The Issue Whether either Petitioner is entitled to Unclaimed Property Account Number 108502717.
Findings Of Fact The Department receives unclaimed property and disburses that property from the State of Florida Treasury to the rightful owners. During the last fiscal year, the Department's Bureau of Unclaimed Property received in excess of $300,000,000 of unclaimed property, and paid claims in excess of $212,000,000. The Department has the duty to evaluate the merits of each claim for unclaimed property and to pay only those claimants who can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they are the rightful owners of the unclaimed property. Anja Sova was born in 1921 in Finland, but resided in Lake Worth, Florida. Her husband's brother was married to Iina Sova, who resided in Finland. Anja Sova opened several accounts with different banks during her lifetime; two of those accounts were opened at Washington Mutual Bank, and she designated Iina Sova, her sister-in-law, and Silja Lappalainen, her grand-niece and Iina's granddaughter, as joint pay-on-death beneficiaries. In January 2001, at the age of 79, Anja Sova opened a Certificate of Deposit (CD) account with Sterling Bank, depositing $95,000.00 in the account. The CD designated the pay- on-death beneficiary as Silja Sova. Anja Sova signed the signature card for this CD three times, once right next to the name of the designated beneficiary, Silja Sova. The bank had no other information as to the beneficiary. Anja Sova died in a car accident in 2002. The accounts with Washington Mutual were paid to the designated beneficiaries, her sister-in-law, and her grand-niece. Unclaimed Property Account Number 108502717 consists of the matured Sterling Bank CD, worth $127,031.97, and designates Silja Sova as the pay-on-death beneficiary. It had been held by Sterling Bank until its remittance to the Department as unclaimed property. American Research is a corporate claimant representative, and represents the residual heirs of Anja Sova's estate. Choice Plus is also a corporate claimant representative, and represents Silja Lappalainen, Anja Sova's grand-niece. American Research ran searches through various private, social, and governmental databases in the United States, and found no person named Silja Sova. In 2013, American Research also requested and received an Extract from the Population Information System in Finland. This database was created in 1969. The Extract revealed one person named Silja Sova; that person is a child born in 2009, who lives in Finland. No credible evidence was presented on whether the Extract includes only living persons, or if it also includes deceased persons (persons who were born between 1969 and 2001 and died before November 2013, when the search was done through the Extract). American Research argued that Silja Sova simply does not exist. It is unknown, however, whether Anja Sova's husband had more brothers with the surname Sova, or whether Anja Sova's father-in-law had brothers. The undersigned cannot find, given the scant evidence presented, that Silja Sova does not exist, and never existed, in Finland. American Research also proposed the theory that Anja Sova purposely created a fictitious name when designating Silja Sova as the beneficiary. There was no credible evidence presented to support this theory, either; it was mere speculation. An Order for Subsequent Administration was entered by a probate court in Palm Beach County, Florida, on April 11, 2013. It establishes the residual beneficiaries of Anja Sova's estate, but it does not include Silja Lappalainen, Anja Sova's surviving grand-niece. Choice Plus was also unable to locate a person named Silja Sova, and argued that the CD mistakenly designated the pay-on-death beneficiary as Silja Sova when it should have read Silja Lappalainen, Anja's grand-niece who had also been a beneficiary on the Washington Mutual accounts. Curiously, Choice Plus represents Silja Lappalainen, but did not offer testimony from her at the hearing.1/ Instead, Choice Plus offered into evidence an affidavit from Iina Sova, the deceased's sister-in-law, disclaiming any interest in the account. The affidavit is not found credible or reliable; it is written in a language that the affiant did not speak, there is no indication that a certified translator was present while the statement was being made, and the affidavit is replete with hearsay. Unfortunately, there was no credible evidence presented to support Choice Plus's argument that the designation of Silja Sova as the pay-on-death beneficiary was indeed a mistake that a then 79-year-old great-aunt made. The record is void of any credible evidence which meets the preponderance of the evidence standard, entitling either Petitioner to Unclaimed Property Account Number 108502717.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that American Research and Investigations, Inc.'s claim for Unclaimed Property Account Number 108502717 be DENIED. It is also RECOMMENDED that Choice Plus, LLC's claim for Unclaimed Property Account Number 108502717 be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2014.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the claim of International Equities Group, Inc. on behalf of Theodore Andrews, the personal representative of the estate of Shirley Andrews, for abandoned property in the custody of the Respondent, in the amount of $16,515.62, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 19, 1991, International Equities Group, Inc. (International) filed a claim on behalf of Theodore Andrews, the personal representative for the estate of Shirley Andrews, for the amount of $16,515.62 in abandoned property. This sum was originally in the form of a bank deposit under account no. 1197-1988-00184, originally deposited in Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, N.A. (the Bank), which was the original "holder" of the property and account in question. There is no dispute that the property constitutes abandoned property having been in possession of the Bank for the required period of seven years without any activity whatever. Consequently, after the Bank attempted to contact the named owner of the account, Arthur G. Cullen, at the last known address and was unable to make such contact because the address proved to be invalid, the account was treated by the Bank and the Department as abandoned. The bank account in question was a savings account with Arthur G. Cullen listed on the signature card as the owner of the account. After determining that no activity had occurred with regard to the account for a period of at least seven years, the Bank attempted to contact Mr. Cullen at the address it had of record, which was 413 Rider Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida 33425. The Bank learned that that address was apparently invalid and consequently, was unable to make any contact with Mr. Cullen. On July 15, 1991, Mr. Schwartz, representing the personal representative of the estate of Shirley Andrews, with power of attorney, contacted Ms. Pam Klettner of the Bank and explained that the social security number listed on the account in question, 118-34-5232, was the social security number of the late Ms. Shirley Andrews. Mr. Schwartz testified that he explained to Ms. Klettner that that listed social security number belonged to the late Ms. Shirley Andrews, as evidenced by social security records and her death certificate. He explained to Ms. Klettner that the Petitioner was the illegitimate father of at least one of Ms. Shirley Andrews' children. He then inquired of Ms. Klettner as to whom the account would be paid to, Ms. Andrews' estate, as her social security number was a match with the social security number entered on the account, or to Mr. Cullen (if he could be found, as the listed address had proved to be invalid according to the post office). Ms. Klettner responded, according to Mr. Schwartz, that she would seek a ruling for that situation from the Bank's legal department and would inform him as to the proper ownership of the account. Mr. Schwartz was later contacted by personnel of the Bank and informed that the owner of the social security number, in the Bank's view, would be the owner of the account and the funds deposited therein and that once the necessary probate documents were generated, Ms. Klettner would draft a letter to the State of Florida Unclaimed Property Department stating that the proper disbursement of the account would be to the Andrews' estate. As a consequence of this communication, Mr. Schwartz contacted Ms. Pam McMahon in the State of New York to begin probate of the Shirley Andrews' estate, informing her of the decision of the Bank regarding required documentation for payment of the account to Mr. Schwartz and International, on behalf of the personal representative, Theodore Andrews. Letters of Administration were apparently issued by the probate court in New York and the above-named claimant, Mr. Schwartz, submitted the proper forms and documents to the State of Florida Unclaimed Property Section, seeking possession of the funds in question. This was because, in the meantime, the Bank had elected to deem the property abandoned and pay the funds over to the custody of the Department. Mr. Schwartz contacted Ms. Klettner and requested that she draft the required letter to the Department to accompany the claim, as she had offered to do earlier. Ms. Klettner apparently informed Mr. Schwartz that she no longer worked in that department and was unable to keep her earlier commitment in this regard. Thereafter, a decree was entered by the Surrogate Court of the State of New York, County of Niagara, purportedly stating that the funds in question should be released to the estate of Shirley Andrews within ten days. According to Mr. Schwartz, the decree was issued to both the State of Florida and to the Bank. The purported court decree was not acted upon in the required ten days and ultimately, this claim was denied by the Department by its denial letter of November 4, 1992. The death certificate of Ms. Shirley Andrews purportedly contains the above-referenced social security number, which is the same social security number as appears on the bank account which is listed under the name of Arthur Cullen. Apparently, personnel of the Department checked that social security number through the State of Florida drivers license indexing system and the number appeared in that system with the name of Arthur G. Cullen attached. However, a credit check using that social security number through a credit reporting agency record revealed that the number matched the name of Ms. Shirley Andrews and not Arthur G. Cullen. The death certificate of Shirley Andrews has not been submitted into evidence and, according to testimony, apparently is not a certified death certificate, although it is inferred from the totality of the testimony that the death certificate was presented to the Department at some point in the claim process. The purported decree of the probate court for the County of Niagara, State of New York, Surrogates Court, has not been presented in evidence either. According to the evidence of record, Arthur G. Cullen, the purported owner of the account, under the Department's theory that the listed name on the account is tantamount to ownership, has never been located. Even if his whereabouts were known, the evidence shows that both the address on the account and the social security number on the account are not apparently those of Arthur G. Cullen. Other than the testimony of Mr. Schwartz, however, no definitive proof in the form of a certified copy of the death certificate bearing the social security number of Shirley Andrews, so that it could be matched to that appearing on the original bank account record, nor a certified copy of the New York probate court's judgement or decree, which might indicate findings of fact or conclusions of law establishing a basis for payment of the funds over to the estate of Shirley Andrews, has been placed in evidence. Consequently, it is determined that adequate proof by a preponderance of the evidence has not been established so as to justify award of the funds in question to the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the claim of International Equities Group, Inc. on behalf of Theodore Andrews, as personal representative of the estate of Shirley Andrews, for the abandoned property in the amount of $16,515.62, with regard to account number 1197-1988-00184, without prejudice to perfection of such claim by submission of appropriate proof and explanation of entitlement to the Department at a later time, subject to any time limits and other requirements contained in Chapter 717, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 3D, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2591 Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted in the sense that the non-certified death certificate may have been presented to the Department by way of explanation of entitlement with regard to the claim in question but such death certificate was not presented in evidence to the Hearing Officer. Accepted in the sense that it demonstrates the basis for the Department's initial denial of the claim. Rejected, as it does not state the entirety of the proof presented to the Hearing Officer in this Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, proceeding. Accepted to the extent that it constitutes the Department's basis for denial of the claim. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Stephen Schwartz International Equities Group, Inc. 1532 Camden Avenue Los Angeles, California 90025 Leslie A. Meek, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller 401 North West 2nd Avenue, Suite N-708 Miami, Florida 33128 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, Esquire General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact A notice to show cause why the Petitioner should not have a civil penalty assessed against it or the license be suspended or revoked, together with a notice of right to hearing was sent to Petitioner by certified mail. A formal administrative hearing was requested by Petitioner. Respondent contends that petitioner violated Section 83.49, Florida Statutes, by failure to give notice to a tenant of the disposition of her security deposit and later of the claim against it within 15 days. Petitioner contends it received no security deposit and therefore no notice was necessary. On or about August 18, 1977, Hizi Malka, president of the Petitioner corporation, entered into an oral agreement with Denise Lombardo to rent to Lombardo an apartment owned by Petitioner corporation. There had been discussions about the rental of an apartment between Mr. Malka and Lombardo prior to the date of August 18, and Lombardo had moved some of her possessions into the apartment. Mr. Malka presented an unexecuted lease agreement to Lombardo at the time of the oral agreement to rent with a request that it be executed. Lombardo paid a sum of $200 by check for which she was presented a receipt reflecting a billing of $300 and a payment of $200. She was then given a key to the apartment and took the unexecuted lease with her. Lombardo moved into an apartment of Petitioner and resided there until sometime in December of 1977. Received into evidence was a receipt dated 8/18 reflecting a billing of $300, $200 paid and $100 due; a receipt dated 9/2/77 denoting $150 paid; a receipt dated 10/4/77 denoting $150 paid; a receipt dated 10/30/77 reflecting a billing of $150, $100 paid and a balance due of $50. Also received into evidence was a letter from Petitioner's attorney to Denise Lombardo dated January 11, 1978. Also entered into evidence was the unexecuted lease agreement in which the proposed terms were that the monthly rental for the subject apartment would be $150 a month, payable in advance the first of each month with an advance rental payment of $150 and a security payment of $150. The proposed lease was dated September 1, 1977, to September 30, 1977 for the advance rental payment, but the lease itself was to have run for a term of 12 months beginning on the 18th of August, 1977 and ending on the 17th day of August, 1978. It is uncertain from the testimony at the hearing the exact date when Lombardo vacated the premises although she informed the Petitioner that she intended to vacate the premises at the end of November, 1977. Lombardo surrendered the keys to the premises sometime during the month of December, 1977. Lombardo was unable to state exactly when she surrendered the keys to Mr. Melka, but he stated that she delivered the keys on December 31, 1977. The Petitioner, through an attorney, Myron B. Berman, by letter dated January 11, 1977, made a demand upon Lombardo to pay an additional sum of money in the amount of seventy five ($75) dollars for rent of the premises rented from the Petitioner corporation and stated that a security deposit in the amount of $150 was applied to the arrearages. There had been no mention of a security deposit on any of the billing statements given to Lombardo. Lombardo paid the total sum of $600 to the Petitioner from August, 1977 to the time the premises were vacated in December, 1977. There was no substantiating evidence of any other payments made although Lombardo said she made additional payments in cash and the Respondent denied receiving any such payments. The premises were used by Lombardo for storage purposes during the first part of August before she moved into the premises and paid the original $200 payment. The Hearing Officer further finds: the receipts presented show that monies were paid but there is no showing that a security deposit was demanded or paid. All the monies paid by the witness to the Petitioner were assigned to the payment of rent, which at the rate of $150 per month would be the amount of the agreed rental payments for the period from the first of August to the end of November or the middle of August to the middle of December. The premises were not used for living by the witness until August 18, 1977, but the premises were not vacated and the keys returned to the Petitioner until sometime in December, 1977. The proposed lease agreement was not executed and therefore the findings of fact relative to the renting of the premises by the witness from the Petitioner is largely dependent upon the evidence and testimony received at the hearing. The letter from the Petitioner's attorney erroneously concluded that the witness had paid a security deposit which could be applied to arrearages in rent. The proposed recommended orders of the parties were considered in the findings and conclusions of law in this order.
Recommendation Dismiss the complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Francis Bayley, Esquire Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Myron B. Berman, Esquire Post Office Box 1113 North Miami Beach, Florida 33160
The Issue Whether either of the Petitioners is entitled to the funds in Unclaimed Property Account Number 117786622.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is the state agency authorized to administer the Florida Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, chapter 717, Florida Statutes. In that capacity, the Department, as custodian, receives dormant accounts from various entities and safeguards the funds until the rightful owner files a claim establishing his or her entitlement to the funds. In 2013, the Department received $273,100 from Amco Insurance Company (“Amco”), a subsidiary of Nationwide Insurance Company (“Nationwide”). Amco reported the funds as the proceeds of a Matured Life-Limiting Age insurance policy payable to the “Estate of Larry Bunda” and “Home Q Servicing” (hereinafter cited as “HomEq,” the company’s preferred name styling). Amco also provided a last known address for HomEq of Post Office Box 57621, Jacksonville, Florida 32241, as an additional property identifier. The funds are now identified as Unclaimed Property Account Number 117786622. Global is registered with the Department as a claimant’s representative pursuant to section 717.1400, Florida Statutes, which permits it to file claims with the Department on behalf of apparent owners. In 2015, Global began investigating account number 117786622. In an email dated July 13, 2015, Nationwide reported to Bonnie McKee-Flores of Global that the customer in question was named Larry R. Bunda, born on October 19, 1950, with a reported address of 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California. Global investigated the status of Larry R. Bunda. It obtained a Washington State Certificate of Death indicating that Larry R. Bunda died on September 8, 2008, in Seattle, Washington, of injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident. Global discovered three heirs to the estate of Larry R. Bunda: Amelia Bunda of Bremerton, Washington; Robert Bunda of Bremerton, Washington; and George Bunda of El Cajon, California. On September 13, 2016, Ms. McKee-Flores of Global sent an email to Nationwide requesting the issue date and check number of the check issued to Larry Bunda and HomEq Servicing. Ms. McKee-Flores explained that she was attempting to obtain a release from HomEq’s successor, Ocwen, for the funds to be released to the Bunda estate, and that the information as to the check would help persuade Ocwen to sign the release. Nationwide responded: “The original check # was 0371843635 and it was issued on 11/05/2009.” Nationwide did not state to whom the check was made payable. The three heirs initiated a probate proceeding in the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida, Case No. 2016 CP 000687. On September 22, 2016, the court entered an Order of Summary Administration adjudging that there be an “immediate distribution of the assets of the decedent” equally to each of the heirs. Each heir was to receive a “one-third (1/3) share of decedent’s share” of the Department’s Unclaimed Property Account Number 117786622. On October 17, 2016, Global filed with the Department a claim on behalf of the Bunda heirs, claiming 50 percent of the funds in account number 117786622, with HomEq (or its successor) entitled to the other 50 percent as the joint named payee on the life insurance policy. The Global claim was filed on Department Form DFS-UP- 108, which is the form prescribed by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69G-20.0021(6) for claims filed by a claimant’s representative. There is no dispute that Global used the correct form to file its claim. On December 19, 2016, Ocwen filed its claim to the “Matured Life--Limiting Age” policy issued by Amco to the “Estate of Larry Bunda” and “Home Q Servicing.” Ocwen claimed the funds as the successor company to HomEq. The Ocwen claim was filed on Department Form DFS-UP- 106, which is the form prescribed by rule 69G-20.0021(4) for claims filed directly by apparent owners, including corporations. At some point after the claims were filed, the Department made further inquiry to Nationwide as to the nature and status of the insurance policy. In an email dated January 30, 2017, Jenn Hupp, a Nationwide premium processor, reported to Department regulatory specialist Tiffani Ealy Claven as follows: “I show that check 378366435 was issued on claim 84M85897 date of loss 10/22/2007. In payment of: POLICY LIMITS FOR DWELLING LOST IN FIRE-- REISSUE OF CK 378364049.” Ms. Hupp did not provide a date for either of the referenced checks, nor did she expressly state to whom they were made payable. Neither check number referenced by Ms. Hupp matched the check number that Nationwide provided to Global on September 13, 2016. None of the referenced checks were made part of the record. The actual policy document was provided to the Department by Nationwide no sooner than October 31, 2017.2/ The Department did not make Global aware that it had the policy document until November 14, 2017, when Global filed a written motion seeking to exclude the policy on grounds of inadequate notice. After hearing argument at the final hearing, the undersigned overruled Global’s objection and admitted the policy. The policy was not a life insurance policy but a homeowner’s policy, number HMC 0009452948-6, issued by Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Allied Property”), another subsidiary of Nationwide, for the period running from May 6, 2007, to May 6, 2008. The face value of the insurance policy was $273,100 for a dwelling, and included additional coverages for other structures, personal property, and personal liability. The policy declarations page identified Larry R. Bunda of 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California, as the named insured. The policy declarations page identified 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California, as the insured property. The policy identified HomEq as the mortgage loss payee on the first mortgage. HomEq’s address was listed as Post Office Box 57621, Jacksonville, Florida 32241-7621. Nothing in the record explains why Nationwide originally reported the policy to the Department as a life insurance policy, or why it was reported by Nationwide’s Amco subsidiary rather than by Allied Property, the issuer of the policy. In support of its claim, Ocwen submitted a copy of a Deed of Trust, dated October 5, 2005, relating to the property located at 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California. The Deed of Trust identifies Larry R. Bunda as the purchaser/borrower, BNC Mortgage, Inc., as the lender, and TD Service Company as the trustee. The Deed of Trust identifies Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary, “acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” The Deed of Trust reflects a purchase price of $495,000. The Deed of Trust, in the Uniform Covenants, at paragraph 5, requires Mr. Bunda to insure the property against fire, flood, and other hazards, and further states: All insurance policies required by Lender . . . shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee and Borrower further agrees to generally assign rights to the insurance proceeds to the holder of the Note up to the amount of the outstanding loan balance. If Mr. Bunda failed to purchase the insurance, then the lender, through its servicing agent, had the authority to purchase insurance at Mr. Bunda’s expense. In the event of loss, insurance proceeds were to be applied to restoration or repair of the property. If restoration or repair were “not economically feasible or Lender’s security would be lessened,” the insurance proceeds would be applied to the amounts secured by the Deed of Trust, with any excess paid to the borrower, Mr. Bunda. Ocwen also provided an Assignment of Deed of Trust, dated August 10, 2011, that specifically identifies 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California, as the subject property. In the Assignment of Deed of Trust, MERS, as nominee for BNC Mortgage, Inc., assigns its rights under the Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”), as “Trustee under Securitization Servicing Agreement Dated as of December 1, 2005 Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-11” (the “Securitization Servicing Agreement”). U.S. Bank’s address is listed as c/o Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, at Ocwen’s West Palm Beach, Florida, office. The Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded at the San Diego County Recorder’s Office on August 25, 2011. Ocwen submitted a copy of a Substitution of Trustee, dated March 3, 2011, in which MERS, as nominee for U.S. Bank, and “as trustee for the Securitization Servicing Agreement,” substitutes Western Progressive, LLC (“Western Progressive”), as trustee under the Deed of Trust, in place of TD Service Company, the original trustee. The Substitution of Trustee was not recorded in the San Diego County Recorder’s Office until July 12, 2011. In its preliminary decision, the Department accepted that the Deed of Trust on 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California, was included in the Securitization Servicing Agreement, the first mention of which in the record is in the Substitution of Trustee dated March 3, 2011. Ocwen submitted a Limited Power of Attorney, dated June 1, 2012, listing the Securitization Servicing Agreement among those items over which U.S. Bank granted Ocwen a limited power of attorney. The Assignment of Deed of Trust also names the Securitization Servicing Agreement, implying a connection to the Deed of Trust on the Bunda mortgage. However, the Securitization Servicing Agreement itself is not part of the record in this case. The Assignment of Deed of Trust certainly assumes that the Bunda mortgage is part of the Securitization Servicing Agreement, but there is no document establishing that fact. The failure to tie the Bunda mortgage to the Securitization Servicing Agreement would not affect the assignment of rights from BNC Mortgage to U.S. Bank, or the substitution of trustee from TD Service Company to Western Progressive, because both of those documents are executed in direct reference to the Deed of Trust on the Bunda property. However, the Limited Power of Attorney from U.S. Bank to Ocwen references only the Securitization Servicing Agreement. There is no record evidence directly establishing that Ocwen’s limited power of attorney includes the Deed of Trust on the Bunda property. It appears that the Department was willing to infer that the Deed of Trust is included in the Securitization Servicing Agreement based on the indirect evidence of the Assignment of Deed of Trust and the Substitution of Trustee. Ocwen submitted a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form 8-K filed by Ocwen Financial Corporation, dated September 8, 2010, detailing Ocwen Financial Corporation’s acquisition of “HomEq Servicing,” through its subsidiary Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (the “Ocwen” referenced throughout this Order), effective September 1, 2010. The acquisition includes the “mortgage servicing rights and associated servicer advances” of HomEq. In the Form 8-K, HomEq is identified as “the U.S. non-prime mortgage servicing business” owned by Barclays Bank PLC, a British company, and Barclays Capital Real Estate Inc., a Delaware corporation. Florida Division of Corporations documents identify HomEq Servicing as a fictitious name registered by Barclays Capital Real Estate, Inc., on August 29, 2006. The registration was canceled on October 27, 2010. Ocwen submitted a series of notices sent to Larry R. Bunda at 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California, giving notice of transfers of loan servicers. In a notice dated January 27, 2006, HomEq informed Mr. Bunda that the servicing of his account was being transferred from Option One to HomEq, effective February 1, 2006. HomEq sent another notice, dated August 11, 2010, addressed to Larry R. Bunda at 1306 Poindexter Avenue West, Bremerton, Washington 98312-4333. By this time, Mr. Bunda had been dead for almost two years. The address is the same as that given by Mr. Bunda’s heir, Robert Bunda, in the claim documents filed by Global. It is also the address given for “Rob Bunda” as the decedent’s son on Larry R. Bunda’s death certificate. Nothing in the record of this case indicates how HomEq came by this address for Larry R. Bunda in 2010. The August 11, 2010, notice was intended to inform Mr. Bunda that HomEq was transferring the servicing of his account to Ocwen, as of September 1, 2010. This is consistent with Ocwen’s Form 8-K, which stated that Ocwen was acquiring HomEq, effective September 1, 2010. Ocwen submitted a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust (“Notice of Default”), dated February 17, 2011, over the signature of Marco Marquez. Mr. Marquez’ position is unclear, as the signature line includes both “Western Progressive, LLC, as agent for beneficiary” and “By LSI Title Company, As Agent.” The relationship of LSI Title Company to this case is unexplained in the record. The document indicates that it was recorded in the San Diego County Recorder’s Office on February 18, 2011. The date on the Notice of Default is prior to the appointment of Western Progressive as trustee by the Substitution of Trustee document dated March 3, 2011. The source of Western Progressive’s authority to do anything regarding the property as of February 17, 2011, is unexplained in the record. The Notice of Default does not state to whom it is addressed. By February 17, 2011, Larry R. Bunda was long dead, but the document includes no acknowledgement of his death or of any effort to locate his heirs. The text of the document repeatedly refers to “your property,” states that “you are behind in your payments” and advises “you” how to obtain a written itemization of the amount “you must pay.” Nothing in the document gives any indication that the “you” being addressed is anyone other than Larry R. Bunda, the borrower, who was dead. The Notice of Default offers the recipient an opportunity to bring the account into good standing by paying all past due payments, stated as $121,831.17 as of February 17, 2011. The Notice of Default goes on to provide: NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN: That Western Progressive, LLC is either the original trustee, the duly appointed substituted trustee, or acting as agent for the trustee or beneficiary under a Deed of Trust dated 10/5/2005, executed by LARRY R. BUNDA, A WIDOWER, as Trustor, to secure certain obligations in favor of BNC MORTGAGE, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION A CORPORATION [sic], AS LENDER, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as beneficiary, recorded 10/12/2005, as Instrument No. 2005-0881960, in Book , Page , and rerecorded on as of Official Records in the Office of the Recorder of San Diego County, California describing land therein as: As more particularly described on said Deed of Trust. The subject obligation includes ONE NOTE(S) FOR THE ORIGINAL sum of $495,000.00. A breach of, and default in, the obligations for which such Deed of Trust is security has occurred in that payment has not been made of the following: Installment of Principal and Interest plus impounds and/or advances which became due on 9/1/2008 plus late charges, and all subsequent installments of principal, interest, balloon payments, plus impounds and/or advances and late charges that became payable. You are responsible to pay all payments and charges due under the terms and conditions of the loan documents which come due subsequent to the date of this notice, including, but not limited to, foreclosure trustee fees and costs, advances and late charges. Furthermore, as a condition to bring your account in good standing, you must provide the undersigned with written proof that you are not in default on any senior encumbrance and provide proof of insurance. Nothing in this notice of default should be construed as a waiver of any fees owing to the beneficiary under the deed of trust, pursuant to the terms and provisions of the loan documents. Again, the statements addressed to “you” do not appear to reference anyone other than the borrower, Larry R. Bunda, who was dead well before the Notice of Default was issued. In fact, Mr. Bunda was dead before the due date cited by the Notice of Default. Also, the assertion that Western Progressive “is either the original trustee, the duly appointed substituted trustee, or acting as agent for the trustee or beneficiary under a Deed of Trust dated 10/5/2005, executed by LARRY R. BUNDA, A WIDOWER, as Trustor, to secure certain obligations in favor of BNC MORTGAGE” was not true as of February 17, 2011, at least insofar as the record evidence of this case indicates. Western Progressive was not substituted as trustee until March 3, 2011.3/ The Notice of Default concludes with the following statements: The mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has fulfilled its obligation under California Civil Code Section 2923.5(a) by contacting the borrower either in person or by telephone to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options to avoid foreclosure prior to 30 days of filing the Notice of Default. The borrower was advised of their right to a subsequent meeting within 14 days of the initial contact. In addition, the borrower was provided with the toll-free telephone number made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency. The quoted statements cannot be true. Neither the mortgagee, nor the beneficiary, nor any authorized agent contacted the borrower, Larry R. Bunda, either in person or by telephone, because Larry R. Bunda was dead. The borrower was not advised of his right to a subsequent meeting, nor was he provided with a toll-free HUD number, because he was dead. The record is bereft of information as to the legal effect under California law of falsely attesting to having provided the notice apparently required by the cited provision of that state’s civil code, or of failure to provide notice to the actual, living parties in interest. Unsurprisingly, the borrower did not respond to the Notice of Default and the property proceeded to a trustee’s sale. Ocwen submitted a Notice of Trustee’s Sale, dated July 8, 2011, and recorded in the San Diego County Recorder’s Office on July 12, 2011. This document is signed by Robin Pape, Trustee Sales Assistant, on behalf of Western Progressive, as trustee. The Notice of Trustee’s Sale begins as follows: YOU ARE IN DEFAULT UNDER A DEED OF TRUST DATED 10/5/2005. UNLESS YOU TAKE ACTION TO PROTECT YOUR PROPERTY, IT MAY BE SOLD AT A PUBLIC SALE. IF YOU NEED AN EXPLANATION OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING AGAINST YOU, YOU SHOULD CONTACT A LAWYER. Nothing in the Notice of Trustee’s Sale gives any indication that it is addressed to anyone other than Larry R. Bunda, who remained dead on July 8, 2011. The Notice of Trustee’s Sale informs the recipient that the trustee’s public auction sale will occur on August 8, 2011, at the South entrance to the County Courthouse, 220 West Broadway, San Diego, California. It lists the street address of the property as 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California 92065, and states that the amount of the unpaid balance and other charges is $610,258.23. Finally, Ocwen submitted a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, dated September 20, 2011, and recorded at the San Diego County Recorder’s Office on September 29, 2011. The document states that Western Progressive, as Trustee under the Deed of Trust, “does hereby GRANT and CONVEY to Matthew D. Parker, a named man as his sole and separate property . . . all right title and interest conveyed to and now held by it as Trustee under the Deed of Trust in and to the property situated in the county of San Diego, State of California, described as follows ” There follows a legal description matching the Bunda property at 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California. The Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale also provides as follows: This conveyance is made in compliance with the terms and provisions of the Deed of Trust executed by LARRY R. BUNDA, A WIDOWER as Trustor, dated 10/5/2005 in the Official Records in the office of the Recorder of San Diego, California under the authority and powers vested in the Trustee designated in the Deed of Trust or as the duly appointed Trustee, default having occurred under the Deed of Trust pursuant to the Notice of Default and Election to Sell under the Deed of Trust recorded on 10/12/2005, instrument number 2005-0881960, Book ---, Page and rerecorded on --- as --- of official records. Trustee having complied with all applicable statutory requirements of the State of California and performed all duties required by the Deed of Trust including sending a Notice of Default and Election to Sell within ten days after its recording and a Notice of Sale at least twenty days prior to the Sale Date by certified mail, postage pre-paid to each person entitled to notice in compliance with California Civil Code 2924b. All requirements per California Statutes regarding the mailing, personal delivery and publication of copies of Notice of Default and Election to Sell under Deed of Trust and Notice of Trustee’s Sale, and the posting of copies of Notice of Trustee’s Sale have been complied with. Trustee, in compliance with said Notice of Trustee’s sale and in exercise of its powers under said Deed of Trust sold said real property at public auction on 9/14/2011. Grantee, being the highest bidder at said sale became the purchaser of said property for the amount bid, being $65,000.00, in lawful money of the United States, in pro per, receipt thereof is hereby acknowledged in full/partial satisfaction of the debt secured by said Deed of Trust. Again, there is no indication that any living person with an interest in the estate of Larry R. Bunda was given notice of this sale, despite the assurances of Western Progressive, in the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale. The facts recited above raise many questions. First, why is this case being heard in Florida? Larry R. Bunda lived in California. His heirs live in the states of Washington and California. Ocwen’s filings indicate that it is based in Boston, Massachusetts. The real property was in California and the Deed of Trust was drafted on a California-specific form. The mortgage was declared in default according to California law, and the foreclosure and subsequent resale were performed under California law. The insurance policy was issued by a California agency. It appears the only connection of this unclaimed property to Florida is the address provided to the Department by Amco in its initial 2013 report: “last known address” of Post Office Box 57621, Jacksonville, Florida 32241. This address turned out to be that of HomEq. According to Ocwen’s Form 8-K, HomEq ceased to exist as a separate company as of September 1, 2010, approximately three years before Amco reported the unclaimed funds to the Department. The only real connections to Florida in this case are Global and Ocwen’s acts of following the money to its landing place at the Department. It is understandable that the Department took custody of the unclaimed property at the time Amco submitted it, given that the only address on the documentation was in Jacksonville. However, at some point it should have occurred to the Department that its unclaimed property counterpart in the State Controller’s Office of California might be better placed to resolve this controversy involving issues of California real property law, inheritance law, and insurance law.4/ One example will suffice to illustrate the problem of a Florida administrative agency attempting to apply California law to resolve these issues. In its proposed recommended order, the Department confidently argues that a 2014 amendment to section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure alters the analysis of this case as to the extinguishment of the debtor-creditor relationship during foreclosure proceedings. The Department fails to note that three separate Federal courts in California have concluded that the operation of the 2014 amendment is prospective only. It would therefore be inapplicable to the instant case. See Shin v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14997 at n.2 (S.D. Cal. 2018); Prianto v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94673 at n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Johnson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185345 at 19 (C.D. Cal. 2013). An agency more familiar with California law might have been aware of the court decisions and the California rules of statutory construction that underlay their conclusions. Given its insistence that California law governs this case, the Department should have considered whether a California tribunal would be better placed to resolve these issues.5/ A second question regards the status of Ocwen, which filed its claim on Department Form DFS-UP-106, the form prescribed for “apparent owners.” Section 717.101(2) defines “apparent owner” as “the person whose name appears on the records of the holder as the person entitled to property held, issued, or owing by the holder.” It is unclear whether Amco or the Department would be considered the “holder” of the insurance proceeds, but it makes no difference as Ocwen’s name did not appear on the records of either entity. Ocwen could ultimately be found to be an “owner” as defined in section 717.101(18), and could be a “claimant” as defined in rule 69G-20.030(14), but Ocwen was not an “apparent owner” at the time it filed its claim, under the express terms of section 717.101(2). Therefore, it appears that Ocwen’s claim was filed on the wrong form and should have been filed on Form DFS-UP-107, prescribed by rule 69G-20.0021(5) for “claims filed by other than apparent owners,” which includes heirs, personal representatives, or beneficiaries, if Ocwen believed it was entitled to claim the funds as an owner. The Department should not have processed the Ocwen claim because it was not “complete” under the terms set forth in rule 69G-20.0021(1)(b), which provides that a complete claim “shall include the correct claim form identified in this rule.” Even if it were accepted that the rule’s definition of “apparent owner” should not be read literally and that Ocwen was entitled to file its claim as “apparent owner” by virtue of its status as HomEq’s purchaser and successor in interest,6/ there remains the question of whether HomEq, and therefore Ocwen, could be considered the “owner” of the unclaimed property in the sense required by section 215.965, Florida Statutes, which provides: Disbursement of state moneys.— Except as provided in s. 17.076, s. 253.025(17), s.717.124(4)(b) and (c), s. 732.107(5), or s. 733.816(5), all moneys in the State Treasury shall be disbursed by state warrant, drawn by the Chief Financial Officer upon the State Treasury and payable to the ultimate beneficiary. This authorization shall include electronic disbursement.[7/] (Emphasis added). The record evidence establishes that HomEq, and Ocwen as its successor, functioned as no more than loan servicers. While it is true that HomEq is named on the insurance policy as the “mortgage loss payee,” there is nothing in the record that establishes HomEq as the “ultimate beneficiary” of the insurance policy. HomEq’s part of the insurance transaction would be to collect the proceeds and pass them on to the ultimate beneficiary of the insurance contract, i.e., the lender whose money is at risk under the Deed of Trust. Ocwen could succeed to no more of an interest than that held by HomEq. The Department argues that “Ocwen is claiming the funds in its own name under the authority of a limited power of attorney to act on U.S. Bank’s behalf as a loan servicer.” For the sake of argument, the undersigned will put aside Ocwen’s failure to connect the Bunda mortgage to the Securitization Servicing Agreement for which it has a limited power of attorney. The Department offers no explanation as to what set of circumstances would allow an entity operating pursuant to a limited power of attorney--by definition,8/ in a representative capacity--to claim ownership, in its own name, of funds it seeks as agent on behalf of its principal. The Department simply takes it as a given that Ocwen may claim as an owner. The Department specifically relies on language from the Limited Power of Attorney giving Ocwen authority to: Demand, sue for, recover, collect and receive each and every sum of money, debt, assessment, and interest (which now is, or hereafter shall become due and payable) belonging to or claimed by U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee . . . . The Department seems to believe that this language self-evidently establishes Ocwen’s ownership interest in the proceeds of this insurance policy, when it merely authorizes Ocwen to go out and recover funds “belonging to U.S. Bank.” It does not transfer ownership of those funds to Ocwen. It does not make Ocwen the ultimate beneficiary of the insurance policy. The undersigned is aware of cases such as Lenart v. Ocwen Financial Corporation, 869 So. 2d 588 (Fla 3d DCA 2004), in which the court assumed without discussion that a loan servicer such as Ocwen may stand in the shoes of the mortgagee as “owner” for the purpose of litigation over insurance proceeds. However, Lenart involved litigation between private parties. It did not involve an unpaid property claim before the Department, which has very specific requirements under statute and rule, including the “apparent owner” limitation on the use of Form DFS-UP-106 and the “ultimate beneficiary” limitation on the disbursement of moneys from the State Treasury in section 215.965. Even if Ocwen were to establish its right to claim insurance proceeds as the mortgage loss payee, it would not necessarily have proven its right to claim those funds once they have become unclaimed property and passed to the Department’s custody. In its attack on the proposed award to Ocwen, Global contends that Ocwen’s documentation fails to establish that the rights of HomEq as the loss payee on the insurance policy were transferred to Ocwen by its acquisition of HomEq in 2010. As indicated above, the undersigned is persuaded that Ocwen did succeed to HomEq’s rights but finds that those rights are insufficient to establish Ocwen’s status as an owner of the proceeds. The record evidence at most establishes that Ocwen is the agent of the ultimate beneficiary of the insurance policy. Global cites Martin Young v. Department of Banking and Finance, 659 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), for the proposition that the Department may not disburse funds to Ocwen because Ocwen is no more than a creditor in this case. In Martin Young, the Department had awarded unclaimed insurance proceeds to creditors of the apparent owner. On appeal, the Court first held that the Department has no statutory authority to prioritize competing claims, a holding since superseded to a degree by statute. See § 717.1241, Fla. Stat. More to the point, the court held that creditors were not “owners” because they did not have a “legal or equitable interest” in the subject property. “Insurance proceeds are personal property which judgment creditors cannot reach or claim an interest in until after resorting to judicial process.” Martin Young, 659 So. 2d at 411. The Department distinguishes Martin Young by arguing that it involved unsecured creditors, whereas U.S. Bank was a secured creditor by reason of the recorded Deed of Trust containing a power of sale provision and the homeowner’s insurance policy with the standard mortgagee clause. Global accurately points out that the Martin Young court stated no distinction between secured and unsecured creditors. However, the court’s holding appears expressly limited to the reach of judgment creditors who have not obtained a lien by way of writ of execution. The Department is correct that a secured creditor such as U.S. Bank already has a lien on the property and executes on that lien when it forecloses on the secured loan. Of course, the Department’s analysis assumes that U.S. Bank’s agents foreclosed on the property in accordance with California law. As indicated in Findings of Fact 31-45, there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that the default and foreclosure were properly performed. Though Martin Young appears not to preclude an award to Ocwen, the statutes and rules under which the Department operates do not allow Ocwen, as U.S. Bank’s agent, to claim “ownership” of the unclaimed funds. The question at the heart of this case, regarding the claim of Global and especially that of Ocwen, is: what happened in California? The Department’s preliminary decision to award the claim to Ocwen assumes that a check was issued to the Bunda estate, that the Bunda estate failed to keep up the payments on the property, and that the Bunda estate allowed the foreclosure to occur in 2011. The evidence supports none of the Department’s assumptions. It is known for certain that Larry R. Bunda entered into a Deed of Trust to purchase the property at 546 Elm Street, Ramona, California, on October 5, 2005. It is known for certain that Larry R. Bunda purchased homeowner’s insurance on the property with a face value of $273,100 for the dwelling and that the term of the insurance was from May 6, 2007, to May 6, 2008. It is known for certain that Larry R. Bunda died on September 8, 2008. Beyond these facts, matters become hazier if one relies on the documents in evidence without assuming facts outside the record. One may reasonably presume the correctness of Nationwide’s report that the total loss of Mr. Bunda’s dwelling occurred on October 22, 2007. That date coincides with the time of the Witch Creek fire, which began near the town of Ramona and destroyed over 1,000 residences and other buildings. Therefore, it is reasonable to find that Larry R. Bunda was alive when the loss occurred. Nationwide reported to Global that the original check to pay the insurance claim was check number 0371843635 and was issued on November 5, 2009, more than one year after Larry R. Bunda’s death. Nationwide offered no explanation as to why the check was issued more than two years after the loss was incurred. Nationwide did not provide a copy of the check or state to whom the check was made payable. No explanation was given for the failure of any party to negotiate the check. Nationwide later reported to the Department that two other checks had been issued: check number 378364049 and the reissued check number 378366435. Nationwide gave no dates for these two checks. Nationwide did not provide copies of these checks or state to whom the checks were made payable. No explanation was given for the failure of any party to negotiate either of the checks. No evidence was presented as to why Nationwide issued more than one check. No evidence was presented as to why none of these checks was ever negotiated. If one presumes that the checks were made payable to the policy payees, Larry R. Bunda and HomEq, and that Mr. Bunda was dead at the time they were issued, then one questions why HomEq apparently failed to take any steps to secure the funds for its principal. Was HomEq aware that Larry R. Bunda was dead at the time the checks were issued? Such might be inferred from the August 11, 2010, notice that HomEq sent to Mr. Bunda at his son’s address in Bremerton, Washington. However, it is just as likely that Mr. Bunda moved in with his son after the loss of his home and sent HomEq a forwarding address. Any finding on that score would be speculative. In any event, HomEq was absorbed by Ocwen on September 1, 2010. The record indicates no further correspondence addressed to Bremerton, Washington. As HomEq’s successor, Ocwen should have known of the Washington address, but the record contains no direct mailings from Ocwen to Larry R. Bunda. There is nothing in the record indicating that Western Progressive’s Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee’s Sale were addressed to anyone other than the borrower, Larry R. Bunda, who was long dead by the time the default and foreclosure proceedings on 546 Elm Street began. Nonetheless, the Notice of Default falsely stated that Western Progressive had contacted “the borrower either in person or by telephone” to explore options to avoid foreclosure. Further, at the time it issued the Notice of Default, Western Progressive had yet to be substituted as trustee under the Deed of Trust. Based on this record and the briefs of the parties, there is no way to ascertain the rights (if any) of Larry R. Bunda’s heirs to unwind the sale of the property or seek damages for Western Progressive’s selling of the property without notice to the Bunda estate. This point is important because a large part of the Department’s argument for awarding the claim to Ocwen rests on the assumption that the Bunda heirs “waived” their right to contest the Ocwen claim because of “the foreclosure they allowed to occur in 2011.” There is no record evidence that the Bunda heirs even knew of the foreclosure, let alone “allowed” it to happen. The Department simply assumes a fact not in evidence.9/ Global claims that the Bunda heirs are entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the insurance policy as the successors to Larry R. Bunda as the joint named payee on the policy. Global relies on the Order of Summary Administration entered by the Leon County circuit court on September 22, 2016, adjudging that there be an immediate distribution of the assets to the Bunda heirs. On November 15, 2017, the circuit court on its own motion entered an Order to Set Aside Order of Summary Administration, citing unspecified “abnormalities” that had been found in the estate file. Thus, Global’s reliance on the Order of Summary Administration is misplaced. As to the heirs’ entitlement to one-half of the proceeds, this argument would be more persuasive had the policy been one for life insurance, as the Department and Global originally believed. Because the actual policy was a homeowner’s insurance company, the heirs’ rights would appear to be subsidiary to the rights of the secured creditor to obtain the difference between the value of the note and the price obtained from the trustee’s sale of the property in its damaged condition. Again, however, this hierarchy of rights depends on a finding that the Notice of Default, the Notice of Trustee’s Sale, and the trustee’s sale of the property at 546 Elm Street were conducted in accordance with California law. The Department appears sanguine that this is the case, but the record presented at the hearing does not permit a finding that Ocwen’s principal, U.S. Bank, through its agent, Western Progressive, gave notice to any living person with an interest in Larry R. Bunda’s estate of the default, foreclosure, or trustee’s sale on the property at 546 Elm Street in Ramona, California. The record is not even clear that Western Progressive was an authorized agent at the time it issued the Notice of Default. The record permits no conclusion as to the legal effect of a failure to notify the estate or of falsely attesting that notice has been given to the borrower. Nonetheless, a finding that Ocwen has failed to establish ownership of the funds does not necessitate a finding that the Bunda heirs are entitled to the funds. Enough is known of the situation to permit the conclusion that the Bunda heirs’ claim is likely a subsidiary claim. It would be premature to award them half of the unclaimed property until the Department or some other entity conducts a proper investigation and determines whether the foreclosure on the Bunda mortgage was conducted in accordance with California law. Global’s final ground for claiming entitlement to the funds is that it filed the first complete claim. Section 717.1241(1)(a) provides: When conflicting claims have been received by the department for the same unclaimed property account or accounts, the property shall be remitted in accordance with the claim filed by the person as follows, notwithstanding the withdrawal of a claim: To the person submitting the first claim received by the Division of Unclaimed Property of the department that is complete or made complete. The Department concedes that Global filed all of the necessary paperwork. Its application was not “incomplete” in the clerical sense that Global left out any of the information required by Form DFS-UP-108. The Department contends that Global’s application was not substantively complete in that it did not establish proof of entitlement to the funds on the part of the Bunda heirs. “Proof of entitlement” is expressly required in order for an application to be deemed “complete.” Section 717.1241(3) provides: “A claim is complete when entitlement to the unclaimed property has been established.” See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 69G-20.0021(1)(b)&(c). The Department observes that section 717.1241 is a procedural statute enacted to provide guidance to the Department when it receives claims from two or more claimants, all of whom are entitled to the property. The “first to file” language does not create an independent basis for establishing entitlement but is a way for the Department to choose among entitled claims. For purposes of commencing a review, the Department deems a claim “complete” when all the required documentation has been submitted. If a claim is missing information, the Department may return it to the claimant or request additional information from the claimant. If more information is sought, the claim is abated until the Department receives the requested information or deems the claim withdrawn for failure to provide the information. § 717.124(1)(b), Fla. Stat. If the claimant provides the requested information, then the Department will review the claim on the merits to determine whether entitlement has been demonstrated. The Department argues that the merits review is subsequent to and separate from the claimant’s submission of the required documents. Global has conflated the claimant’s responsibility to provide all required documentation with the Department’s responsibility to review the claim on the merits and determine whether entitlement has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. The mere fact that the claimant provides the documentary information required by statute and rule does not mean the claim is “complete” in the sense that entitlement is established. The Department’s argument is correct. The facts of this case do not permit a finding that the Bunda heirs are entitled to the unclaimed funds. A secured lienholder who followed all proper steps in notifying the borrower or his heirs of the default, of the foreclosure, and of the pending trustee’s sale would be entitled to cover any deficiency with some or all of the proceeds of the insurance policy. Ocwen’s failure to demonstrate that all proper steps were taken means that it is not entitled to the unclaimed funds under the facts of this case, but Ocwen’s failure does not establish that Global’s claim is “complete” on the merits. In summary, Ocwen has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to the funds in Unclaimed Property Account Number 117786622 because: It failed to file its claim on the correct form; It failed to establish its right to claim as an “owner” of the property; and It failed to establish that the foreclosure and sale of the Bunda property were conducted in accordance with California law. Global failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a portion of the funds in Unclaimed Property Account Number 117786622 because its claim is subsidiary to that of the secured creditor, and the evidence did not foreclose the possibility that U.S. Bank may have a valid claim to the property as the secured creditor, if the regularity of the events surrounding the foreclosure and sale of the Bunda property can be established. Under the facts established by the record of this case, neither claimant established its entitlement to Unclaimed Property Account Number 117786622. This finding and recommendation should not preclude the Department from allowing Ocwen to file a proper claim as a representative of U.S. Bank and then undertaking further investigation to establish whether the foreclosure sale on the Bunda property was conducted in accordance with California law. If Ocwen is unable to establish U.S. Bank’s right to the unclaimed property as a secured creditor, then the subsidiary claim put forward by Global on behalf of the Bunda heirs should be held entitled to the property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, for entitlement to Unclaimed Property Account Number 117786622 be DENIED, without prejudice. It is also RECOMMENDED that the claim of Global Discoveries Ltd., LLC, for entitlement to Unclaimed Property Account Number 117786622, be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 2018.
The Issue Does Respondent, Ynnor Distribution Group, Inc., owe Petitioner, William E. Gable, Jr., d/b/a Gable Enterprises, $13,430.02 for the sale of four shipments of watermelons?
Findings Of Fact On July 17, 2001, Mr. Gable sold Ynnor 42,330 pounds of watermelon for $3,128.19. (Exhibit 1) On July 17, 2001, Mr. Gable sold Ynnor 42,740 pounds of watermelon for $3,150.70. (Exhibit 2) On July 19, 2001, Mr. Gable sold Ynnor 46,283 pounds of watermelon for $4,165.47. (Exhibit 3) On July 24, 2001, Mr. Gable sold Ynnor 44,540 pounds of watermelon for $2,985.70. (Exhibit 4) The total amount Ynnor owed Mr. Gable was $13,430.02. (Exhibit 4) There was no payment on the account by Ynnor. Mr. Gable called the recipient of the watermelons. They were all received in good shape and payment for the watermelons was made by the recipient to Ynnor. Ynnor did not attend the hearing. No evidence was received on the amount Ynnor alleged as a counterclaim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter its final order finding that Respondent, Ynnor Distribution Group, Inc., owes Petitioner, William E. Gable, the amount of $13,430.02. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Alves Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 87 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Ronald S. Booth, Sr. Ynnor Distribution Group, Inc. Post Office Box 1202 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1202 William E. Gable, Jr. Gable Enterprises 6511 Bradley Road Marianna, Florida 32448 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building 407 South Calhoun Street, Mail Stop 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioners established entitlement to $22,165 of abandoned property being held by the Respondent, the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, under Chapter 717, Fla. Stat. (1993).
Findings Of Fact On or about December 21, 1992, the National Abandoned Property Processing Corporation delivered to the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, $22,165 in cash derived from the cash acquisition of McGraw-Edison Company on May 30, 1985, Cooper Industries, Inc. Cooper Industries indicated that the cash, representing $65 per common share for 341 unexchanged shares, had been abandoned by Helen A. Block, 1116 North 13th Court, Hollywood, Florida 33019, and that the owner's account number was 000148084992, but Cooper Industries does not have a social security or tax identification number or any other information to identify the owner. Richard Steel-Reed and Donald E. Block are the adult sons of, and heirs to the estate of, a Helen A. Block who died in California on August 6, 1989, after having resided in Chatsworth, California, for approximately three to five years. Prior to residing in California, and in particular in 1983, she resided at 3901 South Ocean Drive, Hollywood, Florida. But there is no evidence that she ever resided at 1116 North 13th Court, Hollywood, Florida 33019. The Petitioners were unable to produce any stock certificates or account statements or any other evidence directly identifying their mother as the owner of the $22,165 at issue in this case. The Petitioners were unable to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their mother was the owner of the $22,165 at issue in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Banking and Finance, enter a final order denying the Petitioners' claim to the $22,165 being held by the Department. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce G. Kaufmann, Esquire 11151 66th Street North Suite 401 Largo, Florida 34643 Paul C. Stradler, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, Esquire General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, William D. Manser (Respondent) was licensed in Florida as a real estate broker, having been issued license number BK 0427410. Respondent was a broker/officer of United Equity Marketing, Inc., located at 6635 West Commercial Boulevard, Tamarac, Florida. Since October 1, 1995, his broker's license has not been on an active status due to non-renewal of the corporate registration. By warranty deed dated February 14, 1992, James and Angela Cunduff became owners of property located at 6531 Southwest Seventh Place, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. By Articles of Agreement for Deed dated February 25, 1992, James and Angela Cunduff agreed to convey the property to Respondent's corporation, United Capital Networks, Inc., if certain conditions were complied with. The conditions included Respondent's corporation making all the mortgage payments and paying the taxes on the property, and keeping the buildings on the property properly insured. In return, James and Angela Cunduff agreed, among other things, to execute a warranty deed to Respondent's corporation and to place the warranty deed in escrow. Respondent and the Cunduffs agreed that the Articles of Agreement for Deed would not be recorded. Respondent looked upon himself and conducted his actions as the owner of the property at 6531 Southwest Seventh Place, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On October 31, 1995, Mary J. Augustine signed a lease agreement for the rental of a portion of the home, the rear of the home, located at 6531 Southwest Seventh Place, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The rear area of the home had its own entrance. The rental was for one year, beginning November 15, 1995, and ending October 30, 1996. Respondent used part of the home as a storage area. At the front of the home, there were two separate entrances. One of the separate entrances was for the storage area. The other separate entrance was for another area of the home. The lease agreement indicated United Equity Markets, Inc., as the managing agent of the property. The lease agreement required signatures of the "Tenant" and the "Lessor." Ms. Augustine signed the lease as "Tenant," and Respondent signed as "Lessor," adding the word "Agent" next to his signature. United Equity Markets, Inc., is Respondent's corporation. Prior to the signing of the lease, Respondent had met with Ms. Augustine at the house at least twice before she signed the lease agreement. Respondent represented himself as the manager of the property. The home was listed as a single-family residence. Ms. Augustine believed that the home would be occupied by Respondent, another tenant, and herself. The evidence is insufficient to show and make a finding that three families would live or had lived at the home. In accordance with the lease agreement, Ms. Augustine gave Respondent $1,290, as a security deposit. Ms. Augustine had also given Respondent, prior to the security deposit, $645 for the first month's rent. Ms. Augustine wanted to move into the rear portion of the home approximately two weeks prior to the beginning of the rental period. Respondent agreed that Ms. Augustine could have access to the home and clean the rear area where she was going to reside. Ms. Augustine had problems with, such things as, the refrigerator, oven, and swimming pool. She decided not to rent the home. Ms. Augustine demanded her deposit and first month's rent from Respondent. However, he refused to return the monies. The lease agreement contained a default provision, providing for the recovery of damages by the lessor if the tenant defaulted. The lease agreement also contained a security provision, providing for the non-refundable nature of the security deposit under certain conditions, including termination of the lease prior to its expiration. Ms. Augustine attempted but could not contact Respondent at his office because he had closed his office prior to October 1995. Ms. Augustine attempted also to contact Respondent at the telephone number that he had provided her, which was his home number. She was again unsuccessful due to Respondent having his telephone disconnected because he had gone to New York to care for his ill sister. Respondent did not provide Ms. Augustine with an accounting of the monies. Respondent was conducting his own personal real estate transaction with Ms. Augustine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against William D. Manser. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1999.
Findings Of Fact John F. Cole, David J. Hayes and Andre LeClerc conveyed certain real estate situated in Broward County ("the property") to respondent by quitclaim deed dated December 16, 1976, and recorded on December 29, 1976. This instrument reflects payment of a documentary stamp tax in the amount of thirty cents ($0.30) as well as a documentary surtax. On September 30, 1971, Thomas N. Sprague and Peggy A. Sprague had mortgaged the property to Merle Ford to secure repayment of the principal sum of twenty-three thousand five hundred dollars ($23,500.00). On October 1, 1971, the Spragues mortgaged the property to Atlantic Federal Savings and Loan Association of Fort Lauderdale to secure repayment of the principal sum of one hundred three thousand dollars ($103,000.00) On November 21, 1973, John A. Kasbar, as trustee, mortgaged the property to the Spragues to secure repayment of the principal sum of twenty- three thousand one hundred dollars ($23,100.00) On June 5, 1969, Esther E. Adams conveyed the property by warranty deed to Andre LeClerc, as trustee. The warranty deed reflected payment of a documentary stamp tax in the amount of five hundred forty-three dollars ($543.00). The property which was the subject of these transactions is evidently worth a substantial sum of money, but the evidence fails to establish the value of the interest quitclaimed on December 16, 1976, and does not establish what consideration for the quitclaim deed was given, if any was given.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the notice of proposed assessment be withdrawn. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Mr. Ronald Payne, Esquire 621 South Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida
