and because of a scar on one arm. The undersigned observed his demonstration. If there is a deformity, it is not substantial, and the scar is not visible without close inspection. Sometime in August-September 2007, probably during the back-to-school/college season, Mr. Horton observed Petitioner wearing what Mr. Horton believed to be a brace on Petitioner’s hand, but which was, in fact, a wristband. However, no evidence supporting Petitioner’s theory that any superiors or personnel office employees did, in fact, perceive him as disabled/handicapped was adduced. Petitioner denied ever being handicapped or unable to perform the essential functions of his job as a Wal-Mart Garden Center Sales Associate. Mr. Horton and Jennifer Chewning each credibly denied ever perceiving Petitioner as handicapped, even up to the date of the hearing. When he had been hired in 1999, Petitioner acknowledged receipt and understanding of the policies contained within Respondent’s Associates Handbook. Petitioner again acknowledged receipt and understanding of these policies on March 29, 2001, when he was issued a revised Associates Handbook. Wal-Mart regularly offers leaves of absence to any associate who has a medical condition that is not perceived by the employee or management as a “disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Florida Civil Rights Act, but whose condition prevents him from performing his job. Ms. Chewning testified that the Request for Leave of Absence form described below is used specifically for situations not covered by the ADA or by State disability laws.3/ The form upon which an employee may apply for such a leave of absence advises that the leave of absence is without pay; that there will be no accrual of benefits or seniority during the leave of absence; and that the employee must pay his own insurance premiums during this period. Grant of the requested leave is dependent upon the treating physician’s verification of the employee's medical condition. (See Finding of Fact 20.) Based on Petitioner's inability to perform the essential functions of any available position within the store in September 2007, Ms. Chewning offered Petitioner such a leave of absence. Petitioner disputes some of the contents of the Request for Leave of Absence form in evidence, which completed form Mr. Horton retroactively approved on September 21, 2007, for Petitioner to be on continuous leave beginning September 7, 2007, with a return date of December 31, 2007. However, Petitioner admits that he signed this form. The date beside Petitioner’s signature seems to be September 19, 2007. Petitioner’s signature on this form signifies that he was requesting “medical leave,” thereby acknowledging: A medical condition (including pregnancy and childbirth, and on-the-job Workers’ Comp. injuries) requiring time away from work. The Health Care Provider’s Section, below, must be completed and signed. Before returning, associate must submit a return- to-work statement/release from a Health Care Provider detailing restrictions, if any. . . . * * * . . . I fully understand Wal-Mart’s Leave of Absence Policy. Petitioner also agreed that on or about September 19, 2007, as reflected on the portion of this Request for Leave of Absence form which was filled-in by Dr. Wassef, Petitioner’s doctor had certified that Petitioner should begin medical leave on September 9, 2007, and continue through September 30, 2007. Petitioner asserted that on or about September 13, 2007, he delivered to someone other than Ms. Chewning in Respondent's personnel office another note from Dr. Wassef stating: Patient has partial permanent disability.[4] Does not need sick leave. He needs to continue to work full-time with limited lifting, pulling, and pushing. Petitioner asserted that on or about October 29, 2007, Petitioner delivered to someone other than Ms. Chewning in Respondent's personnel office the last note he had received from Dr. Wassef, which stated: Patient able to work full-time with limited lifting to 20 pounds. Ms. Chewning testified that neither the September 13, 2007, nor the October 29, 2007, medical notes contemporaneously reached either herself or Petitioner’s personnel file. According to the last medical note she received prior to hearing, Petitioner could not even perform the essential functions of a People Greeter position. (See Findings of Fact 10 and 13.) Reviewing Dr. Wassef’s September 13, 2007, and October 29, 2007, notes for the first time at hearing, she pointed out that, according to the most recent note, Petitioner was still medically restricted from performing some of the essential functions of his Garden Center Sales Associate’s position. (See Findings of Fact 3 and 22.) She has never received a medical release permitting Petitioner to return to full functioning as a Garden Center Sales Associate. Ms. Chewning testified that Wal-Mart has a policy that a medical leave of absence may not extend beyond one year. However, neither its printed non-ADA leave of absence policy in evidence nor the Request for Leave of Absence form in evidence specifies a one year maximum leave. More than a year after Petitioner’s leave began on September 7, 2007, and nearly 10 months after the leave was supposed to end on December 31, 2007, Wal-Mart has not taken steps to terminate Petitioner, because of the current litigation that began with Petitioner’s filing his complaint with FCHR on November 20, 2007. Ms. Chewning testified that, as of the date of hearing on October 15, 2008, Respondent had not terminated Petitioner; Petitioner remained on his approved unpaid leave of absence; and if Petitioner brings in a doctor’s note saying he can perform all the essential functions listed on his Garden Center Sales Associate’s job description, including but not limited to being able to lift 50 pounds, Wal-Mart will put Petitioner back in his Garden Center Sales Associate position, and he will retain his salary level, his accrued years of service, and all his benefits as they existed at the beginning of his leave of absence. Petitioner erroneously perceives himself as having been terminated and wants to go back to work, but he has not yet presented any doctor’s release that allows him to perform regularly the functions of a Garden Center Sales Associate. There is no evidence herein that under similar conditions Wal-Mart has treated any person of any race other than African-American differently than Petitioner has been treated. There is no evidence herein that under similar conditions Wal-Mart has treated any person of any age other than 66-68 years of age, differently than Petitioner has been treated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondents, Ag-Mart Produce, Inc. (Ag-Mart), and its employees' Justin Oelman (in DOAH Case No. 06-0729) and Warrick Birdwell (in DOAH Case No. 06-0730), committed some, any, or all of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints detailed herein and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented at the final hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with administration of the Florida Pesticide Law, Chapter 487, Part I, Florida Statutes. Among the duties of the Bureau of Compliance Monitoring within the Division of Agricultural Environmental Services are the designation and regulation of restricted-use pesticides, the testing and licensure of certified pesticide applicators, and the enforcement of federal worker protection standards regarding the exposure of farm workers to pesticides. §§ 487.011, 487.042, 487.044, and 487.051, Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 5E-2.039. The Administrative Complaints allege two types of violation of the Florida Pesticide Law. First, they allege that Ag-Mart harvested tomatoes prior to the end of the pre-harvest interval, the period of time that must pass after a pesticide is applied to a tomato plant before that plant's fruit may be safely harvested. The pre-harvest interval is specified on the labels of restricted-use pesticides. Second, they allege that Ag-Mart allowed workers to enter sprayed fields prior to the end of the restricted entry interval, the period of time that must pass after a pesticide is applied before it is safe for a worker to enter or remain in the treated area. The restricted entry interval is also specified on the labels of restricted-use pesticides. In 2004, Ag-Mart operated farms in several locations in Florida and North Carolina. Ag-Mart operated packing houses in Plant City, Florida, and in New Jersey. Ag-Mart grows, packages, and distributes grape tomatoes under the "Santa Sweets" label, and a round-type tomato marketed as "Ugly Ripe." During all times relevant to this proceeding, Ag-Mart's principal administrative offices were located in Plant City, Florida, and Ag-Mart's operations were managed by its president, Donald Long. At the final hearing, several Ag-Mart employees, including Mr. Long, testified as to Ag-Mart's practices in establishing planting and pesticide spraying schedules, carrying out those schedules in the field, and ensuring that legal restrictions on pesticide use are observed. This testimony is credited as to Ag-Mart's general pattern and practice, but does not disprove the Department's evidence as to particular instances of pre-harvest interval or restricted entry interval violations. Among other duties, Mr. Long was responsible for scheduling Ag-Mart's cultivation of tomato plants at the company's farms, so that product is available year-round. Mr. Long prepared a 2004 planting schedule that spaced the planting of new crops a week to ten days apart to ensure a continuous flow of tomatoes once the plants matured. For the 2004 season, the South Florida farm began planting in September 2003, with harvesting commencing in December 2003 and continuing through May 2004. The North Florida farm started its spring season plantings in March and April 2004, with harvest beginning in early June 2004 and lasting until August 2004. Each "planting" at Ag-Mart consists of a specific amount of acreage that is cultivated for a specific period of time to produce an expected yield of tomatoes. Mr. Long determines the size of each planting based on past yields and projected needs. A single planting of grape tomatoes is harvested multiple times. Depending on conditions, a planting of grape tomatoes at the South Florida farm can be harvested between ten and 15 times in the fall, with fewer harvesting opportunities in the spring. A planting of grape tomatoes at the North Florida farm may be harvested between eight and ten times. Each planting takes up portions of acreage called "fields," which are divided by land features and irrigation systems. Fields are of varying sizes, depending on the nature of the terrain and the irrigation system. The fields are numbered, and a planting is usually done in a certain number of roughly contiguous fields. A field is further divided into separately numbered "blocks," each block consisting of six rows of tomato plants, three rows on each side of a "drive area" through which tractors and harvest trucks can maneuver to reach the plants. The blocks are numbered in sequence from the beginning to the end of the field. At the South Florida farm in 2004, Ag-Mart cultivated ten separate plantings of between 79 and 376 gross acres. Each planting contained as few as three and as many as ten separate fields. At the North Florida farm in 2004, Ag-Mart cultivated five separate plantings of between 92 and 158 gross acres. Each planting contained either two or three separate fields.2 The cycle of farming activities at the Ag-Mart farms included ground preparation, planting, staking, tying, harvesting, and post-harvest clean-up. Farm laborers were recruited and transported to the fields by crew leaders, who must be registered as farm labor contractors with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation pursuant to Chapter 450, Part III, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61L-1.004. The crew leaders supervised the field laborers and prepared their weekly time cards. The crew leaders were directed by Ag-Mart's labor supervisors as to where the laborers were to work and which tasks were to be performed at any given time. Crew leaders providing services to Ag-Mart in 2004 included: Sergio Salinas, d/b/a Salinas & Son, Inc.; Pascual Sierra; and Juan Anzualda, d/b/a Juan Anzualda Harvesting, Inc. Mr. Salinas and Mr. Anzualda were crew leaders at the South Florida farm in the spring 2004 season. Mr. Sierra was a crew leader at the North Florida farm in 2004. At the South Florida farm, Mr. Salinas and three or four supervisors called "field walkers" oversaw the daily work of the 150 to 200 farm laborers who worked in Mr. Salinas' crew. Mr. Salinas owned and operated buses that transported the workers to and within the farm. Mr. Salinas also operated trucks to haul the harvested tomatoes from the fields to the shipping dock on the South Florida farm. A truck was also needed to move portable toilets to the fields for the use of the laborers. Because of the amount of equipment necessary to conduct a harvest, and the intense hand labor required to pick a row of tomatoes, Mr. Salinas always kept his crew together in one location while harvesting. During the period of January through May 2004, Mr. Salinas' crew typically harvested in one or two fields per day, and never more than four fields in one day. Mr. Anzualda and his 15 field walkers supervised a crew of 150 laborers at the South Florida farm during March and April 2004. Mr. Anzualda always kept his crew together when performing harvesting activities, due to the amount of equipment and the time necessary to set up near the work areas. Mr. Anzualda estimated that it took between 45 and 90 minutes to set up his equipment and line up his workers along the rows before harvesting could commence in a given field. Mr. Anzualda's crew typically harvested in one or two fields per day at the South Florida farm during the peak harvest period of March and April 2004, and never in more than four fields in one day. Ag-Mart paid the farm laborers the piece rate of $2.50 per tub of grape tomatoes. A "tub" weighs about 21 pounds. Different piece rates applied to different forms of work. For tying activities, the laborers under Mr. Salinas were paid $0.75 per 100 linear feet of work, while those under Mr. Anzualda were paid $0.50 per 100 linear feet. The laborers were paid the minimum wage of $5.15 per hour for some work, such as weeding and the harvest of Ugly Ripe tomatoes. In any event, the laborers were guaranteed the minimum wage, and were paid $5.15 per hour if that amount was greater than their pay would have been under piece work rates. Planting activities are performed by hand. Tomato plants are started in greenhouses, and then transplanted to the field when they are six weeks old and about six inches high. Staking is performed manually and by machine, as stakes are placed between the tomato plants to support the plants as they mature. Tying is performed manually, from about the second week after planting until the eighth or ninth week. "Tying" involves tying the tomato plants with string to the stakes to allow them to grow up the stakes as they mature. The tomato plants are six to seven feet tall at maturity. After the tomatoes were planted in 2004, Ag-Mart's farms began the application of pesticides according to a company-wide spray program devised by Mr. Long prior to the season. The spray program outlined the type and volume of pesticide products to be applied to the maturing tomato plants from the first week of planting through the end of the harvest. Once tying and harvesting activities began, Ag-Mart's spray program called for the application of pesticides "behind the tying" or "behind the harvest," meaning that spraying was done immediately after tying or harvesting was completed in a field. The spraying was done behind the workers because picking and tying opens up the plants, which enables the pesticide to better penetrate the plant. The timing of the spraying also allows fungicide to cover wounds from broken leaves caused by picking, thus preventing infection. Harvesting is performed manually by the farm laborers, who pick the ripe fruit from the tomato plants and place it into containers. The crew leader lines up the laborers with one person on each side of a row of tomatoes, meaning that a crew of 150 laborers can pick 75 rows of tomatoes at a time. The farm workers pick all of the visible fruit that is ripe or close to ripe on the blocks that are being harvested. Once the picking is complete on a block, it takes seven to ten days for enough new fruit to ripen on that block to warrant additional harvesting. Justin Oelman was Ag-Mart's crop protection manager at the South Florida farm in 2004. Mr. Oelman worked for Ag-Mart for eight years as a farm manager and crop protection manager before leaving in 2005 and had three years prior experience as a crop protection manager for another tomato grower. As crop protection manager in 2004, Mr. Oelman was the licensed pesticide applicator responsible for ordering chemicals and directing the application of pesticides. His job included writing up the "tomato spray ticket" for each pesticide application. The spray ticket is a document that, on its face, indicates the date and time of a pesticide application and its location according to planting, field, and block numbers. The spray ticket also states the name of the tractor driver who physically applies the pesticide, the type and amount of the pesticide applied, and the number of acres treated. Licensed pesticide applicators are required by Department rule to record the information included on the spray ticket. Fla. Admin. Code R. 5E-9.032. In applying pesticides to the South Florida farm's grape tomato crop in 2004, Mr. Oelman followed the spraying program designed by Mr. Long before the season. Because the pesticides were applied behind the farm workers' field activity, Mr. Oelman maintained close communications with Josh Cantu, the Ag-Mart labor supervisor in charge of tying activities on the South Florida farm, and with Eduardo Bravo, the labor supervisor in charge of grape tomato harvesting. Mr. Bravo in turn directed crew leaders such as Mr. Salinas and Mr. Anzualda on where to take their crews to conduct harvesting work. These communications kept Mr. Oelman apprised of where the crews were working and how much progress the tying or harvesting activities were expected to make by the end of the day. Mr. Oelman was then able to plan the next day's pesticide applications so that his tractor drivers would be ready to enter the field and apply the pesticides soon after the tying or harvesting activities were completed. Mr. Oelman typically wrote the spray tickets on the day before the actual pesticide application, based on the information gathered from Mr. Bravo and Mr. Cantu. Thus, the starting times shown on the tickets are times that were projected by Mr. Oelman on the previous afternoon, not necessarily the time that spraying actually commenced. Spraying could be delayed for a number of reasons. At times, the work in the fields would not progress as quickly as Mr. Cantu or Mr. Bravo had anticipated, due to the heaviness of the harvest. Pesticides are not applied to wet plants; therefore, rain could delay a planned spray application. Mr. Oelman's practice was to write a new spray ticket if a day's planned application was completely cancelled. However, if the planned spray application was merely delayed for a time, Mr. Oelman did not create a new spray ticket or update the original ticket to reflect the actual starting time. Mr. Oelman failed to explain why he did not always create a new ticket when the information on the existing ticket ceased to be accurate. Mr. Oelman directly supervised the Ag-Mart employees who drove the tractors and operated the spray rigs from which pesticides were applied to the tomato plants. Mr. Oelman trained the tractor drivers not to spray where people were working, but to wait until the tying or harvesting activities in designated fields had been completed. Once the fields had been sprayed, Mr. Oelman would orally notify Mr. Bravo and Mr. Cantu of the location of the pesticide applications. Mr. Oelman would also post copies of the spray tickets at the farm's central posting board, on which was posted relevant information regarding the pesticides being used at the farm, the restricted entry intervals and pre-harvest intervals for the pesticides, and other safety information.3 When restricted-use pesticides4 were to be applied, Mr. Oelman posted the entrances to the field with warning signs before the application began. The signs, which stated "Danger/Pesticides/Keep Out" in English and Spanish, were left in place until twelve hours after the expiration of the restricted entry interval for the applied pesticide. Mr. Oelman attested that he always made these postings when restricted-use pesticides such as Monitor and Danitol were applied at the South Florida farm. Mr. Salinas and Mr. Anzualda testified that they never harvested tomatoes from fields posted with pesticide warning signs. Mr. Anzualda checked for warning signs every day to ensure that his crew was not being sent into fields where pesticides had recently been applied. The restricted entry interval (REI) and the pre- harvest interval (PHI) are set forth on the manufacturer's label of each restricted-use pesticide, in accordance with 40 C.F.R. Parts 156 (labeling requirements for pesticides and devices) and 170 (worker protection standard). The REI, a worker safety standard, is the time period after application of a restricted- use pesticide that must elapse before workers are allowed to enter the treated area. The PHI, a food safety standard, is the time period that must elapse after a spray application before harvesting can begin. The REI and PHI vary according to individual pesticides. In 2004, Warrick Birdwell was the farm manager at Ag- Mart's North Florida farm in Jennings. Prior to 2004, Mr. Birdwell had worked ten years for other tomato growers in Virginia and Florida. As farm manager, Mr. Birdwell was responsible for all operations from ground preparation through post-harvest clean-up at the North Florida farm. Mr. Birdwell was also a licensed restricted-use pesticide applicator and was responsible for the application of pesticides at the North Florida farm. In 2004, Mr. Birdwell was assisted in carrying out the spray program by Dale Waters, who supervised the tractor drivers and equipment.5 During 2004, grape tomatoes were harvested at the North Florida farm on a rotation of at least seven days per block, meaning that it would take at least seven days after a harvest, in a given field, to grow enough vine ripe fruit to warrant another harvest. Mr. Birdwell prepared the spray tickets for the planned application of pesticides. He created his spray tickets a day or two before the actual date that the application was scheduled to take place. At times, delays occurred due to weather, equipment failures, or slower than anticipated progress in the harvest. Mr. Birdwell's practice was to create a new ticket and destroy the old one if the delay prevented a scheduled application from occurring on the scheduled date. However, if the spraying was commenced on the scheduled date, but had to be completed on the next day, Mr. Birdwell kept the original spray ticket without amendment. Mr. Birdwell failed to give a reason why a new ticket was not created each time the information, included in the original ticket, ceased to be accurate. Mr. Birdwell communicated throughout the day with Charles Lambert, the North Florida farm's labor supervisor, to monitor the progress of the harvesting activities and ensure that workers did not enter fields where REIs or PHIs were in effect. Mr. Birdwell also directed that warning postings be placed at the entrances to fields where restricted-use pesticides had been applied. Farm labor crews were allowed to move on the farm property only at the specific direction of Mr. Lambert, whose constant communication with Mr. Birdwell helped ensure that labor crews stayed out of treated fields until it was safe to enter them. Harvested product received at Ag-Mart's packing houses is tracked by foreman receiving reports, which identify the product and its quantity, the name of the crew leader responsible for harvesting the product, the farm from which the product was shipped, and the planting number from which the product was harvested. The receiving reports are used to calculate the commission payments due to the Ag-Mart crew leaders, who are paid based on the amount of fruit their crews harvest, and to analyze the yields of specific plantings. The "date received" column on the receiving reports showed the date the product was shipped from the farm to the packinghouse. In March 2005, the Palm Beach Post published an article stating that three women, who harvested tomatoes for Ag- Mart in 2004, bore children who suffered from birth defects. The article questioned whether the birth defects were connected to the pesticides used by Ag-Mart on its tomatoes. The women had worked at both the South Florida and North Florida farms, and at an Ag-Mart farm in North Carolina. In response to the article, the Collier County Health Department began an inquiry to determine the cause of the birth defects and asked for the Department's help in performing a pesticide use inspection at the South Florida farm, where the three women, identified as Francisca Herrera, Sostenes Salazar, and Maria de la Mesa (also called Maria de la Mesa Cruz), worked from February through July 2004. The Department's investigation commenced with a work request sent from Tallahassee to Environmental Specialist Neil Richmond in Immokalee on March 7, 2005.6 Mr. Richmond regularly conducts inspections at golf courses, farms, chemical dealers, and fertilizer plants throughout Collier County. The work request directed Mr. Richmond to obtain pesticide use records for Ag-Mart covering the period of February through July 2004 and employee records showing the names of the three employees and the dates they worked in 2004. The work request further directed Mr. Richmond to conduct a pesticide use inspection at the South Florida farm to document the pesticide products used in the field. Finally, the work request directed Mr. Richmond to conduct a full worker protection standard inspection to document the posting of fields, central posting information, and REIs at the South Florida farm. Mr. Richmond initially visited Ag-Mart's South Florida farm on March 28, 2005, accompanied by two persons from the Collier County Health Department. During the course of the inspection, Ag-Mart's farm manager, Doug Perkins, produced spray tickets for both the South Florida and North Florida farms for the period February through July 2004. Mr. Perkins also produced a spreadsheet identifying the dates worked and the farm locations for each of the three women named in the newspaper article. This spreadsheet was prepared at the direction of Ag- Mart's human resources manager, Angelia Cassell, and was derived from the three workers' timesheets for 2004. On March 30, 2005, Mr. Richmond filed a written report with the documents he received from Ag-Mart. The Department's Bureau of Compliance Monitoring then assigned the matter to Case Reviewer Jessica Fernandez in Tallahassee. Ms. Fernandez was given the task of reviewing all the information gathered by the Department's inspectors to determine whether Ag-Mart had violated the Florida Pesticide Law or any of the Department's implementing rules. On April 12, 2005, Ms. Fernandez sent a request for additional information to Mr. Richmond, which stated in relevant part: According to the work log included in this file, Ms. Fransisca [sic] Herrera, Ms. Maria de la Mesa Cruz and Ms. Sostenes Salazar worked at the Ag-Mart farm located in Immokalee between January 2004 and October 2004. Please obtain as much information as possible regarding the specific Planting, Field and Block numbers in which these workers worked during the period of February 2004 through June 2004. Mr. Richmond went to the South Florida farm on March 13, 2005, and communicated this request for additional information to Mr. Oelman, who responded that it would take several days to gather the requested information. Mr. Richmond returned to the farm on April 15, 2005. On that date, Mr. Oelman explained to Mr. Richmond the sequencing of harvesting and spray activities at the South Florida farm. Mr. Oelman told Mr. Richmond that Ag-Mart's harvest records indicate, only, which planting the laborers were working in on a given day and that a planting includes more than one field. Mr. Oelman also told Mr. Richmond that Ag-Mart's spray records are kept according to field and block numbers and that his practice was to spray behind the picking. On April 22, 2005, Ms. Cassell faxed to Mr. Richmond a spreadsheet entitled "Field Locations for SFL 2/04 thru 6/04." All involved understood that "SFL" referred to the South Florida farm.7 With the assistance of subordinates in her office, Ms. Cassell produced this document to show, in her words, "the total of what field locations the [three] women might have worked in." Ms. Cassell started with time cards, which indicated the dates and hours the three women worked. Then she obtained foreman receiving reports, which she understood to tell her which plantings were harvested on which dates. Finally, she obtained, from the farm, a handwritten document showing which fields were included in each planting. From this information, Ms. Cassell was able to fashion a spreadsheet indicating the range of fields each woman could have worked in from February through June 2004. Mr. Richmond testified that he read the spreadsheet's title and understood the document to show where the women actually worked each day. The document appeared self- explanatory. No one from Ag-Mart told Mr. Richmond that the spreadsheet showed only where the women could have worked, or "possible" locations. Mr. Richmond passed the spreadsheet on to Ms. Fernandez, with a report stating that it showed "the field locations for Ms. Herrera, Ms. Salazar, and Ms. de la Mesa where they worked on respective dates." Ms. Fernandez also operated on the assumption that the spreadsheet showed what its title indicated, the actual field locations of the three women on any given day from February through June 2004. Ms. Cassell testified that she put the title on the spreadsheet without much thought, simply as an identifier for the file on her computer's hard drive. Ms. Cassell understood that she was creating a spreadsheet of all the fields the women could possibly have worked in on a given day. She could be no more precise, because Ag-Mart did not keep records that would show the specific fields where an individual worked on a given day. The president of Ag-Mart, Mr. Long, confirmed that Ag- Mart does not keep records on which fields a worker is in on a given day. At the time the Department made its request, Mr. Long told Ms. Cassell that there was no way Ag-Mart could provide such precise worker location data. The closest they could come would be to correlate harvest or receiving data, which showed what plantings a crew had harvested from, with the workers' time cards. Ag-Mart knew whose crew each woman had worked in; so the spreadsheet listed all the fields in the planting worked by the crew, as a way of showing which fields the women might have worked in. On May 4, 2005, Ms. Fernandez sent Compliance Monitoring Bureau Chief Dale Dubberly a request for additional information, which Mr. Dubberly forwarded to Mr. Richmond the next day. Ms. Fernandez first requested the time work started and ended for each worker in each field on every date listed in the spreadsheet provided on April 22, 2005. Ms. Fernandez next asked for the field location for each worker from July 2004 to November 2004. She asked for the block numbers corresponding to each of the fields in North Florida, South Florida, and North Carolina during the 2004 season and a map showing the distribution of blocks, fields and plantings for those farms during the 2004 season. She asked for spray records for South Florida for October and November 2004. Finally, Ms. Fernandez requested a more legible copy of the spreadsheet, which she stated "shows each worker's field location." Upon receiving this request through Mr. Richmond, Ms. Cassell, her staff, and Ag-Mart farm compliance manager, Amanda Collins created a new spreadsheet, which Ms. Cassell titled "Field Locations for 3 Employees for 2004." This spreadsheet was identical in format to the earlier document, but was expanded to include the dates the three women worked for all of 2004. For each worker, the spreadsheet provided a cell for each day worked, and within that cell a list of field numbers. Again, the Department took these field numbers to represent fields in which the women actually worked, when Ag-Mart actually intended them to represent fields in which the women possibly worked. Some of the cells listed as many as 23 field numbers for one day. The method of developing this spreadsheet was similar to that employed for the first one. The weekly time cards of the three women were used to provide the days they worked. Ag-Mart's weekly time cards show the name of the employee, the rounded hours worked each week, the number of piece units worked, the hours worked for minimum wage, and the initials of the crew leader for whom the employee worked that week. For their South Florida farm work in 2004, Ms. Herrera and Ms. Salazar worked exclusively for crew leader Sergio Salinas. Ms. de la Mesa worked at South Florida for crew leader Juan Anzualda and at North Florida for crew leader Pascual Sierra.8 To identify the fields where the three women might have worked on a given day, Ms. Cassell and her staff again used foreman receiving reports and planting schedules. The receiving reports were understood to provide the dates of shipping for harvested product, and these were correlated to the dates on which the three women worked. Again, Ms. Cassell listed every field within a planting as a possible work location, because Ag-Mart kept no data that identified the fields in which the women actually worked on a given date. On May 6, 2005, Mr. Richmond met with Ms. Cassell and Ms. Collins at Ag-Mart's Plant City administrative offices. The meeting lasted no more than 15 minutes and consisted of Ag-Mart employees turning over various documents to Mr. Richmond, along with some explanatory conversation. Ms. Cassell specifically recalled explaining to Mr. Richmond that the field location spreadsheet indicated the "total possible fields that the three employees could have worked in." Mr. Richmond denied that Ms. Cassell gave him any such explanation. Ms. Collins recalled that Mr. Richmond and Ms. Cassell had some discussion about the spreadsheet, but could recall no particulars.9 Mr. Richmond forwarded the documents received at the May 6, 2005, meeting to Ms. Fernandez in Tallahassee. His written summary, also dated May 6, 2005, represents Mr. Richmond's contemporaneous understanding of the meaning of the documents he was given at the Plant City meeting. The summary stated, in relevant part: Ms. Collins provided the times which the three ladies worked at the various locations which came from the three ladies time cards (See Exhibits V-1 through V-3, copies of time worked information). Ms. Collins stated that this has the start and finished [sic] times, but does not have which fields they worked at a particular time as they may pick in several fields throughout the day. Ms. Collins provided another copy of the field locations for each of the three ladies (See Exhibits W-1 and W-2, copies of field locations of workers). Ms. Collins also provided maps with field locations depicting blocks and plantings (See Exhibits X-1 through X-13, maps depicting field locations with blocks and plantings). The field no. is the main number in each block, the first two numbers are the numbers of the planting, while the remaining number in the set is the block number. . . . At the hearing, Mr. Richmond testified that he "absolutely" would have communicated to Ms. Fernandez any conversation he had with, either, Ms. Cassell or Ms. Collins indicating that the field location spreadsheet was anything other than a document showing where the women worked on a given day. This testimony is credible and, coupled with Mr. Richmond's contemporaneous written statement, leads to the finding that Mr. Richmond's testimony regarding the May 6, 2005, meeting in Plant City should be credited. On May 12, 2005, Ms. Cassell sent Mr. Dubberly an e- mail with an attachment correcting some aspects of the spreadsheet. Ms. Cassell's e-mail message stated: I have attached the the [sic] revision to the original sheet given on the 3 woman's [sic] field locations. I included which field location for NC. There was one revision I made for Francisca on week ending 4/24/05 [Ms. Cassell clearly means 2004]. She was in NC that week and on the last two days of that week I had SFL field numbers and it should of [sic] been NC [sic] please discard old report and replace with revised one. The Department cites this e-mail as further indication that Ag-Mart represented the spreadsheet as indicating actual field locations for the three women, or at least that Ag-Mart said nothing to clarify that the spreadsheet showed something other than the fields where the women actually worked. Ms. Fernandez, the case reviewer whose analysis led to the filing of the Administrative Complaints against Ag-Mart, believed that the field location spreadsheets prepared by Ms. Cassell and her staff reflected the actual work locations for Ms. Herrera, Ms. Salazar, and Ms. de la Mesa. As a case reviewer, Ms. Fernandez receives files compiled by the field staff and reviews the files to determine whether a violation of the Florida Pesticide Law has occurred. The procedure of the Bureau of Compliance Monitoring appears designed to ensure that the case reviewers have no contact with the subjects of their investigation and, instead, rely on field inspectors to act as conduits in obtaining information from companies such as Ag-Mart. As a result, Ms. Fernandez had no direct contact with anyone from Ag-Mart and, thus, had no direct opportunity to be disabused of her assumptions regarding the field location spreadsheet. Ms. Fernandez conceded that she had never been on a tomato farm at the time she conducted her review of the Ag-Mart case. She did not take into consideration the acreage of the fields or the size of the work crews and their manner of operation. She made no attempt to visualize the effort it would take for one worker to harvest in ten or 20 fields in one day. She assumed that each woman worked in at least part of each field listed on the spreadsheet for each day listed. Ms. Fernandez believed that the spreadsheet was clear on its face and saw no need to make further inquiries as to the plausibility of the assumption that it reflected actual, not possible, field locations. As found above, Ag-Mart made no statement to any Department employee to qualify that the spreadsheet meant only possible field locations. Nonetheless, common sense should have caused someone in the Department to question whether this spreadsheet really conveyed the information that its title appeared to promise. On some days, the spreadsheet places a single field worker in 23 fields. Ag-Mart's crew leaders credibly testified that their crews never worked in more than four fields in one day and more often worked in only one or two. Even granting Ms. Fernandez' ignorance, Mr. Dubberly or some other superior in the Department should have had enough knowledge of farm operations to question the plausibility of Ms. Fernandez' assumptions. While Ag-Mart is at fault for not explaining itself clearly, the Department is also at fault for insisting that the spreadsheet be taken at face value, no matter how implausible the result.10 At the hearing, Ms. Fernandez explained how she used the documents provided by Ag-Mart to draft the Administrative Complaints. As an example, Counts I and II of the North Florida Complaint provide: Count I On June 6, 2004, Mr. Cesar Juarez and Mr. Alexis Barrios treated approximately 157.6 acres of grape tomatoes, planted in fields 7-8, with a mixture of Bravo Weather Stik, Monitor 4 Spray and Danitol 2.4 EC Spray. The Monitor 4 Spray supplemental label states: "REMARKS . . . Do not apply more than a total of 10 pints per acre per crop season, nor within 7 days of harvest." Worker field location records show that tomatoes were harvested from fields 7 and 8 on June 7, 2004. Therefore, these tomatoes were harvested prior to the 7 day pre- harvest interval stated on the Monitor 4 Spray label. Count II The Danitol 2.4 EC Spray label states: "TOMATO . . . Do not apply the DANITOL + MONITOR 4 Spray tank mix within 7 days of harvest." As noted in the previous paragraph, fields 7-8 were treated with a mixture of Bravo Weather Stik, Monitor 4 Spray and Danitol 2.4 EC Spray on June 6, 2004. Tomatoes were harvested from these same fields on June 7, 2004. Therefore, these tomatoes were harvested prior to the 7 day pre-harvest interval stated on the Danitol 2.4 EC Spray label. Ms. Fernandez obtained the information regarding the date, time, and manner of pesticide application from the spray tickets described above. She obtained the Monitor and Danitol PHI information from the product label. She obtained the harvest information from the spreadsheet, which indicated that Ms. de la Mesa worked in fields 7 and 8 on June 7, 2004. Counts I and II alleging violations of the PHIs for Monitor and Danitol had an accompanying Count XIX, alleging a violation of the REI for Monitor arising from the same set of facts: Count XIX The Monitor 4 Spray and the Danitol 2.4 EC Spray labels contain the following language: "AGRICULTURAL USE REQUIREMENTS. Use this product only in accordance with its labeling and with the Worker Protection Standard, 40 CFR part 170. This Standard contains requirements for the protection of agricultural workers on farms, forests, nurseries, and greenhouses, and handlers of agricultural pesticides. It contains requirements for training, decontamination, notification, and emergency assistance. It also contains specific instructions and exceptions pertaining to the statements on this label about personal protective equipment (PPE) and restricted entry interval. The requirements in this box only apply to users of this product that are covered by the Worker Protection Standard." On June 6, 2004, Mr. Cesar Juarez and Mr. Alexis Barrios treated approximately 157.6 acres of grape tomatoes, planted in fields 7-8, with a mixture of Bravo Weather Stik, Monitor 4 Spray and Danitol 2.4 EC Spray. The application started at 11:30 am and ended at 5:30 pm on June 6, 2004. The Monitor 4 Spray label states: "Do not enter or allow worker entry into treated areas during the restricted entry interval (REI) of 48 hours." Work records show that Ms. de la Mesa, directed by licensed applicators Mr. Charles Lambert (PV38793)11 and Mr. Warrick Birdwell (PV36679), worked in fields 7 and 8 on June 7, 2004, and that her working hours for June 7, 2004, were 8:00 am to 6:30 pm. Therefore, Ms. de la Mesa and other workers were instructed, directed, permitted or not prevented by the agricultural employer, Ag-Mart Produce, Inc. from entering treated fields before the expiration of the REI stated on the Monitor 4 Spray label. Throughout the hearing, Ag-Mart contended (and the Department did not dispute) that no statute or rule requires Ag-Mart to keep a daily log of the fields where its employees work. The Department also conceded that Ag-Mart was cooperative throughout its investigation.12 Ag-Mart contends that all counts should be dismissed because of the Department's reliance on the field location spreadsheet, which shows only the possible field locations of the workers. This contention goes to far. For example, the counts set forth above are well taken, because the spray tickets indicate that fields 7 and 8 were sprayed on June 6, 2004, and the field location spreadsheet indicates that Ms. de la Mesa worked only in fields 7 and 8 on June 7, 2004. Ag-Mart further attacked the spreadsheet by suggesting the unreliability of the dates on the foreman receiving reports. As found above, the receiving reports generally showed the date the product was shipped from the farm to the packinghouse, as well as the crew leader who provided the tomatoes and the planting from which the tomatoes were harvested. At the hearing, Ag-Mart contended that the date the product was shipped was not always the same date it was harvested. Further, Ag-Mart demonstrated that one of the receiving reports relevant to this proceeding showed the date the product was received at the packing house, rather than the date the product was shipped from the farm, due to a clerical error. Ag-Mart argued that this example showed that the receiving reports were not a reliable source for determining the precise dates of harvest in a given field on the North Florida farm. Ag-Mart's evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the unreliability of the receiving reports, where Ag-Mart itself relied on the reports to provide the Department with the spreadsheet showing possible field locations of the three workers. Ag-Mart had ample opportunity to make a thorough demonstration of the reports' alleged unreliability and failed to do so. Ag-Mart also attempted to cast doubt on the accuracy of the spray tickets through the testimony of Mr. Oelman and Mr. Birdwell, both of whom stated that the spray tickets are written well in advance of the pesticide applications and are not invariably rewritten or corrected when the spraying schedule is pushed back due to rain or slow harvest. However, the pesticide applicator is required by law to maintain accurate records relating to the application of all restricted-use pesticides, including the date, start time and end time of the treatment, and the location of the treatment site. Fla. Admin. Code R. 5E-9.032(1). The Department is entitled to inspect these records. Fla. Admin. Code R. 5E-9.032(6). Ag-Mart may not attack records that its own employee/applicators were legally required to keep in an accurate fashion. The Department is entitled to rely on the spray tickets as accurate indicators of when and where pesticide applications occurred. Thus, the undersigned has accepted the accuracy of the spray records and the receiving reports, but not of the field location spreadsheet. However, there are some dates on which the fields shown on the spreadsheet perfectly match the fields shown on the spray tickets, as in Counts I, II, and XIX of the North Florida Complaint set forth above. It is found that the Department has proven these counts by clear and convincing evidence. In addition to Counts I, II, and XIX of the North Florida Complaint, the Department has proven the following counts of the North Florida Complaint by clear and convincing evidence: Counts XI, XII, and XXII (spraying in fields 7 and 8 on June 17, 2004; Ms. de la Mesa worked only in fields 7 and 8 on June 19, 2004); and Count XIII (spraying Agrimek 0.15 EC Miticide/Insecticide, with PHI of seven days, in fields 7 and 8 on June 3, 2005; Ms. de la Mesa worked only in fields 7 and 8 on June 7, 2004). The Department has proven none of the counts in the South Florida Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. Some explanation must be made for the finding that Counts XXXI and XXXII were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Those counts allege as follows: Count XXXI On April 17, 2004, Mr. Lorenzo Reyes, Mr. Demetrio Acevedo and Mr. Francisco Vega treated approximately 212.5 acres of grape tomatoes, planted in fields 11, 6 and 4, with a mixture of Bravo Weather Stik, Monitor 4 Spray and Danitol 2.4 EC Spray. The Monitor 4 Spray supplemental label states: "REMARKS . . . Do not apply more than a total of 10 pints per acre per crop season, nor within 7 days of harvest." Worker field location records show that tomatoes were harvested from fields 11, 6 and 4 on April 21, 2004. Therefore, these tomatoes were harvested prior to the 7 day pre-harvest interval stated on the Monitor 4 Spray label. Count XXXII The Danitol 2.4 EC Spray label states: "TOMATO . . . Do not apply the DANITOL + MONITOR 4 Spray tank mix within 7 days of harvest." As noted in the previous paragraph, fields 11, 6 and 4 were treated with a mixture of Bravo Weather Stik, Monitor 4 Spray and Danitol 2.4 EC Spray on April 17, 2004. Tomatoes were harvested from these same fields on April 21, 2004. Therefore, these tomatoes were harvested prior to the 7 day pre-harvest interval stated on the Danitol 2.4 EC Spray label. These counts base their allegation that tomatoes were harvested from fields 11, 6, and 4 on April 21, 2004, on the field location spreadsheet, which indicates that Ms. Salazar possibly worked in fields 4, 6, 9, 10, and/or 11 on April 21, 2004. Thus, the spreadsheet does not definitely prove that Ms. Salazar harvested tomatoes in the three sprayed fields within the PHI. At the final hearing, the Department introduced a spray ticket showing that Monitor and Danitol were also applied to fields 9 and 10 on April 15, 2004. This additional spray ticket completed the Department's demonstration that every field in which Ms. Salazar harvested tomatoes on April 21, 2004, had been sprayed with Monitor and Danitol within the seven-day PHI. However, the Department did not amend the South Florida Complaint to allege the fact of the second spray ticket, and, so, must be held to the allegations actually made in the complaint. Ag-Mart may not be found guilty of facts or violations not specifically alleged in the South Florida Complaint. See Cottrill v. Department of Insurance, 685 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (facts not alleged in the Administrative Complaint). See also B.D.M. Financial Corporation v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 698 So. 2d 1359, 1362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (violations not alleged in the Administrative Complaint). In similar fashion, Counts XLI and XLII of the South Florida Complaint allege that fields 21, 22, 18, and 19 were sprayed with Monitor and Danitol on May 15, 2004, and allege PHI violations in fields 21, 22, 18, and 19 on May 20, 2004, based on the field location spreadsheet's indication that Ms. Salazar possibly worked in one or more of fields 18 through 25 on that date. Thus, the spreadsheet does not definitely prove that Ms. Salazar harvested tomatoes in the four sprayed fields within the PHI. At the final hearing, the Department introduced a spray ticket showing that Monitor and Danitol were, also, applied to fields 20, 23, 24, and 25 on May 14, 2004. This additional spray ticket completed the Department's demonstration that every field in which Ms. Salazar harvested tomatoes on May 20, 2004, had been sprayed with Monitor and Danitol within the seven-day PHI. Again, however, the Department failed to amend the South Florida Complaint to reflect its subsequently developed evidence. Subsection 487.175(1)(e), Florida Statutes, provides that the Department may enter an order imposing an administrative fine not to exceed $10,000 for each violation. The statute further provides as follows: When imposing any fine under this paragraph, the department shall consider the degree and extent of harm caused by the violation, the cost of rectifying the damage, the amount of money the violator benefited from by noncompliance, whether the violation was committed willfully, and the compliance record of the violator. Mr. Dubberly testified that the Department does not have a rule for determining the amount of fines, but uses a matrix, attaching a rating of 0 to 5 for each of the criteria named in the quoted portion of the statute, with 5 representing the most egregious violation. The extent of harm caused by the violation is divided into two classifications: (A) the degree and extent of harm related to human and environmental hazards and (B) the degree and extent of harm related to the toxicity of the pesticide(s). The remaining criteria considered in the matrix are: (C) the estimated cost of rectifying the damage, (D) the estimated amount of money the violator benefited by noncompliance, whether the violation was committed willfully, and (F) the compliance record of the violator. Each factor is given its numerical value. The values for factors (B) through (F) are added, then the total is multiplied by the value for factor (A). The resulting number is then multiplied by $100.00 to determine the amount of the fine. The PHI violations were primarily food safety violations, the concern being that there might be an unacceptable pesticide residue on the tomatoes if they were harvested within the PHI. The REI violations were based on concerns for worker safety from pesticide exposure. In determining the fines for PHI violations, the Department assigned a numerical value of 2 for factor (A). In determining the fines for REI violations, the Department assigned a numerical value of 3 for factor (A), based on a reasonable probability of human or animal death or injury, or a reasonable probability of serious environmental harm. For purposes of this proceeding, all the pesticides used by Ag-Mart were restricted-use pesticides. In considering the value to be assigned to factor (B), the Department relied on the pesticide labels, which contain signal words for the category of potential hazard to human or animal life posed by that pesticide. Monitor contained the signal word "Danger," which represents the highest level of potential hazard. A value of 5 was assigned for factor (B) in the alleged violations involving the use of Monitor. Danitol and Agrimek contained the signal word "Warning," which indicated a lesser potential hazard. A value of 3 was assigned for factor (B) in the alleged violations involving Danitol or Agrimek. Because the estimated cost of rectifying the damage and the estimated amount of money the violator benefited by noncompliance was unknown, the Department assigned a value of 0 to factors (C) and (D). As to factor (E), dealing with the willfulness of the violation, the Department assigns a value of 0 if there is no evidence of willfulness, a value of 1 if there is apparent evidence of willfulness, and a value of 5 if it determines the violation was intentional. Because of the large number of alleged PHI and REI violations, the Department assigned a value of 1 for factor (E), finding apparent evidence of willful intent for each alleged violation. As to factor (F), dealing with the violator's compliance history, the Department considers the three years immediately preceding the current violation. The Department assigns a value of 0 if there are no prior violations, a value of 1 for a prior dissimilar violation, a value of 2 for multiple prior dissimilar violations, a value of 3 for a prior similar violation, and a value of 4 for multiple prior similar violations. Because Ag-Mart had one prior dissimilar violation within the preceding three years, the Department assigned a value of 1 for factor (F) for each alleged violation. Because the sole basis for finding apparent evidence of willful intent was the number of alleged violations, the Department calculated its recommended fines in two ways: by assigning a value of 0 based on no evidence of willful intent and by assigning a value of 1 based on apparent evidence of willful intent. In DOAH Case No. 06-0730, the North Florida Complaint, the Department recommended a fine of either $1,200 (no evidence of willful intent) or $1,400 (apparent evidence of willful intent) for each of the PHI violations alleged in Counts I, III, V, VII, IX, and XI, which involved the use of Monitor. The Department recommended a fine of either $800 (no evidence) or $1,000 (apparent evidence) for Counts II, IV, VI, VIII, X, and XII, involving the use of Danitol, and for Counts XIV, XV, and XVI, involving the use of Agrimek. For each of the REI violations alleged in Counts XIX through XXII, the Department recommended a fine of either $1,800 (no evidence) or $2,100 (apparent evidence). The Department established by clear and convincing evidence seven of the 20 counts of the North Florida Complaint that remained at issue at the time of the hearing, and none of the 58 counts of the South Florida Complaint that remained at issue at the time of the hearing. The undersigned accepts the Department's calculation of the recommended fines for these violations and recommends that the Department apply the lower calculation for each of the violations. Thus, the recommended fines are as follows: Count I, PHI violation involving the use of Monitor, $1,200; Count II, PHI violation involving the use of Danitol, $800; Count XI, PHI violation involving the use of Monitor, $1,200; Count XII, PHI violation involving the use of Danitol, $800; Count XIII, PHI violation involving the use of Agrimek, $800; Count XIX, REI violation, $1,800; and Count XXII, REI violation, $1,800. Thus, the total recommended fine for the seven proven violations is $8,400. In conclusion, it is observed that these cases demonstrate a gap in the enforcement mechanism of the Florida Pesticide Law, at least as it is currently understood and practiced by the Department. The law requires licensed applicators to comply with the PHI and REI restrictions on the labels of the restricted-use pesticides they apply to these crops. The law requires the applicators to keep accurate records of when and where they apply pesticides and of the kind and quantity of pesticides applied in each instance. Yet all parties to this proceeding agreed that the law does not require either the applicators or the growers to keep accurate records of when and where farm workers enter the fields and conduct the harvest. This failure to complete the record- keeping circle makes it extremely difficult for the Department to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a PHI or REI violation has taken place. The PHI and REI restrictions appear virtually unenforceable through company records, except when some fluke of record keeping allows the Department to establish that a given worker could only have been in a recently sprayed field on a given day. It does little good to know when the pesticides were applied to a field if there is no way of knowing when workers first entered the field or harvested tomatoes after the spraying. Ag-Mart credibly demonstrated that its general practices are designed to minimize worker exposure and guarantee safe harvest, but the company keeps no records to demonstrate to its customers that it observes these practices in particular instances and is under no legal obligation to keep such records. This state of regulatory affairs should be as disturbing to Ag-Mart as to the Department, because purchasers of tomatoes in Florida's grocery stores do not require clear and convincing evidence in order to switch brands.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order that provides as follows: That Ag-Mart committed the violations alleged in Counts I, II, XI, XII, and XIII of the North Florida Complaint, for which violations Ag-Mart should be assessed an administrative fine totaling $8,400; That Ag-Mart pay to the Department $3,000 to resolve Counts L through LIV of the South Florida Complaint and Counts XVII and XVIII of the North Florida Complaint; and That all other counts of the North Florida Complaint and the South Florida Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a) of the Code of Ethics and the Principles of Professional Conduct of the Education Profession in Florida as alleged in Petitioner?s June 6, 2012, notice of recommendation of termination and, if so, the nature of the sanctions.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the system of public schools in Lake County, Florida. Art. IX, § 4(b), Florida Constitution; § 1001.32, Fla. Stat. Petitioner has the authority to discipline instructional staff and other school employees. §1012.22(1)(f), Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a teacher of K-3 students with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). During the 2011-2012 school year, Respondent?s class had between two and seven students. Respondent holds a bachelor?s degree in elementary education and a master?s degree in special education. Respondent received her Florida teaching certificate in 2008. Petitioner has completed the coursework for the autism endorsement, but has not yet added it to her teaching certificate. Petitioner also received annual Crisis Prevention Intervention (CPI) training, which is a nonviolent crisis intervention and restraint training. CPI teaches ways to restrain or calm an autistic child when the child is “coming at you physically.” Respondent started her teaching career in Lake County in December 2008 at Eustis High School, where she taught ninth grade ESE students. She taught at the Spring Creek charter elementary school for the 2009-2010 school year, where she taught a self-contained K-6 class of approximately fifteen students having various disabilities. Respondent was hired at Fruitland Park Elementary School for the 2010-2011 school year, and was assigned to teach a K-3 level class for ASD students. Most of the students in Respondent?s class were kindergarten-level students. Respondent was retained at Fruitland Park Elementary School for the 2011-2012 academic school year pursuant to a professional services contract, entered on August 15, 2011, which provided that: The Teacher shall not be dismissed during the term of this contract except for just cause as provided in sections 1012.33, Florida Statutes, and such other provisions as prescribed by state law, School Board Policy, and the District?s Instructional Personnel Evaluation System. “Just cause” includes, but is not limited to the following: immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, or being convicted or found guilty of, or entering a plea of guilty to, regardless of adjudication of guilt, any crime involving moral turpitude. Respondent received “acceptable” evaluations while at Fruitland Park Elementary School, which was the highest rating at the time. Respondent was the subject of no parent complaints. Respondent was well regarded as a good and effective teacher, firm in discipline, and knowledgeable in her field. Prior to the incidents that are the subject of this proceeding, Respondent was not subject to any disciplinary action. Students with ASD have difficulty controlling their behavior, often act out in a physical manner, and are frequently non-verbal. Respondent?s classroom was located in a portable classroom building. Thus, if a student was outside of the classroom, he or she was physically outside, and not in an interior hallway of a larger building. The classroom backed up to the PE field. Respondent was assigned one full-time and one part- time teacher?s assistant (TA) to help with her ASD students. Elizabeth Price was Respondent?s full-time assistant for the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 school years. Ms. Price claimed that she was “verbally abused” by Respondent during the 2011-2012 school year as a result of an October 2011 discussion, initiated by Respondent and directed at Ms. Price?s “negative attitude.” Ms. Price was overtly critical of Respondent to others during the course of the school year, including the classroom behavior analyst, Ms. Rose. In addition to her testimony as to the criticism leveled at Respondent by Ms. Price, Ms. Rose testified as to her impression that Ms. Price wanted more independence to implement her own strategies, but that Respondent guided her “in staying with the protocols that she had in the classroom.” Ms. Rose?s testimony is not accepted to prove the truth of the matters asserted, but rather as evidence of Ms. Price?s feelings of ill-treatment at the hands of Respondent. Ms. Price testified that she felt unable to complain to the administration because Respondent “had a personal relationship with our assistant principal” and that, if she complained, her job would be in jeopardy. The testimony of Ms. Price as a whole, and her written statement provided to the school on May 2, 2012, leaves the undersigned with the distinct impression of a personal animus by Ms. Price against Respondent. The part-time TAs varied throughout the year. Sharon Rogers was assigned as a part-time TA to Respondent?s classroom at the beginning of the 2011-2012 school year. She was only in the class for a few weeks. Ms. Rogers was replaced by Lauren Atwood, who was in the class from September 27, 2011, to January 30, 2012, at which time she accepted a full-time position as a K-2 teacher for intellectually disabled students at Fruitland Park Elementary. Prior to being placed in Respondent?s classroom, Ms. Atwood had never worked in a unit with autistic children. During the time Ms. Atwood was in Respondent?s class, she never saw Respondent strike a student, never saw Respondent roughly handle a student, and never saw Respondent grab a student by an arm or leg. Ms. Atwood was replaced by Helen Johnson. Ms. Johnson was the part-time TA at the time Respondent was removed from the classroom. From November 2011 until late April, 2011, Lisa Bass was a TA in Jacqueline Dobbs? class for emotionally disturbed children. In late April 2012, Ms. Bass was assigned to replace Ms. Price as a TA in Respondent?s class. Ms. Bass was asked by Candice Benjamin, the Fruitland Park ESE specialist, to report anything “untoward and unprofessional” that happened in Respondent?s classroom. Ms. Bass testified that Ms. Benjamin?s request “was very cryptic” and that she felt as though she was acting “cloak and dagger.” Ms. Bass served as a TA for approximately five days, and on May 2, 2012, reported the conduct that resulted in Respondent?s removal from the classroom. The TAs were typically with Respondent at all times, and assisted with the “centers” where the students did their work. Respondent was, as a rule, alone with the students for no more than 15 minutes per day, when one TA would go to lunch, and the other would go to pick up lunches for the students, who ate in the classroom. During the times they were assigned to Respondent?s classroom, none of the TAs held teaching certificates, and none were certified in any behavioral specialties. In addition to the TAs, Respondent?s class was visited on a regular basis by a speech therapist. The speech therapist missed Respondent?s classroom visit at least once a month, and sometimes more, for reasons that varied. Since the absences often occurred on Wednesdays, Respondent tried to make alternative arrangements for a student who had her speech therapy on Wednesdays and who Respondent felt was being short- changed as a result. Respondent complained to the ESE specialist regarding the absences. In late April, 2012, the school decided to rotate TAs to different classes. Respondent felt that practice disrupted her classroom, which in some measure depended on stability and familiarity of the teachers to the students. Respondent complained about the practice in late April 2012. There were no complaints made against Respondent by her TAs or anyone else until Ms. Bass reported her complaint on May 2, 2012. No TAs complained until Ms. Dejarlais called them in for interviews. Ms. Nave, the Fruitland Park Elementary School assistant principal, observed Respondent in the classroom “many times”. She never observed Respondent engaging in any inappropriate behavior, including slapping, kicking, or grabbing of students. Ms. Linson, the School Board ASD Program Specialist, occasionally observed Respondent in the classroom. She never observed inappropriate behavior in Respondent?s classes. The notice of recommendation of termination that forms the basis for this proceeding alleged that Respondent “slapped, squeezed faces, and pulled forcibly on the arms of the students” and created “a culture of silence . . . in your classroom which discouraged other staff from coming forward with the allegations.” Allegations of Slapping Ms. Atwood testified that she saw Respondent slap one student?s hands “a few times.” The incidents occurred when a particular student took something that was not his, or tried to place his hands on or hurt another student. The slaps were not hard, and triggered no concern that the incidents should be reported. Other than slapping hands, Ms. Atwood knew of no other incidents of Respondent striking a student. Ms. Johnson testified that she observed Respondent slap a student?s hand on one occasion. The incident occurred after the student struck Respondent on the back. Ms. Johnson testified that Respondent slapped the student?s hand and said “don?t hit.” The incident left no mark on the student?s hand. Ms. Johnson did not contemporaneously report the incident. Ms. Johnson also testified that Respondent slapped a student?s hand when he pinched her nipple. Ms. Johnson understood the slap to be a reflexive reaction to the pain. The undersigned does not consider a mild human response to a personal and painful event to constitute a violation of the disciplinary standards at issue in this case. Other than the single incident of slapping the student?s hand in response to being struck on the back, Ms. Johnson never observed Respondent roughly physically handling any student. Ms. Price testified that, on one occasion during the 2011-2012 school year, Respondent slapped a student on the arm while engaged in a “tug of war” over a bin where the student sat. She stated that the slap was, in her opinion, harder than necessary. The slap left no mark on the student?s arm. Ms. Price could not recall when the alleged incident occurred, being unable to narrow it even to a six month window. Ms. Price did not contemporaneously report the incident. Respondent testified that she never struck a student. Respondent testified that she occasionally had to deflect student attempts to strike her, but that physical contact was done as an avoidance technique or when a student was perceived to be a threat to others. ASD teachers are taught to fend off attempts by students to strike the teacher or others by the use of blocking techniques in which the kicks and hits are deflected. The impression conveyed to the undersigned was one of a “wax on-wax off” motion. The attempts are physically blocked, and the target moved. Respondent testified that her attempts to deflect and redirect blows by pushing away a student?s hand could be conceived as a slap. Respondent testified that she is hit and kicked by her students almost as a matter of course. Her testimony was supported by that of Ms. Linson, who noted that ASD students frequently hit teachers, and Ms. Rose, who commented that Respondent turned her back to the students when they struck her, and as a result “often got hit in the back.” Respondent generally ignored the frequent incidents. The evidence as to the slapping of students? hands was contradictory. The analysis of the evidence was made more difficult by the fact that Respondent had specialized training in dealing with ASD students and the TAs had none, and by the fact that blocking techniques could be misconstrued as slapping by those unfamiliar with the intervention. The evidence indicates that at least some of the small handful of incidents were taken to prevent a student from harming other students. Nevertheless, Petitioner proved, by a bare preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent slapped the hands of one or more students in something more than a purely defensive or protective manner on, at most, a very few occasions, including the incident described by Ms. Johnson in which Respondent slapped the hand of a student after having been hit on the back. The evidence demonstrates such incidents were isolated and mild. There was no evidence introduced to support a finding that the incidents were harmful to any student?s learning, or that the incidents adversely affected any student?s mental or physical health, or their safety. Allegations of Squeezing Student?s Faces Two days after she was placed in Respondent?s classroom, Ms. Bass testified that she observed Respondent grab a child?s face. The incident purportedly occurred when a student was running with a toy. Respondent wanted the student to settle down, which he would not do. The student fell and began to cry. Ms. Bass testified that Respondent grabbed the student?s face and said, in a voice between calm and yelling, something to the effect of “I am in charge. You?re not in charge here. You will do as I say.” Ms. Bass stated that “[i]t appeared from my perspective she was squeezing his cheeks.” The incident left no marks on the student?s face. Ms. Bass reported the incident to Ms. Dejarlais and Ms. Nave. Respondent generally denied the description of the event provided by Ms. Bass, and specifically denied ever having squeezed a student?s cheeks. Respondent testified that she would occasionally hold a student?s face in her hands, and direct the student?s eyes to hers while speaking. In directing eye contact, she exerted no pressure on the student?s cheeks or face. That intervention technique was done to gain the attention of the student and remove what may have been distracting them. Based on her education and experience, Respondent understood that technique to be an acceptable way to direct eye contact. Her testimony was more credible than that of Ms. Bass. Ms. Rose agreed that it is an acceptable research- based intervention to orient a student?s face, deliver instruction, and then provide reinforcement. In implementing that “shadowboxing technique,” it is appropriate to use physical guidance, i.e. holding the student?s face, to get eye contact. That approach is “in the scaffolding of prompting, physical prompting,” and is not outside the scope of what the research indicates is effective. Ms. Rose testified that with younger children it is often more appropriate to start with the most prompting and fade to the least prompting, an intervention described as “errorless learning.” Using that model, physical prompting as a first resort is an effective method and it is supported by the research. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent squeezed students? faces as alleged in the notice of recommendation of termination. Allegations of Pulling Forcibly on the Arms of the Students Ms. Price provided the only evidence that Respondent pulled forcibly on the arm of any student. The alleged incident occurred after a student had eloped from the classroom. The student was sitting, cross-legged, on the landing outside the portable classroom. The landing is not gated or otherwise secured, and there is nothing to prevent one from walking from the landing to the PE field or beyond. Ms. Price testified that Respondent got her body in the doorway, grabbed the student by the arm, and pulled him back into classroom “more forcefully than necessary.” Ms. Price characterized the event as aggressive in nature. When asked whether Respondent tried other methods to get the student to return to the classroom, Ms. Price testified that “I?m sure that she did. She typically did,” but that “I don?t recall. I was doing something else.” Ms. Price?s lack of direct attention to the incident leads the undersigned to question her account. Respondent testified that she never pulled a child in from outside through door. In cases of elopement, she would usually try to hold the student by the hand or wrist to guide them back in, but never jerked or pulled on the arm of any student. Her testimony was more credible than that of Ms. Price, and is accepted. Ms. Linson testified that in cases of elopement, it is appropriate to take a student by the hand or wrist to guide them back inside. She stressed that “we have to be careful around wrists and arms” to avoid concerns with dislocation of the shoulder, but gave no suggestion that guiding by the wrist was inappropriate. Ms. Linson also testified that if a student is trying to run away, it is appropriate to apply the “children?s control position” as taught as part of the CPI. In that intervention, an adult, with his or her arms crossed and elbows locked, would hold the student on the adult?s side. The intervention is appropriate only for small children, but is an approved restraint. Ms. Linson recognized that human reflex can occasionally result in the restraint being imperfectly, but still appropriately, administered. Ms. Atwood testified that Respondent occasionally had to move a student to time-out when the student had engaged in behavior warranting discipline. She testified that Respondent generally just guided the student, but that when the student would not go willingly, she might put her arms through the student?s arms and move the student to time-out. Ms. Atwood took the required annual CPI course offered to teachers and TAs, but that even with that one-day training, she was not sure how to handle autistic students, and did not know whether the method used by Respondent to move recalcitrant students to time-out was correct or not. In any event, the method described by Ms. Atwood does not meet the allegation that Respondent “pulled forcibly on the arms of the students.” Respondent testified that she occasionally had to physically move a student if he was injuring himself or others, and it was not possible to get others away. In such an instance, Respondent and a TA would implement an approved intervention to move the student to time out, but in no instance would she or anyone else in her classroom pick a student up by the arm, or otherwise pull a student by the arm. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent “pulled forcibly on the arms of the students” as alleged in the notice of recommendation of termination. Allegation of Creating a Culture of Silence The allegation that Respondent created a culture of silence was based on a statement, frequently repeated at various places, that “what happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas” or “what happens in the classroom stays in the classroom.” The allegation suggested that Respondent made the statement with the intent to discourage the TAs or others from reporting abusive conduct. Ms. Atwood testified that she never heard the “Vegas” statement, but that in any event she was not intimidated by Respondent, and was never discouraged from reporting inappropriate activities. Ms. Nave overheard the “Vegas” conversation at the bus loop in the fall of 2011. The TAs and Respondent were laughing about it, and she perceived nothing of importance or significance about the statement. She understood it to apply to “some silly things that were happening in the classroom.” Ms. Johnson testified that she heard the “Vegas” statement, but was confused about it, and did not know what it meant. Ms. Johnson offered no testimony to support a finding that Respondent intended the statement to discourage her from reporting abusive conduct. Ms. Price offered the only suggestion that the “Vegas” statement was intended to discourage reporting unprofessional or inappropriate activities in the classroom. Ms. Price testified that she “took it” to mean that Respondent was telling her not to bring any complaints against her. She did not testify that Respondent made any direct statement to that effect, but based her testimony on her own subjective belief. Ms. Price did not mention Respondent having discouraged the reporting of inappropriate conduct by means of the “Vegas” statement or otherwise in her May 2, 2012, written witness statement. Rather, she only raised it when her supervisors at the school district told her to think about it. Ms. Price?s testimony and written statement that Respondent intended the oft-repeated “Vegas” statement to be an effort to mask abuse in the classroom, taken as a whole and in conjunction with her general degree of antipathy towards Respondent as described above, is not credible. Respondent and others testified convincingly that the concept of “what happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas” was intended to allow the teachers and TAs to discuss personal matters, and even gossip about other school employees, without fear of their comments being spread around. Respondent testified that the statement was not intended to act as a shield for unprofessional or abusive conduct occurring in the classroom. Respondent?s testimony is accepted. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent created “a culture of silence . . . in your classroom which discouraged other staff from coming forward with the allegations” as alleged in the notice of recommendation of termination. Unpled Issues Ms. Atwood, Ms. Johnson, and Ms. Price each alluded to a degree of “yelling” in Respondent?s class that was greater than they believed should occur in a “normal” class. In her written statement, Ms. Atwood stated that “at times [it] seemed to be a little too much.” Ms. Johnson felt that it “was, to me, over the top.” However, no TA saw fit to report Respondent?s yelling at any time prior to May 2, 2012. No one described what was meant by “yelling” except in the most general and subjective way. No witness testified as to any standard or criteria regarding “yelling” in an ASD class setting. No evidence was elicited as to whether “yelling” might be appropriate at times. Respondent admitted that she raised her voice on occasion to get the students? attention when the classroom was loud or to make a point, but gave no suggestion that it was contrary to any standard. Although Ms. Linson testified that “yelling” is not appropriate in any class, she did not define “yelling,” nor does she have an autism endorsement to her teaching certificate that might provide additional weight to her testimony as applied to the unique challenges of an ASD class. Despite the volume of the evidence and testimony regarding “yelling,” the fact is that it was not pled as a basis for Respondent?s termination. Had it been pled, the Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the “yelling” violated any standard warranting discipline against Respondent. During the course of the proceeding, references were made to Respondent having moved the furniture from her classroom. The evidence was conflicting as to whether the removal of the furniture was known or authorized by the school administration. However, it appears that there was a sound, safety-based reason for removing the furniture and gradually reintroducing it to the classroom. Despite the discussion regarding the removal of furniture from the classroom, that issue was not pled as a basis for Respondent?s termination. Had it been pled, the Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the removal of the furniture violated any standard warranting discipline against Respondent. Discipline Petitioner has adopted, as policy section 6.361 of the School Board of Lake County, an Employee Discipline Plan. The plan provides that “[w]hen discipline of any employee becomes necessary, such action should be in proportion to the employee?s offense or misconduct ” The Employee Discipline Plan includes a Progressive Discipline Method by which sanctions are scaled based on the severity of the occurrence, and on whether it has recurred. The purpose of the policy is to let employees know the nature of the violation and provide an opportunity to correct the behavior. The Progressive Discipline Method includes five steps: Counseling, Level I Reprimand, Level II Reprimand, Suspension and Termination. The Method provides that: Because of the severity in the loss of one?s job employees should be terminated only after thorough investigation. The investigation should conclude that: The employee did, in fact, commit the act; Evidence of guilt is available; The employee?s entire work record, positive and negative, has been considered; The same rules are applied uniformly to other employees; and The penalty of dismissal is reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense. The Employee Discipline Plan provides that: The Superintendent is not required to use this Progressive Discipline Method and may administer discipline at any level, including termination, based on the nature of the offense and the particular circumstances. Examples of actions resulting in immediate suspension or dismissal include, but are not limited to, the following: immorality, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, incompetence, substance abuse including alcohol, being convicted or found guilty of or pleading guilty to (regardless of adjudication of guilt) any crime involving moral turpitude. Respondent did not commit any of the specified offenses that constitute “examples of actions resulting in immediate suspension or dismissal.” The School District did not exercise the Progressive Discipline Method, but proceeded directly to termination of Respondent. Ms. Dejarlais did not know why the progressive disciplinary policy was not followed in Respondent?s case. The school officials elected to have the investigation done at the county level, rather than at the school level. It was not explained why such an investigative procedure was undertaken, or whether it was a deviation from the normal disciplinary practice of the school. Since most of the allegations against Respondent were not proven, including those that would normally be understood to be the most serious, there is no reasonable basis to disregard Petitioner?s adopted Employee Discipline Plan and Progressive Discipline Method. Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent committed the acts alleged, with the exception of a few instances in which she slapped students? hands. The slaps, which were themselves mild, may have been misconstrued defensive blocking techniques. In any event, the instances were isolated, and formed no pattern of unprofessional or inappropriate conduct. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that it considered Respondent?s entire work record, positive and negative, during the investigation. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that it applied the same rules that led to Respondent?s termination to other employees. However, since most of the allegations against Respondent were disproven, any analysis of the violations -- as charged -- would be of limited value. As to the issue of slapping hands, the only evidence in the record as to the sanction for that type of incident was the testimony of Ms. Linson, who was not aware of any instance in which a teacher was terminated for slapping the hand of a student. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the sanction of termination was reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense, especially given that most of the allegations upon which the decision to terminate was based were not proven. Given the isolated nature of the hand slaps, the mild nature of the slaps, and the possibility that the slaps were misperceived blocking techniques, the undersigned finds that the sanction of termination was not reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense. The evidence demonstrates that, upon her removal from the classroom, Respondent was assigned to the school Copy Center at full pay and benefits pending the outcome of this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Lake County School Board, enter a final order: dismissing those allegations in the notice of recommendation of termination that Respondent squeezed faces, pulled forcibly on the arms of the students, and created a culture of silence which discouraged other staff from coming forward with allegations of misconduct; finding that Respondent slapped the hands of students, but that such incidents were isolated, mild, and may have been a misperception of an otherwise acceptable defensive blocking technique; reinstating Respondent to a position equivalent to that previously held with the Lake County School District; imposing the Step I sanction of counseling as set forth in Petitioner?s Progressive Discipline Method; and to the extent Respondent lost wages or benefits, award full back pay and benefits from the time she was removed from the classroom in May 2012, until the date of her reinstatement. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen W. Johnson, Esquire McLin and Burnsed, P.A. Post Office Box 491357 1000 West Main Street Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357 Alfred Truesdell, Esquire Jill S. Schwartz and Associates, P.A. Suite 212 655 West Morse Boulevard Winter Park, Florida 32789-3745 Susan Moxley, Ed.D., Superintendent Lake County School Board 201 West Burleigh Boulevard Tavares, Florida 32778-2496 Pam Stewart, Interim Commissioner Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Lois Tepper, Interim General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether the Respondent is indebted to the Petitioner as stated in the complaint filed by the Petitioner and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rosario and Vito Strano d/b/a Strano Farms, is a producer of Florida-grown agricultural products as set forth in Chapter 604, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company, is a dealer of agricultural products doing business at 2101 15th Avenue, Vero Beach, Florida. On April 2, 1999, Respondent purchased garden variety tomatoes from Petitioner. The driver accepting the tomatoes on Respondent’s behalf acknowledged that the tomatoes were received in good condition by signing a truck manifest. The truck manifest provided, in pertinent part, "Any complaint must be made to [sic] Stano Farm in writing, during unloading, and accompanied by U.S.D.A. inspection." Subsequently, Respondent’s agent telephoned Petitioner to advise that there was a problem with the condition of the tomatoes. Respondent did not immediately forward an inspection report and did not promptly make an accounting for the tomatoes that were subsequently liquidated. Eventually, Respondent forwarded a copy of an inspection certificate for an inspection done on April 5, 1999. That certificate, while largely illegible, reportedly found the subject tomatoes to be in poor condition. Petitioner requested payment for the tomatoes as originally agreed by the parties. Its invoice for the 1040 tomatoes claimed $6,084.00 as the amount due. The invoice provided that checks should be payable to Homestead Tomato Packing Co., Inc., but that "any complaint must be made to Strano Farms in writing immediately during unloading, and accompanied by U.S.D.A. inspection." On or about June 29, 1999, by check made payable to Homestead Tomato Packing Co., Inc., Respondent forwarded the sum of $208.00 in payment for the subject tomatoes. On the backside of the payment check Respondent had stamped the following: "Acceptance of this check constitutes payment in full for invoice #12819." Subsequently, Homestead Tomato Packing Co., Inc., negotiated the check. Petitioner did not provide a written dispute regarding the subject tomatoes prior to the tender of the partial payment. In July of 1999 Petitioner filed a Complaint in the amount of $5,876.00 with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Bureau of License and Bond, Division of Marketing. The Complaint acknowledged receipt of the $208.00 partial payment but maintained no account of the sales or inspection report was included with the payment to justify the low return on the subject tomatoes. At the hearing in this cause Respondent provided an accounting for the tomatoes that claimed the subject tomatoes were sold for $2,984.00. The accounting acknowledged that $336.00 would have been due to Petitioner. Such amount was not the tendered payment and was not provided to Petitioner at the time of partial payment. To date the parties have been unable to resolve the disputed value of the tomatoes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Bureau of License and Bond, Division of Marketing, enter a final order requiring Respondent to remit $5,876.00 to Petitioner as provided by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: United Pacific Insurance Company Three Parkway Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-1376 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Kelly Marinaro Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company 2101 15th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32960 Jack Moon Strano Farms Post Office Box 343064 Florida City, Florida 33034 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
