Findings Of Fact The Respondent Michael Rush is a Doctor of Podiatry having been issued license number PO 0000529. The Respondent Rush was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to possess and import marijuana, Title 21 USC 841(a)(1), in the United States District Court, Connecticut. On March 30, 1981, the Respondent's conviction was affirmed, United States v. Rush, 666 F.2d 10 (2nd Cir. 1981). The Respondent Rush was incarcerated for a period of fourteen months, paid a fine of $15,000 and forfeited $33,000 from his savings account to the federal government pursuant to 21 USC 881(a)(6)(1976). The Respondent Rush is a resident of Broward County, Florida and maintains a professional office at 4700 Sheridan Street, Hollywood, Florida. Prior to the instant conviction, the Respondent Rush had never been charged with or convicted of any crime. The Respondent Rush has been active in community affairs, having participated in Little League, Boy Scouts, the Broward County Fair, and has received character references from a variety of local community leaders. The Respondent Rush is currently practicing his profession, has obtained professional liability insurance through the Podiatry Trust and is on the staff of Community Hospital of North Broward and Hollywood Pavillion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Michael Rush by the Board of Podiatry be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1982.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint, as amended, filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been the holder of a Class "B" security agency license, number B 0001057. On July 27, 1995, Respondent was tried, was found guilty, and was adjudicated guilty of grand theft, a third-degree felony, in violation of Section 812.014(1)(a), Florida Statutes. On July 27, 1995, Respondent was tried, was found guilty, and was adjudicated guilty of perjury not in an official proceeding, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of Section 837.012, Florida Statutes. In the foregoing proceeding, the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, placed Respondent on probation for terms of five years and one year to run concurrently, and ordered Respondent to pay restitution in the amount of $15,783.67 to the victim.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint, as amended, and revoking Respondent's Class "B" security agency license number B 0001057. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 95-5217 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Michele Guy, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. Daniel D. Goldberg 2812 Southwest 65th Avenue Miramar, Florida 33023 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issues are whether, under section 440.107, Florida Statutes, Petitioner may calculate a penalty assessment for a failure to secure the payment of workers' compensation for one day as though the failure persisted over two years and whether Petitioner may calculate a penalty assessment based on double the statewide average weekly wage (AWW) when the lone uncovered employee earned $10 per hour.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was incorporated in 2008 by Ineido Soler, Sr., and his son, Ineido Soler, Jr. Since the corporation began operations, the wife of Mr. Soler, Jr., Idalmis Pedrero, has served as the office manager of this family-owned company. At all material times, Respondent has contracted with a personnel leasing company to handle employee matters, such as securing the payment of workers' compensation. Ms. Pedrero's responsibilities include informing the employee leasing company of new hires, so the company can obtain workers' compensation coverage, which typically starts the day following notification. On the afternoon of November 22, 2015, Mr. Soler, Jr., telephoned his wife and told her that he and his father had hired, at the rate of $10 per hour, a new employee, Geony Borrego Lee, who would start work the following morning. Customarily, Ms. Pedrero would immediately inform the employee leasing company. However, Ms. Pedrero was working at home because, six days earlier, she had delivered a baby by caesarian section, and she was still recuperating and tending to her newborn. A fatigued Ms. Pedrero did not notify the employee leasing company that day of the new hire. Late the next morning, Ms. Pedrero was awakened by a call from her husband, who asked her if she had faxed the necessary information to the employee leasing company. Ms. Pedrero admitted that she had not done so, but would do so right away. She faxed the information immediately, so that the employee leasing company could add Mr. Lee to the workers' compensation policy, effective the next day, November 24. Uncovered for November 23, Mr. Lee joined three other employees of Respondent and performed roofing work at a worksite. Late in the afternoon of November 23, one of Petitioner's investigators conducted a random inspection of Respondent's worksite and determined that Respondent had secured the payment of workers' compensation for the three other employees, but not for Mr. Lee. The investigator issued an SWO on the day of the inspection, November 23. The SWO contains three parts. First, the SWO orders Respondent to cease work anywhere in the state of Florida. Second, the SWO includes an Order of Penalty Assessment, which does not contain a specific penalty, but instead sets forth the formula by which Petitioner determines the amount of the penalty to assess. Tracking the statute discussed below, the formula included in the SWO is two times the premium that the employer would have paid when applying approved manual rates to the employer's payroll "during periods for which it has failed to secure the payment of compensation within the preceding 2-year period." Third, the SWO includes a Notice of Rights, which advises Respondent that it may request a chapter 120 hearing. On November 24, Petitioner released the SWO after Respondent had secured the payment of workers' compensation for Mr. Lee. On November 25, the investigator hand delivered to Respondent a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation (Request). The Request covers November 24, 2013, through November 23, 2015, and demands records in eight categories: identification of employer, occupational licenses, payroll documents, account documents, disbursements, contracts for work, identification of subcontractors, and documentation of subcontractors' workers' compensation coverage. The Request identifies "payroll documents" as: all documents that reflect the payroll of the employer . . . including . . . time sheets, time cards, attendance records, earning records, check stubs and payroll summaries for both individual employees and aggregate records; [and] federal income tax documents and other documents reflecting the . . . remuneration paid or payable to each employee . . . . The Request adds: The employer may present for consideration in lieu of the requested records, proof of compliance with F.S. 440 by a workers' compensation policy or coverage through employee leasing for all periods of this request where such coverage existed. If the proof of compliance is verified by the Department the requested records for that time period will not be required. The Request warns: If the employer fails to provide the required business records sufficient to enable the . . . Division of Workers' Compensation to determine the employer's payroll for the period requested for the calculation of the penalty provided in section 440.107(7)(d), F.S., the imputed weekly payroll for each employee shall be the statewide average weekly wage as defined in section 440.12(2), F.S., multiplied by 2. The Department shall impute the employer's payroll at any time after ten, but before the expiration of twenty eight business days after receipt by the employer of [the Request]. (FAC 69L-6.028) . . . . On December 11, 2015, Respondent provided the following documents to Petitioner: itemized invoices, including for workers' compensation premiums, from the employee leasing company to Respondent and checks confirming payment, but the invoices and checks are from December 2011; an employee leasing agreement signed by Respondent on August 1, 2014, and signed by the employee leasing company on August 5, 2014; an employee leasing application for Mr. Lee dated November 23, 2015, showing his date of birth as November 20, 1996, his hourly pay as $10, and his hire date as November 23, 2015; and an employee census dated December 1, 2015, showing, for each employee, a date of hire and, if applicable, date of termination. Partially compliant with the Request, this production omitted any documentation of workers' compensation coverage prior to August 1, 2014, and any documentation of payroll except for Mr. Lee's rate of pay. On December 14, 2015, Respondent filed with Petitioner its request for a chapter 120 hearing. On December 30, 2016, Petitioner issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (Amended Assessment), which proposes to assess a penalty of $63,434.48. On the same date, Petitioner transmitted the file to DOAH. Petitioner issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on February 16, 2016, which is mentioned in, but not attached to, the Prehearing Stipulation that was filed on April 26, 2016, but the second amended assessment reportedly leaves the assessed penalty unchanged from the Amended Assessment. In determining the penalty assessment, Petitioner assigned class code 5551 from the National Council on Compensation Insurance because Mr. Lee was performing roofing work; determined that the entire two-year period covered in the Request was applicable; identified the AWW as $841.57 based on information provided by the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity for all employers subject to the Florida Reemployment Assistance Program Law, sections 443.01 et seq., Florida Statutes, for the four calendar quarters ending June 30, 2014; applied the appropriate manual rates for class code 5551 to $841.57, doubled, and divided the result by 100--all of which yielded a result of $31,717.24, which, doubled, results in a total penalty assessment of $63,434.48. There is no dispute that the classification code for Mr. Lee is code 5551, the AWW is $841.57, and the manual rates are 18.03 as of July 1, 2013, 18.62 as of January 1, 2014, and 17.48 as of January 1, 2015. Because Petitioner determined that Respondent had failed to provide sufficient evidence of its payroll, Petitioner calculated the penalty assessment by using the AWW of $841.57, doubled, instead of Mr. Lee's actual rate of $10 per hour. Petitioner's calculations are mathematically correct. For the 5.27 weeks of 2013, the penalty assessment is $3198.58 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 18.03 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 5.27. For the 52 weeks of 2014, the penalty assessment is $32,593.67 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 18.62 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 52. For the 46.44 weeks of 2015, the penalty assessment is $27,326.48 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 17.48 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 46.44. Adding these sums yields a total penalty assessment of $63,118.73, which approximates Petitioner's penalty assessment calculation of $63,434.48. (Mistranscription of difficult-to- read manual rates or a different rule for handling partial weeks may account for the small difference.) Respondent challenges two factors in the imputation formula: the two-year period of noncompliance for Mr. Lee instead of one day's noncompliance and the AWW, doubled, instead of Mr. Lee's $10 per hour rate of pay. Underscoring the differences between the two-year period of noncompliance and double the AWW and the actual period of noncompliance and Mr. Lee's real pay rate, at the start of the two-year period, Mr. Lee was three days past his 16th birthday and residing in Cuba, and Mr. Lee continues to earn $10 per hour as of the date of the hearing. The impact of Petitioner's use of the two-year period of noncompliance and double the AWW is significant. If the calculation were based on a single day, rather than two years, the assessed penalty would be less than the statutory minimum of $1000, which is described below, even if double the AWW were used. One day is 0.14 weeks, so the penalty assessment would be $82.38 based on multiplying the AWW, doubled, by the manual rate of 17.48 divided by 100 multiplied by 2 and multiplied by 0.14. If the calculation were based on the entire two years, rather than a single day, the assessed penalty would be about one-quarter of the proposed assessed penalty, if Mr. Lee's actual weekly rate of pay were used instead of double the AWW. Substituting $400 for twice the AWW in the calculations set forth in paragraph 15 above, the penalty would be $760.14 for 2013, $7746.92 for 2014, and $6494.17 for 2015 for a total of $15,001.23. Explaining why Petitioner treated one day of noncompliance as two years of noncompliance, one of Petitioner's witnesses referred to Mr. Lee as a "placeholder" because the real focus of the imputation formula is the employer. The same witness characterized the imputation formula as a "legal fiction," implying that the formula obviously and, in this case, dramatically departs from the much-smaller penalty that would result from calculating exactly how much premium that Respondent avoided by not covering the modestly paid Mr. Lee on his first day of work. Regardless of how Petitioner characterizes the imputation formula, the statutory mandate, as discussed below, is to determine the "periods" during which Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation insurance within the two-year period covered by the Request. The focus is necessarily on the employee found by the investigator to be uncovered and any other uncovered employees. Petitioner must calculate a penalty based on how long the employee found by the investigator on his inspection has been uncovered, determining how many other employees, if any, in the preceding two years have been uncovered, and calculating a penalty based on how long they were uncovered. There is evidence of one or two gaps in coverage during the relevant two years, but Petitioner has failed to prove such gaps by clear and convincing evidence. One of Petitioner's witnesses testified to a gap of one month "probably" from late January to late February 2015. This witness relied on Petitioner Exhibit 2, but it is completely illegible. Ms. Pedrero testified that Respondent had workers' compensation coverage since 2011, except for a gap, which she thought had occurred prior to August 2014, which is the start date of the current policy. This conflicting evidence does not establish by clear and convincing evidence any gap, and, even if a gap had been proved, no evidence establishes the number of uncovered employees, if any, during such a gap, nor would such a gap justify enlarging the period of noncompliance for Mr. Lee. Ms. Pedrero testified that her mother-in-law, Teresa Marquez cleaned the office and warehouse on an occasional basis, last having worked sometime in 2015. Respondent never secured workers' compensation coverage for Ms. Marquez, but she did no roofing work and appears to have been a casual worker, so her periods of employment during the two-year period covered by the Request would not constitute additional periods for which Respondent failed to secure workers' compensation insurance. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence only a single day of noncompliance, November 23, concerning one employee, Mr. Lee, within the relevant two-year period for the purpose of calculating the penalty assessment. Likewise, Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence a rate of pay of only $10 per hour for the purpose of calculating the penalty assessment. At no time has Respondent provided payroll records of all its employees for November 23, 2015. Respondent Exhibit E covers payroll for Respondent's employees for a two-week period commencing shortly after November 23, 2015. But the evidence establishes that Mr. Lee's rate of pay was $80 for the day, which, as discussed below, rebuts the statutory presumption of double the AWW.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order determining that Respondent has failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation for one employee for one day within the two-year period covered by the Request and imposing an administrative penalty of $1000. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan Anthony Martin, Esquire Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Daniel R. Vega, Esquire Robert Paul Washington, Esquire Taylor Espino Vega & Touron, P.A. 2555 Ponce De Leon Boulevard, Suite 220 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to exemption from disqualification by law with regard to working in a position of special trust and responsibility related to children, disabled adults, and elderly persons?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is disqualified from working in a position of special trust because of a 1980 conviction of Grand Theft and Aggravated Assault; a 1981 Grand Larceny conviction; a 1986 Stolen Property conviction; a 1989 possession of cocaine charge; and a 1991 Grand Larceny conviction. Petitioner's testimony was direct, candid, and creditable. She previously engaged in a life-style that is no longer compatible with her present involvement with church and community. A 1976 diagnosis of lupus and subsequent marital problems led to her depression and her prior illicit activities. She has since reformed and is a credit to the community. Her testimony was well corroborated by the testimony of seven other witnesses. As established by clear and convincing evidence at the final hearing, Petitioner is rehabilitated and unlikely again to engage in criminal conduct or present a threat to children, disabled adults, or elderly persons, if employed in a position of special trust. The various criminal offenses for which Petitioner has been convicted, were all committed more than three years prior to her disqualification notice from Respondent for which Petitioner now seeks exemption. Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification to work with children in positions of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn Grimes 626 St. Clair Street Jacksonville, Florida 32254 Roger L. D. Williams, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Samuel C. Chavers, Acting Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 33299-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 33299-0700
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent maintained workers' compensation coverage for certain employees, and, if not, what penalty, if any, should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. (2002). Respondent is a corporation domiciled in Florida and engaged in the business of installing motorized aluminum hurricane shutters and security systems. On June 3, 2003, four of Respondent's workers installed aluminum shutters on a single-family residence located at 20799 Wheelock Drive, No. 909, Heron's Glen, North Fort Myers, Florida. Respondent did not have workers' compensation insurance for the four employees. In addition, Respondent failed to maintain workers' compensation coverage for the benefit of ten employees from June 21, 2002, through June 27, 2003 (the relevant period). Respondent stipulated that Respondent was an employer during the relevant period, and that Respondent failed to maintain workers' compensation coverage for five employees identified in the record as Ricardo Mendez, Pedro Rojas, Willie Marrow, Eric Mendez, and Izarate Cartas. Respondent further stipulated that Petitioner correctly assessed the penalty amounts for those employees. The remaining five individuals that Respondent contends were not employees are identified in the record as Jessica Mendez, Gelacio Zarate, Manual Mendez, Jesus Espinoza, and David Mobley. Respondent asserts, in relevant part, that these individuals were "casual labor" and not "employees" within the meaning of Section 440.02(15)(d)5, Florida Statutes (2002). Under the Workers' Compensation Law in effect on June 21, 2002, an "employee" did not include a person if the employment satisfied the conjunctive requirements of being casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer. § 440.02(15)(d)5, Fla. Stat. (2002). Section 440.02(5), Florida Statutes (2002), defined the term "casual," in relevant part, to be work that satisfied the conjunctive requirements of being completed in ten working days or less, without regard to the number of persons employed, and at a total labor cost of less than $500. Ms. Mendez and Mr. Zarate were Respondent's employees during the relevant period. Respondent paid each more than $500, and each individual performed services that were in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of Respondent. Ms. Mendez worked as an assistant to the wife of the president and sole shareholder of Respondent. The wife maintained accounts and pulled permits for Respondent. Ms. Mendez assisted the wife by answering telephone calls and accompanying the wife when the wife pulled permits for Respondent. Respondent paid Ms. Mendez $760 during the relevant period. Respondent paid Mr. Zarate $800 during the relevant period to help build large roll-down, accordion, or panel shutters. Building shutters is an activity required in the course of Respondent's business. Mr. M. Mendez and Mr. Espinoza were Respondent's employees during the relevant period. Although Respondent paid each person less than $500, Mr. M. Mendez and Mr. Espinoza each performed cleanup work for Respondent. The amount of cleanup required depended on the number of roll-down shutter installations Respondent had at a given time. Constructing roll-down shutters produces a lot of paper and scraps that must be cleaned up to keep the shop clean. Mr. M. Mendez and Mr. Espinoza each performed services directly related to the construction of shutters by Respondent. Respondent argues that Mr. Mobley was either casual labor or an independent contractor. Mr. Mobley did not satisfy the statutory requirements for either classification. Mr. Mobley did not satisfy the requirements for casual labor. Mr. Mobley was an electrician who installed motorized shutters for Respondent. Mr. Mobley secured electrical permits needed for Respondent to do the electrical work essential to Respondent's business. Mr. Mobley accompanied Respondent's president to the construction site, ran the electrical, and wired the motor for the shutter that Respondent was assembling. Although Mr. Mobley worked for Respondent for only three days, Respondent paid Mr. Mobley approximately $1,200. Under the Workers' Compensation Law in effect during the relevant period, Section 440.02(15)(c), Florida Statutes (2002), required an "independent contractor" to satisfy all of the following requirements in Section 440.02(15)(d)1, Florida Statutes: The independent contractor maintains a separate business with his or her own work facility, truck, equipment, materials, or similar accommodations; The independent contractor holds or has applied for a federal employer identification number, unless the independent contractor is a sole proprietor who is not required to obtain a federal employer identification number under state or federal requirements; The independent contractor performs or agrees to perform specific services or work for specific amounts of money and controls the means of performing the services or work; The independent contractor incurs the principal expenses related to the service or work that he or she performs or agrees to perform; The independent contractor is responsible for the satisfactory completion of work or services that he or she performs or agrees to perform and is or could be held liable for a failure to complete the work or services; The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services performed for a commission or on a per-job or competitive-bid basis and not on any other basis; The independent contractor may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing work or services; The independent contractor has continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations; and The success or failure of the independent contractor's business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures. Mr. Mobley satisfied some of the definitional elements of an independent contractor. He maintained a separate business as a sole proprietor not required to obtain a federal identification number, and incurred principal expenses related to the service or work he performed for Respondent. There is insufficient evidence to find that Mr. Mobley satisfied the remaining requirements for an independent contractor. The evidence was insufficient to show that Mr. Mobley could be held liable for failure to complete the work or services he performed for Respondent, had continuing or recurring business obligations, or that the success or failure of his business depended on the relationship of receipts to expenditures. The evidence is clear that Mr. Mobley would not have performed work for Respondent if he were to have suffered a loss. Mr. Mobley was Respondent's employee during the relevant period. Mr. Mobley failed to satisfy the definition of either casual labor or an independent contractor.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order that affirms, approves, and adopts the Amended Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Marshall L. Cohen, Esquire Marshall L. Cohen, P.A. Post Office Box 60292 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-0292 Andrea L. Reino, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 943.13(7), 943.1395(6), and 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on February 14, 1986. Since that time, Respondent has held Correctional Certificate Number 81761. On or about May 8, 1994, Respondent was in the front yard of his residence. Police officers pulled into Respondent's driveway and requested that Respondent approach the patrol car. Respondent walked away from the police car. As he walked away, Respondent dropped an item from his pocket. The item that Respondent dropped was a bag containing white powder. The white powder was cocaine. Respondent was aware of the presence of the bag on his person. Respondent's possession of the bag containing cocaine was unlawful. One of the police officers advised Respondent that he was under arrest. The police officer instructed Respondent to put his hands behind him. Respondent refused to put his hands behind him. The police officers physically restrained Respondent. Respondent subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offenses of attempted possession of cocaine and resisting officer without violence. On July 17, 1995, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of these two offenses by the county court judge, in and for Putnam County, Florida, in Case Number 95-2767MM06. The court suspended any fine or cost which might be imposed for the conviction of resisting officer without violence. The court ordered Respondent to pay a fine of $241.50, prosecution costs of $50, and an investigation cost of $50 for the conviction of attempted possession of cocaine.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy J. Bardill, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Johnnie Holcy, Jr. Route 6, Box 300 Palatka, Florida 32177 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Juan F. Ramos (Petitioner), is entitled to compensation pursuant to sections 961.01 through 961.07, Florida Statutes (2013). Unless otherwise stated, all references to the law will be to Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner immigrated to the United States from Cuba in 1980. In April of 1982, Petitioner resided in Cocoa, Florida, within walking distance of his employer, Armor Flite Southeast. Mary Sue Cobb, the victim of a murder, also lived in the area near Petitioner’s home and Armor Flite Southeast. Petitioner and Mrs. Cobb knew one another. Prior to April 23, 1982, Petitioner had placed an Amway order with the victim and her husband. The Cobbs sold Amway products and solicited Petitioner to purchase items and/or become a salesperson for the company. Prior to April 23, 1982, Petitioner had been at the Cobb residence five or six times. Petitioner had been inside the Cobb home. For the two days prior to April 23, 1982, Petitioner had been sick, unable to go to work, and had not been at the Armor Flite Southeast property. At all times material to this case, Manuel Ruiz was the general manager at Armor Flite Southeast. Mr. Ruiz served as Petitioner’s supervisor. From the Armor Flite Southeast property, it was possible to view the Cobb residence. On the morning of April 23, 1982, Petitioner told his wife he was going to work. Petitioner did not, however, enter the Armor Flite property at the beginning of the work day when Mr. Ruiz opened the shop at approximately 6:45 a.m. Moreover, Mr. Ruiz did not see Petitioner at the Armor Flite Southeast property until he came to pick up his check at 11:30 a.m. or noon on April 23, 1982. Instead of a paycheck, Mr. Ruiz gave Petitioner a letter on April 23, 1982, that notified him he was being laid off effective April 21, 1982. Armor Flite Southeast was in Chapter 11 and the trustee for the company gave Mr. Ruiz a list of four persons who were to be laid off. Petitioner was among those four. Petitioner was invited to attend a meeting with the trustee on April 23, 1982, at approximately 3:30 p.m. In theory, the employees were being laid off due to lack of work, but they could be re-hired if the work volume improved. Mr. Ruiz explained the foregoing to Petitioner. Mr. Ruiz and Petitioner had no difficulty communicating as both men were fluent in Spanish. At some time after the meeting with Mr. Ruiz, Petitioner returned home and was there when family members came over later in the afternoon. During the morning of April 23, 1982, Mrs. Cobb was murdered. Following an investigation of the crime, Petitioner was charged with the first degree murder of Mrs. Cobb, was convicted, and was incarcerated. Subsequent to the conviction and sentencing, Petitioner’s conviction was overturned and his case was remanded for a new trial. The second trial resulted in an acquittal on April 24, 1987. On June 28, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for compensation and alleged he is entitled to relief pursuant to chapter 961, Florida Statutes. An Amended Petition was filed on October 20, 2010, and resulted in an order entered May 13, 2013, by Circuit Court Judge Charles Roberts that provided as follows: The Defendant’s [Petitioner herein] Amended Petition to Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act shall be transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for findings of fact and a recommended determination of whether the Defendant has established that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person who is eligible for compensation.
Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint filed May 28, 1986, Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) charged that Respondent, Theodore Riley (Riley), while employed as an adjuster by United States Fidelity and Guaranty Group, (USF&G), did wrongfully obtain the sum of $400 from a workmens compensation claimant to assure that USF&G would not contest the claim (Count I). The complaint further alleged that on September 16, 1985, Riley entered a plea of nolo contendere to an information charging a violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes, a felony of the second degree and a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the court withheld adjudication and placed Riley on 18 months probation (Count II). The Department concluded that such conduct demonstrated, inter alia, a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance; fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or permit; and, a plea of nolo contendere to a felony involving moral turpitude. Section 626.611(7),(9) and (14), Florida Statutes. At hearing, Riley entered a plea of no contest to Count II of the Administrative Complaint in exchange for the Department's dismissal of Count I of the Administrative Complaint and the Department's agreement that the penalty imposed would be limited to a suspension of his eligibility for licensure for a period of two (2) years. While not conditioning his agreement to a two year suspension, Riley did request that the Department consider crediting the time he has been on probation against the two year suspension. The evidence shows that Riley was arrested and charged with the subject offense in March 1985, that he entered a plea of nolo contendere, that adjudication of guilt was withheld, and that he was placed on probation for 18 months commencing September 16, 1985. As a special condition of probation, Riley was ordered not to apply for an adjuster's license during the term of his probationary period. Consistent with the terms of his probation, Riley has not renewed his adjusters' license. The Department's records reflect that Riley's license was last due for renewal, but not renewed, on April 1, 1985.
