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TERRY R. DOUGLAS vs GULF COAST ENTERPRISE, 14-002524 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida May 28, 2014 Number: 14-002524 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 2014

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Gulf Coast Enterprise (GCE), discriminated against Petitioner, Terry R. Douglas, based on his race--African-American--or his disability-- hearing impairment.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Terry R. Douglas (Douglas) is an African- American male. He is hard of hearing and uses hearing aids (when he can afford the batteries) and relies upon interpretive sign language when it is available.1/ At all times relevant hereto, Douglas worked as a food line server under the employ of GCE, which is a division of Lakeview Center, Inc., an affiliate of Baptist Health Care. The stated purpose of GCE is "to operate a successful business which will provide meaningful employment to persons with disabilities in accordance with the requirements of the AbilityOne Program." AbilityOne is a program that creates jobs and training opportunities for people who are blind or who have other severe disabilities, empowering them to lead more productive and independent lives. GCE is an equal opportunity employer and does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, gender, age, marital status, disability, or any other category protected by law. Douglas had been previously employed by GCE in 2010 as a custodian but voluntarily resigned to pursue employment elsewhere. He briefly took a job in the Orlando area, then went to Memphis for about one year. When he returned to Pensacola he took a position with GCE commencing May 9, 2013, in the food service division. He was hired to work the night shift, from 7:00 p.m., until approximately 1:30 a.m. As part of being hired anew by GCE, Douglas filled out an "Employee Self-Identification Form" in order to advise GCE of his status within a protected class. Douglas identified himself as an individual with a disability but stated that there were no accommodations which GCE needed to provide in order to improve his ability to perform his job. When Douglas recommenced employment with GCE in May 2013, he went through employee orientation. He received copies of the Employee Handbook and various written policies addressing issues such as discrimination, harassment, drug-free workplace, etc. He was also provided training on the GCE Code of Conduct and Respect in the Workplace policies. Douglas' job entailed preparing and/or serving food at the cafeteria in Building 3900 at the Pensacola Naval Air Station (NAS). He was by all accounts a good employee, a hard worker, and gained the respect of his supervisor, Prospero Pastoral (called "Mr. Pete" by most employees). In fact, when Mr. Pete was going to take an extended vacation to visit his home in the Philippines, Douglas was selected as one of the individuals to take over some of Mr. Pete's duties in his absence. Douglas got along well with his fellow employees and co-workers. Douglas' supervisors were Mr. Pete and Paul Markham, the assistant building manager of Building 3900. Douglas had a good relationship with Markham when he first started working in food service, but (according to Douglas) they did not get along so well later on. There did not appear to be any overt animosity between the two men during the final hearing. In November 2013, Markham was advised by the kitchen manager that some food items (including several hams) were missing from the kitchen inventory. It was suspected that some night shift employees may have been stealing the food items. Markham was asked to investigate and see if there was any suspicious behavior by any employees. On the evening of November 22, 2013, Markham changed from his work uniform into civilian clothes just prior to midnight. He then drove to a parking lot just behind Building 3900 and sat inside his darkened vehicle. He had driven his wife's car to work that day so that his pickup truck (which employees would recognize) would not alert others to his presence. At around midnight, he saw two employees (Gerry Riddleberger and Andy Bartlett) sitting outside Building 3900 talking. He could see Douglas in the building through the window. A few minutes later, Douglas exited the building carrying a large black garbage bag. Markham got out of his car and walked toward Douglas. As he approached, Markham began to "chat" with Douglas about trivial things. He asked how he was doing; he asked where Ira (another employee) was; he made small talk.2/ Finally, Markham asked Douglas what was in the bag. Douglas responded that "these are tough times" and that "I have to take care of my family." He then opened the bag and showed Markham the contents therein. The bag contained numerous bags of potato chips and snacks, some bananas, packets of coffee creamer, and other small items. Markham asked Douglas to hand over the bag and he did so. He then asked Douglas for his badge and access key. When Douglas handed those over, Markham told him to leave the NAS and he would be hearing from the GCE human resources/employee relations department (HR). Douglas left the base and Markham waited around a while to see if any other employees were carrying suspicious items. Not observing any other suspect behavior, Markham concluded his investigation for that evening. The next day, Markham handed over the bag and Douglas' badges to HR. It was determined by HR that Douglas' attempted theft of the property constituted just cause for termination of his employment with GCE. The HR office notified Douglas of the decision to terminate his employment. Douglas thereafter visited the HR office to ask that the decision be reconsidered. Douglas was told that the process for reconsideration was to submit, in writing, his statement of the reasons and whether there were mitigating factors to be considered. Douglas submitted a four-page request for reconsideration to Kahiapo, director of employee relations, dated December 2, 2013. In the letter, Douglas admitted to the theft but rationalized that other employees were stealing food as well. He said he had seen Markham taking boxes out of storage and putting them in his truck, but did not know what the boxes contained. He said a blonde worker on the food line ate food from the serving line, but had no details about the allegation. He complained that other workers had been caught stealing but had not been terminated from employment. He alleged that a worker (Jeanette) stole a bag of bacon and only got suspended. Markham had no support or independent verification of the allegations. GCE had one of its employee relations specialists, Alan Harbin, review Douglas' reconsideration letter and investigate the allegations found therein. All of the allegations were deemed to be unfounded. There was a worker named Jeanette who had been suspended for eating an egg off the serving line, but this did not comport with Douglas' allegation. When Harbin's findings were reported to HR, Kahiapo notified Douglas via letter dated December 18, 2013, that his request for reconsideration was being denied. The termination of employment letter was not rescinded. The decision by HR was in large part due to the zero tolerance policy against theft adhered to by GCE. The GCE Employee Handbook contains the following: In accordance with the general "at will" nature of employment with GCE, generally, employees may be discharged at any time, and for any reason. * * * An employee may be discharged on a first offense and without prior disciplinary action if the violation so warrants. * * * Conduct that may result in immediate termination of employment includes, but is not limited to: * * * [12] Theft, pilfering, fraud or other forms of dishonesty. It is clear--and Douglas admits--that Douglas was guilty of theft. He attempted to steal a bag of food items from the building in which he worked. During his term of employment, Douglas never made any claim concerning discrimination against him or anyone else due to his race, African-American. He was never mistreated or treated differently than any other employee by his supervisors. Douglas did not have any problem doing his job. His disability, being hard of hearing, did not adversely affect his employment. He never asked for any accommodation to do his job or suggested to anyone that his disability interfered with his ability to perform his duties. There are simply no facts in this case upon which a claim of discrimination could reasonably be based.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, upholding its determination that no cause exists for a finding of discrimination against Petitioner, Terry R. Douglas, by Respondent, Gulf Coast Enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 2014.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.01760.10760.11
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JACKSONVILLE ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL NO. 1834 vs. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, 77-000425 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000425 Latest Update: Nov. 04, 1977

Findings Of Fact The following quoted provisions of the joint stipulations of fact entered into by the parties, as attached to this recommended order, constitutes the underlying evidential facts to be considered by the undersigned in deliberating the charges in this case. The exhibits mentioned in the quoted provision may be found as a part of the attached joint stipulations of fact and exhibits, which have been made a part of the record herein. The quotation is as follows: JOINT STIPULATIONS OF FACT The charge herein attached as cumulative exhibit #1 was filed by the Charging party on October 21, 1976 and a copy was simultaneously served on Respondent. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Rule 8H-4.03 a copy of the charge is hereby attached. The trial and presentment of the above-captioned cause was assigned to Rodney W. Smith, attorney for the Charging Party on or about February 25, 1977. Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of F.S. 447.203(2) and has its principal place of business in the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida where it is engaged in the business of operating a consolidated municipal government. Respondent is created directly by the legislature of the State of Florida so as to constitute a consolidated government administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or the general electorate. Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein an employee organization within the meaning of 447.203(l0) of the Act. On March 4, 1976 Respondent filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the opinion that said petition would stay the "proposed CERTIFICATION ORDER by the Public Employees Relations Commission until final determination of the case was resolved. On or about May 18, 1976 the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a CERTIFICATION ORDER certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Public Employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Firefighters Lieutenants Captains Employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department EXCLUDED: All officers above the rank of captain employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and all other employees of the City of Jacksonville On or about June, 1976 the Respondent filed an APPEAL of the above- stated certification order by PETITION FOR REVIEW in the First District Court of Appeal in and for the State of Florida. At no time was a stay of the certification order sought or obtained by the Respondent. Although the CERTIFICATION ORDER was challenged by PETITION FOR REVIEW, the Charging Party has been the certified representative for purposes of collective-bargaining of all public employees in the unit described in the above paragraph since May 18, 1976. It has been the continuous policy, and most recently by special ordinance, for the City of Jacksonville to extend dues- deductions to firefighters, lieutenants and captains authorizing such deductions since on or about 1969. This policy of extending dues-deductions to captains, lieutenants and firefighters has continued at all times until October 15, 1976. On October 15, 1976 the biweekly paychecks of the captains (sic) and lieutenants employed by the, Respondent did not reflect the usual dues- deduction. The Charging Party was notified of the City's intention to discontinue dues-deductions for the employees "in the ranks of lieutenants and captains during contract negotiations in late September, 1976. On or about October 18, 1976 agents for the City, including Dave Thompson, Administrative Aide for the Public Safety Department and John Waters, Director of Department of Public Safety informed Robert Carver, President of the Charging Party, that the Respondent would not extend dues-deductions to the captains or lieutenants since the Respondent did not feel these positions were properly included in the certified bargaining unit. The action of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976 was resultant from the attached cumulative exhibit B, Memorandum of September 24, 1976 from John M. Waters to Jack Parker, City Accountant for the City of Jacksonville, which directs that positions above the rank of firefighter are to no longer receive dues-deductions. The Director of Employee Relations and chief negotiator for the Respondent, William Davis, was officially notified of the proposed discontinuation on September 29, 1976 by action of the attached cumulative exhibit c." The act complained of by the Charging Party, is the act of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions for the ranks of lieutenant and captain effective October 15, 1976. (The facts that led up to that action are established in the stipulations of fact entered into by the parties.) In the mind of the Charging Party the discontinuation of the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976, constituted: (1) an interference with the rights of employees as described in 447.501(1)(a), F.S.; (2) a unilateral change during the bargaining process in violation of 447.50l(1)(c), F.S.; and (3) a specific refusal to comply with the provisions of 447.303, F.S. The Respondent disputes and joins issue with that claim. To resolve the conflict, the case is best discussed by dividing the consideration into two broad categories. The first category is concerned with the question of whether the Respondent's initial petition for writ of certiorari filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, on March 4, 1976, and/or the Respondent's appeal of the Public Employees Relations Commission's certification order, which was filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida; imposed an automatic stay of the effect of the proposed certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission, and/or a stay of the certification order of May 18, 1976, entered by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Any stay of the proposed certification order and subsequent certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission must have been effectuated by the filing of the initial petition for writ of certiorari on March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976, because the facts establish that no specific request was ever made of the First District Court of Appeal or the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay. To that end, the Respondent contends that it could justifiably rely on the Florida Appellate Rule to grant an automatic stay in both the initial petition for writ of certiorari of March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976 Pertinent provisions of Rule 5.12 state: "Rule 5.12 Supersedeas Bond not Required of the State and its Political Subdivisions and their Boards, Commissions, etc.; Security when Required When Security Not Required. When the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any officer, board, commission or other public body of the state or any of its political subdivisions, in a purely official capacity, takes an appeal or petitions for certiorari, the filing of the notice of appeal or the petition for certiorari as the case may be shall perfect the same and stay the execu tion or performance of the judgment, decree or order being reviewed and no supersedeas bond need be given unless expressly required by the court. Court May Require Bond. The court may, on motion for good cause shown, require a super sedeas bond or other security, in such amount, form and manner as it may prescribe as a condition for the further prosecution of the appeal or certiorari." On the face of the language of Florida Appellate Rule 5.12, it would appear that the Respondent is correct in its assumption of having an automatic stay; however, there is a subsequent appellate decision which defeats the Respondent's right to rely on the theory it offers as standing for the proposition that an automatic stay is granted. That case is Panama City v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 333 So.2d 470, (1st DCA 1976, Fla.). The decision in this case was initially rendered on May 5, 1976, and a rehearing denied on June 29, 1976. The effective date of the decision is July 14, 1976. The Panama City case, supra, concerns the determination by the Public Employees Relations Commission of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election. Those actions by PERC were not found to be final orders and in discussing the position of that Petitioner requesting a writ of certiorari, the Court stated that a stay of the effect of the enforcement of the agency action does not transpire merely by filing the petition for writ of certiorari. Under the ruling, in the decision, the stay may be granted by the agency or by the Court upon appropriate terms and in keeping with the authority of 120.68(3), F.S. That section of Chapter 120 indicated the following: "(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms, but, in any event, the order shall specify the conditions upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted." Moreover, in the opinion of the Court in the Panama City case, under Florida Appellate Rule 5.5, the Petitioner for writ of certiorari shall apply to the agency for supersedeas to forestall the terms of the agency action. Through its memorandum the Respondent in this cause has concluded that there is a distinction in the facts of the Panama City case and the facts sub judice, in that the Panama City case dealt with determination of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election which were interlocutory matters, whereas the question here deals with a certification order which is final agency action on the part of the Public Employes Relations Commission. As an adjunct to this argument, Respondent indicated that it is the June, 1976, appeal taken by the Respondent, challenging the Public Employees Relations Commission order of certification, that becomes the focal point of the inquiry upon the subject of an automatic stay. This latter phase of the argument is accepted and it is the June, 1976, appeal that should be addressed. With that fact in mind, the language of the Court's opinion in the Panama City case on a petition for rehearing clarifies any distinction which might be drawn between the right to stay in an interlocutory situation, and the right to a stay of final action by an agency. The Court, in its discussion on rehearing, stated that the PERC order certifying an employee organization's exclusive collective bargaining representative of employees is a final order, which is subject to judicial review, together with all prior interlocutory orders. The Court goes on to say that if PERC refuses to stay any bargaining pending the Court review, the Court would have authority to grant that relief, in A order to make the Court's jurisdiction effective. For this proposition it cites to Article V, Section (4)(b) 3, Florida Constitution. A close analysis of the Court's statement on the rehearing in the Panama City case, supra, points out that the party who takes an appeal of the final order of certification by the Public Employees Relations Commission should look to the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay prior to turning to the Court for such relief. This is in keeping with the requirements of 120.68(3), F.S. It can be seen by an examination of the facts stipulated to in this cause that the Respondent has failed at any point to request of the Public Employees Relations Commission that the effect of the order of certification be stayed pending the outcome of the consideration of the appeal on its merits. Consequently, in keeping with the decision of the Panama-City case, supra, the effect of the certification order is not stayed and any action which the Respondent took in derrogation of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Panama City, supra, subsequent to July 14, 1976, the date the decision became binding, may constitute an unfair labor practice. See also, Duval Cty School Bd v. Fla. Pub. Emp. etc., 346 So.2d 1086 (1st DCA 1977, Fla.) Having determined that the effect of the certification order of the Public Employees Relations Commission has not been stayed, consideration of the effect of the Respondent's action which discontinued the dues-deduction after October 15, 1976 for those ranks of lieutenant and captain can be made. It is clear from the facts In the record that it had been the practice of the employer to authorize the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains since 1969 and there is no showing that the employees in those ranks who requested the dues- deduction ever asked that the deductions be discontinued. The conclusion on the part of the Respondent that the dues-deduction should be discontinued was a unilateral action, premised upon Respondent's individual evaluation of the propriety of including lieutenants and captains in a unit with firefighters. In view of the history of the dues-deduction process for lieutenants and captains in the City of Jacksonville, and the outstanding unit certification by PERC which includes such employees, it is concluded that deductions should have been continued beyond October 15, 1976. This is authorized under the opinion of United Faculty of Palm Beach Jr. College, Case No. 8H-CA- 754-1158. The failure to continue this deduction program beyond October 15, 1976 constituted an action by the Respondent in regard to conditions of employment and was per se a violation of the duty to collectively bargain. See 447.309(1), F.S., and NLRB v. Katz, 396 U.S.736 (1962). This responsibility on the part of Respondent to continue the dues-deduction has now been specifically established in 447.303, F.S., as amended at 77-343, Laws of Florida which reads: "Any employee organization which has been certified as a bargaining agent shall have the right to, upon request, have its dues and uniform assessments deducted and collected by the employer from the salary of those employees who authorized the deductions, set dues and uniform assessments In a related argument, the Respondent attempts to suggest that the Public Employees Relations Commission has unilaterally expanded and redefined the bargaining unit that had been previously agreed to between the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF. Specifically, the Respondent claims that the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF had agreed that only fire privates be included in the unit in 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, and that thereafter the Commission expanded and redefined the bargaining unit to include firemen and fire officers. Although this may be a fact, this fact is not in evidence through the stipulation of facts and in view of the limitations imposed by the agreement of the parties through their stipulation, the above-referenced information may not be utilized in reaching conclusions in this case. However, assuming arguendo the propriety of those facts, they would not seem to promote a different result in this cause. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of Clearwater Firefighters Association; Local 1158, IAFF and City of Clearwater, Case No. 8H- RC-766-1O68, 77E-377, reported at 3 FPER 177 (1977) and City of Titusville v. PERC, 3,30 So.2d 733 (1st DCA 1976, Fla.) Even though the Commission and the Court seemed to be stating that the Public Employees Relations Commission may not extend the unit which has voluntarily been recognized by the parties, or offered for recognition by the Petitioner for unit determination, these cases demonstrate that each case that occurs should be examined on an individual basis. Applying that process, it would be necessary to request the Public Employees Relations Commission to reconsider their position in the instant case on the question of the appropriateness of the inclusion of lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit, and that decision could be subject to appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a determination has not been rendered on the merits of excluding lieutenants and captains from the certified bargaining unit, either by the Public Employees Relations Commission or an appellate court, the certification order remains in effect and all rights and entitlements for ,the unit employees remain in force and effect until amended by a Perc order. Consequently, the act of discontinuing the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains in the bargaining unit after October 15, 1976, constituted a specific refusal to comply with the provision of 447.303, F.S.; an interference with the rights of employees in violation of 447.501(1)(a), and an unilateral change during the bargaining process, in violation of 447.501(1)(c) , F.S.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, City of Jacksonville, be required to reinstate the dues-deduction authorizations of those lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert G. Brown, Esquire Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel City Of Jacksonville 1300 City Hall Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Leonard A. Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FLORIDA Exhibit A STATE OF FLORIDA

Florida Laws (9) 120.68447.03447.203447.301447.303447.309447.501447.503837.012
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GREGORY R. LULKOSKI vs FIRST COAST TECHNICAL COLLEGE, 17-002385 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Apr. 19, 2017 Number: 17-002385 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent, First Coast Technical College (Respondent) retaliated against Petitioner, Gregory R. Lulkoski (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), section 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes?1/ Secondary issues raised by Respondent are whether the St. Johns County School Board (School Board) is immune from Petitioner’s allegations, and, if not, whether the School Board was Petitioner’s employer during the relevant period.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the School Board by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). A charter technical school is a creature of Florida statute, distinct from school boards and districts, including those school districts in which they are located, which act as the sponsor of the school. FCTI and the School Board entered into a charter which governed the operating relationship between them. The last operative charter between FCTI and the School Board became effective July 1, 2013. The School Board was the sponsoring entity of FCTC under the charter. The School Board had no involvement in the day to day operations of FCTC when it was operated by FCTI. FCTI had its own management team and board of directors. FCTI had its own articles of incorporation, employment handbook, organizational structure, management plan, human relations (HR) director and department, and its own legal counsel. FCTC’s president, Sandra Raburn-Fortner, entered into a contract of employment with FCTI. No one from the School District is on FCTI’s organizational chart. FCTI and FCTC management, and not the School Board, were responsible for the daily operations of FCTC and all personnel matters of FCTC employees. FCTI had its own procedure in its employee handbook for reporting discrimination and harassment. FCTC employees were designated as School Board employees solely for wage payments, benefits, and collective bargaining purposes under the charter. For this reason, FCTC employees received checks and tax documents from the School Board and the School Board remitted contributions to the Florida Retirement system on their behalf. FCTI reimbursed the School Board for these pass-through expenditures, and the School Board charged FCTI a fee for this service. The School Board’s only involvement in personnel- related decisions of FCTC was the ministerial act of the School Board superintendent signing off on employment decisions made by FCTI officials, which were then placed on the consent agenda of the School Board to be approved at its next meeting. This process--which was necessary given the fact that FCTC employees were designated as School Board employees under the charter for wage payment, benefits, and collective bargaining purposes-- involved ensuring the statutory requirements to take an employment action were met, but did not involve second-guessing the merits of the personnel decisions made by FCTI. Indeed, the charter expressly provides that the School Board assigns and FCTI assumes and retains all responsibility for FCTC employees, including responsibility for the selection and discipline of employees, and all other aspects of the terms and conditions of employment at FCTC. Petitioner submitted his application for employment to FCTC. Petitioner had an FCTC e-mail address and not a school district e-mail address. The School Board was the signatory to some grant applications for funding to be expended at FCTC, however, FCTI was responsible for fulfilling the obligations relating to the grant awards, and appropriately utilizing those funds at FCTC. The School Board was not involved in the day to day administration of programs funded by those grants at FCTC. During the spring of 2016, district personnel became aware of financial irregularities at FCTC through its monitoring of FCTI’s unaudited financial statements. Under state statute, the School Board was required to take certain actions as the sponsor of FCTC when put on notice that FCTC might be in a deteriorating financial condition. The School Board investigated those irregularities and found significant financial mismanagement and budgetary shortfalls at FCTC under FCTI’s administration. On May 3, 2016, the School Board declared that the school was in a deteriorating financial condition. This declaration triggered statutory obligations on the part of the School Board and FCTC to develop a corrective action plan to address these issues. On May 26, 2016, the School Board served a notice of financial emergency stating that it had reason to believe that there was a financial emergency at FCTC and that there was no way to save FCTC other than to terminate the charter and begin operating the programs at FCTC itself. The School Board Superintendent sent a letter to FCTI’s board on June 8, 2016, detailing the findings of the School Board’s investigation into FCTC and the financial issues plaguing the school. On June 14, 2016, FCTI’s board voted to terminate the charter with the School Board and cease operating the programs at FCTC, effective June 31, 2016. On June 15, 2016, the School Board voted to approve an agreement to terminate the charter with FCTI and to take over the programs at FCTC effective July 1, 2016. As part of this transition of the responsibility for operating FCTC, the School Board and FCTI entered into an agreement specifically stating that any liabilities of FCTC arising prior to July 1, 2016, would not be assumed by the School Board. Just before the School Board began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed his Complaint with FCHR. In that Complaint he alleges that he was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity. Petitioner specifically listed two discrete instances of alleged protected activity in his Complaint: I am being discriminated against on the basis of retaliation by my employer. I began employment with Respondent on 11/7/2007, as a Case Manager and most recently as a Grant Writer. On 5/21/2015, I filed a formal grievance due to harassment and nepotism; creating a hostile work environment. This grievance was investigated internally but I never received a response. On 6/30/2015, I filed a second grievance after experiencing retaliation by my Supervisor, Renee Stauffacher. Up to date, both grievances remain unanswered and I continue to experience harassment and retaliation. Petitioner’s claim of discrimination was based solely upon a charge of retaliation. Petitioner did not allege that he was discriminated against based upon race, religion, age, marital status, or any other protected class. Petitioner filed the first grievance referenced in the FCHR Complaint on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then- president, Sandra Raburn-Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and over e-mail. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was mistreated by any School Board employee, and he did not direct the grievance to anyone at the School Board. Petitioner filed this grievance with FCTC’s human resources office. In his second grievance, filed June 26, 2015, Petitioner alleges that Renee Stauffacher, his supervisor at the time, retaliated against him for naming her in his May 21, 2015, grievance by giving him an evaluation on June 26, 2015, that contained some information or statements with which he disagreed, even though he thought the evaluation itself was good and that he was given high numbers. No one from the School Board was involved in this evaluation. When Ms. Stauffacher gave Petitioner this evaluation, she was an employee of FCTC and not the School Board. Petitioner alleges that Sandra Raburn-Fortner retaliated against him for his first two grievances by giving him another position. That change, from “Career Pathways Supervisor” to “Grant Writer” occurred on or about August 4, 2015. Petitioner’s salary did not change. At this time, Ms. Raburn-Fortner, who had a contract with FCTI, was an FCTC employee, and not an employee of the School Board. Later, in the Spring of 2016, Petitioner submitted numerous other grievances, a total of nine more, to FCTC officials and FCTI’s board. Petitioner only introduced his ninth and tenth grievances into evidence at the final hearing. Both are similar. Those grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Raburn-Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s human resources director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Both grievances state that Petitioner believed he was disclosing violations of equal employment opportunity law. During the time that Petitioner submitted these additional grievances, the School Board was in the process of investigating the financial irregularities at FCTC. Petitioner submitted some of these grievances to School Board officials, who told him he needed to take his concerns to the FCTI Board who was still operating FCTC at the time pursuant to the charter. None of Petitioner’s complaints, including those relayed to the School Board and its officials, concerned complaints of discrimination based on a protected class, or retaliation for complaining about discrimination based on a protected class. Petitioner stated he believed he was reporting equal employment opportunity violations in alleging Ms. Raburn-Fortner was hiring or favoring friends and family, because this action prohibited members of many different protected classes from getting a fair shot at positions that would go to family, friends, or associates of Ms. Raburn-Fortner. Petitioner admits all protected classes were treated similarly in this regard and that all protected classes lacked equal access to positions if they were not friends or family of Ms. Raburn-Fortner. While Petitioner does not allege any discrete instances of retaliation that occurred after his title change, Petitioner also contends that he was harassed, including that he felt harassed about how data at the school was handled, the pressure put on him by financial difficulties brought about by the administration of FCTI, and that he was given the cold shoulder by peers. By May 2016, Ms. Raburn-Fortner was no longer working at FCTC.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2018.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (7) 1002.34120.569120.57120.68760.01760.10760.11
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OKALOOSA-WALTON HIGHER EDUCATION ASSOCIATION vs. OKALOOSA-WALTON JUNIOR COLLEGE BOARD OF TRUST, 75-001790 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001790 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 1990

Findings Of Fact During the fall of 1974 OWHEA, an affiliate of the National Education Association, commenced efforts to organize instructional personnel employed by OWJC. By letter dated February 20, 1975, directed to Dr. J. E. McCracken, the President of OWJC, the OWHEA requested recognition as the bargaining agent for all full-time, regularly employed, certified instructional personnel. (PERC Exhibit 5). By letter dated February 26, 1975 the request for voluntary recognition was denied. On March 3, 1975 the OWHEA filed a petition with the Public Employees Relations Commission through which recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent of instructional personnel at OWJC was sought. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). A hearing was scheduled to be conducted on May 1, 1975. On that date the parties entered into an Agreement for Certification Upon Consent Election. In accordance with the Agreement the election was conducted on September 18, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). On September 25, 1975 the Public Employees Relations Commission, through its Chairman, verified the results of the election. By a vote of 41 to 27 OWJC employees within the prospective bargaining unit rejected representation by the OWHEA. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). On July 21, 1975, approximately two months prior to the election, the OWHEA filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Public Employees Relations Commission. Subsequent to the election the OWHEA filed Objections to Conduct Affecting the Results of the Election. By order of the Acting General Counsel of the Public Employees Relations Commission, the two matters were consolidated and a hearing was conducted before the undersigned on January 14, 15, 26, and 27, 1976. On November 7, 1974, Dr. J. E. McCracken, President of OWJC, and a voting member of the Board of Trustees of OWJC, called a meeting of the Faculty Council. The Faculty Council is a group of five faculty members, who meet periodically with the President and members of the President's staff to consider faculty problems and to provide recommendation to the President. At least four of the five members of the Faculty Council at that time were members of OWHEA. The meeting was called to discuss solicitation and distribution guidelines in light of the collective bargaining law, Florida Statutes Sections 447.201 et seq. which would go into effect January 1, 1975. Dr. McCracken wished to adopt guidelines for solicitations by employee organizations in the interim period before comprehensive guidelines were adopted by the Public Employees Relations Commission. The November 7 meeting lasted for longer than one hour. Every member of the council made some contribution to the meeting. Solicitation guidelines substantially similar to those ultimately promulgated, (See: PERC Exhibit 2) were discussed. No disagreement to such guidelines was expressed at the meeting. A solicitation guideline policy was then drafted by President McCracken, and was presented to the faculty at a November 19, 1975 meeting. At the hearing several members of the Faculty Council testified that they were surprised to see the guidelines as they were presented at the November 19 faculty meeting, but none of them spoke in opposition to the guidelines at the meeting. If members of the Faculty Council opposed the guidelines, their opposition crystalized after the November 9 Council meeting, and was not openly expressed at the November 19 faculty meeting. There may not have been a full consensus in support of the guidelines among members of the Faculty Council as expressed in the body of the solicitation guidelines; however, President McCracken was justified in believing that there was such a consensus since no opposition was expressed. The solicitation guidelines were later amended by a memorandum from Dr. McCracken to all personnel dated June 2, 1975. (See: PERC Exhibit 16). The solicitation guidelines presented to the faculty meeting on November 19, 1975 provide in part as follows: "The Faculty Council and the President of the College were in full consensus in affirming the following specifics relative to solicitations on the campus: College personnel are not to be subjected to solicitation by any groups or persons on-campus between 7:30 A.M. and 10:30 P.M. except in the following specified dining areas and during the scheduled lunch hour of any given employee. Meetings and activities on-campus shall be scheduled through the office of the Director of Community Services, Mr. James Rhoades, who maintains the official calendar of College activities and the official room-use schedule. All meetings and activities on the College campus, as a public institution campus, are intended to be in full compliance with the Sunshine Law of the State of Florida. On-campus distribution of any literature and notices which are not official College business shall be by placement on or in the square counters in the front lobby of the Administration Building. Posters and notices of interest to personnel of the College shall be placed in the covered main bulletin board in the front lobby of the Administration Building. Mr. Rhoades, Director of Community Services, will receive such materials for posting and will assure that such notices will be posted and that outdated and obsolete notices are removed." The guideline is signed by Dr. McCracken followed by the following note: "Although inadvertently overlooked in the discussions with the Faculty Council, it is, of course, obviously understood that College clerical services, postage, materials production services, telephones, and equipments are to be used only for official College business." The amendments to the solicitation guidelines distributed in the June 2, 1975 memorandum define "working time" as follows: "Okaloosa-Walton Junior College is officially opened to its clientele and operating with them from 7:30 through 10:30, Monday through Friday. Working time is that time when an employee has any scheduled obligations, whether instructional or non-instructional, to perform with respect to his position at the College including but not limited to all such obligations as required office hours, committee work, conferences, and official meetings." Solicitation is defined in the memorandum in pertinent part as follows: "College personnel are not to be subjected to solicitation by any groups or persons on- campus for any purpose when any person involved in the solicitation is on "working time" as defined above. Meetings and activities on-campus shall be scheduled through the office of the Director of Community Services, who maintains the official calendar of College activities and the official room-use schedule. All meetings and activities on the College campus, as a public institution, are intended to be in full compliance with the Sunshine Law of the State of Florida. On-campus distribution of any literature or notices which are not official College business shall not take place during working time, nor shall it take place in areas where actual work of public employees is normally performed. Posters and notices of interest to personnel of the College shall be placed in the covered main bulletin board in the front lobby of the Administration Building. The Director of Community Services will receive such materials for posting and will assure that such notices will be posted and that outdated and obsolete notices are removed. College clerical services, postage, materials production services, telephones, and equipments are to be used only for official College business and shall not be used in any way for solicitation or for promotion of unsanctioned activities or of organizations other than those which are official elements of the College or in which the College holds institutional membership." The November guidelines were not literally followed by the OWHEA, either in its efforts to secure the requisite showing of interest or in the election campaign. Many solicitations occurred outside of the designated areas during the proscribed hours, and several occurred during times when the person being solicited was actually on duty. The President of OWJC had reason to believe that the guidelines were being violated, but no effort to enforce them was ever initiated. Members and officers of the OWHEA who were involved in the organizational effort and in the election campaign gave various interpretations of the solicitation guidelines that were issued in November, and the amendments to the guidelines issued in June. The guidelines prohibited certain activities which the OWHEA considered desirable; however, the OWHEA was able to engage in a wide variety of campaign activities, and an even wider variety of activities that were available were not utilized. During the campaign members of the OWHEA spoke freely in support of the organization to non-members in the hallways, in the lunchroom, in the parking lot, and in faculty offices. The OWHEA distributed numerous bulletins, newsletters, and assorted memoranda to persons in the prospective bargaining unit. Material was delivered through the mails directly to OWJC, where it was placed in the faculty mailboxes; was delivered through the mails to the residences of faculty members; and was placed at a distribution point in close proximity to the mailboxes so that it could be read by any interested person. Respondent's Exhibits 2 and 4 - 16 are all examples of such literature that was distributed prior to the election. Respondent's Exhibits 17 - 23 are examples of literature distributed after the election. The total volume of materials distributed by the OWHEA through these avenues exceeded materials distributed by the Respondent. OWHEA members personally contacted many persons within the prospective bargaining unit. Many of the authorization cards which were forwarded by the OWHEA to the Public Employees Relations Commission with the representation certification petition were signed on campus as a result of such direct communications. The OWHEA conducted several off campus meetings. Members of the prospective bargaining unit were urged to attend such meetings and several did attend. There was testimony that these meetings were not well attended; however, there was no testimony offered from which it could be concluded that members of the prospective bargaining unit could not have attended these meetings or were not adequately apprised of them. On the contrary it appears that members of the prospective bargaining unit were apprised of the meetings and could have attended them if they desired. The OWHEA was allowed the opportunity to speak at a faculty meeting with respect to the benefits that might be obtained from the collective bargaining process, and with respect to the desirability of having the OWHEA as the bargaining agent. The OWHEA declined to avail itself of this opportunity. Mr. Chilton Jensen delivered a brief statement at that meeting. A copy of the statement was received into evidence as PERC Exhibit 3. Several campaign devices were available to the OWHEA, but were not utilized. The OWHEA could have distributed literature by placing it on automobiles in the faculty parking lot. There was testimony that this would have been too time consuming, but there was also testimony that on some days faculty members had as much as two hours of time which was not devoted to official OWJC duties. At least one bulletin board was available to the OWHEA for placing posters. While undoubtedly not the most effective campaign device, as noted by several OWHEA members, it is one, and could only have assisted in advancing the OWHEA position. While the OWHEA requested that certain meeting facilities be provided for presentations to be given during the lunch hours, no request was made to, conduct such meetings in the area set out in the solicitation guidelines. The only reason for failing to request use of these facilities given by OWHEA officials was that students were often present in that area, and that they did not feel it appropriate to "air the dirty wash" in an area where students were present. No request was made to alleviate this problem by setting aside, an area in the lunchroom. It was suggested that use of this facility would not have been appropriate because managerial officials of the OWJC would be able to attend the meeting. This was not, however, a concern of the OWHEA at the time that it was requesting meeting facilities. In its letter requesting use of other meeting facilities, the OWHEA invited Dr. McCracken, the chief managerial employee of the OWJC to attend the meeting. (PERC Exhibit 9). As stated above, the OWHEA was able to distribute materials to members of the prospective bargaining unit through the mails. There was absolutely no limitation upon such distributions. Distributions could have been timed so that members of the prospective unit would have received whatever amount of literature at whatever time the OWHEA deemed appropriate. No evidence was presented as to whether any telephone solicitations were conducted. This was a campaign device that was available to the OWHEA. Several campaign devices were not available to the OWHEA under the solicitation guidelines. The OWHEA was prohibited from using the campus mail system. The OWJC maintains a mailroom. Each faculty member has a mail box with a combination, in which many college related bulletins are placed. Mail directed to a faculty member through the Junior College is placed in these boxes. The OWHEA desired to use this mailing system so that it could distribute literature to members of the faculty without having to pay mailing expenses. The solicitation guidelines restricted the availability of meeting rooms. On one occasion the OWHEA requested a meeting room other than the lunch area designated in the solicitation guidelines. (See: PERC Exhibits 9, and 12) The request was denied by Dr. McCracken on behalf of the Respondent. (See: PERC Exhibits 10 and 13). The request was denied for several reasons, and indeed, as noted by one OWHEA official, would have been very difficult to grant as framed. It is apparent that any request for a meeting facility other than in the area designated in the solicitation guidelines would have been denied. The OWHEA was not permitted to make a presentation to any faculty meeting, other than at the November meeting. The OWHEA was not permitted to solicit members, or to campaign during working hours, and was not permitted to use the staff or facilities of the OWJC to assist in the campaign effort. The Respondent, under the direction of Dr. McCracken, engaged in an active campaign in opposition to collective bargaining and in opposition to the OWHEA. At a meeting of the faculty in February, 1975, Dr. McCracken read a statement which was received into evidence as PERC Exhibit 6. Counsel for the Respondent made an additional presentation at the meeting. Attendance at the faculty meeting during these presentations was optional. No compunction existed for any faculty member to stay during the presentation. The Respondent distributed numerous memoranda to its faculty respecting the collective bargaining process and OWHEA. Such memoranda were received into evidence as PERC Exhibits B, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27. Additional memoranda were distributed subsequent to the election. (See: PERC Exhibits 28, 29, 34, 35, 37, and 38.) The Respondent did not make any further presentations at faculty meetings, and engaged in no personal contact campaign. Members of the proposed unit who opposed collective bargaining spoke to undecided members of the proposed unit, but there was no evidence from which it could be concluded that there was any connection between that activity and the administration of OWJC. In support of their contention that the Respondent engaged in a campaign of misrepresentation, the general counsel and the OWHEA cite PERC Exhibits B, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and PERC Exhibit 8 is a memorandum that was distributed to the OWJC faculty through the faculty mail system on February 26, 1975. In this memorandum Dr. McCracken treats the request from the OWHEA for recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent of instructional personnel at OWJC as an effort by OWHEA to avoid the election process. In fact, such a request is a condition precedent to the filing of a representation certification petition requesting an election when the employee organization claims that it represents more than fifty percent of the persons in the proposed unit, as did the OWHEA. Dr. McCracken's characterization of the request for exclusive representation totally ignores the fact that the OWHEA was required to make the request. There was, however, ample opportunity for the OWHEA to respond to Dr. McCracken's memorandum, and to set the record straight. The February 26, 1975 memorandum is not such as would have had any effect upon the election, which was conducted some seven months later. PERC Exhibit 14 is a memorandum dated April 11, 1975 from Dr. McCracken directed to the faculty of OWJC through the faculty mails. The memorandum essentially states the Respondent's position in opposition to collective bargaining and to the OWHEA. The following language from the exhibit was cited as a misrepresentation: . . . I would like to state my perception of where we are and where we are going from here. Essentially, it is very simple. We now have two facets of activity going on: (1) the intrusion into normal activities of a representation petition submitted to PERC by Mr. Eugene Stafford, local Director of UNISERV/FUSA/NEA and agent for OWHEA, this development forcing, from here on, active use by the College and by OWHEA of essential, specialized legal assistance; and (2) our ever-present, on-going obligations to the regular planning, services, functions, and commitments of this College." This memorandum constitutes at most an extravagant statement in opposition to the collective bargaining process. PERC Exhibit 21 is a memorandum from Dr. McCracken A directed to all instructional personnel, distributed through the campus mail system, dated September 9, 1975. In the memorandum Dr. McCracken sought to refute certain statements made by the OWHEA in a memorandum dated August 12, 1975 (Respondent's Exhibit 14). In its August 12 memorandum, the OWHEA asserted that the collective bargaining process resulted in substantial gains to members of the faculty in the public schools in Okaloosa County. Many of the "gains" set out in the OWHEA memorandum were subjects of collective bargaining in the Okaloosa County Public Schools; however, they were also matters which had already been a part of the teachers' contracts and were not gains at all. Far from containing misstatements, Dr. McCracken's September 9, 1975 memorandum accurately explains the exaggerations contained in OWHEA's August 12 memorandum. PERC Exhibits 22, 23, 24, 25 and 27 are similar to PERC Exhibit 14. They set out what can be called an exaggerated view in opposition to the collective bargaining process and to the OWHEA. The OWHEA distributed materials which present an exaggerated view in favor of the OWHEA. The memoranda distributed by the Respondent did not result in any subversion of the election process. The OWHEA had adequate opportunity to respond to all of the alleged misrepresentations except for those set out in PERC Exhibits 24, 25, and 27. The election was conducted on September 18, 1975. PERC Exhibit 24 was distributed on September 15, 1975; PERC Exhibit 25 `was distributed one September 16, 1975, and PERC Exhibit 27 was distributed on September 18, 1975. Because of the inability of OWHEA to directly respond to these memoranda, special attention should be given them. In PERC Exhibit 24 Dr. McCracken asserted that information distributed by the OWHEA respecting average teachers salaries at the OWJC was inaccurate. No evidence was offered at the hearing to establish that the information set out in PERC Exhibit 24 was inaccurate. PERC Exhibit 25 contains a statement that the OWHEA's national affiliate was supporting legislation that would require non-union members in a certified bargaining unit to pay a fee to the union in an amount equal to membership dues. The NEA was not supporting such legislation. This misrepresentation was not substantial, and would have had appeal only to persons who did not wish to have the OWHEA serve as its bargaining representative. PERC Exhibit 27 contains the following language: "The Board of Trustees and the President over the past months - almost a year now - have diligently resisted many harassments in order to bring to you today your right to vote secretly . . ." Dr. McCracken had not intended the word "harassments" to refer to activity of the OWHEA. While the word "harassments" might be construed as derogatory of the OWHEA, any member of the faculty of the OWJC would have already been aware that Dr. McCracken held a derogatory opinion of the OWHEA. To the extent that the term "harassments" is a misstatement, it is not one that would have had any material effect upon the outcome of the election. All of the various memoranda distributed by Dr. McCracken which contained exaggerated language, or statements in opposition to collective bargaining and the OWHEA, considered together, would not have had an improper, substantial effect upon the electoral process. As set out above, the OWHEA was not permitted to use the OWJC mailing system to distribute information to members of the faculty, and was not permitted to make presentations to any regular faculty meetings subsequent to November, 1975. The Florida Association of Community Colleges; however, was permitted to use the mailing system and was given time during the faculty meetings to make presentations, including solicitations for membership. The FACC is an organization whose general purpose is to advance the Florida Public Community College program. A copy of the FACC bylaws which set out the purposes of the FACC was received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 27. The Florida Association of Community Colleges is not an employee organization within the meaning of the Public Employees Relations Act. Dr. McCracken advanced the FACC as an organization worthy of support by members of the faculty; however, in doing that he was not a lending support to an employee organization opposing the OWHEA, but rather to a general professional organization. Other organizations were permitted to use the facilities at OWJC to make presentations. Such organizations included the American Association of University Women, a local concert group, armed services recruiters, and a politician. No employee organizations were permitted use of campus facilities for meetings, and those organizations which were permitted use of the facilities made educational, cultural, or community oriented presentations. In its motion to dismiss the objections case, the Respondent has asserted that the General Counsel conducted no investigation of the allegations of the OWHEA's petition. The General Counsel was invited to submit an affidavit respecting what, if any, investigation was undertaken. No affidavit was submitted, and it was asserted at the hearing that the investigation conducted in connection with the unfair labor practice case, and the hearing itself constituted the investigation. In its objections petition, the OWHEA asserted that the Respondent failed to deliver a list of teachers to the OWHEA as required in the Certification Upon Consent Election Agreement. Such a list was mailed to Chilton Jensen, who had been listed as the president of the OWHEA within the time period set out in the agreement. Mr. Jensen was ill, and he did not pick up his mail until after the period set out in the agreement. He then delivered it to Mr. Leatherwood, who had become President of the OWHEA. The failure of the OWHEA to obtain a copy of the list within the period set out in the agreement was not the fault of the Respondent. No substantial competent evidence was offered at the hearing from which it could be concluded that the Respondent coerced, threatened, or intimidated any members of the prospective collective bargaining unit; that the members of the collective bargaining unit were unable to inform themselves with respect to the merits of the collective bargaining system, and the OWHEA; or that the OWHEA was unable to disseminate information to members of the prospective collective bargaining unit. The Respondent did not interfere with, restrain or coerce its employees in the exercise of their rights under the Public Employees Relations Act.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57447.201447.301447.501447.503
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ANNE R. WEBSTER vs METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, CLERK OF THE COUNTY COURT, 99-005113 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 06, 1999 Number: 99-005113 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2008

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, presumed handicap, national origin, age, and marital status; and whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.

Findings Of Fact Ms. Webster is a female, Caucasian, who prefers to be referred to as "a White Anglo," and a Quaker of German descent. She was born on September 7, 1943. At the time of the hearing, she was married. She is a member of the protected class as it relates to discrimination. At all times material hereto, the Clerk was an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. Ms. Webster has a Bachelor of Business Administration and a Master of Business Administration. She was a certified public accountant (CPA) but voluntarily relinquished her Florida CPA license to the Board of Accountancy in October 2003. Ms. Webster had been an employee with Metropolitan Dade County since February 21, 1978. She was employed with the Clerk as an Accountant II in the Comptroller's Division since 1982. Adolphus James was the supervisor of her accounting unit and to whom she reported. Mr. James' supervisor was Margaret Enciso, the Deputy Comptroller. Ms. Enciso reported to Martha Alcazar, the Comptroller. Ms. Alcazar reported to Ricky Schechtman, the Director of the Office of Administrative Services. Ms. Schechtman had the authority to terminate employees under her supervision. Ms. Webster's unit was comprised of employees who were majority Hispanic descent. In the unit, she saw herself as a "minority White Anglo American woman of Quaker religious customs." She saw the Hispanic workers as shutting her out by speaking Spanish. Dismissal On August 10, 2005, Ms. Webster was issued a Disciplinary Action Report (DAR) by her supervisor, Mr. James. Mr. James was recommending her dismissal from employment with the Clerk, as her performance was unacceptable and in direct violation of personnel rules. In the DAR, Ms. Webster was charged with "violating the County's Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7: Paragraph: A, B, D and S," which were indicated as follows: That the employee is incompetent or inefficient in the performance of his [sic] duty. That the employee has been offensive in his [sic] conduct toward his [sic] fellow employees, wards of the County or public. (D) That the employee has violated any lawful or official regulation or order, or failed to obey any lawful and reasonable direction given him/her by a supervisor, when such violation or failure to obey amounts to insubordination or serious breach of discipline which may reasonably be expected to result in lower morale in the organization or result in loss, inconvenience or injury to the County service or to the public. (S) That the employee is antagonistic towards superiors and fellow employees, criticizing orders, rules and policies, and whose conduct interferes with the proper cooperation of employee and impairs the efficiency of the County service. Mr. James attached to the DAR specific facts and instances. Some of the facts and instances included the following: Non-Performance: Ms. Webster failed to complete assigned reconciliations--after she returned from a medical leave of absence from February to mid-June, in a memo from Mr. James, dated June 19, 1995, Ms. Webster was given until July 14, 1995, to complete reconciliations of some general ledger accounts for May 1995; the reconciliations for May 1995 were not completed as directed; and two months of reconciliations were not completed as requested and they had to be assigned to other personnel. Insubordination--Ms. Webster "exhibited" gross insubordination toward Mr. James, on August 4, 1995, when she failed to meet with him after he repeatedly directed her to meet with him before she left for the day (the meeting was re- scheduled). Further, this instance was not the only instance where she failed to follow directives of Mr. James—“When he asks you [Ms. Webster] to refrain from certain behavior or when he explains your duties, you frequently directly ignore what he tells you and proceed to do only what you wish to do.” Disruptive Behavior--Ms. Webster exhibited disruptive behavior constantly. In particular, on August 7, 1995, she indicated to a co-worker, Julio Lucio-O'Farrill, who is Hispanic, that his constant working on his computer was disturbing her. Mr. Lucio-O'Farrill spoke with Mr. James who instructed Ms. Webster not to interfere with the co-worker doing his work. Later, Ms. Webster asked another co-worker, Devon Marrett, who is African-American, whether he knew anyone "like him [Mr. Marrett]" who could "take care of" Mr. Lucio-O'Farrill. Mr. Marrett inquired what Ms. Webster meant by her remarks, and she responded, "a big, black and ferocious man from Liberty City." On other occasions, Ms. Webster has requested information, which has nothing to with her duties and responsibilities, from workers outside her unit, and the workers felt that she was being disruptive in preventing them from doing what they were required to do. Further, on other occasions, Ms. Webster has approached workers, who were engaged in a conversation, and demanded to know what they were discussing and demanded to join in the conversation. Mr. James also attached to the DAR, the Metro-Dade Personnel Department Essential Job Functions Form; his memorandum to Ms. Webster, dated June 19, 1995, regarding "Work Assignments; the aforementioned reconciliations; and a memorandum from Mr. James to Ms. Webster, dated July 24, 1994, regarding "Work assignments and Performance." At hearing, as to the reconciliations, the evidence demonstrated that the expectation for Ms. Webster to complete the reconciliations was appropriate and warranted and that she failed to complete them. At hearing, as to insubordination, the evidence demonstrated that Mr. James gave reasonable directives, that the directives were lawful, and that Ms. Webster failed to comply with the directives. Further, at hearing, as to Ms. Webster's disruptive behavior, the evidence demonstrated that her attitude towards Mr. Lucio-O'Farrill was that he was a Hispanic who believed that women should be controlled by men but that she, being a "White Anglo" woman was not going to allow him to control her; and that he wanted her to be as a "wife" to him, but she was not going to do that. The evidence further demonstrates that her attitude towards him caused disruption in the workplace. As to Mr. Marrett, the evidence demonstrates that he was offended by Ms. Webster's remark to him, and that he believed that Ms. Webster was inquiring of him as to whether he knew of an African-American who would harm Mr. Lucio-O'Farrill. Both Messrs. Lucio-O'Farrill and Marrett were extremely concerned with Ms. Webster's behavior. Mr. Lucio- O'Farrill was so concerned that he called the police, and a police report was filed. At hearing, Mr. James testified that he was very concerned with Ms. Webster's behavior, that he had done what he could do for her, and that he had to consider the well-being of his staff and the office, as well as her behavior. The undersigned finds his testimony credible. On August 16, 1995, Ms. Schechtman met with Ms. Webster to provide Ms. Webster an opportunity to address the allegations set forth in the DAR. Ms. Webster was unable to verbally communicate her response and, therefore, Ms. Schechtman permitted Ms. Webster to submit her response in writing; which she did on or about August 18, 1995 and which consisted of several pages. Having considered the DAR and Ms. Webster's response, Ms. Schechtman decided to terminate Ms. Webster. By letter dated August 22, 1995, Ms. Schechtman notified Ms. Webster of her termination and, among other things, her rights to appeal. Suspension Prior to her termination, on February 13, 1995, Ms. Webster was suspended for six days (February 13 through 20, 1995) by the Clerk based upon a DAR dated February 3, 1995. On February 3, 1995, Mr. James issued a DAR against Ms. Webster. Mr. James was recommending her suspension from employment with the Clerk. In the DAR, Ms. Webster was charged with violating the "County's Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7: Paragraph D" as follows: That the employee has violated any lawful or official regulation or order, or failed to obey any lawful and reasonable direction given him/her by a supervisor, when such violation or failure to obey amounts to insubordination or serious breach of discipline which may reasonably be expected to result in lower morale in the organization or result in loss, inconvenience or injury to the County service or to the public. Mr. James attached to the DAR specific facts and instances. Some of the facts and instances included the following: Recent Absences--Ms. Webster had unplanned absences over the past two months which resulted in inconveniences to management and co-workers in that they had to perform her work requirements which were her responsibility; and indicates with specific instances of absences, beginning with December 8, 1994 through January 27, 1995, for which a leave of absence was granted, with some of the leave being granted for her inability to "focus" on her work, "accomplish work objectives," lack of job performance, "unusual and disruptive behavior" in the office, and to prepare to attend the fitness for duty physical examination (FFDPE). Unusual and Disruptive Behavior--specific instances and dates were indicated, beginning December 5, 1994 through January 30, 1995, in which Ms. Webster, among other things, was attempting to train an employee who was not under her supervision and she (Ms. Webster) became upset when it was brought to her (Ms. Webster's) attention; was going through the office listening to conversations, including management conversations, and being uncooperative and critical of co- workers; continued to complain about not having sufficient work space and about the work environment even after she was advised by her supervisor to concentrate on her work; repeatedly mentioned that group problems existed at work, which were related to ethnic backgrounds; refused to follow her supervisor's directives and exhibited behavior which was disruptive to the work environment; was continually counseled to work on past-due work but walked around the office, talking about ham operators; caused an employee concern due to what he described as a glazed look in her eyes; and was making strange and nonsensical telephone calls to other employees. Lack of Job Performance and Inability to Met [sic] Work Objectives--failure to meet required job requirements and related work objectives, with specificity; failure to be responsive to counseling and to show improvement; and, on occasion, been insubordinate when queried regarding status of past due work. Mr. James also attached a "Facts" section in which he indicated, among other things, the following: that a meeting was held on January 17, 1995, with Martha Alcazar, Acting Comptroller, Ms. Webster, and himself regarding a FFDPE scheduled for January 19, 1995, as a result of Ms. Webster's recent absences, disruptive behavior and lack of performance on the job; that the FFDPE was re-scheduled at a later date, January 26, 1995, at Ms. Webster's request; that Ms. Alcazar requested Ms. Webster to come into her (Ms. Alcazar's) office on January 20, 1995, to complete the paperwork for the FFDPE but that Ms. Webster failed to do so; that Ms. Webster failed to attend the FFDPE on January 26, 1995; and that she (Ms. Webster) was previously informed that her failure to comply with the directive may result in disciplinary action up to and including dismissal. Furthermore, Mr. James recommended that Ms. Webster be suspended without pay until she complied with all the requirements of a FFDPE; that she be required to participate in the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), which had been beneficial to her in the past, before returning to and during work; that management be provided monthly status reports from Ms. Webster's doctor and/or professional counselor; and that her failure to comply with the recommendations result in disciplinary action up to and including dismissal. At hearing, Mr. James testified that Ms. Webster's behavior gave him more concern than anything else in that it was unusual for her and her work pattern and that he wanted to help her, as much as he could, with her behavior and retain her position. The undersigned finds his testimony credible. By letter dated February 13, 1995, the Clerk notified Ms. Webster that she was suspended without pay until she submitted to a FFDPE and complied with the recommendations associated therewith and that it was recommended that she participate in the EAP, with monthly status reports provided to management from her doctor or professional counselor. He further advised her that she had two weeks to comply, and, if she did not, disciplinary action would result up to and including dismissal. A letter dated February 3, 1995, was also sent to Ms. Webster by Martha Alcazar, the Acting Comptroller. Ms. Alcazar indicated, among other things, that a meeting was held on January 17, 1995, with Mr. James, Ms. Webster, and herself regarding a FFDPE scheduled for January 19, 1995, as a result of Ms. Webster's recent absences, disruptive behavior and lack of performance on the job; that Ms. Webster was informed at the meeting that failure to comply with the directive may result in disciplinary action; that Ms. Webster requested a re- scheduling of the FFDPE for January 26, 1995; that Ms. Webster failed to appear for the FFDPE; that, as a result of Ms. Webster's failure to appear, she failed to comply with a direct order; and that her disciplinary action session was scheduled for February 9, 1995, specifying the particular violation. By letter dated February 14, 1995, Ms. Webster was notified by the Clerk that, among other things, her examination was scheduled for February 21, 1995. He further advised her that her failure to comply would result in disciplinary action up to and including dismissal. By letter dated February 22, 1995, the Clerk notified Ms. Webster that, among other things, her psychological evaluation was scheduled for February 28, 1995. Again, he further advised her that her failure to comply would result in disciplinary action up to and including dismissal. By letter dated March 10, 1995, the Clerk clarified his letter dated February 13, 1995, regarding the results of her disciplinary action hearing. He advised her, among other things, that the dates of her suspension were February 13 through 20, 1995, a six-day suspension, and that beginning February 21, 1995, she was placed on administrative leave, pending the results of the physical and psychological examinations. By letter dated March 23, 1995, Ms. Alcazar notified Ms. Webster, among other things, that her (Ms. Webster's) doctor indicated that she (Ms. Webster) should return to treatment with her (Ms. Webster's) physicians who should provide the Clerk with progress reports and her recommendations concerning ability to return to work and that, based on the progress reports, Ms. Webster would be contacted regarding the terms and conditions of her returning to work. In letters from a psychologist and a psychiatrist, dated April 12 and 19, 1995, respectively, both recommend that Ms. Webster be permitted to return to work. Neither the psychologist nor the psychiatrist was performing the FFDPE. By letter dated May 9, 1995, Mr. James notified Ms. Webster, among other things, that her FFDPE was scheduled for May 12, 1995. The physician who performed the FFDPE recommended on May 12, 1995, that Ms. Webster be returned to her previous duties. Appeal of Suspension and Dismissal Ms. Webster appealed her six-day suspension and dismissal. By agreement of the parties, the cases were heard by a Hearing Examiner of the American Arbitration Association in a two-day hearing. The Hearing Examiner rendered his decision on March 1, 1996, with findings of fact and conclusions, and recommended sustaining the six-day suspension and dismissal of Ms. Webster. The Hearing Examiner's findings included a finding that Ms. Webster's response to the six-day suspension and dismissal did not refute the contentions of the Clerk and "to a great degree" address issues that were either "not relevant to the personnel actions" or "unrelated" to them. The undersigned concurs in the Hearing Examiner's findings. The Hearing Examiner's further findings included a finding that Ms. Webster's conduct constituted insubordination and that the testimony supports the violations in the DAR relating to the termination. The evidence in the instant matter also demonstrates that Ms. Webster engaged in insubordination and committed the violations indicated in the DAR regarding her termination. As conclusions, the Hearing Examiner included, among other things, a conclusion that the Clerk, as Ms. Webster's employer, had a responsibility to and did assist Ms. Webster in resolving the behavior that she was exhibiting; that Ms. Webster was clearly and repeatedly provided with warnings by her supervisor as to the consequences of the failure of her non- compliance with work standards and assigned work, but she still failed to comply; that her failure to comply adversely affected the work of the other employees in her unit; that her conduct and verbal statements towards her African American and Hispanic co-workers conveyed an attitude of intolerance and prejudice; and that she was provided ample opportunity to change her behavior but she failed to do so. The evidence presented in the instant matter demonstrates and supports the conclusions expressed by the Hearing Examiner. On March 20, 1996, the County Manager, Armando Vidal, P.E., having reviewed the record of the Hearing Examiner, upheld the six-day suspension and dismissal of Ms. Webster. Retaliation Ms. Webster filed a discrimination complaint with the Clerk's Affirmative Action Office (AAO) alleging that the DAR of August 10, 1995, (the dismissal) was in retaliation for her having filed a formal discrimination complaint with the Clerk's AAO on July 13, 1995. The complaint was against "management in general for employment actions taken and not taken against her and the manner in which her co-workers interact with her." The complaint related to behaviors of co-workers as perceived by Ms. Webster and her reaction based on her perception; the exhibited pattern of dominance by men over women; differential treatment with her than men because upper management suggested that she be placed on two medical leave of absences and a FFDPE be performed; a violation of Title I of the ADA when a vacancy occurred for the Deputy Controller position in that she was not considered due to her not applying because she was on medical leave; women in lower positions than men and performing equal work but not receiving equal remuneration; and the DAR of August 10, 1995. The complaint was investigated by AAO's Senior Affirmative Action Specialist, Carmen Dieguez, for which a report, dated August 21, 1995, of the investigation was prepared. In the process of preparing the report, Ms. Dieguez attended the hearing on the DAR of August 10, 1995, as an observer. In essence, Ms. Dieguez found Ms. Webster's formal discrimination complaint with the AAO to be meritless and concluded, among other things, the following: After having discussed the complainant's actions with her and management which precipitated the DAR and which are specifically addressed in said document and having attended the DAR hearing on August 16, 1995 as an observer, I conclude that Webster's superiors have not retaliated against her as, [sic] she alleges. The incidents described in the DAR of non- performance, insubordination and disruptive behavior appear to have been of concern to management even before Webster filed her complaint of discrimination. And, it is management's responsibility to discipline employees for what appear to be job-related reasons. . . . It is, therefore, concluded that the DAR presented to Webster is not intended to retaliate or otherwise discriminate against her. On August 25, 1995, the Director of AAO, Marcia Saunders, issued a report to the Clerk on Ms. Webster's formal complaint of discrimination filed with the Clerk's AAO. The report included Ms. Dieguez's report. Ms. Saunders concurred with Ms. Dieguez that Ms. Webster's complaint was meritless. Ms. Saunders stated, among other things, in her report the following: I have reviewed her [Ms. Dieguez's] report and the conclusions drawn therein of the seven allegations which were made. You will find that none have been found to be substantiated. To the contrary, there has been corroboration that she [Ms. Webster] instead, whether consciously or unconsciously, harassed her fellow-workers about diversity issues i.e. their 'group behavior patterns and communication styles' to the point that some individuals found her behavior to be offensive and intrusive. Webster's preoccupation with making assumptions about race/ethnic/cultural and her own religious differences may be somewhat misguided. . . . Webster also alleged that an August 10th D.A.R. she received was in retaliation because of filing this formal discrimination complaint. Dieguez attended the D.A.R. hearing as an observer to ensure the issues presented were not in regard to, nor appeared to be precipitated by this complaint. She [Ms. Dieguez] affirms that the issues addressed in the hearing were not retaliatory but a progressive process related to Webster's performance, insubordination and disruptive behavior. Discrimination statutes do not preclude an employer from exercising its right and responsibility to discipline an employee in accordance with lawful personnel rules and procedures. The evidence in the instant matter demonstrates that the retaliation purported by Ms. Webster is meritless. The undersigned concurs in the conclusion reached by the Clerk's AAO. At the hearing in the instant matter, Ms. Webster insisted, among other things, that her being a White Anglo Quaker caused communication and attitude problems between her and the Clerk's employees. She testified that the majority of the Clerk's employees were Hispanic and wanted her to act as a Hispanic woman as it concerned relations with Hispanic men, i.e., to act as their "wife"; and that they failed to understand her behavior, such as her shyness, low tone in talking, and the lowering of her head when she spoke. But, the evidence demonstrated that Ms. Webster, among other things, tried to force her ways upon them and acted irrationally when the employees would not conform to what she wanted. Further, the evidence at the instant hearing demonstrates that Ms. Webster stereotyped her fellow employees and made prejudiced remarks about them. Ms. Webster is correct that ethnic differences can cause communication problems but one cannot force someone to conform to one's way in order to communicate. At hearing, no evidence was presented demonstrating that similarly situated employees were treated differently. Ms. Webster presented evidence as to her financial situation since her termination. Ms. Webster presented evidence as to costs that she incurred associated with the hearing in the instant matter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the discrimination complaint of Anne R. Webster against Metropolitan Dade County, Clerk of the County Court. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Anne R. Webster 12000 Northeast 16th Avenue, B-27 Miami, Florida 33161-6566 William X. Candela, Esquire Dade County Attorney's Office Stephen P. Clark Center 111 Northwest First Street, Suite 2810 Miami, Florida 33128 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.10760.11
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BANYAN AREA AGENCY ON AGING, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-002305BID (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002305BID Latest Update: Jun. 20, 1988

Findings Of Fact Introduction On February 26, 1988 respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), through its District IX office, advertised a Request for Proposal (RFP) in the Florida Administrative Weekly inviting qualified and interested organizations and vendors to submit proposals for the designation of an Area Agency on Aging in District IX. The designation would run from May 2, 1988 through the end of the calendar year but the successful vendor could be expected to be redesignated in subsequent years. According to the advertisement: Proposals will be received by District IX until 12:00 p.m., EST, March 24, 1988, for the designation of an Area Agency on Aging authorized under Title III of the Older Americans Act as amended, within the jurisdictional areas of Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River, Okeechobee and Palm Beach Counties. * * * Contract awards will be based on approximately 75 percent federal funds, 11 percent general revenue and 14 percent local matching funds. * * * Written inquiries concerning the Request for Proposals will be received until 4:00 p.m., EST, March 11, 1988. A Bidders Conference, to review the proposed format and contract award process, will be held on March 4, 1988. * * * Under this proposal, HRS intended to award the contract to the best qualified firm since price proposals were not being submitted. To this extent, the proceeding differs from the typical state project where the contract is ordinarily awarded to the lowest and most responsive bidder. In response to the above RFP, petitioner, Banyan Area Agency on Aging, Inc. (Banyan), timely submitted its proposal. As it turned out, Banyan was the only organization that filed a bid. After being reviewed by a seven person evaluation committee, the proposal was given a score of 480 out of a possible 1525 and a recommendation that it be rejected. This recommendation was later adopted by the District Administrator. This decision was conveyed to petitioner by letter dated April 4, 1988. That prompted a request for hearing by petitioner to challenge the preliminary agency action. As grounds for contesting the action, petitioner contended the agency was arbitrary and capricious in rejecting its proposal. If its preliminary action is sustained, HRS intends to seek authority from the Department of General Services to negotiate a noncompetitive bid. Under this process, HRS desires to designate, after a screening process, one person from each of the five counties to serve on the board of a corporation to be established to run the program. Thus, HRS does not intend to readvertise the RFP and seek competitive proposals a second time. The Contract The contract in question is funded principally through federal grant dollars under the federal Older Americans Act of 1965, as amended. The monies, commonly known as Title III funds, are used to provide programs for senior citizens. Respondent is the State agency charged with the responsibility of administering the program funds. To receive federal funds, HRS was required to prepare a state plan and submit it to the U.S. Commissioner on Aging for his approval. A part of that plan calls for HRS, or District IX in this case, to designate an area agency on aging (AAA) to plan and administer a comprehensive and coordinated system of services for the aging in the five county area of Palm Beach, Okeechobee, Indian River, Martin and S. Lucie Counties. Among other things, the local AAA must develop an area plan for supportive services, senior centers and nutrition services in the five county area. The AAA will receive $300,000 to cover administrative costs in administering the program and will be in charge of dispensing several million dollars annually in grant dollars for aging programs. District IX had previously designated Gulfstream Area Agency on Aging (Gulfstream) as its AAA. However, due to a combination of faulty management, lack of supervision and other factors, Gulfstream was designated as AAA in May, 1987. Since then, HRS has received several waivers from the Commissioner on Aging but now faces a mandate to designate a District IX AAA by October 1, 1988 or lose its federal funding. To avoid a recurrence of the Gulfstream problem, the HRS District IX contract manager, and several other district personnel, prepared a comprehensive RFP to be issued in conjunction with the selection of a new AAA designee. After a draft was assembled at the local level, the RFP was forwarded to HRS' Tallahassee office where further refinements were made. The final product has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 9 and respondent's exhibit 11. According to the District IX contract manager, the RFP is the "state of the art" in terms of what an AAA ought to be. The RFP is a voluminous document, weighing some 6 1/2 pounds according to Banyan, and requires a great deal of information and detail regarding the AAA organization, procedures, and program plans and goals to satisfy the federal act. The RFP was given to interested organizations, including Banyan, around March 1, 1988. This gave vendors approximately three and one-half weeks to prepare and submit a proposal. Only Banyan was interested in being the designee and thus was the only bidder on the job. Its proposal contained 135 pages. Evaluation Process HRS created a seven person evaluation committee to review the proposals. The committee included five HRS employees and two non-HRS members. All members were given Banyan's proposal prior to the selection date. On March 28, 1988 the committee met and each member independently evaluated Banyan's proposal. Although a top score of 1525 was theoretically possible, Banyan received an average overall score from each There of 480, or a rating of approximately thirty-one and one half percent. After the scores were tallied, Banyan was given one hour to orally explain its proposal before the full committee. At the conclusion of the presentation, the committee voted unanimously to reject the proposal. The reasons for rejecting Banyan's proposal are set forth in respondent's exhibit 2. The three primary deficiencies, as broadly stated, were the "proposal did not develop ideas fully enough to demonstrate a clear understanding of the needs and conditions of the District IX 60+ population," the proposal "did not demonstrate a clear understanding of the role and responsibility of area agency on aging nor was there evidence of administrative capability,' and (c) the proposal "did not offer assurance that current board members fully understood their position as the governing board." At hearing, several members of the committee amplified on the above three shortcomings and pointed out specific deficiencies in Banyan's proposal which led them to reject the proposal. For example, the proposal failed to focus on areas outside of Palm Beach County, did not contain a proposed budget, lacked minority representation, failed to fully identify goals and objectives, did not include a detailed description of the fair hearing process and the make- up and procedure of the advisory council and omitted the corporation's bylaws. Given these deficiencies, and others, HRS was justified in rejecting the bid. Petitioner's Case Petitioner contends that three and one-half weeks was too short a time to prepare a responsible proposal to the RFP. In this regard, HRS acknowledged it was a lengthy RFP, but it considered the time adequate for a qualified and experienced organization, particularly since much of the RFP was reference material. Banyan also pointed out that its board of directors was made up of highly qualified people with impressive work experience. While this is true, as evidenced by testimony at hearing, none were experienced in managing a federally funded program of this magnitude. Banyan further stated that, after the proposal was filed, it could have corrected or expanded on many of its abbreviated responses. However, once the proposal was filed, such changes were impermissible. Finally, Banyan conceded that while many of its responses were brief and nonspecific, this was because Banyan intended to rely upon HRS for technical assistance to implement the programs. However, the RFP called for specific, detailed responses so that HRS could properly evaluate the proposal. Allegations of Bias or Impropriety There is no evidence that the committee acted unfairly or improperly during the evaluation process or that any eber was personally biased towards Banyan. There is also no evidence that HRS rejected the bid so that it could "control" the management of the program.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the protest filed by petitioner be DENIED and that a Final Order be entered confirming the rejection of petitioner's proposal. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Colman B. Stein 100 Worth Avenue Apartment 416 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Laurel D. Hopper, Esquire 111 Georgia Avenue Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 R. S. Power, Esquire Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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LONNY OHLFEST vs MIAMI-DADE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 04-002531RU (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 19, 2004 Number: 04-002531RU Latest Update: Oct. 06, 2004

The Issue Whether the Respondent, Miami-Dade Community College, has adopted a statement of agency policy in violation of Florida law.

Findings Of Fact Prior to August 2, 2002, the Respondent employed the Petitioner, Lonny Ohlfest. At the time of his termination, the Petitioner filed a request for a due process hearing with the Respondent to challenge his termination from employment. The Petitioner challenged the basis for his termination as he wanted to clear his name regarding some unflattering allegations but, equally important, he wanted to keep his job with MDC. The Respondent denied the Petitioner's request for an administrative hearing and found that the Petitioner was not entitled to a hearing. More specifically, the Respondent concluded that since the Petitioner did not have a contract of employment he was not entitled to an administrative hearing. The Petitioner disputed the Respondent's claim and argued that he did have a contract, that he had a reasonable expectation that his employment would continue, and that the Respondent unlawfully refused to afford him regress through the administrative process. When the Petitioner's appeal of his request for an administrative hearing failed, he filed the instant case to challenge the Respondent's policy of not referring administrative cases for formal hearing. The delays in the appeal process explain and support the Petitioner's delay in filing the instant challenge to the agency's alleged rule. To understand the historical perspective of this case, the following findings are made pertinent to the Petitioner's employment with the Respondent: The Petitioner began employment with the MDC on or about April 4, 2001. He was hired as a part-time, hourly worker within the school of allied health technologies. The position he assumed was funded and operated within the "Health Careers Opportunities Program" or HCOP. The HCOP was funded by a federal grant. The monies coming from the grant were renewable each year and ran concurrent with the school's fiscal year (July 1-June 30). All employees paid through the HCOP grant were considered "temporary" as the grant monies were necessary to assure continued employment. In January 2002 the Petitioner was given a full-time position within the HCOP. He was designated "Program Leader/Student Services" for the upcoming summer bridge program. At all times material to this case, all parties knew that absent federal funding the HCOP would not continue to operate. Moreover, the Petitioner knew, or should have known, that his employment with the Respondent would run only until June 30, 2002. Thereafter, it was expected that if and when the federal funding came through, the HCOP employees (including the Petitioner) would continue to work within the scope of the program. At the end of the summer program in 2001, the HCOP employees took leave until the school year started and the funding of the program was assured. Accordingly, after the summer bridge program was completed, the Petitioner expected to be on leave during the summer of 2002 until called back to work. Instead, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner from employment. The 2002 summer bridge program had not finished well for the Petitioner. Amid allegations of sexual harassment (unsubstantiated and not at issue in this proceeding) the Petitioner's working relationship within the HCOP floundered. The Petitioner was aghast that unsubstantiated claims had been reported, he wanted the accusations resolved, he wanted his name cleared, and he was disappointed by the process that failed to timely and fully resolve the issues. When the Petitioner left the campus for what he believed would be the break (similar to the one they had taken the prior year), he was uncertain as to his employment status. In fact, when he left the campus he cleaned out his desk and returned his keys. Nevertheless, on July 26, 2002, Dr. Miller directed the Petitioner to present for work on July 29, 2002. He did not do so. On July 29, 2002, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor directed him to appear for work on July 30, 2002. He did not do so. In fact, the Petitioner did not return to the office until July 31, 2002. The Petitioner did not understand that his attendance was mandatory for the two days that he did not appear for work. When the Petitioner did check in with the HCOP office on the 31st he came to understand the gravity of the situation. As a result of the absences, the Respondent cited the Petitioner with insubordination and terminated his employment with MDC. The Petitioner timely challenged the termination but the Respondent ruled he was not entitled to an administrative review of the decision. The Petitioner filed for, and received, unemployment compensation. The termination was not justified by the standards applicable to that forum. The rules governing unemployment compensation do not, however, govern the administrative process regarding whether or not one's employment constitutes a property interest that is protected by law. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's petition seeking an administrative review, the Respondent declined to afford the Petitioner with a hearing. The Respondent does not forward petitions filed by non- contract employees when such individuals seek to challenge their termination of employment. The Respondent maintains that, as a matter of law, they are not required to forward such petitions for formal review. The Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are not entitled to administrative review when their employment is terminated. Conversely, the Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are entitled to an administrative review when their employment is terminated. The Petitioner was not a full-time, contract employee of the Respondent. The Respondent's policy affords full-time contractual personnel a right to an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.54120.56120.569120.57120.68
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RAMON SANTIAGO LOPEZ vs WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP, 18-000297 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jan. 17, 2018 Number: 18-000297 Latest Update: Feb. 15, 2019

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Wal-Mart Stores East, LP (“Walmart”), discriminated against Petitioner, Ramon Santiago Lopez (“Petitioner”), based upon his national origin or age, and/or terminated his employment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).1/

Findings Of Fact Walmart is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Walmart is a national retailer. Petitioner is a Cuban (Hispanic) male. He was 62 years old when he was hired by Walmart in November 2005 and was 72 years old at the time of his dismissal. Petitioner was initially hired to work at a store in Jacksonville, but transferred to Tampa. In June 2010, Petitioner requested a transfer back to Jacksonville and was assigned to Store 4444 on Shops Lane, just off Philips Highway and I-95 in Jacksonville. The store manager at Store 4444 was Scott Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s transfer request and testified that he “very much” got along with Petitioner. Petitioner confirmed that he never had a problem with Mr. Mallatt. Petitioner testified that when he first started at Store 4444, he had no problems. After about four months, however, he began reporting to a supervisor he recalled only as “Lee.” Petitioner described Lee as “kind of a maniac.” Lee would harass Petitioner and give him impossible assignments to accomplish. Petitioner testified that he complained repeatedly to Mr. Mallatt about Lee’s abuse, but that nothing was ever done about it. Eventually, Petitioner gave up complaining to Mr. Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt testified that Petitioner never complained to him about being discriminated against because of his national origin or age. Petitioner apparently did complain about being overworked, but never tied these complaints to any discriminatory intent on the part of Lee. Petitioner testified that Lee no longer worked at Store 4444 in January 2016. From 2010 to 2015, Petitioner worked from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. in various departments, including Grocery, Dairy, Paper, Pet, and Chemical. In 2015, Petitioner spoke with Mr. Mallatt about working at least some day shifts rather than constant nights. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s request. In August 2015, Petitioner was moved to the day shift in the Maintenance department. As a day associate, Petitioner typically worked from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Assistant Store Manager April Johnson transferred to Store No. 4444 in October 2015. Petitioner reported directly to Ms. Johnson. On January 14, 2016, Petitioner was scheduled to work from 8:30 a.m. until 5:30 p.m. He drove his van into the parking lot of Store No. 4444 at approximately 7:58 a.m. He parked in his usual spot, on the end of a row of spaces that faced a fence at the border of the lot. Petitioner liked this spot because the foliage near the fence offered shade to his vehicle. Closed circuit television (“CCTV”) footage, from a Walmart camera with a partial view of the parking lot, shows Petitioner exiting his vehicle at around 8:00 a.m. Petitioner testified that he could see something on the ground in the parking lot, 50 to 60 meters away from where his van was parked. The CCTV footage shows Petitioner walking across the parking lot, apparently toward the object on the ground. Petitioner testified there were no cars around the item, which he described as a bucket of tools. Petitioner stated that the bucket contained a screwdriver, welding gloves, a welding face mask, and a hammer. The CCTV footage does not show the bucket. Petitioner crosses the parking lot until he goes out of camera range.3/ A few seconds later, Petitioner returns into camera range, walking back toward his car while carrying the bucket of tools. When Petitioner reaches his van, he opens the rear door, places the bucket of tools inside, then closes the rear door. Petitioner testified that after putting the tools in the back of his van, he went to the Customer Service Desk and informed two female African American customer service associates that he had found some tools and put them in his car. Petitioner conceded that he told no member of management about finding the tools. Walmart has a written Standard Operating Procedure for dealing with items that customers have left behind on the premises. The associate who finds the item is required to take the item to the Customer Service Desk, which functions as the “lost and found” for the store. Mr. Mallatt and Ms. Johnson each testified that there are no exceptions to this policy. Petitioner was aware of the Standard Operating Procedure. On prior occasions, he had taken found items to the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner conceded that it would have been quicker to take the bucket of tools to the Customer Service Desk than to his van. However, he testified that he believed that he could have been fired if he had taken the tools to the desk before he had clocked in for work. Petitioner cited a Walmart policy that made “working off the clock” a firing offense. It transpired that the policy to which Petitioner referred was Walmart’s Wage and Hour policy, which states in relevant part: It is a violation of law and Walmart policy for you to work without compensation or for a supervisor (hourly or salaried) to request you work without compensation. You should never perform any work for Walmart without compensation. This language is plainly intended to prevent Walmart from requiring its employees to work without compensation. Petitioner, whose English language skills are quite limited, was adamant that this policy would have allowed Walmart to fire him if he performed the “work” of bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he was officially clocked in for his shift. Therefore, he put the tools in his van for safekeeping and informed the Customer Service Desk of what he had done. Petitioner was questioned as to why he believed it was acceptable for him to report the situation to the Customer Service Desk, but not acceptable for him to bring the tools to the desk. The distinction he appeared to make was that the act of carrying the tools from the parking lot to the desk would constitute “work” and therefore be forbidden, whereas just stopping by to speak to the Customer Service Desk associate was not “work.” The evidence established that Petitioner would not have violated any Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he clocked in. He could have been compensated for the time he spent bringing in the tools by making a “time adjustment” on his time card. Mr. Mallatt testified that time adjustments are done on a daily basis when associates perform work prior to clocking in or after clocking out. Petitioner merely had to advise a member of management that he needed to make the time adjustment. Mr. Mallatt was confident that the adjustment would have been granted under the circumstances presented in this case. Petitioner did not go out to retrieve the tools after he clocked in. Mr. Mallatt stated that employees frequently go out to their cars to fetch items they have forgotten, and that Petitioner absolutely would have been allowed to go get the tools and turn them in to the Customer Service Desk. Later on January 14, 2016, Ms. Johnson was contacted by a customer who said tools were stolen off of his truck.4/ Ms. Johnson had not heard anything about lost tools. She looked around the Customer Service Desk, but found no tools there. Ms. Johnson also called out on the store radio to ask if anyone had turned in tools. Finally, the customer service manager at the Customer Service Desk told Ms. Johnson that Petitioner had said something about tools earlier that morning. Ms. Johnson called Petitioner to the front of the store and asked him about the missing tools. Petitioner admitted he had found some tools in the parking lot and had placed them in his vehicle. Ms. Johnson asked Petitioner why he put the tools in his vehicle. Petitioner told her that he was keeping the tools in his car until the owner came to claim them. Ms. Johnson testified that Petitioner offered no other explanation at that time. He just said that he made a “mistake.” Ms. Johnson explained to Petitioner that putting the tools in his vehicle was not the right thing to do and that he should have turned them in to “lost and found,” i.e., the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner was sent to his van to bring in the tools. After this initial conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Johnson spoke with Mr. Mallatt and Mr. Cregut to decide how to treat the incident. Mr. Cregut obtained approval from his manager to conduct a full investigation and to interview Petitioner. Mr. Cregut reviewed the CCTV footage described above and confirmed that Petitioner did not bring the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cregut spoke with Petitioner for approximately an hour to get his side of the story. Petitioner also completed a written statement in which he admitted finding some tools and putting them in his car. Mr. Cregut described Petitioner as “very tense and argumentative” during the interview. As the interview continued, Mr. Cregut testified that Petitioner’s reaction to the questions was getting “a little bit more hostile [and] aggressive.” Mr. Cregut decided to try to build rapport with Petitioner by asking him general questions about himself. This tactic backfired. Petitioner volunteered that he was a Cuban exile and had been arrested several times for his opposition to the Castro regime. Petitioner then claimed that Mr. Cregut discriminated against him by asking about his personal life and prejudged him because of his activism. Mr. Cregut credibly testified that he did not judge or discriminate against Petitioner based on the information Petitioner disclosed and that he only asked the personal questions to de-escalate the situation. Mr. Cregut’s only role in the case was as an investigative factfinder. His report was not colored by any personal information disclosed by Petitioner. At the conclusion of the investigation, Mr. Mallatt made the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. The specific ground for termination was “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues,” related to Petitioner’s failure to follow Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Mr. Mallatt testified that his concern was that Petitioner intended to keep the bucket of tools if no owner appeared to claim them. Mr. Mallatt credibly testified that had Petitioner simply taken the tools to the Customer Service Desk, rather than putting them in his vehicle, he would have remained employed by Walmart. Walmart has a “Coaching for Improvement” policy setting forth guidelines for progressive discipline. While the progressive discipline process is used for minor and/or correctable infractions, such as tardiness, “serious” misconduct constitutes a ground for immediate termination. The coaching policy explicitly sets forth “theft” and “intentional failure to follow a Walmart policy” as examples of serious misconduct meriting termination. Petitioner conceded that no one at Walmart overtly discriminated against him because of his age or national origin. He testified that he could feel the hostility toward Hispanics at Store 4444, but he could point to no particular person or incident to bolster his intuition. Petitioner claimed that his dismissal was in part an act of retaliation by Ms. Johnson for his frequent complaints that his Maintenance counterparts on the night shift were not adequately doing their jobs, leaving messes for the morning crew to clean up. Ms. Johnson credibly testified that Petitioner’s complaints did not affect her treatment of him or make her want to fire him. In any event, Ms. Johnson played no role in the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner’s stated reason for failing to follow Walmart policy regarding found items would not merit a moment’s consideration but for Petitioner’s limited proficiency in the English language. It is at least conceivable that someone struggling with the language might read the Walmart Wage and Hour policy as Petitioner did. Even so, Petitioner was familiar with the found items policy, and common sense would tell an employee that he would not be fired for turning in customer property that he found in the parking lot. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner had been working at Walmart for over 10 years. It is difficult to credit that he was completely unfamiliar with the concept of time adjustment and truly believed that he could be fired for lifting a finger to work when off the clock. Walmart showed that in 2016 it terminated three other employees from Store 4444 based on “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues.” All three were under 40 years of age at the time their employment was terminated. Two of the employees were African American; the third was Caucasian. Petitioner offered no evidence that any other employee charged with gross misconduct has been treated differently than Petitioner. At the hearing, Petitioner’s chief concern did not appear to be the alleged discrimination, but the implication that he was a thief, which he found mortally offensive. It could be argued that Mr. Mallatt might have overreacted in firing Petitioner and that some form of progressive discipline might have been more appropriate given all the circumstances, including Petitioner’s poor English and his unyielding insistence that he never intended to keep the tools. However, whether Petitioner’s dismissal was fair is not at issue in this proceeding. The issue is whether Walmart has shown a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner’s employment. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner offered no reasonable explanation for his failure to follow Walmart policy. Mr. Mallatt’s suspicion regarding Petitioner’s intentions as to the tools was not unfounded and was not based on any discriminatory motive. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Walmart for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart’s stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s age or national origin. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that his termination was in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity. The employee who was allegedly retaliating against Petitioner played no role in the decision to terminate his employment. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart discriminated against him because of his age or national origin in violation of section 760.10.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2018.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.02760.10
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LORIE J. PLEGUE vs SAVE A LOT/JERRY`S ENTERPRISES, 07-004588 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Oct. 05, 2007 Number: 07-004588 Latest Update: May 28, 2008

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race or gender, engaged in sexual harassment, or retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2006).1

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Subsections 760.02(6) and (10). Petitioner is a Caucasian female and filed a complaint of race and gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation with the Commission. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Subsection 760.02(7). Respondent operates retail grocery stores in several states, including Florida. The evidence, in its entirety, does not establish a prima facie showing of discrimination or retaliation. Nor does the evidence prove that Petitioner was sexually harassed. Finally, there is no evidence that Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10. Respondent first employed Petitioner sometime in July 2003 as an "at-will" employee. No written employment contract has ever existed between the parties. Respondent trained and promoted Petitioner to assistant manager of a grocery store. In April 2005, however, Mr. William Reners, Respondent's regional director of operations (RDO), offered Petitioner an opportunity to become the administrative assistant/secretary in Respondent's Regional Office without a decrease in compensation.2 Petitioner accepted the offer. Petitioner continued her employment as an administrative assistant, and she voluntary resigned on February 5, 2007. Petitioner earned positive performance evaluations and regular raises during her employment. Petitioner's claim of disparate treatment relates to Mr. Cornelius Hicks, an African-American male, who was compensated at a higher level than the compensation Petitioner received. However, Respondent employed Mr. Hicks as a store manager, and Mr. Hicks never voluntarily transferred to a position of administrative assistant. Respondent gave Mr. Hicks an extraordinary raise sometime in late 2006 or early 2007. Mr. Hicks' job performance was "tremendous." Respondent intended the raise as recognition of the duties Mr. Hicks performed as a "floater" manager. The job required Mr. Hicks to manage a number of different stores and to commute long distances, on short notice, and to perform the duties of a floater manager for extended periods. Petitioner first learned of the alleged disparate treatment when Petitioner entered Mr. Reners' office without permission while he was on vacation sometime in January 2007. Petitioner learned of the raise when she discovered relevant paperwork in Mr. Reners' office. Disparate treatment is not evidenced by Respondent's refusal to give Petitioner a merit pay increase after Petitioner earned a Master's of Business Administration (MBA) degree. Mr. David Gerdes, Respondent's vice president for Human Resources, told Petitioner at the time that Respondent did not give raises to employees when they earned college degrees that do not improve an employee's ability to do his/her job. The MBA did not improve Petitioner's ability to carry out her clerical duties as an administrative assistant. Petitioner was aware that Respondent maintains a uniform, written non-discrimination policy and a "zero tolerance" sexual harassment policy. Petitioner knew the policies were posted in all stores and included in annual training sessions. Petitioner knew the company had an "open door" policy by which employees who are not satisfied with answers to their inquiries at the local level are encouraged to contact corporate headquarters in Minnesota. Finally, Petitioner knew that Respondent promptly investigates employees' complaints of discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. Mr. Reners is the individual who allegedly discriminated and retaliated against Petitioner. As the RDO, Mr. Reners is responsible for overall management and operation of the 11 grocery stores in Florida. However, Mr. Reners did not have the authority to discharge full-time employees, including Petitioner. The so-called whistle-blower evidence pertains to various memoranda about store conditions that Petitioner wrote during her employment as an administrative assistant. When Petitioner discussed the issue with Mr. Reners in September 2006, Mr. Reners invited Petitioner to send the memoranda to Mr. John Boogren, Corporate Director of Operations. Mr. Boogren is Mr. Reners' supervisor. Petitioner sent the memoranda to Mr. Boogren. The memoranda discussed what Petitioner thought were poor conditions and operating procedures in Respondent's stores. The evidence of sexual harassment involves uncorroborated allegations by Petitioner that Mr. Tom DeGovanni, a co-worker, patted Petitioner on her head and shoulders, or back, on October 6, 2006. Petitioner complained of the incident, but qualified her complaint by saying that "it was no big deal" and by saying that she did not want the company to take any action. Several days after the alleged incident, however, Petitioner delivered a memorandum to Mr. Reners complaining of the alleged conduct. Respondent investigated the claim of sexual harassment by Mr. DeGovanni in accordance with Respondent's long-standing "zero tolerance" sexual harassment policy. The investigation did not substantiate Petitioner's allegations. Mr. DeGovanni adamantly denied touching Petitioner, there were no witnesses to the alleged event, and, even though Petitioner and DeGovanni were in front of a security video camera at the time of the alleged event, the touching was not on the videotape. Respondent reminded Mr. DeGovanni of the company's policy against sexual harassment, gave Mr. DeGovanni a written warning, and transferred him to another store location so Petitioner would not have contact with him. Mr. Reners notified corporate headquarters of the complaint, the investigation results, and the corrective action. Petitioner received a satisfactory performance evaluation, a wage increase, and a bonus in December 2006, after her complaint about DeGovanni. Mr. Reners knew of and approved the evaluation, raise, and bonus and could have stopped them if he had wished to do so. Petitioner resigned her employment as Respondent's administrative assistant/secretary on two occasions prior to February 5, 2007. Although Mr. Reners could have accepted both of the prior resignations, he telephoned Petitioner and persuaded her to resume her employment without penalty. However, Mr. Reners warned Petitioner after the second resignation that, if she resigned again, he would accept the resignation. Mr. Reners was on vacation during the week of January 29, 2007. Petitioner had no communication with Mr. Reners during that week. On Saturday, February 3, 2007, Petitioner prepared a letter of resignation and resigned on February 5, 2007. The psychic that Petitioner consults had previously told Petitioner of an impending job termination. Mr. Reners returned from vacation on Monday, February 5, 2007, and commenced a meeting with two other employees to discuss renovations at Respondent's store in Labelle, Florida. Petitioner thought she should be included in the meeting and knocked on the door to the meeting room. Petitioner mistakenly thought the meeting was a staff meeting that often occurred after Mr. Reners returned from a vacation. Mr. Reners explained to Petitioner that there would be a staff meeting afterwards. Petitioner was upset at not being included in the first meeting and viewed her exclusion from the meeting as the job termination predicted by her psychic. Shortly after the first meeting ended, Petitioner walked up to Mr. Reners, handed her store keys to him, said "You win!" and left the building. Petitioner performed her job duties well. Respondent would not have discharged Petitioner on February 5, 2007. Petitioner voluntarily resigned on that day.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations against Respondent and dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2008.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569760.02760.10
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KELLY MCKEAN vs ECONO AUTO PAINTING, INC., 04-003849 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bartow, Florida Oct. 26, 2004 Number: 04-003849 Latest Update: Apr. 22, 2005

The Issue The issue in this cause is whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices of discrimination against Petitioner, for the reason of her being a female, by denying her management training during her employment tenure and by subsequently terminating her employment, in violation of Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003).1

Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes; and stipulations of the parties, the following relevant and material facts, arrived at impartially based solely upon testimony and information presented at the final hearing, are objectively determined: Petitioner, Kelly McKean, is a Caucasian female and, at all times pertinent to this proceeding, was an employee at one of Respondent's, Econo Auto Painting, Inc., business locations, located at 1822 West Memorial Boulevard, Lakeland, Florida, from February 12, 2001, until she was terminated on June 23, 2003. Petitioner had approximately six years of non-continuous employment at several of Respondent's business locations before beginning her employment at the above Lakeland business site. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a "taper," the person who is responsible for taping cars after body repairs and before painting. The taping of cars consisted of aligning strips of tape to specific areas of each automobile to prevent the taped area from being painted by the painter. Petitioner was an "aggrieved person" as defined by Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. The evidence of record establishes the fact that during all times pertinent, Respondent's Lakeland location employed nine employees comprised of: two females and seven males (five Caucasians/three Hispanics/one African American). Of the nine employees, one Caucasian female and one African American male were in managerial positions. Both were employed through contractual services of Selective HR Services (SHRS), an independent contractor and co-employer of Petitioner. Respondent is an automobile body shop business specializing in automobile body repairs and painting the exterior of cars and, at all times pertinent to this proceeding, was an "employer" as defined by Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. During all times pertinent to this proceeding, SHRS was responsible for providing human resources management services for Respondent's employees.4 At all time pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent hired the shop managers for its several auto body repair shops through SHRS. At no time pertinent to this proceeding did Respondent promote employees to management positions from within. At no time pertinent to this proceeding did Respondent permit, offer, or have in place a management training program for the training and promotions of employees from within the ranks of its shop employees to management positions within the company. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, and, on Monday, June 23, 2003, Marquez Green was the shop manager and Ron Link was the assistant manager of Respondent's Lakeland branch body shop during Petitioner's last term of employment at that location. Basis for Petitioner's Termination Several weeks preceding her termination, on June 23, 2003, the assistant shop manager, Mr. Link, noticed and personally discussed with Petitioner her repeated improper taping of some cars in the assembly line processes. Mr. Link spoke with Petitioner about this problem particularly stressing the fact that each car not properly taped required repainting which resulted in a slowdown of the repair, sanding, taping, and repainting process. It was made clear to Petitioner that repainting due to improper taping was causing the shop to lose profit. During the days following notice of the problem regarding incorrectly taped cars, Petitioner failed and/or refused to improve her work habits. The lack of improvement by Petitioner of her work habit of taping cars apparently became of some concern with management, in view of Petitioner's experience and over seven years of service as a taper with Respondent's business. Added to this disturbing trend, some time later, both the shop manager and assistant manager observed Petitioner in the manager's office reading business documents. Management confronted Petitioner with this violation of its policy that "none management" personnel were not allowed to read/review business documents. Petitioner gave an excuse for her conduct stating that the prior manager permitted her to review office documents when she was caught up with her work. Other than her statement, Petitioner failed to provide the identity or the testimony of the prior manager who allegedly granted her permission to review office documents when she had completed her work assignments before the end of the day. Petitioner presented no corroborating evidence in support of her assertion of prior managerial permission for her to review office documents. Petitioner's allegation of "prior permissive authority" was thus not credible. Mr. Green gave undisputed testimony that during a third occasion, he observed Petitioner and a non-employee male friend of Petitioner walking and talking in the work area restricted to employees only. Mr. Green approached the couple and immediately brought the rule infraction of no non-employees within the restricted work area to Petitioner's attention, ending by instructing Petitioner to tell her male friend to leave the restricted workshop area immediately. Under these circumstances, and in the presence of a non-employee, Petitioner said to her shop manager: "He'll leave when I want him to leave." Following Petitioner's refusal to obey the shop manager's direct order accompanied by her disrespectful comment, Mr. Green moved to call the local police, and only then did Petitioner's male friend leave the premises. Mr. Green subsequently discussed this matter, as well as the profit loss due to improper taping of cars, with Mr. Link, and they jointly decided not to take disciplinary action against Petitioner at that time. Notice of Termination On Monday, June 23, 2003, Petitioner reported to work at approximately 7:35 a.m. and five hours later, at approximately 12:35 p.m., she had completely taped all nine cars in the shop for repair and painting that day. Petitioner sought out Mr. Link, inquiring what he would have her do next; assist other employees in the shop or go to lunch? Mr. Link instructed Petitioner to go home for the remainder of the day. After her departure, Mr. Link and Mr. Green discussed Petitioner's continuing hurried work habits, her attitude toward management when given a direct order, and her unauthorized presence in the manager's office reviewing business documents. Management considered the following: (1) Petitioner's continued episodes of improper taping was causing an increase in cost and a decrease in profits, (2) Petitioner's negative attitude toward management, and (3) Petitioner's unauthorized presence in the manager's office looking at managerial business documents. Management determined that the above conduct was sufficient basis for her termination as an employee. In the afternoon of June 23, 2003, Mr. Link, with authorization from Mr. Green, telephoned Petitioner and informed her that she was terminated because of her repeated and costly taping errors and her failure to correct those errors. The telephonic notice of termination was followed by a written termination letter with check marks beside the boxes "refusal to perform job duties" and "unable to perform job."5 This document formed the factual basis for Petitioner's termination as an employee. Background and Employer's Policy On February 12, 2001, before she began working at Respondent's Lakeland job site, but while she was working for Respondent at another job site, Petitioner executed an Employment Acknowledgement packet containing the policy(s) and procedures she agreed to follow in the event there occurred any employment disputes, including any type of discrimination. Petitioner also agreed to resolve employment disputes through use of SHRS' Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedure. Prior Complaints Made by Petitioner While working at Respondent's Longwood, Florida, job site, but before working at the Lakeland job site, Petitioner made one verbal complaint of sexual harassment to Betty Branham, SHRS compliance supervisor, regarding sexual comments regarding her buttocks made by male co-workers. The record does not contain evidence whether this complaint was pursued or dismissed. Petitioner neither made complaints nor did she make any reports of sexual harassment or discrimination, gender or otherwise, at the Lakeland job site during her February 12, 2001, to June 23, 2003, employment tenure there. Petitioner did not file a report with SHRS claiming discrimination because of her gender and/or because she was denied management training opportunities and opportunities for promotion into management. Other Employees Terminated by Respondent During the early hours of June 24, 2003, one day after Petitioner's termination, Mr. Link terminated a male employee, Edward Burgess. Mr. Burgess was a "sander," and he was terminated for "refusal to perform job duties" and "unable to perform job." According to Mr. Link, Mr. Burgess was "taking two-to-three times longer than what he should to sand cars." During the evening hours of June 24, 2003, Mr. Green terminated another male employee, Mr. Link. Mr. Link was terminated, as he recalled, "because another male employee made accusations that while walking behind him Mr. Link bumped into his rear and made sexual gestures." Mr. Link admitted he could not recall, that is, he could not confirm, argue or deny, the other party's versions of what actually occurred and what was said at the time of his bumping into the other employee. The unnamed other employee did not testify. Petitioner, through the testimony of witnesses, of record, and exhibits admitted into evidence, failed to produce a scintilla of substantial and competent evidence to establish: that she was subjected to an adverse job action when, in fact, she was terminated for poor job performance and disrespectful conduct toward management on June 23, 2003; that because of her gender, female, she was treated differently than similarly situated male employees, who were not terminated after violation of work place policy(s); and (3) that she was qualified for the job as managerial trainee but was denied an opportunity for employee managerial training which was provided by her employer to other employees.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and the Charge of Discrimination filed in this cause by Petitioner, Kelly McKean. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2005.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.02760.10760.11
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