The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioner, Emma J. Brown, was subject to discrimination in her employment by Respondent for the reasons alleged in her Petition for Relief.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, exhibits admitted in evidence, and stipulations and argument of the parties, the following relevant, material, and substantive facts are found: Petitioner, Emma J. Brown (Ms. Brown), an African- American female, began working for Respondent, Sunbelt Health Care (Sunbelt), a nursing home in Zephyrhills, Florida, as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) on or about February 11, 2002, after an interview by Barbara Derby-Bartlett (Ms. Derby- Bartlett), director of nursing, who made the decision to hire Ms. Brown. Margaret Levesque (Ms. Levesque), a white female, was hired as a CNA by Sunbelt in June of 2002. A CNA's duties include assisting the nursing staff in overall patient care. At the time of their hire, all new employees were required to attend an orientation process. During orientation, new employees, including Ms. Brown, were given a copy of Sunbelt's employee handbook and other printed materials, including Sunbelt's "Call-Off Guides" policy. The "Call-Off Guides" policy specifies the means and method employees are required to follow when they can not be present for their scheduled work shifts. The policy also informs the new employee that repeated absenteeism will result in immediate dismissal. Sunbelt is a 24-hour, full-care facility with residents located in both its north side wing and south side wing. Employees work on both wings. Sunbelt used two shifts, the day shift and the night shift, to provide residents with 24-hour care and service. Ms. Brown testified that at the time of her hire, she informed Sunbelt that she could not work the day (first) shift because she had another job. Her request to work the night (second) shift was granted. On February 22, 2002, after 11 days of employment, Ms. Brown suffered an on-the-job injury to her wrist. Ms. Brown re-injured her wrist on March 22, 2002, and suffered an on-the- job back injury on April 7, 2002. Ms. Brown, through counsel, filed workers' compensation claims for her on-the-job injuries. Ms. Brown's treating physician placed her on work restrictions, limiting her duties to no bending and no lifting over 20 pounds. On or about May 24, 2002, Ms. Brown returned to work and presented her work restrictions, and Sunbelt assigned Ms. Brown to the night shift to perform light-duty work assignments. The light-duty work assigned to Ms. Brown consisted of answering residents' call lights, checking their vital signs, assisting residents with their meals (passing trays), and replenishing their water supplies on both the north and south wings. Ms. Brown requested that Sunbelt change her work schedule to day shift and allow her to work five consecutive days with weekends off. This request was denied. During the pertinent time, two other CNAs, Ms. Levesque and Shirley Manley (Ms. Manley), were also on light-duty. Ms. Levesque and Ms. Manley, white females, performed light-duty work assignments on both the north and south wings similar to those performed by Ms. Brown. According to Ms. Brown, Ms. Levesque worked weekdays for two consecutive months with no weekend duty, and she was not allowed to do likewise. On June 6, 2002, Sunbelt transferred Ms. Brown from night shift to day shift. Ms. Brown maintained that there is "more light-duty work" during the day shift than during the night shift, and by keeping her on the day shift, her workload was increased when compared to CNAs working during the night shift. Ms. Brown filed her claim of discrimination, and Sunbelt, by and through counsel, attempted settlement of Ms. Brown's claim of discrimination without success. Ms. Brown maintained that the proffered settlement did not justify the treatment she received. Sunbelt presented the testimony of Ms. Levesque, who was hired in June 2002 as a CNA but was initially assigned to the duty and function of "staffing coordinator." The staffing coordinator is a day shift employee whose primarily duties consisted of preparing CNAs' work schedules and identifying and securing replacements for those CNAs who called in and, for whatever reasons, did not or could not report for duty as scheduled. During her staffing coordinator assignment, Ms. Levesque also assisted CNAs in their duties, but was assigned light-duty with a 20-pound lifting restriction. Her CNA duties include passing food trays during breakfast, lunch, and dinner; replenishing water; and anything that did not require her to physically pick-up and/or lift a resident. In or about mid-August of 2002, Ms. Levesque's schedule changed, and she was required to work every other weekend. On several occasions, Ms. Levesque and Ms. Brown worked on the same shift, but not on the same wing. Ms. Derby-Bartlett testified that upon receipt from an employee's physician detailing the employee's limitations, she would work within those specific limitations in assigning CNAs to light-duty. According to Ms. Derby-Bartlett, light-duty work assignments are less during the night when residents are asleep and more during the day when residents are awake. After her appointment to the position of director of nursing, Ms. Derby-Bartlett became aware that Ms. Levesque was not working every other weekend and informed Ms. Levesque that she would be scheduled to work every other weekend. Ms. Levesque's request for a couple of weeks to make adjustments was granted, and she thereafter was scheduled to work every other weekend. Ms. Derby-Bartlett confirmed that Ms. Brown was assigned light-duty work assignments on June 6, 2002, and Ms. Brown was a no-show for work. On July 3, 2002, Ms. Brown was assigned light-duty, and she called in as a no-show. On July 4, 2002, Ms. Brown was assigned light-duty, and she did not call in or show for work. On July 5, 2002, Ms. Brown was assigned light-duty, and she did not call in or show for work. Ms. Derby-Bartlett contacted the staffing person on each day Ms. Brown called in and on each day Ms. Brown was a no- show, confirming the accuracy of the reports. Ms. Derby-Bartlett contacted Ms. Brown regarding her no-calls and no-shows and informed her of Sunbelt's policy of termination for repeated absenteeism. Ms. Brown, believing her doctor had called Sunbelt on one of the days she was a no-show, was mistaken because no doctor called. On July 5, 2002, Ms. Derby-Bartlett completed Sunbelt's disciplinary form to terminate Ms. Brown due to her several no-calls and no-shows, in violation of Sunbelt's policy, and forwarded her recommendation to Maria Coddington, Sunbelt's unit manager. Ms. Derby-Bartlett testified that since her appointment as director of nursing, the no-show/no-call termination policy has been consistently applied, and she was not aware of any employee who had been no-show/no-call for two consecutive days who had not been terminated. Five months after hiring Ms. Brown, Ms. Derby-Bartlett terminated her. Sunbelt's employee handbook's "Call-Off Guides" policy regarding absenteeism provides, in pertinent part that: "if employees do not call in or do not show up for work for two consecutive days or three nonconsecutive days, it is grounds for termination." Each employee, as did Ms. Brown, signed individual employment documents attesting to having received a copy of Sunbelt's "Call-Off Guides" policy when hired. Ms. Brown was terminated because of her violation of Sunbelt's policy regarding two or more absenteeism without notice to her employer and her repeated failure, albeit her belief that her physician was going to call on her behalf and did not do so, to timely inform her employer of her absence from scheduled duty. Ms. Brown's termination by Sunbelt was based on her violation of their employee work attendance policy and not because of her race and/or ethnic origin. Ms. Brown failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination based on her race as alleged in her complaint of discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Emma J. Brown. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Emma J. Brown 38723 Barbara Lane Dade City, Florida 33523 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alan M. Gerlach, Esquire Adventist Health System-Legal Services 111 North Orlando Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on February 24, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates one of the largest continuing care retirement communities in the country with about 2,400 residents and just over 1,000 employees on a single site in Fort Myers, Florida. Petitioner describes herself as "Indo-Guyanese" and testified that she is a member of the Catholic denomination. Petitioner is an articulate woman who projects an air of dignity and refinement. These qualities, when combined, can easily be interpreted by some individuals as producing an arrogant personality type. On June 6, 2013, Petitioner began employment with Respondent and was assigned to work at The Arbor, which is one of Respondent's assisted living facilities. Petitioner was employed as a hospitality care assistant (HCA) and worked on a PRN, or "as needed/on-call," basis. Petitioner's final date of employment with Respondent was May 8, 2014. Petitioner's employment relationship with Respondent ended after Petitioner refused to return to work after being cleared to do so by her authorized workers' compensation treating physician. During her employment by Respondent, Petitioner was supervised by Stacey Daniels, the registered nurse manager assigned to The Arbor. Ms. Daniels has held this position for 15 years. In her capacity as registered nurse manager, Ms. Daniels supervised seven licensed practical nurses, approximately 35 HCAs and resident care assistants, and two front-desk staff. In addition to Petitioner, Ms. Daniels also supervised Marjorie Cartwright, who works at The Arbors as a full-time HCA. Alleged Harassment by Marjorie Cartwright Petitioner, in her Complaint, alleges that she "endured on-going harassment by Marjorie Cartwright." According to Petitioner, Ms. Cartwright would tell Petitioner things like "we don't allow terrorists to have keys and [a] radio," would ask Petitioner if she is "Muslim," and referred to Petitioner as "that bitch nigger" when speaking with other staff. The Complaint also alleges that Ms. Cartwright told co-workers that she "hate[s Petitioner] to the bone." Olna Exantus and Nadine Bernard were previously employed by Respondent, and each woman worked with both Petitioner and Ms. Cartwright. Ms. Exantus testified that she witnessed an incident between Ms. Cartwright and Petitioner, during which Ms. Cartwright called Petitioner "stupid" and an "idiot" because Petitioner did not deliver to Ms. Cartwright the number of lemons that were requested. Ms. Exantus also recalled an incident where she was working with Ms. Cartwright and Petitioner when, out of the presence of Petitioner, Ms. Cartwright said that she hates Petitioner to the bone or words of similar import. Ms. Bernard testified that Ms. Cartwright referred to Petitioner as "stupid" on one occasion, and on another occasion, she called Petitioner a "bitch." Ms. Bernard also testified that she heard Ms. Cartwright state that she hates Petitioner to the bone or words of similar import. Both Mses. Exantus and Bernard testified that they heard Ms. Cartwright say that the reason why she hates Petitioner to the bone is because Petitioner thinks that "she is a rich lady" and is, therefore, better than everyone else. Neither Ms. Exantus nor Ms. Bernard testified to having heard Ms. Cartwright refer to Petitioner as either a "nigger" or a "bitch." Ms. Cartwright, who is not Indo-Guyanese, has been employed by Respondent for approximately six years as a full-time HCA. Although Ms. Cartwright testified for only a few minutes during the final hearing, she projects a personality type that can best be described as "feisty." Ms. Cartwright and Petitioner worked together approximately ten times during Petitioner's period of employment with Respondent. Ms. Cartwright testified that she never referred to Petitioner using either the word "nigger" or "Muslim." Ms. Cartwright did not deny that she referred to Petitioner as "stupid" or called her an "idiot." Ms. Cartwright also did not deny that she stated that she hates Petitioner to the bone. Petitioner was informed by Mses. Exantus and Bernard that she was disliked by Ms. Cartwright, and they suggested to Petitioner that she should take appropriate steps to protect her food items from possible contamination by Ms. Cartwright. Although Petitioner was warned to take such steps, there is no evidence that Ms. Cartwright engaged in any behaviors designed to cause harm to Petitioner. The evidence is clear, however, that Ms. Cartwright disliked Petitioner during Petitioner's period of employment by Respondent. Petitioner contemporaneously prepared personal notes as certain events happened during her employment by Respondent, including issues she claimed to have had with Ms. Cartwright. None of Petitioner's contemporaneous notes indicate that Ms. Cartwright, or anyone else employed by Respondent, referred to her as either a "nigger" or a "Muslim." The evidence does not support Petitioner's claim that Ms. Cartwright referred to Petitioner as a "bitch nigger" or as a "Muslim" as alleged in the Complaint. Stacey Daniel's Alleged Failure to Act on Complaints Petitioner alleges in her Complaint that she attempted to report Ms. Cartwright's behavior to their joint supervisor Ms. Daniels, but was told by Ms. Daniels that she "didn't have time to listen" to Petitioner's complaints. On December 13, 2013, Ms. Daniels met with Petitioner to discuss Petitioner's possible workers' compensation claim. During the meeting, Petitioner mentioned to Ms. Daniels that she was upset with her because approximately three months earlier, on or about September 4, 2013, Ms. Daniels refused to immediately meet with Petitioner to discuss the problems that Petitioner was having with Ms. Cartwright. Ms. Daniels had no recollection of Petitioner approaching her with concerns about Ms. Cartwright. Petitioner acknowledged that she only approached Ms. Daniels once to discuss her concerns about Ms. Cartwright. During the meeting on December 13, 2013, Ms. Daniels reminded Petitioner that she (Ms. Daniels) is very busy during the workday, that it may be necessary to bring matters to her attention more than once, and that she is not always able to stop what she is doing and immediately meet with employees to address work-related disputes. She apologized to Petitioner for the oversight and immediately offered to mediate any dispute between Petitioner and Ms. Cartwright. Petitioner refused Ms. Daniels' offer because Ms. Cartwright, according to Petitioner, would simply lie about her interaction with Petitioner. Petitioner never complained to Ms. Daniels about Ms. Cartwright referring to Petitioner as either a "nigger" or a "Muslim." Petitioner Complains to Karen Anderson Karen Anderson is the vice-president of Human Resources, Business Support, and Corporate Compliance and has been employed by Respondent for approximately 18 years. On November 21, 2013, Petitioner met with Ms. Anderson to discuss matters related to a workers' compensation claim. During this meeting with Ms. Anderson, Petitioner complained, for the first time, about Ms. Cartwright and the fact that Ms. Cartwright had called Petitioner "stupid" and had also referred to Petitioner as a "bitch." At no time during this meeting did Petitioner allege that she had been referred to by Ms. Cartwright as a "nigger" or a "Muslim." Additionally, at no time during her meeting with Ms. Anderson did Petitioner complain about Ms. Daniels, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, refusing to meet with her in order to discuss her concerns about Ms. Cartwright. Denied Promotion on Three Occasions In her Complaint, Petitioner alleges that she "was denied promotions to Registered Medical Assistant 3 different times" by Ms. Daniels. This allegation is not supported by the evidence. Ms. Daniels testified that Petitioner was never denied, nor did she ever seek, a transfer to the position of registered medical assistant. Ms. Daniels also testified that the only conversation that she and Petitioner had about the position of registered medical assistant occurred before Petitioner was hired by Respondent. Petitioner offered no credible evidence to refute Ms. Daniels' testimony. Retaliatory Reduction in Hours Worked In her Complaint, Petitioner alleges that "[o]ut of retaliation for complaining to Ms. Stacey about Ms. Marjorie, they cut my hours back to 2 days a week without my request." As previously noted, Petitioner worked for Respondent on an "as needed/on-call" basis. Typically, Respondent's on-call staff members are presented with a work schedule that has already been filled in with work times for the full-time staff members. Any work times not filled by full-time staff are then offered to on-call staff. In addition, on-call staff may be called at the last minute, if there is a last minute schedule change by a full-time staff member. On-call HCAs do not have set work schedules and are offered work hours on a first-come, first-served basis. After Petitioner was cleared to return to work following her alleged work-related injuries, Ms. Daniels, along with Amy Ostrander, who is a licensed practical nurse supervisor, tried to give Petitioner notice of the availability of work shifts that were open on upcoming schedules at The Arbor. Ms. Daniels encouraged Petitioner to provide her with an e-mail address in order to provide Petitioner with a more timely notice of available work shifts, but Petitioner refused to do so. E-mail communication is the most typical form of communication used by the rest of the on-call staff and serves as the most efficient and quickest way for Ms. Daniels to communicate with HCA staff. Because Petitioner would not provide an e-mail address, she was at a disadvantage, because other on-call staff members were able to learn of the availability of work shifts and respond faster to the announced openings. Because Petitioner would not provide an e-mail address and indicated that she preferred to receive the notice of work shift availability by mail, Ms. Daniels complied and sent the schedule of availability to Petitioner by U.S. mail. The evidence establishes that any reduction in the number of hours worked by Petitioner resulted exclusively from her own actions and not as a result of any retaliatory animus by Ms. Daniels or Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding: that Respondent, Shell Point Retirement Community, did not commit an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, Ghanshaminie Lee; and denying Petitioner's Employment Complaint of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Glenn Dorsey, Inc., d/b/a My Home Spot, is liable to Petitioner, Tamela Alisha Landrum, for employment discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“the Act”).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in real estate property management which provides management services to homeowners’ associations (“HOA”), including managing the sale, lease, and maintenance of association property; organizing and staffing association board meetings; and enforcing association covenants and restrictions. Mr. Glenn Dorsey is Respondent’s owner. Petitioner is an African-American female and is a licensed Community Association Manager (“CAM”). Petitioner became employed by Respondent on May 23, 2016, as an Assistant HOA Manager.2/ Mr. Dorsey described Petitioner’s position as “the person responsible for how our communities appear.” She was handling contracted services such as pool maintenance, gate access, and landscaping “from writing the RFP, soliciting bids, comparing quotes to managing the vendor performance.” As her employer described, “A major portion of her job is managing the CCR [community covenants and restrictions] inspection schedule, performing the inspections and maintaining our database for CCR enforcement.” The description concludes that “Alisha is a licensed CAM and will soon be managing her own community association portfolio as the HOA Assistant Managers and Accounting Department are returned to full strength.” (emphasis added). According to Petitioner, she did not want to handle HOA board meetings, which occur in the evening and require the employee to stay for the duration of the meeting, which can be lengthy. In early September 2016, Petitioner was asked to cover an evening HOA meeting because Mr. Dorsey was double-booked for two different association meetings that evening. Petitioner was subsequently asked to cover additional evening HOA meetings. Between September 7, 2016, and August 22, 2017, Petitioner handled no less than 64 HOA regular and annual meetings for several different HOAs. On or about January 18, 2017, Mr. Dorsey transferred the responsibility for CCR inspections and enforcement to another employee. Petitioner complained that she was not compensated for working overtime to handle the HOA meetings. Petitioner repeatedly testified the company had no protocol for overtime. After-hour meetings created a personal hardship for Petitioner because they required her to incur additional childcare expenses. Apparently, a member of Petitioner’s family was initially providing childcare, but the arrangement broke down due to the inability to predict the length of HOA board and annual meetings. Petitioner testified that she verbally complained to both her direct supervisor and Mr. Dorsey about the hardship of after-hour duties and requested to be compensated with a salary increase and other benefits. Petitioner complained that her role and hours were changed significantly without any change in compensation. Mr. Dorsey scheduled a mandatory staff meeting for July 6, 2017, and included an agenda in the calendar invitation to staff. One of the agenda items is “meeting makeup time (next am come in late).” On August 16, 2017, Petitioner met with Mr. Dorsey and his assistant, Rachel Ward. At that meeting, they discussed renewal of her employment contract, and she addressed her concerns regarding her hours and compensation. Petitioner complained to Mr. Dorsey that she was not afforded a phone stipend, which was afforded to white managers, to compensate her for use of her personal cell phone for after-hour business. On August 18, 2017, Mr. Dorsey sent a letter to Petitioner “confirming” the August 16 meeting. In the letter, Mr. Dorsey acknowledged that Petitioner’s employment duties were “significantly different” than the duties she was hired for in May 2016. However, in the letter Mr. Dorsey justified the change in duties because of Petitioner’s poor performance of the original assigned duties, including estoppels, maintenance, and other administrative tasks, which he characterized “quickly became disorganized, delinquent, or incomplete.” Mr. Dorsey explained the change in duties as an attempt to “modify your role as to find a position in which you could succeed.” The letter concluded that Mr. Dorsey declined to change Petitioner’s compensation and benefits, or even enter into a new employment contract. Instead, Mr. Dorsey informed Petitioner that her employment would continue on a month-to-month basis, and that either party could terminate the agreement with 30 days’ notice. On August 21, 2017, Mr. Dorsey sent Petitioner the following electronic mail message: Alisha, Per your advisement today regarding your inability or decision not to attend HOA after-hour meetings, myHomeSpot.com will begin to cover those shifts without your participation effective immediately. Every other assistant is attending their portfolio meetings as this is a requirement of the position. We do not have a position at your rate of pay to provide you any extended exception. This is our advanced notice to you to terminate our employment arrangement on Oct. 14, 2017 as you are unable to meet the requirements of the current position. I provide you this date at the current pay rate to allow a smooth transition with someone who can perform the required duties, but, we can end with a 30-day notice to accommodate any changes if you notify us of this within 14 days from 8/22/17. On August 22, 2017, Petitioner sent Mr. Dorsey a letter which notified him she would no longer be available to work “beyond the published business hours” and requested she be returned to an 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. work schedule. However, the letter ended with notice of her immediate resignation. Petitioner’s Allegations In her Petition, Petitioner alleges that her change in job duties and hours, without appropriate compensation, was based upon her sex and race. She complains that she was not given a phone stipend afforded to white managers for use of their personal cell phones after business hours, and was forced to work after hours without overtime pay based on her race. Further, Petitioner alleges that Respondent unlawfully retaliated against her by responding to her complaints “with a write-up and termination notice.” Disparate Treatment Petitioner testified generally that she was paid less than, or denied benefits afforded to, white managers. Petitioner introduced no evidence on which to base a finding of the race of any employee, other than herself, in order to compare salary and benefit information. The record contains no documentation of which employees, if any, received a phone stipend. Absent this information, the undersigned cannot make a factual determination that Petitioner was denied the stipend which was afforded to male employees. Between the dates of May 23, 2016, and June 30, 2017 (slightly less than one month before her termination), Petitioner received the second highest amount of total wages of all Respondent’s employees during that timeframe. Petitioner received a total of $37,377.55 based on 2,051.25 total hours worked and 84.61 “absence hours.” An employee identified as AJ Ward was the only employee with higher total wages at $49,032.66. During that period, Petitioner worked fewer hours than employee Ward and incurred more “absence pay” than employee Ward. Petitioner further alleged that Mr. Dorsey manipulated her time entries in the company time management system, thereby artificially reducing her hours worked. The screenshots of time entries introduced by Petitioner are not sufficient evidence to support that allegation. Retaliation Only two days elapsed between Petitioner’s meeting with Mr. Dorsey, at which she voiced her concerns about uncompensated overtime and use of her personal cell phone after hours, and Mr. Dorsey’s letter giving Petitioner “advance notice” of her termination. Number of Employees The number of Respondent’s employees is a material issue in dispute. Respondent introduced its Department of Revenue Employer Quarterly Report (Form RT-6) for three separate quarters. For the quarter ending June 30, 2016, Respondent reported 15 employees in April and May 2016, and 14 employees in June 2016. For the quarter ending December 31, 2016, Respondent reported 13 employees in October, November, and December 2016. For the quarter ending March 31, 2017, the report identifies 15 employees in January, 14 in February, and 13 in March 2017. Respondent introduced a payroll details report for the pay periods between January 1 and August 31, 2017. The details report identifies only five employees. Petitioner did not challenge the reliability of the documents. Instead Petitioner argued that Respondent employed more than 15 employees when it was fully staffed. The evidence does not support a finding that Respondent employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during either 2016 or 2017.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Discrimination Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of race and religion, and retaliated against him, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA").
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Lawrence N. Brown, III, is an African- American male and is of the Christian faith. Petitioner has been employed with Respondent since April 14, 2014, at its store located at 3800 Oakwood Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida (hereafter, the "Store"). As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent at the Store. Respondent is a corporation doing business in Florida. Respondent owns and operates the Store at which Respondent was employed at the time of the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions. Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief Petitioner filed an Employment Charge of Discrimination ("Discrimination Charge") with FCHR on or about March 10, 2016.4/ The pages attached to the Discrimination Charge form (which apparently was filled out in typewritten form by FCHR staff) were prepared by Petitioner. On or about July 18, 2016, Respondent issued a Determination: No Reasonable Cause, determining that Petitioner had not shown reasonable cause to believe that Respondent had committed unlawful employment practices against him. On or about August 16, 2016, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief requesting a hearing to determine whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices against him. The Petition for Relief alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful discrimination against him on the basis of both his race and religion, and also alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful retaliation. These charges, as specifically set forth in the Petition for Relief, are the subject of this de novo proceeding.5/ In the Petition for Relief, Petitioner claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race by failing to promote him into supervisory or managerial positions for which he claims he was qualified; by giving him lower scores on his employment evaluations than were given to a white employee working in the same position (part-time hardlines merchandiser); by not paying him as much as they paid that same white employee; and by retaining that same white employee as a part-time hardlines merchandiser in the Toy Department, while moving Petitioner to another position as cashier. Petitioner also claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015, while giving other employees that day off. Additionally, Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal department about having to work on Christmas Day 2015, by removing him as a hardline merchandiser in the Toy Department and reassigning him to a cashier position, then subsequently effectively "terminating" (in his words) his employment. Petitioner seeks an award of $5,000,000 in damages in this proceeding. Background Events As noted above, Petitioner was hired by Respondent on or about April 14, 2014. Petitioner initially was hired in a part-time position as a part-time overnight hardlines replenishment associate. In this position, Petitioner's work scheduling availability was between 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. When Petitioner was hired, Alberto Rodriquez was the Store manager. In his position as a part-time employee with Respondent, Petitioner was not guaranteed any specific number of weeks or hours of employment in any given calendar year, nor was he guaranteed that he would attain full-time employee status. The number of work hours Petitioner was assigned was dependent on the company's business needs and on Petitioner's ability to meet the applicable job performance standards. Petitioner acknowledged these and the other conditions of his employment as evidenced by his signature on the Pre-training Acknowledgment Summary dated April 14, 2014. As a result of the elimination of the overnight replenishment associate position, on or about October 26, 2014, Petitioner was transferred to another position as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. In this position, his work scheduling availability was between 6:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. As a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was responsible for stocking store shelves with merchandise, straightening merchandise on store shelves, putting returned merchandise on shelves, and generally keeping the hardlines departments neat and the shelves fully stocked. The Toy Department at the Store was one of several departments that were categorized as "hardlines" departments. In his duties as a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was not assigned to any specific hardlines department, and his responsibilities entailed working in any hardlines department as needed. However, as a practical matter, due to the work demand, Petitioner worked mostly, if not exclusively, in the Toy Department until he was reassigned to the cashier position after Christmas 2015. David Leach became the Store manager in April 2015. At some point before Christmas Day 2015, the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted. Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, December 25, 2015. Petitioner did not volunteer, and had not otherwise requested, to work on Christmas Day 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid holiday for Respondent's employees. On or about December 23, 2015, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, requesting to be removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015. Pursuant to a directive from Respondent's corporate office, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for that day. Petitioner was not required to work on Christmas Day 2015, and he did not work that day. Petitioner was paid for the Christmas Day holiday. Although the Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, some Store employees were scheduled to work, and did work, that day on a volunteer basis, for which they were paid. On December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Petitioner signed the form. The form was marked as showing that Respondent "granted" the religious accommodation. Also on December 28, 2015, Leach informed Petitioner that he had eliminated the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. He offered Petitioner other part-time positions, either as a cashier or in making pizza at the Little Caesar's pizza station in the Store. Leach did not offer any other positions to Petitioner at that time. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, but informed Leach that he was unable to stand in a single place for long periods of time due to injuries he previously had sustained while working on the overnight shift. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, effective January 3, 2016.6/ Petitioner's hourly wage did not change when his position changed to cashier. He continued to make the same hourly wage that he had made as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. At some point on or after December 28, 2015, Petitioner signed a Personnel Interview Record form that reflected his revised work hours associated with his position change to cashier. The form stated his availability to work between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The evidence is unclear as to whether Petitioner did (or did not) call in to inform the appropriate Store personnel that he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or on Thursday, December 31, 2015. Regardless, the persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner worked on Monday, December 28, 2015; did not work on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015; and worked on Saturday, January 2, 2016. The work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, was computer-generated some time during the week of December 27, 2015, through January 3, 2016. If an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to be excused from work on those days, this situation is termed a "no call-no show," and the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week. This is to ensure that there are cashiers available as needed to work on upcoming dates. Regardless of whether Petitioner did or did not call in to inform Respondent he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015, the posted work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work that week. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner did, in fact, work a total of 15.90 hours the week of January 3 through 10, 2016. The work schedule posted as of Saturday, January 9, 2016, also showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner worked a total of 15.41 hours the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. At some point between January 13 and January 26, 2016, Petitioner was moved from the cashier position to the Store's date code specialist position. The date code specialist position also is a part-time position, for which Petitioner is paid the same hourly wage as he was paid as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent, working as the Store's date code specialist. Race Discrimination Claims As previously noted, Petitioner began working for Respondent at the Store on April 14, 2014. His initial employment position was as a part-time overnight replenishment associate. In October 2014, he moved to a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. In both positions, he was responsible for stocking and restocking merchandise in all hardlines departments, so was not assigned exclusively to the Store's Toy Department. However, as noted above, due to work demand in the Toy Department, Petitioner did most, if not all, of his work in that department until he was moved to the cashier position in late December 2015.7/ Petitioner contends that starting in mid-2014,8/ he periodically requested to be promoted to "Toy Lead" or to another supervisory or managerial position. He testified that he had undertaken many activities and implemented various systems to improve the efficiency and productivity of the Toy Department and other departments at the store, and had documented these activities and transmitted that information to the Respondent for inclusion in his personnel file. He testified that rather than promoting him to a supervisory position in the Toy Department, Respondent instead hired a non-African-American person to fill that position.9/ Petitioner additionally testified that he periodically would request to be transferred or promoted to other supervisory positions, but that Respondent did not grant these requests. He contends that since he was qualified for these positions, the only basis for Respondent's decision to fill those positions with other employees was discrimination against him on the basis of his race. In response, Leach testified that there was no formal "Toy Lead" position at the Store; rather, the person supervising the Toy Department is an assistant store manager, a position that entails supervising other hardlines departments besides the Toy Department. Further, Leach testified that in his view, Petitioner was not qualified to occupy certain supervisory positions because of his lack of experience in those areas and his relatively short period of employment with Respondent. Leach also testified that Petitioner had not ever formally applied for a promotion through Respondent's online application process. Petitioner further asserts that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race because he was not paid the same amount as Corey Harper, a white male hardlines merchandiser who also often worked part-time in the Toy Department on the afternoon or evening shift, even though he worked harder and received higher evaluation scores than did Harper.10/ However, Leach credibly testified that Respondent does not currently base its pay rate for part-time employees on job performance evaluation scores, but instead pays them a set hourly pay rate. According to Leach, Respondent has not given an hourly pay rate raise to part-time employees since 2009, so that any pay differential depended on whether employees were hired before or after 2009. Leach credibly testified that Harper has been employed by Respondent since 2004, so had received hourly pay rate raises between 2004 to November 2008; this would result in his hourly pay rate being higher than Petitioner's, even though both are part-time employees. Petitioner testified that when he was moved from the daytime hardlines merchandiser position to the cashier position after Christmas 2015, he made it clear that he wanted to remain in the Toy Department; however, Respondent transferred him out of that department while allowing Harper to remain in a hardlines merchandiser position, which entailed work in the Toy Department. Petitioner also made clear that he wished to return to the hardlines merchandiser position in the Toy Department when such a position became available; however, at some point, Leach reassigned Carol Yaw, who was white, from her previous office manager job to a hardlines merchandiser position. Petitioner asserts that Respondent's actions in allowing Harper to remain as a part-time hardline merchandiser and reassigning Yaw to a hardlines merchandiser position constituted discrimination against him on the basis of his race. However, Leach credibly testified that the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position that Petitioner had occupied was eliminated because of the lack of work in that position, primarily due to declining Toy Department sales after the holiday season. Additionally, immediately after Christmas 2015, Leach consolidated the overnight merchandise unloading and daytime shelf stocking positions and moved the overnight unloading employees to the day shift, where their duties consist of unloading merchandise from trucks and stocking shelves.11/ Leach credibly testified that Harper was not moved from his position because Leach had specifically decided not to move others unaffected by this reorganization out of their existing positions, and that Harper was an afternoon/evening hardlines merchandiser. Leach also credibly testified that he had moved Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position was eliminated because she was a 25-year employee of Respondent, and he felt that she deserved that position out of loyalty for being a long-term employee of Respondent. Petitioner also contends that Respondent's evaluation of his job performance was unfair because it was conducted by an assistant store manager, Marjorie McCue, who was not his direct supervisor. Specifically, he contends that McCue was unfamiliar with his job performance, so did not appropriately consider, in his evaluation, improved Toy Department sales performance and efficiency that were due to measures that he had implemented. Petitioner also contends that McCue initially deliberately gave him an inaccurately low job performance evaluation in an effort to create a record to support terminating his employment, but that when he complained, those lower scores were changed to higher scores. The only performance evaluation regarding Petitioner's job performance that was admitted into evidence is a document titled "Employee Review" that was dated January 31, 2015; Petitioner received a 3.10 overall performance score on this performance evaluation.12/ The Employee Review for Harper dated January 31, 2015, also was admitted into evidence; Harper's overall performance score was 3.00. Upon careful consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden13/ to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his race. To do so, Petitioner must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subject to adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified to do the job; and (4) his employer treated similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class more favorably than he was treated.14/ It is undisputed that Petitioner, as an African- American, is a member of a protected class. However, the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner was subject to adverse employment action. With respect to his assertion that Respondent failed to promote him on the basis of his race, Petitioner needed to show that, in addition to being a member of a protected class, he applied for and was qualified for a promotion; that he was rejected despite his qualifications; and that other equally or less-qualified employees outside of his class were promoted.15/ While Petitioner frequently sent email correspondence to Respondent's corporate legal office requesting to be promoted, the evidence does not show that he followed Respondent's formal online application process for applying for promotions.16/ Further, although the evidence indicates that Petitioner is very hard-working, energetic, bright, and detail-oriented, he did not demonstrate that those characteristics necessarily qualified him for the supervisory positions about which he inquired. He also did not demonstrate that Respondent filled the positions about which he had inquired with less-qualified non-African-American employees. In fact, Petitioner acknowledged, in testimony at the final hearing and in email correspondence with Respondent's corporate legal office, that in his view, some of the individuals who had been promoted were qualified for the positions to which they had been promoted. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not demonstrate adverse employment action by Respondent by failing to promote him on the basis of his race. Petitioner also did not show that he received a lower pay rate and lower evaluation scores than did other similarly- situated employees who were not members of his protected class. The only comparator to which Petitioner referred was Harper, the other part-time hardlines merchandiser that sometimes worked in the Toy Department. However, as discussed above, the evidence showed that Harper actually scored lower than did Petitioner on the January 31, 2015, evaluation.17/ Further, Harper was not similarly situated to Petitioner with respect to pay rate because Harper is a longer-term employee who had received hourly pay rate raises in 2005 through 2008, before Respondent ceased giving raises of hourly pay rates in 2009, but Petitioner was hired in 2014, after Respondent ceased giving hourly pay raises. Petitioner also did not show, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Leach discriminated against him on the basis of his race by electing to reassign him, rather than Harper, to a cashier position after Christmas 2015, and by later reassigning Yaw to fill a full-time hardlines merchandiser position that included responsibilities of working in the Toy Department. As discussed above, when Leach decided to eliminate the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position, he chose not to reassign other employees who were not directly affected by the elimination of that position. The evidence shows that Leach did not reassign Harper to a cashier position because Harper's position was not directly affected by the elimination of the daytime hardlines merchandiser position——not because Leach favored Harper over Petitioner due to race. Also as discussed above, Leach reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position——also a full-time position——was eliminated. Because Yaw was a full-time employee, she did not fill a position for which Petitioner was eligible as a part-time employee; furthermore, under any circumstances, she was not similarly situated to Petitioner because of her longer term of employment with Respondent. For these reasons, neither Harper nor Yaw are similarly situated to Petitioner for purposes of being comparators. For these reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination against him by Respondent on the basis of his race. Further, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of race, Respondent articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions with respect to Petitioner. As discussed above, Respondent did not promote Petitioner because he did not go through Respondent's formal application process for seeking promotions, and also because Leach determined, on the basis of Petitioner's lack of experience and employment longevity, that Petitioner was not qualified for supervisory positions at that time. Additionally, Leach's decisions regarding reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position while retaining Harper and reassigning Yaw to hardlines merchandiser positions were management decisions based on business needs and requirements, rather than on the basis of race. Petitioner did not present evidence showing that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination against him on the basis of his race. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of his race, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Religious Discrimination Claim As previously discussed, shortly before Christmas Day 2015, the employee work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted in the Store. This schedule showed Petitioner as being scheduled to work from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Christmas Day, which fell on a Friday in 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid employee holiday; however, employees could work that day on a voluntary basis and they would be paid time-and-a-half for doing so. As noted above, Petitioner did not volunteer or otherwise indicate that he was willing to work that day. Upon seeing that he was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, which then contacted Leach. Leach had Petitioner removed from the work schedule for December 25, 2015. Petitioner was not required to work that day, did not work that day, and was paid for the Christmas Day 2015 holiday. Petitioner claims that by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day, Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion. Petitioner asserts, as evidence of Respondent's discriminatory intent, that there are others who worked in the Toy Department who were not of the Christian faith, so that if someone was needed to work on Christmas Day, one of those individuals could instead have been scheduled. As previously noted, on December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Leach credibly testified that the purpose of having Petitioner sign the form was to have a written record of Petitioner's religion so that Petitioner would not again be assigned to work on a Christian religious holiday. Petitioner signed the form, but protested being required to do so, because, in his view, Respondent already was on notice that he is of the Christian faith because he always had Sundays off of work. Petitioner testified that when he was hired in April 2014 (notably, before Leach became Store manager) he had verbally requested Sundays off, effectively placing Respondent on notice that he is of the Christian faith. On this basis, Petitioner asserts that Leach and other managers and supervisors at the Store knew that he is Christian and that they nonetheless intentionally scheduled him to work on Christmas Day. Petitioner acknowledged that he never heard Leach make any comments with respect to his (Petitioner's) religion. Leach credibly testified that before he was contacted by Respondent's corporate office regarding Petitioner's concerns about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015, he did not know that Petitioner was Christian, and he had not inferred that from the fact that Petitioner did not work on Sundays.18/ Leach testified, credibly and persuasively, that Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by mistake. He explained that the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was generated using a pre-populated "template" method. This method, which is a method by which the Store sets its weekly work schedules, entails week-to-week copying of the regular——i.e., "template"——work schedule for all Store employees, then modifies that schedule as needed to address changes to individual employee work schedules. Leach explained that in using this method to establish the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, Respondent had inadvertently scheduled employees who had not volunteered to work on Christmas Day. He surmised that this was a possible explanation for why Petitioner mistakenly was scheduled to work that day. As noted above, Petitioner was not the only Store employee scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. Upon consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his religion. To do so, Petitioner must show that he: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) informed Respondent of this belief; and (3) suffered adverse employment action as a result of failing to comply with the employment requirement that conflicted with his belief. It is undisputed that Petitioner falls within a protected class for purposes of a discrimination claim on the basis of religion. However, Petitioner did not prove the existence of the other two elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of religion. Specifically, Petitioner did not prove that Respondent knew that he was Christian or that his Christian faith prohibited him from working on Christmas Day. As noted above, Petitioner was hired at the Store before Leach became Store manager. Further, because Petitioner had not been required to complete a written religious accommodation form when he was hired in April 2014, Respondent did not have any written notice in its possession that would have informed Leach that Petitioner was Christian or that Petitioner needed certain Christian holidays, such as Christmas Day, off of work. As noted above, Leach credibly testified that he did not know that Petitioner was Christian until Respondent's corporate legal office contacted him regarding Petitioner's religion-based complaint about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The evidence also shows that Petitioner did not suffer any adverse employment action. As soon as Respondent was informed of Petitioner's complaint, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015, did not work that day, and was paid for that holiday. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination by Respondent against him on the basis of his religion. However, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, Respondent produced credible, persuasive evidence showing a legitimate, non- discriminatory basis for its action——that is, that through the Store's use of the template work scheduling system, Petitioner was mistakenly scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. As noted above, as soon as Petitioner complained to Respondent, Respondent immediately accommodated his request by removing him from the Christmas Day 2015 work schedule. Petitioner did not present any evidence showing that Respondent's proffered reason for scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015 was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of his religion. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Retaliation Claim Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by reassigning him from his position as a daytime hardlines merchandiser——a position that he clearly liked and at which he believed he excelled——to a cashier position——a position that he clearly considered demeaning and that also was physically difficult for him to perform due to a previous injury. Petitioner was informed that he was being reassigned to a cashier position only five days (and the first workday) after he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day.19/ Petitioner testified that Leach told him that the part- time daytime merchandiser position had been eliminated due to the lack of work demand, particularly in the Toy Department, after the Christmas season was over. Petitioner testified that when he asked Leach about available positions in to which he could transfer, Leach told him that only cashier or pizza-making positions were available. Petitioner provided evidence that a softlines customer service job, which he claims he would have preferred, was open at the time he was reassigned and that Leach did not inform him of that opening or offer him that position. Petitioner also disputes that the part-time daytime merchandiser job that he had occupied had been eliminated. As evidence, he contends that Harper continued to occupy that position, and also that Leach subsequently reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser rather than transferring him back into a hardlines merchandiser position, as he had requested. The part-time cashier position to which Petitioner was transferred was the same level of employment position in Respondent's employment hierarchy as was the part-time daytime merchandiser position that he previously held. Additionally, as discussed above, as a part-time cashier, Petitioner continued to receive the same hourly pay rate and work scheduling availability as he had received when he was employed as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. As discussed above, on or before January 26, 2016, Petitioner was reassigned to the Store's date code specialist position. According to Leach, that position came open after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, and Leach believed that the date code specialist position would play well to Petitioner's strengths of being methodical and detail- oriented. Petitioner bears the burden, by the greater weight of the evidence, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Respondent. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Petitioner must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.20/ For the following reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not satisfy his burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. It is determined that Petitioner engaged in a "protected activity" when he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office, by email dated December 23, 2015, that he had been scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The email stated: Attn: Legal My schedule states that I am scheduled for Christmas day. I am a Christian I exercise religious right no work on a high religious day. Christmas is the day I celebrate the birth of Christ thus the name Christmas day. A Jewish person was assigned to my department (toys) and was allowed to have off all the Jewish holidays. I was told that is his right and approved, I said fine, I don't know who was arguing this but this was fine with me, because I have many Jewish friends, so I understand. Easter which falls on a Sunday and Christmas are my holidays. I am requesting off. I am requesting Christmas day off with holiday pay as my religious day, just like I requested Sundays off. Only I can change my religious day and work on Sunday, which I might have to when promoted. If management tells me I cannot be promoted because I exercise my religious right not to work on the seventh day, then I will have to do as Jewish people have done for centuries, they are released from the commandment that they may only eat Kosher. If captured by the enemy they may eat to survive. So if I can only be manager if I give up my religious right not to work on Sunday, then I will do what management says is a requirement. Thank you. Lawrence Brown Kmart-Hollywood, Fl Oakwood Plaza To be a "protected activity," the activity giving rise to the alleged retaliatory action must, at the very least, communicate to the employer that the complainant believes the employer is engaging in discrimination against him. Petitioner's email can be read broadly to inform Respondent that he believed he was being discriminated against on the basis of his religion by being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. To that point, Petitioner specifically compared his circumstances to those of a Jewish employee who had requested and been allowed to have all Jewish holidays off of work. While not specifically using the word "discrimination," Petitioner's email can be reasonably read to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner believed he was being treated differently than a similarly-situated employee who was not a member of Petitioner's protected class and who had been excused from work on the holidays observed by his religion. Additionally, Leach was aware that Petitioner had complained to Respondent's corporate legal department about being scheduled to work on a Christian holiday. Accordingly, it is determined that Petitioner has established the "protected activity" element of his retaliation claim. However, Petitioner did not show that he suffered a materially adverse employment action as a result of having engaged in protected activity. His reassignment to the part-time cashier position effectively was a lateral transfer that did not affect his hourly pay rate or hours of work scheduling availability. Although Petitioner subjectively considered the cashier position to be demeaning and below his skill level21/ and although his job responsibilities changed, the evidence shows that Petitioner was not reassigned to an objectively less prestigious or otherwise inferior employment position. Furthermore, in any event, approximately three weeks after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, Respondent reassigned him to a position as the Store's date code specialist——a position that he has officially held since January 26, 2016, and from which he has not requested to be transferred. In this position, Petitioner earns the same hourly wage and has the same number of hours of work availability as he did in the hardlines merchandiser and cashier positions. He is solely responsible in the Store for ensuring that date-coded merchandise on the shelves has not exceeded its expiration date—— a position that entails significant responsibility and, as Leach put it, is "very important." The evidence also does not support Petitioner's assertion that his removal from the work schedule in early January meant that he was effectively terminated. Although the evidence does not clearly show what days Petitioner did not work during the week after Christmas in 2015, or whether he did (or did not) call in to notify Respondent that he would be absent, the evidence does clearly establish that Petitioner was not scheduled to work the first week of January 2016, and it is also clear that management personnel at the Store did not believe that he had called in to notify them of his absence. Leach explained that if an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to notify the Store of his or her absence, the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week; this is to ensure that there are enough cashiers available as needed to work in the upcoming week. In any event, when Petitioner noticed that he had not been scheduled to work, he contacted the Store's human relations manager, who told him to come back to work. In fact, Petitioner worked the first and second weeks of January 2016, and thereafter, and he continues to be employed at the Store. Further, Petitioner was never told or otherwise notified, formally or informally, that his employment with Respondent had been terminated. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not suffer a materially adverse employment action by being reassigned for a short period of time from a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser to a part-time cashier position. Petitioner also did not demonstrate the existence of a "causal link" between a protected activity and adverse employment action. As discussed above, Petitioner's sending an email to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 constituted a "protected activity." However, as discussed above, it is determined that Respondent did not engage in an adverse employment action; thus, Petitioner's engagement in protected activity did not "cause" Respondent to take any material adverse employment action against him. Furthermore, in any event, Respondent articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position shortly after Christmas Day 2015—— specifically, that the part-time daytime merchandiser position that Petitioner had held was eliminated due to seasonal workload decline and other business management decisions reallocating hardlines merchandise-related tasks between the overnight and daytime shifts. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Respondent retaliated against him for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of section 760.10(7). Damages Petitioner has requested an award of damages in the amount of $5,000,000. However, section 760.11(6), which governs the award of remedies in administrative proceedings brought under the FCRA, does not authorize DOAH to award damages. Further, the evidence establishes that Respondent did not engage in any unlawful employment practices with respect to Petitioner, and, in any event, Petitioner did not present any evidence to support his entitlement to an award of damages in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2017.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the agency action letter dated June 21, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Chapter 2001-324, Laws of Florida, declared the Escambia County Utilities Authority an independent special district with transferred assets and enumerated powers. Chapter 2004-398, Laws of Florida, changed the Escambia County Utilities Authority’s name to ECUA. By law, ECUA provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida, and has the power to appoint, remove and suspend its employees, and fix their compensation within the guidelines of Escambia County Civil Services Rules. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that the Board and employees of ECUA “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost-effective services.” ECUA has adopted standards set forth in the Manual in order to govern employee conduct. During the relevant time period, ECUA employed Mr. Page as the utility service worker in the patch services division (“the patch crew”). Mr. Page acknowledged on October 10, 2016, that a copy of the Manual was made available to him. The patch crew normally works from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., with a 30-minute lunch break. The patch crew also receives two 15-minute breaks each day. Mr. Page would normally begin each workday by reporting to an ECUA building on Sturdevant Street where the patch crew’s trucks are maintained. The patch crew would use one or more of those vehicles to complete the day’s assignments and return them to the Sturdevant Street location at the end of each day. ECUA’s management received information in May of 2018, that members of the patch crew were leaving work early without authorization. This information led ECUA’s management to initiate an investigation. Part of that investigation involved the installation of tamper-proof global positioning devices (“GPS”) in ECUA vehicles. Those devices transmit a vehicle’s precise location to ECUA at two-minute intervals. The GPS devices also inform ECUA whether a vehicle is moving, idle, or stopped. ECUA’s management also hired a private investigator, Terry Willette, to observe and record the activities of the patch crew. Findings Regarding the Allegations from May 10, 2018 On May 10, 2018, Mr. Page received at least four assignments to fill holes at locations in Pensacola. Mr. Page recorded in ECUA’s work tracking system that he spent two hours completing two of those jobs and one hour completing the other two. Mr. Willette followed Mr. Page that day, and his observations contradict those time entries. Mr. Willette observed Mr. Page driving all over Pensacola, stopping on several occasions, and performing significant work at only one location. ECUA has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Page wasted an excessive amount of time on May 10, 2018. Findings Regarding the Allegations from May 11, 2018 The May 11, 2018, GPS report for truck #1624 indicates that it stopped at or near Mr. Page’s residence from approximately 9:21 a.m. to 9:28 a.m. It is possible that Mr. Page used one of his 15-minute breaks to stop at his residence, and there is no evidence that ECUA expressly prohibits employees from stopping at their homes. The preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that Mr. Page violated any Manual provisions on May 11, 2018. Findings Regarding the Allegations from May 24, 2018 The patch crew employees use an electronic timekeeping system to record the amount of hours they work each day. The Manual specifies that every ECUA employee is responsible for verifying the accuracy of those time entries. Mr. Page’s entry for May 24, 2018, indicates he worked eight hours that day. Mr. Willette observed Mr. Page leaving work at 12:59 p.m. on May 24, 2018. Also, one of the ECUA trucks often utilized by Mr. Page was in use from 7:01 a.m. until 12:57 p.m. on May 24, 2018, and was not used again that day. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Page failed to verify the accuracy of his time entry for May 24, 2018.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that Tadarel S. Page violated Section B-3, attendance records; Section B-13 A (4), conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee; Section B-13 A (13), falsification of records; Section B-13 A (18), loafing; Section B-13 A (21), neglect of duty; Section B-13 A (26), substandard quality and/or quantity of work; and Section B-13 A (33), violation of ECUA rules or guidelines or state or federal law. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2018.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based upon a disability in violation of section 760.10(a), Florida Statutes (2017); and, if so, what remedies are appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The original complaint filed with FCHR states in pertinent part: “I am a disabled female. I have been discriminated against based on disability. On 8/17/2017, I told my CEO (Mr. David Yokeum) that I had to leave the office due to my disability. I was feeling dizzy and needed to take my medication. . . . Respondent knew I had a previous injury on my arm/hand and that I couldn’t use my hand in an excessive amount. I re-injured my hand while cleaning and went to the Emergency Room. I was placed on medical leave until I was cleared by Hand Surgeon. . . . I was told I was no longer needed because I couldn’t clean. The Petition for Relief filed after the FCHR’s Determination of No Cause states in pertinent part: “discriminated, treated unfairly due to anxiety disorder; wrongfully demoted to cleaning person resulting in further aggravation of an injury.” No mention of the anxiety disorder appears in the original complaint. Melissa Bruno is a single mother with two sons. Her father, Thomas Tegenkamp, owns a local business in the Sunrise area. Mr. Tegenkamp has enjoyed a long-standing friendship with David Yokeum, the chief executive officer of WCA USA, Inc. (WCA). There was little, if any, evidence presented about WCA, except that Mr. Yokeum was the chief executive officer and that, at the time of Petitioner’s employment, there were approximately 25 employees. At some point, Mr. Yokeum mentioned to Mr. Tegenkamp that his company was looking for an employee for the office.1/ Mr. Tegenkamp told Mr. Yokeum that his daughter was looking for a job. No evidence was presented regarding her qualifications for the job at WCA-–her past training and job experience was as a cosmetologist. It appears from the evidence that she was hired primarily because of her father’s friendship with Mr. Yokeum. Petitioner was hired by WCA in July 2014 as a receptionist. Initially, her duties included answering the phone and the door, ordering supplies, and helping around the office. Her position was a salaried, as opposed to an hourly, position. About four months after Petitioner was hired, she was given responsibility for the UPS program. The UPS program is a billing function that needed to be completed each week, and involved downloading approximately 20,000 lines of data regarding shipping charges, separating the lines by “members,” and invoicing those members for their shipping costs. Matthew West is the regional director of North America for WCA, and has been with the company for approximately six years. He performed the duties related to the UPS program previously, in addition to several other responsibilities, and performed these duties after Petitioner’s departure. He believes that the UPS program can be completed by one person and is not a full-time job. He was not informed by Petitioner or anyone else that Petitioner had any type of disability. Sudkhanueng Bynoe has worked for WCA for 16 years in a variety of capacities, and currently serves as the company’s office manager. She participated in Petitioner’s hiring, and performs the company’s human resources functions. She remembered that, at some point, Petitioner told her that Petitioner had G.A.D. (generalized anxiety disorder), but she was not familiar with the acronym, and Petitioner did not explain what G.A.D. meant. Petitioner did not ask for any modification of her work based on her anxiety. She acknowledged that she did not advise Ms. Bynoe that her generalized anxiety disorder limited her ability to perform tasks, and did not ask for an accommodation. Both Petitioner’s brother and father testified at hearing. When asked at hearing, neither identified any disability from which Petitioner suffered while working at WCA. Both knew she took medication, but did not know what kind of medication or the basis for taking it. Neither identified any activity of daily life that was impaired by any type of disability. In late 2014, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). She claimed that the reason for the arrest was that she was overmedicated for her anxiety disorder. She notified her employer about the DUI, and had a conference with Mr. Yokeum and Ms. Bynum about the legal requirements she needed to fulfill with respect to the DUI. None of the documents related to the DUI were admitted into evidence, and the specific requirements were not identified. However, it is undisputed that WCA allowed her time off to attend whatever court dates she had, and that she was allowed to come in late and leave early for an unspecified length of time because she needed to get a ride from her father to and from work. Mr. West described Petitioner as someone who tried very hard, and put in a lot of hours. However, her performance was not up to par. The UPS program needed to be completed each week, and her timeline for completion was way too long. She was often as much as a week behind. He recalled her having a couple of “meltdowns” while with the company, but was never informed that she had a disability. In addition to the length of time that it took Petitioner to complete her work each week, she developed a problem with attendance. When she did come to work, she was frequently late, and took lengthy breaks during the day. Mr. West testified that employees started with five vacation days at the beginning of employment, which would progress to ten days. He testified that there was no specific time allotted for personal time in addition to the vacation days. Ms. Bynoe indicated that employees were allotted ten days each year for vacation, and ten PTO (personal time off) days. Respondent believed that she had ten days for vacation and ten days for PTO, for a total of 20 days each year. Assuming that the attendance policy in fact allowed both vacation days and PTO days, Petitioner’s absences exceeded what was allowed. For example, in 2015, Ms. Bruno took nine days of sick leave, 15.5 days of PTO, and nine days of vacation, for a total of 33.5 days. She was allowed to work from home an additional five days, although working from home meant that someone else had to perform her receptionist duties. In 2016, she took 14 days of sick leave, 10.5 of PTO, and nine days of vacation, again for a total of 33.5 days. She came in after 10:00 a.m. an additional six days and worked from home an additional three days (two full days and two half days).2/ Petitioner had hand surgery in June 2016, which accounted for at least some of her absences. In 2017, from January 1 until August 31, Petitioner took six days of sick leave, 6.5 days of personal leave, and one day of vacation. She worked from home on 8.5 days, and was late (coming in after 10:00 a.m.) 13 times. She was also absent from the office an additional 11 days, of which ten were attributed to her suspension as of August 17, 2017. There were two occasions, although the dates were not specified, where Petitioner did not come into work and did not call to say that she would not be coming in. In short, Petitioner was late or absent more times than anyone else in the company. Because of her absenteeism, there was a meeting at some point in 2017 with Ms. Bynoe and another employee, where Ms. Bynoe requested that Petitioner sign in when she came to work and sign out when she left. She was the only employee required to sign in and out, but the procedure was implemented because of her excessive absences that other employees did not share. Petitioner’s absences were related to a variety of problems, including her mother’s passing, an anxiety disorder, dental work, hand surgery in June 2016, a partial hysterectomy, and ovarian cysts. Petitioner also had some issues with one of her sons, which increased her stress. However, the greater weight of the evidence does not indicate that she had a disability as is contemplated under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The evidence also does not establish that Petitioner ever asked for an accommodation based upon a disability. The greater weight of the testimony established that WCA made several attempts to assist her, by having people help her with carrying supplies and allowing her to occasionally work from home, even though that impeded her ability to perform her receptionist duties. In 2017, issues related to Petitioner’s performance came to a head. Mr. West had several discussions with Petitioner during the last six months of her employment, because she was often as much as a week late completing each week’s invoices. She was also often late in the mornings, and while she testified that when she came in after 10:00 a.m., it was because she was picking up supplies for the office, she did not notify her supervisor at the time that that was what she was doing. As noted above, she was allowed to work from home several times during her last year of employment. A few months before her termination, Petitioner came to work with a cast on her arm, and told Mr. West that she had dropped a couch on it at home. She had broken her wrist. However, she did not ask for a less strenuous job because of her hand, and did not ask for help with the UPS program. Other employees helped her with carrying supplies and other manual tasks. Petitioner was aware that she was behind in her work. On August 16, 2017, she spoke directly with Mr. Yokeum and told him she needed additional help. The next morning Petitioner reported to work, but had to leave for the day shortly after she started, because she was dizzy and “twitching,” and was afraid it would evolve into a panic attack. Once again, Petitioner texted Mr. Yokeum to advise him of her absence and the reason she had to leave the office. Mr. Yokeum was not her direct supervisor. On August 17, 2017, Petitioner was advised by letter from Mark Mairowitz, WCA’s Executive Vice President, that she was being suspended from the office until at least September 1, 2017, due to her office attendance. The letter she received states in part: Hello Melissa David Yokeum called me to his office this morning to express his displeasure at your office attendance record as he has grown very concerned. Because of his relationship with your father, he has asked me, as WCA Executive Vice President, to interact with you and to let you know that you are NOT to contact David from now on. He has no desire to hurt your family and so he has turned all matters regarding your employment over to me. Again, you are NOT to contact David in any way. Doing so will jeopardize your continued employment at WCA. You are only to deal with me from this day forward. Your attendance record has been examined by David and myself and we find a disturbing pattern of absence, with far more days/hours out of the office than other WCA employees. We are concerned for your health and your safety in getting to and from the office and before you can return to the office, you will be required to undergo a complete medical evaluation/examination and obtain a “clean bill of health” letter from a physician before you can return to work. Furthermore, as David will be out of the office until September 1st, he prefers you NOT be in the office until his return. So, consider yourself on suspension until that date. Mr. Mairowitz’s letter also requested that Ms. Bruno return her office computer and cell phone until she was reinstated, and advised her that her salary would be unaffected by the suspension. However, it is unclear from the letter what health issue Mr. Mairowitz is referencing. In early September 2017, Ms. Bruno returned to the office. At this time, she was relieved of her responsibilities related to the UPS program and reassigned to cleaning in addition to stocking the office and breakroom. The cleaning consisted of vacuuming, mopping the floor, and taking out the trash. From management’s point of view, this assignment would allow her to have flexible hours and less responsibility, while not suffering any reduction in pay. From Petitioner’s point of view, the change in job responsibilities was demeaning and humiliating, and meant to embarrass her. Ms. Bruno cleaned the office once, over Labor Day weekend, and did not do so again. She testified that after cleaning the office that weekend, she experienced significant pain in her hand and had to go to the emergency room to have it examined. While she testified that the emergency room sent her home with a work release for two days or until cleared by her hand surgeon, no documentation from the emergency room was submitted at hearing, and no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the emergency room records were provided to WCA.3/ Ms. Bruno advised Mark (presumably Mark Mairowitz) that she hurt her hand and could not clean the office the way it needed to be cleaned. She did not report back to work at WCA. There was some testimony that the office was closed for a period in September related to a hurricane that hit the area, but there was no evidence as to how many days the office was closed. Petitioner’s employment was terminated as of September 29, 2017. Petitioner saw her hand surgeon on or about September 26, 2017. She submitted documentation from the Vanguard Aesthetic Plastic Surgery which is, for the most part, illegible, but is clear enough to confirm that she was seen as a patient and received some instructions. She did not report to Ms. Bynoe that she had gone to the emergency room, and did not inform her that she was unable to perform work cleaning and organizing the office because of her hand or because of any other disability. Petitioner did not testify that she was unable to perform the duties of cleaning and organizing the office because of her G.A.D. Petitioner did not establish by the greater weight of the evidence that she has a disability. However, she did establish that toward the end of her employment, WCA perceived her as having some sort of disability, as evidenced by Mr. Mairowitz’s letter to her requesting that she get a doctor’s clearance to return to work. Despite evidence that there were concerns, it is not at all clear whether WCA’s perception is based upon problems with her hand or problems caused by her anxiety disorder. Petitioner did not establish by the greater weight of the evidence that she requested an accommodation from her employer based on a disability. Likewise, she did not establish that WCA ever denied a request from Petitioner for an accommodation. Petitioner did not establish that WCA treated persons without a disability differently. No evidence was presented regarding any employee with a similar position and a similar attendance history, much less that such a person was treated differently than Petitioner. If anything, the evidence supports the view that WCA went to great lengths to accommodate Petitioner, in large part because of her father’s relationship with Mr. Yokeum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2019.
The Issue Two issues are presented for determination in this proceeding. The first is whether Respondent, Volusia County, was Petitioner Coleman’s employer. The second issue is whether Respondent otherwise violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 by unlawfully discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of his gender.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Ocean Center Parking Garage is a parking facility owned and operated by Volusia County in Daytona Beach, Florida. Petitioner’s employer, AUE Staffing Solutions, and Respondent entered into a services contract for temporary employment and employment leasing services. Respondent has no ownership interest in, or control over, AUE Staffing Solutions. On or about July 19, 2012, AUE hired Petitioner. Upon his hiring, AUE provided Petitioner with a list of employment expectations entitled “Welcome to AUE Staffing Solutions – What is Expected of You as a AUE Staffing Solutions Employee.” Among the relevant employment expectations are numbers 4, 12, and 14 which provide: 4. Always arrive on time; contact AUE Staffing Solutions immediately if you cannot report to work or are arriving late. Always leave a message on our 24 [h]our answering servicing if you do not personally speak with a Staffing Coordinator. * * * 12. Misconduct includes: Failure to follow any of our company procedures, insubordination to supervisors or to office personnel, sleeping on the job, horse playing on the job, excessive tardiness and absenteeism, unauthorized use of internet activity, and the use of profanity and/or abusive language on any assignment or to any AUE Staffing Solutions personnel will be grounds for immediate termination. * * * 14. If you are a no call/no show, walk off, or do not complete an assignment, we will consider this a QUIT and you will be paid the minimum wage for all hours worked for that entire week – no exceptions will be made. (Emphasis in original.) On July 19, 2012, Petitioner acknowledged his acceptance of these employment expectations. Thereafter, on or about July 28, 2012, AUE assigned Petitioner to work as a temporary employee parking lot attendant at the Ocean Center Parking Garage to fulfill the terms of its contract with Respondent. Beginning in February 2013, Petitioner began experiencing absences and tardiness. Petitioner’s schedule and time cards for the period February 18, 2013, through June 28, 2013, reflect that Petitioner was late on the following dates: February 22 March 22 April 2, 7, 11, 14, 28 May 12, 21 June 4, 8, 15, 23 Petitioner’s schedule and time cards for the period February 18, 2013, through June 28, 2013, also reflect that Petitioner was a no show on the following dates: February 16 March 24 June 11 June 28 On February 16, 2013, and June 28, 2013, Petitioner was a no show and did not call in to report his absence (no show/no call). Petitioner testified that on June 28, 2013, his immediate supervisor, Rebecca Pearsall, called him at 11:48 a.m. and informed him that he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner disagreed with Ms. Pearsall that he was scheduled to work that day. The AUE work schedule for the week of June 24, 2013 clearly reflects that Petitioner, known as “Willie,” was scheduled to work on June 28, 2013 from 8:30am to 5pm. Ms. Pearsall testified that work schedules were always posted in a prominent place near the office the Thursday prior to the start of the following work week, and that copies were made available on a clipboard to employees who needed a copy. Petitioner acknowledged that copies were available and claims to have taken a copy but lost it when it “blew out the window” of his car. Petitioner asserted at hearing that the “lost” version of the schedule did not require him to work on June 28th. Petitioner worked the Saturday, (June 22nd), Sunday (June 23rd), and Tuesday (June 25th) preceding Friday, June 28, 2013, and so would have had notice, opportunity, and responsibility to review the work schedule to understand when he was to report to work that week. Ms. Pearsall’s testimony, as corroborated by the AUE work schedule and time card for June 28, 2013, is more credible than Petitioner’s assertion that he had a different schedule that “blew out the window” of his car. Ms. Pearsall testified that Petitioner had previously been counseled about the need to report timely and call in when he was not going to be able to report so that the garage could make other arrangements for coverage. During their telephone conversation of June 28, 2013, Ms. Pearsall explained to Petitioner that his services were no longer needed and that he was not to report to the Ocean Center Parking Garage due to his inability to show up to work on time and for not showing up for his shifts without calling. Pearsall terminated Petitioner’s employment with AUE Staffing Solutions immediately. Ms. Pearsall is also an AUE Staffing Solutions employee assigned to the Ocean Center Parking Garage. She has worked at Ocean Center Parking Garage for five years. During the course of Petitioner’s assignment to Ocean Center Parking Garage (February 2013 through June 28, 2013) the other AUE-assigned employee performing duties similar to Petitioner’s was also a male (Patrick). After Petitioner’s termination, Patrick continued working for AUE on assignment to the Ocean Center Parking Garage. As of the hearing, he was still employed by AUE in that capacity. Ms. Pearsall testified that Patrick has not had the same challenges with punctuality and attendance that Petitioner demonstrated. Ms. Pearsall testified that subsequent to Petitioner’s termination, AUE filled Petitioner’s position with other males. Ms. Pearsall testified that during her five years at the Ocean Center Parking Garage other AUE employees, both males and females, were terminated for similar attendance and tardiness issues as Petitioner. On September 26, 2013, Petitioner filed an Employment Complaint of Discrimination (Complaint) against Daytona Beach, Ocean Center Parking Garage, but did not otherwise identify either Volusia County or AUE Staffing Solutions as Petitioner’s employer. Petitioner’s Complaint alleged an unlawful employment practice against him based on his gender and provided in pertinent part: I am a male with parental responsibilities. I believe I was discharged because of my gender. I worked for Respondent as a Temp employee/Parking Lot Attendant beginning on July 28, 2012. On June 28, 2013, I was unable to report to work because I had to take care of my twins due to not being able to get a baby sitter. I was terminated. The reason given was excessive tardiness. Tammy King, Human Resources Manager for Volusia County, conducted a review and investigation into the circumstances of Petitioner’s Complaint. Ms. King responded to FCHR Investigator Jim Barnes by letter dated November 6, 2013, concluding that Petitioner had not been discriminated against on the basis of his gender or any other basis. In his Investigative Memorandum dated April 23, 2014, Investigator Barnes noted that: Complainant was offered multiple opportunities to provide a rebuttal but has not responded. During an introductory telephone call, Complainant provided no additional information relative to his complaint. A telephone message was left on voicemail requesting an interview but Complainant has not responded. Complainant filed this complaint of discrimination based on his gender. The findings of the investigation do not support the allegation. Complainant alleged that he had been terminated because of his gender, after being told he was terminated for excessive tardiness/absenteeism. Respondent related that Complainant was late for work 13 times and failed to report for work four times in 5 months. After repeated counseling and cautions, Complainant was terminated for tardiness and absenteeism. Complainant provided no evidence of discriminatory animus, and no documentary or testamentary evidence that he was discharged for anything other than the stated reason. Upon completion of its investigation, FCHR issued a “Determination: No Cause” finding “that no reasonable cause exists to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred.” Petitioner testified that following the termination of his employment with AUE he found employment with Americano Resort as a porter and entertainer. Petitioner testified that he was terminated from his employment with Americano Resort after he was absent on a Monday, following a weekend trip to Georgia. Petitioner failed to report or call in his absence because he was tired and stayed home to take care of his twin infants. At hearing, Petitioner candidly admitted that he had no evidence to suggest that, had he been a female, he would have been treated any differently by AUE.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 2014
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Emerald Coast Utilities Authority, as a result of its failure to accommodate Petitioner’s disability, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2014).
Findings Of Fact ECUA is a local governmental body which was formed by the Florida Legislature. It provides water, wastewater (sewer), and sanitation collection services in and around defined areas of Escambia County, Florida. ECUA employs more than 15 full- time employees at any given time. Petitioner began his employment with ECUA in September 1995 as a Refuse Collector/Driver in ECUA's Sanitation Department. In 1999, Petitioner transferred to ECUA's Regional Services Department. At all times relevant hereto, he held the position of Utility Service Technician II. On or about June 28, 2012, Petitioner was given a copy of the ECUA’s revised Human Resources Manual and Employee Handbook (Manual). The Manual contains ECUA's human resource policies, including those for discipline and termination of employees. Section B-13 of the Manual establishes disciplinary guidelines, including “general examples of unacceptable employee conduct for which the employee may be disciplined up to and including termination of employment.” Section B-13 A.10. provides that “disciplinary offenses” include: 10. Failure to maintain job qualifications: Failure to maintain required licenses, certifications, or other similar requirements such that an employee is no longer qualified for a position or can no longer perform assigned duties. Section D-16 of the Manual establishes procedures for work related injuries suffered by ECUA employees. In addition to procedures for reporting and treating injuries, the Manual establishes that “[w]hen temporary, light, or unusual duties are suggested; these will be reviewed and, if available, arranged by the Human Resources Department staff, the supervisor and/or department head.” Section D-16 A.2. further provides that: Employees will return to work anytime they are medically able, up to six (6) months from the date of injury. At that point, if unable to return to work the employee must retire, resign, or be terminated. The department head, after consultation with the Human Resources Director, may extend this time based on evaluation of the employee's ability to return to work. ECUA’s Regional Services Department has 111 employees, who are responsible for the maintenance of all water and wastewater services and infrastructure for the ECUA, including, approximately, 1,200 miles of water lines; 1,000 miles of wastewater lines; 22,000 manholes; 20,000 valves; 10,000 water hydrants; and 473 air-release valves. Many of the valves are underground, often under asphalt or concrete. The ECUA position description for Utility Service Technician II (UST II) describes the requirements of the position as: having sufficient physical ability and mobility to work in a field environment; to walk, stand, and sit for prolonged periods of time; to frequently stoop, bend, kneel, crouch, crawl, climb, reach, twist, grasp, and make repetitive hand movement in the performance of daily duties; to lift, carry, push, and/or pull moderate to heavy amounts of weight; to operate assigned equipment and vehicles; and to verbally communicate to exchange information. Lifting heavy objects is a daily component of the UST II position. Items that are routinely lifted off of the job- site truck include pumps that can range from 50 to 80 pounds, 50 to 70 pound jackhammers, ductile and friction saws that weigh 50 to 60 pounds, and sections of pipe that can weigh from 25 to 100 pounds. While the pumps, saws, and other equipment can be retrieved from the bed of the truck, lengths of pipe are frequently carried on overhead racks. In addition to lifting tools and equipment from the truck, the job requires lifting 100-pound manhole covers using a hook, cutting asphalt and concrete with saws, digging to find leaks and access valves, and loosening valves that may not have been turned for decades. Manual dexterity is necessary when a utility worker is in a hole, where they may be called on to grab tools and items passed down to the UST, or get past items in the hole. Mr. Dawson testified credibly that UST work is very strenuous, involving work conditions and positions that are “not ergonomically sound,” and becomes more-so when fatigue sets in. He further testified that given the demands of the job, one cannot expect to perform while keeping his or her arms close in to their body, stating that “it’s hard to short-arm a heavy pump.” On December 18, 2013, the Petitioner incurred an on- the-job injury to his shoulder. The injury occurred while Petitioner was bearing down to loosen a valve that had become “frozen” as a result of having not been turned for a long period of time. While pulling up, he felt something “pop” in his arm. He finished up the job as well as he could. The shoulder injury was initially described as a strain or sprain. After his work injury, Petitioner was directed to Sacred Heart Medical Group to be treated. Dr. Albrecht placed initial restrictions on Petitioner to avoid stooping, kneeling, crawling, climbing, and commercial driving. He was also limited to lifting only up to 15 pounds and pushing and pulling 15 pounds. As a result of the injury, Petitioner took authorized leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) beginning December 19, 2013. As such, Petitioner was entitled to job- protected leave for a period of twelve weeks. At that time, Petitioner became eligible for, and received, workers’ compensation benefits. In January 2014, when it became apparent that Petitioner was going to be out for an extended period, a temporary employee was hired. However, the temporary employee was insufficient to meet the workloads of the Regional Services department, requiring closer supervision, and being limited in the work that the employee could perform independently. On January 2, 2014, Petitioner was treated by his physician and was restricted from pushing, pulling, or lifting more than 15 pounds. He was to avoid climbing and commercial driving. He was also to avoid lifting more than five pounds with his right arm. His physician further opined that he was to be kept on a light-duty status and prescribed physical therapy. The diagnosis was “revised to strain of right shoulder.” On January 23, 2014, Petitioner was treated by his physician, Dr. Albrecht, who opined that conservative treatment had been maximized and a referral to orthopedic physician was made. Petitioner's restrictions remained the same, namely he was restricted from pushing, pulling, or lifting more than 15 pounds. He was to avoid climbing and commercial driving. He was also to avoid lifting more than five pounds with his right arm. Petitioner was seen on February 11, 2014, by Dr. Turnage, an orthopedic specialist. Dr. Turnage’s impression was that Petitioner had “probable labral pathology and/or partial rupture of the biceps.” Surgery was recommended. Surgery was originally scheduled for February 19, 2014, but was delayed due to a problem in the process of approving the procedure by ECUA’s third-party administrator for workers’ compensation claims. Approval was ultimately obtained, and Petitioner was scheduled for surgery on March 14, 2014. Although Petitioner’s authorized FMLA leave was exhausted on March 12, 2014, Petitioner was not terminated from employment. Petitioner presented for the scheduled surgery on March 14, 2014. As the procedure commenced, Petitioner’s blood pressure fell to a degree that the surgeon terminated and postponed the surgery so that Petitioner could be evaluated by a cardiologist to determine if he could safely undergo surgery. Petitioner passed the “cardio test,” and the surgery was rescheduled. By letter dated March 26, 2014, Petitioner was advised that, before he could be restored to employment, he would have to be able to perform the essential functions of his position, as evidenced by a “fitness-for-duty certificate.” The surgery on Petitioner’s right shoulder and bicep was finally performed on April 16, 2014. Petitioner next saw Dr. Turnage on April 29, 2014, approximately two weeks after surgery. Petitioner was, at that time, in a sling and an immobilizer. At that point, Dr. Turnage was of the opinion that Petitioner could not perform duties even at the sedentary level, and recommended that Petitioner undertake physical therapy. On April 30, 2014, the Pensacola area experienced a 200-year rain event which caused significant damage to ECUA’s water and wastewater systems. Mr. Dawson described the damage to ECUA’s infrastructure as being worse than that caused by Hurricane Ivan. Repair of the water and wastewater systems was not work that could be delayed. In addition, ECUA was implementing Department of Environmental Protection requirements for its air release valves, as well as performing routine maintenance and upgrades. Due to the Regional Service department’s extraordinary needs, Mr. Dawson determined that Petitioner’s position needed to be filled by a person who could physically perform all of the required duties. ECUA proved it was under extraordinary pressure due to the 200-year storm event of April 30, 2014, and needed “all hands on deck” who could perform the essential functions of the job. Maintaining the UST II position open for an indefinite period while waiting for Petitioner to recover from his injury, thus necessitating the continued use of a less-capable temporary employee, would have been contrary to the interests of ECUA’s customers, and an undue hardship to ECUA. At some unspecified time after his surgery, Petitioner inquired as to whether he could repair water meters as a light- duty job with ECUA. He had performed that job during a period in 2005 in which he was restricted from duty due to a work- related injury. Repairing meters is not an essential function of a UST. A meter repair technician is a separate position within ECUA, with a separate job title. Petitioner also requested that he be allowed to perform “cut-non-pay” work, which involves the termination of water service connections for non-paying customers. “Cut-non- pay” is performed by a service technician, which is a separate position within ECUA’s Customer Service department, with a separate job title. Petitioner’s inquiries regarding light-duty work were forwarded to Ms. Scruggs. Ms. Scruggs testified that she made inquiry to the Regional Services department and to the Sanitation department as to the availability of light-duty work for Petitioner, but there was none. Ms. Scruggs’ inquiries continued after the expiration of Petitioner’s FMLA leave, and up to the date of his termination, but there were no light duty opportunities within his restrictions and qualifications. Mr. Dawson also testified that the meter technician positions were fully staffed. There was no evidence to the contrary. On May 27, 2014, Dr. Turnage executed a Workers’ Compensation Uniform Medical Treatment/Status Reporting Form in which he identified Petitioner’s work restrictions as sedentary duty, with a “likely” return to duty with no restrictions six weeks hence. By letter dated June 3, 2014, Petitioner was advised by ECUA that, if he could not return to work by June 18, 2014, six months from the date of his injury, he would be terminated pursuant to sections B-13(10) and D-16 of ECUA’s employee handbook, and that ECUA had reviewed the circumstances and determined there to be “no cause for any further extension of your inactive work status.” The letter also advised Petitioner of his right to a predetermination/liberty interest hearing to contest the basis for his recommended termination, including the opportunity to “provide any documents, explanations, or comments.” On June 19, 2014, the predetermination/liberty interest hearing was held. Up to that date, ECUA had not received a medical clearance for Petitioner to return to full duty. Petitioner indicated that his physical therapy was proceeding well and he believed that he would be cleared for duty on July 15, 2014. Petitioner stated that he could get a letter to that effect from Dr. Turnage on that day, since the doctor would be in his office, and asked that ECUA hold off on its decision. Petitioner also indicated that he would go to the office of his physical therapist immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing to get a current assessment of his status. In light of Petitioner’s representation, he was given until June 20, 2014, to provide ECUA with medical clearance for work. During the predetermination hearing, Petitioner made no additional request for a light-duty assignment, nor did he ask for any form of accommodation other than the additional day to provide letters from his doctor and physical therapist. On June 20, 2014, Petitioner provided ECUA with a letter from his physical therapy provider. The letter stated that Petitioner’s shoulder was improving and that the physical therapist anticipated Petitioner could return to work as a UST “following completion of his course of physical therapy.” However, the physical therapist further stated that a medical release would ultimately be up to Dr. Turnage, and if there remained doubts regarding Petitioner’s readiness to return to work, a Functional Capacity Evaluation could be administered to identify his functional abilities. No specific dates were provided for the completion of therapy or the release for duty. Upon receipt of the additional information, which suggested that Petitioner’s ability to return to work as a UST II remained an unknown, ECUA determined that Petitioner still could not perform the essential duties of his job, either with or without accommodation. There were, at the time, no other jobs in the Regional Services department that could be performed by Petitioner, the only jobs not requiring strenuous activity being those of Mr. Dawson and his two assistants, all of which were filled. Thus, for a job in the Regional Services department, there were no reasonable accommodations for one who was unable to lift, carry, maneuver, and use heavy tools and equipment. Based on the information available at the time, the decision was made to terminate Petitioner’s employment with ECUA. On June 23, 2014, ECUA notified Petitioner that his employment with ECUA was terminated, and advised him of his right to request a formal hearing to appeal the employment action. The letter closed by stating that “[s]hould your medical condition improve, you are welcome to apply for any open position for which you are qualified and can perform the essential functions.” Petitioner’s next appointment with Dr. Turnage was scheduled for July 8, 2014. The appointment was canceled, and rescheduled for July 22, 2014. On July 22, 2014, Petitioner was released for work involving no overhead lifting of greater than 20 pounds, and with the restriction that he keeps his arms close in to his body, i.e., no extending his arms. On August 13, 2014, Petitioner was discharged from physical therapy, with the conclusion that Petitioner “[a]chieved the established therapy and RTW [return-to- work]/Functional goals.” That information was not provided to ECUA. In September 2014, Petitioner applied to ECUA for the position of lift-station mechanic assistant, a position that he became aware of through an ECUA on-line job posting. Petitioner did not meet the minimum qualifications for that position, and was therefore not hired. Based thereon, it is apparent that Petitioner was capable of accessing ECUA job opening announcements. On October 23, 2014, Petitioner was released for duty with no restrictions. That information was not provided to ECUA. From October 2014 to February 2015, at least five UST positions became available. Petitioner did not apply for any of those openings. Between October 23, 2014, and January 1, 2015, ECUA hired thirty to forty sanitation truck drivers, positions for which Petitioner was qualified. Petitioner did not apply for any of those openings. Petitioner did not perceive himself as disabled, and never complained to anyone at ECUA that he was disabled. He did not assert a disability at his predetermination hearing. Petitioner did not report that he believed he was being discriminated against, on the basis of his disability or otherwise, to his supervisor, to Mr. Dawson, or to anyone in the Human Resources department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Emerald Coast Utilities Authority, did not commit an unlawful employment practice in its actions towards Petitioner, Roderick Billups, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014- 01582. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire The Hammons Law Firm, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 (eServed) Bradley S. Odom, Esquire Odom and Barlow, P.A. 1800 North E Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in September 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, Petitioner, Ausbon Brown, Jr. (Petitioner), who is an African-American male born on April 25, 1943, contends that Respondent, Department of Health (Department), unlawfully refused to hire him for any one of four positions he applied for on account of his race, gender, and age. The Department denies the allegation and contends instead that Petitioner did not meet all of the qualifications for the positions, and that it hired the most qualified employee in each instance. After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), which took almost 21 months to complete, the Commission issued a Determination: No Cause on August 18, 1999. Although not specifically established at hearing, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Respondent employed at least fifteen employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year and thus is an employer within the meaning of the law. Petitioner received a Bachelor of Science degree in biology in 1965 from Florida A&M University, a Master of Science degree in wildlife and fisheries science in 1978 from Texas A&M University, and a doctorate in wildlife and fisheries science in 1991 from Texas A&M University. According to Petitioner's job applications received in evidence, as supplemented by testimony at hearing, from June 1965 until April 1994 Petitioner worked for the U. S. Department of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service, in various positions, including "survey statistician," "operations research analyst," "chief turtle headstart," "fisheries technician/biologist," and "Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor." Petitioner then retired from federal service. From July 28, 1995, until July 6, 1998, he was employed as a child support enforcement case analyst with the Florida Department of Revenue. Currently, he is employed by Daytona Beach Community College in an undisclosed capacity. In 1996, Petitioner filed a number of job applications with the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). Shortly after the applications were filed, HRS was abolished and many of its functions were transferred by the Legislature to at least three other agencies, including the Department, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and the Agency for Health Care Administration. Four positions that followed the Department are in issue here, and they include positions 66224, 29618, 67370, and 80690. Position 29618 has a long and somewhat confusing history and was originally created for the Volusia County Health Department (Health Department) in January 1994. It was first filled in March 1994, but was vacated in June 1996. The position was then transferred to HRS and reclassified as an Operations and Management Consultant II. Even though it was advertised as a "pending" position in November 1996, Petitioner responded to that advertisement and filed a job application with HRS. Since it was a pending position, it was never filled and was "restructured" a month later to a Personnel Services Specialist. After the HRS reorganization became effective in late 1996 or early 1997, position 29618 was transferred to the Department where it was reclassified Personnel Officer I. The Department advertised the position in March or April 1997, and it was filled in April 1997 through a voluntary demotion taken by a DCFS employee whose prior position as a Senior Personnel Manager was lost through the reorganization. That individual was given priority in filling the position since the Legislature mandated that existing employees who lost their jobs through reorganization be given priority in filling other state jobs. Petitioner did not file an application for the position after it was advertised by the Department, and thus no consideration need be given to allegations pertaining to this job. Further, there is no evidence that the position was reclassified or transferred between the agencies on three occasions for the purpose of allowing it to be filled by a DCFS employee rather than by Petitioner. Position 67370 was classified as a data base analyst coordinator and was transferred from DCFS to the Health Department on an undisclosed date. When the job was advertised by the Health Department only five persons applied for the position, including Petitioner and Shirley Wilson (Wilson), the successful applicant whose race and exact age is unknown. Based on her dates of education, however, she is likely to be younger than Petitioner. In addition to the minimum qualifications, the Health Department desired a person with experience in Microsoft applications used by the Department, system security, supervision of employees in the automation field, and the data base itself. Because Wilson had experience in all of the above areas, was currently employed as a data base analyst/coordinator (system administrator) for the DCFS, and was "recognized statewide for her excellence within the CHD system," she received the highest score and was chosen for the position. Conversely, Petitioner could not match Wilson's direct experience in these fields and therefore did not have the qualifications possessed by the successful applicant. The evidence shows that the most qualified person was chosen. Contrary to a suggestion by Petitioner, the competitively-advertised position was not filled through the promotion of an existing employee, which would be contrary to personnel rules, but rather it was filled through the reassignment of another employee (Wilson). Position 80690, an Inspector Specialist, was located within the Department's Office of Inspector General. Over 130 persons filed applications, and score sheets were prepared for each candidate based on the applicant's education, experience in certain prescribed areas, written and verbal communication skills, and computer skills. Petitioner received an overall score of 136, while the successful candidate, Robert D. Cotton (Cotton), a white male three years younger than Petitioner, received 326 points. Although Petitioner received one of the highest point totals for education (84), he received only 21 points for his experience since his investigative experience was in the scientific area rather than in the areas unique to the Office of Inspector General. Thus, Petitioner's contention in his post- hearing filing that he should have been assigned 300 points for professional investigative experience (rather than 21) has not been accepted. In contrast, Cotton had extensive supervisory experience and prior work experience, including four years as the director of the office which processes and investigates licensee complaints for the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Thus, Cotton was the most qualified person for the job. Petitioner also applied for position 66224, an Environmental Specialist with the Health Department. Forty-three persons filed applications, but only the nine who received more than 40 points were chosen for an interview. Petitioner was not in this group since he received only 26 points, for a ranking of twentieth on the overall list. A three-person evaluation committee initially reviewed the applications and assigned points on the basis of interview selection criteria. The successful applicant, Lawrence Pagel (Pagel), a white male whose exact age is unknown, received 51 points. Based on his dates of education, however, it is likely that Pagel is younger than Petitioner. Before accepting the job, Pagel had served as an Environmental Health Specialist for the Columbia County Health Department, and he had both a bachelor and master's degree in public health. The greater weight of evidence supports a finding that the most qualified person was selected for the job. While the Petition for Relief alleges that the Department "classified positions" and varied "conditions of employment" in an effort not to hire Petitioner, there was no credible evidence to support this claim, or that the Department's actions were a pretext for discrimination. Indeed, there is no evidence from which to even draw an inference that the employment decisions were grounded on discriminatory animus in any respect, or that the Department acted with discriminatory intent when it hired the successful applicants and rejected Petitioner. During cross-examination of Respondent's witnesses and his own rebuttal testimony, Petitioner suggested that employees within an agency have an inherent advantage over outsiders, such as he, since they can more easily obtain the specific job experience required for vacant positions. Even if this is true, however, it does not constitute a discriminatory act on the part of the Department within the meaning of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Petitioner also contended that his applications were not properly scored and that he should have been entitled to more points based on his work experience; the more persuasive evidence belies this contention.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Petition for Relief DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ausbon Brown, Jr. Post Office Box 10946 Daytona Beach, Florida 32120-0946 Steven W. Foxwell, Esquire Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent violated provisions of Petitioner’s Human Resources Manual and Employee Handbook (“the Manual”) on April 20 and May 30, 2018, as charged in the agency action letter dated June 25, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Chapter 2001-324, Laws of Florida, declared the Escambia County Utilities Authority an independent special district with transferred assets and enumerated powers. Chapter 2004-398, Laws of Florida, changed the Escambia County Utilities Authority’s name to ECUA. By law, ECUA provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida, and has the power to appoint, remove and suspend its employees, and fix their compensation within the guidelines of Escambia County Civil Services Rules. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that the Board and employees of ECUA “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost-effective services.” ECUA has adopted standards set forth in the Manual in order to govern employee conduct. During all times relevant to the instant case, Mr. Reiter was a utilities service worker assigned to ECUA’s patch services division (“the patch crew”); and he acknowledged on January 4, 2017, that a copy of the Manual was available to him. The patch crew consists of eight people who normally work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., with a 30-minute lunch break and two 15-minute breaks. A significant part of the patch crew’s work involves filling holes left after other ECUA employees have performed utility work. Mr. Reiter drives a truck that delivers sod, asphalt, and/or dirt to work areas. He begins and ends each workday at an ECUA facility on Sturdevant Street in Pensacola, Florida. ECUA’s management received information from an anonymous source alleging that the patch crew was loafing and abusing ECUA’s overtime policy. As a result, ECUA retained a private investigator, Terry Willette, to surveil the patch crew and videotape their daily activities. From April of 2018 to some point in June of 2018, Mr. Willette routinely surveilled the patch crew for 4 to 12 hours a day. Findings Regarding the Allegations from April 20, 2018 On April 20, 2018, Mr. Willette observed Mr. Reiter and a coworker leaving an ECUA facility in an ECUA truck at 4:00 p.m. and arriving at Woerner Turf on Creighton Road in Pensacola at 4:16 p.m. The preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that Mr. Reiter deliberately extended his workday by taking a circuitous route from the ECUA facility to Woerner Turf. After picking up sod, Mr. Reiter and his coworker left Woerner Turf at 4:38 p.m. and arrived at Intendencia Street in downtown Pensacola at 5:16 p.m. At this point, Mr. Willette received a call to follow another ECUA employee and discontinued his surveillance of Mr. Reiter. There was conflicting testimony regarding the shortest possible route that Mr. Reiter could have taken upon leaving Woerner Turf. Given that Mr. Reiter was driving to downtown Pensacola just before “rush hour” on a Friday afternoon, 38 minutes is not an unreasonable amount of time to drive from Creighton Road to Intendencia Street in downtown Pensacola. The preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that Mr. Reiter deliberately extended his workday by taking a circuitous route from Woerner Turf to the worksite on Intendencia Street. A “daily overtime report” for April 20, 2018, indicates Mr. Reiter worked from 3:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. and claimed three hours of overtime. To whatever extent that ECUA takes issue with the total amount of overtime claimed by Mr. Reiter on April 20, 2018, there is no evidence as to what work Mr. Reiter performed after Mr. Willette discontinued his surveillance of Mr. Reiter shortly after 5:16 p.m. that day, and thus there is no support for a finding that Mr. Reiter dragged out his workday or artificially increased his overtime hours on that date. Findings Regarding the Allegations from May 30, 2018 On May 30, 2018, Mr. Willette photographed Mr. Reiter taking PVC pipe belonging to ECUA and placing it in his personal vehicle. Mr. Reiter acknowledged during his direct testimony that he took the PVC pipe without authorization from a supervisor. He testified that the PVC pipe was “spent material” and that such material is always discarded. Mr. Reiter testified that he ultimately returned the PVC pipe in question. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Reiter took the PVC pipe without authorization.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that Michael J. Reiter violated: Section B-13 A (4), conduct unbecoming an ECUA employee; Section B-13 A (27), theft or stealing; and Section B-13 A (33), violation of ECUA rules or guidelines or state or federal law. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2018.
