The Issue This is a license discipline case in which Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent on the basis of allegations of misconduct set forth in an Administrative Complaint dated August 13, 2003.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent Jean- Rene Joseph has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bond agent. At all times material to this case, Respondent worked as a bail bond agent with a bail bond company named America's Best Bail Bonds, Inc. At approximately 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. on the morning of January 29, 2002, Santacroce contacted Respondent for the purpose of arranging bail for a friend of hers named John Raymond Moyer ("Moyer"). Moyer needed a bond in the amount of $1,500.00. Respondent agreed to provide, and did provide, the requested bail bond for a fee of $150.00. On the morning of January 29, 2002, Santacroce paid $150.00 cash for the bail bond fee. Santacroce also agreed to furnish collateral for the bail bond issued on behalf of Moyer. In this regard, Santacroce agreed that she would either deliver the title to a specified automobile as collateral, or she would make payments of $250.00 per week until the bail bond on behalf of Moyer was fully collateralized. In the early morning hours of January 29, 2002, Santacroce did not have an original certificate of title to an automobile with her. Instead, she gave Respondent a color photocopy of title number 50460657, which was a certificate of title to an automobile. The certificate showed title to a 1986 Chevrolet in the name of a registered owner named Oliver C. Todd ("Todd"). Handwritten information on the certificate indicated that the registered owner had sold the automobile to AAA National Auto Sales, who in turn had sold the automobile to Santacroce. Santacroce also had with her at that time an affidavit signed by Todd that authorized Santacroce to retrieve the subject automobile from a towing company, as well as a document from Festa Towing Service, Inc, itemizing towing and storage charges. During the early morning hours of January 29, 2002, Respondent and Santacroce both signed a receipt document numbered 11122. Section 4 of that document describes the collateral or collateral documents as consisting of a promissory note and "Fl car title #50460657 or weekly payment of $250.00." Santacroce never made any payments towards collateralization of the subject bail bond. Moreover, Santacroce never delivered to Respondent the original of the certificate of title described above. Less than two weeks later, Moyer was arrested and jailed on other criminal charges. Through another bail bond company, Moyer posted bail on the second arrest. Santacroce no longer wished to have any liability on the bail bond issued on January 29, 2002. Accordingly, she asked Respondent to "surrender" the bond and have Moyer returned to jail. Moyer failed to appear for his court appearance that was guaranteed by the bail bond obtained by Santacroce. A bond forfeiture order was issued on February 12, 2002. Eventually, Moyer appeared, the forfeiture order was set aside, and the surety was discharged. Respondent's employer incurred expenses in the amount of $50.00 to have the forfeiture order set aside. At some point after the surety was discharged, Santacroce asked Respondent to return what Santacroce described as the certificate of title she had given to Respondent. Respondent could not return a certificate of title to Santacroce, because Respondent never received a certificate of title from Santacroce. Respondent never returned the photocopy of the certificate of title to Santacroce. That photocopy was still in Respondent's possession as of the day of the final hearing.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint in this case be dismissed because there is no clear and convincing evidence that Respondent received "car title #50460657" or anything else of value as collateral security for the subject bail bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Financial Services Suite N-321 401 Northwest Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Hernan Hernandez, Esquire 1431 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The central issue presented in this case concerns whether the Department of Banking and Finance’s application of Section 717.124(5), Florida Statutes, as amended effective October 1, 2001, to claims filed prior to October 1, 2001, but paid after October 1, 2001, is an unpromulgated rule in violation of Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Computer Mart Claim 1.(A) On or about September 4, 2001, Petitioner filed a claim on behalf of Computer Mart, Inc., for unclaimed property account number 3563-1994-44 in the amount of $1,854.85 and reported in the name of Computer Mart (“the Computer Mart Claim”). Prior to the filing of the Computer Mart Claim, Computer Mart, Inc., executed an Agreement authorizing Petitioner to file the claim on its behalf. Petitioner obtained a bankruptcy search for Florida Central Realty, formerly known as Computer Mart. On or about October 12, 2001, the Department approved the Computer Mart Claim. The Agreement authorized the payment of fees of thirty percent of the accounts claimed, which equaled $556.45. The remaining seventy percent of the accounts claimed equaled $1,298.40. On or about October 19, 2001, the Department issued a warrant in the amount of $556.45 to Petitioner. On or about October 19, 2001, the Department issued a warrant in the amount of $1,298.40 to Computer Mart, Inc. Diversified Claim 2.(A) On or about September 4, 2001, Petitioner filed a claim on behalf of Diversified Hospitality Group, Inc., for unclaimed property account numbers 6467-96-31364, 1165-92- 2634, 1165-92-2241, 1165-92-24712, and 1165-92-1871 in the aggregate amount of $4,165.60 and reported in the name of Diversified Hospitality or Diversified Hospitality Group (“the Diversified Claim”). Prior to the filing of the Diversified Claim, Diversified Hospitality Group, Inc., executed an Agreement authorizing Petitioner to file the claim on its behalf. Petitioner obtained a bankruptcy search for Diversified Hospitality Group, Inc. On or about October 8, 2001, the Department approved the Diversified Claim. The Agreement authorized the payment of fees of thirty percent of the accounts claimed, which equaled $1,249.68. The remaining seventy percent of the accounts claimed equaled $2,915.92. On or about October 19, 2001, the Department issued a warrant in the aggregate amount of $1,249.68 to Petitioner. On or about October 19, 2001, the Department issued a warrant in the aggregate amount of $2,915.92 to Diversified Hospitality Group, Inc. Charde Claim 3.(A) On or about November 13, 2001, Petitioner filed a claim on behalf of Charde, Inc., for unclaimed property account number 4432-00-2 in the amount of $1,641.47 and reported in the name of Charde, Inc. (“the Charde Claim”). Prior to the filing of the Charde Claim, Charde, Inc., executed an Agreement authorizing Petitioner to file the claim on its behalf. Petitioner obtained a bankruptcy search for Charde, Inc. On or about November 13, 2001, the Department approved the Charde Claim. The Agreement authorized the payment of fees in the amount of $125.00. After the deduction of fees, the remaining amount equals $1,516.47. On or about November 20, 2001, the Department issued a warrant in the amount of $125.00 to Petitioner. On or about November 20, 2001, the Department issued a warrant in the amount of $1,516.47 to Charde, Inc. MTS Claim 4.(A) On or about July 11, 2001, Petitioner filed a claim on behalf of MTS Roofing and Installation Corporation, for unclaimed property account number 1495-96-83 in the amount of $1,000.00 and reported in the name of MTS Roofing Corporation (“the MTS Claim”). Prior to the filing of the MTS Claim, MTS Roofing and Installation Corporation, executed an Agreement authorizing Petitioner to file the claim on its behalf. Petitioner obtained a bankruptcy search for MTS Roofing and Installation Corporation On or about November 7, 2001, the Department approved the MTS Claim. The Agreement authorized the payment of fees of thirty percent of the accounts claimed, which equaled $300.00. The remaining seventy percent of the accounts claimed equaled $700.00. On or about November 14, 2001, the Department issued a warrant in the amount of $300.00 to Petitioner. On or about November 14, 2001, the Department issued a warrant in the amount of $700.00 to MTS Roofing & Installation Corp.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Landmark Real Estate and Investment Exchange, Inc. (Landmark), was a corporation licensed as a broker. It holds license number 0170938 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Respondent, Stephen P. McCrady, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0227524 by petitioner. McCrady was also the qualifying broker and officer of Landmark. License renewal fees have apparently not been paid by respondents since 1984 and their licenses are accordingly considered to be inactive. However, such licenses can be reactivated by respondents paying the required fees and completing any necessary continuing education requirements. At the present time, McCrady's license has a status of "pending litigation" because of the instant proceeding. On October 28, 1983, the Division (then the Florida Real Estate Commission) entered a Final Order against respondents in which respondents were reprimanded and ordered to pay a $500 fine within thirty days from the date of order. This fine was never paid. On April 3, 1984, respondent McCrady filed a chapter 7 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. On September 17, 1984, that Court entered a Discharge of Debtor order which released the debtor (McCrady) "from all dischargeable debts" and declared null and void certain other debts. The order further provided that "all creditors who [sic] debts are discharged ... (or) whose judgments are declared null and void ... are hereby enjoined from commencing, continuing or employing any action, process or act to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor." Respondent Landmark did not file a petition nor was it a party to McCrady's bankruptcy proceeding. When the agency Final Order was entered, McCrady could not afford to pay the $500 fine. However, he telephoned a Division attorney and asked if he could pay the fine by installments. He was told he could not do this. Shortly afterwards he filed for personal bankruptcy. It was his impression that the bankruptcy proceeding discharged all debts, including the $500 administrative fine. McCrady did not advise the Division that he had filed for bankruptcy until after the complaint in this proceeding had been filed. McCrady intends to again use his real estate license in the future. Because of serious personal and financial problems, he has not used the license for several years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondents be found guilty of violating Rule 21V-10.31, Florida Administrative Code, and Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), and that they each be required to pay $250 within thirty days from date of the final order in this proceeding to satisfy the terms of the Final Order previously entered on October 23, 1983. Otherwise, their licenses should be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1145 Petitioner: Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan J. Hartman, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ronald R. Rogowski, Esquire 628 S.E. 5th Avenue Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Mr. Harold R. Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, applied for a Bail Bond Runner's License, which application was sworn to and subscribed on the 11th day of June, 1978. Petitioner had previously, on July 9, 1976, submitted an application for professional Bail Bondsman. The Respondent, by letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Licensing, Mrs. Onez O'Neal, dated August 31, 1978, informed Mr. LaFratta that his application for Bail Bond Runner's License was denied and stated that "the investigation conducted by this Department reflects that you do not meet the qualifications as set forth in Sections 648.27(2)(4), and 648.34(2)(f), Florida Statutes." The Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. A deposition of Howard Paul Sabin, who was at the time imprisoned for bribery, was entered into the evidence without objection. The deposition was taken at the Hendry Correctional Institute in Immokalee, Florida, on December 20, 1978, by counsel for the Respondent after Respondent had denied Petitioner's application for licensure. Counsel for the Petitioner, Herb Fried, Esquire, 1461 NW 17th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33125, and the Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, were present. Sabin's testimony was that the Petitioner, whom he identified at the taking of the deposition, shared commissions in performing bail bond activities and that Petitioner acquiesced and participated in bribing a police officer. Mr. Sabin testified that Mr. LaFratta used LaFratta's apartment as an office. Telephone calls were made from the apartment to call the jail and speak to people to see if Sabin could help them make bond while only Sabin, not Mr. LaFratta, was licensed. Sabin testified that the name of the agency was AABBEE Bail Bonds and that LaFratta paid Sabin a percentage of bonds solicited by Mr. Sabin and referred to Mr. LaFratta. The time frame Sabin testified about was approximately from September of 1975, to December of 1975. The Petitioner's attorney questioned Sabin about any promises made to him for his testimony and about other bondsmen, but there were no questions or contradictions by Petitioner or his attorney as to testimony concerning the subject of this hearing. A yellow page from a Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company Directory, dated 1976, was submitted into evidence in which there was an advertisement "Bail Bonds, 24-Hour Service Any Court - State, Federal, Criminal, Narcotic - Pat LaFratta, Manager - AABBEE Bail Bonds" and a telephone number. Also submitted into evidence was a copy of a business card "AABBEE Bail Bonds - Pat LaFratta - 24-Hour Service" with the same telephone number as advertised in the yellow pages of the 1976 telephone directory. It is obvious upon examination that the telephone advertisement and card were advising the public using the directory that Petitioner LaFratta was in the bail bond business. Petitioner was not then licensed. On the application for Bail Bond Runner's License of June 11, 1978, Question 14: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony?" was answered "Yes." The remainder of the question stated: "If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet." This was answered: "1970 - Broward Cty. Ct. - Ft. Lauderdale, Fl. - Poss. Stolen Prop. - 23 counts, 1 yr. cty. jail 2-5 yrs. probation conc." Petitioner listed no other charges or convictions on the application or on a separate sheet. Respondent submitted in defense of its denial a number of exhibits which were entered into evidence as follows: Exhibit 3(a) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 20, 1969. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(b) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated October 23, 1967. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. Petitioner was released from custody. Exhibit 3(c) concerns the offense of auto theft and is dated April 4, 1969. The solicitor announced "No Information," and the Respondent was released from custody. Exhibit 3(d) concerns the offense of uttering a forged instrument and is dated June 30, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(e) concerns the offense of two counts of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi. The Judge released the Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(f) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated January 22, 1969. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(g) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(h) concerns the offense of receiving or aiding in the concealment of parts of a 1968 Chevrolet Impala and is dated October 31, 1969. The State was allowed 30 days to amend because of the vagueness of the charge. Exhibit 3(i) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated April 5, 1971. The solicitor announced a Nolle Prosequi, and the Judge released Petitioner from custody. Exhibit 3(j) concerns the offense of aggravated assault and is dated October 27, 1967. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner was not the defendant in said case. Exhibit 3(k) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated December 13, 1968. Petitioner was acquitted by a jury and released from custody. Exhibit 3(l) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property arid is dated October 1, 1969. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court and released from custody. Exhibit 3(m) concerns the offense of receiving stolen property and is dated June 25, 1968. The Petitioner was acquitted by the court arid released from custody. Exhibit 3(n) concerns the offense of assault and battery, a misdemeanor, and is dated October 30, 1967. Exhibit 3(o) is a judgment and sentence for the crime of receiving stolen property and is dated October 5, 1971. Petitioner was placed on probation for five years. Exhibit (p) is a judgment and sentence dated April 5, 1971. Petitioner was sentenced to one year in prison and an assessment. Exhibit 3(q) concerns the violation of parole. Respondent's Exhibit 3(e), (g), (i), (o), and (p), supra, are part of a 23-count information which was submitted as Petitioner's Exhibit #6 in Case No. 70-25492, an information for Receiving Stolen property. Respondent's Exhibit 3(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (h), (k), (l), and (m), supra, refer to felony charges of receiving stolen property, uttering a forged instrument and auto theft, which were not listed on the Petitioner's application and were not part of the 23-count information, which information concerned receiving stolen property. Exhibit 3(a), (b), (f), (k), (l), and (m), supra, concern stolen property preceding the dates of the offenses mentioned in the 23-count information. The failure to list the foregoing felony charges shows the Petitioner made material misstatements on his application. Petitioner LaFratta testified that he sent a package regarding the 23 counts mentioned in Findings of Fact No. 3, supra, with both application for Professional Bail Bondsman and for subject license to the Respondent. His testimony was not backed by evidence that he in fact sent the materials to the Respondent, which were required to have been sent at the time the application was made and listed on his application. His testimony that he had requested the clerk to "make out a whole booklet on everything that pertains to me," if true, was not adequate to truthfully answer Question 14, Findings of Fact No. 3, supra. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner did not furnished a full and detailed report and information as required by Question 14. It is the finding of the Hearing Officer that Petitioner did not intend to furnish the required information. Petitioner testified that he did not think that he had ever been arrested for assault, but the Respondent presented evidence showing that Petitioner had in fact been arrested for assault and battery. On subject application the Petitioner also failed to fully answer the question as to his employment history for the past five years. He failed to disclose that he had worked for Abel Bail Bonds. On the question as to his residence for the past five years, Mr. LaFratta failed to show that he had been incarcerated at Florida State Prison during that period of time. The herein mentioned 23-count information and the Restoration of Civil Rights were certified in June of 1976, and application for Professional Bail Bondsman was submitted in July of 1976. It is the finding of this Hearing Officer that these instruments were the only information submitted by the Petitioner to the Respondent as to his charges and convictions, despite his testimony. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights to Pat LaFratta, dated June 8, 1976, was previous to the application for Bail Bond Runner's License sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on June 11, 1978, and to the application for Bail Bondsman sworn to and subscribed by the Petitioner on July 9, 1976. The certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights is dated June 8, 1976, and within a few weeks thereafter Petitioner failed to truthfully answer questions under oath on his application on July 9, 1976, and failed to fully and truthfully answer the question on his application for Bail Bond Runner's License of July 11, 1978.
Recommendation Reject the application of Petitioner, Pat LaFratta, for a license as a Ball Bond Runner. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick F. Maroney, Esquire Florida Department of Insurance Legal Division 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Max P. Engel, Esquire 1461 North West 17th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Joseph John Ripa, committed the offenses alleged in a First Amended Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Financial Services, on May 11, 2006, and amended on October 16, 2006, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Financial Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for, among other things, the investigation and prosecution of complaints against individuals licensed to conduct insurance business in Florida. Ch. 626, Fla. Stat.1 Respondent Joseph John Ripa was, at the times relevant, licensed in Florida as a life and health (2-18) insurance agent. Mr. Ripa's license number is A220906. At the times relevant to this matter, Mr. Ripa was associated as an agent with Fidelity Assurance, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Fidelity Assurance"), an insurance agency. As an agent for Fidelity Assurance, Mr. Ripa sold annuities, including equity indexed annuities, to a target clientele of individuals 65 years of age or older. Equity Indexed Annuities. Very broadly speaking, an "annuity" is an insurance/investment product whereby a person invests money in exchange for regular payments over a period certain, over one or more specified individuals' lifetimes, or over a combination of life(s) and a period certain. There are two primary types of annuities: one is called a "fixed" annuity because payments are made in fixed amounts or in amounts that increase by a fixed percentage; the other is called a "variable" annuity because payments vary according to the investment performance of a specific type of investments, typically bond and equity mutual funds. Fixed annuities maybe "deferred" or "immediate." With a deferred fixed annuity, an investment of money is made and the earnings thereon are deferred both in payment and for tax purposes until payment at a later time. An immediate fixed annuity is one where an investment of money is made and payments (a potion of principal and earnings) begin immediately. Immediate annuities usually have "mortality" component also: upon the death of the annuitant, payments are made to a beneficiary. Within the past ten years or so, equity indexed deferred annuities, a form of fixed annuity, has been developed and marketed in Florida. The features of this type of annuity are far more complex than the traditional fixed annuity. For any annuity, and especially an equity indexed deferred annuity, a prospective annuitant must understand a number of things about the annuity: (a) the overall product features; (b) investing; (c) tax impacts of the annuity; (d) the projected rates of return and how certain those rates are; (e) the risks associated with the insurance company, or "credit risk"; (f) liquidity of the investment; and (g) fees or costs associated with the annuity. There are several features of deferred annuity products, including equity indexed deferred annuities, which can have adverse consequences for some annuitants: (a) it is far more complex than traditional fixed annuities; (b) the uncertainty of the return on the annuitant's investment; (c) the treatment of income from the annuity as ordinary income rather than capital gains; (d) the treatment for tax purposes to beneficiaries (no stepped-up basis or capital gains); (e) the lack of liquidity and surrender charges; (f) inflexibility in changing or "rebalancing" the mix of assets invested in; and (g) fees associated with the annuity. Count I: The VandenBosch Transactions. In December 2003 Mr. Ripa met with Emil and Georgette VandenBosch at their Boynton Beach, Florida home. Emil was 88 years of age at the time and Georgette was 89 years of age. While the evidence failed to prove their exact net worth, they were retired and of relatively modest means.2 As a consequence of the December 2003 meeting, Mr. Ripa sold a fixed deferred annuity in the amount of $108,900.69, contract number 449001, from American Investors Life Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "American Investors")(hereinafter referred to as the "First VandenBosch Annuity"). The annuitant was Georgette VandenBosch. The First VandenBosch Annuity, while allowing up to a 10 percent withdrawal from the annuity, after the first year the annuity was in force, once a year. For any other withdrawal from the annuity the contract provided for a 12 percent, 12-year declining surrender charge. Consequently, in order for the VandenBosches to fully access the annuity without penalty, Ms. VandenBosch would have to live until she was at least 101 years of age. Her life expectancy at the time she purchased the First VandenBosch Annuity was only 5.35 years, a fact that Mr. Ripa knew or should have been aware of. The sale of the First VandenBosch Annuity generated commissions of $7,895.30 for Mr. Ripa or his agency, Fidelity Assurance. In January 2004, Mr. Ripa again met with the VandenBosches, this time selling them a $26,520.11 deferred annuity, half in a traditional fixed annuity and half in an equity indexed annuity, contract number 449729, from American Investors (hereinafter referred to as the "Second VandenBosch Annuity"). The annuitant was Emil VandenBosch. Within four months after purchasing the Second VandenBosch Annuity, Mr. VandenBosch, through Mr. Ripa, invested an additional $22,200.00 into the annuity, for a total investment of $48,620.11. The Second VandenBosch Annuity, while allowing up to a 10 percent withdrawal of the annuity once a year after the first year, provided for a 12 percent, 10-year declining surrender charge for any other withdrawals. Consequently, in order for Mr. VandenBosch to fully access the annuity without penalty, Mr. VandenBosch would have to live until he was at least 99 years of age. His life expectancy at the time he purchased his annuity was only 4.85 years, a fact that Mr. Ripa knew or should have been aware of. The sale of the Second VandenBosch Annuity generated commissions of $4,862.02 for Mr. Ripa or his agency, Fidelity Assurance. It has been the practice of the VandenBosches, that Mr. VandenBosch handled all financial transactions impacting the family. It is, therefore, inferred that Mr. VandenBosch was responsible for the purchase of the First and Second VandenBosch Annuities. While neither Emil nor Georgette VandenBosch testified at the hearing of this matter,3 one of their children, Donald VandenBosch did. While much of his testimony constituted hearsay, not subject to any exception under Chapter 90, Florida Statutes,4 he did testify credibly that Mr. VandenBosch was, at the times relevant to this matter, experiencing declining health. His declining health included macular degeneration, which impacted his eye sight, and a decline in his mental capacity. While the evidence failed to prove clearly and convincingly that Mr. VandenBosch was unable to read the documents involved with the purchase of the First and Second VandenBosch Annuities, it is found that, due to his declining mental capacity and the complexity of the contracts for the annuities, Mr. VandenBosch relied heavily, if not exclusively, on Mr. Ripa's representations concerning the policies Mr. Ripa sold them. In January 2005, the VandenBosches, along with their son, Donald VandenBosch, arranged to meet with Ripa. During that meeting the VandenBosches told Mr. Ripa that they desired to access their investments and needed his assistance to avoid the high penalties associated with withdrawals.5 Mr. Ripa accurately explained that the only way to avoid the surrender penalties and access their investments currently would be to make a once-a-year withdrawal of up to 10 percent of the annuities. After emphasizing to Mr. Ripa that they did not want to incur any penalties, Mr. Ripa was instructed to arrange for them to make a 10 percent withdrawal from the First VandenBosch Annuity, which Mr. Ripa explained would amount to the equivalent of approximately $950.00 to $970.00 per month. At no time during the meeting was their any instruction given to Mr. Ripa to arrange for the cancellation of either of the annuities or the purchase of any other product. Mr. Ripa agreed to prepare the necessary paperwork to carry out the VandenBosches' instructions. The events of the January 2005 meeting support a finding that the First and Second VandenBosch Annuities did not meet the VandenBosches' financial goals and were not suitable investments for them. In particular, it is inferred that the VandenBosches did not want to invest in a product that so severely restricted their access to their assets. Despite the clear instructions to Mr. Ripa concerning the VandenBosches' wishes,6 Mr. Ripa presented the VandenBosches with forms for their execution subsequent to their January 2005 meeting which resulted in the cancellation of the First VandenBosch Annuity and the purchase of a new immediate fixed annuity from American Investors, contract number 473129. As a result of these transactions, the VandenBosches incurred a surrender penalty of $11,301.65, the very result they had explicitly told Mr. Ripa they wished to avoid. The monthly payments received by the VandenBosches through the newly purchased fixed annuity were very close to the amount of money they would have received by taking a penalty- free yearly withdrawal and dividing that amount on a monthly basis. There was, therefore, no apparent reason why the VandenBosches would have incurred the penalty of $11,301.65 imposed upon them for canceling the First VandenBosch Annuity. These transactions were carried out by Mr. Ripa despite instructions to contrary, despite the severe penalty incurred by the VandenBosches, and without any discernable reason. It is, therefore, inferred that Mr. Ripa, at best, simply failed to adequately explain the transactions or, at worst, deceived the VandenBosches into believing the documents he provided for their signature were consistent with their instructions during the January 2005 meeting. Count II: The Tuinstra Transaction. In May of 2004, Gerald Tuinstra met with Mr. Ripa at his Boynton Beach home. Mr. Tuinstra was 83 years of age at the time. His wife, Marcella, was 80 years of age and had recently moved into a nursing home. Mr. Tuinstra contacted Mr. Ripa because he was interested in creating an income source with money he had received from the sale of some property. He wanted to create an income source in order to help with the funding of his wife's nursing home expenses, while avoiding the exhaustion of his limited assets. Additionally, Mr. Tuinstra was interested in protecting his property against possible loss which might be caused by the need to seek government funding for his wife's nursing home costs. At the time of his meeting with Mr. Ripa, the money which Mr. Tuinstra was interested in investing was deposited in a bank where it was earning approximately 4 percent interest. Mr. Tuinstra explained his investment goals to Mr. Ripa during their meeting and Mr. Ripa assured him that both goals could be achieved through products offered by Mr. Ripa. As to the goal of creating an income source, Mr. Ripa told Mr. Tuinstra that he would earn 7.37 percent interest on his investment for the first year and would likely earn more in following years. Mr. Ripa told Mr. Tuinstra that he would receive $391.05 per month, writing this amount on notes he left with Mr. Tuinstra. Mr. Ripa did not inform Mr. Tuinstra that the annuity he was proposing was subject to the risk of earning even less then he was currently earning from his bank account or even earning nothing. Mr. Ripa also assured Mr. Tuinstra that his investment would be protected, meeting his second investment goal. Based upon Mr. Ripa's representations, which were, at best, misleading, Mr. Tuinstra purchased a $40,000.00 equity indexed deferred annuity from American Investors, contract number 458412, recommended by Mr. Ripa (hereinafter referred to as the "Tuinstra Annuity"). Mr. Tuinstra's wife was made the annuitant. The money used to make this purchase constituted substantially all of Mr. Tuinstra's liquid assets. The commission on the sale of the Tuinstra Annuity was $4,200.00. The Tuinstra Annuity provided for a 17 percent surrender charge for the first three years of the contract, declining to a 3 percent charge in the 13th year. Mr. Tuinstra's life expectancy at the time of the purchase was 6.65 years. Mr. Tuinstra was not informed of these provisions of the contract by Mr. Ripa during their meeting. In fact, Mr. Ripa led Mr. Tuinstra to believe that he would be receiving monthly payments throughout the term of the annuity. The Tuinstra Annuity that Mr. Ripa had assured Mr. Tuinstra would provide the monthly income he desired, actually failed to provide for any payment. The only provision for a return of his investment without penalty during the first 13 years of the contract was the allowance of a 10 percent withdrawal, after the first year of the contract, on an annual basis, which was not what Mr. Tuinstra asked for or was told he was limited to. When the actual contract for the Tuinstra Annuity was received by Mr. Tuinstra from American Investors, he read the contract and realized that much of what Mr. Ripa had told him about what he was purchasing was incorrect. He then began making efforts to cancel the policy, which he was ultimately able to do. It was during these efforts that he learned for the first time about the withdrawal penalties, not from reading the rather lengthy contract, but from an unidentified man he spoke to about the contract at Fidelity Assurance. Count III: The Putnam Transaction. In March of 2005, the son of Louis Bruno, who was 90 years of age at the time, was pursuing court proceedings to be appointed Mr. Bruno's guardian. Mr. Bruno was living in Boyton Beach, Florida at the time with his companion of 15 or so years, Irene Putnam. Due to his advanced age and lack of short-term memory, Mr. Bruno was unable to manage his own finances, instead, relying upon Ms. Putnam, who had a power of attorney from Mr. Bruno. Ms. Putnam was 82 years of age at that time. At some time shortly before a hearing was scheduled to be held on the guardianship matter, Ms. Putnam and Mr. Bruno discussed the upcoming proceeding with Mr. Ripa, whom Mr. Bruno and Ms. Putnam had known as a friend for a number of years. Mr. Ripa agreed to testify at the court proceeding on behalf of Mr. Bruno. At some point during their discussion, Mr. Ripa asked Mr. Bruno and Ms. Putnam whether they realized that, if Mr. Bruno lost the court proceeding, his son would have authority over all of his assets, including $18,000.00, which Mr. Bruno maintained in two separate bank accounts. This money represented Mr. Bruno's liquid assets at the time. The possibility of losing control of his money was not something that Mr. Bruno or Ms. Putnam had considered and, in response to Mr. Ripa's warning, they asked him if he knew how they could avoid this result. Mr. Ripa told Mr. Bruno and Ms. Putnam that he knew how the money could be protected until after the proceeding. They unequivocally explained to Mr. Ripa that they did want to protect the money, but for only a short period of time. Their intent, which was fully explained to Mr. Ripa, was to re-take possession of the money immediately after the guardianship proceeding ended, in which they expected to prevail. Instead of carrying out Mr. Bruno's clear, unequivocal goal, Mr. Ripa, no more than two or three days before the March 2005 guardian proceeding, sold Mr. Bruno an $18,000.00 equity indexed deferred annuity from American Investors, contract number 476076, with Ms. Putnam as the annuitant7 (hereinafter the "Putnam Annuity"). The Putnam Annuity provided for penalties for withdrawal of the annuity during the first 10 years of the contract, starting at 12 percent during the first year and declining thereafter. Ms. Putnam, whose life expectancy was 8.45 years, would have had to survive to age 92 in order to withdraw the full annuity without penalty. Mr. Bruno would have had to live to age 100 to do so. The commission on the sale of the Putnam Annuity was $1,800.00. Following Mr. Bruno's successful defense of the guardianship proceeding, Ms. Putnam spoke to Mr. Ripa about the retrieval of the $18,000.00 investment. Having received the actual contract, however, Ms. Putnam realized that the Putnam Annuity was not what Mr. Bruno and she had believed they were purchasing. Indeed, having relied totally on Mr. Ripa to protect Mr. Bruno's money for a very short time, including allowing him to complete all of the paperwork for them, she had not even realized that Mr. Bruno had purchased an annuity of any kind prior to receiving the contract. In response to her inquiry, Mr. Ripa suggested that Ms. Putnam have Mr. Bruno surrender another annuity which he owned, one without surrender charges, thereby obtaining cash for his immediate needs and avoiding any surrender charges on the Putnam Annuity. While this suggestion would have allowed Mr. Bruno to replace the $18,000.00 he had tied up in the Putnam Annuity, it was not an option that had ever been discussed with Mr. Bruno or Ms. Putnam and was contrary to what they had requested that Mr. Ripa do with the $18,000.00. Count IV: The LaValley Transactions. In September 2005, Mr. Ripa met with Virginia LaValley at her Boyton Beach, Florida home. Ms. LaValley, who lived alone, was 75 years of age at the time. Ms. LaValley had been evidencing signs of dementia as early as 2003, and her symptoms had continued to increase up to the time Mr. Ripa met with her.8 She had begun to have difficulty remembering simple words to describe objects as early as 2003. During 2005 (prior to September), she had expressed the belief that a computer-generated form letter had been personally written to her; she had begun piling her mail on the dining room table rather than deal with it; she believed that she would "go to jail" if she threw out any of the mail sent to her; she had sealed return envelopes from solicitations she had received and written words to the effect that she would not mail them until the addressees provided her with stamps, a demand that the addressees could not be aware of without the letters being mailed to them, a fact that Ms. LaValley did not understand; and she had stopped reconciling her checkbook or otherwise keeping up with her personal finances.9 Janet Yocum, a friend and an individual who had sold annuities to Ms. LaValley in the 1990's, noticed as early as 2003 that Ms. LaValley was having difficulty following simple instructions concerning the completion and return of a form that Ms. Yocum had sent to Ms. LaValley. It was obvious to Ms. Yocum, although she did not see Ms. LaValley on a regular basis, that Ms. LaValley was losing her ability to understand even simple matters long before Mr. Ripa's meeting with Ms. LaValley. While Mr. Ripa was not aware of some of the foregoing events, it is found that Ms. LaValley's state of health in September 2005 should have been evident to Mr. Ripa when he met with her. If nothing else, Mr. Ripa should have realized that Ms. LaValley was not capable of understanding the complexities of fixed annuity contracts, much less equity indexed deferred annuity contracts. Despite what must have been obvious to him, Mr. Ripa convinced Ms. LaValley during his September 2005 meeting to surrender six annuities which she had purchased from Jackson National Life Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Jackson National") between 1993 and 1997. Mr. Ripa also convinced Ms. LaValley to use the proceeds from the Jackson National annuities, which were old enough to avoid any surrender charges for their surrender and provided for a minimum return of at least 3 percent, to purchase two American Investors annuities (hereinafter referred to jointly as the "LaValley Annuities"). One of the LaValley Annuities, contract number 499901, was an equity indexed deferred annuity for which Ms. LaValley paid $19,500.00. The other, contract number 500794, was also an equity indexed deferred annuity in the amount of $19,079.49. Both provided surrender penalties over 15 years, with a penalty for the first year of 19 percent. Ms. LaValley, whose life expectancy at the time was 12.6 years, would have to live until she was 91 years of age to avoid any surrender penalty. The minimum interest on the annuities was 2 percent compared to the minimum 3 percent rate of the Jackson National policies. During his meeting with Ms. LaValley, Mr. Ripa gave her a company brochure from American Investors' parent, "Amerus." There were a number of handwritten notations on the brochure written by Mr. Ripa. One notation indicates "7%" and is followed by Mr. Ripa's initials. Next the heading "Fixed Strategy" is the notation "3%." While there was no evidence explaining what was said about these notations, they all emphasize "positive" aspects or selling points for the annuity products sold to Ms. LaValley. What Ms. LaValley took from the meeting and, likely, the notations, is that she would be earning 7 percent each year on the LaValley Annuities.10 As further evidence of her declining mental state, when Ms. LaValley received a letter from American Investors' parent company within two weeks after purchasing the LaValley Annuities congratulating her on her purchases. Ms. LaValley, apparently not realizing what the letter meant, wrote a note dated "10/4/200[5]"11 on it stating that "I do not want American Investors Life. Please Cancel." Her signature followed this note. This letter, with her handwritten reply, was returned to American Investors. Whether Ms. LaValley intended to "cancel" the LaValley Annuities or simply thought the letter was a solicitation to purchase insurance is not clear. If the former, she clearly evidenced intent to cancel the LaValley Annuities; if the latter, she evidenced a lack of understanding about what she had done only two weeks before. American Investors apparently treated Ms. LaValley's instructions literally as evidence of her intent to cancel the LaValley Policies, apparently informing Mr. Ripa. Mr. Ripa then revisited Ms. LaValley and prepared a letter for her signature repudiating her attempt to cancel the annuities. The letter, Petitioner's Exhibit 10, was faxed from Fidelity Assurance's fax machine on October 13, 2005. The Unsuitability of the VandenBosch, Tuinstra, Putnam and LaValley Annuities. Given the ages of the annuitants at the time of the purchase of the various annuities at issue in this case (all except one of which were equity indexed deferred annuities; the other was a deferred fixed annuity), their relatively modest financial situations, the long-term nature of the annuities and the high penalties associated with accessing their investments should the need arise (all of the individuals involved would have had to outlive their life expectancies in order to access their investments without penalty), the VandenBosch Annuities, the Tuinstra Annuity, the Putnam Annuity, and the LaValley Annuities were not suitable investments for those individuals, a fact which Mr. Ripa knew or should have known. The foregoing conclusion is also supported by the VandenBosches' efforts not too long after purchasing their annuities to unsuccessfully access their investments and their expression of disappointment upon learning of the severe withdrawal penalties associated with accessing their investments; Mr. Tuinstra's explanation of his intended investment goals when he purchased his annuity and the failure of the Tuinstra Annuity to meet those goals; Ms. Putnam's and Mr. Bruno's explanation of their intended short-term investment goal when the Putnam Annuity was purchased and the failure of the Putnam Annuity to meet that goal; and Ms. LaValley's obvious impaired ability to understand the nature of the transactions carried out by Mr. Ripa, transactions that make no sense from a financial point of view. Finally, the conclusion that the investments at issue in this case were sold to inappropriate purchasers is based upon the obvious failure of Mr. Ripa to perform a basic suitability analysis at the time he sold the annuities to the any of the individual involved or, if he did perform such an analysis, his failure to recognize that the annuities were not a suitable investment for those individuals. The VandenBosches, the Tuinstras, Ms. Putnam and Mr. Bruno, and Ms. LaValley were all individuals of somewhat advanced age and modest financial resources. It is hard to imagine how Mr. Ripa could have performed the type of financial risk analysis he should have performed for these individuals and still concluded that the annuities sold to them were appropriate. None of the individuals were looking for such long-term investments and it was proved that some expressed interest in short-term investments or investments that would create an immediate income stream: the VandenBosches expressed their desire for a return of their funds shortly after Mr. Ripa sold them their annuities; Mr. Tuinstra testified convincingly of his desired investment outcome (income producing and asset protection); and Ms. Putnam testified convincingly that she and Mr. Bruno only wanted to protect his funds for a few weeks. Despite these known goals, Mr. Ripa sold the VandenBosches, the Tuinstras, and Ms. Putnam and Mr. Bruno a product which did nothing but thwart those goals. Jurisdiction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department finding that Joseph John Ripa violated the provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, described, supra, requiring that he pay an administrative fine of $40,000.00 and revoking his licensure as a life and health agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2007.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a manager of real estate specializing in condominiums. It was incorporated in Florida on August 30, 1978, as Property Management, Inc. at the address of its attorney and registered agent, Mr. Michael L. Hyman, Suite 400, 28 W. Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130. The corporation was involuntarily dissolved by the Secretary of State on December 5, 1979, for failure to file its annual report and pay its annual report filing fee. Petitioner admits that it was delinquent in submitting its annual report and filing fee, but contends that it was entitled to notice of delinquency prior to involuntary dissolution and reissuance of its corporate name. Through testimony of Petitioner's president and corporate counsel's secretary, who opens and distributes incoming mail, Petitioner established that it had not received any of the three notices discussed below. Rather, Petitioner learned of the dissolution in February, 1980, when it sought telephone service. It then submitted the annual report and filing fee which were received by the Secretary of State on March 17, 1980. By that time the name Property Management, Inc. had been issued to another corporation and was not available. Petitioner was therefore reinstated as Property Management of South Florida, Inc. The following notices relevant to this proceeding were prepared by the Secretary of State: January, 1979: Notices to all Florida corporations that annual reports and filing fees were due by July 1, 1979. September 1, 1979: Reminder notices to delinquent corporations that dissolution would follow if annual reports and filing fees were not submitted within 90 days. December 5, 1979: Certificates of dissolution issued to corporations which failed to submit the reports and filing fees. The above notices were prepared from computer data and were transmitted by ordinary mail. Respondent produced a computer printout with Petitioner's correct name and address showing dissolution on December 5, 1979. However, no evidence was adduced to establish that this notice or either of the preceding notices were actually mailed to Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's request for return of the name Property Management, Inc. be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael L. Hyman, Esquire Suite 400 Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 William J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Office of the Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Gulf Coast Foodservice, Inc., or its surety, Respondent United Pacific Insurance Company, is liable for funds due to Petitioner Hillandale Farms, Inc. for the sale of agricultural products.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Petitioner produces eggs on a farm that it owns in or near Lake City, Florida. Respondent Gulf Coast is a dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent Gulf Coast operates a food service distributorship in the state of Florida. Eggs are agricultural products as defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. Respondent United Pacific is Respondent Gulf Coast's surety. Pursuant to an agreement between Petitioner and Respondent Gulf Coast, Petitioner sold and shipped eggs to Respondent Gulf Coast from Petitioner's Hillandale-Bushnell Division. Respondent Gulf Coast initially paid thousands of dollars on invoices for shipments of eggs it received from Petitioner. On August 25, 1997, Respondent Gulf Coast paid $1,287.00 on its account with Petitioner. This payment created an overpayment in the amount of $247.50 for Invoice No. 21938 dated May 31, 1997. As of October 23, 1997, Respondent Gulf Coast's account with Petitioner included the following unpaid/overpaid invoices: 6/19/97 22144 810.00 7/2/97 22489 1,665.00 7/15/97 22870 1,701.00 7/28/97 23211 2,340.00 8/11/97 23606 2,043.00 8/18/97 23800 1,665.00 8/25/97 24318 1,233.00 Total Balance Due $11,209.50 Invoice Date Invoice No. Balance Due 5/31/97 21938 $ (247.50) Respondent Gulf Coast currently owes Petitioner for unpaid invoices in the amount of $11,209.50.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order requiring Respondent Gulf Coast, or its surety, Respondent Union Pacific, to pay Petitioner for unpaid invoices in the amount of $11,209.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen C. Bullock, Esquire Brannon, Brown, Haley, Robinson, and Bullock, P.A. 10 North Columbia Street Lake City, Florida 32056-1029 Saul Zalka, President Gulf Coast Foodservice, Inc. 8402 Lemon Road Port Richey, Florida 34668 United Pacific Insurance Company 4 Penn Center Plaza Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 Phillip H. Hudson, III, Esquire One Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3400 Miami, Florida 33131 Soneet R. Kapila, Chapter 7 Trustee Suite 2601 1 East Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Geoffrey S. Aaronson, Esquire Suite 1050 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Steven Turner, Esquire Suite 1204 51 Southwest 1st Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Leve 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Respondent poses an immediate, serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare, and, if so, whether Petitioner has cause to immediately suspend Respondent's loan originator license.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, Respondent was licensed with the Office to conduct business as a loan originator in the State of Florida. Respondent holds certificate of licensure NMLS No. LO19773. As a loan originator in Florida, Respondent is governed by chapter 494. The Office is the state agency charged with licensing, regulating, and supervising loan originators in Florida pursuant to chapter 494. On March 24, 2015, Respondent was arrested for the following crimes by the Sarasota County Sheriff's Office: Occupied Burglary--pursuant to section 810.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes,3/ a first-degree felony; Battery on a person 65 years or older-- pursuant to section 784.08(2)(c), Florida Statutes,4/ a third-degree felony; and Simple Battery (two counts)--pursuant to section 784.03(1)(a)1.,5/ first-degree misdemeanors. On May 12, 2015, Respondent was charged with these crimes in Sarasota County, Florida, in Case No. 2015-CF-004817-NC. Respondent's criminal case is currently pending disposition in Sarasota County. At the final hearing, Respondent described her actions which led to her arrest on March 24, 2015.6/ The incident began with a dispute over money. According to Respondent, an individual allegedly stole $258.00 from Respondent's friend who was staying at her house. Respondent, together with the friend and three other individuals, drove to the suspected thief's house to demand the money's return. Upon arrival at the house, Respondent walked up to and knocked on the front door. Two individuals, the suspected thief and the suspected thief's mother, answered. The confrontation quickly became physical. Respondent claims that the suspected thief's mother started the fight by jumping on her from out of the front door. Rapidly, upwards of five individuals were involved in hitting, pushing, tackling, and wrestling. The scrum ranged from the front door to the house's garage. Respondent recounted that she was battered, punched, slammed to the ground, and beaten with a cane. (The cane-wielder was the suspected thief's grandfather, who is over 65 years old, which apparently led to Respondent's felony charge of battery on a person 65 years or older.) Respondent claimed she suffered injuries to her chin, neck, heart, and scalp. At the final hearing, Respondent testified that she did not enter the suspected thief's home. However, Respondent did admit that at some point during the encounter, she entered the open garage with the intent to access the house through the side door. (This action evidently led to Respondent's felony charge of burglary.) Eventually, the Sarasota County Sheriff's Office was called and responded. The fight broke up. No serious injuries were reported. No information was presented regarding the fate of the $258.00. Respondent testified that she did not start the fight. She claimed that because of her small frame, she was never a serious danger to anyone. Nevertheless, the Sarasota County Sheriff indisputably arrested Respondent for her alleged role in the altercation. As of the date of the final hearing, Respondent understood that she will have a court date in August 2015 for the pending criminal case. Based on Respondent's arrest, on April 8, 2015, the Office issued the Emergency Order. The Office issued the Emergency Order pursuant to sections 120.60(6) and 494.00255(8). The Emergency Order states that the Office found Respondent's activities posed an immediate and serious danger to the public welfare. The Emergency Order ordered Respondent to immediately cease and desist from engaging in the business of loans and any activities in violation of chapter 494 and Office rules. Through the Emergency Order, the Office suspended Respondent's loan originator's license, effective April 13, 2015. Respondent's loan originator license is suspended "until such time as [Respondent] complies with the terms of this order." As described in the Emergency Order, the Office determined that Respondent's actions that led to her arrest posed an immediate, serious danger to the public based on several factors. The Emergency Order declares that the Office found that an emergency suspension and a cease and desist order was necessary to protect Florida consumers from Respondent's "apparent unpredictable and irrational behavior." Furthermore, Respondent's "apparent volatility, unpredictability, and lack of impulse control" calls into question her "trustworthiness and character." The Emergency Order also states that "[c]ommitting felony battery over a financial matter demonstrates that Respondent lacks the character or general fitness necessary to command the confidence of the community." To emphasize the seriousness of the alleged crimes, the Office points to the fact that the felony burglary charge carries a possible maximum penalty of life in prison. The Office included provisions and terms in the Emergency Order to meet the fairness requirement of section 120.60(6). The Emergency Order contained detailed factual findings in order to adequately notify Respondent of the basis for the Office's intended action. The Emergency Order included a Notice of Rights which provided Respondent the point of entry to request an expedited administrative hearing pursuant to chapter 120 to contest the Emergency Order (which Respondent pursued in the present matter). The Emergency Order also informed Respondent of her opportunity to seek to stay the Office's action through an appellate proceeding under section 120.68. Further, the Emergency Order stated that Respondent's loan originator's license is subject to reinstatement, if the criminal charges are ultimately dismissed or not prosecuted. At the final hearing, Respondent conceded that she made the wrong decision to confront the suspected thief. She expressed that she was not thinking clearly at the time. Nevertheless, Respondent asserts that she is falsely accused and has done nothing wrong. She pleads to keep her license during the time it takes Sarasota County to process her criminal case. Respondent proclaims that she should be considered and treated as innocent of all charges up to and until such time as the allegations against her are proven. Respondent asserts that her loan origination business is her sole source of financial support. Based on the facts produced at the final hearing and further discussed below, the undersigned finds that the Office has not met its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that immediately suspending Respondent's license to conduct business as a loan originator is an action "necessary to protect the public interest," as required by section 120.60(6)(b).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Office of Financial Regulation, enter a final order rescinding the Emergency Order to Cease and Desist and Suspending License issued to Respondent, Frankie Damiano, on April 8, 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2015.
