The Issue Whether there was just cause to terminate Respondent’s annual employment contract during the term of the contract.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the duly authorized entity responsible for the operation, control, and supervision of all public schools (grades kindergarten through 12) in Charlotte County, Florida, and for otherwise providing public education to school-aged children in the county. Art. IX, § (4)b, Fla. Const.; § 1001.32, Fla. Stat. (2016). During all times relevant hereto, Petitioner employed Respondent as a classroom teacher working pursuant to an annual contract. Between the years 1986 through 2000, Respondent worked as an educator for the School District of Hillsborough County, Florida. During the late 1990s, Respondent had multiple surgeries on her lungs and jaw. Respondent was prescribed various pain medications following her surgeries, and unfortunately she became addicted to the medication. Around 1998, Respondent’s addiction to pain medication caused her to engage in criminal activity (i.e. attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud), which resulted in her arrest. Respondent, at the time of her arrest in 1998, was employed as a teacher by the Hillsborough County School District. As a result of her arrest, Respondent resigned from employment with the Hillsborough County School District. Additionally, the Florida Department of Education (DOE) was notified of Respondent’s arrest and as a result thereof suspended Respondent’s teaching certificate for two months, imposed a two-year probationary period, and required Respondent to submit to substance abuse treatment. Respondent left the teaching profession in 1998 and did not return to the profession until 2014, when she became employed by Petitioner. When Respondent returned to the profession in 2014, she still needed to complete the two years of probation imposed against her teaching certificate by DOE. As part of her probation, Respondent was required to submit to two years of random drug testing. For the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years, Respondent passed each of her randomly imposed drug tests and has subsequently been released from probation by DOE. Respondent has suffered from migraine headaches for several years and would often miss work due to migraine-related symptoms. Although Respondent missed several days of work during the 2016-2017 school year as a result of migraine headaches, her absences did not rise to the level to where it became necessary for her school principal to speak with her regarding the issue. On the morning of January 3, 2017, which was a teacher planning day, Respondent awoke with a migraine headache. Teachers are expected to report to work by 6:35 a.m. on teacher planning days. Respondent and Lisa Pellegrino were colleagues and friends. On January 3, 2017, at 7:16 a.m., 7:20 a.m., and at 10:29 a.m., respectively, Respondent called Ms. Pellegrino, who was at work. Respondent’s calls were not answered by Ms. Pellegrino because at the time, Ms. Pellegrino did not have her phone in her possession. At 9:01 a.m., on January 3, 2017, Respondent sent a text message to Ms. Deb Capo, who is the school’s secretary. The text message states: “Woke up with a headache . . . will be in ASAP.” At 10:36 a.m., Ms. Capo responded to the text message asking: “Are you here yet. Lou needs to see you.” Respondent replied and stated, “Not yet . . . I’ll be there by noon. All ok?” Ms. Capo then replied, “Yes. See you then.” At approximately 10:50 a.m., Ms. Pellegrino retrieved her cellphone and noticed that she had missed three calls from Respondent. Fearing a possible emergency, Ms. Pellegrino immediately called Respondent. Ms. Pellegrino testified during the final hearing as follows: I just called her because I wanted to see what was going on. I figured I had three missed calls; maybe there was an emergency. And when I spoke with her, she informed me that she had a really bad migraine, she didn’t think she was going to be able to make it, or she was trying to get pain pills because she couldn’t get her Imitrex prescription for a couple of days, and she was having a hard time getting to work to get her grades completed by the end of the day. And she asked me for pain pills or if I had any, and I said no.[1/] Within an hour or so of speaking with Respondent, Ms. Pellegrino and a few of her colleagues were preparing to leave for lunch when the question was asked, “did Lori [Respondent] come in yet?” One of the teachers in the lunch group was Amy Haggarty, who is the chairperson of the school’s math department and was aware of Respondent’s history of addiction to pain medication. Ms. Pellegrino, in response to the question about Respondent’s whereabouts, mentioned to Ms. Haggarty that she had just gotten off the phone with Respondent and that it was a weird conversation because Respondent said, according to Ms. Pellegrino, “that she has a bad migraine headache and she can’t fill her pain medication,” and asked her [Ms. Pellegrino] “if she had any pain medication.” Ms. Haggarty, because she knew of Respondent’s history with addiction to pain medication, became alarmed by Ms. Pellegrino’s statement and she immediately arranged to meet with the school principal, Mr. Long, to discuss what she had been told about Respondent. During her meeting with Mr. Long, Ms. Haggarty informed him of what she had been told by Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Long, upon concluding his meeting with Ms. Haggarty, then met with Ms. Pellegrino. Upon questioning by Mr. Long, Ms. Pellegrino confirmed that she had spoken with Respondent that morning and that Respondent asked her for pain medication. Mr. Long then contacted the school board’s office of human resources to report what he had been told by Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Long was advised by a representative from the office of human resources that Dave Carter would report to the school on the morning of January 4, 2017, to “possibly place Ms. Lorenz on administrative leave.” Dave Carter is a “human resources investigator” for the Charlotte County School Board and he reports to, among others, Mr. Chuck Breiner, assistant superintendent for the school board. According to Mr. Carter, his job responsibilities include conducting “personnel investigations based on allegations of misconduct or violations of school district policies, rules, or the Department of Education code of ethics.” During his testimony, Mr. Carter explained that when Mr. Breiner, or others as appropriate, believes that reasonable suspicion exists to subject an employee to drug testing, he [Mr. Carter] will go to the employee’s worksite, perform “an on- scene concurrence evaluation” of the employee, and, if necessary, transport the employee to the drug testing facility. Mr. Carter testified that an on-scene concurrence evaluation consists of him “interview[ing] the principal, call[ing] the employee down, [and] mak[ing] a physical observation of [the employee].” Mr. Carter testified that upon completion of the concurrence evaluation, if he believes that reasonable suspicion does not exist for drug testing, he will contact Mr. Breiner who will then make the final determination of whether the employee should be subjected to drug testing. Respondent arrived at the school around 6:15 a.m. on the morning of January 4, 2017. Soon after arriving at the school, Respondent saw Mr. Long who informed Respondent that he needed to meet with her during the “second hour” of the day, which is her planning period. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that Respondent taught her first-period class before meeting with Mr. Long and Mr. Carter at 8:10 a.m. There is no evidence indicating that Mr. Long took any steps to observe Respondent’s “performance, appearance, or behavior” in preparation for his January 4, 2017, meeting with Respondent and Mr. Carter, or that Mr. Long reasonably believed that Respondent was under the influence of drugs such that she should be prevented from teaching her class.2/ At about 8:00 a.m. on the morning of January 4, 2017, Mr. Carter reported to Port Charlotte High School for the purpose of interviewing Respondent as part of an investigation into an unrelated matter. When Mr. Carter checked in at the school, he met with Mr. Long who informed him of the allegations concerning Respondent’s solicitation of pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Carter immediately contacted Mr. Breiner and informed him of the allegations against Respondent. Mr. Breiner, when he spoke with Mr. Carter, was not aware of Respondent’s history of drug addiction and, consequently, this was not a factor that he considered when ordering that Respondent be drug-tested. Mr. Breiner, based on the information that Respondent allegedly solicited pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino, as reported by Mr. Long, and the fact that Respondent, like a number of other employees, had multiple absences from work, directed Mr. Carter to terminate the investigation into the unrelated matter and to proceed with taking Respondent to an authorized facility for reasonable suspicion drug testing. At no time prior to directing Mr. Carter to subject Respondent to drug testing did Mr. Breiner instruct Mr. Carter to personally interview Ms. Pellegrino regarding her conversation with Respondent. Additionally, at no time prior to Respondent’s drug test did Mr. Carter even attempt to question Ms. Pellegrino about her conversation with Respondent and the circumstances related thereto. It was only after Respondent had been drug tested that Mr. Carter interviewed Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Carter, after receiving direction from Mr. Breiner, and with the assistance of Debbie Anderson, who works as a personnel analyst in Respondent’s department of human resources, met with Respondent and explained that she was required to submit to drug testing pursuant to the school board’s drug-free workplace policy. Reasonable Suspicion Indicators Petitioner uses a form titled “Reasonable Suspicion Indicators Checklist” (checklist), when evaluating employees for suspicion of violating Petitioner’s Drug and Alcohol Free Work Environment Policy. The checklist provides as follows: Manager/Supervisor: This form is to be used to substantiate and document the objective facts and circumstances leading to a reasonable suspicion determination. After careful observations of the employee’s performance, appearance or behavior, please check all the observed indicators that raised the suspicion that the employee may have engaged in conduct which violates the Drug- and Alcohol-Free Work Environment Policy. Incident or reason for suspicion Apparent drug or alcohol intoxication Nausea or vomiting Abnormal or erratic behavior Evidence of possession, dispensation, or use of a prohibited substance Industrial accident requiring medical attention Physical altercation or assault Odors and/or Appearance Odor of alcohol (on breath or person) Distinctive, pungent aroma on clothing Excessive sweating or skin clamminess very flushed very pale Jerky eye movements Unfocused, blank stare Dilated or constricted pupils Dry mouth, frequent swallowing or wetting lips Bloodshot or watery eyes Behavior and Speech Slurred or incoherent speech Breathing difficulty or irregularity Loss of physical control, dizzy or fainting Unsteady walk, poor coordination Euphoric, fidgety, agitated or nervous affect Shaking hands/body, tremors, twitches Extreme fatigue or sleeping on the job Lackadaisical, apathetic attitude Irritable, moody, belligerent or aggressive demeanor Nausea or vomiting Suspicion of others; paranoia; accuses others Physical and/or verbal abusiveness Rambling, loud, fast, silly or repetitious speech Talkative, cursing, other inappropriate speech Diminished (or lack of) concentration Delayed or faulty decision making Impulsive, unsafe risk-taking Inappropriate response to instructions Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson each completed a checklist. None of the indicators listed above were checked by either Mr. Carter of Ms. Anderson as it pertains to their evaluation of Respondent. There is, however, an “indicator” appearing on the respective forms that is different in substance when comparing the form completed by Mr. Carter with the one completed by Ms. Anderson. On the form completed by Mr. Carter, there is a marked indicator that reads “Colleague disclosed that employee solicited ‘pain medication’ (controlled substance) during a teacher work day.” By comparison, the form completed by Ms. Anderson notes a different indicator which states “Employee discloses that he or she has consumed alcohol, used or ingested a controlled substance during or immediately prior to duty.” Neither party offered an explanation regarding the differences between the forms. Nevertheless, both Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson attached a narrative to the checklist regarding the circumstances surrounding Ms. Pellegrino’s statement about Respondent allegedly soliciting Ms. Pellegrino for pain medication. Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson each completed their respective checklist on January 11, 2017, which coincidentally, was the same date that Respondent’s lab results from her drug test were received by Petitioner.3/ The evidence does not explain why both Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson waited several days to complete their respective checklists. Mr. Carter testified that when he performed his concurrence evaluation of Respondent on January 4, 2017, the only indicator present for subjecting Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing was the statement of Ms. Pellegrino indicating that Respondent solicited pain medication from her on January 3, 2017. Ms. Anderson did not testify at the final hearing. Mr. Breiner, who made the ultimate decision to subject Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing on January 4, 2017, testified that two factors drove his determination: the first being Ms. Pellegrino’s statement, and the second being Respondent’s history of absenteeism from work during the 2016- 2017 school year.4/ On cross-examination, however, Mr. Breiner admitted that in Respondent’s notice of termination he made no reference to absenteeism being a factor in his decision to subject Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing. Morphine and Imitrex Respondent admits that on January 3, 2017, she took morphine in order to get relief from her migraine headache. Respondent testified that she typically takes Imitrex to treat her migraines, but when that drug is ineffective she takes morphine for relief of her symptoms. According to Petitioner, she has been taking Imitrex since about 2007 and she suffers no side effects from the medication. Respondent testified that she typically takes morphine about once or twice a year “when the Imitrex [is not] working” and that the effects of the morphine last “[a]nywhere from four to six hours, sometimes eight, but nothing after that.” Petitioner did not rebut Respondent’s statement and offered no evidence regarding the effects of morphine and the period of time after ingestion that a person is typically under the influence of the drug. According to medical records from Peace River Medical Center, Respondent was discharged from the hospital on August 23, 2007, following treatment for: 1. “[c]hest pain, myocardial infarction protocol; 2. [p]leuritic pneumonia; [and] [m]igraine.” At the time of release from the hospital, Respondent was “discharged home with Morphine 60 mg p.r.n.” According to Respondent’s unrefuted testimony, the morphine pill that she took on January 3, 2017, was part of the batch of pills that she received when discharged from the hospital in 2007. Petitioner, when first interviewed by Respondent on January 13, 2017, denied soliciting pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Charlotte County School Board enter a final order finding that there was no just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment during the term of her 2016-2017 annual contract with the School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2017.
The Issue This case is presented as rules challenges to certain matters allegedly undertaken by the Respondent and is brought in accordance with the authority set forth in Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Petitioner asserts that there exist two rules within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(14), Florida Statutes, which have not been duly promulgated in keeping with the terms and conditions of Section 120.53, Florida Statutes. The items which are challenged by this Petition are: The Respondent's Contract Management System Manual (HRSR-0-75-1). The execution document involved in the award of contract No. 1979 DA-1, entitled "Design and Delivery of Drug Abuse Training Support Program", which was awarded to the Florida Council for Community Mental Health, Inc.
Findings Of Fact In support of its case the Petitioner presented one item of evidence. This item was received as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. The exhibit is a memorandum letter from Robert A. Furlough, Acting Mental Health Program Staff Director, addressed to Abe Lavine and it is entitled "Procedure in the Selection of the Most Appropriate Service Provided for Design Delivery of Training". Notwithstanding the title of the letter, it is in fact a summarization of the steps taken by the Respondent in the award of the "Design and Delivery of Training" element of the "State Training Support Program". In the course of the letter it discusses the fact that the Contract Management System Manual (HSRS-0-75-1) was utilized; however, that manual was not appended to the correspondence and was not offered in the course of the hearing. Likewise, the document of execution of the award of Contract No. 1979 DA-1, for the "Design and Delivery Training" element of the "State Training Support Program", if such a document exists, was not offered as evidence in the hearing sub judice.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may terminate Respondent's employment as a teacher.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been a teacher since 1993. She is a 34- year-old divorced mother of a four-year-old son. Respondent has suffered from a chemical dependency since she was 18 years old. At that time, she completed a 28- day detoxification program at Mt. Sinai Medical Center in Miami. Six or seven years later, Respondent underwent additional inpatient treatment for her addiction to drugs. She submitted to a third detoxification, lasting five to seven days, in 1993 or 1994. Respondent underwent a fourth detoxification ten months later and, in 1996, a fifth detoxification. Respondent admits that she has undergone detoxification several more times since 1996. These detoxifications and Respondent's intermittent participation in Narcotics Anonymous were parts of treatment programs attempting to relieve Respondent from her addiction to cocaine and heroin. Respondent's addiction has spanned her college years through her entire teaching career. The effects of Respondent's illness have, at times, precluded her from reaching her full potential as a classroom teacher. After a brief period of employment by Petitioner as a permanent substitute teacher, Respondent began fulltime employment with Petitioner in August 1994 as a teacher at Oak Grove Elementary School. While at Oak Grove, Respondent was a satisfactory teacher, although her attendance was less than satisfactory. Also, on at least six occasions, evidently starting in her second year, Respondent fell asleep while conducting a reading tutorial session in which the students spent 20 minutes in separate cubicles. Respondent's principal at Oak Grove documented by a memorandum dated December 4, 1995, eleven full-day absences and two half-day absences during the 1995-96 school year and two instances of sleeping while charged with the instruction of a student--both on the same day and both discovered by the principal. Due to these incidents and an earlier incident of sleeping while on duty, the principal administratively referred Respondent to Petitioner's Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The December 4 memorandum documented the actions taken at a conference held the same date involving, among others, Respondent and the principal. Respondent then missed work on December 6 and 7--calling in at 10:06 a.m. on December 7 saying that she had overslept and asking if it was too late to report to work. Respondent missed a considerable amount of work during the 1996-97 school year. Some of the absences, especially from early December through early February, were due to Respondent's chemical dependency. However, some absences, especially during the latter part of the school year, may be attributed to the birth of Respondent's child on July 9, 1997, following a high- risk pregnancy. The record does not disclose much about the 1997-98 school year. However, Respondent missed ten days of work due to sick or personal leave and eleven days of work due to unpaid, but authorized, leave. The absence of additional administrative action against Respondent suggests that she may have improved her attendance and eliminated her sleeping while on duty. For the 1998-99 school year, Respondent transferred to a new school, Linda Lentin Elementary School. Again, Respondent was a satisfactory teacher, except for absenteeism. However, during a nine-day absence from May 20 through June 2, 1999, the principal received a telephone call from someone claiming that Respondent had had a breakdown and was in a "drug rehabilitation hospital." Accordingly, the principal requested that Petitioner's Office of Professional Standards (OPS) monitor Respondent's return to work. On June 8, 1999, Respondent, the principal, Petitioner's OPS Director, and others participated in a Conference for the Record (CFR). Respondent attributed her 21 absences in the 1997-98 school year, as well as 20.5 absences in the 1998-99 school year, to six miscarriages and depression. Petitioner's OPS Director explained the procedures for reasonable-suspicion drug testing. The CFR memorandum concludes by emphasizing that Respondent must report to work when scheduled and on time, obtain medical excuses for all absences, provide lesson plans for substitute teachers, and obtain approval for scheduled leave. At the same time, Petitioner's OPS Director referred Respondent to Petitioner's EAP. Subject to these actions, Petitioner approved Respondent's return to the classroom. However, Respondent's attendance did not improve the following school year, and her behavior became somewhat eccentric early in the school year. At noon on September 27, 1999, Respondent told the principal that she was ill and needed to go home for the remainder of the day and the following day. Respondent went home, but, despite requesting leave and a substitute for the following day, returned to work the following day without calling first. Near the end of the school day, while her students were in a special-area class, Respondent signed out of school and walked down the street, despite the fact that it was raining. The next day, Respondent left the school grounds without permission and, the following day, failed to attend a mandatory teachers' meeting. The situation deteriorated in mid-October 1999. From October 11-14, Respondent telephoned the school each day and reported that she was sick and in the hospital. The following Monday, October 18, Respondent reported to work. However, on October 19, Respondent failed to report to work or call, leaving her class sitting in the hallway. Respondent telephoned the school at mid-day and stated that she had been in a five-car accident. This accident did not take place. On October 20, while driving to school, Respondent was involved in a two-car accident, which resulted in her striking a fire hydrant not far from the school. The accident took place at about 8:45 a.m., which was about 15 minutes after Respondent assumed direct supervision of her students. Respondent arrived at school late, crying and disconcerted. An acquaintance transported Respondent home. The next morning, prior to the start of school, Respondent called the school and stated that she would not be at work. On the following morning, October 22, Respondent reported to work, and her principal ordered her to submit to a reasonable-suspicion drug test. Respondent complied, and the drug test revealed the presence of cocaine and morphine. The drug test accurately detected the presence of these substances because Respondent had used crack cocaine and heroin within the period for which the drug test is sensitive. By memorandum dated October 29, 1999, Respondent's principal asked Petitioner's OPS to monitor Respondent's return to work. By memorandum dated November 1, 1999, Petitioner's OPS informed Respondent that she would require a clearance from OPS before returning to work. On November 8, 1999, Respondent requested a leave of absence without pay to extend from October 22, 1999, through June 16, 2000. Petitioner granted this request. Shortly after starting her leave from work, Respondent was first seen by Dr. John Eustace. Dr. Eustace is Board-certified in internal medicine and is also certified in the treatment of addictions. He is the medical director of the Addiction Treatment Program at Mt. Sinai Medical Center. He is also an assistant professor of psychiatry at the University of Miami medical school. In the last ten years, Dr. Eustace has performed 2000 evaluations of professionals to assess whether they can return to practice with the requisite skill and safety. During his career, Dr. Eustace has diagnosed and treated over 10,000 patients for addictions. Dr. Eustace admitted Respondent as an in-patient at Mt. Sinai for, among other things, a four- or five-day detoxification program. He found that Respondent was in the late middle stage of addiction to heroin and cocaine and that her illness was active. When releasing Respondent from the detoxification program, Dr. Eustace recommended that Respondent enter a twelve- step program to better prepare Respondent for the difficult recovery process, which requires, among other things, gaining insight into the consequences of the addiction. Following the detoxification process, Dr. Eustace opined that Respondent had an even chance of avoiding another relapse. However, this prognosis improves with time. After the first five years without relapse, the relapse rate is only ten percent. Also, after a second treatment, the recovery rate is over 90 percent. Of the 2000 professionals whom Dr. Eustace has treated, over 90 percent have recovered. Unfortunately, Respondent relapsed after her 1999 detoxification and treatment by Dr. Eustace. Despite her return to active use of illegal drugs, Respondent chose to restart the process by which she could return to the classroom. Petitioner's OPS informed Respondent that she would need OPS clearance before returning to work. Reacting to Respondent's request for a clearance, OPS scheduled a CFR with Respondent and others to take place on July 28, 2000. At the July 28 CFR, Respondent signed an Employee Acknowledgement Form concerning Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy. The form states: "Before returning to duty, I must undergo a return-to-duty . . . controlled substances test with verified negative results." At the CFR, Respondent admitted that she had had a chemical dependency, but represented that she was now clean and sober. Apparently, Respondent did not anticipate that she would be required to take a drug test at the July 28 CFR. However, with the new school year imminent, it is difficult to understand exactly when Respondent thought she would be required to take the drug test. If she were going to teach the next school year, her principal needed more than a few days' notice. In any event, Respondent took the test on July 28, and the test revealed the presence of morphine, although not cocaine. By memorandum dated September 6, 2000, from Petitioner's OPS Director to Respondent, Petitioner advised Respondent that it was reviewing its options after receiving the results of the July 28 drug test. By letter dated October 6, 2000, to Respondent, Petitioner's Superintendent advised Respondent that Petitioner was suspending her and initiating dismissal proceedings due to just cause, including incompetency, misconduct in office, gross insubordination, excessive absences, and violation of Petitioner's Rules 6Gx13-4-105 (drug-free workplace) and 6Gx13-4A-1.21 (responsibilities and duties). By letter dated October 12, 2000, and revised October 17, 2000, Petitioner's board took the action recommended by the Superintendent. The contract between Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade (Contract) provides in Article XXI, Section 1.B.1.a, that "[a]ny member of the instructional staff may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year, provided that the charges against him/her are based upon Florida Statutes." Article XXI, Section 2.G, sets forth the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement. Section 2.G.b provides the policy statement on illegal drugs, Section 2.G.c provides the policy statement on alcohol and prescription drugs, and Section 2.G.d provides the policy statement on employee drug screening. Under employee drug screening, Section 2.G.d.5 states: [Petitioner] recognizes that chemical dependency is an illness that can be successfully treated. It is the policy of [Petitioner], where possible, to seek rehabilitation of employees with a self- admitted or detected drug problem. Disciplinary action may be instituted against employees who the Board believes will not be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff. Employees who have previously been referred for assistance or employees unwilling or unable to rehabilitate may be subject to appropriate action, pursuant to Board Policy, applicable Florida Statutes, State Board Rules, and applicable provisions of collective bargaining agreements. Petitioner has invoked two of its rules in this case. Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, which is a statement of "Responsibilities and Duties," requires, at Section 1, all employees "to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system." It is unnecessary to determine whether the Contract incorporates this rule, or whether Petitioner may otherwise rely on this rule to dismiss an instructional employee during the school year. Rule 6Gx13-4-1.05 (Rule), which is the "Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement," is a restatement of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement contained in the Contract. The prominent role of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement in the Contract, as well as its provision for the dismissal of employees, justifies Petitioner’s reliance upon a violation of the Rule as a basis for dismissing an instructional employee during the school year, notwithstanding the provision of the Contract otherwise requiring that all such dismissals be based on violations of Florida Statutes. In most respects, the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement is the same in the Rule and the Contract. The Rule provides for "disciplinary sanctions" against employees who have violated the "standards of conduct" set forth within the Rule. Like the Contract, the Rule contains three "policy statements," which supply most of the operative provisions of the Rule. For illegal drugs, the policy statement, as set forth in the Rule, provides: "Employees are expected to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the following provisions: Employees on duty or on School Board property will not manufacture, distribute, dispense, possess or use illegal drugs, nor will they be under the influence of such drugs. Employees on or off duty will not influence students to use illegal or abuse legal drugs. An employee convicted, adjudicated guilty, or who has entered a plea of guilty for an criminal drug statute violation occurring in the workplace shall notify [Petitioner] within 48 hours after final judgment. Paragraphs A and C are limited to acts and conditions that take place while an employee is on Petitioner's property or on duty. Paragraph B is limited to acts of the employee directed toward students. The evidence does not suggest that Respondent violated any of these provisions of the Rule. Petitioner failed to serve that the incidents involving Respondent sleeping while in charge of students appear not to have been due to her cocaine or heroin intoxication; it is at least as likely that the sleeping resulted from fatigue following the use of one or both of these drugs the preceding night. The distinction between intoxicating levels of these drugs and nonintoxicating trace amounts is explicitly dismissed by the Rule's treatment of alcohol, as to which employees must be "free of measurable . . . concentrations." After the policy statements on illegal drugs and alcohol and prescription drugs, the Rule sets forth the policy statement on employee drug screening. Although this part of the Rule fails to provide explicitly that a positive drug screen is a violation of the Rule, the introductory paragraph of the Rule acknowledges that Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade are jointly committed "to create and maintain a drug-free work environment." Paragraph D within the drug-screening policy statement restates this purpose. Also, the disciplinary sanctions provided by the Rule clearly state that a refusal to submit to a drug test or a second violation of the Rule constitutes an inability to be assisted by rehabilitation; if a refusal to submit to a drug test is a violation, a failed drug test must also be a violation. These statements are therefore sufficient to provide that the presence in employees of even nonintoxicating amounts of illegal drugs, while on duty, constitute a violation of the Rule. In two respects, the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement, as described in the Rule, is materially different from the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement, as described in the Contract. First, the Rule adds another objective: To communicate that persons who violate the standards of conduct cited in this rule and who refuse or cannot be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff shall be dismissed. Second, the Rule provides disciplinary sanctions for any violation--not just for violations of the drug-screening policy statement, as provided by the Contract--of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement. The Rule also adds two presumptive conditions for determining when an employee is unable to be assisted by rehabilitation. The Rule states: Employees who violate the standards of conduct cited it this rule and who the Board determines will not be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff shall be dismissed. A refusal to submit to a drug test or a second violation of the Drug-Free Workplace Policy shall constitute an inability to be assisted by rehabilitation. . . . This case turns on whether Petitioner has proved that Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation because Petitioner has produced little detailed evidence of any negative impact upon Respondent's students. The record lacks detail of Respondent's specific teaching duties, the specific impact of her sleeping incidents or absences, and the academic achievements of her students during the periods in which these shortcomings took place. Notwithstanding the marked shortcomings in Respondent's performance as a teacher, Petitioner did not dismiss her until first giving her a chance to rehabilitate herself. The most likely inference is that Petitioner's administrative employees found that the situation did not satisfy the first criterion for dismissal--negatively impacting students. The basic issue, then, is whether Petitioner could reasonably have determined, from July to October 2000, that Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation. Petitioner could choose to show rehabilitation would be futile by relying on one of the two presumptions contained in the Rule. However, Respondent never refused to submit to a drug test, and difficult questions of her employment status in July 2000 obscure the determination as to whether her failure of the July 2000 drug test constitutes a second violation of the Rule. In this case, though, Petitioner may satisfy its standard of proof without regard to either of the presumptions in the Rule. After a display of considerable patience and good faith by Petitioner, Respondent, in July 2000, misrepresented to Petitioner that she was clean and sober and prematurely requested permission to return to teaching duties despite her knowledge that she was still abusing drugs and not ready to return to the classroom. These facts support the finding that, as of July or October 2000, Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation. This finding of the futility of rehabilitation, as of July or October 2000, is difficult due to the fact that subsequent events suggest that Respondent may finally be rehabilitating herself. After Petitioner dismissed her, Respondent underwent detoxification and then began treatment at St. Luke's Addiction Recovery Center, which is sponsored by Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. She was in intensive residential treatment from November 6, 2000, through January 24, 2001. She later underwent nine urinalyses, through June 1, 2001--a day after the end of the hearing in this case-- and all of them were negative. Respondent is successfully participating in the St. Luke's aftercare program, where she takes weekly drug tests. She is proud of the fact that she has turned her life over to God and has achieved the longest period of sobriety that she has experienced in many years. After regaining sobriety, Respondent substituted for awhile and then found a job teaching a third-grade class at a private school in the Miami area. At the time of the hearing, Respondent had been so employed for six weeks, she had not been late or missed a day of school, and the school had invited her to teach again for the 2001-02 school year. Dr. Eustace opines that Respondent's prognosis is much improved from the prognosis of September 2000.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing Respondent from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger C. Cuevas, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 N. E. Second Avenue Room 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1308 Luis M. Garcia Attorney's Office School Board of Miami-Dade County 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Richard Baron Baron and Cliff 11077 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 307 Miami, Florida 33161 Honorable Charlie Crist Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive an exemption from disqualification to work in positions of special trust.
Findings Of Fact In November 1999, Petitioner was employed by Angels Unaware, Inc., as a caretaker of children or the developmentally disabled. Such a position is a position of trust. By letter dated November 29, 1999, Angels Unaware, Inc., notified Petitioner that it had received information that was disqualifying and, thus, he was ineligible for continued employment as a caretaker of children, disabled adults, or elderly persons. However, in the letter, Petitioner was advised of his right to seek an exemption from disqualification from the licensing agency. Thereafter, Petitioner requested an exemption from disqualification. At all times, pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the state agency responsible for receiving and approving or denying applications for exemptions from disqualification to work in a position of trust. After receiving Petitioner's request for exemption, Respondent conducted the required background screening of Petitioner. The background screening revealed that Petitioner had been arrested and convicted of possession and delivery of cocaine. As a result of Petitioner's conviction, Respondent denied Petitioner's request for exemption. According to the background screening report, Petitioner was convicted of possession and delivery of cocaine on April 2, 1996. The incident that resulted in the conviction occurred on or about January 20, 1995, the day Petitioner was arrested. Following his arrest, Petitioner was charged with possession and delivery of cocaine. On May 1, 1995, Petitioner pled guilty to the aforementioned felony. That same day, the court withheld adjudication and placed Petitioner on probation for one year. Pursuant to condition 7 of Petitioner's probation, he was not to use or possess any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. Notwithstanding this proscription, on or about September 24, 1995, November 14, 1995, and March 3, 1996, Petitioner violated this condition by using cocaine as evidenced by positive urinalysis and his own admission. As a result of Petitioner's repeated use of cocaine, on April 2, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of violating his probation and was adjudged guilty of possession and delivery of cocaine, the charges for which adjudication had been initially withheld on May 1, 1995. Moreover, Petitioner's one-year probation was revoked and he was placed on drug offender probation for two years. One of the special conditions of the drug offender probation was that Petitioner receive drug treatment until he successfully completed such program. On or about May 15, 1997, Petitioner again used and possessed cocaine in violation of the Order of Drug Offender Probation. Following this violation, on July 17, 1997, the court entered an Order of Modification of Probation. Pursuant to that Order, Petitioner's probation continued under the previous terms and conditions but Petitioner's cost for supervision was waived while he was receiving in-patient drug treatment. Petitioner entered a six-month in-patient drug treatment program in June 1997 and successfully completed the program on December 22, 1997. The court terminated Petitioner's probation on April 1, 1998. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that his using cocaine was a "mistake" and stated that he has been drug-free since June 1997, when he began the six-month drug treatment program. However, Petitioner presented no other witnesses or evidence of his rehabilitation during the two years since his probation was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption from his disqualification from employment in positions of trust or responsibility. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard, Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Nwezi A. Nonyelu 6545 Spanish Moss Circle Tampa, Florida 33625 Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to an exemption from disqualification, to have direct contact with unmarried minor clients or clients who are developmentally disabled, having been disqualified from direct contact with those persons by virtue of an offense related to drug abuse prevention and control, Chapter 893, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact In State of Florida v. Victor Days, in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida, Case No. 93-33378, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of cocaine possession. This case was in relation to a criminal law offense prohibited by Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Adjudication was withheld. Petitioner received a one year probation based upon the order of the court entered October 22, 1993. Following the entry of his plea to the offense of possession of cocaine, Petitioner went through a drug screening to be evaluated concerning response to his use of drugs. The result of that screening was a recommendation that Petitioner receive out-patient treatment for his use of cocaine. Petitioner did not participate in an out-patient program. Eventually he enrolled in an in-patient program to address his drug abuse. Although Petitioner offered his plea to the offense of possession of cocaine and accepted the disposition, at the hearing in the present case Petitioner contended that he had not committed the offense for which he stood accused and entered his plea. But the plea entered contemplates a lack of agreement with the truth of the charges. Petitioner also complained in the administrative hearing that he had not received adequate advice from his attorney in the criminal law case. Petitioner does concede that he had a problem with the abuse of crack cocaine that existed before and beyond his arrest for the charge of possession of cocaine. Additionally, Petitioner admits that during this time he abused alcohol. Petitioner describes that he did not "drop" the cocaine that he was arrested for, and that charging him for that offense was an "injustice." Petitioner describes the circumstances of his arrest as a "wake-up call," concerning the fact that he was involved with crack cocaine, if not on the occasion of his arrest, at other times. Petitioner describes his use of crack cocaine as being associated with binges in which he would have $100 and spend it on the crack cocaine. He can recall at least eight occasions in which he would "binge" on crack cocaine. In his testimony at the administrative hearing, Petitioner describes his use of crack cocaine in that period of time as constituting an addiction. Petitioner acknowledges that in the period 1993 through 1994, he suffered from addiction, to the extent that he had a co- dependency for crack cocaine and alcohol. In the years 1992 through 1994, Petitioner had worked for Jackson Memorial Hospital in Dade County, Florida, in the Environmental Services Department. This employment did not include direct contact with patients. Following the disposition of Circuit Court Case No. 93- 33378, roughly a year later, on November 15, 1994, Petitioner entered a residential program for drug abusers, referred to as Faith Farm Ministries in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Specifically, it was a program to benefit adults with drug abuse problems. The program was administered by Fort Lauderdale Rescue Tabernacle, Inc., Alpha Ministry. The program was designed to help the participants deal with their drug dependency and to reorder their lives for the better. Petitioner successfully completed the program as evidenced by a certificate issued to the Petitioner on May 1, 1995. For approximately eight months beyond his graduation from the drug abuse program, Petitioner served as a peer counselor for other adults enrolled in the program. During his probation, Petitioner's probation officer referred Petitioner to the court for having violated probation. Petitioner was not found in violation of his probation. When Petitioner was not found in violation of his probation, Petitioner had already attended the residential drug treatment program. 1l. Following the completion of his drug abuse program, Petitioner worked at a K-Mart in Miramar, Florida, for approximately six months in 1995, as a salesperson. Later Petitioner took a position with Chemical Addictions Recovery Effort, Inc. (Chemical Additions Recovery), in Panama City, Florida, as a Human Service worker, with direct contact with minors who are 13 to 17 years old. More specifically, those youngsters are part of a program referred to as Starting Over Straight (S.O.S.), within the umbrella of Chemical Addictions Recovery. In this position, Petitioner assisted the juveniles who had drug-related problems. This position was held for approximately three months. Petitioner then took a position with a program within the Chemical Addictions Recovery, referred to as Detox. That program, in which he had direct contact with the clients, was in association with adults and children suffering with problems related to alcohol and drugs. Petitioner held that position for approximately three months. During Petitioner's affiliation with Chemical Addictions Recovery, Petitioner was required to undergo a background check, based upon his holding a position of trust and responsibility, as an employee with direct contact with minor clients. When the screening was completed, it revealed Petitioner's criminal law case associated with the possession of cocaine. This disqualified the Petitioner from continuing to have direct contact with unmarried minor clients or clients who are developmentally disabled. Petitioner has an interest in continuing employment involving direct contact with unmarried minors, such as the children who were participants in the S.O.S. For this reason Petitioner has pursued his request for exemption from disqualification. At the time of the hearing Petitioner was employed as a floor-care worker with Bay Genesis Eldercare in Panama City, Florida. He had held that position for approximately three months. On the date of hearing Petitioner was 36 years old. Petitioner believes that his life has changed following participation in the residential drug treatment program. Petitioner in his day-to day life works to tell people that drugs and alcohol are a waste of time. That was the motivation Petitioner had for working as a Human Service worker at Chemical Addictions Recovery. Petitioner does not sense any difficulty in dealing with children. He believes that children look up to him. At present Petitioner does not use alcohol or drugs. Petitioner attends church. Mary Cruel, Petitioner's great-aunt, is a supervisor at S.O.S. She describes that program as a residential program for children who have a problem with substance abuse. Ms. Cruel is familiar with the Detox program associated with Chemical Addictions Recovery. That program, as Ms. Cruel describes it, is a crisis intervention program for adult women and some children. Ms. Cruel recalls that Petitioner had a problem with drugs and alcohol, as part of overall life problems. In response, Ms. Cruel helped to place the Petitioner in the Faith Farm Ministries program. As Ms. Cruel describes it, Petitioner's participation in the Faith Farm Ministries program was voluntary. Participation in that program was felt to be the better choice, in that it had a spiritual emphasis. Ms. Cruel communicated with the Petitioner while he was participating in the drug rehabilitation program. She observed that the Petitioner was passionate about getting well, and that he quit blaming others for his difficulties. Now Ms. Cruel sees the Petitioner about three times a week. Ms. Cruel observes that her husband is close to the Petitioner. Ms. Cruel's husband does not abuse drugs. Ms. Cruel has observed the Petitioner trying to encourage other persons, who have problems with drugs to get into treatment and in conversation with others, Petitioner refers to his life experience. Ms. Cruel notes that Petitioner wants to work in a substance abuse program. Ms. Cruel is aware that Petitioner earns more money at his present employment than he did in the position that he was dismissed from with Chemical Addictions Recovery. Finally, Ms. Cruel observes that Petitioner lives a more regular life than he did before dealing with his addictions, and that Petitioner stays clean and sober one day at a time without being seen to have regressed. Rosemary G. Balkcom, R.N., C.D., a nursing services supervisor at Chemical Addictions Recovery, in correspondence, notes that Petitioner in working in the Detox program related well with clientele and that his overall attitude toward the persons participating in the program was one of genuine concern and empathy. Further, Ms. Balkcom notes in her remarks that Petitioner enjoys being able to assist and provide guidance for the clientele in the program. Finally, Ms. Balkcom notes that if Petitioner were allowed to continue to work in the program, and gained required education and training, Petitioner would present a positive role model for others. Amy Shackleford, Petitioner's co-worker, notes in correspondence that Petitioner has a genuine care for juvenile residents, and that Petitioner is active, motivated, honest, and dependable. Ms. Shackleford notes that young residents with low self-esteem have become actively involved with Petitioner. Ms. Shackleford notes that Petitioner is a perfect role model, and a positive influence in helping young people grow into productive citizens.
Recommendation Upon consideration the of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered exempting Petitioner from disqualification to work in a position of special trust or responsibility that would allow direct contact with unmarried minor clients or clients who are developmentally disabled. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 100A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Victor Renaldo Days 1003 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner may be granted an exemption to work in a position of special trust, pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Since July 1997, Petitioner has been employed continuously as a driver for Big Bend Transit, Inc., an organization that provides transportation services to disadvantaged persons. In this capacity, Petitioner provided direct hands-on care to children and disabled adults by driving them from place to place in the course of her job. When Petitioner was hired by Big Bend Transit, Inc., she was screened, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. It was determined during this screening that Petitioner had been convicted of a felony for possession of cocaine in 1987 and convicted of the misdemeanor of petit theft in 1994. Both of these offenses occurred in Florida. By operation of law, Petitioner is disqualified from working in a position of special trust on the basis of her 1987 conviction for possession of cocaine. It was stipulated by the parties that the petit theft conviction is non-disqualifying. Petitioner also has had a lengthy involvement with, and dependence on, alcohol and cocaine. From before her 1987 conviction for possession of cocaine until at least August 1994, Petitioner regularly used these drugs to excess. Petitioner and her immediate supervisor, Ms. Eddie B. Smith (no relation), were both apparently under the erroneous impression that it was acceptable for Petitioner to continue her employment in a position of special trust, despite the disqualification letter sent them by certified mail on January 26, 1998. There was nothing unclear about the Agency's notification letter. Petitioner has had an incident-free driving record with Big Bend Transit since her employment. Eddie B. Smith, is the Big Bend Transit supervisor for Petitioner. Ms. Smith has never ridden with Petitioner in the Big Bend van nor has she ever observed Petitioner driving the van. However, she considers Petitioner to be a safe, dependable, responsible driver and employee. She testified that among other Big Bend employees and their disadvantaged clientele, Petitioner's reputation is that "all speak highly of her." Although Eddie B. Smith did not know Petitioner prior to her drug rehabilitation, she is aware of Petitioner's past record and experiences, and still wishes to employ her. From 1987 to 1994, Petitioner repeatedly attended and participated in several substance abuse programs, none of which were successful for her. Notwithstanding her substance abuse during the foregoing period, Petitioner managed to maintain regular employment. Petitioner admitted that the shoplifting incident in September 1994 was inspired by her need to get money to buy cocaine and/or alcohol. However, in August 1994, Petitioner had voluntarily entered detox at Apalachee Center for Human Services, in Tallahassee, and voluntarily proceeded immediately afterward to the residential drug rehabilitation program run by Promise Land Ministries in Crawfordville, Florida. Petitioner admitted to one relapse using alcohol in early 1995, but forthrightly asserted that she knows now that she cannot even take one drink of alcohol, let alone use it socially. Petitioner also used drugs on her one night of relapse. She testified that she has not used either alcohol or drugs since that date in 1995. Petitioner quit smoking cigarettes approximately one year before formal hearing. Primary to Petitioner's successful rehabilitation has been her love for, and taking responsibility for the care of, her son, who is now seven years old. On November 14, 1995, Petitioner tested negative for the use of drugs as part of her employment with Cabot Lodge Motel in Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner also took a mandatory drug screening test ordered by Big Bend Transit when she went to work for that corporation in July 1997. She also tested drug-free on that occasion. The foregoing two successful drug tests are only accurate to show that Petitioner had not used cocaine or other illegal drugs for a period of two to three days prior to the administration of each test. Petitioner is buying her own home at Lake Talquin Resort. She is a community leader and holds the position of a Director on the Board of the Home Owners' Association at Lake Talquin Resort. As a Director, Petitioner oversees the maintenance and quality of her trailer park neighborhood. Petitioner runs her own yard and cleanup service to supplement her regular employment with Big Bend Transit and also baby-sits for her friends and neighbors. Petitioner's immediate neighbors, who know her both professionally and intimately as a friend and baby-sitter for their nine-year-old son, are Sergeant Shelton Turner of the Gadsden County Sheriff's Office and his wife, Annetheria. According to Mr. and Mrs. Turner, Petitioner is a model neighbor and friend. Both expressed the sentiment that "my house is her house." Mr. Turner serves on the Home Owners' Association Board with Petitioner. He has known Petitioner for ten years and testified that since her rehabilitation, Petitioner has made a 360-degree change in her life. He considers her totally rehabilitated and has seen her "transformation." Sergeant Turner has had an opportunity to observe Petitioner in her home at all hours of the day and night and testified that, "[She's] not in that old white station wagon at the drug hole [anymore]... no one with drugs is ever hanging on [at her house]." Sergeant Turner further testified that two signs of drug abuse can never be observed in Petitioner's home, e.g., the lights are never cut off for failure to pay, and there is always food in the house. Antheria Turner is a Program Director at a group home for the elderly, where she has observed Petitioner with disadvantaged clients. She testified that, "If there were a position in one of my homes, I would have no problem hiring her." Mrs. Turner has only known Petitioner for the last three years during which time Petitioner has been drug-free, but she is well aware of Petitioner's past criminal record and drug/alcohol dependency. Petitioner is an active church-goer and credits her religious faith as another reason for her continued rehabilitation. She is characterized by Ms. Turner as a "good Christian." Edith Smith is the former owner of Precious Angels Family Home Daycare. Ms. Smith is employed elsewhere at the present time, but has known Petitioner for six to seven years. She also has had an opportunity to observe Petitioner's transition, subsequent to her final successful drug rehabilitation. Before rehabilitation, she would distance herself from Petitioner but now Petitioner often babysits for Ms. Smith's four year old daughter, and Ms. Smith considers Petitioner to be "very loving and caring around children," and trustworthy. At formal hearing, the Department presented one witness, a district screening coordinator who did not recommend that Petitioner be granted an exemption from disqualification. She speculated that the Petitioner might be somehow "covering up" possible continued weekend drug abuse. Her testimony is to the effect that if Petitioner could remain fully employed while "using," the fact that Petitioner has remained fully employed since she quit "using" in 1995 should not be considered as part of the evidence of good moral character. Ms. LeClair's testimony does not amount to either a policy statement by the agency or an expert opinion that Petitioner's current full time employment should be held against her. The Department seemed to merely assert a "legal position" that a longer period of rehabilitation should be necessary to clearly and convincingly establish Petitioner's good moral character, under the circumstances of this case.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner Jacqueline Smith's request for exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert Thornburn, Esquire Grant Dearborn, Esquire Legal Services of North Florida, Inc. Suite 200 8 West Jefferson Street Quincy, Florida 32351 John Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 100A Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Service Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether disciplinary action should be taken against the Respondent's medical license based on an alleged violation of section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, concerning his ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety by reason of illness, substance abuse, or mental or physical condition.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the practice of medicine as delineated in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. The Board of Medicine is organized within the Agency and charged with determining and issuing final orders in disciplinary cases involving physicians within its jurisdiction. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Murtha has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida, holding license no. 0037467. As a licensed physician in the State of Florida, Dr. Murtha is subject to the licensure and medical practice regulatory jurisdiction of the Board of Medicine of the Agency of Health Care Administration. Dr. Murtha, at the time of the Agency's investigation, was approximately 42 years of age. He received his medical degree in 1978 from the University of Florida and completed his residency at the University of Tennessee. In 1981, he became board certified in internal medicine. He has been on the staff of St. Joseph's Hospital in Tampa, Florida for the ten years prior to the initiation of this action. In August 1995, the Agency filed a complaint against Dr. Murtha alleging that two episodes affected Dr. Murtha's ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of use of alcohol. The first episode related to a charge of driving under the influence. On May 2, 1994, Dr. Murtha was involved in a minor traffic accident and charged with driving under the influence (DUI). On August 24, 1994, Dr. Murtha pled no contest to the charge, and he received 12 months probation, six months revocation of his driver's license, a $250.00 fine, required attendance of DUI school, and court costs. 7/ The officer who investigated the May 2, 1994 accident and who also charged Dr. Murtha was not available for the hearing and did not testify. The second episode alleged by the Agency relates to the allegation that Dr. Murtha practiced medicine while intoxicated. Specifically, the Agency alleged that Dr. Murtha saw patients while intoxicated. Relating to the second factual allegation, Nurse Georgia Jacinta Paille testified that on January 30, 1995, she encountered Dr. Murtha visiting a patient at St. Joseph's Hospital. Ms. Paille is the day charge nurse at St. Joseph's Hospital in Tampa, and she appeared as the first witness for the Agency. Nurse Paille testified that on January 30, 1995, she encountered Dr. Murtha and that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. She further testified that Dr. Murtha was acting angry and inappropriate and that he raised repetitive questions relating to care given to one of his patients. While Nurse Paille noticed the odor of alcohol, she did not notice if Dr. Murtha's speech or gait was affected by the alcohol. Furthermore, Nurse Paille could not testify that Dr. Murtha acted like someone who had been drinking. Nurse Paille reported her observations of Dr. Murtha to her manager, Margie Butler, who in turn made a report to Dr. Gilbert J. Pitisci, the Hospital Administrator. Gilbert J. Pitisci is a medical physician and the Senior Vice President for Medical Affairs at St. Joseph's Hospital in Tampa, Florida. In addition to various administrative duties, Dr. Pitisci is authorized to summarily suspend a physician's privileges at a hospital. On January 30, 1995, the same day that Nurse Paille observed Dr. Murtha, Dr. Pitisci encountered Dr. Murtha. Dr. Pitisci also noticed the odor of alcohol on Dr. Murtha's breath, and he noticed that Dr. Murtha had a slight slurring of his speech and that there was a slight tremor in his hands. Dr. Murtha declined Dr. Pitisci's invitation to discuss his condition in private. Rather, Dr. Murtha insisted that the discussion be held publicly at the nurses' station. Based on Dr. Murtha's physical appearance and based on the odor of alcohol on his breath, Dr. Pitisci summarily suspended Dr. Murtha as a potentially impaired physician and directed him to leave the hospital. Subsequently, Dr. Pitisci notified the state that it had a physician with a potential impairment with alcohol abuse. Other than detecting the odor of alcohol on Dr. Murtha's breath, Dr. Pitisci had no information as to the amount of alcohol consumed by Dr. Murtha. On or about March 24, 1995, the Agency received notification of Dr. Murtha's suspension from St. Joseph's Hospital. In response, the Agency opened an investigation that led to the filing of an order compelling physical and mental examination. Subsequently, Dr. Murtha received an order from the Agency compelling him to submit to both a physical and mental examination. The Agency chose the physician and directed Dr. Murtha when to appear for his appointment. On June 6, 1995, Dr. Murtha complied with the Agency order compelling his mental examination, and he was evaluated by Daniel J. Sprehe, M.D. Daniel J. Sprehe, M.D. is a psychiatrist licensed in the State of Florida. He has been qualified by various Florida courts as an expert in clinical and forensic psychiatry and was accepted as an expert in the area of psychiatry on behalf of the Agency. Dr. Sprehe's examination and testing of Dr. Murtha lasted approximately three hours. Dr. Sprehe obtained and prepared a detailed social and medical history of Dr. Murtha, administrated the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Psychological Test (MMPI) and MMPI II, administered the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST), and administered a Beck Depression Inventory. He also questioned Dr. Murtha and performed a mental status examination. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine Dr. Murtha's medical condition and to make any recommendations for treatment concerning his fitness to practice medicine. Dr. Sprehe completed a written evaluation, including a written opinion based on the evaluation. In addition to the aforementioned tests, Dr. Murtha was given a blood test that revealed no alcohol or drugs in his system. Dr. Sprehe's report indicated that Dr. Murtha scored rather low, a score of 7 (out of a possible 30), on the MAST test. He stated that the MAST is a self-reporting test and that a score of five or more places the subject in the range to be considered an alcoholic. Later, Dr. Sprehe indicated that based on the facts presented in other reports relating to Dr. Murtha, he would have modified Dr. Murtha's score to 9. Still later at the hearing, Dr. Sprehe again revised his scoring of Dr. Murtha's MAST test and concluded that he scored a 20. Dr. Sprehe surmised that Dr. Murtha did not answer the test questions candidly and that his score should have been higher. Dr. Sprehe also found that Dr. Murtha minimalized his abuse of alcohol. Based on the MAST test, Dr. Sprehe found that Dr. Murtha fell into the alcoholic range. For reasons fully stated in paragraphs 26, 27, and 41, the undersigned declines to adopt, as a finding of fact, any diagnosis of Dr. Murtha based on the MAST test. Dr. Sprehe explained the differences between the definitions of abuse and dependence. Subsequently, Dr. Sprehe opined, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the Respondent was an alcohol abuser. Based on his opinion, Dr. Sprehe recommended that Dr. Murtha consider a diversionary program such as the Physicians Recovery Network. Dr. Sprehe also opined that Dr. Murtha suffered from narcissistic personality disorder, which can complicate the diagnosis of alcoholism. A person with narcissistic personality disorder tends to deny defects in themselves. Dr. Sprehe's diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder was made after a one-hour examination of Dr. Murtha. Dr. Sprehe could not state with certainty that Dr. Murtha could not practice with reasonable skill and safety. Dr. Sprehe did opine, however, that "there is at least a question in my mind as to [Dr. Murtha's] ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety." Dr. Sprehe opined that the results of the MAST test and the mental examination, coupled with Dr. Murtha's history, placed Dr. Murtha in the high risk category. No where in the written report to the Agency did Dr. Sprehe advise the Agency that Dr. Murtha was not able to practice medicine with skill and safety. Dr. Sprehe also opined, based on a hypothetical question, that Dr. Murtha "is not in a position to practice medicine safely to patients." The hypothetical question, however, was based on the testimony of Dr. Murtha's ex- wife which has been found to lack consistency. (See paragraphs 28-30). Therefore, for the reasons stated in paragraphs 28-30, the undersigned declines to adopt, as a finding of fact, Dr. Sprehe's opinion which was based on a factually deficient hypothetical question. On August 9, 1995, sixty-five days after Dr. Sprehe's examination and report, the Agency issued an Emergency Suspension Order against Dr. Murtha's license to practice medicine. Dr. Murtha called Mark Stuart Goldman, Ph.D. as his sole witness. Dr. Goldman is a clinical psychologist and distinguished Professor of Psychology at the University of South Florida. Dr. Goldman specializes in the area alcohol research and is currently the director of the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Institute at the University of South Florida. Dr. Goldman was accepted as an expert witness in the field of alcohol and alcoholism, and he testified on behalf of Dr. Murtha. Dr. Goldman testified to the issue of alcoholism and discussed in detail the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST). As discussed earlier, Dr. Sprehe relied on the MAST to help make his diagnosis that Dr. Murtha is dependent on alcohol. Dr. Goldman testified that the MAST can be skewed and that the very accusation of alcohol abuse can result in the subject having points scored against him. Dr. Goldman stated that tests such as MAST are crude devices used for screening alcohol problems but are not designed for the purpose of making diagnosis. To make this point, Dr. Goldman cited the Handbook of Alcoholism Treatment Approaches, by Hester and Miller, for the purpose that screening tests such as MAST should not be used for the purpose of making a diagnosis and that to do so represents a violation of professional and ethical standards. The undersigned is persuaded by Dr. Goldman's position that tests such as MAST should be used as screening not diagnostic tools. As such, any opinions based on results from the MAST test are rejected as not supported by credible evidence. Dr. Goldman examined Dr. Murtha on two separate occasions. Dr. Goldman obtained and reviewed Dr. Sprehe's report, and he reviewed the results of the MMPI and the MAST. Based on his review of the materials generated by Dr. Sprehe and on his own examination of Dr. Murtha, Dr. Goldman could not offer an opinion as to whether Dr. Murtha is safe to practice medicine. In addition, Dr. Goldman felt the record was incomplete to offer an opinion as to whether the Respondent was dependent on alcohol. In summary, Dr. Goldman found that a conclusive diagnosis would take considerably more time and would involve additional examination techniques. The undersigned adopts Dr. Goldman's position that inadequate information was available to render an opinion regarding Dr. Murtha's ability to safely practice medicine. In addition to the expert testimony received at the hearing, the Agency also offered the testimony of Dr. Murtha's ex-wife, Donna Gail Murtha. Mrs. Murtha is a registered nurse employed at James A. Haley Veterans Administration Hospital, and she was married to Dr. Murtha for 23 years until their divorce in December of 1994. Mrs. Murtha was offered for the purpose of establishing that Dr. Murtha was an abuser of alcohol and that he regularly consumed alcohol while engaging in the practice of medicine. Mrs. Murtha offered conflicting testimony relating to the quantity of alcohol Dr. Murtha consumed during their marriage. At the hearing she stated that he consumed "at least a pint [of liquor] a day. During the discovery deposition, however, she stated that "she couldn't state an amount [of alcohol consumed]." She also denied ever stating that he [Dr. Murtha] drank a fifth a day. Mrs. Murtha offered additional conflicting testimony as it related to Dr. Murtha's use of alcohol while on call at the hospital. At the hearing she testified that Dr. Murtha consumed alcohol while on call. During the discovery deposition, however, she testified that she knew of no specific incident when Dr. Murtha used alcohol on call. She also stated that she could not recall any instance when Dr. Murtha went to the office after having consumed alcohol. Mrs. Murtha's testimony is rejected because it is inconsistent and it lacks reliability 8/ At no time during or prior to the Agency's investigation had any complaints been received against Dr. Murtha.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED: That a final ordered be entered dismissing with prejudice the complaint filed against the Respondent in DOAH Case No. 96-0567. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1996.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsection 466.028(1)(s), Florida Statutes (2000-2005), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state department charged with regulating the practice of dentistry pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 466, Florida Statutes (2006). Dr. Driggers is a licensed dentist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 5473. The Professional Resource Network (PRN) is the impaired practitioner program for the Board of Dentistry, pursuant to Section 456.076, Florida Statutes (2006). PRN monitors the evaluation, care, and treatment of impaired healthcare professionals. Dr. Driggers has a long history of problems with alcohol. On January 15, 1987, he was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). He was adjudicated guilty of that offense. In 1990, Dr. Ken Thompson did an intervention on Dr. Driggers based on Dr. Driggers' alcohol abuse. As a result, Dr. Driggers was admitted to Glenbeigh Hospital of Tampa for a three-day evaluation of alcoholism and chemical dependency. Dr. Driggers was diagnosed with alcohol abuse and benzodiazepine abuse. Dr. Martin Zfaz, who evaluated Dr. Driggers, recommended that Dr. Driggers attend an outpatient treatment program with Dr. Ken Thompson five days a week, attend 90 Alcoholic Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings in 90 days, and obtain a sponsor. On December 17, 1990, Dr. Driggers entered into an Impaired Practitioner Program of Florida Physicians Recovery Network Advocacy Contract. The contract required that he "abstain completely from the use of any medications, alcohol, and other mood altering substances." He agreed to attend a self-help group meeting such as AA or NA three times per week, to participate in continuing care group therapy one time per week, and to attend a 12-step program of recovering professionals every other week. The contract was for five years, with renewal subject to review by PRN. Dr. Driggers did complete an outpatient treatment program with Dr. Thompson by February 1991. He did attend some meetings of recovering professionals. In January 1992, PRN referred Dr. Driggers to Anton M. Krone, M.D., for an evaluation of Dr. Driggers' status. Dr. Driggers told Dr. Krone that he had not completely abstained from consuming alcohol, but that his consumption had not caused a problem. He was not attending AA meetings and did not have a sponsorship. Dr. Driggers did not consider himself to be an alcoholic and was opposed to attending AA meetings and abstaining completely from drinking. Dr. Krone opined that "it would be very difficult to engage [Dr. Driggers] in a recovery process at this time which is abstinence based." Dr. Krone suggested that "PRN follow him on an informal basis and watch to be sure that he is not getting into future trouble and to be ready to intervene with him promptly if such trouble begins to appear." The contract between Dr. Driggers and PRN dated December 17, 1990, was voided as of February 1992. On October 6, 2000, Dr. Driggers was again arrested for DUI. He drove his car into the back of a car stopped at a red light. He was given a breathalyzer test, which showed a blood alcohol level of .23, which is almost three times the limit for a presumption of DUI in Florida.1 Dr. Driggers did not feel like he was intoxicated and blamed the accident on his leaning over to prevent carry-out food from falling to the floor. He was adjudicated guilty of DUI in October 2001. Dr. Driggers reactivated with PRN and agreed to an inpatient evaluation. On November 13, 2000, he went to Shands at Vista for the evaluation. Dr. Thompson evaluated Dr. Driggers and concluded that he was concerned about Dr. Driggers' ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety. He made the following recommendation for the treatment of Dr. Driggers: "Return for inpatient detoxification with further assessment. I do not believe that in view of his denial, stress, shame, and anxiety level that he would likely be very successful in detoxing himself on an outpatient basis even with supervision." Dr. Driggers remained at Shands at Vista until he was discharged on March 9, 2001, with a diagnosis of alcohol dependence, sedative dependence, and anxiety disorder. On April 1, 2001, Dr. Driggers signed another five- year Impaired Practitioners Program of Florida Physician Recovery Network Advocacy Contract. As before, Dr. Driggers agreed to abstain completely from the use of any medications, alcohol, and other mood altering substances. He agreed to attend self-help meetings such as AA or NA three to four times per week. He agreed to attend a PRN monitored professional support group. Dr. Driggers agreed to participate in a random urine drug or blood screen program within 12 hours of notification. On June 23, 2004, Dr. Driggers tested positive for a metabolite of alcohol based on an ethyl glucuronide test, which detects metabolites of alcohol in urine. On July 12, 2004, Dr. Driggers again tested positive for a metabolite of alcohol based on an ethyl glucuronide test. His July score was higher than his June score. Dr. Driggers admits that he had not completely abstained from the use of alcohol and that he occasionally had a glass of wine with his new wife. Dr. Driggers rationalized his consumption of alcohol with the following comment: "I didn't think that the--that a glass of wine on a particular day would--would not only show in urine, but I didn't think that it was any major thing at the time. It was--it was something I did that I regret." On August 16, 2004, Dr. Driggers was referred by PRN to Martha E. Brown, M.D., for an evaluation. Dr. Driggers admitted to Dr. Brown that he had not abstained completely from alcohol. He told her that he went to PRN group meetings for a while, but quit going to the meetings. Dr. Brown concluded that she did "not feel Dr. Driggers can practice with reasonable skill and safety. He has been diagnosed with Alcohol Dependency in the past, yet has again resumed drinking. He appears to have much minimization of his alcohol use with rationalizations about it is okay that he has returned to drinking." Dr. Brown recommended that Dr. Driggers continue to participate in PRN, follow PRN recommendations, enter into a long-term residential treatment for chemical dependency, and abstain from all mood altering substances, including alcohol. In September 2004, Dr. Driggers sought a second opinion from Chowallur Dev Chacko, M.D., who is board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry in general psychiatry, addiction psychiatry, and forensic psychiatry. Based on Dr. Driggers' long history of alcohol abuse and his continuing to drink while under a monitoring contract with PRN, Dr. Chacko opined that Dr. Driggers was not able to practice his profession with reasonable skill and safety and recommended that Dr. Driggers receive long-term residential treatment for his alcoholism. Dr. Driggers refused to follow the recommendations of either Dr. Brown or Dr. Chacko. On November 9, 2004, PRN sent notice to the Department advising that Dr. Driggers was not in compliance with his PRN monitoring contract. On June 17, 2005, Dr. Driggers returned to Dr. Brown for a new evaluation. Dr. Brown was still of the opinion that Dr. Driggers had a substance dependency problem and needed treatment. During her evaluation of Dr. Driggers, he told her that he would not be in PRN and would not follow PRN's recommendations. He was in severe denial concerning his chemical dependency. Dr. Brown recommended that Dr. Driggers should participate in PRN and follow the recommendations of PRN; that Dr. Driggers should minimally enter a partial hospitalization program with a step-down to an intensive out- patient program for his chemical dependency; that he should abstain from all mood altering substances, including alcohol; that he should attend 90 meetings of a self-help program in 90 days; and that he should turn in a signed list for attendance at 12-step meetings for six months to document his recovery. Dr. Driggers was evaluated by Jeffrey A. Danziger, M.D., on September 8, 2005, at the request of Dr. Driggers' attorney. Dr. Danziger opined that Dr. Driggers did not meet the criteria for alcohol dependence or active alcohol abuse at the time of the evaluation. Dr. Danziger diagnosed Dr. Driggers with posttraumatic stress disorder, in remission, and alcohol abuse, in sustained full remission. It was Dr. Danziger's "opinion that, from a psychiatric standpoint, Dr. Driggers did not have any substance abuse or psychiatric problems that would impair his ability to safely function as a dentist." Dr. Danziger explained that much of his evaluation was focused on whether Dr. Driggers posed an immediate danger that would justify an emergency suspension. Dr. Brown reviewed Dr. Danziger's evaluation report on Dr. Driggers and her prior evaluations of Dr. Driggers. On January 30, 2006, she opined as follows: I continue to believe that Dr. Driggers has a diagnosis of Alcohol Dependency as evidenced by having a BAL [blood alcohol level] of .2 at the time of one of his second DUI, indicating tolerance to the use of alcohol as "social" drinkers at a BAL of .2 would not have been able to get in their car to drive; he has been unsuccessful in his efforts to control his substance use while in PRN (he had continued to drink while in PRN) and again, if he was a social drinker, should have been able to completely abstain from substance use in PRN without any difficulty; and he has continued to use alcohol despite knowledge of having a persistent and recurrent problem with alcohol. Certainly of note is the fact that he has had not one but 2 DUIs in his past. He continues to have a great denial about the disease of chemical dependency and the need to abstain from all mood altering substances. This type of thinking poses an extreme risk to the public for him practicing without appropriate monitoring of his status by PRN. Alcohol Dependency is a permanent medical disease that does not go away once you develop it. A healthcare professional that has Alcohol Dependency must have long-term, appropriate treatment and monitoring to ensure they do well and can practice. In the most recent records you sent, numerous individuals gave affidavits that they have never seen him impaired while practicing. However, I would point out that simply not drinking at work, or not looking impaired, does not translate into whether one can practice their profession with reasonable skill and safety. Dr. Brown continued to recommend abstention from alcohol and mood altering substances, outpatient treatment, and participation in PRN monitoring. If those recommendations were followed, she felt that he could practice with reasonable safety and skill. However, Dr. Driggers has continued to refuse to participate in any PRN monitoring. On September 27, 2006, Dr. Danziger again evaluated Dr. Driggers. He was still of the opinion that Dr. Driggers had a diagnosis of alcohol abuse rather than alcohol dependence. Once you have a diagnosis of alcohol abuse, you will always have alcohol abuse, but it can be in remission. He agrees with Dr. Brown that Dr. Driggers is in need of outpatient treatment and monitoring. Whether Dr. Driggers' drinking problem is labeled alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the consensus of the experts in addiction psychiatry who evaluated Dr. Driggers is that Dr. Driggers must have some type of treatment and must be monitored in order for him to be able to practice dentistry with reasonable skill and safety. Dr. Driggers has been disciplined previously by the Board of Dentistry in 1989.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Driggers has violated Subsection 466.028(1)(s), Florida Statutes (2004); giving Dr. Driggers a written reprimand; requiring Dr. Driggers to undergo a new evaluation by a PRN- approved evaluator; requiring Dr. Driggers to comply with PRN recommendations; and suspending his license until he undergoes further evaluation and begins compliance with PRN recommendations. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2007.
