The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent's corrections officer license is subject to suspension, revocation or other discipline.
Findings Of Fact On August 29, 1996, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that Respondent's corrections officer license should be disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 943, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character by testing positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, which was indicative of the illegal ingestion of a controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On September 5, 1996, Respondent filed an Election of Rights in which he disputed the allegations of the Administrative Complaint and requested an administrative hearing. Thereafter, the case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings on June 23, 1999. The Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at Volusia Correctional Institution (VCI) in early 1991. A corrections officer is a special risk employee in a safety sensitive position. At the time of licensure Respondent passed his drug screen. In 1996, the month of February had 29 days. In February 1996, Warden Bruce Scherer received allegations of possible drug abuse by Respondent from Connie Beach, Respondent's (then) wife. Respondent's wife was also a corrections officer. Ms. Beach had been in the Warden's office asking for a day off to retrieve her belongings from the marital home due to personal problems with Respondent. Upon inquiry of the Warden, the Warden learned that Ms. Beach's brother Carroll Bradshaw had smoked marijuana with Respondent. The Warden called the brother by telephone. The brother confirmed he had smoked marijuana with Respondent several occasions. In response, the Warden asked Respondent to submit to a drug test. Respondent was cooperative and agreed to submit to the drug test. Volusia Correctional Institution does not conduct random drug testing. At no time did Respondent question why he was being asked to submit to a drug test. Bolton accompanied Respondent to the Halifax Hospital facility to submit a urine specimen for drug testing. In testing specimens for marijuana, two tests are conducted; the first of these is an immunoassay screen, and the second is a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS) test. The GCMS test is the more definitive test which specifically identifies THC, the major metabolite of marijuana. THC is also the part of marijuana which gives it its psycho-active properties. Cut-off levels are used in the testing process in order to exclude positive test results for persons who may have had accidental (or second-hand) exposure to marijuana. Respondent submitted his first urine sample for drug testing on February 28, 1996. On March 4, 1996, the results on the immunoassay screen came back positive for cannabinoid (marijuana). The sample first tested positive. It then tested about 300 nanograms of THC in the GCMS test. On March 19, 1996, a second test was conducted on Respondent's original urine sample. On March 20, 1996, the results of that test were received and reviewed by Dr. Hung Doan. The GCMS test showed 259 nanograms of THC. The result was confirmatory of the first as positive for marijuana. Dr. Hung Doan is a certified Medical Review Officer (MRO). He is certified as to his knowledge of drugs, their medical usage and ingestion. Dr. Doan is an expert in the field. Dr. Doan was the MRO who reviewed and certified the results of Respondent's two positive drug tests in 1996. The high levels of marijuana detected in the two positive tests of Respondent's urine sample conclusively establish that the results could not have been caused by accidental or passive inhalation of marijuana. The results did not rule out ingestion of marijuana since the evidence showed that about two cigarette sized amounts of marijuana would produce results similar to those found on Respondent's tests. However, the evidence did not show that Respondent had eaten any marijuana. Only multiple "accidental" exposures to, in conjunction with "accidental" ingestion of marijuana could possibly have resulted in the nanogram levels detected in Respondent's urine without his knowledge. Respondent did not produce any evidence beyond speculation to suggest that this might have occurred in his case. Mr. Beach was notified of the first positive test on March 4, 1996, by Mary Yochum, Dr. Doan's assistant. Respondent's response to being told that he tested positive for marijuana was "okay." He was concerned with the result but could not go into detail over the phone because other officers were present. On March 6, 1996, Respondent submitted a separate urine sample for the purposes of having an independent drug test. The results of that test were negative for marijuana. However, this second test occurred seven days after the first urine sample was given. The test only shows Respondent's level of cannabinoid on the latter date had decreased or diluted sufficiently to fall below the cut-off point for such tests. Marijuana can clear the human body's system within days. However, a chronic user of marijuana may take up to 75 days before the drug clears the persons system. It depends on the persons individual metabolism. Carroll Bradshaw is the ex-brother-in-law of Respondent. Mr. Bradshaw is a known drug user and convicted felon. He was last released from incarceration in 1998 after serving time for a cocaine charge. He continues to use drugs to date. Mr. Bradshaw regularly socialized, and smoked marijuana with Respondent. However, he had not smoked marijuana for quite a while before receiving the telephone call from the Warden. Respondent admittedly was familiar with the smell and appearance of marijuana. Respondent would typically supply and prepare the marijuana which he and his brother-in-law smoked while socializing. Respondent kept his stash of marijuana on a "paraphernalia" tray underneath his couch in his home. Respondent's former mother-in-law, who was also familiar with the look and smell of marijuana because of her son's problems, witnessed Respondent smoking marijuana with her son and others. She confirmed the testimony of her son and her daughter as to Respondent's use of marijuana. Given these facts Petitioner has shown clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Chapter 943, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and that Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Gabrielle Taylor, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 John Stanton, Esquire 121 1/2 North Woodland Boulevard Suite 3 Deland, Florida 32720 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Andrew Pollock (also known as Antone Pollock), should be terminated from employment with the City of Clearwater (City) after testing positive for cocaine, while on duty, as alleged in the City's Termination and Dismissal Notice (Notice) dated March 7, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Respondent began working for the City in August 2001. In November 2012 he was reclassified as a Stormwater Technician II. Pursuant to federal Department of Transportation (DOT) safety regulations, this position is considered a safety- sensitive position and requires that Respondent have a commercial driver's license (CDL) and that he submit to random drug testing. The City has a zero tolerance for drug and alcohol use while on the job. This is explained in the City's Drug/Alcohol Program Policy, also known as Policy No. 3401.2. See City Ex. 3, p. 5 ("Any employee covered by this policy who . . . fails an alcohol or drug test . . . will be immediately removed from active duty and subject to discipline, including termination."). Respondent signed documents acknowledging that he was given a copy of the policy and was responsible for complying with its terms and conditions. See City Ex. 1 and 2. Various rules, standards, and policies have been adopted by the City to govern the conduct of its employees. Specifically, the City has adopted a Performance and Behavior Management Program (PBMP) manual, which includes Personal Responsibility, Integrity, Excellence, and Citywide Standards. Pursuant to authority in the Code of Ordinances (Code), the Civil Service Board has adopted Rules and Regulations governing the conduct of all positions in the civil service. Relevant to this case is chapter 13, section 3, Rules and Regulations, which spells out grounds for suspending, demoting, or dismissing an employee. Also, as noted above, DOT safety regulations apply to employees such as Respondent who are performing safety-sensitive functions on the job. Finally, the City has adopted Policy 3401.2, which establishes guidelines and procedures regarding the use or abuse of illegal drugs by employees. Notably, these standards, rules, policy, and DOT regulations apply only to the use of drugs and alcohol by an employee while on duty. With certain exceptions not relevant here, there is no City prohibition against the use of drugs or alcohol while off-duty. But if an employee fails a drug test administered during regular working hours, it is presumed he is using, or under the influence of, drugs while on the job. In accordance with DOT regulations, on February 17, 2015, Respondent was selected for a random drug test and willingly submitted to the collection procedure that morning. See City Ex. 4, p. 5. Respondent acknowledges that he participated in the collection procedure on that date. The results of the test, conducted by Largo Medical Center, are shown on a copy of a barely legible Verification Report (Report) received in evidence as Exhibit 4. No individual from the testing facility testified, the Report is not signed by the medical review officer, and several significant sections in the Report are not completed or signed. Given these deficiencies, the City agrees that it does not have "admissible drug lab evidence." Tr., p. 77. Without objection the Report was offered only for the purpose of showing "what action [the City took] upon receipt of this document," and not to prove that Respondent failed the drug test. Tr., p. 18. On February 23, 2015, Respondent was notified that he tested positive for cocaine. While he disputes the laboratory results, he does not dispute the laboratory collection procedure. A recommendation was then made by his department head that he be terminated for violating City rules, policies, and standards, and DOT regulations. Civil Service Board regulations allow an employee to explain the circumstances which led to the positive test results and to provide mitigating facts. See ch. 13, § 8, Rules and Regs. An employee may request a disciplinary determination meeting with the Department of Human Resources; an adverse decision is then subject to review by a hearing officer (administrative law judge). Alternatively, an employee may file a grievance pursuant to the union collective bargaining agreement. If the grievance is denied, the employee may have the matter heard by an arbitration panel, but the cost of arbitration is borne by the employee. Because of financial constraints, Respondent elected to have the matter reviewed by the Department of Human Resources. A disciplinary determination meeting was conducted on March 3, 2015. Respondent was represented at the meeting by a member of his union. After Respondent's explanation was not deemed to be plausible, on March 7, 2015, the City Manager formally notified Respondent that he was being terminated effective March 11, 2015. See City Ex. 6. Respondent then requested a hearing to contest that action. At hearing, Respondent essentially repeated the explanation he gave at the disciplinary determination meeting. He testified that while at a local bar with his brother on the evening of February 15, 2015, or two days before the random drug test and while off-duty, he asked a long-time friend, Eric "Red Rock" Gibson, for a "black and mild" (a cigar). After smoking the cigar, Respondent said that something seemed different about the cigar, his tongue was numb and tingling, and he was mumbling words. However, he attributed this to being drunk at the time and gave it no further thought. After receiving the results of the random drug test, and being told that he was terminated, Respondent spoke to Gibson and learned that Gibson always laced his cigars with cocaine, including the one given to Respondent. The City relies on this admission, and not the drug test, to prove the charges in the Notice. Thus, the sum of the case is that Respondent admitted that he unknowingly smoked a cigar laced with cocaine on February 15, 2015. There is, however, no competent evidence to support the charge that he flunked a drug test two days later, as charged in the Notice, or that cocaine was in his system when he reported to work that day. Respondent testified credibly that he does not use drugs and he unknowingly injested the cocaine. He pointed out that, except for this test, he has never failed a drug test while employed by the City. Shortly after the random testing, he paid for a follow-up drug test, which produced negative results. He desires to return to work in order to reinstate his health insurance benefits and to provide a source of income for his family. It is undisputed that Respondent has a blemish-free record working for the City over the last 14 years and, among other awards, he has received over 17 certifications for exceling in his work. His last evaluation in February 2015 was "Excellent." Policy 3401.2, the City's Administrative Policy and Procedure Manual, states that an employee in a safety-sensitive position who fails a drug test "may be demoted to a non-CDL or non-safety sensitive position in accordance with the procedures outlined in this document." City Ex. 3, p. 6. Even assuming arguendo that Respondent failed a drug test, which has not been proven here, Respondent testified that he is willing to accept a demotion to a non-CDL position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board enter an order dismissing all charges against Respondent and reinstating him, with back pay, to his position as a Stormwater Technician II. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, as well as the factual stipulations entered into by the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on May 3, 1985, and issued certificate number 19-85-502-01, which she still holds. On January 31, 1990, Respondent was employed by Metro-Dade County as a correctional officer and held the rank of corporal. She had been employed as a Metro-Dade County correctional officer for the previous five years. On January 31, 1990, Respondent reported to Mount Sinai Medical Center (Center) in Miami Beach, Florida for a biannual physical examination required by her employer. Respondent had approximately two weeks advance notice of this examination. At about 9:18 a.m., in a private area of the Center, as part of her examination, Respondent urinated into a sterile urine sample cup that had been provided by the Center. She then delivered the cup containing her urine sample to Phyllis Miller, an employee of the Center's laboratory. Miller immediately capped the sample cup and labeled it with bar code number 417002 and the laboratory reference number 83278, thus making it uniquely identifiable. At about 4:14 p.m., the sealed sample cup containing Respondent's urine was delivered to Toxicology Testing Services' (TTS's) laboratory in Miami and placed in secure storage. At about 8:00 p.m., TTS laboratory employee Monica Hernandez retrieved the sample cup. Hernandez dispensed a portion of the urine sample from the cup and then performed an initial chemical screen to determine if there was evidence of any controlled substances or their metabolites in the urine. On March 8, 1990, at about 5:00 p.m., a portion of the remaining urine in the cup was dispensed and a confirmation analysis of the urine was performed. Neither the sample cup, nor the urine sample it contained, had been tampered with, altered or adulterated since the initial collection of the urine sample. Respondent's urine was analyzed by gas chromatography-mass spectrometry, an extremely reliable confirmatory testing method. This confirmatory testing revealed the presence of benzoylecgonine in Respondent's urine in a concentration of 588 nanograms per milliliter. Benzoylecgonine is a metabolite that is produced when cocaine is introduced into the body. Cocaine is the only substance known to produce benzoylecgonine. The results of the testing of Respondent's urine sample were consistent with, and indicative of, Respondent's voluntary ingestion of cocaine sometime within a two month period prior to giving the sample. 2/ At the time of the final hearing in the instant case, Respondent was no longer employed by Metro-Dade County as a correctional officer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding Respondent guilty of having failed to maintain "good moral character," in violation of Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes, by virtue of her unlawful use of cocaine on or about January 31, 1990; and (2) revoking her certification, based upon such a finding. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of December, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1991.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent failed to maintain the good moral character requisite to continued certification as a Correctional Probation Officer in violation of Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is James C. Norman, holder of Correctional Probation Certificate 152252. Respondent was employed in the capacity of correctional officer at the Union Correctional Institute. Bruce M. Fitzgerald, personnel manager at Union Correctional Institute, supervises drug screening of correctional officers at the Institute. Fitzgerald set up a drug screen to be administered to Respondent on October 16, 1995. Respondent came to Fitzgerald’s office on that date where Fitzgerald explained the process to Respondent, provided Respondent with a chain of custody form bearing specimen identification number 09A664423, and obtained Respondent’s signature on a Employee Drug Testing Notice. Respondent was instructed to go to Bradford Hospital in Starke, Florida for the collection of his urine sample and submission of that urine sample for the drug screening process. Pamela Langham, a licensed practical nurse for the past 20 years, was working on October 16, 1995, in the Acute Care Office at Bradford Hospital where obtaining specimens for drug screening was a part of her duties. On October 16, 1995, Langham received from Respondent the chain of custody form bearing specimen identification number 09A664423. Langham then followed standard protocol in obtaining Respondent’s urine sample by having Respondent empty his pockets, turn the pockets inside out, take off any loose fitting garments, wash his hands and clean his fingernails, and remove his footwear. Langham then had Respondent go into the restroom and obtain his urine specimen in a container. Respondent returned from the restroom with the container where Langham then gave Respondent the lid for the container. The specimen container was then sealed in Respondent’s presence. Langham had Respondent sign the specimen container. The container was then sealed in a plastic bag upon which Respondent placed his initials. Respondent’s specimen container was then refrigerated for later pick up by a courier and transportation to the laboratory in Tampa, Florida, for analysis. Langham completed a portion of the chain of custody form number 09A664423 which was sent along with the specimen to the laboratory. Michael Dean Miller, an expert in the field of forensic chemistry, is the toxicology manager and records custodian at the laboratory where Respondent’s specimen was received. The laboratory is certified by the State of Florida and nationally accredited by the College of American Pathologists. At the final hearing, Miller presented the documents prepared in the reception and testing of specimen number 09A664423. Respondent’s specimen was received in a sealed package by Enoris Moore at the laboratory on October 16, 1995. The specimen seal was intact and bore no indication that the specimen had been contaminated in any way. The specimen was analyzed and handled in accordance with the requirements of the laboratory and the State of Florida. Respondent’s specimen was tested in accordance with standard and accepted procedures in the industry. The specimen was examined by Mark Bartalini. The specimen tested positive for the presence of cocaine metabolite. Compared to a minimum cut off for testing for drug presence in urine of 150 nanograms, Respondent’s urine sample contained 11,649 nanograms which is considered a high level. This result indicated the actual presence of cocaine metabolite in Respondent’s system. Respondent denied usage of any other compound which may have affected the level of cocaine metabolite found to exist in his urine sample. His additional denial of cocaine consumption prior to the collection of his urine sample is not credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and revoking his certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 488-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489 James C. Norman Post Office Box 651 Raiford, FL 32083 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the parties' stipulations, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October 13, 1981, certified by the Commission as a correctional officer. She holds certificate number 3-81- 5000-00. At the time of the incidents alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer with the Broward County Sheriff's Department (hereinafter referred to as "BSO"). On November 9, 1989, Lieutenant Charles Bass of the Davie Fire Department and other Davie Fire Department personnel were dispatched to a residence located at 13710 Southwest 36th Court in Davie, Florida, to respond to a report of a gasoline spill inside the structure. When Lieutenant Bass arrived on the scene, he was met outside the residence by Respondent, who identified herself as the owner and a resident of the home. Respondent told Lieutenant Bass that, upon returning home that day, she had discovered that someone had apparently entered the residence during her absence and spilled gasoline on the carpeting. In view of the information with which he had been provided, Lieutenant Bass contacted the BSO Bomb and Arson squad, as well as the Davie Police Department, to request that a criminal investigation be initiated. After having done so, he entered the home and found that the living room carpeting was saturated with gasoline. To reduce the danger of an explosion or fire, it was necessary to remove the gasoline-saturated carpeting from the home. Before this could be accomplished, however, the furniture that was on the carpeting had to be moved. One of the pieces of living room furniture that Lieutenant Bass and his colleagues had to move was a recliner. Under the recliner was an ashtray that contained the remnants of two hand-rolled, unfiltered cigarettes. Lieutenant Bass noticed the ashtray and its contents when the recliner was lifted off the floor. He thought that, given their appearance, the cigarette remains in the ashtray might possibly contain marijuana. He therefore brought the matter to the attention of the law enforcement officers who had arrived on the scene. One of these law enforcement officers was Detective Wayne Boulier of the Davie Police Department, who had extensive training and experience in the identification of illegal substances. Detective Boulier, based upon his visual inspection of the cigarette remains in the ashtray, believed that they contained marijuana. He then field-tested the cigarette remains using a Valtox disposal kit. The results were positive for the presence of cannabis. Detective Boulier then confiscated the cigarette remains. When he returned to police headquarters, he placed the suspected contraband in the police property room. Before completing his report of the incident, Detective Boulier interviewed various people, including Respondent. In his completed report, Detective Boulier noted that marijuana had been found in Respondent's home. A copy of the report was sent to BSO, Respondent's employer. On December 11, 1989, after reviewing the report, Lieutenant Mike Ryan, the Executive Officer of BSO's Internal Affairs Division, assigned Detective Carol Dansky, one of his subordinates, to investigate the matter. Detective Dansky was instructed to contact Respondent and inquire if she would undergo urinalysis testing. Detective Dansky and Respondent were acquaintances. They had previously worked together in BSO's Internal Affairs Division. The same day that she was assigned the case Detective Dansky telephoned Respondent at the detention facility at which Respondent was working and asked Respondent to report to the Internal Affairs Division office to see her as soon as possible. Detective Dansky did not volunteer why she wanted to meet with Respondent and Respondent did not ask Detective Dansky to explain the purpose of the proposed meeting. Respondent complied with Detective Dansky's request and reported to the Internal Affairs Division office later that day. Detective Dansky informed Respondent of the report that had been received from the Davie Police Department regarding the discovery of marijuana in Respondent's home and that, as a result of this report, BSO's Internal Affairs Division was requesting 2/ that Respondent provide a urine sample for drug testing. Respondent freely and voluntarily consented to provide Detective Dansky with the requested urine sample. She indicated to Detective Dansky that she was in a hurry and wanted to get the matter over with quickly. Urine samples collected by BSO's Internal Affairs Division were tested and analyzed by Metpath Laboratories (hereinafter referred to as "Metpath"). 3/ Metpath provided BSO with sterile containers for the storage of the samples, 4/ as well as identifying labels and forms which were to be filled out and sent with the samples. Detective Dansky went to where these materials were kept and obtained a sterile container and the requisite form and labels. She also obtained from this area some food coloring and a clean styrofoam cup that, by all appearances, had not been used previously. Detective Dansky then walked with Respondent to the ladies' room. Upon entering the ladies' room, Detective Dansky went into one of the stalls and placed food coloring in the toilet bowl, after which she went to the sink in the ladies' room to wash her hands. While Detective Dansky was washing her hands, Respondent went into the stall that Detective Dansky had vacated and urinated into the clean styrofoam cup that Detective Dansky had given to her for that purpose. Respondent came out of the stall holding the styrofoam cup containing her urine sample in her hand. She then poured the urine sample from the styrofoam cup into the Metpath-provided sterile container. After the styrofoam cup was emptied, it was discarded in the waste basket in the ladies' room. Detective Dansky promptly sealed the container into which Respondent's urine sample had been poured. The container was sealed in a manner that made it highly improbable that the sample could be tampered with without the tampering being obvious. Taking the sealed container with her, Detective Dansky, accompanied by Respondent, walked back to her office. In her office, Detective Dansky filled out a Metpath Drug Screen Test Requisition (Chain of Custody) form. On the line on the form where the "Patient Donor Signature" was supposed to be placed, Respondent, consistent with accepted BSO practice and policy designed to protect the confidentiality of test results, instead put her initials, as well as her BSO computer control number, 2559. After the form was completed, Detective Dansky placed green labels, each bearing the same unique identifying number, on the form and the sealed container. She then put the completed form and the container in an envelope. The envelope was stored in a refrigerator until it was picked up by a courier. The envelope was delivered to Metpath's forensic laboratory later in the day on December 11, 1989. The sealed container with Respondent's urine sample was received in good condition without any evidence of tampering. At the laboratory, the sample was kept in a secure manner throughout the testing process. Adequate procedures were employed to ensure that the sample was properly identified, that the chain of custody was properly maintained, and that there had not been any tampering with the sample. An initial immunoassay screening of Respondent's urine sample indicated the presumptive presence of the unique metabolite of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which is produced when marijuana is ingested and metabolized in the body. Additional laboratory testing of the sample was then performed to verify the results of the immunoassay screen previously performed. Gas chromotography-mass spectrometry, the most reliable and accurate confirmatory testing method currently available, was utilized. The gas chromotography-mass spectrometry analysis of Respondent's urine sample was positive for the presence of the THC metabolite in a concentration of 27 micrograms per liter. 5/ The microgram per liter results of the testing are consistent with, and indicative of, Respondent's knowing and voluntary ingestion of marijuana prior to the collection of her urine sample. Passive inhalation of another's secondhand marijuana smoke would produce much lower results. BSO's Internal Affairs Division received the results of the testing on December 15, 1989. On December 20, 1989, Detective Dansky took a statement from Respondent. In her statement, Respondent willfully and knowingly provided false information when she denied using marijuana. Respondent also denied that Detective Boulier had informed her that marijuana had been found in her home. BSO eventually terminated Respondent's employment on the grounds that Respondent had engaged in the illegal use of drugs and had provided false information during an internal investigation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding the evidence sufficient to prove that Respondent is guilty, as charged, of having failed to maintain "good moral character," in violation of Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, and (2) revoking her certification as a correctional officer as punishment therefor. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of August, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in its employment decisions in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Oscar Jones (Petitioner), is a black male. He began working for Respondent in July 1997, as a longshoreman working on "chicken boats." In that position, Petitioner loaded boxes of frozen chicken into the holds of refrigerated ships. Respondent, Coastal Maritime Services, LLC (Respondent), is engaged in the business of stevedoring and seaport terminal operations, including loading and unloading ships, and receiving cargo. On May 28, 1998, Respondent injured himself when a very heavy box of frozen chicken fell on his ankle. Other than first aid at the worksite, Petitioner declined further medical treatment that day. He was given a medical form authorizing treatment at the medical clinic which provided medical services to injured employees who might be covered under Respondent's workers' compensation insurance. The next day, on May 29, 1998, Petitioner sought medical treatment for his injury at the medical facility which handled Respondent's workers' compensation injuries. As part of that treatment, Petitioner was asked to take a drug test and Petitioner consented. Although no formal written drug test policy was in effect by Respondent at the time of Petitioner's injury, the general policy and practice was that a work-related injury would subject an employee to a voluntary drug test. Petitioner's drug test came back positive for marijuana. As a result of the positive drug test result, Respondent's insurance carrier controverted Petitioner's workers' compensation claim. There was no evidence that Respondent's management had any responsibility or involvement in the carrier's decision to controvert Petitioner's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. During the 12-month time period of January 1998 through December 1998, Petitioner was not the only employee of Respondent required to take a drug test after a work place injury. In fact, in June 1998 (the same time period as Petitioner's test) seven white employees were required to take a drug test and three black employees were required to take a drug test. For the entire 1998 calendar year, 51 total drug tests were administered, with 31 of those tests administered to non- black employees (for example, white or Hispanic) and only 21 of those tests administered to black employees. Similarly, for the entire 1998 calendar year, a total of 18 employees were not administered drug tests, either because medical attention was refused or because of the severity of the injury. Of those 18 employees, 11 were non-black employees and seven were black employees. Employees who were not required to take a drug test either were those who refused medical attention or who were severely injured and had to seek treatment from hospital emergency rooms where drug tests were not given. Clearly, race played no factor in who was required to take a drug test or who received a drug test. Petitioner did cite the names of two white employees, Jay Chavers and Andy Wiley, who allegedly were treated more favorably than Petitioner, in that those two employees did not take a drug test. However, those two employees were not "similarly situated" to Petitioner. First, the injuries of both Mr. Chavers and Mr. Wiley were much more serious in nature than the contusion (bruise) that Petitioner had suffered and both were taken to emergency rooms for their injuries where drug tests were not routinely administered. Specifically, Mr. Chavers had fallen from a high distance and suffered numerous broken bones, thus, rendering him incapable of giving consent to a drug test at the hospital. As to Mr. Wiley, his injuries were not subject to workers' compensation coverage, unlike Petitioner's. Thus, given the nature of the injuries of Mr. Chavers and Mr. Wiley, those two individuals were not sufficiently "similarly situated" to Petitioner to enable him to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Petitioner's positive drug test result had no other impact on his employment with Respondent, apart from the controversion of his workers' compensation benefits. Indeed, Respondent attempted to get Petitioner to return to work. Shortly thereafter, in early June 1998, Petitioner contacted the chief financial officer of Respondent, Kathleen Wiley, who in 1998 was Respondent's office manager. Petitioner expressed concern to Ms. Wiley about his workers' compensation benefits and his employment status with Respondent. Ms. Wiley informed Petitioner that he was still considered to be employed with Respondent and that he needed to contact Ben Brown for a light duty assignment. Petitioner was expressly informed that light duty work was available that would meet his medical restrictions imposed after his injury. Petitioner never followed-up with Mr. Brown about light duty work. Almost immediately thereafter in June 1998, Respondent hired Bud Underwood as its new safety manager. Mr. Underwood's responsibilities were to oversee workers' compensation cases and follow up on accidents and injured employees. Ms. Wiley informed Mr. Underwood to follow up on the situation of Petitioner to get him to return for a light duty assignment. In late June or early July 1998, Mr. Underwood contacted Petitioner as directed and offered him light duty work within his medical restrictions. Petitioner informed Mr. Underwood in very obscene terms that he was not going to accept any light duty assignments. Petitioner never appeared for any light duty assignments after that conversation. Based upon Petitioner's response to that telephonic offer of light duty employment, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter around July 9, 1998, informing him that based upon his refusal of light duty work, he had been deemed to have abandoned his employment, and thus was no longer employed by Respondent due to self-termination. Thereafter, in September 1998, Petitioner contacted Respondent by telephone seeking employment. However, by that time, opportunities for longshoremen, such as Mr. Jones were extremely limited, as the "chicken boat" operation had all but shut down for financial reasons, and no positions were available at the time. Thus, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter dated September 2, 1998, informing him that no positions were available, but encouraging him to reapply. Despite the invitation to Petitioner that he should reapply, Petitioner never submitted any subsequent inquiry for employment. Respondent's "chicken boat" operation had shut down completely by February 1999. Petitioner later applied for unemployment compensation benefits, but those benefits were denied on the ground that Petitioner had abandoned his employment by refusing the light duty work that was offered to him. In fact, in an evidentiary hearing held in his unemployment compensation matter, the Unemployment Appeals Referee found as a fact that Petitioner admitted that he had refused the light duty work offered to him. Petitioner's appeal of that adverse decision was, likewise, denied by the Unemployment Appeals Commission. Petitioner's race played no role in Respondent's determination that Petitioner had abandoned his employment or in Respondent's determination that no position existed for Petitioner in September 1998. Similarly, race played no role in the insurance carrier's decisions regarding Petitioner's workers' compensation benefits. In fact, Petitioner voluntarily settled his workers' compensation claim disputes in a settlement agreement signed by him and his attorney dated March 22, 1999. Petitioner had a family to support and needed the money. Pursuant to that settlement agreement, Petitioner agreed to accept $4,500 in full, final and complete settlement, release and discharge of any and all claims against the employer arising out of Petitioner's alleged accident, injury, and disability in issue, including, but not limited to claims for temporary total, temporary partial, permanent total, and/or permanent partial disability compensation, and past and future medical benefits. Petitioner verified that the settlement was adequate and was not entered into under duress. Rather, Petitioner of his own accord thought that the settlement was in his best interest. The Department of Labor approved the settlement. Petitioner has made no credible showing that there was any relationship between his race and the adverse employment actions of which he has complained.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Reed Corbin, Esquire Richard L. Ruth, Jr., Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 121 West Forsyth Street Suite 1000 Post Office Box 41566 Jacksonville, Florida 32203 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Oscar Jones 1817 East 27th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact 1-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-8, respectively. 9-24. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8-23, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Arthur W. Quicksall, Pro Se 2123 Raiford Road Starke, FL 32091 Jeffery Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Daryl McLaughlin Executive Director Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the seriousness of the offense as it relates to the public trust placed in a correctional officer who guards those incarcerated by society, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order revoking Respondent, Arthur W. Quicksall's correctional officer certification. Respectfully submitted and entered this 14th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4000 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Petitioner in this case.
