Findings Of Fact George A. Heyen is a duly registered real estate salesman with the Florida Real Estate Commission, and was so registered and has been so registered continuously since October 1, 1972, as evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit number 1. While serving in the capacity as a real estate salesman, the Respondent entered into a listing agreement with one Thomas S. Bowers and Brenda L. Bowers, his wife. This agreement was drawn on December 11, 1973 and is Petitioner's Exhibit number 4. On February 6, 1974, a purchase and sell agreement was drawn up by the Respondent and entered into between Maria A. Hindes and the Bowers. This purchase and sell agreement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 3. This contract of February 6, 1974 was submitted to Molton, Allen and Williams, Mortgage Brokers, 5111 66th Street, St. Petersburg, Florida. The contract, as drawn, was rejected as being unacceptable for mortgage financing, because it failed, to contain the mandatory FHA clause. When the Respondent discovered that the February 6, 1974 contract had been rejected, a second contract of February 8, 1974 was prepared. A copy of this contract is Petitioner's Exhibit number 5. The form of the contract, drawn on February 8, 1974, was one provided by Molton, Allen and Williams. When, the Respondent received that form he prepared it and forged the signature of Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. The explanation for forging the signatures as stated in the course of the hearing, was to the effect that it was a matter of expediency. The expediency referred to the fact that the parties were anxious to have a closing and to have the transaction completed, particularly the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Bowers. Therefore, in the name of expediency the signatures were forged. Testimony was also given that pointed out the Bowers were very hard to contact in and around the month of February, 1974, and some testimony was given to the effect that the Bowers made frequent trips to Ohio, but it was not clear whether these trips would have been made in the first part of February, 1974. The Bowers discovered that their name had been forged when they went to a closing on April 11, 1974. They refused to close the loan at that time. On April 24, 1974, a new sales contract was followed by a closing which was held on April 26, 1974 and a copy of the closing statement is Petitioner's Exhibit number 6. The Respondent has received no fees or commissions for his services in the transaction and there have been no further complaints about the transaction. Prior to this incident, the Respondent, George A. Heyen, was not shown to have had any disciplinary involvement with the Florida Real Estate Commission and has demonstrated that he has been a trustworthy individual in his business dealings as a real estate salesman.
Recommendation It is recommended that the registration of the registrant, George A. Heyen, be suspended for a period not to exceed 30 days. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. R. Parkinson, Esquire Associate Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 George A. Heyen c/o Gregoire-Gibbons, Inc. 6439 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33710
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, as amended, and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a state agency. It is responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Part II, Florida Statutes. Respondent is now, and has been since June 1, 1996, a Florida-certified residential real estate appraiser (holding certificate number RD 0002087 issued by Petitioner). 3/ At no time during the period of his certification has he had any disciplinary action taken against his certificate. At all times material to the instant case, Steve Mohan was the owner of the following income-producing properties: attached "twin homes" located at 3976 and 3978 West Roan Court, Lake Worth, Florida; and a triplex located at 517 South F Street, Lake Worth, Florida (Subject Properties). In or about March of 1998, Mr. Mohan approached Brett Matchton, a mortgage broker, to inquire about refinancing the loans that he (Mr. Mohan) had obtained to purchase the Subject Properties. Mr. Matchton advised Mr. Mohan that, in order to obtain such refinancing, Mr. Mohan needed to have the Subject Properties appraised. On or about March 2, 1998, Mr. Matchton asked Respondent if he would appraise the Subject Properties (which Mr. Matchton described as a duplex and a triplex) for Mr. Mohan (Appraisal Assignment). Respondent told Mr. Matchton that he would accept the Appraisal Assignment, provided that he was paid either "at the door" (in advance) or upon delivery of the appraisals. Mr. Matchton advised that Mr. Mohan would pay Respondent by check "at the door." Respondent deemed such an arrangement to be acceptable. That same day, accompanied by Mr. Mohan, Respondent inspected, photographed, and made rough sketches of the Subject Properties. He also obtained information about the properties from Mr. Mohan. Before departing, Respondent received two checks (both made out to him) from Mr. Mohan. One check (in the amount of $400.00) was for "a duplex income property appraisal on the [West] Roan Court property" and the other check (in the amount of $450.00) was for "a triplex income property appraisal on the F Street property." Following his visit, using his computer, Respondent accessed local government public records (that were available "on line") on the Subject Properties and on other "comparable" properties ("to find comparable sales"). His examination revealed, among other things, that there were actually "two single-family twin homes" (not a duplex) located at 3976 and 3978 West Roan Court. Respondent subsequently spoke with Mr. Matchton and informed him that a separate appraisal needed to be done for each of the "twin homes." Mr. Matchton responded that he "wanted it done as a duplex," not as two separate properties. Mr. Matchton also told Respondent what "minimum valuations" were required "to make the [refinancing] work." Based upon the preliminary work he had done, Respondent determined that the fair market values of the Subject Properties were "far and above" these "minimum valuations." Sometime after April 1, 1998, Respondent contacted Mr. Matchton and advised that he (Respondent) was not going to do any additional work on the Appraisal Assignment because of ethical concerns he had regarding the manner in which (in accordance with Mr. Matchton's instructions) he was to complete the assignment. 4/ On or about April 10, 1998, Respondent spoke with Mr. Mohan over the telephone. During this telephone conversation, Mr. Mohan told Respondent to "forget about" appraising the Subject Properties and "just refund the money back." Respondent agreed to refund, in full, the $850.00 he had received from Mr. Mohan for the Appraisal Assignment, but indicated that, because of his financial situation, it was "going to take [him] some time" to make such a refund. Respondent never completed any appraisal reports concerning the Subject Properties (although he had started working on such reports). Not having received the promised refund from Respondent (who was experiencing serious "cash flow" problems at the time), Mr. Mohan, on May 26, 1998, filed a formal written complaint with Petitioner. The complaint read as follows: I, Steve Mohan requested Tony J. Maffei to appraise the following properties, 517 South F Street, Lake Worth Florida and 3976 and 3978 West Roan Court, Lake Worth, Florida. On March 2, 1998, Mr. Maffei came out and looked at the above properties and I paid him the amounts of $400 and $450 (copies of checks enclosed). On 3/16/98, Mr. Maffei was contacted to inquire about whether the appraisals were done. He said that they were not. Mr. Maffei was contacted almost every other day between 3/17/98 and 4/7/98, only to be told that the appraisals were not done. On 4/10/98, Mr. Maffei was contacted by phone, at which time he said that he could not do the appraisals and he would refund the monies back. Today is 5/13/98 and I have not received anything from him. Mr. Mohan's complaint was assigned to Dennis Thresher, an investigator specialist with Petitioner, on June 15, 1998. Mr. Thresher interviewed Respondent on July 30, 1998, at which time he requested Respondent to produce "copies of the two appraisals that were supposed to be provided to Mr. Mohan." On August 18, 1998, after some delay, Respondent provided Mr. Thresher with a copy of his work file on the Subject Properties. Included in the file were data sheets, photographs, and sketches. Because of a hardware problem, he was unable to retrieve and make copies of the "partial," unfinished appraisal reports concerning the Subject Properties that he had stored on his computer. At no time did Respondent "come out and actually say" to Mr. Thresher that he (Respondent) had not completed the appraisal reports concerning the Subject Properties. He reasonably assumed that Mr. Thresher already knew, from reading Mr. Mohan's complaint, that no such appraisal reports were completed by Respondent. Respondent did not intend, at any time, to mislead Mr. Thresher. On or about October 5, 1999, after the filing of the Administrative Complaint in the instant case, Respondent sent the following letter, accompanied by a check in the amount of $400.00, to Mr. Mohan: I have enclosed a bank check in the amount of $400 for the refund of the appraisal fee that you paid to me for the appraisal of one of the properties located in Palm Beach County. An additional bank check for $450 will follow as the refund of the appraisal fee for the other Palm Beach County property. I humbly apologize for the delay of the appraisal refund checks and the inconvenience it has caused you. This was due to my lower- than-typical cash flow and higher-than- typical bills/expenses. As we discussed via telephone, I am personally compelled to compensate you for you inconvenience, loss of interest income and costs you may have incurred due to the delay of the appraisal fee refund. As we agreed upon, I will perform an appraisal report for you on a single family or condominium property at "no fee" after you have received the full $850 appraisal refund. Please be expecting a $450 bank check for payment of the final balance before October 30, 1999. Please note that a copy of this letter and the $400 check will be faxed to the Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board for their files. Again, I apologize for the inconvenience this has caused you. Mr. Mohan subsequently received from Respondent the "$450 bank check" Respondent had promised to send to him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board issue a final order dismissing Counts I and II of Administrative Complaint; finding Respondent guilty of the violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes, alleged in Count III (as amended) of the Administrative Complaint; and fining Respondent $500.00 for having committed this violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2000.
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are, first, whether Respondent, a certified real estate appraiser, committed various disciplinable offenses in connection with three residential appraisals; and second, if Respondent is guilty of any charges, whether she should be punished therefor.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board ("Board") is the state agency charged with regulating real estate appraisers who are, or want to become, licensed to render appraisal services in the State of Florida. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department") is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting complaints against such appraisers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Elsa Cartaya ("Cartaya") was a Florida-certified residential real estate appraiser. Her conduct as an appraiser in connection with the matters presently at issue falls squarely within the Board's regulatory jurisdiction. Case No. 04-1680 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1680, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisal of a residence located at 930 East Ninth Place, Hialeah, Florida (the "Hialeah Property"). Specifically, the Department made the following allegations against Cartaya:1 Respondent developed and communicated an appraisal report (Report) for the property commonly known as 930 E. 9 Place, Hialeah, Florida 33010. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On the Report, Respondent represents that: she signed it on July 27, 2000, the Report is effective as of July 27, 2000. On or about October 26, 2001, Respondent provided a "Report History" to Petitioner's investigator. A copy of the report history is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. On the Report History, Respondent admits that she completed the report on August 7, 2000. On Report, Respondent represents that there were no prior sales of subject property within one year of the appraisal. Respondent knew that a purchase and sale transaction on subject property closed on July 28, 2000. Respondent knew that the July 28, 2000, transaction had a contract sales price of $82,000. A copy of the closing statement is attached hereto as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. Respondent knowingly refused to disclose the July 28, 2000, sale on Report. On [the] Report, Respondent represented that the current owner of subject property was Hornedo Lopez. Hornedo Lopez did not become the title- owner until on or about July 28, 2000, but before August 7, 2000. On [the] Report, Respondent represents that quality of construction of subject property is "CBS/AVG." The public records reflect that subject property is of mixed construction, CBS and poured concrete. On [the] Report, Respondent represents: "The income approach was not derived due to lack of accurately verifiable data for the mostly owner occupied area." The multiple listing brochures indicate as follows: for comparable one: "Main House 3/2 one apartment 1/1 (Rents $425) and 2 efficiencies each at $325. Live rent free with great income or bring your big family." A copy of the brochure for comparable one is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 4. for comparable three: "Great Rental . . . two 2/1 two 1/1 and one studio. Total rental income is $2,225/month if all rented." A copy of the brochure for comparable three is attached and incorporated as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 5. On or about October 23, 2001, Petitioner's investigator inspected Respondent's work file for Report. The investigation revealed that Respondent failed to maintain a true copy of Report in the work file. On [the] Report, Respondent failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180.000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits to having received a request for appraisal of subject property indicting a contract price of $195,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that the multiple listing brochure for subject property listed the property for $119,900, as a FANNIE MAE foreclosure. On [the] Report History, Respondent also admits that she had a multiple listing brochure in the file, listing subject property for $92,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that she did not report the listings in Report. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits knowledge that comparable three was "rebuilt as a 2/1 with two 1/1 & 1 studio receiving income although zoned residential." On [the] Report, Respondent failed or refused to explain or adjust for comparable three's zoning violations. On the foregoing allegations, the Department charged Cartaya under four counts, as follows: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest conduct, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes.[2] COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having accepted an appraisal assignment if the employment itself is contingent upon the appraiser reporting a predetermined result, analysis, or opinion, or if the fee to be paid for the performance of the appraisal assignment is contingent upon the opinion, conclusion, or valuation reached upon the consequent resulting from the appraisal assignment in violation of Section 475.624(17), Florida Statutes.[3] In her Answer and Affirmative Defenses, Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 5-9, 11, 13-15, 17-19, and 23-25 of the Amended Complaint. Based on Cartaya's admissions, the undersigned finds these undisputed allegations to be true. Additional findings are necessary, however, to make sense of these particular admissions and to determine whether Cartaya committed the offenses of which she stands accused. In April 2000, Southeast Financial Corporation ("Southeast") asked Cartaya to prepare an appraisal of the Hialeah Property for Southeast's use in underwriting a mortgage loan, the proceeds of which would be applied by the prospective mortgagor(s) towards the $205,000 purchase price that he/she/they had agreed to pay Hornedo Lopez ("Hornedo") for the residence in question.4 In preparing the appraisal, Cartaya discovered that the putative seller, Hornedo, was actually not the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Rather, title was held in the name of the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"). The Hialeah Property was "in foreclosure." Cartaya informed her contact at Southeast, Marianella Lopez ("Marianella"), about this problem. Marianella explained that Hornedo was in the process of closing a sale with Fannie Mae and would resell the Hialeah Property to a new buyer soon after acquiring the deed thereto. Cartaya told Marianella that, to complete the appraisal, she (Cartaya) would need to be provided a copy of the closing statement documenting the transfer of title from Fannie Mae to Hornedo. No further work was done on the appraisal for several months. Then, on July 25, 2000, Marianella ordered another appraisal of the Hialeah Property, this time for Southeast's use in evaluating a mortgage loan to Jose Granados ("Granados"), who was under contract to purchase the subject residence from Hornedo for $195,000. Once again, Cartaya quickly discovered that Fannie Mae, not Hornedo, was the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Once again, Cartaya immediately informed Marianella about the situation. Marianella responded on July 26, 2000, telling Cartaya that the Fannie Mae-Hornedo transaction was scheduled to close on July 28, 2000. On July 27, 2000, Marianella faxed to Cartaya a copy of the Settlement Statement that had been prepared for the Fannie Mae sale to Hornedo. The Settlement Statement, which confirmed that the intended closing date was indeed July 28, 2000, showed that Hornedo was under contract to pay $82,000 for the Hialeah Property——the property which he would then sell to Granados for $195,000, if all the pending transactions closed as planned. Upon receipt of this Settlement Statement, Cartaya proceeded to complete the appraisal. In the resulting Appraisal Report, which was finished on August 7, 2000,5 Cartaya estimated that the market value of the Hialeah Property, as of July 27, 2000, was $195,000. The Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the house at the Hialeah Property was, in fact, constructed from CBS and poured concrete, as alleged.6 At the time Cartaya gave the Department a copy of her workfile for this appraisal assignment, the workfile did not contain a copy of the competed Appraisal Report.7 (The workfile did, however, include a working draft of the Appraisal Report.) The allegation, set forth in paragraph 21 of the Administrative Complaint, that Cartaya "failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180,000," was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. First, there is no nonhearsay evidence in the record that "comparable one" was, in fact, listed at $145,000 and subsequently sold for $180,000. Instead, the Department offered a printout of data from the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS"), which printout was included in Cartaya's workfile. The MLS document shows a listing price of $145,550 for "comparable one" and a sales price of $180,000 for the property——but it is clearly hearsay as proof of these matters,8 and no predicate was laid for the introduction of such hearsay pursuant to a recognized exception to the hearsay rule (including Section 475.28(2)). Further, the MLS data do not supplement or explain other nonhearsay evidence.9 At best, the MLS document, which is dated July 25, 2000, establishes that Cartaya was on notice that "comparable one" might have sold for more than the asking price, but Cartaya has not been charged with overlooking MLS data. Second, in any event, in her Report History, Cartaya stated that she had analyzed the putative asking price/sales price differential with respect to "comparable one" and concluded that there was no need to make adjustments for this because available data relating to other sales persuaded her that such differentials were typical in the relevant market. Cartaya's declaration in this regard was not persuasively rebutted. Since the evidence fails persuasively to establish that Cartaya's conclusion concerning the immateriality of the putative asking price/sales price differential as a factor bearing on the value of "comparable one" was wrong; and, further, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that an appraiser must, in her appraisal report, not only disclose such information, even when deemed irrelevant to the appraisal, but also expound upon the grounds for rejecting the data as irrelevant, Cartaya cannot be faulted for declining to explicate her analysis of the supposed price differential in the Appraisal Report. The evidence is insufficient to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Cartaya "failed or refused to explain or adjust for "comparable three"'s zoning violations." This allegation depends upon the validity of its embedded assumption that there were, in fact, "zoning violations."10 There is, however, no convincing evidence of such violations in the instant record. Specifically, no copy of any zoning code was offered as evidence, nor was any convincing nonhearsay proof regarding the factual condition of "comparable three" offered. Cartaya cannot be found guilty of failing or refusing to explain or adjust for an underlying condition (here, alleged "zoning violations") absent convincing proof of the underlying condition's existence-in-fact. Case No. 04-1148 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1148, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisals of residences located at 1729 Northwest 18th Street, Miami, Florida ("1729 NW 18th St") and 18032 Northwest 48th Place, Miami, Florida ("18032 NW 48th Place"). These appraisals will be examined in turn. With regard to 1729 NW 18th St, the Department alleged as follows: On or about April 29, 1999, Respondent developed and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the property commonly known as 1729 NW 18th Street, Miami, Florida. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On or about March 18, 2001, David B. C. Yeomans, Jr., A.S.A., and Mark A. Cannon, A.S.A., performed a field review of the report. A copy of the review is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. The review revealed that unlike it states in the Report, the subject property’s zoning was not "Legal," but "legal noncomforming (Grandfathered use)." The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that if the improvements sustain extensive damage or demolishment or require renovation which exceeds 50% of the depreciated value, it is likely that a variance would be necessary to build a new dwelling. The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that subject property has two underground gas meters. The review further revealed that unlike Respondent states in Report, subject property’s street has gutters and storm sewers along it. The review further revealed that subject property is a part of a "sub-market" within its own neighborhood due to its construction date of 1925. Respondent applied three comparables built in 1951, 1953, and 1948, respectively, all of which reflect a different market, without adjustment. Respondent applied comparables which have much larger lots than the subject, which is of a non-conforming, grandfathered use. Respondent failed to adjust for quality of construction even though subject is frame and all three comparables are of concrete block stucco construction. Respondent failed to note on the Report that comparables 1 and 2 had river frontage. Respondent failed to adjust comparables 1 and 2 for river frontage. The review revealed that at the time of the Report there were at least five sales more closely comparable to Subject than those which Respondent applied. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Yeomans Report") that David B.C. Yeomans, Jr. prepared in March 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Yeomans Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, and Mr. Yeomans testified at hearing. Mr. Yeomans disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 1729 NW 18th St, concluding that the property's market value as of April 29, 1999, had been at the low end of the $95,000-to-$115,000 range, and not $135,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraphs 6 and 7. The form that Cartaya used for her Appraisal Report regarding 1729 NW 18th St contains the following line: Zoning compliance Legal Legal nonconforming (Grandfathered use) Illegal No zoning Cartaya checked the "legal" box. Mr. Yeomans maintains that she should have checked the box for "legal nonconforming" use because, he argues, the property's frontage and lot size are smaller than the minimums for these values as prescribed in the City of Miami's zoning code. The Department failed, however, to prove that Cartaya checked the wrong zoning compliance box. There is no convincing nonhearsay evidence regarding either the frontage or the lot size of 1729 NW 18th St.11 Thus, there are no facts against which to apply the allegedly applicable zoning code provisions. Moreover, and more important, the Department failed to introduce into evidence any provisions of Miami's zoning code. Instead, the Department elicited testimony from Mr. Yeomans regarding his understanding of the contents of the zoning code. While Mr. Yeomans' testimony about the contents of the zoning code is technically not hearsay (because the out-of-court statements, namely the purported code provisions, consisted of non-assertive declarations12 that were not offered for the "truth" of the code's provisions13), such testimony is nevertheless not clear and convincing evidence of the zoning code's terms.14 And finally, in any event, Cartaya's alleged "mistake" (which allegation was not proved) was immaterial because, as Mr. Yeomans conceded at hearing, in testimony the undersigned credits as true, the alleged "fact" (again, not proved) that 1729 NW 18th St constituted a grandfathered use would have no effect on the property's market value. Paragraphs 8 and 9. The Yeomans Report asserts that "[b]ased on a physical inspection as of March 17, 2001[,] it appears that the site has two underground gas meters and there were gutters and storm sewers along the subject's street." It is undisputed that Cartaya's Appraisal Report made no mention of underground gas meters or storm water disposal systems. While the Department alleged that Cartaya's silence regarding these matters constituted disciplinable "failures," it offered no convincing proof that Cartaya defaulted on her obligations in any way respecting these items. There was no convincing evidence that these matters were material, affected the property's value, or should have been noted pursuant to some cognizable standard of care. Paragraphs 10 and 11. The contention here is that Cartaya chose as comparables several homes that, though relatively old (average age: 48 years), were not as old as the residence at 1729 NW 18th St (74 years). Mr. Yeomans asserted that older homes should have been used as comparables, and several such homes are identified in the Yeomans Report. The undersigned is persuaded that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value with respect to 1729 NW 18th St is probably more accurate than Cartaya's. If this were a case where the value of 1729 NW 18th St were at issue, e.g. a taking under eminent domain, then Mr. Yeomans' opinion might well be credited as against Cartaya's opinion in making the ultimate factual determination. The issue in this case is not the value of 1729 NW 18th St, however, but whether Cartaya committed disciplinable offenses in appraising the property. The fact that two appraisers have different opinions regarding the market value of a property does not mean that one of them engaged in misconduct in forming his or her opinion. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned is not convinced that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if her analysis appears to be somewhat less sophisticated than Mr. Yeomans'. Paragraphs 12 through 16. The allegations in these paragraphs constitute variations on the theme just addressed, namely that, for one reason or another, Cartaya chose inappropriate comparables. For the same reasons given in the preceding discussion, the undersigned is not convinced, based on the evidence presented, that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if he is inclined to agree that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value is the better founded of the two. With regard to 18032 NW 48th Place, the Department alleged as follows: On or about August 9, 1999, Respondent prepared and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the Property commonly known as 18032 NW 48th Place, Miami, Florida, 33055. (Report) A copy of the Report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. On the Report, Respondent incorrectly stated that the property is in a FEMA Zone X flood area. In fact, the property is in an AE Zone. In Report, Respondent states: "Above sales were approximately adjusted per market derived value influencing dissimilarities as noted." Respondent failed to state in Report, that comparables 1 and 3 have in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent represented comparable 1 had one bath, where in fact it has at least two. In [the] Report, Respondent failed to state that comparable 1 has two in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent stated that comparable 3 is a two-bath house with an additional bath in the in-law quarters. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT V Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT VI Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 18 and 20 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Marmin Report") that Frank L. Marmin prepared in May 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Marmin Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Mr. Marmin did not testify at hearing, although his supervisor, Mark A. Cannon, did. Mr. Marmin disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 18032 NW 48th Place, concluding that the property's market value as of August 9, 1999, had been $100,000, and not $128,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 19. Cartaya admitted that she erred in noting that the property is located in FEMA Flood Zone "X," when in fact (she agrees) the property is in FEMA Flood Zone "AE." She did, however, include a flood zone map with her appraisal that showed the correct flood zone designation. Cartaya's mistake was obviously unintentional——and no more blameworthy than a typographical error. Further, even the Department's expert witness conceded that this minor error had no effect on the appraiser's opinion of value. Paragraphs 20 through 24. The Department asserts that two of Cartaya's comparables were not comparable for one reason or another. The Department failed clearly and convincingly to prove that its allegations of fact concerning the two comparables in question are true. Thus, the Department failed to establish its allegations to the requisite degree of certainty. Ultimate Factual Determinations Having examined the entire record; weighed, interpreted, and judged the credibility of the evidence; drawn (or refused to draw) permissible factual inferences; resolved conflicting accounts of what occurred; and applied the applicable law to the facts, it is determined that: Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not commit culpable negligence in connection with the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not fail to exercise reasonable diligence in developing the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that, in connection with the Appraisal Report relating to the Hialeah Property, Cartaya did commit one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2- 2(b)(vi) of Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding that: As to Case No. 04-1148, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I through VI, inclusive; As to Case No. 04-1680, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I, II, and IV; she is, however, guilty, under Count III, of one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(vi) and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix). As punishment for the violations established, Cartaya's certificate should be suspended for 30 calendar days, and she should be placed on probation for a period of one year, a condition of such probation being the successful completion of a continuing education course in USPAP. In addition, Cartaya should be ordered to pay an administrative fine of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes (2010), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and if so, the appropriate penalty.1/
Findings Of Fact Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate appraisal pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Mr. Butterfield is licensed as a state-certified general real estate appraiser, holding state license number RD 1063. Consequently, he is certified to give residential and commercial appraisals in Florida. Further, Mr. Butterfield has been a licensed appraiser in Florida since 1991. In addition to being licensed in Florida, Mr. Butterfield is licensed in 11 other states, holding seven active and four inactive licenses. There is no evidence that Mr. Butterfield has any prior discipline. On April 26, 2010, Mr. Butterfield issued the Appraisal Report, which is at issue in this administrative hearing. He prepared the Appraisal Report for Charles Morgan, P.A., a law firm located in North Miami Beach, Florida. The Appraisal Report identified the law firm as the intended user and that the appraisal would be used in litigation. The stated purpose of the Appraisal Report was to provide a market value for the subject property. The subject property of the appraisal is located at 1500 Brickell Avenue, Miami, Florida.2/ The subject property is a unique parcel located on Brickell Avenue, near the heart of Miami's Financial District. The subject property's site is approximately 15,286 square feet with a 6,497 square foot building. The building is a French Chateau home constructed in 1928 by John Murrell, a prominent Miami attorney that helped develop Miami and Coral Gables. The subject property was the home of Mr. Murrell and his wife Ethel Murrell. Ms. Murrell was a noted attorney, author, lecturer and known as one of Florida's leading feminists. Consequently, the subject property has significant historical value. The building, as described by the Appraisal Report, "contains two octagonal towers with tent roof, parpet roof and dormers, crenellated garage roof, and trefoil arch windows with leaded and stained glass." Clearly, this is a unique historical building situated on one of Miami's most prestigious streets, Brickell Avenue. The Appraisal Report does not identify whether it is a self-contained appraisal report, a summary appraisal report or a restricted use appraisal report, as required by Standards Rule 2-2 of USPAP. Similarly, Mr. Butterfield's work file does not identify the type of appraisal he performed on the subject property. Rather, Mr. Butterfield's work file shows that he contracted to provide a "Commercial Narrative Appraisal Report." Mr. Butterfield's uncontradicted testimony that the Appraisal Report is a summary appraisal report for the intended user, a law firm, is credible. The complaint against Mr. Butterfield was instigated by Scott Taylor (Mr. Taylor). Mr. Taylor, a licensed residential appraiser, initially contacted Mr. Butterfield requesting assistance in appraising the subject property. Because the subject property appeared to be a commercial property, Mr. Taylor was not qualified to give an appraisal. Consequently, Mr. Taylor requested Mr. Butterfield's assistance. Mr. Taylor assisted Mr. Butterfield in the preparation of the appraisal with the taking of photographs and gathering of information. However, Mr. Taylor became unhappy with Mr. Butterfield concerning the payment of Mr. Taylor's fee. According to Mr. Butterfield, Mr. Taylor threatened to file a complaint with the Department, if Mr. Butterfield did not pay the fee. Mr. Butterfield refused to pay the disputed amount. Consequently, Mr. Taylor filed a complaint against Mr. Butterfield for perceived errors in the appraisal. The record contains no evidence that the intended user, the law firm, had any complaint concerning the quality of the work or that the law firm was misled by the Appraisal Report. The Department's expert witness, Mr. Spool, has 39 years of experience as an appraiser in the Miami-Dade, County area. Further, he has taught appraisal practice at Miami-Dade College, and published numerous articles concerning appraisal practice. Mr. Spool identified USPAP as the standards used by appraisers in conducting real estate appraisals. Further, he credibly testified that USPAP standards related to an appraiser using "reasonable diligence" in preparing an appraisal by requiring that the appraiser correctly use recognized methods and techniques to create a credible appraisal. The Appraisal Report contains Mr. Butterfield's certification that the appraisal was conducted in compliance with USPAP. The Department's case at the hearing proceeded to show that Mr. Butterfield did not use reasonable diligence in the preparation of the Appraisal Report along the following four general lines: The Highest and Best Use section of the Appraisal Report did not contain any supporting analyses or discussion; The Zoning section of the Appraisal Report did not contain any supporting analyses or discussion; The comparables used by Mr. Butterfield were inappropriate, and that he used an incorrect methodology for determining the subject property's market value; and The Appraisal Report contained numerous errors that call into question its credibility. Each of these areas is discussed separately in this Recommended Order. Highest and Best Use The Appraisal Report here sets out the Highest and Best Use of the subject property as following: The Highest and Best Use of the subject property could accommodate office usages. The structure represents a significant portion of the total value of the whole property. Therefore, due to the contributory value of the improvements and our estimate of the Highest and Best use of the subject property is its present usage, as would benefit an owner occupant, or as present building may generate lease income. The Appraisal Report's discussion of the subject property's highest and best use contains what could be best described as "boilerplate language," setting out definitions and the appropriate tests to be applied when reviewing the subject property.3/ Mr. Spool's criticism of the Appraisal Report is not that Mr. Butterfield reached an inappropriate conclusion, but rather the lack of analysis. Mr. Butterfield credibly testified, however, that this appraisal was a summary appraisal report, and that further analysis was not required. The undersigned rejects Mr. Spool's testimony that a more detailed analysis needed to be contained in the Appraisal Report because the report is a summary. A review of the appraisal shows that it summarized the highest and best use of subject property as its existing use. Consequently, the undersigned finds that Mr. Butterfield's determination of the subject property's highest and best use complied with USPAP 2-2(b). Moreover, the Comment to Standard 2-2(b)(vii) provides that "[b]ecause intended users' reliance on a appraisal may be affected by the scope of work, the report must enable them to be properly informed and not misled." In the instant case, the Department did not bring forward any evidence showing that the intended user, a law firm, had been misled by Mr. Butterfield's determination of the subject property's highest and best use. The record shows that the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield failed to use reasonable diligence in the preparation of the appraisal's determination of highest and best use. Zoning Mr. Butterfield specifically identified the subject property's zoning, at the time of the appraisal, as "R-3 Multi- Family with HC-Residential Office Heritage Conservation District overlay." Mr. Spool's criticism of the Appraisal Report's zoning section is that Mr. Butterfield's analysis is lacking. A review Appraisal Report's section titled zoning again includes mostly "boilerplate language" without analysis, as to the meaning of the zoning and historical overlay. However, considering that the Appraisal Report here is a summary appraisal report prepared for a law firm, the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield did not use reasonable diligence. There was no evidence that Mr. Butterfield's identification of the zoning, without further analysis, was a lack of reasonable diligence in the context of a summary. Moreover, there was no evidence that the intended user, the law firm, was misled by Mr. Butterfield's identification of the proper zoning, without a further analysis. Market Value Determination The Department questioned Mr. Butterfield's choice of his direct sales and rental comparisons, and his methodology in determining the subject property's market value. Mr. Spool offered properties that, in his opinion, were more appropriate comparisons with the subject property and questioned Mr. Butterfield's methodology. The discussion of each test used to determine the subject property's market value is discussed separately. Direct sales comparison The Appraisal Report here shows that Mr. Butterfield identified the three approaches used by appraisers to determine a property's market value: 1) the cost approach; 2) direct sales comparisons; and 3) an income approach. Further, the Appraisal Report shows that Mr. Butterfield used a direct sales comparison methodology and income approach to determine the subject property's market value. In the direct sales comparison, the Appraisal Report shows that Mr. Butterfield used four comparable direct sales within the location of the subject property for his analysis. Of the four comparable sales identified by Mr. Butterfield, one involved an office and three involved residential homes. The record shows that Mr. Butterfield chose to use both an office and residential properties in the sales comparison because both uses were permitted by the subject property's zoning. At the time of the appraisal, the subject property could have been used as either a residence or an office. Consequently, the direct sales comparison which included both office and residential sales was appropriate for valuing the subject property. Based on Mr. Butterfield's testimony and the Appraisal Report, the key consideration in choosing these comparable sales was the proximity to the subject property's Brickell Avenue address. Further, a review of Mr. Butterfield's work file shows that he considered numerous properties for direct sales comparisons in developing his market value opinion. The key factor for Mr. Butterfield in preparing his sales comparisons was the Brickell Avenue location. The undersigned finds Mr. Butterfield's testimony concerning his use of the comparative properties and methodology credible. Mr. Spool's first criticism was that Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect methodology in conducting the direct sales comparison. Specifically, Mr. Spool testified that the highest and best use of the property, as identified by Mr. Butterfield, was an office. Consequently, Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect methodology when he used direct sales from residences for comparison. In essence, the correct methodology required that any comparison be made with direct sales of office space or rather compare "apples to apples and oranges to oranges." Mr. Spool's criticism that Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect methodology is rejected because it is based on a wrong premise. Mr. Butterfield did not identify the subject property's highest and best use as only an office. The record shows that Mr. Butterfield identified the subject property's highest and best use as its permissible uses, which at the time was either a residence or office. Mr. Butterfield used reasonable diligence in comparing direct sales from nearby residences and an office in his analysis. Next, Mr. Spool identified other properties, which in his opinion, were more appropriate as sales comparisons, such as a historic home near the Miami River that had been converted into office space. However, the identification of other properties that could have been used by Mr. Butterfield does not show that Mr. Butterfield did not use reasonable diligence in preparing his report. It is noted that the properties offered by Mr. Spool did not share the Brickell Avenue address, which is highly desirable. Consequently, the undersigned finds that the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield failed to use reasonable diligence in the preparation of his direct sales comparison. Income approach Next, the Appraisal Report shows that Mr. Butterfield used an income approach to determine the subject property's market value. The record credibly shows that Mr. Butterfield identified four rental comparables all located on Brickell Avenue within close proximity to the subject property, and verified the rental rate per square foot in the range of $24.00 to $37.00 per square foot. Mr. Spool offered alternative properties that in his opinion were more appropriate for making a rental comparison. The crux of the Department's testimony was that Mr. Butterfield's use of rental space from new high rises was inappropriate for comparing with the subject property, which is an older property. The undersigned, however, finds that Mr. Butterfield's explanation that he chose comparable rental properties based on the Brickell Avenue address credible. Again, the fact that other properties may be used as comparable properties does not show that Mr. Butterfield did not prepare the Appraisal Report without reasonable diligence. Next, Mr. Spool's explanation that Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect methodology for determining an income approach by using residential properties is rejected. As found earlier, Mr. Butterfield determined that the subject property's highest and best use could be either as an office or residence. Therefore, it was appropriate to determine the rental income from residences and office space. Moreover, the record shows that Mr. Butterfield gathered information to determine the per square-foot income. Therefore, the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield failed to use reasonable diligence in the preparation of the appraisal's income approach analysis. Miscellaneous Errors The Appraisal Report does contain several admitted errors. Examples of the errors are that the Appraisal Report wrongly indicates that ingress and egress to the subject property was from Brickell Avenue; that Brickell Avenue was a minor north-south thoroughfare; that the three residences used for direct sales comparison were "historic," as opposed to being located in "historic South Miami"; that it failed to designate the type of appraisal that was conducted; and that it did not state in the certification that Mr. Butterfield had not personally viewed the subject property. The undersigned finds that these errors do not rise to the level of showing a lack of reasonable diligence or could mislead the intended user. For example, the Appraisal Report attached photographs of the three residences used in the direct sales comparison. The photographs clearly show that the three residences were not historical homes, but modern construction. Therefore, it is clear that Mr. Butterfield took steps to insure that the intended user of the report would know the type of residences which were being used for comparison with the subject property. Moreover, concerning the errors about Brickell Avenue, one could safely assume that a law firm in Miami Beach would know that Brickell Avenue is a major and desirable location in Miami. Therefore, the undersigned finds that although the appraisal contains errors, which were admitted by Mr. Butterfield, those errors are not of such a nature as to show a lack of reasonable diligence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Mr. Butterfield. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 2012.
