The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 12A-1.053(7), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority and/or is unconstitutional?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Florida Cable Television Association (hereinafter referred to individually as the "Association"), is a voluntary association of franchised cable television operators in the State of Florida. The Association's membership is reflected on Joint Exhibit 7. Petitioner, Cablevision Industries of Central Florida, Inc. (hereinafter individually referred to as "Central"), and Petitioner, Cablevision Industries of Middle Florida, Inc. (hereinafter individually referred to as "Middle"), are franchised cable system operators in Orange County, Florida. Central and Middle are members of the Association. Central provides cable television services in the cities of Clermont, Edgewater, Groveland, Helen, Holly Hill of Lake County, Mascotte and Oak Hill, and the Town of Minneola. Central also provides services in the Winter Garden, Orange County, Florida, franchise area. Middle provides cable television services in the cities of Belle Glade, Live Oak, Pahokee, Palatka, South Bay and the Town of Interlachan. Middle also provides cable television services in the unincorporated areas of Bradford, Palm Beach and Putnam Counties. Middle also provides services in the MAGNA franchise area, an area of Orange County. The Respondent is the Florida Department of Revenue, an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with responsibility for administering the State's revenue laws. See Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. The following facts concerning the Intervenor, BellSouth, were stipulated by the parties to be true: BellSouth is a corporation authorized to do business in Florida . . . . . . . . 5. . . . a) BellSouth is a utility service provider which owns utility or transmission poles and receives fees from others for the privilege of attaching wires and other equipment to those poles; and, b) BellSouth pays fees to others who own utility or transmission poles for the privilege of attaching wires and other equipment to those poles. . . . . Adoption of the Challenged Rule. On December 31, 1992, the Department caused to be published notice of its intent to amend Rule 12A-1.053, Florida Administrative Code. The notice was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 18, No. 53, December 31, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the "Notice"). See Joint Exhibit 1. On January 21, 1993, the Petitioners initiated a challenge to the proposed amendment of Rule 12A-1.053(7), Florida Administrative Code, by instituting a Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, proceeding. The Challenged Rule provides the following: The charge by the owner of a utility or transmission poles to anyone other than a utility service provider as the term "utility service" is defined in s. 203.012(9), Florida Statutes, for the privilege of attaching wires and other equipment thereto is taxable as provided in s. 212.031, Florida Statutes, as a license to use real property. Joint exhibit 1. The "specific authority" for the Challenged Rule cited by the Department in the Notice was Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2), and 213.06(1), Florida Statutes. The "law implemented" by the Challenged Rule cited by the Department in the Notice was Sections 212.02(20), 212.05(1)(b)(e), 212.06(1)(a)(b) and (2)(a), 212.08(4) and (7)(j), and 212.18(2), Florida Statutes, and Sections 13 and 14 of Chapter 92-319, Laws of Florida. The Taxable Event; Effect on the Petitioners. Typically, members of the Association, including Central and Middle, deliver cable television services in the State of Florida through wires and equipment attached to utility poles. Typically the wires are utilized by cable television providers to transmit audio and video signals to subscribers of the providers' services. Although cable television providers may own some poles and, in some instances, may install their own poles, most cable television providers, including Central and Middle, enter into agreements with owners of utility poles, such as electric and telephone providers, for the use of existing poles (hereinafter referred to as "Attachment Agreements"). See Joint Exhibits 2(a)- 1, 2(a)-2, 2(b)-1, 2(b)-2, 2(c)-1 and 2(c)-2, which are examples of Attachment Agreements. Pursuant to the Attachment Agreements, cable television providers agree to pay a fee to the owner of utility poles for the right to attach cable television wires and equipment to the poles. The fee is typically calculated based on the number of poles used each year. Pursuant to the Challenged Rule, members of the Association, and Central and Middle, will be required to pay sales and use tax on the charges they pay pursuant to Attachment Agreements they enter into. Utility Pole Characteristics. Utility poles to which cable television provider wires and equipment is attached are usually owned by utility service providers and are installed on public and private streets or rights-of-way. The underlying land and right-of- way may or may not be owned by the utility provider. Utility poles remain the property of the utility provider and do not become the property of the owner of the land or the right-of-way upon which the pole is located. Electric service provider utility poles are generally considered to be components of the "overhead electric distribution system," which consists primarily of the poles wires and transformers. The components are suppose to be designed and installed in accordance with the National Electric Safety Code. Poles installed pursuant to the National Electric Safety Code are to be installed in the ground and are anchored to the ground to insure that the pole remains in a vertical position. Anchoring may be secured by cement anchors and bolts embedded in concrete which is placed in the ground. Poles are installed and anchored to withstand the forces of nature. Generally, poles are installed to withstand winds of up to 150 miles per hour. In general, poles are intended to be installed permanently and, on average, have a useful life of twenty-five to thirty years. In practice, utility poles are sometimes replaced or moved. Poles become rotten and have to be replaced. Poles are also replaced when damaged. Poles are also removed and relocated for various reasons. Central and Middle were aware of approximately 200 utility pole changes during one year. In order to replace or move a utility pole, heavy equipment is required. Exemption for Utilities. Most poles to which cable television wires are attached are already being used by utilities for utility services. Pursuant to the Challenged Rule fees paid by "utility service providers" for the use of utility poles to attach wires and other equipment to utility poles are exempt from sales and use tax. The Department's exemption of utility service providers is based upon the provisions of Section 212.031(1)(a), Florida Statutes: (1)(a) It is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting, leasing, letting, or granting a license for the use of any real property unless such property is: . . . . 5. A public or private street or right-of-way occupied or used by a utility for utility purposes. Currently only utilities and cable television providers enter into Attachment Agreements. Local Government Franchise Agreements. Central and Middle operate in their respective areas of the State of Florida pursuant to agreements with local governments (hereinafter referred to as "Franchise Agreements"), authorizing them to provide cable television services within the jurisdiction of the city or county with which the agreement has been entered into. See Joint exhibit 3. Franchise Agreements entered into by Central and Middle generally give them a nonexclusive right to provide cable television services in the areas they serve. Central and Middle both operate within areas located in Orange County, Florida. Orange County has enacted Chapter 12 of the Orange County Code, Community Antenna Television Systems; Cable Television, Etc. Joint exhibit 5a. Section 12-48 of the Orange County Code, provides, in part, the following: Payment to the grantor of franchise consideration. A cable operator shall pay to the county a franchise fee of five (5) percent of its gross annual revenues for each year of the term of the franchise. The franchise fee shall be in addition to all other taxes, fees and assessments which are required to be paid to the county, and which do not constitute a franchise fee under the Act. . . . . . . . Time of Payment. . . . . (3) Nothing in this subsection (b) shall limit the cable operator's liability to pay other applicable local, state or federal taxes, fees, charges or assessments. A fee (hereinafter referred to as a "Franchise Fee"), similar to that charged pursuant to Section 12-48 of the Orange County Code is imposed by Palm Beach and Hillsborough Counties. See Joint exhibits 5(b) and 5(c). Franchise Fees are paid by cable television providers for the right to serve a given community. Not all cable television service providers are required to pay Franchise Fees of 5 percent. Central and Middle report their gross income on a quarterly basis to Orange County for purposes of paying the Orange County Franchise Fee imposed by Section 12-48 of the Orange County Code. Central and Middle calculate and pay to Orange County a Franchise Fee of 5 percent of their annual gross income. The Orange County Franchise Fee is paid quarterly. See Joint exhibits 4(a) and 4(b). The Orange County Franchise Fee is imposed on all gross revenues of Central and Middle, i.e., installation charges, leases of remote and converter boxes, sale of program guides and advertising. Central and Middle have entered into Attachment Agreements to utilize utility poles located in Orange County. A fee is paid for the use of those poles pursuant to the Attachment Agreements. The State of Florida does not impose a Franchise Fee on cable television service providers in Florida. In addition to paying Franchise Fees, some cable television service providers, including Central and Middle, also pay sales taxes in the State of Florida. 47 U.S.C. Sections 521-559 (hereinafter referred to as the "Cable Act"), provides Federal regulations governing cable television systems operated in the United States. Rule 12A-1.046(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 12A-1.046(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (b) The charge by the owner of utility or transmission poles to others for the privilege of attaching wires or other equipment thereto is exempt as a service transaction. The provisions of Rule 12A-1.046(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, are in conflict with the Challenged Rule. Rule 12A-1.046(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, has not been amended or repealed by the Department. It is, therefore, a valid rule of the Department. The Department, after proposing to amend Rule 12A-1.046(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, to eliminate the inconsistency with the Challenged Rule, decided to await the outcome of this case. Although a final decision has not been made, it is reasonable to conclude that the discrepancy between the Challenged Rule and Rule 12A-1.046(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, will be eliminated if the validity of the Challenged Rule is ultimately upheld.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the above-named Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner based upon her race, in purported violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Barbara Means, is an employee of the Department, occupying the position of "Accountant III." She has been employed with the Department since 1994. She applied for a promotion to a position of "Accountant IV" in October 2003. She competed for that position with other employees. The Petitioner was one of three finalists for the Accountant IV position. The other two finalists for the position were employees who had been hired by the Department in 1995 and 1997. One factor considered in the evaluation process for the promotion position was the various employees' most recent performance evaluations. The Petitioner had received lower overall performance evaluation scores than had the other two finalists. The three finalists, including the Petitioner, were interviewed by a panel of four supervisors, one of whom was Omar Arocho, the Petitioner's own supervisor. Mr. Arocho supervised both Petitioner Means and Ms Wells, one of the other finalists for the accountant position. The four interviewers asked each employee applicant the same ten skills questions and then recorded their responses, for comparison with standard acceptable answers to the questions. The employee performance during this skill interview was considered to be crucial to a determination of who was to be promoted to the subject position. The testimony of Mr. Arocho persuasively established that the Petitioner was excelled in these interviews by the two competing co-workers. This is shown in his testimony, in the recorded responses to the questions in evidence, and their comparison to the standard acceptable answers provided. The conclusion of the evaluation panel of four supervisors, according to Mr. Arocho's testimony which is accepted, was that the Petitioner and the other two applicants were qualified, but that the other two applicants were more qualified than the Petitioner. The Petitioner was not promoted to the position of Accountant IV and remains in the position of Accountant III with the Department. There was no substantial, persuasive evidence to show that the employment decision made by the panel of four supervisors, including supervisor Arocho, was based in whole or in part on any intentional discrimination or animus based upon the Petitioner's race.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Means Post Office Box 1345 Newberry, Florida 32669 Mark Simpson, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his employment with the Respondent in the Hospitality Department at the Grand Floridian Hotel on or about March 18, 1993 on the basis of his national origin (Hispanic-Dominican Republic), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent at its Grand Floridian Hotel as a valet/greeter/bellman in the Hospitality Department during the relevant period of time, including March of 1993. The Petitioner is of Hispanic origin from the Dominican Republic and is a member of a protected class. In approximately October of 1988, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent at the Contemporary Hotel as a valet/greeter. In April of 1989, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for not logging in a piece of luggage. The Petitioner did not grieve the April 1988 written reprimand. In May of 1989, the Petitioner transferred to the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel, where he was a valet/greeter/bellman. In February of 1990, the Petitioner received an oral reprimand for three separate incidents of improperly logging luggage. 9. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the February, 1990 oral reprimand. In August of 1990, the Petitioner again received an oral reprimand, this time for mixing up luggage while loading it into vehicles. The luggage had to be mailed to each rightful owner at the Respondent's expense and caused an inconvenience to the guests. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the August 1990 oral reprimand. In December of 1991, the Petitioner mishandled luggage by failing to tag all of a guest's bags. In May of 1992, the Respondent's management discussed with the Petitioner his failure to tag a piece of luggage. In July of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for failing to log in a guest's luggage. The Petitioner's verbal reprimand in July of 1992 was the result of a direct complaint by a guest, who was required to search for a piece of his own luggage in the Hotel's storage room. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the July 1992 verbal reprimand. In September of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for approaching a guest to discuss splitting a tip with a bellman, an impermissible practice. The Petitioner was not suspended for this incident. In December of 1992, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for failing to follow proper procedures regarding a guest's luggage on two separate occasions. The Petitioner did not grieve the December 1992 written reprimand. The Respondent decided not to consider the two incidents in December of the Petitioner's luggage-mishandling as separate incidents for progressive discipline purposes, even though such action was permissible under the collective bargaining agreement. The Respondent's decision not to consider the two December 1992 incidents separately for progressive discipline purposes was based upon the Petitioner's length of service and his good performance in other areas. The Petitioner had a good attitude, had good people skills, and had received good guest comments during the course of his employment. In December of 1992, the Petitioner understood that he was in the progressive discipline process. In January of 1993, the Respondent met with the Petitioner and offered to remove him from the responsibility of handling luggage by putting him in a non-tipped, dispatcher position. Also, in January of 1993, the Respondent and the Petitioner's union representative were working together to preserve the Petitioner's job. The Petitioner was reminded by his union representative about his previous reprimands and that one more incident would cause his termination. The Petitioner was told by his union representative that the purpose of moving him to a dispatcher position was to get him away from the luggage-handling area. The Petitioner was told that if he remained free of similar reprimands for one year, he could return to the tipped position of valet/greeter with no loss of seniority. After initially refusing the dispatcher position, the Petitioner accepted. The Petitioner was given the shift that he requested when he was transferred to the dispatcher position. In February of 1993 while on duty as a dispatcher, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension, without pay, for using poor judgment. He interrupted a valet while the valet was servicing a guest. The Petitioner did not grieve the February 1993 suspension. The Petitioner's action as a dispatcher of interrupting a valet was grounds for the valet to grieve such actions to the union. The suspension in February of 1993 for the Petitioner's poor judgment as a dispatcher was not the basis for his termination. The Petitioner requested a reclassification back to valet/greeter/bellman position. The Petitioner understood that one more incident of any kind would result in his immediate termination. The Petitioner requested the change from dispatcher back to valet/greeter/bellman for personal financial reasons; and his union representative also advised him that if one more incident of any kind occurred, he would be terminated. On March 16, 1993, the Petitioner mishandled luggage. The Petitioner did not properly log in a guest's luggage (a garment bag). 35. The Petitioner was terminated on March 18, 1993 for poor job performance. The progressive discipline which the Petitioner received was consistent with the union contract. The contract provides that an employee can be terminated for the next offense following a single written reprimand. The Petitioner had the opportunity to grieve all of the reprimands he received, and his union representative was aware of the actions taken in connection with the Petitioner's employment. The Petitioner grieved his termination, and that grievance was denied. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence of any similarly-situated employee who was not terminated for mishandling luggage on as many occasions as he had. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence regarding any discrimination against other Hispanic employees, other than his own belief, speculation or conjecture. The Petitioner understood that the Respondent's management was closely checking into everyone's performance. Management asked all of the employees at the Grand Floridian Hotel to help the Hotel earn a five-star rating. The Petitioner was never part of the Respondent's management and did not attend manager meetings. During the course of his employment, the Petitioner was chosen to train other employees because he knew the proper procedures for his valet/bellman/greeter position. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for handling luggage received from guests. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for logging in and handling bags. The Petitioner received copies of the Respondent's policies and procedures for a valet/bellman, including luggage handling. The Petitioner did not report many of the alleged discriminatory actions of his co-workers to management. The Petitioner conceded that on those occasions when he did make reports to management, these alleged actions stopped. The Petitioner received the overtime and schedules which he requested because of his seniority. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Orlando, Florida, work site has increased from 1993 to 1996. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel has either remained the same or increased from 1992 to 1995. In January of 1993, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department was 14, of which 11 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. In February of 1996, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department (including valets, bellmen, greeters and dispatchers) was 16, of which 12 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. The Petitioner failed to produce any evidence of an overall plan by the Respondent's management to eliminate minorities, including Hispanics, from employment at the company. The Respondent allows employees to review their employment records at any time upon request. The Petitioner presented only his own beliefs, speculation or conjecture as a basis for his claims of national origin discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which denies the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3990 The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-20, 22-31, 33-39, 41-61. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 21, 32, 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Jorge V. Jimenez 2716 FDC Grove Road Davenport, Florida 33837 Myrna L. Galligano, Esquire Garwood, McKenna & McKenna, P.A. 731 North Garland Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Dana C. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Based on all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a claim by petitioner, William C. Eagle (petitioner or Eagle), that in February 1994 he was denied employment as a delivery helper by respondent, S. R. Perrott, Inc., on account of a real or perceived handicap. According to the complaint, at the time the alleged discriminatory practice occurred, petitioner was suffering from a "soft tissue injury" from a "work related accident with his former employer." Because the evidence shows that in February 1994 petitioner did not enjoy in some measure the full and normal use of his physical facilities, he was a handicapped person, at least temporarily, within the meaning of the law. A preliminary investigation by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. Respondent is a beer distributor in Ormond Beach, Florida. Whether respondent employs "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year" so as to be subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, is not of record. In February 1994, petitioner learned of an opening for a delivery helper at respondent's plant. The position required that the employee unload beer kegs weighing 167 pounds from a delivery truck onto a dolly and then push the dolly into the business establishment. At that point, the employee would have to bend over and lift the keg off of the dolly to a waist-high position and place it in the desired location. Empty kegs would then be loaded onto the dolly and taken back to the truck and loaded. Since a truck would typically make up to 30 to 40 stops per day, the helper was required to engage in repetitious bending, twisting and lifting of heavy objects. After filing an application with respondent, petitioner was interviewed by respondent's general manager, Gary Connors, on February 23, 1994. During the interview, petitioner failed to disclose that he had suffered a back injury on a previous job, he was receiving worker's compensation benefits, he was then being treated by a doctor, and because of the injury, he was, at least arguably and temporarily, a handicapped individual. Without these undisclosed facts, Connors believed Eagle was qualified for the job and told him to report to work the next morning as a delivery helper. Like every other applicant, however, Eagle was also told that the job was contingent on his successfully passing a pre- employment physical examination. On the same morning that petitioner began work, or February 24, 1994, Connors contacted the office of Dr. James W. Bennett, a local chiropractic physician who conducted employment physicals for respondent, to set up an appointment for Eagle. During his telephone conversation with Dr. Bennett, Connors learned that Eagle was being treated by Dr. Bennett for a back injury suffered on his previous job, and that he had been examined by Dr. Bennett on February 14, 1994, or ten days earlier. Dr. Bennett accordingly saw no need to re-examine Eagle, and he advised Connors that Eagle could aggravate "an existing, active injury," and that he could not pass the pre-employment physical examination. Based on this information, Connors immediately spoke with the plant manager, Richard Shaffer, and instructed him to recall Eagle from his route and terminate his employment. In making this employment decision, Connors was not motivated by discriminatory animus, but rather he made the decision solely because of Eagle's inability to pass a pre-employment physical examination, a prerequisite for employment for all job applicants. Indeed, at that time, while Connors knew that Eagle had a pre-existing back injury through conversations with Dr. Bennett, he neither knew, or had reason to believe, that the injury constituted a handicap under the law. Shaffer recalled Eagle from his route and discharged him around noon on February 24, 1994. Since Shaffer did not know the reason for the termination, he told Eagle to check back in a few days and he would find out the specific reason for his discharge. A few days later, Eagle returned and met with Connors who told him that he was discharged because he could not pass the pre-employment physical examination. Several months later, Eagle filed his charge of discrimination. At hearing, Eagle denied that he was handicapped and asserted that as of February 1994 he "felt fine" physically. Indeed, he described in some detail the type of heavy manual labor he had performed with another employer up to the time he applied for the position. He also contended that the injury was minor and would not interfere with a delivery helper's tasks. But testimony from Dr. Bennett established that as of February 24, 1994, Eagle had "a current, precarious injury," namely, moderate chronic lumbar sprain strain, that work restrictions with his former employer had been recommended, and that Eagle was "highly likely" to worsen that injury should he engage in the job activities required of a delivery helper. This testimony was not credibly contradicted. Although Eagle was later discharged from Dr. Bennett's care on April 1, 1994, Eagle could not pass the pre-employment physical examination on February 24, 1994, when the employment decision was made, and thus he did not qualify for the job. Eagle further suggested at hearing that, assuming he was handicapped, respondent failed to take reasonable steps to accommodate his disability. But Eagle made no request for accommodation either at the time he sought the position or after he learned the reason for his termination. Even if Eagle had requested accommodation, respondent had no positions in the business that did not require some heavy lifting except for a secretarial slot, for which Eagle was not qualified. Moreover, respondent's general manager did not know, or even believe, that Eagle was handicapped and thus may have required accommodation. Then, too, in order to accommodate Eagle, respondent would have had to make fundamental alterations in its work program or even create a new job. Eagle did not rebut this showing at hearing, and he failed to respond with any evidence regarding his individual capabilities and suggestions for possible accommodations by respondent within the restrictions imposed by Dr. Bennett. There is no evidence regarding the compensation Eagle would have received as a delivery helper. The record also fails to establish his compensation since that time, and thus there is no basis on which to make a finding as to lost wages. Whether petitioner seeks reinstatement as a delivery helper is also not of record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petition for relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1788 Petitioner: Petitioner filed an "order" with nine unnumbered paragraphs containing a mixture of proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5 and 8. 6-8. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. 9. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence or a conclusion of law. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the more credible evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: P. Daniel Williams, Esquire P. O. Box 1007 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Winston K. Borkowski, Esquire P. O. Box 1725 Ormond Beach, Florida 32175 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner has been subjected to an unlawful housing practice by Respondents, as alleged in the Amended Housing Discrimination Complaint filed by Petitioner on May 30, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Eduardo Mory is a dark-skinned Peruvian. In July 2004, he purchased a condominium unit at 276 Timber Run Way, Cocoa, Florida. The condominium unit was part of a condominium development governed by Northwest Lakes pursuant to a declaration of condominium dated September 24, 1998. In 2001, Northwest Lakes negotiated a bulk cable television service and easement agreement with Time Warner Communications, which became Bright House Networks in the Orlando market in 2003. Under the terms of the agreement, Northwest Lakes pays Bright House a monthly service fee for each of its 250 units. The fee is discounted from the standard rate that a unit owner would pay if he purchased service directly from Bright House. Pursuant to its declaration of condominium, Northwest Lakes passes the bulk cable fee through to each unit owner as a common expense. The fee is included in the unit owner's monthly maintenance fee. As of 2008, the monthly maintenance fee for unit owners in Northwest Lakes was $130.00, which included $28.00 for the bulk cable fee. In a letter to Mr. Mory dated February 22, 2008, Linda Miklosovic, the new president of Northwest Lakes, wrote that it had come to her attention that Mr. Mory had not paid the bulk cable fee for several years. She calculated that for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008, Mr. Mory owed $1,132.00 in maintenance fees, of which roughly $600 consisted of unpaid bulk cable fees. Mr. Mory responded that he was not required to pay the bulk cable fee. Mr. Mory had never wanted cable service in his unit. He testified that in 2006, he had arrived at an arrangement with Donald Feeser, then the president of Northwest Lakes, whereby he would not have to pay the bulk cable fee. The details of the arrangement between Mr. Mory and Mr. Feeser were not entirely comprehensible.1 However, those details are not of particular importance as this hearing is not intended to resolve the monetary dispute between Mr. Mory and Northwest Lakes. Mr. Feeser testified that he told Mr. Mory that he did not have to pay the bulk cable fee. Mr. Feeser testified that the issue was discussed at a meeting of the full Northwest Lakes board, but that the board did not vote on whether to waive the fee for Mr. Mory. Correspondence went back and forth between Mr. Mory and Ms. Miklosovic. Mr. Mory accused Ms. Miklosovic and Northwest Lakes of "stereotype discrimination." Ms. Miklosovic was adamant that no unit owner was excused from paying the bulk cable fee. She testified that she had confirmed this position with Bright House. She searched Northwest Lakes' records for some document to support Mr. Mory's exemption claim, but could find none. On May 12, 2008, Ms. Miklosovic sent Mr. Mory a final notice, giving him until May 23, 2008, to bring his account up to date or face legal proceedings. On July 31, 2008, counsel for Northwest Lakes sent Mr. Mory a demand letter for $1,076.43. At the hearing, Mr. Mory testified that he is the only black person in a 340-unit community, and believes that the actions of Ms. Miklosovic and Northwest Lakes are premised on a feeling that he does not belong there. While he offered testimony regarding disputes with Northwest Lakes over parking a recreational vehicle, Mr. Mory could provide no specific examples of speech or behavior by residents of the condominium or by officers of Northwest Lakes that in any way referenced his skin color or national origin, or that could even be inferred as discriminatory. Ms. Miklosovic credibly testified that this is simply a collection dispute. She provided records demonstrating that every unit in Northwest Lakes is billed for the bulk cable fee. She testified that every unit owner except Mr. Mory pays the bulk cable fee. At the time she sent the February 22, 2008, letter, Ms. Miklosovic had not met Mr. Mory.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2009.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Petitioner timely filed his charge of unlawful employment discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. 1/
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing herein, including Petitioner's testimony, the following relevant facts are found. Petitioner, Richard L. Schmitt, was initially employed by the Respondent, City of Ft. Lauderdale Police Department, as a police officer on January 7, 1980. Petitioner's employment relationship was terminated on February 11, 1983. On February 6, 1984, Petitioner filed the instant charge of employment discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Petitioner acknowledges that he was aided and assisted by counsel in filing unlawful discrimination charges since his separation from employment with Respondent, City of Ft. Lauderdale.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the charge filed herein by Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1985.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on October 19, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Respondent manufactures and supplies residential windows and doors. On June 15, 2015, Petitioner was hired by Respondent to work as a Technician 1. Petitioner’s responsibilities included working on the manufacturing assembly line for windows. Petitioner’s employment with Respondent was subject to a 90-day probationary period which would have ended on or about September 15, 2015. However, on or about August 18, 2015, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment, and Petitioner contends that Respondent’s decision to terminate his employment resulted from unlawful discriminatory animus. Respondent disagrees with Petitioner’s allegations and contends that legitimate business reasons motivated its decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment with the company. Background Events Prior to August 4, 2015 The Employment Charge of Discrimination alleges that Petitioner believes that he was the victim of unlawful discrimination while working for Respondent. Petitioner alleges what will generally be described as three categories of conduct in support of his charge of discrimination.1/ First, Petitioner alleges that a white coworker named Adam “made a statement saying black people are a waste of space,” and that Petitioner’s immediate supervisor, Eric Christman, who is also white, laughed in Petitioner’s presence after hearing the offensive statement. Second, Petitioner claims Mr. Christman created a racially charged work environment by routinely segregating employees to work in groups based on race. Third, Petitioner claims that when he complained to Respondent’s office of human resources about Mr. Christman’s behavior, Mr. Christman retaliated against him by terminating his employment with the company, and that the decision to terminate his employment was the result of illegal racial animus. Adam Petitioner and an employee named Adam (last name unknown) were hired at the same time and worked on the same team. Although Adam did not testify during the final hearing, the undisputed evidence is that Adam is an individual who identifies as white. At some point during July 2015, Petitioner, Adam, Mr. Christman, Yvonnte Hartsfield, and a few other workers, were on lunch break when Petitioner and Adam started conversing. During the course of the conversation, Adam stated that “blacks are a waste of space.” Both Petitioner and Ms. Hartsfield were offended by Adam’s statement. Petitioner testified that Mr. Christman laughed in response to Adam’s statement and took no action against Adam for making the offensive remark. Ms. Hartsfield corroborated Petitioner’s testimony and testified that she also witnessed Mr. Christman laughing in response to Adam’s offensive statement. Petitioner did not report the incident to Respondent’s office of human resources or to anyone else working in a managerial capacity at the facility. Segregated Work Environment There were approximately 12 individuals who worked on Petitioner’s team while he was employed by Respondent. Petitioner testified that there were times during his employment when production volume in his assigned work area had decreased which resulted in Mr. Christman temporarily reassigning workers to other work-groups throughout the plant. According to Petitioner, it was routinely the case that Mr. Christman reassigned the black and Hispanic workers to other work-groups, while allowing the white workers to remain in their original work assignments. This practice by Mr. Christman resulted in the minority workers having a more labor intense work day, while the white workers in Mr. Christman’s group were essentially idle due to the lack of work. Two of Petitioner’s coworkers testified that they too had observed how the work environment had been segregated in this manner. According to former PGT employee Chris Russo, who is white, “[i]t was like, there was a bunch of, like, racist redneck people there, and they had black people over there, and they’d always keep us separated.” Ms. Hartsfield testified that it appeared to her that Mr. Christman sent the two black workers (her and Petitioner) and the Mexican worker to other production lines while the Caucasians workers remained at their regular work stations. Personal Cell Phone Usage Respondent provides to all of its employees a “PGT Team Member Handbook” (handbook), which Petitioner received on his first day of employment. The handbook, with respect to personal cell phone usage, provides as follows: While at work, team members are expected to exercise the same discretion using personal cell phones as they would using PGT phones. Personal calls and texting during work hours, regardless of the phone used, can interfere with productivity and be distracting to others. Team members are expected to make personal calls during breaks or lunch and should communicate with friends and family members to ensure they are aware of the policy. Team members must inform their leader of the need to use a cell phone while working on the line and obtain permission (which will be granted/denied on a case-by- case basis). Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action. In addition, company- issued cell phones should be turned off or set to silent or vibrate mode during meetings and in other locations where incoming calls may disrupt normal workflow. During July 2015, Mr. Christman, on several occasions, observed Petitioner using his cell phone while on company time. Apparently, cell phone use by employees while working in the production area had become an issue; so sometime in July 2015, members of Respondent’s management team called a group meeting and reminded Petitioner, and other members of the window assembly team, of the company’s cell phone usage policy. Within a few days of the group meeting, Mr. Christman, on August 4, 2015, received on his cell phone a photo image of Petitioner using a cell phone while on the production line. Adam had taken the picture and sent it to Mr. Christman. Soon after receiving the picture of Petitioner on his phone, Mr. Christman met with Petitioner and issued him a “confirmation of conversation,” which is the second step, following a verbal warning, on Respondent’s progressive discipline scale. The confirmation of conversation provides in part that Petitioner is expected “to be in compliance with company policy, [that] [i]mmediate and sustained improvement is expected, [and] failure to correct the [behavior] may result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment.” On August 5, 2015, the day after Petitioner received the confirmation of conversation, he contacted Respondent’s office of human resources and complained that Mr. Christman had treated him unfairly and was discriminating against him on the basis of race. In response to Petitioner’s concerns, a meeting was held on August 6, 2015, where Petitioner was able to meet with Mr. Christman; Ron Clarke, who was Mr. Christman’s supervisor; and Karla Lugo, a representative from human resources. Petitioner requested a transfer to another unit, but after it was explained to him by Mr. Clarke that he needed to stay in his current unit to better learn the job, Petitioner agreed to remain in his position which was supervised by Mr. Christman. Petitioner suggests that Mr. Christman was motivated by racial animus when he disciplined him for unauthorized cell phone usage. Petitioner admitted during the final hearing that on the day in question he was in violation of Respondent’s cell phone usage policy. Nevertheless, Petitioner contends that employees often use cell phones while working and, to his knowledge, are not disciplined, as he was, for their transgressions. Yvonnte Hartsfield has worked for Respondent for several years assembling doors and windows. Ms. Hartsfield testified that she often observed employees using their cell phones while assembling window frames. Ms. Hartsfield testimony is, however, imprecise regarding when her observations were made in relation to the meeting that management had with employees in July 2015 during which employees were told that they were expected to comply with the company’s cell phone usage policy. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that he was treated differently from other employees who, after being reminded of the company’s cell phone usage policy, continued to use their cell phones while working on the production line. Retaliation In Petitioner’s Employment Charge of Discrimination, he mentions several times that he complained to human resources about Mr. Christman’s alleged racist behavior and that Mr. Christman treated him worse after learning of his complaints. The credible testimony establishes that Petitioner did not complain to management about any issues of discrimination until August 5, 2015, which is the day after Petitioner received the confirmation of conversation resulting from his unauthorized cell phone usage. Petitioner offered no credible evidence of any retaliatory actions taken against him by Mr. Christman between August 5 and August 18, 2015, the date upon which Petitioner’s employment was terminated. Respondent’s Reason for Firing Petitioner On August 13, 2015, Petitioner, while operating machinery known as a frame welder, caused the machine to malfunction, which resulted in damage to a window frame and a three and one-half hour loss of use of the machine while repairs were performed. Corey Marks, who works for Respondent as a maintenance technician, testified that he serviced the frame welder in question on August 13, 2015, after Petitioner caused the machine to fail. Mr. Marks credibly testified that he performed a failure analysis on the machine and determined that the problem in question occurred as a result of Petitioner not operating the machine properly. When questioned by Respondent about what caused the frame welder to malfunction, Petitioner offered two theories, neither of which were confirmed by Respondent’s investigation as to the cause of the malfunction. First, Petitioner advised that the machine unexpectedly started on its own, and second that the machine has a “hair trigger” which resulted in Petitioner inadvertently starting the machine. Mr. Marks’ failure analysis did not substantiate either of Petitioner’s theories as to why the machine failed. Respondent, when considering that Petitioner, while on employment probation, had been disciplined for unauthorized cell phone usage and, through inattentiveness, had caused a substantial delay on productivity by damaging the frame welder, decided to terminate Petitioner’s employment. The decision to terminate Petitioner was made by Respondent’s department of human resources. No Evidence of Pretext Petitioner claims that other individuals had damaged Respondent’s machines and were not terminated as a result thereof. Respondent, on cross-examination, elicited the following testimony from Petitioner: Q: You said earlier that there were white employees who broke machines with no action taken. Do you recall that testimony? A: Yes. Q: Who were those employees? A: I was new at the time. So I don’t know. Q: Can you name a single one? A: Nope. Q: Can you name a single machine that you saw broken by a white employee against whom no action was taken? A: No. Hearing Transcript, pgs. 82-83. Mr. Russo, who is white, testified that a frame welder malfunctioned once while he was operating the machine and that he was not disciplined as a result of the incident. The scenario described by Mr. Russo is not comparable to Petitioner’s situation because Petitioner’s incident occurred as a result of operator error, as opposed to an equipment malfunction. Petitioner has failed to offer evidence which establishes that Respondent’s reason for terminating his employment is simply a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, PGT Industries, did not commit an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, Alain Blaise, and denying Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2017.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed for approximately five years with Respondent as a salesman. RF Group, LLC, is a limited liability company, doing business as Respondent, McGowan's Heating and Air Conditioning, and is a company engaged in the heating and air conditioning business. Petitioner was a successful salesman for four and one- half years with the company until a new salesman was hired. According to Petitioner, the new salesman was given most of the sales leads and Petitioner was cut out. Eventually, Petitioner's salary was reduced due to a decrease in his sales performance. He attributes his decrease in sales production to Respondent choosing the new salesman over him. Although he claimed age discrimination in his initial complaint, Petitioner offered no evidence or testimony that he was not given the sales leads due to his age and that the younger salesman received the leads because Respondent considered Petitioner too old to conduct his business. Petitioner resigned his position with Respondent because he was not making enough salary. After his resignation, Petitioner went to work with Total Air Care, but his employment was terminated due to company lay-offs in October 2010.
Recommendation it is Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the "unlawful employment practice" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 G. Alan Howard, Esquire Milam, Howard, Nicandri, Dees & Gilliam, P.A. East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Luis G. Arias 3526 Laurel Leaf Drive Orange Park, Florida 32065 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 10, 1989, Petitioner, Mark Cleveland, a male, applied through Job Service of Florida, for employment as a telemarketer with Respondent, Sears Roebuck and Company at the Sears store located in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner had several years of sales experience with at least six months of experience in telemarketing. He also had a good speaking voice as evidenced by the fact that he is currently employed as a disc jockey at a local radio station. Clearly, Respondent was qualified for the telemarketing position. The telemarketer position would enable Petitioner to earn approximately $85.00 a week or $365.50 a month. The telemarketing section at the Pensacola Sears store consisted of virtually all women with perhaps three or four rare male telemarketers. Petitioner had two separate interviews with two different Sears employees responsible for filling the telemarketing positions. During the Petitioner's interviews with the two Sears employees, Petitioner was repeatedly questioned on whether he could work with all women or mostly all women and be supervised by women. Petitioner assured his interviewers that he could since he grew up with six sisters and in general liked working with women. Petitioner left the interview with the information that he would be hired after another supervisor reviewed the applications and that he would be called once the supervisor's review was complete. After several days, Petitioner, being excited about what he thought was going to be his new job, called one of the two women who interviewed him. He was informed that the telemarketing positions had been filled. Later that same day Petitioner discovered that the positions had, in fact, not been filled and that he had been told an untruth. The telemarketing positions were eventually filled by women. Petitioner remained out of work for approximately four months before he was hired as a telemarketer by the Pensacola News Journal. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on August 27, 1991, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent did not respond to the Notice. On October 10, 1991, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent's address and acknowledgment of this litigation was confirmed when Respondent filed its answer to the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even though Respondent received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Petitioner was present at the hearing. The Respondent did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that it would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Respondent to appear, the hearing was commenced. As a consequence of Respondent's failure to appear, no evidence rebutting Petitioner's facts were introduced into evidence at the hearing and specifically no evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose was introduced at the hearing. 1/ Petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his sex, given the fact that Sears tried to mislead him into believing the telemarketing positions had been filled when they had not, the positions were all eventually filled by women and Sears' clear concern over Petitioner's ability to work with women. Such facts lead to the reasonable inference that Sears was engaging in an unlawful employment practice based on Respondent being a male, a protected class, in order to preserve a female work force in telemarketing. Such discrimination based on sex is prohibited under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner is entitled to relief from that discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner was the subject of an illegal employment practice and awarding Petitioner $1,462.00 in backpay plus reasonable costs of $100.95 and an attorney's fee of $2,550.00. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.
Findings Of Fact On August 24, 1981, Famous Brands Television and Appliances, Inc., entered into a Consent Order with the State Attorney for Palm Beach County, Florida, whereby Famous Brands, together with its principals and officers and agents, agreed to cease and desist from utilizing "bait and switch" practices or be held in contempt of court. At all times material to that litigation, Respondent Bill Lacek was the president of Famous Brands Television and Appliances, Inc. Famous Brands became bankrupt. Lacek knew that his credibility had been affected by his management of Famous Brands. Therefore, when he opened V.T.S. Video, Inc., a similar business, he placed the corporation in the name of his sister Rose Richard. Although ostensibly the president and sole director of V.T.S. Video, Rose Richard's duties were limited to those of a bookkeeper/office manager, the same duties which she had when she worked for her brother at Famous Brands. V.T.S. Video was in the business of advertising and offering for sale video, television and stereo products to the general public. The business was located at 25 North Military Trail, West Palm Beach, Florida. Respondent Bill Lacek formulated, controlled, and directed the acts and practices at V.T.S. Video. He was personally responsible for the purchasing, advertising, marketing, and promoting of the products sold by V.T.S. Video. He personally wrote the advertising, established the sales commission structure for the employees of V.T.S. Video, and attended sales meetings. Lacek solicited customers through newspaper advertising, including advertisements in The Palm Beach Post. Lacek's advertisements included ads for Sony and Hitachi televisions and video cameras. Respondent Lacek's advertisements were not bona fide offers to sell the advertised products. When customers appeared at V.T.S. Video to purchase the advertised Sony or Hitachi products, they were told by V.T.S. Video employees that the Sony or Hitachi products were not available or that the only product available was a "floor model," i.e., a model which has been used at the business for demonstration purposes and which frequently has been damaged and is, therefore, an unattractive product for purchase. Additionally, Lacek and the employees of V.T.S. Video would disparage the advertised products and "switch" the shopper to a different brand, the item which Lacek intended to sell instead of the advertised product. To assure that his salesmen would follow his established "switch and bait" techniques, Lacek set the sales commission structure so that no commission was paid to a salesman who sold the advertised product (if one were available) rather than the product to which the customer was to be switched. Further, the advertisements written by Lacek did not disclose the fact that the advertised item was a floor model. Hopper Electronics in Miami purchases from the factory rebuilt or refurbished products which it then sells to wholesalers. A rebuilt or refurbished product is a product which has been returned to the factory as defective by a customer or a distributor. The factory repairs the item and then re-boxes it for sale. In other words, a rebuilt or refurbished ("RB") product is a used product. Lacek purchased from Hopper on behalf of V.T.S. Video between 3,000 and 5,000 Emerson "RB" products between approximately late 1986 and late 1987. All of the Emerson RB units purchased from Hopper Electronics carried a label saying "RB" on the back of the unit itself and a label saying "RB" on the box containing the unit. Lacek paid Hopper Electronics a total of $780,000 for Emerson RB units during that time period. Although Lacek knew that the RB units were used and not new products, his newspaper ads for those units did not disclose that the products were used or that they were RB products. The Emerson televisions and VCRs purchased from Hopper were sold to the public as new products. Lacek instructed his employees not to disclose that the Emersons were not new products. If a customer questioned the "RB" label appearing on the back of the unit or on the box, the customer was told that the product had been re-boxed or that the product was from Riviera Beach. Respondent Bill Lacek knew that his sales practices were deceptive and that they constituted unfair trade practices, even prior to the institution of this proceeding, since they were the same practices that he was enjoined from utilizing when he signed the Consent Order on behalf of Famous Brands Television and Appliances, Inc., in 1981. Respondent Lacek's practices in the operation of V.T.S. Video have injured the public. Two Assistant Attorneys General represented Petitioner at the final hearing in this cause. Attached to Petitioner's proposed recommended order are affidavits from those attorneys stating that they have spent 220 hours combined in the "investigation and resolution" of this matter. Petitioner has failed to submit a cost affidavit and has therefore waived its statutory right to recover reasonable costs in this action. The Agreed Final Order to Cease and Desist entered into by Petitioner and Respondents V.T.S Video, Inc., and Rose Richard the day before the final hearing in this cause provides that Respondent V.T.S. Video, Inc., will pay to Petitioner the sum of $10,000 in civil penalties plus the sum of $15,000 for attorney's fees in this action.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Bill Lacek guilty of the allegations in the Complaint filed against him; Ordering Respondent Bill Lacek to cease and desist from all violations of Chapter 501, Part II, Florida Statutes, and of Chapter 2-9, Florida Administrative Code; Assessing against Respondent Bill Lacek a civil penalty in the amount of $1,500,000; and Denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement of its attorney's fees and costs against Respondent Bill Lacek. DONE and ENTERED this ,7th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 88-0505 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 5, 7-15, and 17 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 6 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 16 has been rejected as not being supported by the record in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda G. Lapin, Esquire Andy Itzkovits, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Suite N921 401 N.W. Second Avenue Miami, Florida 32128 James S. Telepman, Esquire 340 Royal Palm Way Post Office Box 2525 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 (Last known address for Respondent Bill Lacek) Honorable Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 =================================================================
