The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact At times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, a female born in October 1953, received housing assistance from a federally funded assistance program referred to as the Section 8 Choice Voucher program (the Section 8 program). The Section 8 program relevant to this proceeding is administered by Respondent and has eligibility criteria that a participant must meet. A participant receives a voucher from the Section 8 program that pays part, but not all, of the participant’s rent. Petitioner has also received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) at all times relevant to this proceeding. Respondent knew that Petitioner received SSI, but it had no information as to why she qualified to receive SSI. At the times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner’s landlord was named Rupert Phipps. On May 27, 2007, Mr. Phipps issued to Petitioner a notice styled “Three-day Notice for Non- payment of Rent pursuant to Florida Statutes" (Notice). After stating the amount owed and the address of the rented premises, the Notice demanded “. . . payment of the rent or possession of the Premises within three days (excluding Saturday, Sunday and legal holidays). ” Petitioner was evicted from her apartment. The date of the eviction was not established. After being advised by Mr. Phipps that Petitioner had failed to pay her rent, Ms. Smith mailed to Petitioner a certified letter dated July 6, 2007, stating that she would be terminated from the Section 8 program effective August 6, 2007. The stated reason for the termination was Petitioner’s failure to pay rent to the landlord, which is considered a serious violation of the lease and, therefore, a violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982,511(4)(c), which prohibits a participant in the Section 8 program from committing any serious or repeated violation of the lease with the participant’s landlord. Ms. Smith’s letter also contained the following statement: . . . If you wish to appeal this decision, you have the right to an informal hearing. The request must be submitted to this agency in writing within 10 days from the date of this letter. Your request should be directed to Alex Morales, Executive Director. The ten-day period for the appeal is part of Respondent’s written policies and is consistent with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 982.554(a), that require an agency such as Respondent to have a written appeals process. Respondent has consistently treated the failure of a participant to pay his or her share of the rent as a serious violation of a lease. Petitioner was familiar with Respondent’s appeal process because she had successfully appealed a prior notice of termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Ms. Smith’s letter was received by Petitioner on July 7, 2007. At some undetermined time between July 7 and July 19, 2007, Ms. Tennie called Ms. Smith and told Ms. Smith that she was sick. Ms. Smith told Ms. Tennie that she would have to follow the instructions set forth in the letter and respond in writing if she wanted an informal appeal. On July 19, 2007, Petitioner sent the following letter to the attention of Ms. Smith and Mr. Morales: Would you give me Mae Tennie another hearing because I got the letter to [sic] late and I was in the hospital due to an anurism [sic] stroke at the brain their [sic] was blood on my head and I’m still rehabilitating the after affects [sic] of this serious condition. In the case of my Section 8 voucher being terminated I plead for another hearing due to the terms [sic] of my hospitalization. Respondent received Petitioner’s letter on July 23, 2007. Petitioner’s written request for an appeal was after the ten-day deadline for filing the request. By letter signed by Mr. Morales and dated July 25, 2007, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request contained in her letter dated July 19 as follows: I am in receipt of your letter requesting a hearing. Please be advised that your request for a hearing cannot be granted because your request was not made within the required 10 day period. For this reason, your case will remain closed. No further action was taken by either party to this proceeding until December 2007, when Petitioner sought the services of Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc. On December 20, 2007, Mr. Lewis, as counsel for Petitioner, sent the following letter to Mr. Morales: This office represents Ms. Mae Tennie regarding her participation in the Section 8 program administered through the Hialeah Housing Authority (“HHA”). Ms. Tennie has been a participant of Section 8 through HHA for the past 25 years. On July 6, 2007, HHA served Ms. Tennie with notice of its intent to terminate her Section 8 assistance on the basis that she violated one of her obligations under the program. The notice informed Ms. Tennie of her right to appeal the decision and to attend an informal hearing. The written request was to be submitted to HHA within 10 days of the date of the letter. Ms. Tennie faxed her written request for an appeal on July 19, 2007. A copy of Ms. Tennie’s letter is attached as “Attachment A.” In her request, she notified HHA that she was unable to submit her request within the time required because she [had] been, and still was, recovering from a brain aneurism.[2] On or about July 31, 2007, HHA notified Ms. Tennie that her request was denied because it was submitted too late. Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie with an informal hearing to appeal the termination. Ms. Tennie is an elderly woman in failing health. In June 2007, Ms. Tennie was hospitalized twice at Jackson South Community Hospital as a result of suffering an “intracranial hemorrhage.”[3] I have attached copies of supporting medical documentation as “Attachment B.” As a result of this very serious medical condition, Ms. Tennie’s cognitive abilities were significantly diminished. Ms. Tennie was bed-bound and only able to communicate under great strain. The Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits [sic] any agency or landlord receiving federal funds to deny equal access for individuals with disabilities to housing or other program benefits and services. To ensure individuals with disabilities have equal access to those services and benefits, an agency or landlord is required to provide reasonable accommodations to that person’s disability. One form of reasonable accommodations is the modification of a program rule or policy. The right to a hearing to appeal the termination of Section 8 assistance is a benefit that Ms. Tennie, as a participant, was entitled to. Ms. Tennie made clear in her letter to HHA that she was unable to comply with HHA’s time requirement because of her disabling medical condition. Ms. Tennie also asked that the policy be modified to accommodate her disability. HHA should have reasonably accommodated Ms. Tennie’s disability by simply modifying the time period by adding 3 extra days for her to submit her request for a hearing. By failing to do so, HHA effectively denied Ms. Tennie equal access to federal benefit under the Section 8 program, that of having a hearing to appeal her termination. Ms. Tennie is therefore renewing her request to HHA for reasonable accommodations to her disability by modifying the time limit to request a hearing. For the above reasons, Ms. Tennie requests that HHA reconsider its denial and provide Ms. Tennie a hearing to challenge her termination from Section 8. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or additional information at ... . [telephone number omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] By letter dated December 26, 2007, Respondent denied the request set forth in Mr. Lewis’s letter. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the complaint with HUD that culminated in this proceeding as described in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order. Ms. Tennie was hospitalized June 7, 2007, and discharged June 14, 2007. Mr. Lewis attached to his letter a discharge summary from Jackson Memorial Hospital, which contained the following diagnoses on discharge: Intracranial hemorrhage with intraventricular extension secondary to uncontrolled hypertension. Diabetes. The discharge summary reflects that Petitioner had fallen the Saturday before admission and had hit her head on a doorknob. The discharge summary reflects that on discharge she was awake, alert, and oriented times three. She had fluent speech and she was able to ambulate without difficulty. She was instructed to make an appointment with her primary care doctor in one week and to follow up in the Jackson Memorial’s Stroke Clinic in 4 to 8 weeks. Petitioner was discharged to home in a stable condition. Petitioner scheduled an appointment with Milton R. Bengoa, M.D., and on June 18, 2007, she kept that appointment. No finding is made as to Petitioner’s physical status as determined by Dr. Bengoa because nearly all of his notes of that meeting are illegible. In response to questions from her attorney, Petitioner testified as follows beginning at page 27, line 12: Q. And Ms. Tennie, can you please describe what your current health conditions are? A. Right now it’s not very good, because after I had the aneurism I have been having problems walking and problems breathing and I have seizures that I never had before until I had the aneurism and I take all kinds of medicines. And I just found out last week I have a brain mass and they don’t know if it is cancer or what, because the blood that was left in my head was still there so I have excruciating headaches. Q. And could you please explain what your health condition was at or about the time you suffered the stroke or shortly after you had suffered the stroke? A. Well, shortly after I suffered the stroke I had to try and walk all over again, because my memory where I had the stroke at, the neurologist said that it was so deep in my brain that they couldn’t do surgery and that it was going to mess my motor skills up. So I had to learn how to swallow. I forgot how to swallow meat and stuff, so I started eating soft food. I had problems breathing, so when I come [sic] home I had a breathing machine – oxygen machine there. My daughter had to help me try to walk all over again. Q. And so I take it you had someone helping you? A. Yes. My daughter. I moved home with my daughter, because they wanted to put me out at Purdue, it is a nursing facility, but she wanted me to come home with her, so that is what I did. I went home with my daughter and I stayed there for six months. Then I found the place down the street, close to her, which was a two bedroom. Q. Now, prior to suffering the stroke, how was your – can you describe what your health condition was. A. Before I had the stroke, I was sick too. I have congestive heart failure, so I kept going back and forth into the hospital because of my breathing. When the water built up around my heart it had [sic] me to where I can’t breathe. So I have to go in and let them pull the water off. And I was sick before I had the stroke. Petitioner also testified that she could not timely request a hearing and blamed that inability on her general medical condition. Petitioner’s testimony as to her medical condition shortly after the hospitalization is unconvincing because it contradicts the description of her medical condition as described by her treating physician in the discharge notes. The evidence established that Petitioner received Ms. Smith's letter dated July 6, 2007, and understood its contents. Petitioner’s testimony is insufficient to establish that her medical condition caused her failure to timely request an informal hearing to appeal of the termination of her participation in the Section 8 program. Petitioner failed to establish that she required an extension of the expired deadline to request an informal hearing as a “reasonable accommodation” of her condition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not liable for the acts of discrimination alleged in the subject Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether any of the respondents is guilty of unlawful discrimination against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling, in violation of section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been an individual with a disability because he is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). He is required regularly to take medication to control the disease. At all material times, Respondent Scandinavian Properties, LLC (Respondent Scandinavian) has owned a small complex of rental units in Miami Beach consisting of one or more Airbnb units at the back of the property and two duplex units at the front of property in a two-story building. This case involves one of the two-bedroom, one-bath duplexes with the address of 7910 Byron Avenue, Unit 1 (Unit 1), which was the ground-floor duplex. At all material times, Respondent Renes has been a managing principal of Respondent Scandinavian, and Respondent Bourguigne has been an employee of a property management company retained by Respondent Scandinavian to manage the complex. In an effort to find a suitable rental unit, Petitioner employed the services of a real estate broker or associate, who contacted Respondent Renes to discuss the rental of Unit 1, which had just undergone extensive renovations of two years' duration. Petitioner was recovering from recent surgery, so, as a favor to the real estate agent, Respondent Renes agreed to rent Unit 1 to Petitioner with a background check, but not the customary face-to-face meeting that Respondent Renes required with prospective tenants. Thus, Respondent Renes had limited, if any, contact with Petitioner during the lease negotiations. Petitioner and Respondent Scandinavian entered into a 12-month lease commencing November 1, 2018 (Lease). The Lease prohibited keeping any pets, smoking "in the Premises," creating any "environmental hazards on or about the Premises," keeping any flammable items "that might increase the danger of fire or damage" on the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, destroying, defacing, damaging, impairing or removing any part of the premises belonging to Respondent Scandinavian, and making any alterations or improvements to the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, although Petitioner was allowed to hang pictures and install window treatments. The Lease required Petitioner to ensure that all persons on the premises acted in a manner that did not "unreasonably disturb any neighbors or constitute a breach of the peace" and permitted Respondent Scandinavian to adopt or modify rules for the use of the common areas and conduct on the premises. The Lease assigned to Petitioner the responsibility for maintaining smoke detectors, locks, keys, and any furniture in the unit. The Lease permitted "[o]ccasional overnight guests," who could occupy the premises for no more than seven nights per month, and required written approval for anyone else to occupy the premises. Among the rules of the complex was a prohibition against disabling smoke detectors. However, without reference to the Lease provision applicable to pets, one rule allowed one dog or one cat. Another rule assured that management would help tenants gain access to their units when locked out. Within a few weeks of the commencement of the Lease, Petitioner's visitors violated two provisions of the Lease by smoking outside and allowing a dog to run loose in the common area. Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner of the violations, which do not appear to have resulted in any penalties. Admitting to the presence of the dog, Petitioner testified only that the video of the dog violation, if not also the smoking violation, led him to believe that he was being watched. Petitioner's complaint of individual surveillance became an ongoing issue--in his mind. The minimal staffing and small area occupied by the small complex, as a practical matter, both precluded individual operation of cameras to trace the movements of Petitioner and his visitors in the common area and facilitated the surveillance of all, or nearly all, of the common area with relatively few cameras. The evidence fails to support Petitioner's claim that the respondents at any time conducted video surveillance particularly of Petitioner or his visitors. Subsequently, Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner that someone had been shouting his name outside the gate of the complex during the evening hours. This incident is not prohibited by the Lease because the person, while perhaps acquainted with Petitioner, was not his invitee onto or about the premises. Nonetheless, Petitioner's sole reported reaction to this disturbance was to demand a copy of any video--and complain when the respondents failed to comply with his demand. Another of Petitioner's visitors parked a car outside the gate in a space reserved for occupants of the Airbnbs. When, evidently in the presence of Petitioner, Respondent Bourguigne confronted the visitor, the visitor replied that he had only been parked there for 20 minutes. Respondent Bourguigne stated that she had seen the car parked in the spot for 43 minutes. Again, Petitioner's sole response was not to deal with the violation, but to complain about surveillance, evidently of the parking area. The most serious violations of the Lease were discovered on January 28, 2019, when Respondent Renes conducted an inspection of Unit 1. Respondent Renes inspected all rental units of the complex every two or three months to check for safety issues that could imperil tenants or the complex itself. In her inspection, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had disconnected the smoke alarms and encased them in plastic tape to render them inoperative. She also found that Petitioner had crowded the unit with furniture to the point of impeding egress and constituting a fire hazard. Although not involving safety issues, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had attached screws to metal doors and kitchen cabinets, damaging these new fixtures. Additionally, Respondent Renes noted the presence of a cat. As noted above, the rules conflicted with the Lease as to the presence of a single dog or cat. In any event, by this time, the respondents were aware that the cat, as well as a human, routinely shared Unit 1 with Petitioner, and the respondents had impliedly consented to these cohabitations. Again, Petitioner's reaction to the Lease violations found by Respondent Renes on January 28 was not to address the problems. Instead, he objected to the inspection as singling him out. By letter delivered to Petitioner on February 14, 2019, Respondent Scandinavian advised that he was in violation of the Lease for allowing an unauthorized person and a cat to occupy the unit, for wrapping the smoke detectors in plastic, for damaging the unit's fixtures by attaching screws into the metal doors and kitchen cabinets, and by cluttering the interior of the unit so as to impede internal movement. The letter demands that Petitioner correct the violations within seven days, or else Respondent Scandinavian would terminate the lease. Respondent Bourguigne's main involvement with this case involves an incident that occurred on the evening of February 15, 2019, when Petitioner locked his keys in his unit and was unable to unlock the door or otherwise enter the unit. Petitioner called the office, but Respondent Bourguigne, who responds to such requests during her normal working hours of Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., did not receive the call until the following morning when she listened to messages. Respondent Bourguigne promptly called Respondent Renes for guidance, and Respondent Renes directed her to summon the complex's handyman, who, as soon as he could, which was 1:00 p.m. on February 16, drove to the complex and opened Unit 1 for Petitioner. Rather than call a locksmith when the respondents failed to respond immediately to his call to the office, Petitioner and a companion attempted to break into Unit 1 with a screwdriver at about 1:30 a.m. Although unaware of the lockout, Respondent Renes learned of the attempted break-in through an automated security system, so she called the police, who reported to the scene and, after briefly interrogating Petitioner, determined that no crime had taken place. Petitioner wrongly concluded that Respondent Renes had been watching him in real time and called the police, knowing that the apparent perpetrator was really Petitioner and no crime was taking place. While locked out of his unit, Petitioner had also sent emails to Respondent Renes. In one of them sent on February 16, Petitioner advised for the first time that he was diagnosed with HIV and dependent on medication that was locked in his unit. Respondent Renes testified that she did not see these emails until days later. At minimum, it is clear that, prior to February 16, no respondent was on notice of Petitioner's disability, so the seven-day notice letter delivered two days earlier could not have been motivated by a discriminatory intent. Despite the seven-day deadline contained in the letter of February 14, by email or text dated February 21, Petitioner advised Respondent Renes that, by 2:00 p.m. on February 22, he "will have remedied each of the … listed [violations]." This was one day past the deadline. Because Petitioner failed timely to meet the conditions of the February 14 seven-day notice letter, Respondent Scandinavian commenced an eviction proceeding on February 22 and, after a hearing, obtained a judgment ordering the eviction of Petitioner. Petitioner failed to prove any discriminatory intent on the part of any of the respondents in their dealings with him, any incidental discriminatory effect in their acts and omissions, or any failure or refusal to accommodate Petitioner's disability. To the contrary, as to discrimination, Respondent Renes chose to forego eviction and instead give Petitioner a chance timely to remedy the Lease violations; when Petitioner failed to do so, Respondent Scandinavian proceeded to evict Petitioner. Nor has any act or omission of any respondent had a discriminatory incidental effect on Petitioner. Lastly, the availability of Respondents Renes and Bourguigne or other employees of Respondent Scandinavian to open units to locked-out tenants and occupants was reasonable and in no way constituted a failure to accommodate Petitioner's disability, for which Petitioner never requested or, on these facts, needed an accommodation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the respondents not guilty of the charges set forth in the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Philip Kim, Esquire Pensky & Kim, P.A. 12550 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 401 North Miami, Florida 33181 (eServed) Jack Wilson 17560 Atlantic Boulevard, Apartment 515 Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160 (eServed) Cheyenne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling; or provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”), section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2019).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female residing in Tallahassee, Florida, who purports to have diagnoses of depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and a learning disability. Petitioner offered no evidence regarding how her diagnoses affect her daily life. Petitioner originally signed a lease with Respondent to rent apartment F201 at Sabal Court Apartments, 2125 Jackson Bluff Road, Tallahassee, Florida, from November 1, 2017, to October 31, 2018. Petitioner moved into the apartment with her two minor children on November 2, 2017. Petitioner testified her two minor children also have ADHD. On October 24, 2018, Petitioner renewed her lease for the apartment for the term of November 1, 2018, through October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that, during the term of both leases, she experienced problems with the apartment; including mold in the bathroom, bed bugs, ants, roaches, spiders, and cracked flooring. Most distressing to Petitioner was the air conditioning unit, which Petitioner alleges was filthy and failed to cool the apartment. Petitioner testified she submitted several requests for the unit to be serviced, but it was never repaired to good working condition. Petitioner complained that the apartment was too hot—frequently reaching temperatures in excess of 80 degrees—for her and her children to sleep at night. On August 7, 2019, Petitioner executed a lease renewal form, requesting to renew her lease for an additional 12 months—through October 31, 2020. On September 23, 2019, Respondent posted a Notice of Non-Renewal of Lease (“Notice”) on Petitioner’s apartment door. The Notice notified Petitioner that her tenancy would not be renewed and that she was expected to vacate the premises on or before October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that she did not know why her lease was non- renewed, but believed it to be additional mistreatment of her and her family by Respondent. In response to the undersigned’s question why Petitioner believed Respondent’s treatment of her to be related to her handicap, or that of her children, Petitioner replied that she does not believe that the non-renewal of her lease, or other issues with Respondent’s management, was based on either her handicap or that of her children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202021115. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Dastha L. Crews Apartment A 2125 Pecan Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Joni Henley, Assistant Manager Sabal Court Apartments 2125 Jackson Bluff Road Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Todd A. Ruderman Green Oaks Tampa, LLC Suite 218 3201 West Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Cordell John, (Landlord) discriminated against Petitioner, Denise Johnson- Acosta (Johnson) on the basis of her or her daughter’s alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Johnson is a Hispanic woman. She has asthma and other medical conditions. Johnson has a teenage daughter, Ashley Denise Rivera. Ashley has a seizure disorder and has bipolar disorder. Johnson is engaged to Alexis Pons. The Landlord is an African-American male. He owns the property located at 13847 Beauregard Place in Orlando, Florida (the Property). The Property is a single-family residential townhouse. At some unspecified time during calendar year 2012, Johnson approached the Landlord expressing an interest in leasing the Property. At that time, another tenant was living in the Property but was in the process of moving out. The Landlord showed Johnson the Property. Johnson expressed her complete satisfaction with the Property and that she would like to lease it (and possibly buy it in the future). At first sight, Johnson liked everything about the Property except for the back yard. On September 10, 2012, the Landlord emailed a Rental Application to Johnson. The email advised Johnson that there would be a $50 application fee which must be paid when the application was delivered. In response to the email, Johnson confirmed that she wanted to view the Property on the upcoming Thursday. On September 11, 2012, Johnson filled out the Rental Application and provided it to the Landlord for review. The application listed Johnson as the primary tenant and Ashley and Pons as additional residents. The application also noted that Johnson had a pet, a petite Chihuahua, which would be living in the unit. After reviewing the application, the Landlord notified Johnson via email that he would need pictures of the Chihuahua. He also asked how much the dog weighed. The Landlord also told Johnson that the rent would be $1,250 per month and that a $200 nonrefundable pet fee must be paid. Johnson replied that the dog weighed four pounds. She was concerned that the Landlord was now quoting $1,250 per month when earlier discussions had indicated the rent would be $1,200 per month. Johnson thanked the Landlord and agreed to provide a picture of the dog. The Landlord replied to Johnson that when pets are involved, the rent is increased slightly. Johnson and the Landlord had a conversation on September 17, 2012. By email dated September 18, 2012, Johnson told the Landlord that she had decided to withdraw her application because of “multiple misunderstandings” between the parties. At some point thereafter, Johnson decided to go through with the lease after all. On October 20, 2012, Johnson did a walk-through inspection of the Property. By way of her signature on the walk-through check list, Johnson agreed that the living room, kitchen, dining room, both bathrooms, both bedrooms, and all other portions of the Property were satisfactory. The only caveat was that there was stain on a counter in the kitchen area. Johnson said she would “advise at time of move” as to her feelings about the parking areas and the patio/terrace/deck area. On November 2, 2012, Johnson and the Landlord entered into a binding Residential Tenancy Agreement. Johnson initialed each page and signed the agreement. The agreement was witnessed by two individuals. On or about that same date, Johnson gave the Landlord several money orders: A $250 money order for the pet deposit; $50 for Pons’ application fee, and $880 for prorated rent for November. Johnson did not complain about the pet deposit at that time. Johnson moved into the Property on or about November 2, 2012. About two months later, on January 1, 2013, Johnson mailed a letter to the Landlord via certified mail, return receipt requested. The letter advised the Landlord that Johnson would be moving out of the Property on or before January 14, 2013. The letter cited several bases for the decision to move out, including: Air condition vents were “visibly covered with dust and dark surroundings”; Johnson and her daughter have severe allergies; Johnson has acute asthma and bronchitis; and The dwelling is unlivable. Johnson also claimed many violations of Florida law by the Landlord concerning the lease, including: Taking a deposit for a pet when that pet was in fact a companion dog. (Johnson submitted a letter into evidence from a behavioral health care employee. The letter, dated some five months after Johnson vacated the unit, said that Ashley would benefit from having a companion dog as she did not have many friends. There was no evidence that the Chihuahua was ever registered or approved as a companion dog.); Smoke alarms which were not in working order; Electrical breakers tripping throughout Property; Unreimbursed expenses, e.g., for changing locks; Failure to put Pons on the lease agreement despite doing a background financial check on him; and Harassment from Bank of America employees trying to collect the Landlord’s mortgage payment for the Property. In the letter stating she would be moving, Johnson expressed her sorrow that the housing situation did not work out. She then set forth the amount of deposit money she believed should be returned to her. In response, she received a letter from the Landlord’s counsel advising that her security and pet deposits had been forfeited. On January 4, 2013, the Landlord posted a notice on the Property door demanding payment of outstanding rent within three days. In lieu of payment, Johnson could vacate the premises within three days. Johnson vacated the premises. On January 14, 2013, Johnson did an exit walk-through of the Property, along with the Landlord, his mother, and Pons. At the completion of the walk- through, Johnson turned over the keys for the Property to the Landlord. Johnson claims discrimination on the part of the Landlord because he failed to recognize or accept the companion dog, failed to put Pons on the lease agreement, and failed to make accommodations for Johnson’s claimed health conditions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Denise Johnson-Acosta in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cordell John 2921 Swoops Circle Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Denise Johnson-Acosta Post Office Box 453347 Kissimmee, Florida 34745 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Assad F. Malaty, discriminated against Petitioners, Dr. James E. Townsend and his niece, Contessa Idleburg (formerly, Ms. Rogers), in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the appropriate remedy therefor.
Findings Of Fact Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Dr. Townsend has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. He suffered a stroke in May 2014, upon which the requested modifications and accommodations were based. The stroke substantially limited one or more major life activities, given his need for using a wheelchair and walker. § 760.22(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Mr. Malaty conceded as much at the hearing.3/ Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Ms. Idleburg has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. She has a shunt to drain fluid from her brain, has received Supplemental Social Security Income since at least 2014, and also has used a walker. That said, the evidence is undisputed that Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodations solely to assist Dr. Townsend after he suffered the stroke. Thus, Ms. Idleburg’s handicap is not relevant to the claims at issue. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Petitioners informed Mr. Malaty in May 2014 that Dr. Townsend suffered a stroke and requested that he make several modifications to the Unit, including handrails in the bathroom, and handrails and a ramp at the front door, and to accommodate them by assigning them a parking spot outside the Unit. There is no dispute that the requested modifications and accommodation were never made. Importantly, however, the evidence does not establish that Petitioners’ renewed those requests again before they filed complaints with the Department of Justice in late 2016 and HUD in early 2017.4/ Although Dr. Townsend reminded Mr. Malaty in a December 2016 letter that he had failed to make the requested the modifications, the undersigned finds that letter to be more in the nature of a response to Mr. Malaty’s threat of eviction rather than a renewed request to accommodate them. The weight of the credible evidence also confirms that Petitioners never offered to pay for the handrails, ramp, or signage for the requested parking spot. Indeed, Dr. Townsend testified that he believed Mr. Malaty was responsible for making such modifications as the owner of the Unit. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Mr. Malaty did not evict Petitioners because of their handicaps or their requests for modifications or an accommodation. Mr. Malaty initially threatened to evict them for failing to pay rent in January 2013, reducing their rent in September and December 2016, and failing to take care of the lawn as required in the lease. It had been three years since Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodation due to Dr. Townsend’s stroke and they did not re-raise those issues again until after Mr. Malaty threatened to evict them for failing to pay the rent. The evidence also is clear that Petitioners could have avoided eviction by paying the missed rent by December 29, 2016. But, they failed to do so and then did not pay their rent in January 2017, which ultimately led to Mr. Malaty filing the eviction action.
Conclusions For Petitioners: James E. Townsend, Sr., pro se Contessa Idleburg, pro se Apartment 2101 140 Aida Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 For Respondent: Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esquire Law Office of Charlann Jackson Sanders 2225 East Edgewood Drive, Suite 8 Lakeland, Florida 33803
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Center Lake Owner's Association, Inc. ("Center Lake"), discriminated against Petitioner, James Schweim ("Schweim"), on the basis of his purported disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Schweim is a white male who at all times material hereto resided at Center Lake. Schweim provided some evidence of his medical condition at final hearing, but did not affirmatively establish a disability, per se. Notwithstanding that fact, a review of the facts will be made concerning the merits of Schweim's claim. Center Lake is the homeowner's association for the Center Lake subdivision located in Manatee County. The association has been in existence since 1986. The subdivision is subject to various deed restrictions as set forth in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Centre1/ Lake, recorded at O.R. Book 1168, Page 1508, in the public records of Manatee County, Florida. Of significance to this proceeding, Section 11 of the deed restrictions is relevant. Section 11, as it will be referred to herein, states in whole: Vehicles. No vehicle of a subdivision resident shall be parked in the subdivision except on a paved driveway, or inside a garage. No vehicle shall at anytime be parked on grass or other vegetation. No trucks or vehicles which are used for commercial purposes, other than those present on business, nor any trailers, may be parked in the subdivision unless inside a garage and concealed from public view. Boats, boat trailers, campers, vans, motorcycles and other recreational vehicles and any vehicle not in operable condition or validly licensed shall be permitted in the subdivision only if parked inside a garage and concealed from public view. No maintenance or repair of any boat or vehicle shall be permitted upon any Lot except within an enclosed garage. Beginning some time in 2004, Schweim and Center Lake commenced a dispute concerning Schweim's alleged violation of the provisions of Section 11. Specifically, Schweim was accused of parking a recreational vehicle (the "RV") on his property in violation of the deed restriction. There is no dispute between the parties that Schweim owns a 23-foot recreational vehicle, which is kept on his property (at 3550 65th Avenue Circle East). As a result of the 2004 dispute, the parties entered into a Settlement Stipulation signed by Center Lake and its attorneys on December 6 and 7, 2004, respectively. Schweim's attorney signed the document on November 24, 2004; Schweim and his wife signed on that same date. The Settlement Stipulation was admitted into evidence at the final hearing. Schweim asserted that the version of the Settlement Stipulation entered into evidence was not the version he signed, but the most persuasive evidence is that it is the same version. Schweim does not agree that all the terms and conditions in the Settlement Stipulation were extant at the time he signed, but he could not produce a copy of any other version of the document for comparison. In the Settlement Stipulation, Schweim agreed to move the RV from his property and not to bring it onto the property except for loading or unloading. In exchange, Center Lake agreed to voluntarily dismiss its then-pending lawsuit against Schweim. Despite the resolution of the aforementioned lawsuit, Schweim did not remove his RV from his property. Instead, Schweim kept the RV on the property and, ultimately, filed a discrimination action against Center Lake because of their efforts to have him remove the RV. That action is the subject of the instant proceeding. Schweim does not dispute that he is keeping the RV on his property in violation of the deed restrictions. Rather, Schweim suggests that he should be allowed to do so on three bases: One, that he is proposing a fence on his property that will cover the RV and make it hidden from view from the street; Two, that there are other residents of the subdivision who are also in violation of the deed restrictions; and, three, that he is disabled and needs the RV parked on his property to accommodate his disability. As to his first reason, Schweim's proposal is simply that, a proposal. There is no evidence that the fence proposed by Schweim would satisfy the requirements of the deed restriction. Further, Center Lake has no confidence, based on its history with Schweim, that he would follow through with the proposal. There is some evidence that other residents in the area appear to be in violation of the deed restrictions. However, there was no evidence presented at final hearing that those residents had refused to move their vehicles upon filing of a complaint. That is, the homeowner's association tends not to take any action unless a homeowner files a formal complaint concerning a violation. In Schweim's case, several complaints were filed as to his RV. There was also some discussion at final hearing as to the appropriate licensure for the RV. Any vehicle not properly licensed is not allowed to be parked in the subdivision based on the deed restrictions. However, Schweim says the license is currently up-to-date and that is no longer an issue. Concerning Schweim's disability, he presented the following facts: At age 23, Schweim suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen, causing long-term damage; In 1991, Schweim had a ruptured disc; Surgical fusion of his disc was performed in 2002 and again in 2004; In 2009, Schweim underwent a lumbar fusion. As a result of those events, Schweim has what he describes as an acute medical condition limiting his ambulatory abilities. At the final hearing, Schweim negotiated the hearing room slowly and with some difficulty. Judy Schweim, a nurse, testified that she transports Schweim to doctor's appointments and other medical situations. At times, Schweim's back will "go out," and she is responsible for getting him to medical treatment as soon as possible. Schweim produced evidence that he has received a Florida parking permit for disabled persons. The application for the permit indicates his condition as "severe limitation in a person's ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition." A doctor's order dated May 6, 2004, indicates that it is "medically necessary for [Schweim] to have ready access to a walk-in vehicle to accommodate his disability." An August 19, 2010, memo from Dr. Tally at the Neuro Spinal Associates, P.A., and a September 27, 2010, memo from the Dolphin Medical Group, state essentially the same thing. None of the hearsay documents were sufficient to establish a disability, per se. Schweim says that his disability makes it necessary for him to have the RV parked in his yard so that, when necessary, he can use it to get medical treatment. Schweim says that when his back goes out, he needs a vehicle that he can walk into while standing up. He cannot sit down into an automobile at those times. The incidences of Schweim's debilitating back pain only occur every couple of years. When not experiencing that pain, Schweim is able to drive his red car, described by neighbors as a "hot rod," without any problem. Schweim drove a motorcycle for years, but says he has not driven it for quite some time. Schweim said that an ambulance was not a viable option for him when he has the back pain, because the ambulance will not take him where he needs to go, i.e., straight to a particular doctor, rather than the emergency room. There is no competent evidence to support that contention. Schweim candidly admits that the only time he needs the RV is when he has an episode with his back and that such episodes are few and far between. And while it is true that an episode may occur at any time, there is insufficient evidence to support Schweim's claim that the RV is integral to him receiving prompt and appropriate medical care.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, James Schweim, in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondents committed discriminatory housing practices against Petitioners based on their familial status.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners appeared but presented no evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2008.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners on the basis of race, or retaliated against them for exercising a protected right, or both, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Because no evidence was admitted into the record at the final hearing, the undersigned cannot make any findings of fact. § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (“Findings of fact shall be based … exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters officially recognized.”).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Petitioners no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Antonio Carraway Whang Carraway 1406 Southwest Osprey Cove Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 (eServed) Jillian Sidisky, Esquire Stefanie S. Copelow, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 120 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's race, African-American, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Miguel Johnson is an African-American male and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2009). He filed a complaint for housing discrimination against Riviera Towers at 6896 Abbott Avenue in Miami Beach. Respondent Riviera Terrace Apartments (Riviera Terrace) was apparently erroneously named Riviera Towers in the complaint and in the style of this case. Notice of that error was given by the owner, Arie Markowitz, and in the absence of any indication that Riviera Terrace is a corporate entity, Mr. Markowitz is also added as a Respondent. The style has been corrected to reflect these corrections. Riviera Terrace, 6890 Abbott Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, 33141, is a 20-unit apartment complex. Mr. Johnson thought that the complex has 22 units, but there is no evidence to support his thinking. Contrary to his request, the undersigned has no independent investigative powers and must accept the evidence in the record. According to his records, Mr. Johnson, on March 17, 2009, telephoned a number he saw on a "For Rent" sign at Riviera Terrace. A woman identified as Diana Miteff answered the telephone. Mr. Johnson said Ms. Miteff identified herself as the manager of the complex. The telephone records indicate that the conversation lasted one minute. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him to call back later. Mr. Johnson telephoned Ms. Miteff again on March 21, 2009, and his records indicate that they talked for 8 minutes. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him about the security deposit, that the rent for a one bedroom apartment was $900 a month, and that she had some vacant efficiencies. Mr. Johnson testified that a friend of his, Pedro Valdes, lives in the same complex and that together they met with Ms. Miteff the day after Mr. Johnson talked to her on the telephone, and saw a vacant efficiency apartment. According to Mr. Johnson, Ms. Miteff told him, after seeing him, that there were no vacancies. Ayesha Azara, Mr. Johnson's wife, testified that she made another unsuccessful attempt to rent a unit in Riviera Terrace in May 2009. She had no information in March 2008, except to say tht Ms. Miteff claimed to be the manager and told her the building was for elderly people. Pedro Valdes testified that he lives in Riviera Towers and gave his address as 6896 Abbott Avenue. He said that the "For Rent" sign for Riviera Terrace is not always posted in front of the complex. Mr. Markowitz is the owner of Riviera Terrace at 6890 Abbott Avenue. He testified that he is also the manager and that Ms. Miteff is a tenant. He uses her telephone number on the "For Rent" sign because he does not speak Spanish. The apartments are government-subsidized Section 8 housing. The only vacant efficiency in March 2008 was a unit for which he already had a written lease, but the tenant could not move in until after a government-required inspection. He also testified that his tenants are not all Caucasians and not all elderly. Ms. Miteff confirmed that she has been a resident of Riviera Terrace for 20 years. She concedes that she told Mr. Johnson's wife that the people in the complex are very quiet and mostly old people. Mr. Johnson's claim of discrimination based on race is not supported by the evidence, which is contradictory with regard to the name and address of the property, and because there were no vacant apartments at Riviera Terrace in March 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Supraski, Esquire Louis A. Supraski, P.A. 2450 Northeast Miami Gardens Drive 2nd Floor North Miami Beach, Florida 33180 Miguel Johnson 916 West 42nd Street, Apt. 9 Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Miguel Johnson C/O Robert Fox 1172 South Dixie Highway Coral Gables, Florida 33146 Diana Mittles Riviera Terrace Apartments 6896 Abott Avenue Miami Beach, Florida 33141
The Issue Whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent engaged in an unfair and discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, section 760.20 et seq., Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact Ms. Billingsley is an African-American woman; thus, a member of a protected class. The Housing Authority is a government entity of the City of Winter Park, Florida, that provides affordable, public assistance housing for elderly, disabled, and low-income families and individuals. Applicants for the public housing are required to fill out an application that requests information identifying the applicant's income source, Social Security number, addresses for the past five years, and the size of the apartment that the applicant is seeking to rent. The applicant is then placed on a waiting list for an available apartment. Generally, an applicant is informed that the wait for housing is between six to 12 months. The time on this waiting list can be affected by whether or not an applicant meets the criteria for a preference in granting the housing and transfers of existing tenants within the housing complex. Ms. Hinckley, the Housing Authority's executive director, credibly testified that the Housing Authority provides preferences for working families and families with disabled members. In order to qualify for a working-family preference, an applicant must have worked at least 20 hours a week for six of the last 12 months. Ms. Hinckley credibly explained that before an applicant is moved into a housing unit, the Housing Authority will conduct a home visit and verify the applicant's employment for the working preference. In addition to preferences, Ms. Hinckley explained that the amount of time an applicant is on the waiting list can be affected by transfers within the housing complex. The Housing Authority allows a family to transfer within the housing complex based on need, before accepting new families from the waiting list. For example, a family living in a two-bedroom apartment would be allowed to transfer to a larger three-bedroom apartment before an applicant from the waiting list would be allowed to move into the housing complex. On August 27, 2008, Ms. Billingsley applied with the Housing Authority for a three-bedroom apartment. She indicated in her application that she was eligible for the working-family preference. Ms. Billingsley was then placed on the waiting list and given a working-family preference. On June 2, 2009, Ms. Hinckley conducted the home visit with Ms. Billingsley concerning her application. Between December 2009 and Spring 2010, the Housing Authority began renovations of the rental unit bathrooms. During this time, the Housing Authority was unable to accommodate Ms. Billingsley for a three-bedroom apartment. Moreover, the Housing Authority honored transfers within the housing complex before offering Ms. Billingsley a housing unit. On April 9, 2010, the Housing Authority contacted Ms. Billingsley and informed her that a three-bedroom unit would be available in May of 2010. The Housing Authority then sought to verify Ms. Billingsley's working status. Unfortunately, Ms. Billingsley had recently been discharged from employment. The Housing Authority contacted Ms. Billingsley and asked her to provide proof of employment. On May 12, 2010, Ms. Billingsley informed the Housing Authority that she was not employed, but that she was looking for work. Based on the fact that Ms. Billingsley was not working at the time in late April 2010, she was no longer eligible for the working-family preference. As a result, the Housing Authority did not rent the available unit to Ms. Billingsley. Ms. Billingsley has not provided the Housing Authority with any subsequent proof of employment. Moreover, the Housing Authority has not been able to verify her recent claim that she has been employed by Toys-R-Us. Ms. Billingsley did not introduce any evidence, either direct or indirect, showing that the Housing Authority discriminated against her based on her race or that the Housing Authority had a racial preference for Hispanics.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Fannie Billingsley's, Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2011.
