The Issue The issues for consideration are those allegations set forth in an Administrative Complaint brought by the State of Florida Department of Professional Regulation (Department), in which the Respondent, Scarlett Jones, R.N., is accused of various violations of Chapter 464, Florida Statutes. Through Count One it is said that the Respondent transcribed an order for Heparin to be administered to the patient K.W. as 15,000 units when the physician's order quoted the dosage as 5,000 units, and that the patient was given two dosages at 15,000 units as opposed to the required 5,000 units. In an additional accusation against the Respondent, related to patient care, Respondent is said to have failed to indicate in the patient K.W.'s nursing notes, on or about May 16, 1988, that an administration of Aminophylline was to be restarted during the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. Further, it is alleged that this substance was not restarted until 8:00 a.m. on the next day as discovered by a subsequent shift employee. As a consequence, Respondent is said to have violated Section 464.018(1) (f), Florida Statutes, related to alleged unprofessional conduct. Count Two to the Administrative Complaint alleges that on or about June 4, 1988, the Respondent who was assigned to care for the patient E.J., was told by a co-worker that the patient had fallen out of bed and soiled himself and that the Respondent failed to respond to the patient's needs after repeated requests. Eventually, it is alleged that the patient's wife assisted him back to bed and the co-worker took care of the patient's hygiene. As a consequence, Respondent is said to have violated Section 464.018(1)(f), Florida Statutes, related to unprofessional conduct and that she violated Section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes, for knowingly violating a rule or order of the Board of Nursing. Finally, the third count of the Administrative Complaint alleges that the Respondent, on or about June 14, 1988, was found asleep while on duty in violation of Section 464.018(1)(f), Florida Statutes, an act of unprofessional conduct, including, but not limited to, the failure to conform to minimum standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. For these alleged violations, the Department seeks to impose disciplinary action which could include revocation or suspension, the imposition of an administrative fine and/or other relief which the Board of Nursing might deem appropriate.
Findings Of Fact During the relevant periods under consideration in this Administrative Complaint the Respondent was licensed by the Department as a registered nurse and subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Nursing in disciplinary matters. The license number was 1702172. On April 11, 1988, Respondent took employment with Gadsden Memorial Hospital in Gadsden County, Florida, in a position of charge nurse on the Medical-Surgical Pediatrics Unit, also known as "Med-Surg. Ped." That unit provides short term acute care for post-operative patients, acute medical patients, and acute pediatric patients, some of which require 24-hour observation. Response to the needs of the patients is given by three nursing shifts in each day which begins with shifts of 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., followed by the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. and then 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on the following morning. Upon hiring, Respondent was assigned to the work the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. and was the only registered nurse on duty during that shift. Among the responsibilities of the charge nurse at the time under examination here, was the assessment of patients on the unit as well as an awareness of the abilities of those other employees who were working in this shift. This was in an effort to provide direct supervision of critical care patients and included supervision of activities performed by a Nurse Technician. Respondent was more directly responsible for critical patients. Other duties included making frequent rounds and checking vital signs in an attempt to insure that the patients were stable. Respondent as charge nurse on "Med-Surg. Ped." could not leave the floor without notification of the house supervisor, another registered nurse. This person would replace the Respondent on those occasions where the Respondent would need to vacate the floor. In addition it was expected that the Respondent would notify those personnel who were working with her on the unit, where she intended to go and how long she would be gone. Before departing it was expected that the Respondent would check the stability of patients. physician's Orders were written on March 2D, 1988, in anticipation of the admission of patient K.W. to Gadsden Memorial Hospital to "Med. Surg Ped." The admission was under orders by Dr. Halpren. Among those orders was the prescription of Heparin, 5,000 units, subcutaneously every 12 hours. The Physician's Orders in terms of legibility are not immediately discernible but can be read with a relatively careful observation of the physician's orders. A copy of those may be found at Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. The problem that tends to arise is that on the line which immediately follows the orders related to Heparin 5,000 units, is found the word hysterectomy written in such a fashion that the initial portion of the letter "H" might be seen as being placed on the prior line giving the unit dosage of the Heparin the appearance of being 15,000 units as opposed to 5,000 units. On April 11, 1988, K.W. was admitted to Gadsden Memorial Hospital as anticipated. At the time of admission the Physician's Orders previously described were provided. Surgery was scheduled and the patient file was made on "Med-Surg. Ped." Under the practices within this hospital, the ward clerk was responsible for transcribing physician's orders onto the patient's Medication Administration Record. This was done here by the ward clerk, S. Diggs. This is to be checked for accuracy by the charge nurse, to include Respondent, with the fixing of the signature to this Medication Administration Record verifying the accuracy of the clerk's entries. Respondent initialed the Medication Administration Record for the patient designating that Heparin in the amount of 15,000 units Q-12, meaning to be given every 12 hours was the requirement, and had been administered in that dosage. This may be seen in a copy of the Medication Administration Record which is part of Petitioner's Exhibit No. The patient was to undergo extensive abdominal surgery, to include the possibility of a hysterectomy and the incorrect administration of Heparin might promote problems with bleeding. The incorrect amount of Heparin as a 15,000 unit dosage was given to K.W. on two occasions. Another patient who was admitted to the ward which Respondent was responsible for as charge nurse was the patient A.W. Physician's Orders were written for that patient by Dr. Woodward on May 16, 1988. A copy of the Physician's Orders may be found at Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. Among the substances prescribed was Aminophylline drip 20 milligrams per hour I.V. This patient had been admitted to the pediatric unit with a diagnosis of asthma and prescribed the Aminophylline to aid the patient's breathing. It was expected that patient A.W. was to be administered two dosages of Aminophylline, an intermediate dosage to be given every few hours in a larger quantity, and a continuous drip to run at 20 milligrams per hour. Within Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6 are nursing notes made by Respondent concerning A.W. On May 17, 1988, between the hours of 12:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. it is noted that Respondent was having trouble with patient A.W.'s I.V. She states that the I.V. site was assessed and had to be pulled and that she was not able to reinsert due to the uncooperative nature of this child. The I.V. was restarted by the house supervisor nurse. An entry at 6:30 a.m. made by the Respondent describes the I.V. position as acceptable. When the shift changed at 7:00 a.m. the new charge nurse did not find the Aminophylline drip in progress, as called for, and this is noted in a 7:30 a.m. entry made by this registered nurse, Sherry Shiro. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence is a Confidential Incident Report prepared by the Gadsden Memorial Hospital concerning allegations against the Respondent. They have to do with an alleged incident that occurred around 5:00 a.m. and contain the purported observations by Lucinda Mack, a licensed practical nurse on duty at that time, and they were received on June 15, 1988, by Carol Riddle, R.N., Director of Nursing at Gadsden Memorial Hospital, and the person responsible for investigating this matter. The copy of the Confidential Incident Report contained observations about the alleged failure of treatment by the Respondent directed in the matter of the patient E.J. These remarks are hearsay. They do not corroborate competent evidence at hearing concerning any oversight by the Respondent in the treatment of the patient E.J. On or about June 14, 1988, the Director of Nursing, Carol Riddle, called the night supervisor Michelle Warring at 2:00 a.m. to ascertain if the Respondent was on duty. Respondent was working on that date. At 2:15 a.m. Warring advised Riddle that the Respondent could not be found and Riddle went to the hospital at that time. When she arrived at the facility at 3:00 a.m. she went to "Med-Surg. Ped." where she was informed by the communications clerk that Lucinda Mack, LPN, was the only nurse on duty in that unit, and that the clerk did not know where Respondent could be found. Riddle and Warring then looked through the patient rooms in "Med-Surg. Ped." but could not find the Respondent. One and a half hours after commencing the search Riddle located the Respondent in a different wing of the hospital which contains a respiratory therapy manager's office. Respondent was there with her husband asleep, with the door locked and lights off. At that time she was the only registered nurse on duty in "Med-Surg. Ped." which had six patients receiving care on that evening. Respondent was not performing her duties or supervising those other persons who worked with her on the unit. Respondent had been observed asleep at her nurses' station desk on several other occasions by Dale Storey, a registered nurse working at the Gadsden Memorial Hospital. Linda Reed, a nurse technician at Gadsden Memorial Hospital had observed the Respondent asleep on duty. As commented on by nurse Riddle, who is qualified to give expert opinion testimony about the performance of the Respondent in her nursing practice, the conduct set out before in these findings of fact constitutes unprofessional conduct in the practice of nursing, in a situation which the Respondent knew what her duties were as charge nurse and failed to perform them at an adequate level.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which fines the Respondent in the amount of $1,000 for the violation related to the care of patient K.W. as set out in Count One and for sleeping on duty as set out in Count Three. And, finds that the violation related to patient A.W. as set out in Count One and the violation alleged in Count Two related to the patient E.J. were not proven. DONE and ENTERED this 19 day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19 day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 88-5719 Petitioner's fact finding is subordinate to the finding in the Recommended Order with exception of paragraph 16 which is not relevant and reference within paragraph 34 to the date June 24, 1988, which should have been June 14, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa M. Bassett, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Scarlett Jones 2636 Mission Road, #138 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Judy Ritter, Executive Director Florida Board of Nursing 111 East Coastline Drive, Room 504 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Department is the state agency charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine in Florida. At all times material to the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been a licensed physician, in the State of Florida, license number ME 0027088. Respondent is board certified in three areas of specialty: gastroenterology, radiology, and internal medicine. Respondent is on the staff of several hospitals in the Palm Beach County region. From March 28, 1986, until April 4, 1986, Respondent treated Goldie Marshak. At the time of such treatment, Mrs. Marshak was a seventy-one year old in good health. Mrs. Marshak had been referred to Respondent by Dr. Neil Katz. Dr. Katz was Mrs. Marshak's regular physician who had unsuccessfully treated her for persistent gas and burping. In accordance with Mrs. Marshak's health plan guidelines, Dr. Katz had referred her to Respondent, a specialist in similar disorders, for additional diagnosis. The referral form indicated Mrs. Marshak suffered from persistent stomach pain and gas. Attached to the referral were the results from a prior upper GI series which established there were no abnormalities of the upper gastrointestinal tract. Respondent first met with Mrs. Marshak on March 28, 1986. At the initial visit Mrs. Marshak completed a form which identified her current problem as "burping and rectal gas as soon as I eat. Some pain upper chest that has diminished." In addition, Mrs. Marshak supplied a social history, a past medical history, drug allergy, operations, injury, hospitalizations, family history, immunizations, and a general review of systems. No other records prepared on that date were retained. There are no records from which it can be determined what physical examination, if any, Respondent gave to Mrs. Marshak on March 28, 1986. Apparently, after reviewing the referral form and discussing her symptoms with Mrs. Marshak, Respondent elected to schedule her for a procedure called a flexible sigmoidoscopy. After conferring With Dr. Katz, whose consent was required for health plan purposes, the procedure was set to be performed April 3, 1986. Mrs. Marshak was given instructions regarding preparations required in order for the examination to be performed. When Mrs. Marshak returned to Respondent's office on April 3, 1986, she had successfully followed the instructions and was ready for the proposed procedure. Mrs. Marshak was given an authorization form which she signed in the presence of Marina Harmon. Mrs. Harmon was an unlicensed employee who assisted Respondent by escorting patients to the procedure room, having them sign the authorization form, and by explaining the procedure to be performed. The authorization form signed by Mrs. Marshak authorized Respondent to perform a flexible sigmoidoscopy. The form did not disclose risks or inherent dangers regarding the procedure but did provide the following: The motive and purpose of the diagnostic procedure, possible alternative methods, the risks and possible consequences involved, and the possibility of complications have been fully explained to me. I acknowledge that no guarantee or assurance has been made as the results that may be obtained. I also specifically authorize the physician, or his designee, to perform such additional procedures or render such treatment as he may, in his professional judgement deem necessary in the event any unforeseen condition arise during the course of the consented-to- diagnostic procedure that would put the patient's (my) well-being in jeopardy. A flexible sigmoidoscopy is a procedure whereby an instrument is inserted into the rectum and is then passed up the colon the desired distance. The length the instrument is extended specifies what the procedure is called. A flexible sigmoidoscopy involves looking into the rectum and the sigmoid colon only. A colonoscopy looks into the digestive tract beyond an anatomical portion of the colon called the splenic flexure. A left-sided colonoscopy involves looking into the lower digestive tract beyond the sigmoid colon but not beyond the splenic flexure. In terms of length, the flexible sigmoidoscopy would be the shortest procedure of the three described. On April 3, 1986, Respondent performed a colonoscopy on Mrs. Marshak which resulted in a perforation of her colon. This perforation would have occurred regardless of the procedure performed since the tear was located approximately twenty centimeters into the colon. During and following the procedure, Mrs. Marshak complained of extreme pain. Respondent presumed the pain to be that typically experienced during the procedure. The pain which continued after the instrument was removed, Respondent attributed to trapped gas within the colon which would be passed naturally in the hours following the procedure. Respondent sent Mrs. Marshak home for rest and advised her that the procedure had not revealed any abnormal condition in the area examined. Once home, Mrs. Marshak continued to have pain and discomfort. Her husband, Kalman Marshak, telephoned Respondent's office to advise of his wife's continued suffering. Respondent did not speak with either of the Marshaks' but did telephone a prescription for Tylenol with Codeine to their pharmacy. Mr. Marshak picked up the drug and administered it to his wife as directed. Codeine is an improper drug to prescribe for a patient who may be retaining gas since it inhibits parastoltic activity of the bowel. Respondent should have discussed the patient's symptoms with her to ascertain whether or not the pain suffered warranted further examination or emergency treatment. Despite the drug, Mrs. Marshak's pain continued through the night. On the morning of April 4, 1986, Mr. Marshak again telephoned Respondent's office to advise them of his wife's discomfort. The Marshaks were given an appointment for three o'clock that afternoon. The delay in setting the appointment or referring the patient for emergency treatment was inappropriate. At the time of her revisit, Mrs. Marshak had a distended abdomen with some tenderness. Respondent took x-rays of the area and reinserted the colonoscope a very short distance in an effort to expel what Respondent believed to be trapped gas in the colon. The procedure did not relieve Mrs. Marshak's pain and she was advised to go to the hospital for further treatment. Subsequent to Mrs. Marshak leaving the office, Respondent read the x-rays and discovered the perforation. Respondent immediately telephoned the emergency room to advise the physician on duty of Mrs. Marshak's condition and her need for attention. The perforation required surgery which resulted in Mrs. Marshak having to wear a colostomy bag for several months. Afterwards, a second surgery restored her colon to allow normal elimination. At the time of the final hearing, Mrs. Marshak had completely recovered from the perforation. On April 8, 1986, Respondent prepared a letter to Dr. Katz which outlined the treatment given to Mrs. Marshak. Any notes or other records used to prepare the letter were destroyed. The x-rays taken at Respondent's office on April 4, 1986, were lost and were, therefore, unavailable. According to Respondent, the missing x-rays were very similar to the ones taken at the hospital when Mrs. Marshak arrived on April 4, 1986. The Respondent did not obtain a consent form or written authorization for the procedure performed on April 4, 1986. The reinsertion of the instrument into the rectum was inappropriate since the x-rays clearly showed the perforation. Other than the letter written to Dr. Katz, Respondent did not maintain any medical records for the treatment he gave to Mrs. Marshak on March 28, April 3, and April 4, 1986.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a Final Order which finds Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I and IV of the Amended Administrative Complaint, dismisses Counts II and III, imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $1000, places Respondent on probation for a period of two years, and requires Respondent to attend such continuing education courses as may be deemed appropriate by the Board. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3397 Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 are accepted. To the extent paragraph 11 describes a colonoscopy as "more invasive" the paragraph is accepted. However, as to all of the examinations performed (colonoscopy, flexible sigmoidoscopy or left-sided colonoscopy) the basic description is similar. Consequently "more extensive explanation "is not required. Thus the balance of paragraph" is rejected as contrary to the evidence. Paragraph 12 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 13 is accepted. Paragraph 14 is accepted however it must be noted that such explanations given by Harmon are in supplement to those given by Rothenberg. Paragraph 15 is accepted but is unnecessary. Paragraphs 16 and 17 are accepted, however, see note above re: paragraph 14. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are accepted. Paragraph 20 is rejected as argument, irrelevant and immaterial. Paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 are accepted. Paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 are accepted with the note that the communications addressed were with Respondent's office. There is no evidence that Respondent personally spoke with Mr. Marshak to determine the patient's condition. Paragraph 29 is rejected as contrary to the evidence. It was inappropriate to delay the revisit until 3 o'clock, but there is no evidence Respondent made that decision. Based upon the testimony, The more appropriate course would have had Respondent discuss the situation directly with the patient (or her husband) and to schedule the revisit as soon as possible or have the patient go to the hospital. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraphs 31, 32, and 33 are accepted. Paragraph 34 is rejected as repetitive and unnecessary. Paragraph 35 is rejected as contrary to the evidence. Paragraph 36 is rejected as irrelevant immaterial and assuming facts not in evidence. Paragraphs 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43 are accepted. Paragraphs 44, 45, 46, and 47, are rejected as argumentative or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 48 and 50 are rejected as argumentative. Paragraph 49 is accepted. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 12 the area of the perforation was between 15- 25 centimeters according to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are accepted. Paragraph 15 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence as to "reread." That paragraph with the word "read" for "reread" would be accepted. Paragraphs 16, 17, 18, and 19 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Branson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Charles A. Nugent, Jr., Esquire Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth & Romano Servico Centre-Suite 300/400 1601 Belvedere Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Kenneth D. Stahl, M.D. ("Dr. Stahl" or "Petitioner"), is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs to be paid by the Department of Health, Board of Medicine ("Department" or "Respondent"), pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2014).1/
Findings Of Fact Review of the record indicates that, at the time the Administrative Complaint was filed at DOAH, the following facts were known by Respondent, as later stated in the Findings of Fact of the Final Order of the underlying case: In February 2011, Patient C.C., a 52-year-old female, was admitted to Jackson Memorial Hospital ("JMH") with a diagnosis of perforated appendicitis. She also had a perirectal abscess. Her records indicate that she was treated with percutaneous drainage and a course of intravenous antibiotics. She was discharged on March 4, 2011. On June 22, 2011, Patient C.C. presented to the JMH Emergency Department complaining of 12 hours of abdominal pain in her right lower quadrant with associated nausea and vomiting. Shortly after her arrival, she described her pain to a nurse as "10" on a scale of one to ten. A computed tomography ("CT") scan of Patient C.C.'s abdomen was conducted. The CT report noted that the "the uterus is surgically absent," and "the ovaries are not identified." It noted that "the perirectal abscess that was drained previously is no longer visualized" and that the "appendix appears inflamed and dilated." No other inflamed organs were noted. The radiologist's impression was that the findings of the CT scan were consistent with non-perforated appendicitis. Patient C.C.'s pre-operative history listed a "total abdominal hysterectomy" on May 4, 2005. Patient C.C.'s prior surgeries and earlier infections had resulted in extensive scar tissue in her abdomen. Patient C.C. was scheduled for an emergency appendectomy and signed a "Consent to Operations or Procedures" form for performance of a laparoscopic appendectomy, possible open appendectomy, and other indicated procedures. Patient C.C. was taken to surgery at approximately 1:00 a.m. on June 23, 2011. Dr. Stahl was the attending physician, and notes indicate that he was present throughout the critical steps of the procedure. The Operative Report was dictated by Dr. Eddie Manning after the surgery and electronically signed by Dr. Stahl on June 23, 2011. The report documents the post-operative diagnosis as "acute on chronic appendicitis" and describes the dissected and removed organ as the appendix. Progress notes completed by the nursing staff record that, on June 23, 2011, at 8:00 a.m., Patient C.C. "denies pain" and that the laparoscopic incision is intact. Similar notes indicate that at 5:00 p.m. on June 23, 2011, Patient C.C. "tolerated well reg diet" and was waiting for approval for discharge. Patient C.C. was discharged on June 24, 2011, a little after noon, in stable condition. On June 24, 2011, the Surgical Pathology Report indicated that the specimen removed from Patient C.C. was not an appendix, but instead was an ovary and a portion of a fallopian tube. The report noted that inflammatory cells were seen. Surgery to remove an ovary is an oophorectomy and surgery to remove a fallopian tube is a salpingectomy. On Friday, June 24, 2011, Dr. Nicholas Namias, chief of the Division of Acute Care Surgery, Trauma, and Critical Care, was notified by the pathologist of the results of the pathology report, because Dr. Stahl had left on vacation. Dr. Namias arranged a meeting with Patient C.C. in the clinic the following Monday. At the meeting, Patient C.C. made statements to Dr. Namias regarding her then-existing physical condition, including that she was not in pain, was tolerating her diet, and had no complaints. Dr. Namias explained to Patient C.C. that her pain may have been caused by the inflamed ovary and fallopian tube or may have been caused by appendicitis that resolved medically, and she might have appendicitis again. He explained that her options were to undergo a second operation at that time and search for the appendix or wait and see if appendicitis recurred. He advised against the immediate surgery option because she was "asymptomatic." The Second Amended Administrative Complaint alleged that Dr. Stahl performed a wrong procedure when he performed an appendectomy which resulted in the removal of Patient C.C.'s ovary and a portion of her fallopian tube instead. The Final Order concluded that the evidence did not clearly show that the wrong procedure was performed. It concluded that it was more likely that exactly the right procedure was performed on Patient C.C. That is, it was likely that an oophorectomy and salpingectomy were the right procedures to remove the inflamed organs and address the abdominal pain that caused Patient C.C. to present at the JMH emergency room, but that the right procedure was initially denominated incorrectly as an "appendectomy," as a result of patient history and erroneous interpretation of the CT scan.
The Issue Whether respondent's license to practice medicine should be disciplined on grounds that: (1) he engaged in gross or repeated malpractice or failed to practice medicine with the required level of care, skill, and treatment, and (2) he is unable to practice medicine with the requisite skill and safety by reason of illness or as a result of a mental or physical condition.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, the following facts are determined: Respondent is an 80-year-old physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida. He has been a general practitioner in the Miami area for over 40 years; during that time, he has earned the respect and esteem of the medical community. During the 1940s, he helped establish the first cancer clinic in Dade County; he is recognized as one of the community's early medical pioneers. He has never before been the subject of a disciplinary action for professional misconduct. (Testimony of Bishop, Boughton; R-2.) I. The Claresta Halloran Abortion On July 3, 1980, Ms. Claresta Halloran, age 35, visited respondent's office for a therapeutic abortion. She told respondent that her last menstrual period was "sometime in April." (P-3.) Respondent palpated her, examined her by use of a sounding instrument, and dilated her uterus. After determining that she was approximately 12 weeks pregnant, respondent attempted to abort the fetus by suction and curettage. Fearing that he had perforated Ms. Halloran's uterus, respondent had her transported to North Miami General Hospital for an exploratory laparotomy. Results of the exploratory surgery were negative; there was no evidence of perforation of the uterus or injury to the bowel. (Testimony of Boughton; P-3.) William Wickman, M.D., performed the exploratory surgery on Ms. Halloran at the hospital. His bimanual examination revealed an enlarged uterus, "the size of approximately [a] 12 week pregnancy." (Testimony of Boughton; P-3.) Two days after the surgery, Ms. Halloran passed a macerated fetus which, after pathological examination, was estimated to be of 17 weeks' gestation. Her convalescence from surgery was otherwise uneventful and she was discharged from the hospital the next day, July 6, 1980. (Testimony of Boughton; P-3.) Absent specialized training, abortions "from below," that is, by dilating the cervix and removing the contents of the uterus, should not be performed on pregnancies which have progressed beyond 12-weeks. This is because, after 12 weeks, the fetus's bones have developed calcium and sharp, razor-like edges which can perforate the uterus and endanger the health and safety of the patient. (Testimony of Rudolph.) Respondent has not received specialized training which would enable him to safely use the "from below" method on pregnancies beyond 12 weeks. However, his examination of Ms. Halloran led him to believe she had been pregnant for 12 weeks. In reaching that conclusion, he did not rely solely on the date of the patient's last menstrual period. His palpation and examination of the patient's uterus confirmed that the pregnancy was approximately 12 weeks. Dr. Wickman's subsequent examination of the patient at the hospital confirmed that the patient's uterus indicated an approximate 12-week pregnancy. (Testimony of Rudolph, Boughton; P-3.) There are other more advanced methods, such as sonography, which enable one to more accurately determine the gestational age of a fetus. However, the evidence does not support a finding that respondent's failure to use such methods constitutes malpractice or a failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. (Testimony of Rudolph.) Respondent admits that he erred in his diagnosis of the stage of Ms. Halloran's pregnancy. However, his diagnosis was not shown to have been unjustified or unreasonable in light of the facts known to him at the time. Both the date of the patient's last menstrual period and manual examination of the uterus supported a determination that the pregnancy was approximately 12 weeks. The "from below" abortion procedure which respondent utilized is only unacceptable for use on pregnancies in excess of 12 weeks. In short, respondent's treatment of the patient was consistent with his diagnosis. While the diagnosis was in error -- the fetus was of 17 weeks' gestation, not 12 weeks -- other physicians, under similar circumstances, would likely have made the same error. (Testimony of Boughton; P-3.) II. The Wilhemina Evans Abortion On August 5, 1980, Ms. Wilhemina Evans, age 18, visited respondent's office for a therapeutic abortion. She told respondent that her last menstrual period was at the end of April. He palpated her, placed a sounding instrument, and dilated her uterus. After concluding that she was at least 13 weeks pregnant; 2/ he attempted to abort the fetus "from below" by use of placental forceps and a curette. He thought the abortion had been successful and permitted the patient to, return home. (Testimony of Rudolph, Boughton; P-4.) The next day, the patient went to Jackson Memorial Hospital complaining of abdominal pain. Several minutes after arriving at the emergency room, she passed a 750-gram male still-born fetus. Subsequent pathological examination indicated that the fetus was of 24 weeks' gestation. (P-4.) Respondent failed, in several respects, to provide Ms. Evans with treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as acceptable under similar circumstances. Without special training, the "from below" method of aborting the fetus should not have been used on a woman beyond 12 weeks pregnant. 3/ Moreover, if respondent was uncertain of the gestational age of the fetus, he should not have attempted to abort the fetus "from below" in an office setting. Despite the patient's obesity, respondent should have been able to determine the advanced gestational stage of the fetus. Finally, a reasonably prudent similar physician would have realized that the attempted abortion had been unsuccessful and would not have permitted the patient to immediately return home. Thus, it is concluded that respondent's treatment of Ms. Evans was inconsistent with acceptable medical practice. 4/ (Testimony of Rudolph.) III. Treatment of Skin Lesions of Bernice Riordan Since 1951, Bernice Riordan, age 68, has been a patient of respondent's. Over the years, he treated her for various ailments, including basal cell carcinomas and squamous cell carcinomas on her face and neck. He used different techniques to treat the carcinomas; electrocoagulation in 1955; electrodesiccation and silver nitrate in 1961, 1962, 1972, and 1976; bichloracetic acid in 1976; and 5-Fluorouracil in 1978. In April, 1961, respondent referred Ms. Riordan to a dermatologist for specialized treatment. In 1969, he referred her to Jackson Memorial Hospital for radiation therapy because of multiple lesions on her face. She was a difficult and eccentric patient; she continually resisted his efforts to refer her to specialists for treatment of her increasingly serious carcinomas. Finally, in 1980, he referred her to two specialists -- a plastic surgeon and another dermatologist. By 1980, the cancer of the skin on her face had destroyed the entire nose and perioral skin. (Testimony of Boughton; P-2.) The Department presented, by deposition, the testimony of Dr. Richard C. Childers, a dermatologist who had reviewed the patient records of Ms. Riordan. He graduated from medical school in 1969 and was licensed to practice medicine in Florida in 1971. Since 1974, he has engaged in the private practice of dermatology in Gainesville, Florida, with a clinical appointment at Shands Teaching Hospital. It was Dr. Childers' opinion that respondent should have referred Ms. Riordan, no later than 1959, to a specialist for treatment of recurring skin lesions. Dr. Childers also opined that respondent, on numerous occasions over the years, had used ineffective or inappropriate treatment techniques on Ms. Riordan's lesions. (P-2.) Dr. Childers' testimony is rejected as inadequate to establish that respondent failed to provide treatment to Ms. Riordan which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar circumstances. Dr. Childers is a specialist in dermatology, not a general practitioner. He practices in Gainesville, not Miami. When respondent applied many of the complained of treatment techniques to Ms. Riordan, Dr. Childers had not yet begun medical school. It would be patently unfair to measure treatment for carcinomas furnished by a general practitioner in 1961 by a specialist's with the standard of care applicable to general practitioners in the Miami area during the period in question. to establish an appropriate standard of care applicable to respondent's treatment of Ms. Riordan. (Testimony of Boughton; P-2.) IV. Respondent's Ability to Practice Medicine with Reasonable Safety to His Patients On April 27 and 30, 1981, a mental status examination was given psychiatrist's opinion, respondent's appearance, behavior, and overall thinking was intact; there was no evidence of psychosis. However, respondent's response was somewhat impaired. Dr. Bishop concluded that respondent suffers from of Bishop.) Respondent recognizes that his advanced age affects his ability to However, he believes that he is able to operate an office practice with reasonable skill and safety and without endangering his patients. He is willing his work. The practice of medicine is his avocation as well as his profession; it is the habit and pleasure of his life. (Testimony of Boughton.) interfere with his ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to his patients. The ability to remember facts is essential to a physician's patient's illness. (Testimony of Bishop.) However, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that respondent's his livelihood. The evidence on the extent which his impairment will affect his ability to practice is problematic. He is willing to submit to the supervision supervision of another physician, it is likely that he will be able to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to his patients. (Testimony of
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is That respondent's license to practice medicine be suspended until respondent submits to the Board an acceptable proposal which ensures that his the Board approves the proposal, respondent should be placed on a probationary status and his practice restricted to exclude the performance of surgery and DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 20th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 1981.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents performed a wrong procedure on patient C.C., as set forth in the second amended administrative complaints, and if so, what is the appropriate sanction.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health, Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in the state of Florida, pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondents were licensed physicians within the state, with Dr. Kenneth D. Stahl having been issued license number ME79521 and Dr. Eddie Ward Manning having been issued license number ME110105. Dr. Stahl has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida since 1999 and in California since 1987. He has never had disciplinary action taken against either license. Dr. Stahl is board certified by the American College of Surgeons in general surgery, cardiac and thoracic surgery, and trauma and critical care surgery. Dr. Stahl's address of record is 3040 Paddock Road, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33141. Dr. Manning has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida since May 31, 2011. He has never had disciplinary action taken against his license. On June 23, 2011, Dr. Manning was a resident in general surgery. Dr. Manning's address of record is 1900 South Treasure Drive, Apartment 6R, North Bay Village, Florida 33141. In February 2011, patient C.C., a 52-year-old female, was admitted to Jackson Memorial Hospital (JMH) with a diagnosis of perforated appendicitis. She also had a perirectal abscess. Her records indicate that she was treated with percutaneous drainage and a course of intravenous (IV) antibiotics. She was discharged on March 4, 2011. On June 22, 2011, patient C.C. presented to the JMH Emergency Department complaining of 12 hours of abdominal pain in her right lower quadrant with associated nausea and vomiting. Shortly after her arrival she described her pain to a nurse as "10" on a scale of one to ten. A computed tomography (CT) scan of patient C.C.'s abdomen was conducted. The CT report noted that the "the uterus is surgically absent," and "the ovaries are not identified." It noted that "the perirectal abscess that was drained previously is no longer visualized" and that the "appendix appears inflamed and dilated." No other inflamed organs were noted. The radiologist's impression was that the findings of the CT scan were consistent with non-perforated appendicitis. Patient C.C.'s pre-operative history listed a "total abdominal hysterectomy" on May 4, 2005. Patient C.C.'s prior surgeries and earlier infections had resulted in extensive scar tissue in her abdomen. Dr. Stahl later described her anatomy as "very distorted." Patient C.C. was scheduled for an emergency appendectomy, and patient C.C. signed a "Consent to Operations or Procedures" form for performance of a laparoscopic appendectomy, possible open appendectomy, and other indicated procedures. Patient C.C. was taken to surgery at approximately 1:00 a.m. on June 23, 2011. Dr. Stahl was the attending physician, Dr. Manning was the chief or senior resident, and Dr. Castillo was the junior resident. Notes indicate that Dr. Stahl was present throughout the critical steps of the procedure. Dr. Stahl had little recollection of the procedure, but did testify that he recalled: looking at the video image and seeing a tremendous amount of infection and inflammation and I pulled-–I recall that I myself went into the computer program and pulled up the CT scan and put that on the screen right next to the video screen that's being transmitted from the laparoscope and put them side-to-side and compared what the radiologists were pointing to as the cause of this acute infection and seeing on the laparoscopic video image that that indeed matched what I saw in the CT scan and I said, well, let's dissect this out and get it out of her so we can fix the problem. Dr. Stahl further testified that the infected, hollow organ that was dissected and removed was adherent laterally in the abdomen and was located where the appendix would normally be. He recalled that an abscess cavity was broken into and the infected, "pus-containing" organ that was removed was right in the middle of this abscess cavity. Dr. Stahl also recalled the residents stapling across the base of the infected organ and above the terminal ileum and the cecum and removing it. The Operative Report was dictated by Dr. Manning after the surgery and electronically signed by Dr. Stahl on June 23, 2011. The report documents the postoperative diagnosis as "acute on chronic appendicitis" and describes the dissected and removed organ as the appendix. Progress notes completed by the nursing staff record that on June 23, 2011, at 8:00 a.m., patient C.C. "denies pain," and that the laparoscopic incision is intact. Similar notes indicate that at 5:00 p.m. on June 23, 2011, patient C.C. "tolerated well reg diet" and was waiting for approval for discharge. Patient C.C. was discharged on June 24, 2011, a little after noon, in stable condition. On June 24, 2011, the Surgical Pathology Report indicated that the specimen removed from patient C.C. was not an appendix, but instead was an ovary and a portion of a fallopian tube. The report noted that inflammatory cells were seen. Surgery to remove an ovary is an oophorectomy and surgery to remove a fallopian tube is a salpingectomy. On Friday, June 24, 2011, Dr. Namias, chief of the Division of Acute Care Surgery, Trauma, and Critical Care, was notified by the pathologist of the results of the pathology report, because Dr. Stahl had left on vacation. Dr. Namias arranged a meeting with patient C.C. in the clinic the following Monday. At the meeting, patient C.C. made statements to Dr. Namias regarding her then-existing physical condition, including that she was not in pain, was tolerating her diet, and had no complaints. Dr. Namias explained to patient C.C. that her pain may have been caused by the inflamed ovary and fallopian tube or may have been caused by appendicitis that resolved medically, and she might have appendicitis again. He explained that her options were to undergo a second operation at that time and search for the appendix or wait and see if appendicitis recurred. He advised against the immediate surgery option because she was "asymptomatic." The second amended administrative complaints allege that Dr. Stahl and Dr. Manning performed a wrong procedure when they performed an appendectomy which resulted in the removal of her ovary and a portion of her fallopian tube. It is clear that Dr. Stahl and Dr. Manning did not perform an appendectomy on patient C.C. on June 23, 2011. Dr. Stahl and Dr. Manning instead performed an oophorectomy and salpingectomy. It was not clearly shown that an appendectomy was the right procedure to treat patient C.C. on June 23, 2011. The Department did convincingly show that patient C.C. had a history of medical problems and that she had earlier been diagnosed with appendicitis, had been suffering severe pain for 12 hours with associated nausea and vomiting, that she suffered from an infection in her right lower quadrant, that the initial diagnosis was acute appendicitis, and that the treatment that was recommended was an appendectomy. However, substantial evidence after the operation suggests that an appendectomy was not the right procedure. The infected and inflamed organ that was removed from the site of a prior abscess was not an appendix. After the procedure, patient C.C. no longer felt severe pain in her lower right quadrant, with associated nausea and vomiting. She was discharged the following day and was asymptomatic. It is, in short, likely that the original diagnosis on June 22, 2011, was incorrect to the extent that it identified the infected organ as the appendix. The pre-operative diagnosis that patient C.C.'s severe pain and vomiting were caused by a severe infection in an organ in her lower right quadrant was correct. Surgical removal of that infected organ was the right procedure for patient C.C. If that inflamed organ was misidentified as the appendix before and during the operation, that would not fundamentally change the correctness of the surgical procedure that was performed. The evidence did not clearly show that the wrong procedure was performed. It is more likely that exactly the right procedure was performed on patient C.C. That is, it is likely that an oophorectomy and salpingectomy were the right procedures to address the abdominal pain that caused patient C.C. to present at the JMH emergency room, but that the right procedure was incorrectly initially denominated as an "appendectomy," as a result of patient history and interpretation of the CT scan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Medicine, enter a final order dismissing the second amended administrative complaints against the professional licenses of Dr. Kenneth D. Stahl and Dr. Eddie Ward Manning. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2015.
Findings Of Fact The current petition Following the entry of a final order of the Board of Medicine dismissing the administrative action previously filed against her, petitioner filed the pending request for an award of attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to Sections 57.111 and 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine (Department), has conceded that: the underlying licensure disciplinary "action in Department of Professional Regulation v. Ada Gonzalez, M.D., DBPR Case No. 90-06789, was initiated by the Department of Professional Regulation (now Department of Business and Professional Regulation), a state agency, and, therefore, the Department is not a nominal party only"; the "Petitioner qualifies as a small business party as defined by Section 57.111, Florida Statutes"; the "Petitioner prevailed in the underlying case . . . in that the Board of Medicine dismissed the case with a Final Order filed on October 27, 1993"; and, the "Petitioner's claimed attorney's fees and costs [attorney's fees of $20,189.00 and costs of $3,784.95] seem reasonable; however, Respondent asserts that the statutory cap of $15,000.00 inclusive of fees and costs, is applicable." Under the circumstances, the sole issue with regard to the claim for attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, is whether the actions of the Department were "substantially justified" when it initiated the underlying disciplinary action and, with regard to the claim for attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes, apart from the applicability of such section to the instant case, is whether any pleading, motion or other paper was filed in the underlying proceeding for an "improper purpose." The underlying disciplinary action On or about May 22, 1990, the Department received, pursuant to statutory requirement, a closed claim report from the Department of Insurance. The report reflected that an indemnity of $160,000 had been paid to the family of Patient C. D. through a settlement within the presuit period prescribed by Section 768.57, Florida Statutes. The predicate for the claim against petitioner, Ada Gonzalez, M.D., was the apparent assertion that the patient died as a consequence of petitioner's failure to appropriately treat her. By memorandum of May 22, 1990, the Division of Medical Quality Assurance recommended to the Department of Professional Regulation's complaints department that a case be opened. That memorandum provided: DISCUSSION: This review is predicated upon receipt of a closed claim DOI report. The specific allegation is that the doctor treated the patient for PID - rule out urinary tract infection. The patient was reportedly treated with antibiotics on 11/14/88 and on 11/16/88 appeared better. However, the patient reportedly did not improve and died of a ruptured ovarian abscess on 11/18/88. There are no medical records to review and there is no history or explanation given as to what happened in the time period from the onset of the pain to the demise of the patient. * * * COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: I recommend a case be opened. There is a question of stan dard of care. Records should be obtained and referred to a similarly placed physician for review. As a consequence of the foregoing referral, the Department opened its Case No. 90-06789, and assigned its investigator Providence Padrick to the case. The investigator obtained a copy of the Palm Avenue Physicians Center and the Fatima HMO medical records, which included the documentation reflecting petitioner's treatment of the patient; the Jackson Memorial Hospital medical records, the facility at which the patient expired; and the autopsy report. Petitioner was duly informed by the Department that the case had been opened against her, and she was offered an interview but declined. The Palm Avenue Physicians Center and Fatima HMO medical records reflect that the patient was first seen by petitioner on November 14, 1988, and presented with a complaint of bilateral flank pain radiating to the lower abdomen, frequency of urination with some tingling on urination, a yellowish vaginal discharge, and a low grade temperature; such symptoms of approximately one day duration. Examination revealed lower abdominal tenderness to palpation, cervical motion tenderness, and a brown cervical discharge. Petitioner diagnosed pelvic inflammatory disease ("PID") and possible urinary tract infection ("UTI"). As a consequence of the history and examination, petitioner ordered x- rays of the abdomen, biochemical profile, pregnancy test, syphilis test and cultures of the vaginal discharge and urine; prescribed antibiotics; made a referral for the patient to see a gynecologist in two weeks; and, advised the patient to return for a follow-up visit in two days. As for the testing results, the urine culture and sensitivity came back positive for a urinary tract infection; however, all of the other laboratory tests came back negative. The patient was next seen by petitioner on November 16, 1988, for her follow-up visit. At the time, the patient reported that she felt better, and petitioner's examination revealed less vaginal discharge and discomfort, although she still suffered a low grade fever. Petitioner confirmed her earlier diagnosis of pelvic inflammatory disease, and prescribed another antibiotic (Septra DS) for urinary tract infection. The following day, November 17, 1988, the patient returned to see petitioner complaining of severe abdominal pain over the whole abdomen, nausea and vomiting. Examination revealed that the patient was in distress, with a distended abdomen, decreased bowel sounds and positive tenderness on palpation over the abdominal area. Petitioner again diagnosed pelvic inflammatory disease and urinary tract infection, and referred the patient to the Fatima HMO for observation, IV fluids and x-rays. The patient refused, however, to go to the Fatima HMO and, in fact, evidenced her intent to cancel her membership in the HMO. At or about 6:34 p.m., November 17, 1988, the patient presented to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Emergency Room complaining of severe abdominal pain, nausea and vomiting, and yellow vaginal discharge. Routine laboratory work was undertaken, but when she was taken to the x-ray department and placed on the table she became unresponsive. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was immediately commenced without success, and the patient was pronounced dead at 11:25 p.m. that evening. An autopsy performed by the Dade County Medical Examiner revealed the following abnormal findings: Diffuse peritonitis Ruptured left fallopian tubal abscess Crude intrauterine contraceptive device Bilateral ovarian cysts Soft liver, spleen, and kidneys Congested lungs Gallstones Scarred gallbladder The autopsy concluded that the cause of death was acute diffuse peritonitis due to ruptured fallopian tubal abscess. On August 11, 1992, the Department forwarded its investigative report and related exhibits to its expert, Stanley H. Bernstein, M.D., for review and opinion concerning petitioner's adherence to the appropriate standard of care. By letter of August 20, 1992, Dr. Bernstein responded to the Department's request as follows: The subject A. G. [petitioner] was treating this 49 year old female for symptoms related to the genito-urinary tract. The scant information noted in the medical office records suggested that the patient had a urinary tract infection as well as symptoms suggesting pelvic inflammatory disease. How ever no studies were initiated to define the extent of the infection in the pelvis. No consultations from either a urologist of [sic] gynecologist were obtained. Although antibiotic was given, there was no realization that the infection in the pelvis might have needed much more intensive therapy. The subject is unknown to me. There was no adequate assessment of the patient's condition. Since pelvic inflammatory disease was suspected, a consultant gynecologist and/or appropriate x-rays of the pelvis should have been done. Since the subject did not suspect the true diagnosis in this case, inappropriate antibiotics were given. Since appropriate diagnostic tests such as ultrasound and/or cat scan of the pelvis were not done the diagnosis could not be appreciated. The plan of treatment was inadequate. There was no adequate monitor being carried out for this patient in regard to antibiotic therapy. The written medical records were woefully inadequate. The applicable standard of care for this patient was not met since the subject did not appreciate the possibility that the patient had more extensive infection in her pelvis. The subject did note that pelvic infection was probably present but she never used appropriate consultants. This suggests that the subject had a poor understanding of the extent to which such infections can cause major catastrophic events. It seem to be that the subject needs further training-certainly in medical conditions where infection is present. On September 24, 1992, the probable cause panel of the Board of Medicine (Board) met in Tampa, Florida. Those present at the meeting were panel members Louis Murray, M.D., chairman, and Mr. Gilbert Rodriguez; Alan Grossman, Assistant Attorney General; Larry McPherson, Jr., chief medical attorney for the Department; Randolph Collete, senior attorney for the Department; and, James Reese, chief medical investigator for the Department. At the commencement of the meeting, the panel members (Dr. Murray and Mr. Rodriguez) acknowledged that they had received and reviewed the complete investigative file pertaining to, among others, the petitioner. With regard to petitioner's case, the transcript of that meeting reflects the following brief discussion: MR. COLLETTE: Item A-03 is on Ada Gonzalez, M.D., case number 90-06789. The case is before the Panel on a recommendation that probable cause be found and an adminis trative complaint be filed. It's alleged that the respondent practiced medicine below the acceptable level of care by failing to appropriately diagnose and treat the patient C. D.'s condition and mistakenly treating her for a urinary tract infection with antibiotics when, in fact, the patient was suffering from an ovarian abscess; and that the respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment; and that the records are sketchy and inadequate. Based upon these facts, the Department is alleging a violation of 458.331(1)(t) and (m), and recommends that probable cause be found and an administrative complaint be filed. MR. RODRIGUEZ: Move a finding of probable cause and the filing of an administrative complaint. MR. MURRAY: Second. MR. MURRAY: So moved a finding of probable cause and the filing of an administrative complaint, seconded, and passed without objection. On October 8, 1992, an administrative complaint was filed against petitioner alleging that she violated the Medical Practices Act, Section 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes, by failing to practice medicine at the accepted standard of care in that petitioner was guilty of "mistakenly treating [the patient] for a urinary tract infection with antibiotics, when in fact [the patient] was suffering from an ovarian abscess," and that petitioner's "medical records are sketchy and inadequate in that they fail to justify [her] course of treatment." Subsequent to the filing of the administrative complaint, petitioner's counsel employed an expert, Martin Arostegui, M.D., to review the matter and render an opinion regarding the merits of the claim against petitioner. Based on his review of the investigative file and an interview with petitioner, Dr. Arostegui concluded: . . . As a result of my extensive review, I have come to an opinion that is substantially different from that of the other physician who previously reviewed this file. I attribute this difference to the level and intensity of my review and scrutiny of the file records and my interview with Dr. Gonzalez who I found to be very professional, concerned and wholly credible. CONCLUSION: Dr. Ada Gonzalez was faced with a very difficult patient who was obese and, as a result, difficult to examine and who appeared to be clinically less sick than she really was. This patient developed a severe pelvic infection as a result of a home made intrauterine contraceptive device which probably was placed illegally and without regard for patient safety. The device was not disclosed to Dr. Gonzalez by the patient and it is reasonable to expect that Dr. Gonzalez would not uncover the device under the circumstances. Dr. Gonzalez attempted to get proper surgical evaluation and care for this patient but the patient refused, went home and, at least six hours later, appeared at an emergency department where the continuity of communication with Dr. Gonzalez was broken, the diagnosis was completely missed and the patient expired. In my opinion, Dr. Ada Gonzalez' care did not fall below community standards. However, Dr. Gonzalez did a less than satisfactory job of documenting her care of this patient and this probably had a role in the formulation of the different opinion by the other reviewing physician. It is particularly worth noting that the physician reviewer did not mention the existence of the home made intrauterine contraceptive device. On or about February 11, 1993, petitioner's counsel provided the Department a copy of their expert's report with the understanding that the Department would provide the report to its expert and if the expert's opinion was materially changed as a result the Department "would entertain taking this case back to probable cause, perhaps dismissing it or softening at least the consent agreement by eliminating perhaps probation or other items" [TR. pp. 15- 16]. Upon receipt and review of the aforesaid report, the Department amended the administrative complaint to correct certain factual inaccuracies. In this regard, paragraphs three, four and five of the original compliant, which had inaccurately averred that petitioner had treated the patient on October 8 and 31, 1988, were dropped; paragraph 7 of the original complaint, now paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, was amended to reflect that petitioner had "referred her [the patient] to a gynecologist in two weeks, and asked her to return in two days," as opposed to having simply "scheduled her to see a gynecologist" as alleged in the original complaint; and paragraph 10 of the original complaint, now paragraph 7 of the amended complaint, was amended to correctly reflect that petitioner referred the patient to Fatima HMO for observation, as opposed to referring her to Jackson Memorial Hospital as alleged in the original complaint. Other than such factual corrections, the premise for the charges leveled against petitioner remained unchanged. On April 16, 1993, the Department forwarded a copy of the amended complaint, which had been filed that date with its clerk, and a copy of petitioner's expert report to Dr. Bernstein for review. The cover letter that accompanied such materials concluded "Please read over the enclosed materials. If you see anything that you want to bring to my attention, please give me a call . . . ." Here, the proof fails to demonstrate any change in Dr. Bernstein's opinion as a consequence of his review of the materials, but fails to explicate why no change occurred. 2/ By letter of April 19, 1993, the Department advised petitioner's counsel of the amendment of the complaint, consequent to her review of his expert's analysis, and encouraged petitioner's agreement to a proposed stipulation for settlement of the case. Ultimately, in September 1993, the parties entered into a written consent agreement, subject to Board approval, to resolve the subject dispute. On or about October 2, 1993, the consent agreement was presented to the Board of Medicine for consideration. Present were fourteen members of the Board; however, one member, Dr. Louis Murray, was excused from participating since he had served on the probable cause panel. Pertinent to this case, the transcript of the Board meeting reflects the following comments by Board members: CHAIRMAN DAUER: Thank you. I just want to make a few opening comments here. I was a little bit disturbed when I saw the materials here, and let me express my concerns here. I think the doctor in this case probably did everything right. You had a patient that she first saw on November 14th, she ordered a beta HCG, it's clearly on the order here, the pregnancy test came back negative, there's no history of the IUD, she appropriately treated her, I think her medical records are adequate, and what happened, she even referred her to a gynecologist. She got the patient back in 48 hours, and I think it was an incident that could not be expected. There's no way to expect this woman to have a ruptured tubal with the results she had done, the history that was not adequate. I think this doctor did everything right. I looked at this case material and I said why is this even here. I think the case should have been dismissed. * * * DR. ECHEVARRIA: I thoroughly agree with your comments, Mr. Chairman. As I read the original AC, I made a note to take issue with the Administrative Complaint to start with, and I really feel that she did things according to the book and it is an unfortunate final ending in this case, and I'm kind of wondering why peritonitis with a ruptured tubal would kill her this quickly. We see people with ruptured diverticulitis, ruptured appendices that linger on and on and on, and it doesn't kill them. So I don't know why the death occurred so quickly without a lot of other symptoms being associated with it. So I think there may have been something like toxic shock or whatever, as a result of the foreign body. I would agree, I would certainly favor a move to dismiss. Following such dialogue, a motion was made by a member of the Board to reject the consent agreement and dismiss the case. The motion passed unanimously, and by final order dated October 8, 1993, filed with the Department of Professional Regulation October 27, 1993, the consent agreement was formally rejected and the case dismissed. Whether the action of the agency was substantially justified or other special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust. Here, facially, the probable cause panel had before it evidence in the form of its expert's report that would, if his opinions were credited at final hearing, suggest that petitioner had failed to maintain adequate medical records and had failed to maintain the appropriate standard of care. The reliability or efficacy of that expert's opinions has, however, been rendered suspect by the Board's unanimous conclusion that petitioner's medical records and treatment were appropriate. Under such circumstances, and the Department having failed to demonstrate, at hearing, that the information upon which the Board based its decision differed in some marked degree from that considered by the probable cause panel or to offer proof to explicate the basis or reasonableness of the expert's conclusions, the expert's report cannot be accepted at face value as reasonably indicating that the violations had occurred. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Department has failed to demonstrate that its decision to initiate the underlying action was substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust. While the Department may have failed in its burden to demonstrate that its action was substantially justified, such does not compel the conclusion that any pleading or paper filed by the Department was interposed for an "improper purpose," such that attorney's fees and costs would be appropriately awarded under Section 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes. To the contrary, the proof fails to support such conclusion. Moreover, and most importantly, the proof fails to demonstrate that the subject charges ever pended before the Division of Administrative Hearings and, therefore, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, there is no basis upon which to assess attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes.
