The Issue In 2009, Elmwood Terrace Limited Partnership (Petitioner) filed an application with the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (Respondent), seeking funding to develop an affordable housing apartment complex in Ft. Myers, Florida. The Respondent denied the application. The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's application should have been granted.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a limited partnership and developer of affordable housing in Florida. The Petitioner is seeking to construct a 116-unit affordable housing family apartment complex ("Elmwood Terrace") in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. The Petitioner has standing to initiate and participate in this proceeding. The Respondent is a public corporation organized under Chapter 420, Florida Statutes (2010), to administer state programs that provide financial support to developers seeking to construct affordable housing. Such support is provided through a variety of mechanisms, including the use of federal tax credits. The federal tax credit program was created in 1986 to promote the construction and operation of privately-developed affordable housing. The tax credits relevant to this proceeding provide a dollar-for-dollar credit against federal tax liabilities for a period of ten years. The Respondent is the designated Florida agency responsible for distribution of the federal tax credits. The tax credits are awarded pursuant to a "Qualified Allocation Plan" (QAP) that must be annually approved by the Governor and adopted as an administrative rule by the Respondent. As a matter of course, developers receiving the federal tax credits sell them through syndicators for discounted cash. The sale of the tax credits generates debt-free cash equity for developers. Developers seeking financial support to build affordable housing units submit applications to the Respondent during an annual competitive process known as the "Universal Cycle." Every three years, the Respondent commissions a study (the "Shimberg Report"), which measures, within each Florida county, the number of "cost-burden" renters earning 60 percent or less of an area's median income (AMI) who pay more than 40 percent of their income in rent. The AMI is determined by the federal government. The cost-burden households are further classified into four groups: families, the elderly, farm workers, and commercial fishermen. The Shimberg Report also assesses needs related to homeless people in the state. Developers seeking to obtain affordable housing financing are required to set aside a portion of the proposed units for income-limited residents. Access to affordable housing units is generally targeted towards persons receiving no more than 60 percent of the AMI. The Universal Cycle process allows the Respondent to target specific housing deficiencies in terms of geographic availability and population demographics and to preserve the stock of existing affordable housing. During the Universal Cycle process, the Respondent identifies areas where additional affordable housing is unnecessary, to discourage additional development in weak markets and to encourage development in those locations where there is a lack of access to affordable housing. The Respondent classifies areas where there is little need for additional affordable housing as "Location A" areas. Each application filed during the Universal Cycle is evaluated, scored, and competitively ranked against other applications filed during the same Universal Cycle. After the Respondent completes the competitive ranking of the applications submitted in the Universal Cycle, the applicants are provided with an opportunity to review and comment on the evaluation and scoring of the proposals. Applicants may also cure defects in their own proposals. After the close of the review and comment period, the Respondent publishes a revised competitive ranking of the proposals. Developers may challenge the second ranking through an administrative hearing. After the second ranking process is final, developers achieving an acceptable score receive preliminary funding commitments and proceed into a "credit underwriting" evaluation process. The credit underwriting process is governed by Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.0072. The Respondent selects an independent credit underwriter who reviews each proposal according to requirements set forth by administrative rule (the "Credit Underwriting Rule"). The cost of the credit underwriting review is paid by the developer. The credit underwriter considers all aspects of the proposed development, including financing sources, plans and specifications, cost analysis, zoning verification, site control, environmental reports, construction contracts, and engineering and architectural contracts. The responsibility for the market study is assigned by the credit underwriter to an independent market analyst. The credit underwriter prepares a report for each applicant invited into the process. The reports are submitted to the Respondent's nine-member, statutorily-created Board of Directors (Board). The Board approves or denies each application for financial support. The Petitioner applied for funds for the Elmwood Terrace project during the 2007 Universal Cycle. The Petitioner's application received a perfect score, maximum points, and was allocated tax credits in the amount of $1,498,680. The Petitioner thereafter entered the credit underwriting process. The credit underwriting analysis was performed by Seltzer Management Group (SMG). SMG contracted with a market analyst, Vogt, Williams & Bowen Research, Inc. (VWB), to prepare the required market study. The affordable units at Elmwood Terrace were initially intended for persons receiving incomes no more than 60 percent of the AMI. The VWB research indicated that the Elmwood Terrace project would adversely affect the existing affordable housing developments, if the Elmwood Terrace units were available to the 60 percent AMI population. The existing affordable housing developments, also serving the 60 percent AMI population, included two developments that had participated in the Respondent's "Guarantee Fund" program, addressed elsewhere herein. VWB determined that the impact of the Elmwood Terrace project on the existing developments could be ameliorated were some of the Elmwood Terrace units targeted during "lease-up" to persons at income levels of not more than 50 percent of the AMI. The lease-up period is the time required for a new development to reach anticipated occupancy levels. The issue was the subject of discussions between the Petitioner, VWB, and SMG. To resolve the anticipated negative impact on the existing affordable housing developments, the Petitioner agreed to target the 50 percent AMI population. In September 2008, the credit underwriter issued his report and recommended that the Petitioner receive the previously-allocated tax credits. On September 22, 2008, the Respondent's Board accepted the credit underwriting report and followed the recommendation. In the fall of 2008, after the Petitioner received the tax credits, the nation's economic environment deteriorated considerably. As a result, the syndicator with whom the Petitioner had been working to sell the tax credits advised that the sale would not occur. The Petitioner was unable to locate an alternate purchaser for the tax credits. The Petitioner considered altering the target population of the project in an attempt to attract a buyer for the tax credits, and there were discussions with the Respondent about the option, but there was no credible evidence presented that such an alteration would have resulted in the sale of the Petitioner's tax credits. Lacking a buyer for the tax credits, the Petitioner was unable to convert the credits to cash, and they were of little value in providing funds for the project. The Petitioner was not alone in its predicament, and many other developers who received tax credits in the 2007 and 2008 Universal Cycles found themselves unable to generate cash through the sale of their tax credits. In early 2009, Congress adopted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (PL 111-5), referred to herein as ARRA, which incorporated a broad range of economic stimulus activities. Included within the ARRA was the "Tax Credit Exchange Program" that provided for the return by the appropriate state agency of a portion of the unused tax credits in exchange for a cash distribution of 85 percent of the tax credit value. The State of Florida received $578,701,964 through the Tax Credit Exchange Program. The ARRA also provided additional funds to state housing finance agencies through a "Tax Credit Assistance Program" intended to "resume funding of affordable housing projects across the nation while stimulating job creation in the hard-hat construction industry." On July 31, 2009, the Respondent issued a Request for Proposals (RFP 2009-04) to facilitate the distribution of the ARRA funds. The Respondent issued the RFP because the 2009 QAP specifically required the Respondent to allocate the relevant federal funds by means of a "competitive request for proposal or competitive application process as approved by the board." The 2009 QAP was adopted as part of the 2009 Universal Cycle rules. Projects selected for funding through the RFP would be evaluated through the routine credit underwriting process. Participation in the RFP process was limited to developers who held an "active award" of tax credits as of February 17, 2009, and who were unable to close on the sale of the credits. The RFP included restrictions against proposals for development within areas designated as "Location A." Although the location of the Elmwood Terrace project had not been within an area designated as "Location A" during the 2007 Universal Cycle process, the Respondent had subsequently designated the area as "Location A" by the time of the 2009 Universal Cycle. The RFP also established occupancy standards for projects funded under the RFP that exceeded the standards established in the Universal Cycle instructions and an evaluation process separate from the Universal Cycle requirements. Although the restrictions in the RFP would have automatically precluded the Petitioner from being awarded funds, the Petitioner submitted a response to the RFP and then filed a successful challenge to the RFP specifications (DOAH Case No. 09-4682BID). In a Recommended Order issued on November 12, 2009, the Administrative law Judge presiding over the RFP challenge determined that certain provisions of the RFP, including the automatic rejection of Location A projects, the increased occupancy standards, and the RFP evaluation criteria, were invalid. The Respondent adopted the Recommended Order by a Final Order issued on December 4, 2009, and invited the Petitioner into the credit underwriting process by a letter dated December 9, 2009. The credit underwriter assigned to analyze the Petitioner's project was SMG, the same credit underwriter that performed the original analysis of the Petitioner's project during the 2007 Universal Cycle. SMG retained Meridian Appraisal Group, Inc. (Meridian), to prepare the required market study. The Respondent was not consulted regarding the SMG decision to retain Meridian for the market analysis. The decision to retain Meridian for the market analysis was entirely that of SMG. The Respondent did not direct SMG or Meridian in any manner regarding the assessment or evaluation of any negative impact of the proposed project on existing affordable housing developments. Meridian completed the market study and forwarded it to SMG on January 26, 2010. The Meridian market analysis included a review of the relevant data as well as consideration of the actual economic conditions experienced in Lee County, Florida, including the extremely poor performance of the existing housing stock, as well as significant job losses and considerable unemployment. The Meridian market analysis determined that the Elmwood Terrace development would have a negative impact on two existing affordable housing apartment developments that were underwritten by the Respondent through a Guarantee Fund created at Section 420.5092, Florida Statutes, by the Florida Legislature in 1992. The existing Guarantee Fund properties referenced in the SMG recommendation are "Bernwood Trace" and "Westwood," both family-oriented apartment developments within five miles of the Elmwood Terrace location. The Guarantee Fund essentially obligates the Respondent to satisfy mortgage debt with the proceeds of Florida's documentary stamp taxes, if an affordable housing development is unable to generate sufficient revenue to service the debt. Because the Guarantee Fund program essentially serves to underwrite the repayment of mortgage debt for a "guaranteed" affordable housing development, the program increases the availability, and lowers the cost, of credit for developers. The Guarantee Fund program has participated in the financing of more than 100 projects, most of which closed between 1999 and 2002. Since 2005, the Respondent has not approved any additional Guarantee Fund participation in any affordable housing developments. The Respondent's total risk exposure through the Guarantee Fund is approximately 750 million dollars. Prior to October 2008, no claims were made against the Guarantee Fund. Since November 2008, there have been eight claims filed against the Guarantee Fund. Affordable housing financing includes restrictions that mandate the inclusion of a specific number of affordable housing units. Such restrictions are eliminated through foreclosure proceedings, and, accordingly, access to affordable housing units can be reduced if a development fails. Presuming that the eight claims pending against the Guarantee Fund eventually proceeded through foreclosure, as many as 2,300 residential units could be deducted from the stock of affordable housing. When there is a claim on the Guarantee Fund, the Respondent has to assume payment of the mortgage debt. The claims are paid from the Guarantee Fund capital, which is detrimental to the Respondent's risk-to-capital ratio. The risk-to-capital ratio is presently four to one. The maximum risk-to-capital ratio acceptable to rating agencies is five to one. The eight claims against the Guarantee Fund have ranged between ten and 18 million dollars each. The Respondent's bond rating has declined because of the eight claims. A continued decline in the Respondent's bond rating could result in documentary stamp tax receipts being used for payment of Guarantee Fund claims and directed away from the Respondent's programs that are intended to support the creation of affordable housing. In an effort to prevent additional claims against the Guarantee Fund, the Respondent has created the "Subordinate Mortgage Initiative" to provide assistance in the form of two- year loans to troubled Guarantee Fund properties. When preparing the 2010 market study, Meridian did not review the VWB market analysis performed as part of the 2007 application. Although the Petitioner has asserted that Meridian should have reviewed the 2007 VWB analysis, there is no evidence that Meridian's decision to conduct an independent market study without reference to the prior market review was inappropriate. On February 8, 2010, SMG issued a recommendation that the Petitioner's funding request be denied "because of the proposed development's potential financial impacts on developments in the area previously funded by Florida Housing and an anticipated negative impact to the two Guarantee Fund properties located within five miles of the proposed development." There is no evidence that the Meridian analysis was inadequate or improperly completed. There is no evidence that the SMG's reliance on the Meridian analysis was inappropriate. For purposes of this Order, the Meridian analysis and the SMG credit underwriting report have been accepted. Elmwood Terrace, a newer development with newer amenities, would compete for residents with the Bernwood Trace and Westwood developments. The financing for Bernwood Trace and Westwood was premised on projections that the affordable housing units would be leased to the 60 percent AMI population; however, the developments have been unable to maintain full occupancy levels, even though a number of units in the two properties are leased at reduced rates based on 50 percent AMI income levels. A rent reduction implemented by an existing development, whether based on economic conditions or resulting from competition, constitutes a negative impact on the development. There is no credible evidence that the occupancy rates are attributable to any difficulty in management of the two developments. It is reasonable to conclude that the leasing issues are related to economic conditions present in Lee County, Florida. In January 2010, VWB conducted an alternative market analysis. The VWB analysis was not provided to SMG or to the Respondent at any time during the credit underwriting process. Based on the 2010 VWB analysis, the Petitioner asserted that economic conditions in Lee County, Florida, have improved since the first credit underwriting report was completed in 2008 and that the improvement is expected to continue. There is no noteworthy evidence that economic conditions have improved or will significantly improve in the Lee County, Florida, market in the predictable future, and the VWB analysis is rejected. The Petitioner offered to mitigate any negative impact on the Guarantee Fund properties by committing affordable units to 50 percent AMI income levels. Given the existing economic and rental market conditions in Lee County, Florida, the evidence fails to establish that the offer would actually alleviate the negative impact on the affected Guarantee Fund developments. The 2010 VWB analysis states that there is substantial unmet demand for housing at 50 percent AMI and that there will be no impact on the Guarantee Fund units if the Elmwood Terrace units were set aside for such individuals. There is no credible evidence that there is a substantial and relevant unmet affordable housing demand in Lee County, Florida. The VWB analysis is rejected. Following the completion of each annual Universal Cycle process, the Respondent actively solicits feedback from developers and the public and then amends the Universal Cycle requirements to address the issues raised, as well as to reflect existing affordable housing needs and general concerns of the Board. The amendments are applicable for the following Universal Cycle. In 2009, the Respondent amended subsection (10) of the Credit Underwriting Rule as part of the annual revisions to the Universal Cycle process. The relevant amendment (referred to by the parties as the "Impact Rule") added this directive to the credit underwriter: The Credit Underwriter must review and determine whether there will be a negative impact to Guarantee Fund Developments within the primary market area or five miles of the proposed development, whichever is greater. The amendment was prompted by the Respondent's experience in the fall of 2008 when considering two separate applications for affordable housing financing. The potential negative impact of a proposed development on an existing Guarantee Fund property was central to the Board's consideration of one application, and the Board ultimately denied the application. In the second case, the Board granted the application, despite the potential negative impact on a competing development that was not underwritten by the Guarantee Fund. The intent of the language was to advise developers that the existence of Guarantee Fund properties within the competitive market area would be part of the credit underwriting evaluation and the Board's consideration. Notwithstanding the language added to the rule, the credit underwriter is charged with reviewing the need for additional affordable housing. Even in absence of the added language, consideration of any negative impact to competing developments based on inadequate need for additional affordable housing would be appropriate. In rendering the 2010 credit underwriting report on Elmwood Terrace, the credit underwriter complied with the directive. Prior to determining that the Petitioner's funding application should be denied, the Respondent's Board was clearly aware of the Petitioner's application, the credit underwriting report and market analysis, and the economic conditions in Lee County, Florida. There is no credible evidence of any need for additional affordable housing in Lee County, Florida. There is no credible evidence that the Lee County, Florida, market can sustain the addition of the units proposed by the Petitioner without adversely affecting the financial feasibility of the existing Guarantee Fund developments. The Board was aware that the Elmwood Terrace development could attract residents from the nearby Guarantee Fund properties and that local economic conditions threatened the financial viability of the properties. Given current economic conditions, approval of the application at issue in this proceeding would reasonably be expected to result in a negative impact to existing affordable housing developments. The protection of Guarantee Fund developments is necessary to safeguard the resources used to support the creation and availability of affordable housing in the state.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order denying the application for funding filed by Elmwood Terrace Limited Partnership. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, & Purnell, P.A. 119 South Monroe Street, Suite 202 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Wellington Meffert, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 Della Harrell, Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Department of Children and Families (DCF), may impose a moratorium for new residents at The Haven Center, Inc., for those who are enrolled in the Developmental Services Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Program (DS Waiver).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating residential facilities that provide DS waiver services. Sunrise Opportunities, Inc., Sunrise Communities, Inc., and The Haven Center, Inc., are members of the Sunrise group of providers that serve individuals with developmental disabilities. Sunrise Opportunities, Inc., is a charitable, tax-exempt entity that provides residential and day treatment services to individuals under the DS Waiver program. The Haven Center, Inc., owns seven homes located on 23+/- acres in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The homes located at The Haven Center, Inc., are operated by Sunrise Opportunities, Inc. Such homes have been monitored and reviewed by the DCF on numerous occasions. The reviews or inspections have never revealed a significant deficiency. Moreover, historically the DCF has determined that residents at The Haven Center, Inc., have received a high quality of care. For some unknown time the parties were aware of a need to move individuals residing at The Haven Center into community homes in the greater South Miami-Dade County area. Concurrently, it was planned that individuals in substandard housing would then be moved into The Haven Center. This "transition plan" as it is called in the record would be accomplished as improvements were completed to the Sunrise properties. That the parties anticipated the transition plan would be implemented as stated is undisputed. Because it believed the transition plan had been agreed upon and would be followed, Sunrise Opportunities, Inc., incurred a considerable debt and expended significant expenses to purchase and improve homes in the South Miami-Dade County area. Additionally, DS Waiver participants were moved from The Haven Center to the six-person homes in South Miami-Dade County. In fact, over fifty percent of The Haven Center residents have made the move. In contrast with the transition plan, only 12 individuals were allowed to move into The Haven Center. Instead, DCF notified the Petitioners of a moratorium prohibiting the placement of DS Waiver residents into The Haven Center. This moratorium, represented to be "temporary," is on-going and was unabated through the time of hearing. The moratorium prompted the instant administrative action. Upon notice of DCF's intention to impose a moratorium on The Haven Center, the Petitioners timely challenged such agency action. DCF based the moratorium upon an Order Approving Settlement Agreement entered in the case of Prado-Steiman v. Bush, Case No. 98-6496-CIV-FERGUSON, by United States District Judge Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr. on August 8, 2001. The Petitioners had objected to the approval of the Settlement Agreement in Prado-Steiman but the court overruled the objectors finding they, as providers of services to the DS Waiver residents, did not have standing in the litigation. The Prado-Steiman case was initiated by a group of disabled individuals on behalf of the class of similarly situated persons who claimed the State of Florida had failed to meet its responsibility to such individuals under Federal law. Without detailing the case in its totality, it is sufficient for purposes of this case to find that the Prado-Steiman Settlement Agreement imposed specific criteria on the State of Florida which were to be met according to the prospective plan approved and adopted by the court. At the time the Prado-Steiman case was filed, The Haven Center was licensed as a residential habilitation center. After the Settlement Agreement was executed by the parties in Prado-Steiman, but before the court entered its Order Approving Settlement Agreement, the licensure status of The Haven Center changed. Effective June 1, 2001, The Haven Center became licensed as seven group homes together with a habilitation center. Pertinent to this case are specific provisions of the Prado-Steiman Settlement Agreement (Agreement). These provisions are set forth below. First, regarding group home placements, the Agreement provides that: The parties agree that they prefer that individuals who are enrolled in the Waiver [DS Waiver] live and receive services in smaller facilities. Consistent with this preference, the parties agree to the following: The Department [DCF] will target choice counseling to those individuals, [sic] enrolled on the Waiver who presently reside in residential habilitation centers (where more than 15 persons reside and receive services). The focus of this choice counseling will be to provide information about alternative residential placement options. The Department will begin this targeted choice counseling by December 1, 2000, and will substantially complete the choice counseling by December 1, 2001. * * * 4. The Department and the Agency [Agency for Health Care Administration] agree that, in the residential habilitation centers, if a vacancy occurs on or after the date this agreement is approved by the Court, the Department will not fill that vacancy with an individual enrolled on the Waiver. (Emphasis added) None of the individually licensed group homes at The Haven Center is authorized to house more than 15 persons. All of the group home licenses at The Haven Center were approved before the Prado-Steiman Court approved the Agreement. The Agreement also provides that the parties: . . . have agreed that the Court may retain jurisdiction of this litigation until December 31, 2001, at which time this case will be dismissed with prejudice. The Plaintiffs may seek to continue the jurisdiction of the Court and to pursue any of the relief requested in this lawsuit only if they can show material breach as evidenced by systemic deficiencies in the Defendants' implementation of the Plan of Compliance. In any motion to continue the jurisdiction of the Court, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that alleged breaches and any proposed cure were fully disclosed to the state defendants consistent with the "Notice and Cure" provisions set forth below in paragraphs 7-10 below, that the action requested by the plaintiffs is required by existing law, and the State Defendants have refused to take action required by law. Such relief may not be sought after the scheduled dismissal of the litigation. Absent the allegation of material breach in a pending motion, the Court will dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice on December 31, 2001. (Emphasis added) Also pertinent to this case, the Agreement provides: 19. The parties' breach, or alleged breach, of this Agreement (or of the terms contained herein) will not be used by any party as a basis for any further litigation. "Systemic problems or deficiencies" is defined by the Agreement to mean: problems or deficiencies which are common in the administration of the Waiver, inconsistent with the terms of this Stipulated Agreement, and in violation of federal law. Isolated instances of deficiencies or violations of federal law, without evidence of more pervasive conduct, are not "systemic" in nature. State otherwise, a problem or deficiency is systemic if it requires restructuring of the Florida Developmental Services Home and Community-Based Services Waiver program itself in order to comply with the provisions of federal law regarding the Waiver; but that it is not "systemic" if it only involves a substantive claim having to do with limited components of the program, and if the administrative process is capable of correcting the problem. After the Agreement was adopted the Respondent advised Petitioners to continue with the transition plan. On or about September 1, 2001, the Petitioners and the Respondent entered into contracts for the group homes operated at The Haven Center. Each home is properly licensed, has honored its contracts to provide services to disabled individuals, and has complied with state licensure laws. A licensed Residential Habilitation Center may not have a licensed capacity of less than nine. Advocacy issued a letter dated March 8, 2002, that alleged systemic problems constituting material breaches of the Agreement. Among the cited alleged deficiencies is the failure of the state to ensure . . . that locally-licensed providers receiving waiver funds for providing group- home services in fact are providing services in that setting rather than in institutional settings. Examples include: a) A former residential habilitation center known as Haven is now licensed as a group home in District 11 (Miami/Dade) and receives HCBS waiver funds. There is no evidence that The Haven Center is providing services in any setting other than as licensed by the Respondent. That is, there is no evidence it is not operating as individually licensed group homes. Further, Advocacy had actual knowledge of the instant administrative action. In short, it did not attempt to participate in the Petitioners' challenge to the moratorium. DCF has imposed a moratorium on no other licensed group home in the State of Florida. The group homes at The Haven Center are the sole targets for this administrative decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a Final Order lifting the moratorium on placements of DS Waiver participants at The Haven Center's group homes. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Sevices 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Veronica E. Donnelly, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Steven M. Weinger, Esquire Kurzban, Kurzban, Weinger & Tetzeli, P.A. 2650 Southwest 27th Avenue, Second Floor Miami, Florida 33133
The Issue Whether Respondents Alfred Homes and Felicia Homes Foster1 subjected Petitioner Nidia Cruz to discriminatory housing practices based on Ms. Cruz’s national origin, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (FHA).
Findings Of Fact Ms. Cruz, who is Hispanic in national origin, rented and occupied a mobile home at lot #9 in Pine Grove Trailer Park (Pine Grove), in an unincorporated area adjacent to Fernandina Beach, Florida. Respondent Alfred Homes owns Pine Grove. His daughter, Respondent Felicia Homes Foster, oversees the business operations of Pine Grove. Ms. Foster lives in a mobile home at Pine Grove, and owns two other mobile homes that are rental units. Ms. Cruz rented one of these mobile homes from Ms. Foster. The remaining mobile homes in Pine Grove are owner-occupied, with those owners renting their lots from Respondents. Neither party could produce a lease between Respondents and Petitioner concerning the mobile home. Based on the parties’ testimony and other evidence presented at the final hearing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s tenancy for the mobile home commenced on or about October 15, 2016, for an approximately one-year term ending November 30, 2017. Respondents charged a $500 security deposit, and $600 per month for rent, which included water and sanitary sewer that Pine Grove’s well and septic system provided. Ms. Cruz was responsible for electrical services to the mobile home. After the expiration of the lease on November 30, 2017, the parties did not renew the lease, and Ms. Cruz continued to occupy the mobile home under a month-to-month agreement, until she vacated the mobile home on or about September 29, 2018. Ms. Cruz sought out Respondents to rent a mobile home, as her previous landlord had terminated the lease for her previous residence because of her unauthorized possession of pets. Ms. Foster informed Ms. Cruz that she had an available mobile home to rent, but as the previous tenants had just moved out, she needed to make repairs to the mobile home before it could be occupied. Ms. Cruz requested to move in immediately while the Respondents repaired the mobile home, because she and her daughter were, at that point, homeless. Respondents employed Michael Hamilton to repair and provide maintenance work to the mobile homes in Pine Grove. Mr. Hamilton worked for Respondents on weekends, as he had a full-time job during the week. Within approximately one month of Ms. Cruz moving into her mobile home, Mr. Hamilton made the needed repairs to its interior, including replacing the refrigerator, carpet, commode, and door locks. After moving into the mobile home, Ms. Cruz was involved in an incident at a nearby McDonald’s restaurant with an employee. That employee, Theresa McKenzie, was a tenant of Pine Grove and resided in lot #10, which was adjacent to Ms. Cruz’s mobile home. Ms. Cruz and her daughter, Ms. Burgos, complained to Ms. Foster that Ms. McKenzie and her co-tenant Earnest Roberts made loud, harassing, and defamatory statements about Ms. Cruz and her national origin. Respondents, individually, warned Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts to refrain from calling Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos names. The feud between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie was interrupted when Ms. Cruz was arrested on November 18, 2016. Ms. Cruz was charged with, among other offenses, aggravated stalking arising from a violation of an order of protection and filing a false police report. The victim of these offenses was a previous landlord from whom Ms. Cruz had rented a room. While in pretrial detention, a psychologist evaluated Ms. Cruz, and determined her to be incompetent to proceed in the criminal proceeding. The trial court subsequently committed Ms. Cruz to a mental health facility, and she pled guilty to filing a false police report. The trial court sentenced Ms. Cruz to a split sentence of two years with special conditions, which included enrollment into the mental health court program. After acceptance into the mental health court program, Ms. Cruz was released from the Nassau County Jail. On February 13, 2017, Ms. Foster hand delivered a letter to Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts, which warned them that if they did not refrain from verbal attacks against Ms. Cruz, Respondents would evict them from Pine Grove and obtain a no trespassing order. Chris Cummings, who was a Pine Grove resident at lot #4, testified he was aware of the incident at McDonald’s involving Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie, as his wife also worked at that McDonald’s. Mr. Cummings observed, but could not hear, Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie “squaring off” against each other. Mr. Cummings recounted that he observed Ms. Cruz lift her skirt and bend over, in a manner that he interpreted to mean that Ms. McKenize could kiss her rear end. In August 2017, Hurricane Irma caused a large branch from a pine tree to fall on top of Ms. Cruz’s mobile home, puncturing the exterior metal skin of the mobile home’s roof, which allowed water to intrude into the interior of the mobile home. The water intrusion caused significant damage to the ceilings, walls, and floor coverings of the mobile home. It is undisputed that Hurricane Irma inflicted serious damage to the mobile home, and that Ms. Cruz resorted to using buckets to catch water leaking from the roof. Shortly after Hurricane Irma passed, Mr. Hamilton placed a tarp over the top of the mobile home to stop the water intrusion. He then began repairs to Ms. Cruz’s mobile home over the course of several weekends, which included removing and replacing damaged sheet rock, patching the metal roof, and installing new carpet and linoleum flooring. Mr. Hamilton testified that Ms. Cruz, on several occasions, frustrated his ability to complete these repairs by denying him entry into the mobile home. Ms. Cruz presented evidence that her mobile home required extensive repairs upon moving in, and that it sustained severe damage from Hurricane Irma. However, she presented no credible evidence to rebut the testimony that Mr. Hamilton, on behalf of Respondents, completed all necessary repairs. Additionally, Ms. Cruz presented no credible evidence that Respondents treated her differently than other Pine Grove tenants in responding to and completing any necessary repairs to other tenant’s mobile homes. Neither the passage of time, incarceration, nor the trauma of Hurricane Irma, ended the feud between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. The Nassau County Sheriff’s Office had regular call-outs to Pine Grove regarding Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. The feud escalated when, on January 4, 2018, Ms. McKenzie filed a petition for an injunction for protection against Ms. Cruz, and the circuit court entered a temporary injunction that same day. The next day, January 5, 2018, Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos each filed petitions for an injunction for protection against Ms. McKenzie. Then, on January 16, 2018, Ms. Cruz sought a petition for an injunction for protection against Mr. Roberts, which the circuit court granted, as a temporary injunction, that same day. On January 17, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition against Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos’s petition against Ms. McKenzie, and on January 18, 2018, granted a final injunction in each case. On January 18, 2018, Ms. Burgos filed a petition for an injunction for protection against Mr. Roberts, which the circuit court denied. On January 24, 2018, the circuit court heard Ms. Cruz’s petitions against Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts; the circuit court denied the injunction against Ms. McKenzie, but granted a final injunction against Mr. Roberts. On January 29 and February 9, 2018, the circuit court entered orders to show cause in Ms. Burgos’s injunction against Ms. McKenzie, and after hearing argument, dismissed them on February 15, 2018. Despite these multiple injunction proceedings, Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie continued their feud. On January 22, 2018, Ms. Cruz was arrested for violation of the protection order in favor of Ms. McKenzie. Ms. Cruz’s arrest triggered a violation of her felony probation. While in pretrial detention, she was again evaluated by a psychologist, who determined her to be incompetent to proceed. The circuit court committed Ms. Cruz to a mental health facility. She subsequently returned to court and pled guilty to a violation of probation. The circuit court sentenced Ms. Cruz to a split sentence of time served, reinstated probation, and extended probation with an added special condition for 12 months. Ms. Cruz was released from the Nassau County Jail on July 27, 2018. On July 31, 2018, Ms. Foster hand delivered a notice to terminate the lease, stating that the lease will end on August 31, 2018, and that Ms. Cruz should vacate the mobile home no later than September 1, 2018. Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos continued to hold over in the mobile home until they moved out on September 29, 2018. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents, or Mr. Hamilton, made any disparaging statements to Ms. Cruz regarding her national origin. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents treated her less favorably than other tenants with regard to her feud with Ms. McKenzie. Put differently, Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents treated any other tenant disputes differently than the way they treated the dispute between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. Ms. Foster attempted to intervene on behalf of Ms. Cruz to end the feud, when she hand-delivered the letter to Ms. McKenzie on February 13, 2017, that threatened eviction. The credible evidence presented demonstrated that Ms. Cruz often created or exacerbated this feud, which ultimately led to her incarceration. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents’ decision to end the month-to-month holdover of the lease of the mobile home was based on her national origin, or that Respondents treated Ms. Cruz differently than any other tenants who resided at Pine Grove in ending the month-to-month holdover of a lease.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Nidia Cruz’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Nidia Cruz Post Office Box 1923 Callahan, Florida 32011 (eServed) James Pratt O'Conner, Esquire James Pratt O'Conner, P.A. Post Office Box 471 Fernandina Beach, Florida 32035 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Did the action of Respondent, in denying Petitioner the use of an emotional support dog in her condominium unit for her son, violate a legal duty to reasonably accommodate the needs of her son, A.C.?
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of relevant and material facts: Facts From Pre-hearing Stipulation Filed June 20, 2016 Petitioner was aware that the Association had a "no pet" policy and signed a document acknowledging same. Petitioner was sent a letter on February 24, 2014, from the Association's then property manager advising Petitioner that the Association had been advised that a dog was being kept in their unit, and reminding Petitioner of the Association's no pet policy. A Fines Committee hearing was scheduled for March 10, 2014, in regard to Petitioner's violation of the no pet policy. Petitioner was not issued a fine for violating the pet policy. Prior to the Fines Committee hearing, Petitioner made her first claim that her son had a disability and required an emotional support animal. Prior to the Fines Committee hearing, Petitioner made her first request to the Association for a reasonable accommodation. The Association's Board of Directors scheduled an interview with Petitioner on April 30, 2014, wherein Petitioner would be able to explain her request for a reasonable accommodation, the need for the emotional support animal, and her son's disability. The Association advised Petitioner, prior to the scheduled interview, that Petitioner may provide the Association with any documents Petitioner believes support her position. An interview and/or meeting occurred on April 30, 2014, between Petitioner, her husband, Yovani Cabreriza, Petitioner's attorney, and certain members of the Board of Directors, along with the Association's attorney, to discuss Petitioner's request for an accommodation. The Association determined that Petitioner was not in need of a reasonable accommodation and requested that the dog be removed via written correspondence dated May 19, 2014. The Association again requested that the subject dog be removed via written correspondence dated May 22, 2015, and advised Petitioner that an arbitration action would follow if the dog was not removed. A Petition for Arbitration was filed on June 4, 2015. Petitioner's response to the arbitration petition was filed on September 14, 2015. The arbitrator issued an order striking the complainants' defense and requiring proof of filing a Fair Housing Complaint. Petitioner filed her housing complaint with FCHR and Housing and Urban Development on November 2, 2015. On March 8, 2016, the FCHR housing investigator issued a "Notice of Determination of No Cause," concluding that reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. On April 8, 2016, FCHR received a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Housing Practice from Petitioner. Findings of Fact From the Hearing This case involves a family who lives at Respondent's condominium complex, Arlen House Condominium, located at 300 Bayview Drive, Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160. Petitioner owns condominium unit PH05. Petitioner resides at this location with her husband and minor son, A.C. Petitioner's son was 11 years old in 2014. Her son has suffered from an anxiety disorder since he was a young boy. A.C.'s anxiety disorder problem became worse in 2012. He cried every morning and did not want to go to school. Apparently, he had difficulty breathing during anxiety or panic attacks. His mother described him as being "completely withdrawn" at school.1/ To help her son cope with his anxiety problem, Petitioner bought him a small dog, Jake, in the latter part of 2012. When she bought the dog, she knew that the condominium had a "no pet policy," but failed to alert the condominium or request permission to keep the dog.2/ In early 2014, the Association discovered that the dog was being kept in violation of the Association's rules and regulations. It notified Petitioner in writing on February 24, 2014, and told her to remove the animal. Resp. Ex. 2(e). March 10, 2014, Meeting Petitioner met with the Association's Fine Committee on March 10, 2014. During the meeting, Petitioner presented, for the first time, a letter or letters from the child's doctor, Rasciel Socarras, M.D.3/ Resp. Ex. 2(f). After the meeting before the Fine Committee, counsel for the Association sent Petitioner's counsel a letter dated March 21, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2(g). Essentially, the letter reiterated the "no pet policy" and concluded that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate to the Fine Committee that her son had a disability that substantially limited a major life activity or that an accommodation was necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their condominium unit. The letter also requested a meeting to help the Association "conduct a meaningful review of your client's request for an accommodation."4/ Prior to the next meeting between the parties on April 30, 2014, counsel for the Association sent a letter to Petitioner's counsel dated April 18, 2014. In that letter, counsel requested copies of any and all documents that may support the boy's disability and need for an accommodation, including but not limited to the medical records that demonstrate his disability.5/ April 30, 2014, Meeting As arranged, Petitioner and her husband, along with their legal counsel, met with the Board of Directors on April 30, 2014. At the meeting, Petitioner explained her son's anxiety problem.6/ Although the record was not clear on this point, based on the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, the undersigned concludes that the two (2) letters (dated and undated) from Dr. Socarras were reviewed and discussed during the April 30, 2014, meeting with Petitioner.7/ The board members asked Petitioner several questions about her son's condition. Petitioner informed the Board of Directors that her son was not on any medication to treat his anxiety, nor was he receiving any mental health counseling or therapy. Petitioner told the Board of Directors that she had diagnosed the child as having problems with anxiety. The Board of Directors also asked her how her son was performing in school and learned that he was enrolled in the gifted learning program at his school.8/ As a result of the meeting, the Board of Directors concluded: (1) that it did not have enough information to determine whether the child was limited in his ability to live in the unit; (2) that he had a disability; or (3) that the pet was medically necessary for him. As a follow-up to that meeting, on May 19, 2014, the Association's counsel sent a letter to Petitioner. The letter outlined the Board of Directors' position and speaks for itself. See Resp. Ex. 2(i). The letter stated in relevant part: At this time, the Board of Directors can neither approve your request for an accommodation nor can it provide an exception to its "no pet" policy. You have been unable to provide information that supports that your son suffers from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his daily activities. There has been no documentation to support that your son has been diagnosed or treated for a disability. More importantly, you have not provided relevant information that your son has a disability or that the dog helps alleviate any identified symptoms. The letter concluded by demanding that the dog, Jake, be removed from the condominium unit no later than Monday, June 2, 2014.9/ Nearly a year of "radio silence" passed with no activity by either party. The Association did not check on the removal of the pet, and Petitioner did not remove the dog despite the demand by the Association. A year later, on May 15, 2015, the Association acted and sent another letter to Petitioner demanding that she remove the pet. Again, Petitioner did not remove the pet. On June 4, 2015, the Association filed a petition for mandatory non-binding arbitration with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Ultimately, the arbitrator entered an order on November 19, 2015, staying the arbitration case until the resolution of the discrimination complaint filed by Petitioner with FCHR. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned concludes that during the meeting on April 30, 2014, with the Board of Directors, that other than the letter(s) from Dr. Socarras, and an identification certificate for their pet dog Jake, there was no other medical information or documentation provided by Petitioner to assist Respondent in reviewing and evaluating her request for the accommodation to keep Jake in the unit.10/ As a related topic, the Board of Directors had previously approved service animals for at least two (2) other residents.11/ One resident had suffered a stroke and needed assistance to walk. Another resident had a serious medical condition and was allowed to keep a service animal which was trained to detect the onset of the person's medical condition. In both instances, the Board of Directors followed the same process followed in Petitioner's case. Letters were sent and meetings were held. However, in the cases where a service animal was approved, the Board of Directors requested and was provided medical records which it relied upon to conclude that a service animal was needed as a reasonable accommodation. Prior to this hearing before DOAH, the Board of Directors had not been informed, and no claim was made, that "learning" was a major life activity that was substantially impaired by A.C.'s anxiety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint for discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2016.
The Issue Whether Petitioners, Kim and Coby Lantz, should be granted a license as a family foster home.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating family foster homes. Petitioners are applicants for a family foster home license. In February 2004, Petitioners initially sought to adopt a child, but, subsequently, changed the application to provide foster care for children. As part of the process, Petitioners attended an orientation conducted by Respondent's family services counselor and completed a screening questionnaire. As part of the application process, applicants are required to complete the Model Approach for Parenting (MAP) training, which includes classes to better prepare prospective foster and adoptive parents for the placement of children in their homes. The purpose is to ensure, prior to placement, that prospective parents work effectively as a team with each other and with Respondent. It is also important that they know and understand their rights and obligations that a stable environment be created for the children. As part of the MAP training and evaluation, prospective foster parents are required to complete a thorough background and history form. They are asked to give a complete life history, including prior relationships, marriages, customs, and culture. Both Petitioners completed the form. Petitioner Coby Lantz has been very supportive of his wife's desire to obtain a family foster home license and to provide care for foster children. He provided sufficient information in order for Respondent to complete his portion of the family assessment. Petitioner Coby Lantz completed the MAP training during this period. Petitioner Kim Lantz was given credit for completing the MAP training while married to her second husband, Darrell Palmer. Petitioner Kim Lantz completed the Adult's Personal Profile (for prospective mothers), consisting of 17 pages, plus a five-page, hand-written "Life Story." On page five of the profile, she was specifically asked to complete information on previous intimate relationships and former marriages. Petitioner Kim Lantz listed only one former marriage. She indicated she was married to Darrell Palmer from November 18, 2000, until his death on September 12, 2001. However, Petitioner Kim Lantz was, in fact, married to Robert D. Haynes in June 1991, separated two years later, and the final decree of divorce was entered on October 10, 1995. Petitioner Kim Lantz's explanation of this omission, while testifying at the hearing, was that she and her first husband married shortly after college. She stated, "[i]t was a high school sweetheart thing . . . he was not abusive to me. He did drink. We just grew apart. We divorced. That was it. It was like a guy I dated. He's not really anything to comment about. I moved on " These responses, along with other parts of her testimony, indicate that Petitioner Kim Lantz tends to suppress unpleasant memories from her past and to not deal with them effectively. Also, Petitioner Kim Lantz has not given a credible explanation of her complete omission of any reference to Haynes in her profile or "Life Story." In addition, it was only with excessive prodding that Petitioner produced a Certificate of Divorce from Haynes. These omissions and vague explanations have prevented Respondent from completing a thorough family assessment as required by Florida law. Petitioner Kim Lantz's second marriage to Darrell Palmer ended tragically on November 12, 2001. She was present with her husband in their apartment when local law enforcement came to their door. The law enforcement officers were seeking to determine the origin of bomb threats made to a local Dillard's department store. Apparently, they wanted to interview her, who was employed there at the time, and Palmer, a former employee. When Palmer, who was preparing a meal in the kitchen, opened the door with a kitchen knife in his hands, he was shot and killed by law enforcement. Petitioner was emotionally devastated by this event. At her parents urging, she returned to their home in upstate New York, where she received love and support from her family and her church. Petitioner Kim Lantz testified that she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and received mental health counseling for two years and, also, received medication for this condition. However, Petitioners have provided only sketchy information concerning her current mental health status. While still in New York, Petitioners met at a church function, dated, and married and eventually moved to Cocoa, Florida. During the course of Respondent's family assessment, it was determined, in late March 2005, that Petitioner Kim Lantz was terminated at her place of employment, a daycare facility, on February 28, 2005. She failed to report this event and attempted to withhold this fact from Respondent. Her explanation to Respondent's investigator and her testimony at the hearing is not credible and amounts to a willful or intentional misstatement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioners, Kim and Coby Lantz's application for a family foster home license be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Cato, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Kim Lantz Coby Lantz 6983 Dahlia Drive Cocoa, Florida 32927 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) whether Riverside Village Partners, LTD. (Riverside or Petitioner), has, or had at the time of application, a present plan to convert its proposed development to any use other than affordable residential rental property; (2) whether Provincetown Village Partners, LTD. (Provincetown or Petitioner), has, or had at the time of application, a present plan to convert its proposed development to any use other than affordable residential rental property; (3) whether Riverside irrevocably committed to set aside units in its proposed development for a total of 50 years; and (4) whether Provincetown irrevocably committed to set aside units in its proposed development for a total of 50 years.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner, Provincetown Village Partners, LTD., is a Florida limited partnership with its business address at 1551 Sandspur Road, Maitland, Florida 32751, and is in the business of providing affordable housing units. Petitioner, Riverside Village Partners, LTD., is a Florida limited partnership with its business address at 1551 Sandspur Road, Maitland, Florida 32751, and is in the business of providing affordable housing units. Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation (Florida Housing), is a public corporation that administers governmental programs relating to the financing and refinancing of affordable housing and related facilities in Florida pursuant to Section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2003). Florida Housing's Financing Mechanisms To encourage the development of affordable rental housing for low-income families, Florida Housing provides low-interest mortgage loans to developers of qualified multi-family housing projects. In exchange for an interest rate lower than conventional market rates, the developer agrees to "set-aside" a specific percentage of the rental units for low-income tenants. Through its Multi-Family Mortgage Revenue Bond (MMRB) program, Florida Housing funds these mortgage loans through the sale of tax-exempt and taxable bonds. Applicants then repay the loans from the revenues generated by their respective projects. Applicants who receive MMRB proceeds are required to execute a Land Use Restriction Agreement (LURA or Land Use Restriction Agreement), which is recorded in the official records of the county in which the applicant’s development is located. Through the State Apartment Incentive Loan (SAIL) program, Florida Housing funds low-interest mortgage loans to developers from various sources of state revenue, which are generally secured by second mortgages on the property. Applicants who receive SAIL proceeds are required to execute and record a LURA in the county records as with MMRB's Land Use Restriction Agreements. Florida Housing also distributes federal income tax credits for the development of affordable rental housing for low-income tenants; those tax credits are referred to as "housing credits." Generally, applicants who utilize tax-exempt bond financing for at least 50 percent of the cost of their development are entitled to receive an award of housing credits on a non-competitive basis. These non-competitive housing credits are received by the qualified applicant each year for ten consecutive years. Typically, applicants sell this future stream of housing credits at the initiation of the development process in order to generate a portion of the funds necessary for the construction of the development. The Application, Scoring, and Ranking Process Because Florida Housing’s available pool of tax-exempt bond financing and SAIL funds is limited, qualified projects must compete for this funding. To determine which proposed projects will put the available funds to best use, Florida Housing has established a competitive application process to assess the relative merits of proposed projects. Florida Housing’s competitive application process for MMRB and SAIL financing is included with other financing programs within a single application process (the 2003 Universal Application) governed by Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapters 67-21 and 67-48. The 2003 Universal Application form and accompanying instructions are incorporated as Form "UA1016" by reference into Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67-21 and 67-48 and by Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-21.002(97), and 67-48.002(111), respectively. For the 2003 Universal Application cycle, each applicant who completed and submitted Form UA1016 with attachments was given a preliminary score by Florida Housing. Following the issuance of preliminary scores, applicants are provided an opportunity to challenge the scoring of any competing application through the filing of a Notice of Possible Scoring Error (NOPSE). Florida Housing considers each NOPSE filed and provides each applicant with notice of any resulting change in their preliminary scores (the NOPSE scores). Following the issuance of NOPSE scores, Florida Housing provides an opportunity for applicants to submit additional materials to "cure" any items for which the applicant received less than the maximum score or for which the application may have been rejected for failure to achieve "threshold." There are certain portions of the application which cannot be cured; the list of noncurable items appears in Florida Administrative Code Rules 67-21.003(14) (for MMRB applicants) and 67-48.004(14) (for SAIL applicants). Following the cure period, applicants may again contest the scoring of a competing application by filing a Notice of Alleged Deficiencies (NOAD), identifying deficiencies arising from the submitted cure materials. After considering the submitted NOADs, Florida Housing provides notice to applicants of any resulting scoring changes. The resulting scores are known as "pre-appeal" scores. Applicants may appeal and challenge, via formal or informal hearings, Florida Housing’s scoring of any item for which the applicant received less than the maximum score or for any item that resulted in the rejection of the application for failure to meet "threshold." Upon the conclusion of the informal hearings, and of formal hearings where appropriate, Florida Housing issues the final scores and ranking of applicants. Applicants are then awarded tentative MMRB and/or SAIL funding in order of rank; Florida Housing issues final orders allocating the tentative funding and inviting successful applicants in the credit underwriting process. If an applicant who requests a formal hearing ultimately obtains a final order that modifies its score and threshold determinations so that its application would have been in the funding range had the final order been entered prior to the date the final rankings were presented to the Florida Housing Board of Directors (Board), that applicant’s requested funding will be provided from the next available funding or allocation. The 2003 Application Process On or about April 8, 2003, Riverside, Provincetown, and others submitted applications for MMRB and SAIL financing in the 2003 Universal Application cycle. Riverside requested $3,205,000 in tax-exempt MMRB funding and $1.6 million in SAIL funding to help finance its proposed development, a 34-unit development in Pinellas County, Florida. In its application, Riverside committed to lease all or most of these units to house families earning 60 percent or less of the area median income (AMI). However, depending on which Florida Housing funding source(s) Riverside’s application was deemed eligible to receive, it would commit to lease at least 17 percent of the units to families earning 50 percent or less of AMI, or would commit to lease only a total of 85 percent of the units to families earning 60 percent or less of AMI. Provincetown requested $4.5 million in tax-exempt MMRB funding and $2.0 million in SAIL funding to help finance its proposed development, a 50-unit development in Gadsden County, Florida. In its application, Provincetown committed to lease all or most of the units to families earning 60 percent or less of AMI. However, depending on which Florida Housing program(s) Provincetown’s application was deemed eligible to receive, it would commit to lease at least 11 percent of the units to families earning 50 percent or less of AMI, or would commit to lease only a total of 85 percent of the units to families earning 60 percent or less of AMI. Florida Housing evaluated all applications and notified applicants of their preliminary scores on or before May 12, 2003. Applicants were then given an opportunity to file NOPSEs on or before May 20, 2003. After considering all NOPSEs, Florida Housing notified applicants by overnight mail on or about June 9, 2003, of any resulting changes in the scoring of their applications. Applicants were then allowed to submit, on or before June 19, 2003, cure materials to correct any alleged deficiencies in their applications previously identified by Florida Housing. Applicants were also allowed to file NOADs on competing applications on or before June 27, 2003. After considering the submitted NOADs, Florida Housing issued notice to Provincetown, Riverside, and others of their adjusted scores on or about July 21, 2003. Commitment to Affordability Period Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006, entitled "Development Requirements," lists certain minimum requirements that a development shall meet or that an applicant shall be able to certify that such requirements shall be met. One of these requirements is "The Applicant shall have no present plan to convert the Development to any use other than the use as affordable residential rental property." Part III.E.3 of the Application provides a line for an applicant to commit to an "affordability period" for its application. This subsection of the application form reads in its entirety: 3. Affordability Period for MMRB, SAIL, HOME, and HC Application: Applicant irrevocably commits to set aside units in the proposed Development for a total of years. Both Provincetown and Riverside filled in the number "50" on the blank line in this subsection of their respective applications. An applicant’s score on its application is determined in part by the length of its affordability period commitment. An applicant who commits to an affordability period commitment of 50 or more years received 5 points; 45 to 49 years, 4 points; 40 to 44 years, 3 points; 35 to 39 years, 2 points; 31 to 34 years, 1 point; and 30 years or less, 0 points. Scoring of Provincetown and Riverside Applications In its preliminary scoring of the Provincetown and Riverside applications, Florida Housing awarded each applicant the full 5 points on Part III.E.3 of his or her application for the 50-year affordability period commitment. Also, in the preliminary scoring of the Provincetown and Riverside applications, Florida Housing did not find any threshold failure regarding an alleged present plan to convert the development to a use other than affordable residential rental property. In its preliminary scoring of the Provincetown application, Florida Housing identified an alleged threshold failure related to the validity of the contract for purchase of the site of the proposed development. A subsequent cure submitted by Provincetown regarding the contract for purchase of the site has resolved this issue, and Florida Housing no longer takes the position that the Provincetown application fails threshold for any reason related to site control. In its preliminary scoring of the Riverside application, Florida Housing identified a threshold failure related to documentation of the status of site plan approval, or plat approval, for the proposed development. A subsequent cure submitted by Riverside regarding the status of site plan approval has resolved this issue, and Florida Housing no longer takes the position that the Riverside application fails threshold for any reason related to site plan approval, or plat approval. During the scoring process, Florida Housing received NOPSEs on both the Provincetown and Riverside applications, which asserted that these applicants were proposing transactions that were not financially feasible and would not pass subsequent credit underwriting requirements. The NOPSEs also alleged that the Riverside and Provincetown applications were for townhouses designed with an intent to eventually convert to home ownership in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006(6). According to that rule, the applicant shall have no present plan to convert the development to any use other than the use as affordable residential rental property. After reviewing these NOPSEs, but before issuing revised NOPSE scores, Florida Housing determined that it was inappropriate to apply subsequent credit underwriting requirements during the scoring of these applications, and therefore, disagreed with the allegations of the NOPSEs on those grounds. Accordingly, Florida Housing's scoring summaries for Riverside and Provincetown issued, after receipt of the NOPSEs, raised no issues concerning financial feasibility, and it was not placed at issue in this proceeding. Following the filing of NOPSEs, Florida Housing released NOPSE scores for all applicants, including Riverside and Provincetown. The NOPSE scores are reflected on a NOPSE Scoring Summary dated June 9, 2003. For both Provincetown and Riverside, the NOPSE Scoring Summary contained the following statement regarding alleged threshold failure, identifying two separate reasons for the alleged threshold failure: The proposed Development does not satisfy the minimum Development requirements stated in Rule 67-21.006, F.A.C. The Development is not a multifamily residential rental property comprised of buildings or structures each containing four or more dwelling units. Further, the Applicant has a present plan to convert the Development to a use other than as an affordable residential rental property. The first threshold failure noted in the preceding paragraph relates to Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006(2), which requires that there be four or more residential units per building for projects financed with MMRB. A subsequent cure regarding the design of the proposed developments has resolved this issue, and Florida Housing no longer contends that these applications, as cured, exhibit a threshold failure related to the number of residential units per building. The second threshold failure noted in the NOPSE Scoring Summary and quoted in paragraph 30 above, relates to Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006(6), which requires that applicants "shall have no present plan to convert the Development to any use other than the use as affordable residential rental property." In response to the NOPSE Scoring Summaries, both Provincetown and Riverside submitted cures to their respective applications. In the cures, Provincetown and Riverside presented their explanations of how they believed their applications, as submitted, demonstrated a 50-year affordability period commitment and included these applicants’ contentions that they had no present plan to convert the developments to a use other than affordable residential rental property. For Provincetown, an issue had also been raised by a NOPSE concerning whether the Provincetown application was entitled to certain "tie-breaker" points for the distance from the proposed development to a public transportation stop. The points awardable to Provincetown for tie-breaker purposes are not in dispute, and Provincetown, if its application is otherwise deemed to meet threshold requirements, would be entitled to 5.0 of a possible 7.5 tie-breaker points. If Riverside's application were deemed to meet threshold requirements and if the 5 points for the affordability period commitment were restored, Riverside would have been within the funding range for applicants within the 2003 Universal Application cycle at the time the Board took final action on the ranking of applications on October 9, 2003. If Provincetown's application were deemed to meet threshold requirements and if the five points for the affordability period commitment were restored, Provincetown would have been within the funding range for applicants within the 2003 Universal Application cycle at the time the Board took final action on the ranking of applications on October 9, 2003. The Sciarrino Letter and Cures After reviewing the NOPSEs filed against the Provincetown and Riverside applications, Florida Housing received a letter dated June 2, 2003 (Sciarrino letter or letter), from Michael Sciarrino, president of the CED Companies, addressed to Orlando Cabrera, executive director of Florida Housing, with a copy to Kerey Carpenter, deputy development officer of Florida Housing. Michael Sciarrino is a manager of the sole general partner (CED Capital Holdings 2003 Y, LLC., a Florida limited liability company) of Provincetown. Mr. Sciarrino is also a Class B limited partner of the sole member of the general partner (CED Capital Holdings XVI, LTD., a Florida limited partnership). Michael Sciarrino is a manager of the sole general partner (CED Capital Holdings 2003 K, LLC., a Florida limited liability company) of Riverside. Mr. Sciarrino is also a Class B limited partner of the sole member of the general partner (CED Capital Holdings 2003 XVI, LTD., a Florida limited partnership). As manager of the sole general partner of Provincetown and Riverside, Mr. Sciarrino had supervisory authority and editorial control over the processing and preparation of the Provincetown and Riverside applications. The Sciarrino letter was drafted, in part, to respond to the allegations of the NOPSEs filed against Provincetown and Riverside applications and specifically addressed those issues pertaining to Provincetown and Riverside applications. Also, while the letter does not mention Petitioners by name, the description and location of the properties, as detailed in the letter, clearly refer to these applicants. The Sciarrino letter evinces a present plan on the part of Petitioners to convert the proposed developments to a use other than that of affordable residential rental housing. First, the letter describes in detail the economic motivations for the subsequent sale of the units of the proposed development within the 50-year extended affordability period stating that the "residual value potential" of such an arrangement "is the single biggest economic reason for our desire to develop these communities." Next, the letter describes in detail the means by which Petitioners would be relieved of the commitment to a 50-year affordability period as stated in their applications, that is, by seeking a waiver from Board after the 15-year period of tax credit recapture exposure had expired. Third, the letter plainly states that Petitioners had intended to request such relief from the 50-year affordability period in the future. Petitioners' present plan to convert the proposed developments for sale to homeowners during the 50-year extended affordability period is further evident by the fact that the concept of such a conversion existed prior to and at the time the applications were filed. Moreover, the Provincetown and Riverside developments were specially selected to test the concept. On or about June 19, 2003, Petitioners filed cures with Florida Housing addressing the issues raised in the NOPSEs. While the cures presented argument in favor of their respective applications and reiterated Petitioners' commitment to the 50-year extended affordability period for each proposed development, they did not deny that it was their intention to seek relief from this period in the future. Following review of the Sciarrino letter and the cures submitted by Petitioners, Florida Housing rejected both the Provincetown and Riverside applications for failing to meet the mandatory development requirement set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-21.006(6). The applications also had five points deducted from their scores on the grounds that, under the circumstances, their commitment to an affordability period could not be determined.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order that upholds the scoring of the applications of Riverside Village Partners, LTD., and Provincetown Village Partners, LTD.; that rejects the applications of Riverside Village Partners, LTD., and Provincetown Village Partners, LTD.; and that denies the relief requested in the Petitions. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez & Cole, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Fifth Floor Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 Orlando J. Cabrera, Executive Director Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wellington H. Meffert, II, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by refusing to rent her an apartment because she is legally blind and relies upon a service dog to ambulate independently.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Lourdes Guzman (“Guzman”) is legally blind and relies upon a service dog (also referred to as a guide dog or “seeing eye” dog) to ambulate independently. Respondent Charles Harris (“Harris”) owns an eight-unit apartment building (the “Property”) located in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Harris, who is retired, holds the Property for investment purposes and lives on the rental income it generates. In or around April of 2002, Harris placed an advertisement in the newspaper seeking a tenant for one his rental units. Guzman saw this ad, was interested, and made an appointment to see the Property. A short time later, Guzman and her live-in boyfriend José Robert (“Robert”) met Harris and Paul Karolyi (“Karolyi”) late one afternoon at the Property. (Karolyi is a tenant of Harris’s who helps out at the Property; Guzman and Robert viewed him as the “building manager,” which was apparently a reasonable perception.) During their conversation, the prospective renters mentioned that they owned a dog. Upon hearing this, Harris explained that he had just finished renovating the advertised unit because the previous tenant’s dog had destroyed the rug and caused other damage to the premises. Thus, Harris told Guzman and Robert, he was not interested in renting this unit to someone with a dog. Robert then informed Harris that: (a) Guzman’s sight was impaired; (b) the dog in question was a service dog; and (c) Harris was legally obligated to let Guzman bring the dog into the unit, should she become Harris’s tenant, as a reasonable accommodation of her handicap. Once he understood the situation, Harris acknowledged that a service dog was different and stated that he would not refuse to rent the unit to someone with a service dog. Accordingly, Harris gave Guzman and Robert a rental application, which Guzman later completed and returned to Harris. After receiving Guzman’s application, Harris checked her references and discovered that Guzman’s two most recent landlords considered her to be a poor tenant. While Guzman disputes the veracity of some of the information that was provided to Harris, at hearing she admitted that much of what he learned was true. The following rental history is based on Guzman’s admissions. Town & Country Apartments. From October 2001 until January 24, 2002, Guzman lived at the Town & Country Apartments in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Her landlord was T & C Associates, Ltd. (“T & C”). At least six times during this 16-month period, Guzman failed to timely pay her rent and was required to pay a late fee. She also received at least five statutory “three-day notices” warning that her failure to pay the overdue monthly rent within 72 hours would trigger an eviction proceeding.1 T & C sued to evict Guzman after she failed to pay the rent due for December 2001. Consequently, when Guzman vacated the Town & Country Apartments on January 24, 2002, she did so pursuant to a writ of possession. Guzman claims that she chose to be evicted as an expedient means of breaking her lease with T & C. The Sahara. After being evicted from the Town & Country Apartments, Guzman moved into a unit at the “Sahara”—— which Guzman described at hearing as a “motel”——pursuant to a short-term lease. Guzman’s landlord at the Sahara was Allen L. Kaul (“Kaul”). Guzman lived at the Sahara for about two months.2 Guzman had some sort of dispute with Kaul, and when she moved out of the Sahara she took the keys to the unit she was vacating and the remote control device that opened a gate to the premises; these items were never returned to Kaul. These facts convinced Harris that Guzman was not an acceptable risk. He notified Guzman that he would not rent to her due to her “poor credit history.” Ultimate Factual Determinations Harris rejected Guzman’s rental application, not because of her handicap or service dog, but because he discovered, through a reasonable process of checking references, that Guzman had recently been evicted from one apartment and vacated another under suspicious (or at least questionable) circumstances, taking with her some personal property of the landlord’s that she never returned. There is no credible, competent evidence that Harris rented his apartments to non-handicapped persons having rental histories similar to Guzman’s. Nor does the evidence support a finding that Harris invoked Guzman’s negative rental history (the material aspects of which were undisputed) as a pretext for discrimination. In short, Harris did not discriminate unlawfully against Guzman; rather, he rejected her rental application for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Guzman’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2003.
The Issue Whether, on the basis of her handicap, Respondent discriminated against Petitioner as alleged in Petitioner’s Housing Discrimination Complaint, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“FFHA”).
Findings Of Fact HABC is a PHA that administers vouchers used in Brevard County, Florida, as part of the HCV Program. Petitioner, Karenlee Krason, began receiving an HCV Program voucher ("voucher") in 2009. In 2019, she rented a two-bedroom house at 407 Ward Road Southwest, Melbourne, Florida, 32980 ("Ward Unit"). HABC granted a reasonable accommodation to Petitioner by approving a second bedroom for her oxygen equipment. On July 30, 2019, Petitioner's landlord notified her in writing that her lease would not be renewed for the Ward Unit. Ms. Alysha Connor, a Section 8 Technician at the HABC, scheduled a relocation appointment on October 9, 2019, to assess Petitioner's plan for finding new housing. HABC issued Petitioner a voucher authorizing her to find new housing within 60 days. HABC is not responsible for finding suitable housing for voucher recipients. However, HABC repeatedly attempted to assist Petitioner in finding a new place to reside. Petitioner notified HABC that she found a place to rent at Las Palmas Apartments, located at 1915 Agora Circle, Unit 101, Palm Bay, Florida 32909 (“Agora Circle Unit"). In an e-mail dated November 5, 2019, Petitioner requested that her voucher include reimbursement for expenses relating to her certified service animal. A Request for Tenancy Approval was submitted for the Agora Circle Unit for a potential move-in date of December 1, 2019. All rental units must meet minimum standards of health and safety and pass a Housing Quality Standard (“HQS”) inspection, as determined by HABC in cooperation with HUD. The Agora Circle Unit failed an inspection conducted by HABC on November 18, 2019. HABC identified the conditions/items needing to be addressed in order to pass inspection. In the meantime, HABC obtained an extension on Petitioner's Ward Unit lease with her landlord. The lease would not expire until December 31, 2019. An additional inspection of the Agora Circle Unit was performed on November 27, 2019, at which time the Agora Circle Unit passed HABC's re- inspection. However, Petitioner communicated to HABC that she no longer wanted to rent the Agora Circle Unit. Petitioner now expressed a desire to rent a unit at 409 Mercury Avenue Southeast, Unit 103, Palm Bay, Florida ("Mercury Unit"). The Mercury Unit passed HABC's inspection on December 11, 2019. However, issues arose with Petitioner refusing to submit an application for her daughter's background check. HABC had offered to pay the required application fee, but the landlord revoked Petitioner's application approval because she failed to comply with the landlord's request for the background check. By this time, Petitioner's lease extension for the Ward Unit had expired, as of December 31, 2019. However, Petitioner was still residing in the unit. On January 9, 2020, HABC attempted to obtain another extension on Petitioner's lease, but the landlord refused the request. Nonetheless Petitioner continued to live in the Ward Unit as she searched for alternative housing. On February 3, 2020, Petitioner's realtor, Bruce Reilly, contacted HABC regarding a unit located at 1642 Lizette Street Southeast, Palm Bay, Florida ("Lizette Unit"). Mr. Reilly inquired whether Petitioner could afford the unit. HABC provided Mr. Reilly its calculations on what Petitioner could qualify for. There were no further communications from Mr. Reilly. During this time, Petitioner's landlord at the Ward Unit provided her with notice to vacate the unit by February 29, 2020. Furthermore, the landlord communicated to HABC that he would no longer accept rent from HABC for the following month. Two days before her deadline to vacate the Ward Unit, Petitioner sent an email to HABC advising that she had located a unit at 3025 Thrush Drive, Unit 101, Melbourne, Florida (''Thrush Unit"). Petitioner advised HABC that the property needed to be inspected the following day. The Request for Tenancy Approval ('"RFTA") packet submitted by Petitioner for the Thrush Unit was incomplete. Although HABC was closed for business on Friday, February 28, 2020, HABC made arrangements for one of its employees to inspect the Thrush Unit that day. In addition, HABC's CEO, Michael Bean, accelerated the process to allow Petitioner to relocate to the Thrush Unit immediately so she would not become homeless. Later that day, Petitioner notified HABC that the Thrush Unit had been rented to another individual. Throughout the relocation process, Petitioner was granted numerous extensions on her voucher. At the end of each year, HABC conducts a mandatory review of the financial information provided by Section 8 voucher recipients through the Enterprise Income Verification (“EIV”) system. EIV provides a comprehensive online system for the determination and verification of various resident information and income that PHAs use to determine rental subsidies. On or about January 2020, EIV reported that Petitioner's daughter was working at Cumberland Farms. Petitioner had failed to disclose this fact. Upon contacting Petitioner to discuss this omission, Petitioner continued to assert that her daughter was not employed. HABC proceeded to investigate this matter further. Throughout its investigation, HABC retrieved employment records from Cumberland Farms. This documentation confirmed that Petitioner’s daughter indeed worked at Cumberland Farms. Moreover, Florida Power and Light billing records disclosed that Petitioner’s daughter no longer resided at the residence occupied by Petitioner. In light of the above revelations, HABC began the process of terminating Petitioner's voucher because she had violated HABC's policies and regulations. Specifically, Petitioner violated HABC’s policy by failing to disclose additional household income and by failing to disclose that her daughter was no longer living at the Ward Unit. On February 3, 2020, HABC emailed Petitioner, outlining its findings, and notifying her that HABC would be terminating her voucher effective March 31, 2020. HABC informed her she had the option to request a hearing before termination. Petitioner elected to have an informal hearing to contest her termination from the program. The informal hearing was held on February 14, 2020. Petitioner appeared by telephone. At the hearing, Petitioner was combative and refused to answer questions posed by Hearing Officer G. Phillip J. Zies. She abruptly ended the telephone call before the conclusion of the hearing. At the hearing, HABC recommended the Hearing Officer not terminate Petitioner's voucher. On the same day as the hearing, the Hearing Officer decided to make Petitioner's status "conditionally eligible" subject to her making arrangements with HABC to stay in the HCV Program within seven (7) days of the hearing. On February 19, 2020, HABC reached out to Petitioner via email providing a list of documents she needed to complete, including: A Retroactive Payment Plan; Nicole Krason’s tax returns from 2017, 2018, and 2019 tax years; Copies of updated driver's licenses from Petitioner and Nicole Krason; and An Updated Lease Agreement from Nicole Krason. As of October 9, 2020, the date of Ms. Disco’s affidavit, Petitioner has failed to provide any of the documents requested above. Notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure to comply with HABC's documentation requests, HABC has extended Petitioner's voucher until December 31, 2020. Petitioner’s voucher originally expired on November 30, 2019, but has been extended through December 31, 2020. During the period of the extension, Petitioner was required to complete her annual recertification in order to remain eligible under the HCV Program. HUD mandates HABC must conduct an annual re-examination of a participant's eligibility for the HCV Program. The purpose of the annual re-examination is to establish that every family's eligibility for assistance is based on their income, as determined in accordance with program rules. During the annual recertification process, Petitioner requested that her daughter be deemed a “live-in aid” so that her daughter's income would not count towards the household income. However, Petitioner declined to continue with this process because she wanted the voucher to transfer to her daughter. According to HUD guidelines, Petitioner's daughter would not qualify as a live-in aide, eligible for rental assistance or occupancy in a subsidized unit, because her daughter had lived as an "other household adult" between 2008 and 2019. HABC's administrative plan does not allow prior, or current, household adults to be live-in aides. Participants must provide information requested by HABC because changes in income or family composition can affect the amount of assistance a tenant is eligible to receive. Those who fail to cooperate in providing such information can have their voucher terminated. On or about July 30, 2020, HABC sent Petitioner an annual recertification packet in order for her to complete the annual recertification process. This packet needed to be completed by September 1, 2020. On September 17, 2020, HABC sent a letter to Petitioner advising her she had not completed the annual recertification packet and that she would need to complete the packet in order to remain eligible under the HCV Program. On September 23, 2020, Petitioner returned the packet, but it was incomplete. Specifically, Petitioner did not provide proper documentation for her out-of-pocket medical expenses. HABC requested the proper documentation be submitted to complete the annual recertification process. Petitioner did provide HABC with a letter from Health First Alliance Group confirming her continued need for medical equipment. Independent of the proceedings before FCHR, HUD also investigated the handling of Petitioner's case by HABC. The scope of HUD’s investigation was to determine whether HABC discriminated against Petitioner in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and its implementing regulations found at 24 CFR, Part 8. Section 504 provides that no otherwise qualified individual with disabilities shall, solely on the basis of disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity that receives federal financial assistance from HUD. HUD’s investigation led to a finding that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that an unlawful discriminatory housing practice had occurred.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) LaShawnda K. Jackson, Esquire Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A. Suite 1400 300 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) KarenLee Krason c/o General Delivery Melbourne, Florida 32901 (eServed) Francis Sheppard, Esquire Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A. Suite 1400 300 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Michael D. Begey, Esquire Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A. Suite 1400 300 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether the actions of Florida Housing concerning the review and scoring of the responses to Request for Applications 2019-102 (“RFA”), titled “Community Development Block Grant--Disaster Recovery (‘CDBG- DR’) to be Used in Conjunction with Tax-Exempt MMRB and Non- Competitive Housing Credits in Counties Deemed Hurricane Recovery Priorities,” were contrary to the agency’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the RFA specifications.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: THE PARTIES Berkeley is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $6,500,000 in CDBG Development funding; $2,500,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; and $844,699 in non-competitive housing credits. The Berkeley Application, assigned number 2020-017D, was preliminarily deemed ineligible for consideration for funding. Brisas is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $5,000,000 in CDBG Development funding and $1,674,839 in non-competitive housing credits. The Brisas Application, assigned number 2020-056D, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Northside is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $7,300,000 in CDBG Development funding; $1,588,014 in non-competitive housing credits; and $24,000,000 in Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bonds (“MMRB”). The Northside Application, assigned number 2020-024D, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Beacon Place is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $6,925,500 in CDBG Development funding; $4,320,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; $1,764,203 in non-competitive housing credits; and $24,000,000 in MMRB. The Beacon Place Application, assigned number 2020-045DB, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Bella Vista is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $8,000,000 in CDBG Development funding; $1,450,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; $609,629 in non-competitive housing credits; and $13,000,000 in MMRB. The Bella Vista Application, assigned number 2020-038DB, was preliminarily deemed eligible but was not selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Solaris is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $3,420,000 in CDBG Development funding; $4,500,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; and $937,232 in non-competitive housing credits. The Solaris Application, assigned number 2020-039D, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Metro Grande is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $3,175,000 in CDBG Development funding and $1,041,930 in non-competitive housing credits. The Metro Grande Application, assigned number 2020-041D, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Sierra Bay is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $3,650,000 in CDBG Development funding; $3,300,000 in CDBG Land Acquisition funding; $1,074,173 in non-competitive housing credits; and $16,000,000 in MMRB. The Sierra Bay Application, assigned number 2020-040DB, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Bembridge is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $7,800,000 in CDBG Development funding; $564,122 in non-competitive housing credits; and $10,100,000 in MMRB. The Bembridge Application, assigned number 2020-046DB, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. East Pointe is an applicant in the RFA that requested an allocation of $4,680,000 in CDBG Development funding and $690,979 in non-competitive housing credits. The East Pointe Application, assigned number 2020-053D, was deemed eligible and preliminarily selected for funding under the terms of the RFA. Florida Housing is a public corporation organized pursuant to Chapter 420, Part V, Florida Statutes, and, for purposes of these consolidated cases, is an agency of the State of Florida. Florida Housing is tasked with distributing a portion of the CDBG-DR funding allocated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), pursuant to the State of Florida Action Plan for Disaster Recovery. THE COMPETITIVE APPLICATION PROCESS AND RFA 2019-102 Florida Housing is authorized to allocate low-income housing tax credits and other named funding by section 420.507(48). Florida Housing has adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60 to govern the competitive solicitation process. Rule 67-60.009(1) provides that parties wishing to protest any aspect of a Florida Housing competitive solicitation must do so pursuant to section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. Funding is made available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of a request for applications. Rule 67-60.009(4) provides that a request for application is considered a “request for proposal” for purposes of section 120.57(3)(f). The RFA was issued on July 30, 2019, with responses due on August 27, 2019. The RFA was modified four times and the application deadline was extended to September 24, 2019. No challenges were made to the terms and specifications of the RFA. Section Five of the RFA included a list of 48 “eligibility items” that an applicant was required to satisfy to be eligible for funding and considered for funding selection. Applications that met the eligibility standards would then be awarded points for satisfying RFA criteria, with the highest scoring applications being selected for funding. No total point items are in dispute. Proximity Point items are contested as to the Beacon Place, East Pointe, and Bembridge Applications. Applicants could select whether they would be evaluated as Priority I, II, or III applications. All of the parties to these consolidated cases identified themselves as Priority I applications. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award an estimated $76,000,000 of CDBG Land Acquisition Program funding to areas impacted by Hurricane Irma, and in areas that experienced a population influx because of migration from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands due to Hurricane Irma. Florida Housing will award up to $66,000,000 for CDBG Development funding and an additional $10,000,000 for CDBG Land Acquisition Program funding. Applicants were not required to request CDBG Land Acquisition Program funding. Forty-four applications were submitted in response to the RFA. A Review Committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (the “Board”). The Review Committee found 34 applications eligible for funding. The Review Committee found 8 applications ineligible, including that of Berkeley. Two applications were withdrawn. The Review Committee developed charts listing its eligibility and funding recommendations to be presented to the Board. On December 13, 2019, the Board met and accepted the recommendations of the Review Committee. The Board preliminarily awarded funding to 12 applications, including those of Sierra Bay, Solaris, Metro Grande, East Pointe, and Bembridge. Petitioners Berkeley, Brisas, Northside, Beacon Place, and Bella Vista timely filed Notices of Protest and Petitions for Formal Administrative Hearing. THE BERKELEY APPLICATION As an eligibility item, the RFA required applicants to identify an Authorized Principal Representative. According to the RFA, the Authorized Principal Representative: must be a natural person Principal of the Applicant listed on the Principal Disclosure Form; must have signature authority to bind the Applicant entity; (c) must sign the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form submitted in this Application; (d) must sign the Site Control Certification form submitted in this Application; and (e) if funded, will be the recipient of all future documentation that requires a signature. As an eligibility item, the RFA required applicants to submit an Applicant Certification and Acknowledgment form executed by the Authorized Principal Representative. As an eligibility item, the RFA also required applicants to submit a Site Control Certification form executed by the Authorized Principal Representative. In section 3.e.(1) of Exhibit A of the RFA, the applicant is directed to enter the contact information of its Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley entered the name, organization, and contact information for Jennie D. Lagmay as its Authorized Principal Representative, in response to section 3.e.(1). The name of Jennie D. Lagmay was not disclosed on the Principal Disclosure form required by the RFA. The Applicant Certification and Acknowledgment form and the Site Control Certification form were executed by Jonathan L. Wolf, not Jennie D. Lagmay, the designated Authorized Principal Representative. On both forms, Mr. Wolf is identified as “Manager of Berkeley Landing GP, LLC; General Partner of Berkeley Landing, Ltd.” Jonathan L. Wolf is listed on the Principal Disclosure Form. Aside from section 3.e.(1) of Exhibit A, Jennie D. Lagmay’s name is not found in the Berkeley Application. Florida Housing determined that the Berkeley Application was ineligible for an award of funding for three reasons: 1) the Authorized Principal Representative listed was not disclosed on the Principal Disclosure form; 2) the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form was not signed by the Authorized Principal Representative; and 3) the Site Control Certification was not signed by the Authorized Principal Representative. Two other applications for this RFA were found ineligible for identical reasons: Thornton Place, Application No. 2020-020D; and Berkshire Square, Application No. 2020-034D. In these, as in the Berkeley Application, Jennie D. Lagmay was named as the Authorized Principal Representative in section 3.e.(1) of Exhibit A, but Jonathan L. Wolf executed the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form and the Site Control Certification form as the Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley concedes it made an error in placing the name of Ms. Lagmay in section 3.e.(1), but argues that this constituted a minor irregularity that should have been waived by Florida Housing. Berkeley contends that the entirety of its Application makes plain that Jonathan D. Wolf is in fact its Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley argues that Florida Housing should waive the minor irregularity and determine that the Berkeley Application is eligible for funding. Berkeley points out that only two members of the Review Committee, Rachel Grice and Heather Strickland, scored the portions of the Berkeley Application that led to the ineligibility recommendation. Ms. Grice determined that the Authorized Principal Representative listed in the Berkeley Application was not disclosed on the Principal Disclosure form. Ms. Strickland determined that neither the Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form nor the Site Control Certification form was executed by the Authorized Principal Representative. Neither Ms. Grice nor Ms. Strickland conducted a minor irregularity analysis for the Berkeley Application. Rule 67-60.008, titled “Right to Waive Minor Irregularities,” provides as follows: Minor irregularities are those irregularities in an Application, such as computation, typographical, or other errors, that do not result in the omission of any material information; do not create any uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the competitive solicitation have been met; do not provide a competitive advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other Applicants; and do not adversely impact the interests of the Corporation or the public. Minor irregularities may be waived or corrected by the Corporation. Berkeley contends that because a minor irregularity analysis was not conducted by the Review Committee members, the Board was deprived of a necessary explanation for the preliminary recommendations of Ms. Grice and Ms. Strickland. Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s Director of Multifamily Allocations, agreed that the Review Committee members did not perform a minor irregularity analysis but testified that none was required given the nature of the discrepancy in the Berkeley Application. Ms. Button performed a minor irregularity analysis as Florida Housing’s corporate representative in this proceeding and concluded that the error could not be waived or corrected without providing an unfair competitive advantage to Berkeley. Ms. Button testified that the fact that the person identified as the Authorized Principal Representative was not the same person who signed the certification forms could not be considered a minor irregularity because the application demonstrated conflicting and contradictory information, creating uncertainty as to the applicant’s intentions. She stated that Florida Housing is required to limit its inquiry to the four corners of the application. Ms. Button stated that Florida Housing cannot take it upon itself to decide what the applicant intended when the information provided in the application is contradictory. Berkeley points to the fact that the Application Certification and Acknowledgement form, signed by Mr. Wolf, includes the following language: “The undersigned is authorized to bind the Applicant entity to this certification and warranty of truthfulness and completeness of the Application.” Berkeley argues that it should have been clear to Florida Housing that Mr. Wolf is the person authorized to bind the company and that the inclusion of Ms. Lagmay’s name in section 3.e.(1) was in the nature of a typographical error. Florida Housing points out that the Application Certification and Acknowledgement form also includes the following language below the signature line: “NOTE: Provide this form as Attachment 1 to the RFA. The Applicant Certification and Acknowledgement form must be signed by the Authorized Principal Representative stated in Exhibit A.” Florida Housing notes that the Site Control Certification form includes similar language: “This form must be signed by the Authorized Principal Representative stated in Exhibit A.” Berkeley contends that Florida Housing was well aware that Jonathan L. Wolf has been the named Authorized Principal Representative on multiple applications filed under the umbrella of Wendover Housing Partners, the general developer behind Berkeley. In at least one of those previous applications, Ms. Lagmay, an employee of Wendover Housing Partners, was identified as the “contact person.” Ms. Button responded that Review Committee members are specifically prohibited from using personal knowledge of a general development entity in a specific application submitted by a single purpose entity. She further testified that if Florida Housing employees were to use their personal knowledge of an experienced developer to waive errors in a specific application, applicants who had not previously submitted applications would be at a competitive disadvantage. Ms. Button testified that Berkeley was established as a single purpose entity in accordance with the RFA’s requirements. She testified that she has known general developers to structure these single purpose entities in different ways, depending on the requirements of an RFA. An applicant might designate an employee, such as Ms. Lagmay, as a principal to give her experience as a developer. Again, Ms. Button emphasized that Florida Housing is not in a position to decide what the applicant “really meant” when there is a discrepancy in the information provided. Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing has determined in prior RFAs that an applicant was ineligible because the person identified as the Authorized Principal Representative was not the same person who signed the certification forms. Florida Housing rightly concluded that there are only two possible ways to interpret the Berkeley Application. If Ms. Lagmay was the Authorized Principal Representative, then the application is nonresponsive because she was not listed on the Principal Disclosure form and she did not sign the required certification forms. If Ms. Lagmay was not the Authorized Principal Representative, the application is nonresponsive because no Authorized Principal Representative was identified. There is no way to tell from the four corners of the application which of these alternatives is the correct one. Florida Housing cannot step in and cure the defect in the application by making its own educated guess as to the intended identity of the Authorized Principal Representative. Berkeley has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of ineligibility was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA, or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. THE SIERRA BAY APPLICATION The parties stipulated to the facts regarding the Sierra Bay Application, which are incorporated into this Recommended Order. Florida Housing deemed the Sierra Bay Application eligible and, pursuant to the terms of the RFA, preliminarily selected Sierra Bay for funding. In order to demonstrate site control, the RFA required execution of the Site Control Certification form. Site control documentation had to be included in the application. One way to demonstrate site control was to include an “eligible contract.” The RFA required that certain conditions be met in order to be considered an “eligible contract.” One of those requirements was that the contract “must specifically state that the buyer’s remedy for default on the part of the seller includes or is specific performance.” Sierra Bay acknowledged that the site control documentation included within its application did not meet the “eligible contract” requirement because it failed to include language regarding specific performance as a remedy for the seller’s default. Sierra Bay agreed that the omission of the specific performance language was not a minor irregularity and that Sierra Bay’s Application is ineligible for funding under the terms of the RFA. THE SOLARIS APPLICATION The RFA specified that a Local Government, Public Housing Authority, Land Authority, or Community Land Trust must hold 100 percent ownership in the land of any qualifying Priority I application. The RFA defined “Community Land Trust” as: A 501(c)(3) which acquires or develops parcels of land for the primary purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing in perpetuity through conveyance of the structural improvement subject to a long term ground lease which retains a preemptive option to purchase any such structural improvement at a price determined by a formula designed to ensure the improvement remains affordable in perpetuity. The RFA provided that if a Community Land Trust is the Land Owner, the Community Land Trust must provide the following documentation as Attachment 2 to the application to demonstrate that it qualifies as a Community Land Trust: The Community Land Trust must provide its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws demonstrating it has existed since June 28, 2018 or earlier and that a purpose of the Community Land Trust is to provide or preserve affordable housing; and The Community Land Trust must provide a list that meets one of the following criteria to demonstrate experience of the Community Land Trust with owning property: (i) at least two parcels of land that the Community Land Trust currently owns; or (ii) one parcel of land that the Community Land Trust owns, consisting of a number of units that equals or exceeds at least 25 percent of the units in the proposed Development. The RFA required that the proposed development must be affordable in perpetuity. For purposes of the RFA, “perpetuity” means 99 years or more. Solaris identified Residential Options of Florida, Inc. (“Residential Options”), as the Community Land Trust owner in its Priority 1 Application. Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application included the Articles of Incorporation of Residential Options (“Original Articles”), filed with the Division of Corporations on July 30, 2014. The purpose of the corporation as stated in the Original Articles was as follows: Said corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, and scientific purposes, including for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or the corresponding section of any future federal tax code. Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application also included Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Residential Options (“Amended Articles”), filed with the Division of Corporations on September 20, 2019. The Amended Articles retained the boilerplate statement of purpose of the Original Articles, but added the following paragraph: This shall include the purpose of empowering individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities to successfully obtain and maintain affordable and inclusive housing of their choice and to provide affordable housing and preserve the affordability of housing for low- income or moderate income people, including people with disabilities, in perpetuity. Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application also included the Articles of Incorporation of ROOF Housing Trust, Inc. (“ROOF Housing Trust”) filed with the Division of Corporations on July 17, 2017. The purpose of the corporation as stated in these Articles includes the following: “to acquire land to be held in perpetuity for the primary purpose of providing affordable housing for people with developmental disabilities.” Finally, Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application included Articles of Merger, which were filed with the Division of Corporations on September 10, 2019. The Articles of Merger indicated that the Residential Options and ROOF Housing Trust had merged, with Residential Options standing as the surviving corporation. The petitioners contesting the Solaris Application raise several issues. The first issue is whether the RFA requires only that the entity named as the Community Land Trust have been in existence in some form as of June 28, 2018, or whether the entity had to exist as a Community Land Trust as of that date. The Community Land Trust named in the Solaris Application, Residential Options, existed prior to June 28, 2018, but not as a Community Land Trust. The second issue is whether the June 28, 2018, date applies only to the existence of the Community Land Trust or whether the RFA requires that the Community Land Trust have been in existence and have had a stated purpose to provide or preserve affordable housing and have met the ownership experience criteria as of June 28, 2018. It is questionable whether Solaris would be eligible for funding if the RFA required the latter, because Residential Options did not have a stated purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing prior to its merger with ROOF Housing Trust, at least no such purpose as could be gleaned from the four corners of the Solaris Application. The third issue is whether the RFA’s definition of “Community Land Trust” requires the qualifying entity to have existing ground leases at the time of the application. Florida Housing and Solaris concede that Residential Options did not have operative ground leases at the time Solaris submitted its application. Hurricane Irma struck Puerto Rico and Florida in September 2017. Ms. Button testified that in creating this RFA, Florida Housing wanted to weed out opportunistic community land trusts created only for the purpose of obtaining this funding. Florida Housing initially proposed an RFA requirement that the community land trust have existed as of September 2017, but discovered through workshops with interested parties that the early date would exclude legitimate Community Land Trusts that had been established in response to the storm. Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing’s intent was to make this RFA as inclusive as practicable. Florida Housing therefore selected June 28, 2018, as a date that would exclude opportunists without penalizing the genuine responders to the natural disaster. Both Florida Housing and Solaris point to the text of the RFA requirement to demonstrate that the date of June 28, 2018, should be read to apply only to whether the Community Land Trust existed as of that date. Solaris argues that the RFA states three independent criteria for eligibility: 1) that the Community Land Trust “has existed since June 28, 2018 or earlier”; 2) that a purpose of the Community Land Trust is1 to provide or preserve affordable housing; and 3) the Community Land Trust must demonstrate its property ownership experience, one means of doing which is to name at least two parcels of land that the Community Land Trust currently owns. Florida Housing argues that Solaris met the first criterion by providing its Articles of Incorporation showing it has existed since July 30, 2014. Florida Housing argues that Solaris met the second criterion by providing its Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, which stated the purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing in perpetuity. Florida Housing argues that Solaris met the third criterion by identifying two properties in Immokalee, Independence Place, and Liberty Place as parcels that it currently owns. Florida Housing thus reached the conclusion that Residential Options met the definition of a Community Land Trust in the RFA as of June 28, 2018. Florida Housing argues that, according to the definition in the RFA, a Community Land Trust must be a 501(c)(3) corporation, which Residential Options clearly is. It must acquire or develop parcels of land, which it has done. Finally, it must have the “primary purpose of providing or preserving affordable housing in perpetuity through conveyance of the structural improvement subject to a long term ground lease.” Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing’s interpretation of the RFA’s Community Land Trust definition was that if Residential Options had the primary purpose of providing affordable housing in perpetuity through the use of long term ground leases, the definition has been met even if Residential Options had not actually entered into any ground leases at the 1 Both Florida Housing and Solaris emphasize that the second criterion is stated in the present tense, which suggests that it does not intend a backward look to June 28, 2018. time it submitted its application. This is not the only way to read the RFA’s definition, but it is not an unreasonable reading, particularly in light of Florida Housing’s stated intent to make the RFA as inclusive as possible in terms of the participation of legitimate community land trusts. Sheryl Soukup, the Executive Director of Residential Options, testified via deposition. Ms. Soukup testified that in 2017, Residential Options realized there was a need for housing for people with disabilities and decided to become a nonprofit housing developer of properties that would be kept affordable in perpetuity. To that end, ROOF Housing Trust was created to act as the community land trust for the properties developed by Residential Options. The two companies had identical Boards of Directors and Ms. Soukup served as Executive Director of both entities. In its application to the IRS for 501(c)(3) status, ROOF Housing Trust included the following: The organization does not own any property yet. ROOF Housing Trust intends to own vacant land, single family homes, and multi-family units. Some of the units will be provided as rental units. ROOF Housing Trust will sell some of the houses for homeownership, while retaining the land on which they are located. The land will be leased to homeowners at a nominal fee to make the purchase price affordable, using the community land trust model. Ground leases and warranty deeds not been developed yet [sic], but will be based on the sample documents provided by the Florida Community Land Trust Institute.[2] Ms. Soukup described ROOF Housing Trust as “a vehicle by which Residential Options of Florida could act as a community land trust…. [I]t was always the intention of Residential Options of Florida to develop and put into 2 The ROOF Housing Trust 501(c)(3) application was not a part of the Solaris Application. It was included as an exhibit to Ms. Soukup’s deposition. a community land trust property so that it would remain affordable in perpetuity for use by people of intellectual and development [sic] disabilities.” Residential Options acquired the aforementioned Independence Place and Liberty Place properties but never conveyed ownership to ROOF Housing Trust. Residential Options acted as a de facto community land trust. No ground leases have yet been entered into because the properties are at present rented directly by Residential Options to persons with developmental disabilities. Ms. Soukup testified that at the time ROOF Housing Trust was created, the Board of Residential Options was undecided whether to create a separate entity to act as a community land trust or to incorporate that function into the existing entity. The decision to incorporate ROOF Housing Trust was based on the Board’s intuition that a separate corporation would “allow us the most flexibility in the future.” In any event, Residential Options and ROOF Housing Trust were functionally the same entity. Ms. Soukup testified that plans to merge the two companies emerged from a situation in which Collier County refused to allow Residential Options to convey its two properties to ROOF Housing Trust. The Board that controlled both companies decided that there was no point in maintaining separate legal entities if ROOF Housing Trust could not perform its main function. As noted above, Articles of Merger were filed on September 10, 2019. Northside points to minutes from Residential Options’s Board meetings in August and September 2019, as indicating that the Board itself did not believe that Residential Options was a community land trust prior to the merger with ROOF Housing Trust. Northside contends that the September 2019 merger was initiated and completed mainly because Residential Options had been approached about serving as the Community Land Trust for the applications of Solaris and Sierra Bay in this RFA. Northside points to the “frenzied activity” by Residential Options to create an entity meeting the definition of Community Land Trust in the days just before the September 24, 2019, application deadline. Northside argues that Residential Options is the very kind of opportunistic community land trust that the June 28, 2018, date of creation was intended to weed out. Northside’s argument is not persuasive of itself, but it does point the way to an ultimate finding as to the Solaris Application. Both Florida Housing and Solaris gave great emphasis to Ms. Soukup’s testimony to refute the suggestion that Residential Options acted opportunistically. Ms. Soukup was a credible witness. Her explanation of the process by which Residential Options first created then merged with ROOF Housing Trust dispelled any suggestion that Residential Options was a community land trust created solely to cash in on this RFA. The problem is that Ms. Soukup’s explanation was not before the Review Committee when it evaluated the Solaris Application. The only information about Residential Options that the Review Committee possessed was Attachment 2 of the Solaris Application. The dates of the merger documents and Amended Articles certainly give some credence to the suspicions voiced by Northside. However, the undersigned is less persuaded by the implications as to the intentions of Residential Options than by the contradictions between Florida Housing’s statements of intent and its reading of the RFA in relation to the Solaris Application. The decision to find the Solaris Application eligible for funding founders on the first issue stated above: whether the RFA requires only that the Community Land Trust have been in existence in some form as of June 28, 2018, or whether it had to exist as a Community Land Trust as of that date. Ms. Button testified that the June 28, 2018, date was settled upon as a way of including community land trusts created in the wake of Hurricane Irma, while excluding those created to cash in on this RFA. During cross- examination by counsel for Northside, Ms. Button broadened her statement to say that Florida Housing’s intention was to exclude entities that had not been involved in affordable housing at all prior to June 28, 2018. Nonetheless, the RFA language is limited to Community Land Trusts. The RFA states: “The Community Land Trust must provide its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws demonstrating that it has existed since June 28, 2018 or earlier…” The Solaris Application shows that Residential Options existed prior to June 28, 2018, but not as a Community Land Trust. Residential Options did not become a Community Land Trust until it completed its merger with ROOF Housing Trust and filed the Amended Articles on September 20, 2019. Ms. Button’s statement of intent is accepted as consistent with the plain language of the RFA: the date of June 28, 2018, excludes Community Land Trusts created subsequently. It is inconsistent for Florida Housing to also read the RFA language to say that the qualifying entity need not have existed as a Community Land Trust prior to June 28, 2018. It would be arbitrary for Florida Housing to set a date for the creation of Community Land Trusts then turn around and find that the date does not apply to this particular Community Land Trust. Ms. Soukup’s testimony was that Residential Options and ROOF Housing Trust were effectively a single entity and that Residential Options was in fact operating as a community land trust prior to the September 10, 2019, merger. However, Ms. Soukup’s explanation was not before the Review Committee, which was limited to one means of ascertaining whether an entity was a Community Land Trust prior to June 28, 2018: the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. Residential Options’s Original Articles included no language demonstrating that it was a Community Land Trust prior to the September 10, 2019, merger with ROOF Housing Trust and the filing of the Amended Articles on September 20, 2019.3 As set forth in the discussion of the Berkley Application above, Florida Housing is required to limit its inquiry to the four corners of an application. It was contrary to the provisions of the RFA for Florida Housing to find that Residential Options’s mere existence as a legal entity prior to June 28, 2018, satisfied the requirement that the Community Land Trust must demonstrate that it existed prior to June 28, 2018. Ms. Button’s own testimony demonstrated that Florida Housing intended to exclude Community Land Trusts created after June 28, 2018. ROOF Housing Trust existed as a Community Land Trust in 2017, but ROOF Housing Trust was not the Community Land Trust named in the Solaris Application. Ms. Soukup’s explanation of the circumstances showed that Residential Options was well intentioned in its actions, but her explanation was not a part of the Solaris Application that was before Florida Housing’s Review Committee. THE METRO GRANDE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the Metro Grande Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, the Metro Grande Application was preliminarily selected for funding. Petitioner Brisas contends that the Metro Grande Application should have been found ineligible for failure to include mandatory site control documentation. Metro Grande submitted a Priority I application that was not seeking Land Acquisition Program funding. The site control requirements for such applicants are as follows: 3 This finding also disposes of Solaris’s arguments regarding the legal effect of corporate mergers. The RFA provided one simple way of demonstrating whether an entity was a Community Land Trust as of June 28, 2018. Florida Housing’s Review Committee could not be expected to delve into the complexities of corporate mergers to answer this uncomplicated question. The Local Government, Public Housing Authority, Land Authority, or Community Land Trust must already own the land as the sole grantee and, if funded, the land must be affordable into Perpetuity.[4] Applicants must demonstrate site control as of Application Deadline by providing the properly executed Site Control Certification form (Form Rev. 08-18). Attached to the form must be the following documents: A Deed or Certificate of Title. The deed or certificate of title (in the event the property was acquired through foreclosure) must be recorded in the applicable county and show the Land Owner as the sole Grantee. There are no restrictions on when the land was acquired; and A lease between the Land Owner and the Applicant entity. The lease must have an unexpired term of at least 50 years after the Application Deadline. Metro Grande did not include a deed or certificate of title in its application. In fact, no deed or certificate of title for the Metro Grande site exists. Miami-Dade County owns the Metro Grande site. Miami-Dade County acquired ownership of the Metro Grande site by eminent domain. The eminent domain process culminated in the entry of four Final Judgments for individual parcels which collectively compose the Metro Grande site. The Final Judgments were not attached to Metro Grande’s Application. There was no requirement in the RFA that Metro Grande include these Final Judgments in its application. The Final Judgments were produced during discovery in this proceeding. In its application, Metro Grande included a Land Owner Certification and Acknowledgement Form executed by Maurice L. Kemp, as the Deputy Mayor of Miami-Dade County, stating that the county holds or will hold 100 percent ownership of the land where Metro Grande’s proposed 4 The RFA defined “Perpetuity” as “at least 99 years from the loan closing.” development is located. Additionally, in its application, Metro Grande stated that Miami-Dade County owned the property. The RFA expressly states that Florida Housing “will not review the site control documentation that is submitted with the Site Control Certification form during the scoring process unless there is a reason to believe that the form has been improperly executed, nor will it in any case evaluate the validity or enforceability of any such documentation.” Florida Housing reserves the right to rescind an award to any applicant whose site control documents are shown to be insufficient during the credit underwriting process. Thus, the fact that no deed or certificate of title was included with Metro Grande’s site control documents was not considered by Florida Housing during the scoring process. Ms. Button testified that while this was an error in the application, it should be waived as a minor irregularity. The purpose of the documentation requirements was to demonstrate ownership and control of the applicant’s proposed site. There was no question or ambiguity as to the fact that Miami- Dade County owned the Metro Grande site. Florida Housing was not required to resort to information extraneous to the Metro Grande Application to confirm ownership of the site. The Land Owner Certification and Acknowledgement form, executed by the Deputy Mayor as the Authorized Land Owner Representative, confirmed ownership of the parcels. Metro Grande’s failure to include a deed or certificate of title, therefore, created no confusion as to who owned the property or whether Miami-Dade County had the authority to lease the property to the applicant. There was no evidence presented that the failure to include a deed or certificate of title resulted in the omission of any material information or provided a competitive advantage over other applicants. Brisas contends that the RFA was clear as to the documents that must be included to satisfy the site control requirements. Metro Grande failed to provide those documents or even an explanation why those documents were not provided. Florida Housing ignored the fact that no deed or certificate of title was provided, instead relying on information found elsewhere in the application. It is found that Metro Grande failed to comply with an eligibility item of the RFA, but that Florida Housing was correct to waive that failure as a minor irregularity that provided Metro Grande no competitive advantage, created no uncertainty as to whether the requirements of the RFA were met, and did not adversely affect the interests of Florida Housing or the public. Brisas has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility and selection for funding was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. THE BEACON PLACE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the Beacon Place Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Beacon Place was not preliminarily selected for funding. The RFA provides that an application may earn proximity points based on the distance between its Development Location Point and the selected Transit or Community Service. Proximity points are used to determine whether the Applicant meets the required minimum proximity eligibility requirements and the Proximity Funding Preference. Beacon Place is a Large County Application that is not eligible for the “Public Housing Authority Proximity Point Boost.” As such, the Beacon Place Application was required to achieve a minimum Transit Point score of 2 to be eligible for funding. Beacon Place must also achieve a total Proximity Point score of 10.5 in order to be eligible for funding. Beacon Place must achieve a total Proximity Point score of 12.5 or more in order to receive the RFA’s Proximity Funding Preference. Based on the information in its Application, Beacon Place received a Total Proximity Point score of 18 and was deemed eligible for funding and for the Proximity Point Funding Preference. The Beacon Place Application listed a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop as its Transit Service. Applying the Transit Service Scoring Charts in Exhibit C of the RFA, Florida Housing awarded Beacon Place 6 Proximity Points for its Transit Service. The Beacon Place Application listed a Grocery Store, a Pharmacy, and a Public School in its Community Services Chart in order to obtain Proximity Points for Community Services. Using the Community Services Scoring Charts in Exhibit C of the RFA, Florida Housing awarded Beacon Place 4 Proximity Points for each service listed, for a total of 12 Proximity Points for Community Services. Beacon Place has stipulated, however, that the Public School listed in its application does not meet the definition of “Public School” in the RFA and Beacon Place should not receive the 4 Proximity Points for listing a public school. The RFA defines a “Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop” as: [a] fixed location at which passengers may access public transportation via bus. The Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop must service at least one bus that travels at some point during the route in either a lane or corridor that is exclusively used by buses, and the Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop must service at least one route that has scheduled stops at the Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop at least every 20 minutes during the times of 7am to 9am and also during the times of 4pm to 6pm Monday through Friday, excluding holidays, on a year- round basis. Additionally, it must have been in existence and available for use by the general public as of the Application Deadline. The Beacon Place Application included Metrobus Route 38 (“Route 38”) as a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop. Route 38 has scheduled stops at the location identified in the Beacon Place Application at the following times during the period of 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. Monday through Friday: 7:01, 7:36, 7:56, 8:11, 8:26, 8:41, and 8:56. Brisas and Northside contend that Route 38 does not meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop because there is a gap of more than 20 minutes between the 7:01 a.m. bus and the 7:36 a.m. bus. Applicants are not required to include bus schedules in the application. Florida Housing does not attempt to determine whether an identified stop meets the RFA definitions during the scoring process. During discovery in this litigation, Florida Housing changed its position and now agrees that Route 38 does not satisfy the definition. Nonetheless, the standard of review set forth in section 120.57(3) is applicable to Florida Housing’s initial eligibility determination, not its revised position. All parties stipulated that Route 38 meets the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop as to scheduled stops during the hours of 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. Monday through Friday. If the bus stop listed by Beacon Place does not also meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop as to scheduled stops during the hours of 7 a.m. to 9 a.m., Beacon Place would not be entitled to any Transit Service Proximity Points and would be ineligible for funding. Beacon Place cannot contest the fact that there is a 35 minute gap between the 7:01 and the 7:36 buses. Beacon Place has attempted to salvage its situation by comparing the language used in the RFA definition of a Public Bus Stop with that used in the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop. The RFA defines Public Bus Stop in relevant part as [a] fixed location at which passengers may access one or two routes of public transportation via buses. The Public Bus Stop must service at least one bus route with scheduled stops at least hourly during the times of 7am to 9am and also during the times of 4pm and 6pm Monday through Friday, excluding holidays, on a year round basis…. Florida Housing has interpreted the “hourly” requirement of the Public Bus Stop definition to mean that a bus must stop at least once between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., and at least once between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. Beacon Place suggests that Florida Housing should interpret the “every 20 minutes” requirement for a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop similarly, so that a bus must stop at least once between 7:00 a.m. and 7:20 a.m., once between 7:20 a.m. and 7:40 a.m., and once between 7:40 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. Florida Housing has rejected this interpretation, however, noting that the language in the two definitions is explicitly different. Ms. Button testified that if Florida Housing had intended these two distinct definitions to be interpreted similarly, it could easily have worded them differently. It could have required a Public Bus Stop to have stops “at least every 60 minutes,” rather than “hourly.” It could have required a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop to have “three stops per hour” rather than “every 20 minutes.” Ms. Button observed that the purpose of the Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop definition is to award points for serving the potential residents with frequent and regular stops. The idea was to be sure residents had access to the bus during the hours when most people are going to and from work. Florida Housing’s interpretation of “every 20 minutes” is consonant with the plain language of the phrase and reasonably serves the purpose of the definition. Florida Housing also rejected the idea that the failure of the identified stop to meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop in the RFA should be waived as a minor irregularity. Ms. Button testified that allowing one applicant to get points for a stop that did not meet the definition would give it a competitive advantage over other applicants, including some potential applicants who did not apply because they could not satisfy the terms of the definition. Because the bus stop listed by Beacon Place does not meet the definition of a Public Bus Rapid Transit Stop, Beacon Place is not entitled to any Transit Service Proximity Points and is thus ineligible for funding. Brisas and Northside have demonstrated that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility for Beacon Place was contrary to the specifications of the RFA. Florida Housing’s original recommendation would have been contrary to the terms of the RFA. THE EAST POINTE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the East Pointe Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, East Pointe was preliminarily selected for funding. Bella Vista challenged Florida Housing’s action alleging that the Medical Facility selected by East Pointe did not meet the definition found in the RFA. East Pointe proposed a Development in Lee County, a Medium County according to the terms of the RFA. Applicants from Medium Counties are not required to attain a minimum number of Transit Service Points to be considered eligible for funding. However, such applicants must achieve at least 7 total Proximity Points to be eligible for funding and at least 9 Proximity Points to receive the Proximity Funding Preference. The East Pointe Application identified three Public Bus Stops and was awarded 5.5 Proximity Points based on the Transit Service Scoring Chart in Exhibit C to the RFA. However, East Pointe has stipulated that Public Bus Stop 1 listed in its application does not meet the definition of a Public Bus Stop because it does not have the required scheduled stops. Based on the Transit Service Scoring Chart, East Pointe should receive a total of 3.0 Proximity Points for Transit Services for Public Bus Stops 2 and 3. East Pointe listed a Grocery Store, a Medical Facility, and a Public School in its Community Services Chart. Based on the Community Services Scoring Charts in Exhibit C to the RFA, East Pointe received 1 Proximity Point for its Grocery Store, 4 Proximity Points for its Medical Facility, and 3 Proximity Points for its Public School, for a total of 8 Proximity Points for Community Services. East Pointe listed Lee Memorial Health System at 3511 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard, Ft. Myers, Florida, as its Medical Facility. The RFA defines “Medical Facility” as follows: A medically licensed facility that (i) employs or has under contractual obligation at least one physician licensed under Chapter 458 or 459, F.S. available to treat patients by walk-in or by appointment; and (ii) provides general medical treatment to any physically sick or injured person. Facilities that specialize in treating specific classes of medical conditions or specific classes of patients, including emergency rooms affiliated with specialty or Class II hospitals and clinics affiliated with specialty or Class II hospitals, will not be accepted. Additionally, it must have been in existence and available for use by the general public as of the Application Deadline. If East Pointe’s selected Medical Facility does not meet the definition of “Medical Facility” in the RFA, East Pointe will lose 4 Proximity Points, reducing its total Proximity Points to 7. The East Pointe Application would still be eligible but would not receive the Proximity Funding Preference and, therefore, would fall out of the funding range of the RFA. Bella Vista alleged that East Pointe should not have received Proximity Points for a Medical Facility because the Lee Community Healthcare location specified in its application “only serves adults and therefore only treats a specific group of patients.” Lee Community HealthCare operates nine locations in Lee County, including the “Dunbar” location that East Pointe named in its application. Lee Community Healthcare’s own promotional materials label the Dunbar location as “adults only.” Robert Johns, Executive Director for Lee Community Healthcare, testified by deposition. Mr. Johns testified that as of the RFA application date of September 24, 2019, the Dunbar office provided services primarily to adults 19 years of age or over, by walk-in or by appointment. A parent who walked into the Dunbar office with a sick or injured child could obtain treatment for that child. A parent seeking medical services for his or her child by appointment would be referred to a Lee Community HealthCare office that provided pediatric services. Mr. Johns testified that the Dunbar office would provide general medical treatment to any physically sick or injured person who presented at the facility, including children. Children would not be seen by appointment at the Dunbar facility, but they would be treated on a walk-in basis. The RFA requires a Medical Facility to treat patients “by walk-in or by appointment.” Ms. Button testified that Florida Housing reads this requirement in the disjunctive. A Medical Facility is not required to see any and all patients by walk-in and to see any and all patients by appointment. Florida Housing finds it sufficient for the Medical Facility to see some or all patients by walk-in or by appointment. Ms. Button opined that the Dunbar office met the definition of a Medical Facility because it treated adults by walk-in or appointment and treated children on a walk-in basis. Florida Housing’s reading is consistent with the literal language of the RFA definition. While it would obviously be preferable for the Dunbar facility to see pediatric patients by appointment, the fact that it sees them on a walk-in basis satisfies the letter of the RFA provision. Bella Vista has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility and selection for funding was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. THE BEMBRIDGE APPLICATION Florida Housing deemed the Bembridge Application eligible. Pursuant to the terms of the RFA, Bembridge was preliminarily selected for funding. Bembridge proposed a development in Collier County, a Medium County in RFA terms. As an applicant from a Medium County, Bembridge was required to achieve at least 7 total Proximity Points to be eligible for funding and at least 9 Proximity Points to receive the Proximity Funding Preference. Medium County applicants are allowed, but not required, to claim both Transit Service points and Community Service points. As to Community Services, the RFA provides that an applicant may receive a “maximum 4 Points for each service, up to 3 services.” The RFA goes on to state: Applicants may provide the location information and distances for three of the following four Community Services on which to base the Application’s Community Services Score.[5] The Community Service Scoring Charts, which reflect the methodology for calculating the points awarded based on the distances, are outlined in Exhibit C. In its Application, Bembridge listed four, not three, Community Services. Bembridge was one of six Applicants that mistakenly submitted four Community Services instead of three. The Review Committee scorer reviewing Community Services in the applications stated on her scoring sheet: “After removing points for the service with the least amount of points, all still met the eligibility requirement.” 5 The four listed Community Services were Grocery Store, Public School, Medical Facility, and Pharmacy. Florida Housing interpreted the RFA as not specifically prohibiting an applicant from listing four Community Services, but as providing that the applicant could receive points for no more than three of them. As to the six applicants who submitted four Community Services, Florida Housing awarded points only for the three Community Services that were nearest the proposed development.6 Bembridge received 3 Proximity points for its Grocery Store, 3.5 Proximity Points for its Pharmacy, and 4 Proximity Points for its Public School, for a total of 10.5 Proximity Points for Community Services. Thus, as originally scored, Bembridge met the Proximity Funding Preference. Florida Housing did not score the Medical Facility listed by Bembridge, which was the farthest Community Service from the proposed development. Ms. Button testified that this fourth Community Service was treated as surplus information, and because it did not conflict with any other information in the application or cause uncertainty about any other information, it was simply not considered. Ms. Button likened this situation to prior RFAs in which applicants included pharmacies as Community Services even though they were not eligible in proposed family developments. Florida Housing disregarded the information as to pharmacies as surplus information. It did not consider disqualifying the applicants for providing extraneous information. Ms. Button also made it clear that if one of the three Community Services nearest the proposed development was found ineligible for some reason, the fourth Community Service submitted by the applicant would not be considered. The fourth Community Service was in all instances to be disregarded as surplusage in evaluating the application. 6 When queried as to whether the fourth Community Service was removed because it was worth the fewest points, as the reviewer’s notes stated, or because it was farthest away from the proposed development, Ms. Button replied that the distinction made no difference because the service that is farthest away is invariably the one that receives the fewest points. Florida Housing did not consider disqualifying Bembridge and the other five Applicants that mistakenly listed an extra Community Service in their applications. Ms. Button stated, “They provided in all of them, Bembridge and the others that were listed in this, they did provide three Community Services. And so I don’t think it is reasonable to throw out those applications for providing a fourth that we would just not consider nor give benefit to for those point values.” Bella Vista contends that Florida Housing should have rejected the Bembridge application rather than award points for the three nearest Community Services. Ms. Button testified that this was not a reasonable approach if only because there was nothing in the RFA stating that an application would be rejected if it identified more Community Services than were required. Ms. Button also noted that this was one of the first RFAs to allow applicants to select among four Community Services. She believed the novelty of this three-out-of-four selection process led to six applications incorrectly listing four Community Services. She implied that the Community Services language would have to be tweaked in future RFAs to prevent a recurrence of this situation, but she did not believe it fair to disqualify these six applicants for their harmless error. The Review Committee scorer did not perform a minor irregularity analysis relating to the fourth Community Service provided by Bembridge and the other applicants. Ms. Button opined that the addition of an extra Community Service amounts to no more than a minor irregularity because it provided no competitive advantage to the applicant and created no uncertainty that the terms and requirements of the RFA have been met. The RFA allows up to six proximity points for Transit Services. It specifically provides: Up to three Public Bus Stops may be selected with a maximum of 2 points awarded for each one. Each Public Bus Stop must meet the definition of Public Bus Stop as defined in Exhibit B, using at least one unique bus route. Up to two of the selected Public Bus Stops may be Sister Stops that serves the same route, as defined in Exhibit B. The RFA defines “Sister Stop” as: two bus stops that (i) individually, each meet the definition of Public Bus Stop, (ii) are separated by a street or intersection from each other, (iii) are within 0.2 miles of each other, (iv) serve at least one of the same bus routes, and (v) the buses travel in different directions. The Bembridge Application listed two Public Bus Stops, the definition of which is set forth at Finding of Fact 107 above. Based on the Transit Service Scoring Chart, Bembridge received a total of 1.0 Proximity Point for Transit Services for its two Public Bus Stops. Numerous questions were asked at the hearing about whether Bembridge’s identified bus stops were “Sister Stops” as defined in the RFA, and the evidence on that point was not definitive. However, whether they are Sister Stops is irrelevant because each stop identified by Bembridge independently met the definition of “Public Bus Stop” in the RFA and was therefore eligible for Transit Proximity Points. Bella Vista has failed to demonstrate that Florida Housing’s preliminary determination of eligibility and selection for funding was contrary to the applicable rules, statutes, policies, or specifications of the RFA or was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order as to RFA 2019-102 finding that: The Berkeley Application is ineligible for funding; The Sierra Bay Application is ineligible for funding; The Solaris Application is ineligible for funding; The Metro Grande Application is eligible for funding; The Beacon Place Application is ineligible for funding; The East Pointe Application is eligible for funding and entitled to the Proximity Funding Preference; and The Bembridge Application is eligible for funding. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Craig D. Varn, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. Suite 820 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Amy Wells Brennan, Esquire Manson Bolves Donaldson & Varn, P.A. Suite 300 109 North Brush Street Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Donna Elizabeth Blanton, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) Anthony L. Bajoczky, Jr., Esquire Ausley & McMullen, P.A. Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC Suite 3-231 1400 Village Square Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley & McMullen, P.A. 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Seann M. Frazier, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP Suite 750 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
