The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the terms, conditions, privileges, or provision of services in connection with the rental of a dwelling from Respondent, based on her race, in violation of section 804(b) or 804(f) of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2011).
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and manages the Country Club Woods residential community in Starke, Florida. Country Club Woods is a racially-mixed community. The current residential mix includes 29 African-American families and 6 white families. County Club Woods receives low-income housing subsidies in the form of tax credits through the Florida Housing Finance Corporation. Some residents qualify for federal Section 8 housing subsidies. Petitioner is African-American. On February 4, 2011, Petitioner signed a lease agreement for a home in Country Club Woods. Rent was $698.00 per month. The home was vacant, and power and water had been turned off. Respondent asked Petitioner to activate power and water so that repairs and unit preparation could be performed, and she did so. Petitioner?s rent for February was partially prorated to account for the period during which she did not occupy the unit. The lease agreement required that all occupants of the house be listed, and provided that “[n]o other occupants are permitted.” Guests were limited to stays of no more than 14 consecutive days. Due to the status of Country Club Woods as an affordable housing community, it is subject to restrictions on the income and criminal history of its residents. Therefore, all permanent occupants are required to undergo income and background screening to ensure that the low income housing tax credit rules are being met. The failure to do so could jeopardize the tax credits. When she signed the lease, Petitioner knew what the lease required regarding the occupancy of the house. Petitioner listed Aulettia Russ and Aarian Russ, her daughter and son, as occupants with her in the home. After the lease contract was signed, Respondent performed a few repairs and updates to prepare the unit for Petitioner. Mr. Sam Baker, who performed maintenance services for County Club Woods, fumigated the house and painted some of the interior walls. He performed a minor repair to the roof, which consisted of applying tar around the cracked rubber boot of the roof drain vent. Mr. Baker moved a stove into the house from another unit because there was no stove when the lease was signed. He also replaced the toilet with a new one. Petitioner moved into the unit on February 16, 2010. She was joined by her fiancé, Kevin Sampson, and her older son, Kelsy Roulhac, neither of whom were listed as occupants. Mr. Sampson was on probation for several felony offenses. Both Mr. Sampson and Mr. Roulhac were residents for the entirety of Petitioner?s tenancy. At no time during the tenancy did Petitioner seek to add Mr. Sampson or Mr. Roulhac to the lease. Petitioner testified that Rebekkah Baker, the property manager, knew that Mr. Sampson was a permanent occupant, but had no objection. Ms. Baker denied that she consented to his occupancy, given that it would have been a violation of Country Club Woods policy against leasing to persons with a criminal history in the past seven years. Given the consequences of failing to meet the occupancy and background screening requirements, Ms. Baker?s testimony is credited. When Petitioner moved in, there were still problems with the unit. Problems noted by Petitioner included a broken dishwasher, mildew on a number of surfaces, dead insects -- likely from the fumigation -- in the cabinets, a hole in the foyer wall caused by the adjacent door?s doorknob, a ceiling stain from the roof leak, a missing shower head, a broken light fixture, and a missing smoke alarm. In addition, the carpet was stained and in generally very poor condition. Petitioner resolved the mildew problem by cleaning the affected surfaces with Tilex. Petitioner?s son, Mr. Roulhac, got rid of the dead insects and cleaned the cabinets. Petitioner replaced the showerhead on her own. Shortly after she moved in, Petitioner notified Respondent that her roof was leaking. Mr. Baker went to the house, advised Petitioner?s daughter that he was there to fix the roof, and went onto the roof. He determined that the leak was occurring at the location of his previous repair. He completed the repair by re-tarring the roof drain vent boot. Petitioner testified that the roof continued to leak after heavy rains. She indicated that she made a subsequent complaint via a message left on Ms. Baker?s telephone answering machine. Ms. Baker testified that she received no subsequent complaints, and there is no other evidence to suggest that Respondent received any subsequent complaints regarding the roof. Mr. Baker performed no further repairs. Petitioner complained that the dishwasher was holding water. She testified that Respondent never came to fix the dishwasher. Both Mr. Baker and Ms. Baker testified that Mr. Baker was tasked to repair the dishwasher, but upon arriving at the house was denied entry, with the explanation that the dishwasher had been fixed by a friend, and the problem resolved by removing a plastic fork that had clogged the drain. From the time Petitioner moved in, until the time she vacated the home, Mr. Baker fixed the hole in the foyer wall and the broken light fixture. In addition, Mr. Baker came to the house to fix the refrigerator, which was a problem that was not on the original list. From the beginning of her tenancy, Petitioner complained of the carpet. The carpet was badly stained and worn. In addition, the carpet contained a dye or some other substance that aggravated Aarian Russ?s asthma. It was Petitioner?s desire to have the carpet replaced before the time of her daughter?s graduation. Respondent agreed to replace the carpet, and had employees of a flooring company go to Petitioner?s house to measure for new carpet. The flooring company employees were allowed entry to the house by Petitioner?s daughter. They measured the rooms, except for Petitioner?s bedroom, which was locked. Respondent advised Petitioner that the measurements of the bedroom of an identical unit could be provided to the carpet company. It is not known if that was done. Due to difficulties on the part of the flooring company, the new carpet was not installed before Petitioner vacated the unit. There was no evidence offered to suggest any relationship between the failure to install new carpet and Petitioner?s race. Petitioner complained that she had not been given notice that the flooring company employees were coming, and complained that Respondent had not performed a background check on the workers. She argued that she was entitled to have a background check done on anyone providing services before she would have to allow them into her home. There is no relationship between Petitioner?s complaints regarding the lack of a background check on the workers and Petitioner?s race. The lease agreement provides that “[m]anagement will make repairs . . . after receipt of written notice.” Respondent occasionally prepared work orders describing the nature of the problem at a unit, and the work done to resolve the problem. However, the evidence demonstrates that written work orders were likely the exception rather than the rule. It appears that most problems were reported by verbal requests, and resolved by Mr. Baker?s maintenance and repairs. Most of Petitioner?s requests for repairs and maintenance were made verbally. At some point, due to the number of items, Petitioner provided Respondent with a list of items for repair. There is no evidence that any repairs at Petitioner?s home were documented with a work order. In any event, there was no evidence that the failure to document the work, which was common, was the result of Petitioner?s race. Petitioner did submit seven work orders in evidence. Six of the work orders reflected repairs made by Respondent to the homes of African-American families upon verbal requests. One of the work orders reflected repairs made by Respondent to the home of a white family upon a verbal request. Petitioner questioned why none of her repairs were memorialized in work orders. The work orders do not substantiate that Petitioner was discriminated against on account of her race, and in fact serve to indicate that Respondent provided maintenance services equally, without any consideration to the race of the person requesting such services. Petitioner complained that Mr. Baker did not have “credentials,” and questioned him regarding any education or licenses that qualified him to perform maintenance, including electrical work. Whether qualified to do so or not, Mr. Baker performed maintenance for all of the residents of Country Club Woods, regardless of their race. There is no relationship between Petitioner?s complaints regarding Mr. Baker?s credentials and Petitioner?s race. Beginning in April, 2011, Petitioner began to fall behind on her rent. Petitioner was paid bi-weekly, though how that affected her ability to plan for monthly rental payments was not clearly explained. On April 21, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on Petitioner?s door demanding that the $279.60 balance of the April rent payment be made. Petitioner denied having seen the notice. However, the copy of the notice put in evidence includes the notation from Ms. Baker that “[p]romised to pay balance w/ May 2011?s rent.” On May 9, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on Petitioner?s door demanding that the rent payment be made. The amount in arrears was calculated to be $1,077.60, which included a late fee. Petitioner denied having seen the notice. However, the copy of the notice put in evidence includes the notation from Ms. Baker that “pd. $698 on 5/11/11.” On June 1, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on Petitioner?s door demanding that the rent payment be made. The amount in arrears remained at $1,077.60. Petitioner denied having seen the notice. On July 27, 2011, Respondent provided a notice to Petitioner indicating that due to unauthorized occupants and $1,975 in unpaid rent, Petitioner had until August 1, 2011, to vacate the premises, or Respondent would commence eviction proceedings. Petitioner admitted to having received that notice. Respondent?s resident history report indicates that by the time Petitioner vacated the home on August 31, 2011, her rent was $2,075.60 in arrears. Some of that was due to assessed late charges, but the majority reflected unpaid rent. When Petitioner vacated the unit, Petitioner?s security deposit was applied, the remaining arrearage was assigned to a collection company, and Respondent?s books were cleared. Ms. Sheila Palmer and Ms. Tynesha Epps testified at the hearing. They have been residents of Country Club Woods for 16 years and for 1 year and 3 months, respectively. Both are African-American. Both testified that they had never been refused maintenance at their homes, and that Respondent was responsive to their requests for maintenance which were generally verbal. Neither Ms. Palmer nor Ms. Epps was aware of any instance in which management of Country Club Woods had discriminated against any tenant due to their race, though neither personally knew Petitioner. Ms. Headrick, Ms. Baker, and Mr. Baker each testified that they never denied or limited repair and maintenance services to any resident of Country Club Woods account of their race. They each testified convincingly that race played no factor in their duties to their tenants. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent failed or refused to provide services to Petitioner under the same terms and conditions that were applicable to all persons residing in the Country Club Woods community. There was not a scintilla of evidence that, in providing services to Petitioner, Respondent deviated from its standard practice of providing maintenance services to all residents of Country Club Woods regardless of their race, income, or any other reason. The evidence does support a finding that Petitioner materially breached the terms of the lease agreement, both by allowing undisclosed persons to reside at the house, and by failing to timely pay rent. Petitioner?s race had nothing to do with the timing or manner in which maintenance and repair services were provided to her by Respondent, and it is expressly so found. The evidence did not demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0004. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Eulinda M. Russ Post Office Box 902 Starke, Florida 32091 Sean Michael Murrell, Esquire Murrell Law, LLC 4651 Salisbury Road South, Suite 503 Jacksonville, Florida 32256 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The Applicant is the owner of approximately 799.58 acres of land (hereinafter referred to as the "Country Club Property"), located on Loch Rane Boulevard, Clay County, Florida. In the early part of 1987, the Applicant applied to rezone the Country Club Property as a planned unit development district (hereinafter referred to as a "PUD"). The Country Club Property is to be developed in phases. At issue in this proceeding is that portion of the Country Club Property other than Unit One, which consists of lots 1 through 295. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied Upon by the Applicant. Prior to approving the rezoning of the Country Club Property requested in the early part of 1987, Clay County advised the Applicant that it would be required to commit to resignalize and expand the Loch Rane/Blanding Boulevards interchange as a condition to Clay County approving the rezoning of the Country Club Property as a PUD. Clay County approved the requested rezoning of, and the master land use plan for, the Country Club Property on March 24, 1987. The master land use plan specifies that the Country Club Property will include development of the following: (a) up to 599 single-family dwelling units within the residential portion; (b) ten acres of commercial uses, including retail shops, a day-care center and a restaurant; (c) a sales center; and (d) a golf course and club facilities. Engineering plans for phase one of the proposed development were submitted to Clay County in 1987. As part of the engineering plans, the Applicant obtained permits from the Army Corps of Engineers, the St. Johns' River Water Management District and the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation. The plat for phase one of the Country Club Property was submitted to Clay County and on May 12, 1987, Clay County approved the final plat for phase one. In April, 1989, the Applicant applied for building permits for construction of the golf course clubhouse, pool facilities and the golf cart storage barn. Permits for these facilities were issued by Clay County in October, 1989. In 1991, engineering plans for phase two of the Country Club Property were submitted to Clay County. They were approved effective January 1, 1992. On February 12, 1993, Clay County issued a Vested Property Certificate for phase one of the development, Lots 1 through 295 of Unit One, pursuant to Section 20.8-6 of the Vested Rights Review Ordinance of Clay County, Florida. The Applicant's Detrimental Reliance. In reliance on Clay County's actions in approving the PUD rezoning and accompanying master plan and the engineering plans for phase one and phase two, the Applicant constructed master infrastructure improvements for the project. Improvements have included drainage, water and sewer systems, a master road system designed and sized to serve the entire development at a cost of approximately $4,972,670.00. These improvements were made between November, 1988 and April, 1990. The Applicant has also constructed the entry features for the Country Club Property, master recreational facilities, including an eighteen-hole golf course, golf course clubhouse, pool and tennis facilities and a sales center. Total costs of these improvements were approximately $7,224,917.00. These improvements were made between November, 1988 and April, 1990. Finally, the Applicant has resignalized and expanded the Loch Rane/Blanding Boulevards interchange. The cost of these improvements was approximately $72,000.00. These improvements were made between October, 1991 and January, 1992. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. Pursuant to the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan, the portion of Blanding Boulevard impacted by the Country Club Property development does not have sufficient capacity to develop the property as proposed. To comply with the comprehensive plan will require considerable delays in completion of the project which will result in a substantial adverse financial impact on the Applicants. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended by Clay County Ordinance 92-22 have been met.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon Petitioner’s race or handicap in providing housing assistance. Whether Respondent, in providing housing assistance, failed to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner’s physical disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and his family have been in subsidized housing for many years. Most recently, housing assistance has been provided by the Alachua County Housing Authority, first through the Tenant Based Rental Assistance (TBRA) program and, currently, through Section 8 subsidized housing. At the time of the administrative hearing, Petitioner and his family were still in Section 8 housing administered by Respondent. Under the TBRA program, the Castellio family was required to meet regularly with Housing Authority staff and their affiliates. They also had to meet certain performance standards relative to employment searches and maintenance of the household. Petitioner’s family was often unable to meet those performance standards-–particularly with respect to employment and payment of electrical bills. Because of his interactions with Respondent's staff, Petitioner had earned the reputation of being loud, demanding, and physically imposing. In one incident, Petitioner tried to prevent one of Respondent's workers from mowing his yard by physically blocking the lawn mower, even though such maintenance was required under the government program and was also an issue of local code enforcement. More than one of Respondent's staff reported that Petitioner would raise his voice when he was in Respondent's Housing Authority office. Some of Respondent's staff were intimidated by Petitioner. Because of this, the director of the Alachua Housing Authority, Gail Monahan, was tasked with dealing with Petitioner and the Castellio family. The pertinent part of Petitioner's Complaint states: My name is Christopher S.A. Castellio. My wife's name is Ethelyn L. Reese-Castello. We are the proud parents of five children which ages are 5, 7, 9, 11, and 16. Our 16 year old is living in Bend, Oregon with his uncle who has more resources to provide for him. Approximately for two years now, my family and I have lived on Section 8 through the Alachua County Housing Authority here in Gainesville, Florida. We have to report to the Executive Director of the Alachua County Housing Authority, Ms. Gail Monahan, every Wednesday of every week in order to report progress of trying to become self supporting and financial independent. During this time I have been humiliated in front of my wife, Ms. Monahan's office staff, other customers and patrons and, most humiliating, in front of my own kids. Ms. Gail Monahan has absolutely no compassion, professionalism, or moral conduct. Ms. Gail Monahan has called me everything but a child of God. In front of my kids, she has called me a lying sack of s-t, a sorry son of a b--h, a con artist, a--hole, and an f--wad. One day I just walked into her office and the first thing she said was, "hay you little s--tbird, what have you done s--ted out today." I served 6 years in the United States Marine Corps during Desert Storm from 1986 until 1992. While serving I injured my knee in Kuwait. I returned to the states where I underwent knee surgery. I was honorably discharged several months later. Ms. Monahan says I'm lying about my service, despite my service and medical records. Right now I am in constant pain in both my knees and my back. I have taken two MRI's for both knees and my doctor says that I desperately need a total right knee replacement and a basic left knee operation based on my MRI's. Ms. Monahan also says that's a lie. And she refuses to look at any doctor's reports. She said I probably faked them. Ever since I've been meeting with Ms. Monahan she has always had something discrimitory [sic], degrading, intimidating, and threaten [sic] to say to me. She always threatens to take our housing away from us, like she's doing right now, if we don't do exactly what she says to do. I do believe that she is prejudice [sic] against me because I am a very, very light-skinned black man with red hair and freckles. I do look like a white man to most people and my wife is very dark skinned African American. We have done everything she has told us to do but still she says that we have done nothing. She does not take into consideration the bad economy and that jobs are very hard to come by and that more and more people are being laid off every day. So she is going to make a family with 4 small children become homeless just because I can't work because of my back and my knees and because my wife couldn't find a job in today's economy. By the way, my wife has finally found a job working at Wal-mart. We finally received a letter from Ms. Monahan informing us of the termination of tenant based rental assistance. In the allotted time of seven working days, I have answered her letter in writing, requesting a hearing to appeal her decision. As of the date of this letter, I have not received anything or any notice of any hearing from Ms. Monahan. I will fax you a copy of both letters. Our move out date has been set as December 31st, 2009. Consistent with his Complaint, Petitioner testified that Ms. Monahan, the director of the Alachua County Housing Authority treated him badly, believed he was lazy, and questioned whether he suffered from a physical disability. In further support of the allegations, Petitioner’s wife, Ms. Reese-Castellio, testified that Gail Monahan was “mean” to their family. According to Ms. Reese-Castellio, Ms. Monahan called Petitioner a liar, said that he “didn’t give a damn” about his family, and suggested to her that she should consider leaving Petitioner. At the final hearing, Ms. Monahan admitted that she did not respect Mr. Castellio because he did not appear to be making any effort to support his family. She denied, however, that she cursed at him, and testified that she never discriminated against Petitioner or his family. While it is clear that there was personal animosity between Petitioner and Ms. Monahan, the evidence was insufficient to show that either Ms. Monahan or Respondent discriminated against Petitioner or his family. On cross-examination, Ms. Reese-Castellio disclosed that Ms. Monahan's remarks were only directed toward Petitioner, and that Ms. Monahan did not use racial epithets or otherwise give any indication that she was discriminating against Petitioner or his family because of race, handicap, or any other impermissible factor. Petitioner's wife further testified that she had no complaints about any of the other staff members at the Housing Authority. Likewise, Petitioner failed to provide evidence that either Ms. Monahan or Respondent has ever acted in a discriminatory manner toward him or his family based on race, ethnicity, handicap, or any other impermissible basis. Further, the evidence presented at the final hearing did not show that either Petitioner or his family have ever been denied housing assistance by Respondent. In fact, the evidence revealed that Petitioner and his family’s housing benefits administered by Respondent have never been interrupted or denied, and that the Castellio family has been treated at least as well, if not better, than other housing clients served by Respondent. In addition to administering basic housing benefits under TBRA and the Section 8 program, Respondent arranged to pay over $1,300 to repair Petitioner’s family car, paid for utilities when the Castellios were unable to do so, and provided bus vouchers and other transportation for the family on a regular basis. Respondent’s decision to provide these additional benefits was made by Ms. Monahan. At the final hearing, both Petitioner and his wife confirmed that Respondent had provided additional assistance and that Gail Monahan had control over these additional benefits. Neither Petitioner nor Ms. Reese-Castellio offered an explanation for why Ms. Monahan would go “above and beyond” the requirements of subsidized housing in order to assist the Castellio family. Ms. Monahan, in her credible testimony, explained that she had considerable compassion for Ethelyn Castellio and the Petitioner’s children, and that her compassion led her to offer extensive support for the Castellio family beyond simple housing assistance. Although Petitioner testified that the family was rejected as potential tenants at an apartment complex known as “Eden Park” after initially being accepted by the private landlord, and said that he believed that Gail Monahan had something to do with the rejection, Petitioner offered no evidence to support that belief. Ms. Monahan stated that neither she nor anyone from the Housing Authority spoke to anyone at Eden Park regarding the Petitioner or his family. She explained that tenants are responsible for locating suitable housing which is then inspected and approved by the Housing Authority. The credible testimony of Ms. Monahan, together with Petitioner's own testimony and admissions, demonstrated that Respondent did not interfere in the Eden Park situation, and never delayed inspections or unreasonably rejected any housing benefits for the Castellio family. In addition, while indeed, as alleged in the Complaint, Respondent issued a letter informing Petitioner that his family's rental assistance was scheduled to be terminated, the evidence adduced at the final hearing showed that the letter was issued in error, and that it was withdrawn. Finally, while the Commission states on page 5 of its Determination of no cause dated February 16, 2010, that “Complainant alleged he requested a reasonable accommodation, and Respondents denied his request,” a plain reading of the Complaint, quoted in paragraph 7, above, does not reveal that Petitioner ever alleged that Respondent failed to accommodate his disability. Moreover, the applications Petitioner and his family filed in 2008 and 2009 to obtain housing assistance from the Respondent state that the family was not seeking any accommodations on account of disability and that no one in the family suffered from any physical handicap. At the final hearing, Petitioner confirmed that the family never asked Respondent for accommodation based on any physical disability and reported in their applications that no member of the family was handicapped or required an accommodation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2011)1/.
Findings Of Fact Background Respondents Hoyt and Nancy Davis (the Davises) own a residential property located at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, Florida (the Property). The Property is utilized exclusively as a rental. Respondent Florida Coastal Jacksonville Realty, Inc. ("Florida Coastal") and its principal John McMenamy ("McMenamy") acted as listing agents for the Property (collectively, the "Broker Respondents"). Mr. McMenamy and his company have managed the rental of the Property for approximately six years. In association with their listing of the Property, the Broker Respondents were responsible for advertising, showing, accepting applications for and assisting in the selection of tenants for the Property. At the time of the events in question, the Property was being offered for lease at a rate of $1,450 per month. Generally, due to its location within a St. Johns County golf community and proximity to good schools, the Property rents easily and quickly. The Rental Applications On May 14, 2010, Petitioner Jaime Terry (Mrs. Terry) contacted McMenamy regarding the Property. McMenamy instructed Mrs. Terry on the rental application process. On the afternoon of Sunday, May 16, 2010, Petitioners submitted via e-mail their rental application, dated May 15, 2010. On their application, the Petitioners disclosed that they had previously declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy was entered in December 2007 and discharged in January 2009. Petitioners also disclosed that they were currently living with Mrs. Terry's parents. The application included a statement of the Terrys' monthly income, and also disclosed that they had three children residing with them -- aged eleven, five and two at the time. A memo attached to the application elaborated on the bankruptcy and other details of their employment and financial situation. Mrs. Terry testified that during the application process the Respondents did not solicit additional information concerning her employment history. On May 18, 2010, McMenamy ran a credit check on the Terrys using the "Online Rental Exchange." The credit report for Jaime Terry reflected a credit score of 664, while Steven Terry's assigned score was 649. However, both reports noted "conditional" approval because of the bankruptcy filing. Although the exact date is unknown, at approximately the same time that the Terrys submitted their application, another couple, Rick and Jessica Egger (the Eggers) contacted McMenamy regarding their interest in possibly renting the Property. On the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010, the Eggers formally submitted an application to rent the Property. The Eggers' application disclosed that, unlike the Terrys', they did not have a bankruptcy in their history. In addition, the Eggers' combined monthly income was higher than the Terrys'2/ and the younger of their two children was nine years old. The credit report obtained for the Eggers reflected a credit score of 672 for Jessica Egger and 696 for Rick Egger, with an unconditional approval rating. Respondents' Tenant Selection Process McMenamy testified that in evaluating applications, potential tenants must meet certain minimum criteria. Factors he considers in assessing applicants include credit checks, criminal background checks, employment status, and rental history. However, he agreed that the evaluation process he uses is subjective. McMenamy acknowledged that bankruptcy would not automatically disqualify a potential tenant, and in fact, confirmed that he has rented to tenants who have a bankruptcy in their history. With regard to credit scores, McMenamy testified that he considered a score below 500 to be unacceptable. Mrs. Davis testified that McMenamy manages the entire process of renting the Property on behalf of herself and her husband. Once McMenamy determines the suitability of a prospective tenant, he discusses that tenant with the Davises. McMenamy does not discuss applicants with the Davises that he does not consider eligible. The Davises do not participate in the background screening process and they do not review applicants' credit ratings. However, Mrs. Davis was aware of McMenamy's process for selecting tenants, and she confirmed her understanding that applicants must meet certain minimum requirements. In selecting a tenant, McMenamy looks not only for a candidate that is financially qualified, but also one who will rent the property for a significant period of time, will take good care of the property, and will make monthly rent payments in a timely manner, according to Mrs. Davis. Denial of Petitioners' Lease Application Mr. Davis testified that he and Mrs. Davis discussed the Petitioners' application with McMenamy. At hearing, Mr. Davis recounted that conversation as follows: Cross-examination by Mr. Organes: Q. Mr. Davis, you stated that you had discussed with Mr. McMenamy the application of Steven and Jaime Terry? A. Yes. Q. And that’s a common practice with Mr. McMenamy as when he receives reasonably qualified applicants, he discusses them with you? A. Yes. Q. And that’s what he did with the Terrys? A. Yes. Q. And you said you did not tell him not to rent to them because of their children? A. That is true, we did not tell him. Q. The issue of children wasn’t discussed at all? A. No. Q. What reason did you give him to tell them why their application was being denied? A. Because of their past rental history and their bankruptcy foreclosure. Q. In general if you don’t approve of an applicant, what reason would you give for denying that applicant? A. I would give that reason, that we didn’t feel that, you know, we probably would get a better applicant and the reason we turned them down is because we didn’t feel that they were suitable for our rental. There is no evidence in this record as to precisely when the above conversation between the Respondents took place, although based upon Mr. Davis's statement that "we probably would get a better applicant" it is reasonable to infer that it was prior to the Eggers submitting their application on the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010.3/ Early on the morning of Friday, May 21, 2010, McMenamy sent an e-mail to Ms. Terry, which read: Jaime I left a message yesterday but did not hear from you. I spoke to the owner about the application and she was concerned about not really having any rental history and the number of small children. She is a perfectionist and just had the home professionally painted. The one family who lived there had small children and there were handprints all over the walls so that it needed to be repainted. So this was her main concern and therefore does not want to rent to you and the family. If you have any questions please call. Sincerely, John At hearing, Mrs. Davis maintained that the Petitioners' children were not the determining factor in the decision to deny their application. Rather, it was based on their finances and lack of rental history. Consistent with Mr. Davis's testimony, Mrs. Davis also testified that she and her husband did not instruct McMenamy to reject the Petitioners' application because of their children. After being informed that their application was denied, Petitioners immediately began searching for alternate housing. Mrs. Terry testified that their primary concern was to locate a rental in a high quality school district. Within a couple of weeks of receiving the denial e-mail from McMenamy, the Terrys located a home at 983 Lilac Loop, St. Johns, Florida. Petitioners entered into a lease for this property on June 6, 2010; the rent was $ 1,200 per month. Although the Lilac Loop home was acceptable, the Terrys considered it to be inferior to the Property, and Petitioners paid to have the home repainted and wired for cable access. The cable installation fee was $150.00. On September 22, 2010, Petitioners were notified that the Lilac Loop house was in foreclosure. Petitioners appealed to a default-law organization in an attempt to enforce their one-year lease, but were ultimately unsuccessful. As a result of the foreclosure, Petitioners were forced to seek alternative housing within the same school district, and in November 2010, leased a property at 1528 Summerdown Way, Fruit Cove, Florida, 32259. The monthly rent at 1528 Summerdown Way was $1,600 monthly. Petitioners also incurred additional expenses necessitated by hiring a moving service, in the amount of $773.50. At of the hearing, Petitioners continued to reside in the Summerdown Way rental. The Commission Investigation On August 16, 2010, the Terrys filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with HUD alleging they had been unlawfully discriminated against by Respondents based upon their familial status. Thereafter, the Commission opened an investigation of the allegation. As part of that investigation, Respondents were invited to submit written statements setting forth their version of the events at issue, and any defenses to the allegation they wished to raise. On August 19, 2010, the Davises submitted a written statement to the FCHR. In the first paragraph of that submittal the Davises stated: To Whom it May Concern: We enlisted realtor John MaMenamy to find a new tenant for our rental house at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, FL 32092. Mr. McMenamy was told that we preferred not to rent to someone with more than one, if any, very small children at this particular time. The reason being we just had to have the interior of the house professionally repainted and repairs made to several areas, the walls in particular. Additionally, in light of the fact there were several highly qualified persons interested in and looking at the house concurrently. The submittal continued by identifying four former tenants of the Property, as well as the current tenants (the Eggers), all of whom had children living with them. It is found that McMenamy's e-mail of May 21, 2010, and the Davises' letter of August 19, 2010, constitute direct evidence that Respondents' decision not to rent to Petitioners was based upon their familial status. The testimony of McMenamy and the Davises that familial status was not the reason for refusing to rent to Petitioners is rejected as not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against the Terrys in violation of section 760.23(1) and (2), and prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact At times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, a female born in October 1953, received housing assistance from a federally funded assistance program referred to as the Section 8 Choice Voucher program (the Section 8 program). The Section 8 program relevant to this proceeding is administered by Respondent and has eligibility criteria that a participant must meet. A participant receives a voucher from the Section 8 program that pays part, but not all, of the participant’s rent. Petitioner has also received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) at all times relevant to this proceeding. Respondent knew that Petitioner received SSI, but it had no information as to why she qualified to receive SSI. At the times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner’s landlord was named Rupert Phipps. On May 27, 2007, Mr. Phipps issued to Petitioner a notice styled “Three-day Notice for Non- payment of Rent pursuant to Florida Statutes" (Notice). After stating the amount owed and the address of the rented premises, the Notice demanded “. . . payment of the rent or possession of the Premises within three days (excluding Saturday, Sunday and legal holidays). ” Petitioner was evicted from her apartment. The date of the eviction was not established. After being advised by Mr. Phipps that Petitioner had failed to pay her rent, Ms. Smith mailed to Petitioner a certified letter dated July 6, 2007, stating that she would be terminated from the Section 8 program effective August 6, 2007. The stated reason for the termination was Petitioner’s failure to pay rent to the landlord, which is considered a serious violation of the lease and, therefore, a violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982,511(4)(c), which prohibits a participant in the Section 8 program from committing any serious or repeated violation of the lease with the participant’s landlord. Ms. Smith’s letter also contained the following statement: . . . If you wish to appeal this decision, you have the right to an informal hearing. The request must be submitted to this agency in writing within 10 days from the date of this letter. Your request should be directed to Alex Morales, Executive Director. The ten-day period for the appeal is part of Respondent’s written policies and is consistent with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 982.554(a), that require an agency such as Respondent to have a written appeals process. Respondent has consistently treated the failure of a participant to pay his or her share of the rent as a serious violation of a lease. Petitioner was familiar with Respondent’s appeal process because she had successfully appealed a prior notice of termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Ms. Smith’s letter was received by Petitioner on July 7, 2007. At some undetermined time between July 7 and July 19, 2007, Ms. Tennie called Ms. Smith and told Ms. Smith that she was sick. Ms. Smith told Ms. Tennie that she would have to follow the instructions set forth in the letter and respond in writing if she wanted an informal appeal. On July 19, 2007, Petitioner sent the following letter to the attention of Ms. Smith and Mr. Morales: Would you give me Mae Tennie another hearing because I got the letter to [sic] late and I was in the hospital due to an anurism [sic] stroke at the brain their [sic] was blood on my head and I’m still rehabilitating the after affects [sic] of this serious condition. In the case of my Section 8 voucher being terminated I plead for another hearing due to the terms [sic] of my hospitalization. Respondent received Petitioner’s letter on July 23, 2007. Petitioner’s written request for an appeal was after the ten-day deadline for filing the request. By letter signed by Mr. Morales and dated July 25, 2007, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request contained in her letter dated July 19 as follows: I am in receipt of your letter requesting a hearing. Please be advised that your request for a hearing cannot be granted because your request was not made within the required 10 day period. For this reason, your case will remain closed. No further action was taken by either party to this proceeding until December 2007, when Petitioner sought the services of Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc. On December 20, 2007, Mr. Lewis, as counsel for Petitioner, sent the following letter to Mr. Morales: This office represents Ms. Mae Tennie regarding her participation in the Section 8 program administered through the Hialeah Housing Authority (“HHA”). Ms. Tennie has been a participant of Section 8 through HHA for the past 25 years. On July 6, 2007, HHA served Ms. Tennie with notice of its intent to terminate her Section 8 assistance on the basis that she violated one of her obligations under the program. The notice informed Ms. Tennie of her right to appeal the decision and to attend an informal hearing. The written request was to be submitted to HHA within 10 days of the date of the letter. Ms. Tennie faxed her written request for an appeal on July 19, 2007. A copy of Ms. Tennie’s letter is attached as “Attachment A.” In her request, she notified HHA that she was unable to submit her request within the time required because she [had] been, and still was, recovering from a brain aneurism.[2] On or about July 31, 2007, HHA notified Ms. Tennie that her request was denied because it was submitted too late. Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie with an informal hearing to appeal the termination. Ms. Tennie is an elderly woman in failing health. In June 2007, Ms. Tennie was hospitalized twice at Jackson South Community Hospital as a result of suffering an “intracranial hemorrhage.”[3] I have attached copies of supporting medical documentation as “Attachment B.” As a result of this very serious medical condition, Ms. Tennie’s cognitive abilities were significantly diminished. Ms. Tennie was bed-bound and only able to communicate under great strain. The Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits [sic] any agency or landlord receiving federal funds to deny equal access for individuals with disabilities to housing or other program benefits and services. To ensure individuals with disabilities have equal access to those services and benefits, an agency or landlord is required to provide reasonable accommodations to that person’s disability. One form of reasonable accommodations is the modification of a program rule or policy. The right to a hearing to appeal the termination of Section 8 assistance is a benefit that Ms. Tennie, as a participant, was entitled to. Ms. Tennie made clear in her letter to HHA that she was unable to comply with HHA’s time requirement because of her disabling medical condition. Ms. Tennie also asked that the policy be modified to accommodate her disability. HHA should have reasonably accommodated Ms. Tennie’s disability by simply modifying the time period by adding 3 extra days for her to submit her request for a hearing. By failing to do so, HHA effectively denied Ms. Tennie equal access to federal benefit under the Section 8 program, that of having a hearing to appeal her termination. Ms. Tennie is therefore renewing her request to HHA for reasonable accommodations to her disability by modifying the time limit to request a hearing. For the above reasons, Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie a hearing to challenge her termination from Section 8. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or additional information at ... . [telephone number omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] By letter dated December 26, 2007, Respondent denied the request set forth in Mr. Lewis’s letter. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the complaint with HUD that culminated in this proceeding as described in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Ms. Tennie was hospitalized June 7, 2007, and discharged June 14, 2007. Mr. Lewis attached to his letter a discharge summary from Jackson Memorial Hospital, which contained the following diagnoses on discharge: Intracranial hemorrhage with intraventricular extension secondary to uncontrolled hypertension. Diabetes. The discharge summary reflects that Petitioner had fallen the Saturday before admission and had hit her head on a doorknob. The discharge summary reflects that on discharge she was awake, alert, and oriented times three. She had fluent speech and she was able to ambulate without difficulty. She was instructed to make an appointment with her primary care doctor in one week and to follow up in the Jackson Memorial’s Stroke Clinic in 4 to 8 weeks. Petitioner was discharged to home in a stable condition. Petitioner scheduled an appointment with Milton R. Bengoa, M.D., and on June 18, 2007, she kept that appointment. No finding is made as to Petitioner’s physical status as determined by Dr. Bengoa because nearly all of his notes of that meeting are illegible. In response to questions from her attorney, Petitioner testified as follows beginning at page 27, line 12: Q. And Ms. Tennie, can you please describe what your current health conditions are? A. Right now it’s not very good, because after I had the aneurism I have been having problems walking and problems breathing and I have seizures that I never had before until I had the aneurism and I take all kinds of medicines. And I just found out last week I have a brain mass and they don’t know if it is cancer or what, because the blood that was left in my head was still there so I have excruciating headaches. Q. And could you please explain what your health condition was at or about the time you suffered the stroke or shortly after you had suffered the stroke? A. Well, shortly after I suffered the stroke I had to try and walk all over again, because my memory where I had the stroke at, the neurologist said that it was so deep in my brain that they couldn’t do surgery and that it was going to mess my motor skills up. So I had to learn how to swallow. I forgot how to swallow meat and stuff, so I started eating soft food. I had problems breathing, so when I come [sic] home I had a breathing machine – oxygen machine there. My daughter had to help me try to walk all over again. Q. And so I take it you had someone helping you? A. Yes. My daughter. I moved home with my daughter, because they wanted to put me out at Purdue, it is a nursing facility, but she wanted me to come home with her, so that is what I did. I went home with my daughter and I stayed there for six months. Then I found the place down the street, close to her, which was a two bedroom. Q. Now, prior to suffering the stroke, how was your – can you describe what your health condition was. A. Before I had the stroke, I was sick too. I have congestive heart failure, so I kept going back and forth into the hospital because of my breathing. When the water built up around my heart it had [sic] me to where I can’t breathe. So I have to go in and let them pull the water off. And I was sick before I had the stroke. Petitioner also testified that she could not timely request a hearing and blamed that inability on her general medical condition. Petitioner’s testimony as to her medical condition shortly after the hospitalization is unconvincing because it contradicts the description of her medical condition as described by her treating physician in the discharge notes. The evidence established that Petitioner received Ms. Smith's letter dated July 6, 2007, and understood its contents. Petitioner’s testimony is insufficient to establish that her medical condition caused her failure to timely request an informal hearing to appeal of the termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Petitioner failed to establish that she required an extension of the expired deadline to request an informal hearing as a “reasonable accommodation” of her condition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not liable for the acts of discrimination alleged in the subject Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's race, African-American, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Miguel Johnson is an African-American male and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2009). He filed a complaint for housing discrimination against Riviera Towers at 6896 Abbott Avenue in Miami Beach. Respondent Riviera Terrace Apartments (Riviera Terrace) was apparently erroneously named Riviera Towers in the complaint and in the style of this case. Notice of that error was given by the owner, Arie Markowitz, and in the absence of any indication that Riviera Terrace is a corporate entity, Mr. Markowitz is also added as a Respondent. The style has been corrected to reflect these corrections. Riviera Terrace, 6890 Abbott Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, 33141, is a 20-unit apartment complex. Mr. Johnson thought that the complex has 22 units, but there is no evidence to support his thinking. Contrary to his request, the undersigned has no independent investigative powers and must accept the evidence in the record. According to his records, Mr. Johnson, on March 17, 2009, telephoned a number he saw on a "For Rent" sign at Riviera Terrace. A woman identified as Diana Miteff answered the telephone. Mr. Johnson said Ms. Miteff identified herself as the manager of the complex. The telephone records indicate that the conversation lasted one minute. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him to call back later. Mr. Johnson telephoned Ms. Miteff again on March 21, 2009, and his records indicate that they talked for 8 minutes. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him about the security deposit, that the rent for a one bedroom apartment was $900 a month, and that she had some vacant efficiencies. Mr. Johnson testified that a friend of his, Pedro Valdes, lives in the same complex and that together they met with Ms. Miteff the day after Mr. Johnson talked to her on the telephone, and saw a vacant efficiency apartment. According to Mr. Johnson, Ms. Miteff told him, after seeing him, that there were no vacancies. Ayesha Azara, Mr. Johnson's wife, testified that she made another unsuccessful attempt to rent a unit in Riviera Terrace in May 2009. She had no information in March 2008, except to say tht Ms. Miteff claimed to be the manager and told her the building was for elderly people. Pedro Valdes testified that he lives in Riviera Towers and gave his address as 6896 Abbott Avenue. He said that the "For Rent" sign for Riviera Terrace is not always posted in front of the complex. Mr. Markowitz is the owner of Riviera Terrace at 6890 Abbott Avenue. He testified that he is also the manager and that Ms. Miteff is a tenant. He uses her telephone number on the "For Rent" sign because he does not speak Spanish. The apartments are government-subsidized Section 8 housing. The only vacant efficiency in March 2008 was a unit for which he already had a written lease, but the tenant could not move in until after a government-required inspection. He also testified that his tenants are not all Caucasians and not all elderly. Ms. Miteff confirmed that she has been a resident of Riviera Terrace for 20 years. She concedes that she told Mr. Johnson's wife that the people in the complex are very quiet and mostly old people. Mr. Johnson's claim of discrimination based on race is not supported by the evidence, which is contradictory with regard to the name and address of the property, and because there were no vacant apartments at Riviera Terrace in March 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Supraski, Esquire Louis A. Supraski, P.A. 2450 Northeast Miami Gardens Drive 2nd Floor North Miami Beach, Florida 33180 Miguel Johnson 916 West 42nd Street, Apt. 9 Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Miguel Johnson C/O Robert Fox 1172 South Dixie Highway Coral Gables, Florida 33146 Diana Mittles Riviera Terrace Apartments 6896 Abott Avenue Miami Beach, Florida 33141
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Fair Housing Act by denying Petitioners financial assistance on account of their national origin and Mr. Rodriguez's disability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners reside at 207 Northeast 24th Terrace, Cape Coral, Florida. They are of Hispanic (Mexican) origin. Although Mr. Rodriguez alluded to the fact that he has a disability, the specific nature of the disability was not disclosed. The Housing Corporation is a non-profit corporation with offices in Naples, Florida. It performs housing counseling services, including homebuyer education, credit counseling, financial literacy training, and foreclosure prevention counseling services in Southwest Florida. Respondent has seven full-time employees. The Housing Corporation is not a financial institution or a licensed real estate firm, and it is not in the business of providing commercial real estate loans. Due to the housing crisis which began around 2008, the federal government allocated foreclosure prevention funding that provides temporary assistance to eligible homeowners. If a homeowner qualifies for assistance, the homeowner may receive up to 12 months of financial assistance that is used to pay past due or current mortgage payments. The federal funds are administered in the State by the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (FHFC) through a program known as the Florida Hardest Hit Fund (the program). A number of advisor agencies have contracted with the FHFC to process applications under the program, including the Housing Corporation. To qualify for assistance under the program, among other things, applicants must demonstrate loss of employment income through no fault of their own. This requirement can be met in one of three ways: demonstrating eligibility for unemployment compensation; providing a letter from a current or previous employer indicating that loss or reduction of income was involuntary; or providing a letter from a doctor confirming that the applicant is suffering a temporary medical issue and will be able to resume work in the near future. These requirements are imposed by HUD and are strictly enforced. In April 2011, Mr. Rodriguez applied for assistance through the program. The application was initially processed by Reliable Business Solutions (RBS), an advisor agency in Orlando, but Petitioners were deemed to be ineligible because their mortgage was more than six months in arrears. After RBS ceased participating in the program, in December 2012 Petitioners' file was transferred to the Housing Corporation for further review. By that time, mortgage delinquency was no longer a reason for ineligibility. The reason why RBS held the application for an extended period of time is unknown. In January 2013, Petitioners' application was assigned to Kathleen Guevara, a Housing Corporation employee, whose national origin is Hispanic (Colombian). Because his unemployment compensation had ended in 2010, Mr. Rodriguez could not demonstrate that he was eligible for unemployment assistance. Also, he could not provide a letter from a current or previous employer confirming that he had suffered an involuntary loss or reduction in income. Ms. Guevara then explained to Mr. Rodriguez that in order to qualify for assistance under the program guidelines, he must provide a letter from a medical doctor confirming that he has a temporary medical issue or disability preventing him from working but he will be able to resume work in the near future. Mr. Rodriguez did not provide this information. At hearing, he stated that he could not afford to pay a doctor to prepare such a letter. On May 30, 2013, Ms. Guevara sent Mr. Rodriguez an email stating that the application could not be approved without "a letter from a doctor indicating [that] the nature of [his] disability is temporary." Attached to the email was a letter from the Executive Director stating that Petitioners were ineligible for program funding due to "No Qualifying Hardship – Permanent Disability." The letter also provided information on how to appeal that decision to the Florida Housing Coalition. Petitioners did not appeal the decision to the Florida Housing Coalition but elected instead to file a discrimination complaint with the EEOC. Mr. Rodriguez testified that he did so, in part, after consulting with other unidentified persons who advised him that he was the victim of discrimination. Mr. Rodriguez asserted that Ms. Guevara required him to provide the medical eligibility information only after she learned he was born in Mexico, and that other applicants for temporary assistance (especially Cubans) who were not born in Mexico were treated differently. There is no credible evidence to support this assertion. The more persuasive testimony is that the eligibility information is required from all applicants, regardless of their national origin. This is because HUD requires strict adherence to program guidelines and performs a biannual audit on the Housing Corporation to verify that the guidelines are being followed. The decision to deny the application was not based on Petitioners' national origin. Mr. Rodriguez failed to establish that he has a disability within the meaning of the law. See § 760.22(7), Fla. Stat. (2013). At best, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 1 shows that he had a magnetic resonance imaging taken in June 2010 for "left shoulder pain," and he received an epidural injection within the last month or so, or long after the alleged discrimination occurred. In any event, the decision to deny the application for lack of documentation was not based on any actual or perceived disability but was based on Petitioners' failure to provide the required documentation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed on behalf of Jorge and Alquidania Rodriguez. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Lake Waldena Resort is a mobile home park as defined by Section 723.003(6), Florida Statutes. It is located at Route 4, Box 300, Silver Springs, Florida 32688. The mobile home park is subject to regulation pursuant to Section 723.002(1), Florida Statutes. That law is administered by the Petitioner. All Respondents are mobile home park owners as defined by Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. The Hilgemans are park owners and have been at all relevant times for this dispute. At the times relevant to the inquiry Pat Montgomery was the park operator, which equates to park owner under the terms of the statute. Pat Montgomery concluded her affiliation with Lake Waldena Resort in May 1989. Pat Montgomery, as the park operator, who had been employed by Donald L. Hilgeman, collected the rent from the mobile homeowners who had lots within the park. She attended any problems that the mobile homeowners confronted her with. She ordered supplies for the operation of the mobile home park. She sold mobile homes for use in the park and ordered them for sale. She was involved with the provision of carports and screen rooms associated with mobile homes in the park. She was responsible for the payroll and basically everything that transpired in the day-to- day operations in the mobile home park. The Hilgemans had limited affiliation with the park. Mr. Hilgeman was involved with doing physical labor at the park and was Montgomery's employer. On July 26, 1988, a notice of lot rental increase was mailed to all tenants in the Lake Waldena Resort Mobile Home Park. This notice was provided in accordance with Rule 7D-32.002(1), Florida Administrative Code. The basis for this increase was associated with the economic pressures on the park owner brought about by increases in real estate taxes, insurance costs, sanitation fees, other fees payable to the Petitioner, and wage increases. An exemplar of the form notice which had been sent out to each mobile home owner may be seen in Respondents' Exhibit 5 admitted into evidence. All notices were dispatched by U.S. Mail. As contemplated by Rule 7D-32.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, official notice was considered to have been made within five days of July 26, 1988, which corresponded to July 31, 1988. A meeting within 30 days of the provision of notice as described in Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, would equate to August 30, 1988. The proposed lot increase was from $78 to $88. At the time of notification of the lot increase Lloyd Carter was the vice president of the homeowners' association at Lake Waldena Resort. He was residing in the mobile home park. Gordon Gibson was the president of the homeowner's association who, at the moment of the lot increase, was residing in Minden, Ontario, Canada. Mr. Carter picked up a copy of the notice of lot rental increase from the office at the mobile home park shortly after the notice had been prepared on July 26, 1988. He then called Mr. Gibson in Canada and explained the particulars of that notice. At that time, Mr. Carter stated no concerns to Mr. Gibson about the notice of lot rental increase. He merely informed Mr. Gibson of the pendency of the lot rental increase. Under ordinary circumstances the' expected time for delivery of mail dispatched from the United States to Canada was in the neighborhood of five to seven days; however, in August 1988, the Canadians were undergoing a postal strike which delayed matters. Nonetheless, Mr. Gibson received his copy of the notice and on August 4, 1988, he wrote Mr. Hilgeman. A copy of that correspondence may be seen as Respondents' Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence. Mr. Gibson informed Mr. Hilgeman in that correspondence that he wished to have a meeting to discuss the lot rental increase. The meeting would be attended by a committee of not more than four persons under the direction of Mr. Carter. He asked that the meeting be held at a convenient time prior to August 26, 1988. The basis for Mr. Gibson's action in which he requested a meeting with the park owner was through the process of discussion with his board of directors in independent conversations in which it was decided that a meeting was desired. A meeting to discuss the reasons for the lot rental increase was not held before August 26, 1988, or before August 30, 1988. When Mr. Gibson sent his August 4, 1988 correspondence he was aware of the problems of the postal strike in Canada and the delay that this might promote in the receipt of his letter by the park owner. He had not instructed Mr. Carter to make any contact with the park owner prior to the park owner's receipt of the correspondence which outlined the fact of Mr. Carter's duties as chairman of the committee. The return receipt correspondence from Gibson to Hilgeman dated August 4, 1988, was received by, Pat Montgomery in mid August 1988. By correspondence of August 22, 1988, addressed from Mr. Hilgeman to Mr. Gibson, a copy of which may be seen as Respondents' Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, Mr. Hilgeman demanded of Mr. Gibson that he confirm that a majority of the Lake Waldena residents had in fact selected Mr. Gibson to represent them. Reference is made in that letter to section 723.078(2)(b), Florida Statutes, having to do with the requirements for bylaws in homeowners' associations. This request of Mr. Gibson is not a prerogative of Mr. Hilgeman as park owner in dealing with the issue of the conduct of the meeting. Nor is it available to Mr. Hilgeman to remind Mr. Gibson that he had to comply Section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes or Section 723.076(1), Florida Statutes. To the extent that those provisions have any relevance to the homeowners' association, the former pertains to standing to challenge increases in such things as the lot rental amount through the homeowners' association, something that the park owner is not called upon to advise the homeowners' association about. This question of standing does not enter in to the matter of the ability to represent mobile home owners at a meeting pursuant to Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, for purposes of discussing the lot rental increase. Likewise, the latter statutory reference that describes the idea of incorporation of a homeowners' association and the need to notify the park owner is not associated with the meeting to discuss the purposes of the lot rental increase. On the other hand, when Mr. Hilgeman referred to Rules 7D-32.003(1) and 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, those are provisions which have some significance in considering the matter of a meeting to discuss a lot rental increase. Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Codes, states: If requested to do so by the park owner or subdivision developer, the committee shall certify that it has been selected as described Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Administrative Code. The certification shall include a certificate of all members of the committee attesting to its proper formation under the statute in these rules. Significantly, that provision does not describe the relationship of such a request to the obligation of the park owner to meet within 30 days of notice of lot rental increase as contemplated by Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. None of the principals, given the statutory scheme and rules that were designed to effectuate the purposes of the statute, could have reasonably understood on what terms the park owner was entitled to make this request taking into account the complications of corresponding back and forth between the United States and Canada in the midst of a mail strike, the consequence of which made it unlikely that the meeting would take place on or before August 30, 1988. In the conclusions of law a discussion is made of the effect of the request for certification and whether it tolls the time for conducting the informational session to discuss the reasons for the lot rental increase. The envelope for the August 22, 1988 correspondence was stamped in the United States on August 23, 1988, in Bradenton, Florida. It also bears a date of August 29, 1988, which is seen as a part of the verification of receipt of that letter in Canada. Mr. Gibson received the Hilgeman correspondence of August 22, 1988 on August 29, 1988. Mr. Carter also received a copy of the August 22, 1988 correspondence by Mr. Hilgeman and had a discussion with Mr. Hilgeman about that letter sometime around August 23 or August 24, 1988. That conversation took place in the mobile home park. This did not lead to the resolution of the certification request made by Mr. Hilgeman to the homeowners' association. It was left to Mr. Gibson to take care of the response to the request for certification. In the conversation being described, between Hilgeman and Carter, Carter made it known that he intended to complain to the Petitioner about the park owner not meeting with the homeowners' committee within 30 days of notice. A complaint was made as may be seen in a copy of that complaint which is Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. That complaint was sent out on August 26, 1988. The basis for the homeowners' association complaining to the Petitioner was related to their concern that they preserve their right to have the meeting even if it transpired beyond the 30 days contemplated in the statute. Notwithstanding the complaint's existence, Mr. Gibson went forward with his attempts to try to satisfy Mr. Hilgeman concerning certification and did so with the assistance of Victor Davis a member of the board of directors of the homeowners' association. Mr. Gibson's attitude about this was to the effect that the request by Mr. Hilgeman was a legitimate request that should be complied with. A discussion had also been held between Carter and Hilgeman on August 18, 1988, in which Mr. Hilgeman gave advance notice of the fact that he needed several questions answered and that there would be a delay in the meeting. The indication was made that a letter would be sent to Mr. Gibson to have those questions answered. That eventuated in the August 22, 1988 correspondence from Hilgeman to Gibson. Upon making these matters known to Mr. Carter on August 18, 1988, Mr. Carter's only remark was that this would be "fine." On September 9, 1988, a letter was written from Ralph B. Murray, Jr., Specialist Enforcement Section, Bureau of Mobile Homes within the Petitioner's department which was sent to Mr. Hilgeman reminding him of the necessity to respond to allegations that had been made by the Lake Waldena Resort Homeowners' Association concerning the claim that Mr. Hilgeman had refused to meet with those mobile homeowners in the statutorily prescribed time as announced at Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 9, admitted into evidence. On September 13, 1988, by correspondence, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 10 admitted into evidence, Mr. Hilgeman offered his reply. He tells Mr. Murray that he is not sure whether the homeowners' association is legitimate and that they had not responded to his August 22, 1988 correspondence to Mr. Gibson which he enclosed in his letter to Mr. Murray. He spoke of delays in the mailing time for mail coming from Canada. He makes mention of the fact of having informed Mr. Carter that the manager, who was Ms. Montgomery was on vacation and would not return until August 30, 1988. In fact, Ms. Montgomery was not available to meet with the homeowners' association in the period August 18 through August 30, 1988. This would not have relieved Mr. Hilgeman of the necessity to meet with the homeowners' association on or before August 30, 1988, had they complied with his request for certification prior to that date. They did not. Compliance with the certification process was achieved by correspondence of September 12, 1988 from Gibson to Hilgeman in which he sets out the explanation of certification of the credentials of the homeowners' association to form a committee and meet with the park owner. That was received by the park owner on September 19, 1988, in the person of Pat Montgomery. A copy of this correspondence and the certification of receipt may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 11 admitted into evidence. After receipt of the information concerning the certification of the homeowners' association committee, Mr. Hilgeman sent a letter to Mr. Carter on September 29, 1988, to establish a meeting. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 13 admitted into evidence. It outlines the fact that Mr. Hilgeman is sufficiently satisfied concerning the certification to have the meeting and offers a meeting prior to October 4, 1988 or after October 9, 1988, and invites Mr. Carter to consult with Pat Montgomery to establish a mutually convenient time for the meeting. A meeting was held between Mr. Murray and Mr. Hilgeman in October, 1988, in which a discussion ensued concerning whether or not Mr. Hilgeman himself would meet with the homeowners' committee. Mr. Hilgeman held firm in his attitude that his manager Pat Montgomery would be available to meet with the homeowners' committee, but that Mr. Hilgeman would not be meeting with them. As explained in the correspondence of October 14, 1988, addressed from Mr. Carter to Mr. Murray, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 14 admitted into evidence, contact was made between Carter and Montgomery and Carter was told on October 11, 1988 that a meeting would be held at 10:00 a.m. on October 14, 1988, between Montgomery and the committee. She was told by Carter that this meeting would not be acceptable unless Mr. Hilgeman was in attendance. Based upon conversations with Mr. Murray, the homeowners' association had been persuaded that it was only appropriate to meet with Mr. Hilgeman. Consequently, by this logic it was not appropriate to meet with Ms. Montgomery. A copy of this correspondence of August 14, 1988 was made available to Mr. Hilgeman. On June 7, 1989, the Petitioner brought an action against the Respondent and he sought a formal hearing which was conducted on February 22, 1990. Prior to that hearing the homeowners did have their meeting with Mr. Hilgeman on November 14, 1989, in which they were made aware of the reasons for the lot rental increase. The homeowners accepted the explanation and the idea of the increase and do not desire to pursue the present complaint against the Respondents. When Mr. Hilgeman sought certification of the credentials of the committee assigned by the homeowners association he was acting in good faith. In addition, he was entitled to look to Pat Montgomery as park operator and by consequence park owner under the definition of Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes, to speak for him in the course of the meeting to discuss the lot rental increase. The misconception of the committee of mobile home owners concerning the necessity to meet with Mr. Hilgeman and not with his park operator, as fostered by the remarks of Mr. Murray, who lead those mobile homeowners to believe that they could only meet with Mr. Hilgeman, caused a delay in arranging the meeting. Mr. Hilgeman should not be hold accountable for that delay.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered that dismisses these actions against the Respondents. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-4100 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties. Petitioner's Facts Paragraphs 1-9 are subordinate to facts found. Although Paragraph 10 is an accurate portrayal of the meeting of August 24, 1988 between Mr. Carter and Mr. Hilgeman, it should be stated that any meeting to discuss lot rental increase was contingent upon the response to the certification request made by Mr. Hilgeman and replied to by Mr. Gibson on a date beyond the 30 day period. Paragraphs 11 and 12 are subordinate to facts found. Concerning Paragraph 13, whatever Mr. Hilgeman perceptions would be about the role of Ms. Montgomery, whether she was considered to be the same as an attorney representing or in some other capacity, in law she was a park owner and entitled to act in behalf of the park owners at the meeting. Concerning Paragraph 14, the effect of failing to respond to the request for certification within the 30 day period was tantamount to a waiver or agreement to meet at a time later. Paragraph 15 is subordinate to facts found. Concerning Paragraph 16, to the extent this paragraph suggests that the length of the meeting or breadth of detail in the explanation made by Mr. Hilgeman was inadequate, that idea is rejected in that sufficient explanation was given to comply with the requirements of law. The comments in Paragraph 17 are not relevant. The accommodation that was made between counsel was not a necessary arrangement to mitigate the circumstance in an instance where Respondent Donald L. Hilgeman had violated Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. This meeting was beneficial to the homeowners and park owners alike, but came at this late date based upon the failure of the homeowners to meet with Pat Montgomery over a year earlier. Respondents' Facts Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution to the dispute. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of those two sentences that come before the last sentence in that paragraph. Paragraphs 4 and 5 and all sentences save the last of Paragraph 6 are subordinate to facts found. That sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 7 through 11 with the exception of the second sentence in Paragraph 11 are subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is misleading in that it intimates that Mr. Carter was derelict in his duties to make contact with Mr. Hilgeman to establish a meeting; however, the contacts that were made were in accordance with the expectations of Mr. Hilgeman and Mr. Gibson who were controlling the timing of that meeting. Paragraphs 14 through 16 with the exception of the last sentence to Paragraph 16 are subordinate to facts found. The last sentence to Paragraph 16 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the last sentence which is not necessary to the resolution of this dispute. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the last sentence which is not necessary to the resolution of this dispute. Paragraph 21 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute and is an inaccurate portrayal of the requirements of law as to gaining the approval of the majority of homeowners before representing them in the course of a meeting to discuss lot rental increases. Paragraphs 22 through 25 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 David D. Eastman, Esquire Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Corry Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Susan C. Marvin Pamela Leslie Assistants General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL, 32399-1007
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, Country Club Village MHP, Inc. (CCV Park), discriminated against Petitioner, Miguel A. Cotrich (Mr. Cotrich), based on his national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act), and, if so, the relief to which Mr. Cotrich is entitled.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Cotrich is a Hispanic male,8/ who resided in CCV Park for approximately 29 months. Mr. Cotrich did not own the mobile home or the lot (number 56) on which it was placed; thus, he owed monthly rent to CCV Park and to the owner of the mobile home. Mr. Cotrich moved out of CCV Park in late May or early June 2011.9/ Rocio Harris, an Hispanic woman, who spoke Spanish, was CCV Park's manager during the majority of the time that Mr. Cotrich resided in CCV Park. Ms. Harris was well thought of and did her best as manager, but she did not collect monthly rent payments or enforce park rules uniformly. On June 5, 2009, Mr. Cotrich and Anna Maria Cotrich, his wife, executed a $10,000.00 Promissory Note (Note) to buy the mobile home located at lot 56 in CCV Park. The Note was between the Cotriches and Maria Gonzalez. The Note called for a $1,400.00 down payment and monthly installments of $500.00 beginning on July 1, 2009. Mr. Cotrich created a ledger to record the monthly Note payments he made on the mobile home (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). This ledger reflects he paid the $1,400.00 down payment and a $500.00 payment on January 3, 2009, five months before the Note was executed. Likewise, it also reflects five $500.00 payments for the trailer before the Note was executed. Simply by adding up the figures on Mr. Cotrich's ledger, the total comes to $10,600.00. This is $600.00 in over-payments. Mr. Cotrich did not disclose this overpayment during his testimony. Mr. Cotrich did not possess the title to the mobile home, nor did he produce any credible evidence that he was entitled to it. Mr. Cotrich's testimony contradicts the executed Note and his own written record of the amounts of payments. Neither Mr. Cotrich's testimony nor his ledger is credible. Mr. Cotrich allegedly paid Ms. Harris the monthly Note payments because he did not trust Ms. Gonzalez. Mr. Cotrich did not receive a receipt from Ms. Harris or Ms. Gonzalez for any payments made on the Note. His claim that he was working away from the mobile home and could not get to the office during its office hours to obtain such a receipt is not credible. Further, Mr. Cotrich's testimony that he paid someone other than the Note lender without obtaining a receipt from that recipient is not credible. In January 2011, Debra Hunter became CCV Park's manager following Ms. Harris' death. Ms. Hunter started collecting the rent payments on time and enforcing CCV Park rules. Her actions caused tension among those who were delinquent with their rent and/or not abiding by other park rules. Mr. Cotrich was always in arrears for his lot rent payment while Ms. Hunter was the manager. At some point Mr. Cotrich had one or two dogs (at least one of which was a pit bull dog) in his rented mobile home. CCV Park rules allow for one small (under 20 pounds) dog. Apparently Ms. Harris knew of the dogs, but did not charge Mr. Cotrich for having them. However, beginning in January 2011, when Ms. Hunter became the manager and was aware of the dogs, Mr. Cotrich was charged $16.00 monthly for having the two dogs ($8.00 per pet, per month). Charles Stevens, one of CCV Park's owners, credibly testified that he had a conversation with Mr. Cotrich about the pit bull dog(s). In that conversation, Mr. Stevens advised Mr. Cotrich that mean dogs (including pit bull dogs) were not (and are not) allowed in CCV Park. This was because there were children present, and there were insurance concerns. Mr. Stevens felt he was unable to make Mr. Cotrich understand the need to remove the dog(s). At some point, Mr. Cotrich approached Ms. Hunter and told her he wanted to sell or rent his trailer to his brother, who is Puerto Rican. Ms. Hunter objected to that proposal on the grounds that Mr. Cotrich owed past-due rent. Mr. Cotrich became loud and apparently yelled that Ms. Hunter did not want Puerto Ricans in CCV Park. Ms. Hunter's position to deny Mr. Cotrich's proposed tenant was based on the outstanding balance that Mr. Cotrich had with CCV Park. Following this verbal confrontation, Mr. Cotrich claimed he felt harassed by CCV Park management. Although Mr. Cotrich produced his medical records for hospitalization dates of January 8, January 10, and March 30, 2011,10/ there is nothing therein to substantiate that CCV Park or its management caused his physical circumstances. Mr. Cotrich, upon being discharged from the last hospitalization, went to a rehabilitation/nursing home facility. Mr. Cotrich testified he was not evicted from CCV Park, but he voluntarily left CCV Park in May 2011, because he felt his health was in jeopardy. Mrs. Cotrich completed her move out of CCV Park sometime in June 2011. CCV Park issued monthly receipts for payments it received. For the 29-month period that Mr. Cotrich claimed to reside at CCV Park, only 13 dated receipts were produced. (There were a total of 20 pages of receipts, but some were duplicative.) The receipts offered and accepted in evidence began in July 2009. All but one receipt had a monetary figure in the section "REMINDER OF OUTSTANDING CHARGES" at the bottom of each receipt. Ms. Hunter and Mr. Stevens both testified that CCV Park is 70 percent Hispanic. Mr. Stevens knows the rental market in Kissimmee, and he understands the Hispanic population has a very real presence in Kissimmee. CCV Park is a multi-cultural mobile home park. Since becoming the manager (while Mr. Cotrich lived there and after), Ms. Hunter has increased rental collections, enforced the park rules, and made CCV Park a nice place to live. CCV Park has instituted several after-school programs and activities that have apparently helped raise the children's grade-point averages in school. Mr. Cotrich presented Jess Jusino, his son-in-law, and Ernest Cotrich, his son and care-giver, as witnesses. The undersigned evaluated the testimony presented by these two witnesses and found it to be unpersuasive. Mr. Cotrich did not substantiate his claim of discrimination based on his national origin. The testimony and evidence demonstrate that Mr. Cotrich left CCV Park on his own volition and that he failed to pay rent in a timely manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Miguel A. Cotrich. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2012.
