Findings Of Fact Ernest Brown is a registered real estate salesman holding a registration issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Brown received notice of the instant hearing as required by the statutes and rules. His probation officer testified she had contacted him and he had advised her that he would not attend the proceedings. Brown was placed on probation with an adjudication of guilt withheld by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, on January 25, 1989 (see Exhibit 2). Paragraph 10 of the conditions of probation requires that Brown serve 180 days in the Pinellas County Jail on weekends from 7:00 p.m. Friday until 7:00 p.m. Sunday. Because of the appeal of his case, Brown did not begin serving this jail term until August 24, 1989. He has served 72 of the 180 days according to the records of his probation officer. Brown is currently in the custody of the State's probation department.
Recommendation The Board's counsel advised the Hearing Officer after hearing that Respondent had surrender his license. This constitutes an ex parte communication of which notice is hereby given to all parties. This fact is immaterial to consideration of the matter at hand. The Board has long taken the position, quite correctly, that surrendering of a license did not impair jurisdiction to consider violations of its statutes by a licensee while licensed. Similarly, surrender of a license cannot terminate the Hearing Officer's consideration of the matter after hearing. The instant case was duly heard and the Recommended Order prepared prior to receipt of any pleadings relative to surrender by Brown of his license. At this point, the Board may accept surrender of the license and dismiss the Administrative Complaint, in which case Brown would be considered not to have had any disciplinary action against him, or the Board may enter its final order based upon the record and this Recommended Order. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the license of Ernest Brown. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Ernest B. Brown 2027 Thirteenth Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33172
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive an exemption from disqualification to work in positions of special trust.
Findings Of Fact In November 1999, Petitioner was employed by Angels Unaware, Inc., as a caretaker of children or the developmentally disabled. Such a position is a position of trust. By letter dated November 29, 1999, Angels Unaware, Inc., notified Petitioner that it had received information that was disqualifying and, thus, he was ineligible for continued employment as a caretaker of children, disabled adults, or elderly persons. However, in the letter, Petitioner was advised of his right to seek an exemption from disqualification from the licensing agency. Thereafter, Petitioner requested an exemption from disqualification. At all times, pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the state agency responsible for receiving and approving or denying applications for exemptions from disqualification to work in a position of trust. After receiving Petitioner's request for exemption, Respondent conducted the required background screening of Petitioner. The background screening revealed that Petitioner had been arrested and convicted of possession and delivery of cocaine. As a result of Petitioner's conviction, Respondent denied Petitioner's request for exemption. According to the background screening report, Petitioner was convicted of possession and delivery of cocaine on April 2, 1996. The incident that resulted in the conviction occurred on or about January 20, 1995, the day Petitioner was arrested. Following his arrest, Petitioner was charged with possession and delivery of cocaine. On May 1, 1995, Petitioner pled guilty to the aforementioned felony. That same day, the court withheld adjudication and placed Petitioner on probation for one year. Pursuant to condition 7 of Petitioner's probation, he was not to use or possess any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. Notwithstanding this proscription, on or about September 24, 1995, November 14, 1995, and March 3, 1996, Petitioner violated this condition by using cocaine as evidenced by positive urinalysis and his own admission. As a result of Petitioner's repeated use of cocaine, on April 2, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of violating his probation and was adjudged guilty of possession and delivery of cocaine, the charges for which adjudication had been initially withheld on May 1, 1995. Moreover, Petitioner's one-year probation was revoked and he was placed on drug offender probation for two years. One of the special conditions of the drug offender probation was that Petitioner receive drug treatment until he successfully completed such program. On or about May 15, 1997, Petitioner again used and possessed cocaine in violation of the Order of Drug Offender Probation. Following this violation, on July 17, 1997, the court entered an Order of Modification of Probation. Pursuant to that Order, Petitioner's probation continued under the previous terms and conditions but Petitioner's cost for supervision was waived while he was receiving in-patient drug treatment. Petitioner entered a six-month in-patient drug treatment program in June 1997 and successfully completed the program on December 22, 1997. The court terminated Petitioner's probation on April 1, 1998. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that his using cocaine was a "mistake" and stated that he has been drug-free since June 1997, when he began the six-month drug treatment program. However, Petitioner presented no other witnesses or evidence of his rehabilitation during the two years since his probation was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption from his disqualification from employment in positions of trust or responsibility. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard, Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Nwezi A. Nonyelu 6545 Spanish Moss Circle Tampa, Florida 33625 Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The primary issue for determination is whether Dr. Jones violated provisions of Chapter 458, F.S. by violating terms of his probation, more specifically, those terms requiring attendance at Grand Rounds and monitoring by a local, Board certified pediatrician. If those violations occurred, an appropriate disciplinary action must be determined.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dr. Jones, is now, and has been at all relevant periods, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0017104. His practice is located in Seminole, Florida. On April 21, 1986, a Final Order was entered by the Board of Medical Examiners, resolving by an amended stipulation, a twenty-count Administrative Complaint that had been filed against Dr. Jones on December 1, 1983. Pertinent provisions of the Final order included: Placement on probation for a period of five years commencing with the effective date of the order; Attendance at Grand Rounds weekly during probation at both All Children's Hospital in St. Petersburg, Florida and the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida; and, Monitoring by a local Board-certified pediatrician, John H. Cordes, Jr., M.D., who was to make visits to Dr. Jones' office every two weeks and to randomly select 15 percent of Dr. Jones' medical charts to verify appropriateness of care and thoroughness of record-keeping. Dr. Jones was out of the country, in Antigua, when the order arrived, and it was in his office when he returned on May 4, 1986. Approximately two weeks later, around May 19th, Dr. Jones tried to call Dr. Cordes, the designated monitoring physician, and was told he was out of town. When he reached Dr. Cordes in early June, Dr. Cordes told him that under no circumstances would he serve as his monitoring physician and that he had written a letter to DPR advising them of such. After making some unspecified and unsuccessful efforts to locate a substitute, Dr. Jones contacted Lewis A. Barness, M.D., Chairman of the Department of Pediatrics at the University of South Florida. In a letter to Dr. Jones dated July 11, 1986, Dr. Barness agreed to review "about ten or fifteen percent of your charts on a biweekly basis." (Petitioner's exhibit #4) Dr. Jones was out of the country again the last two weeks of July, and the monitoring by Dr. Barness began on August 15, 1986. Dr. Barness was approved by the Board of Medical Examiners as a substitute on August 2, 1986. Dr. Jones continues to be monitored by Dr. Barness at Dr. Barness' office at the University. Dr. Jones brings his appointment book (although Dr. Barness never reviews it) and his charts, and Dr. Barness pulls, at random, fifteen to twenty percent of the charts and reviews them. Grand Rounds, lectures on pediatric medical topics, are held at 8:00 A.M. on Fridays at the University of South Florida Medical Center, and at 12:30 P.M. on Fridays at All Children's Hospital. Between his receipt of the Final Order and June 15, 1986, (the date specified in the amended complaint) Dr. Jones never attended Grand Rounds at the University of South Florida. He attended once, June 6th, during this period at All Children's Hospital. The basis for non-attendance is specified for each Friday session during the relevant period as follows: May 9, 1986 (the first Friday after Dr. Jones returned and saw the Final Order)--Dr. Jones' van was broken. His wife, a part-time employee at an interior design shop, was called in for work that day, so he did not have transportation. Further, he met with the mother of one of his patients at noon on this date. May 16 and 23, 1986--Dr. Jones' recently-widowed mother was visiting, and since she was also quite ill, he spent time with her. Further, Grand Rounds were cancelled at the University of South Florida on May 16th. May 30, 1986--Dr. Jones' van was again broken and his wife was called to work leaving him without transportation. June 6, 1986--Dr. Jones awoke with gastroenteritis, so he did not attend the morning session at the University of South Florida; he did attend the session at All Children's Hospital. June 13, 1986--Grand Rounds were cancelled at the University of South Florida on this date. Dr. Jones decided to take his children to Disney World as they lived out of state and were leaving the next day. June 15, 1986 was the close of the relevant period regarding attendance at Grand Rounds, according to the Administrative Complaint, as amended. From the testimony and evidence, I am unable to determine conclusively whether Dr. Jones has attended regularly since that date. Except for weekends and the trips out of country, Dr. Jones continued to practice medicine as a pediatrician between April 21, 1986 and July 1986, the date of the Administrative Complaint. He stipulated that he understood the terms and conditions of the Board's Order regarding probation. His testimony at the hearing revealed that he was thoroughly familiar with the details of the order. Nevertheless, he violated the terms of probation. Although he knew that the Board had approved the Stipulation in January 1986, and that the stipulation specified Dr. Cordes as the monitoring physician, he waited until the last minute (two weeks after he received the order) to contact Dr. Cordes about commencing the monitoring. While Dr. Cordes' refusal to participate is not attributable to Dr. Jones, the delay in obtaining a substitute could clearly have been eliminated with better planning by Dr. Jones. Technically, the monitoring conducted by Dr. Barness does not comply with the terms of the probation order, as Dr. Jones brings the charts to him for review. Dr. Barness has impressive credentials and is understandably unable to visit Dr. Jones' office every two weeks. However, Dr. Jones admitted that he never asked the Board to modify the terms of his probation in that regard. Dr. Jones' lack of judgment regarding the terms of probation is also reflected in his uncontroverted excuses for non-attendance at Grand Rounds. With the obvious exception of the cancellation of the lectures, the excuses fail to mitigate the violations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: Finding that Respondent, Archbold M. Jones, M.D. violated subsections 458.331(1)(h) and (x) F.S.. Suspending Dr. Jones' license for three months (conforming to the approximate period that he practiced without supervision). Requiring Dr. Jones to appear before the Board with Dr. Barness to outline the details of the monitoring process and insure that proper review can be made at Dr. Barness' office, rather than Dr. Jones' office. Providing for Dr. Jones' immediate notification to the Board in the event Dr. Barness is unable to continue with monitoring consistent with the Board's direction. Outlining specific guidelines for excused non-attendance at Grand Rounds and providing for notification by Dr. Jones to the Board each time he fails to attend, and the reason for such failure. Providing that future violations will result in nullification of the stipulation and immediate proceeding on the original multi-count complaint. Providing that all other terms and conditions of the April 21, 1986 Order remain in full force and effect. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 6th day of July, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3920 The following constitute my specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph #1. 2. Rejected as unnecessary. 3. Adopted in substance in paragraph #2. 4. Rejected as unnecessary. 5-6. Adopted in substance in paragraph #2. 7-8. Adopted in paragraph #7. 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph #4. 10-11. Adopted in paragraph #9. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph #1. 2-3. Adopted in substance in paragraph #2. The closing date is addressed in paragraph #7, however the June 15, 1986, date relates only to attendance at Grand Rounds and not to the period during which monitoring did not occur. (See motions to amend complaint.) Adopted in paragraph #3. Adopted in paragraph #6. 7-15. Adopted in substance in paragraph #7. However, the characterization of a "medical emergency" in paragraph #9 is unsupported by the record, as are the characterizations, "justification" for not attending Grand Rounds and "legitimately prevented" from attendance. Respondent was not unable to attend Ground Rounds, except when the rounds were cancelled. He chose rather not to attend for various reasons which to him were more important than his attendance. Adopted in paragraph #4. Adopted in paragraph #5, except however the "diligence" of the search was not established by competent credible evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph #5. 19-27. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. The "diligence" is unsupported by competent credible evidence. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Michael I. Schwartz, Esquire Suite 100, Capitol Office Center 119 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues presented were those advanced by an Administrative Complaint brought against the Respondent by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, in which Respondent is alleged to have violated Section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes, by willfully or repeatedly violating a lawful order of the Board of Nursing previously entered in a disciplinary proceeding. In particular, it is alleged that Respondent violated the terms and conditions of an order of probation entered by the Board of Nursing on November 22, 1983, pertaining to the failure to seek counseling with a psychiatrist, psychologist or other recognized drug alcohol rehabilitation program specialist and to furnish reports to the Board of Nursing. It is further alleged that Respondent failed to submit to a random urine test which was designed to determine if he had consumed, injected or otherwise self-medicated himself with any unprescribed controlled substance.
Findings Of Fact Disciplinary action had been taken against the Respondent by the Board of Nursing stemming from his abuse of the controlled substances percodan and tylenol. The license number in question was license No. 34401-1. On October 15, 1982, Respondent appeared before the Board of Nursing to seek reinstatement of this license. At that time, the Board decided to reinstate the license conditioned upon the service of a probationary term, including special conditions of probation. Among the special conditions of probation was a requirement that "the licensee shall obtain/continue counseling with a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other recognized drug/alcohol rehabilitation program, and shall cause progress reports to be furnished to the Board or probation supervisor every three (3) months during treatment as scheduled by the probation supervisor." The nature of the dialogue at the October 15, 1982, meeting was such that the Respondent was misled into believing that the above- referenced condition of probation would not be required. The Final Order related to the Respondent's reinstatement was issued on November 22, 1982, and it set forth the probation condition related to counseling. It also included a condition to the effect that the Respondent agreed to submit to random blood and/or urine tests to detect the presence of unprescribed controlled substances. Respondent had not been receiving counseling for a drug problem at the time of the October 15, 1982, meeting to consider his reinstatement or at the point in time of receipt of the Final Order relating to the subject of his reinstatement and service of a two-year probationary term. Having reviewed the terms related to attendance of such a program or continuation of the program and the necessity for reports as found in the November 22, 1982 Order, and believing that the remarks made in the course of the October 15, 1982 meeting to consider reinstatement had excluded the necessity to attend such sessions if he was not already in attendance in a rehabilitation program, he contacted Geraldine Johnson, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation, to inquire about what he perceived to be a discrepancy between the decision at the meeting in October and the Order entered in November. Ms. Johnson referred Respondent to Helen Keefe, Executive Director of the Board of Nursing, who told King that the Order's terms could not be changed. Additionally, she indicated that a Probation officer would get in contact with King about compliance with the terms and conditions of the Probation Order. John Coats was assigned as the Probation Officer for the Respondent. He first met with the Respondent as Probation Officer on March 10, 1983. At that time, King continued to express concern that the Probation Order and the decision of the Board at the October meeting were "at odds" as to the requirement of counseling. Coats indicated that he felt that the terms of the Probation Order related to counseling were required of King. He nonetheless indicated to King that he would "check into it." On the same date that the initial contact was made, King was requested to give a urine specimen to allow detection of any controlled substance that might be present. This request was made at King's place of employment and in response to King's concern that he not be required to give the sample at the place of employment in order to avoid embarrassment, King was not required to give a random sample at that time. At that point, Respondent was employed at an institution known as Pine Castle which assists mentally retarded adults. At the time of hearing, King was a vocational coordinator for Pine Castle's clients. A further meeting was held between Coats and the Respondent on March 30, 1983, at which time Coats indicated that it was necessary for counseling reports to be provided by the Respondent. King continued to insist that he did not need to attend counseling due to remarks at the Board meeting by Board member, Choulat. Choulat later told Coats that she had not made remarks to that effect. On April 6, 1983, King wrote to the Board of Nursing to ascertain if he indeed had to attend counseling and file reports. This inquiry was responded to by Ms. Keefe on May 3, 1983. In her letter of response, she made reference to the conditions in the Probation Order related to the obtaining or continuing counseling and the necessity for reports and alluded to the fact that in her mind, the first report was due on March 1, 1983, and a second report would be due on June 1, 1983. Further, she indicated that those reports would continue to be due until Respondent was discharged from counseling or a report was received from a counselor indicating that King would no longer need therapy. On May 11, 1983, based upon investigation by Coats, it was determined to pursue charges against Respondent for failing to offer the March 1, 1983, report related to counseling. A report was made by a Dr. Mullen of the Mental Health Clinic of Jacksonville, Inc., on June 22, 1983. This report was addressed to Ms. Keefe. Ms. Keefe was undecided whether this report indicated that the Respondent was released or should be released from any necessity to attend counseling. She did not pursue this matter by presenting it to the Board for their opinion, in view of the fact that the charges of May 11, 1983, had been instituted. From the point of view of Ms. Keefe as spokesperson for the Board of Nursing, it was not necessary to answer this question nor for Respondent to have to continue to offer quarterly reports beyond March 1, 1983, pending the outcome of charges related to the failure to file a report of March 1, 1983. During the course of the exchanges related to the necessity to receive counseling and provide counseling reports on a quarterly basis, Coats continued to seek random urine samples from the Respondent to detect the presence of controlled substances. One of those samples was obtained on April 28, 1983, following contact with the Respondent, allowing him a couple of hours before making the appearance to give that sample. The results of that sample were negative. A similar contact was made with the Respondent on June 29, 1983. The Respondent was telephoned by Coats around two or three o'clock in the afternoon and an arrangement made for Respondent to come by Coats' office around 5:00 p.m. to offer the urine sample. King made his appearance but did not give the sample, indicating that he was unable to void. He requested to be allowed to return the following morning to offer the urine specimen. This arrangement was not pursued by Coats. No further explanation was given to Coats about the inability of Respondent to provide the urine sample and at hearing, Respondent repeated his statement that he was simply unable to perform that task on June 29, 1983. This failure to provide a sample led to a second set of charges dating from July 28, 1983. This charge and the March 1, 1983, failure to file a counseling report formed the basis of the Administrative Complaint of September 6, 1983, filed by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation against Respondent. Respondent requested a formal Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing which was held on January 25, 1984.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which finds the Respondent guilty of violating the Probation Order of the Board of Nursing by failing to submit to a urine test on June 29, 1983, and dismisses the charge of failure to submit a quarterly counseling report for March 1, 1983. By way of penalty, the Final Order should impose a suspension of six months, with the last four months of that terms being set aside if, within the initial two months, Respondent seeks a psychological evaluation from a qualified psychiatrist, psychologist or other qualified mental health care counselor who, by report to the Board, addresses the Respondent's capability of continuing in the nursing profession without posing a threat to the safety of patients based upon abuse of drugs or related matters and the need to continue counseling and conditioned upon Respondent's submitting to random blood or urine samples to detect unprescribed controlled substances during the six months suspension period. The final order should also state that Respondent's failure to provide the counseling report and continue needed counseling or to submit to detection of unprescribed controlled substances through blood or urine sample shall promote the imposition of the remaining four months of the suspension term. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia P. Forrester, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jeffery B. Morris, Esquire 437 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at Tomoka Correctional Institution, Daytona Beach, Florida. He is presently serving a sentence of 60 years and has a presumptive parole release date of 180 months. Petitioner specifically challenges the validity of the matrix time range contained in Rule 23-21.09(5), Florida Administrative Code. That provision contains a matrix which sets the time ranges for presumptive parole release dates. A copy of that matrix is attached to this order as Appendix I. The most current matrix was last amended effective October 1, 1982. The initial or first matrix was developed and became effective in 1979 in response to legislation adopted in 1978 which required the Parole and Probation Commission (hereafter referred to as Commission) to develop and implement objective parole guidelines. Prior to this time, the granting or denying of parole had been a subjective decision by the commissioners and required a majority vote of the commissioners. In originally developing the matrix, the Commission used the Thurston Scaling Method in ranking various criminal offenses from least to most serious offense. This method involved providing each of the Commissioners with 40 index cards on which the various criminal offenses were written. Each commissioner then ranked the various criminal offenses in order of seriousness. The Board then reviewed the results and arrived at a consensus on the ranking of the various crimes. The Thurston scaling methodology is an accepted scientific methodology for ranking different crimes by level of seriousness or severity. This methodology was recommended to the Commission by three consultants in the field of parole. These same three experts, Peter Hoffman, Director of Research for the U.S. Parole Commission, Dale Parent, Director of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission for the State of Minnesota, and Betty Taylor, a parole commissioner for the State of Oregon, advised and consulted with the board in developing the objective parole guidelines. After the initial matrix was adopted as a Commission rule, it was reviewed on an annual basis as required by statute. Since 1979, some changes in the matrix have been adopted by the Commission based upon their annual review. Each change was adopted as a rule change and the procedures for adopting or amending administrative rules were followed. The procedure for adopting the rule changes generally took at least 90 days. The present matrix contains six categories of crimes broken down by degrees. Each inmate is assigned a salient-factor score and by using this score with the offense for which the person was sentenced a time range for the Presumptive parole release date for that individual is obtained from the matrix. The Commission sets the presumptive parole release date within that range unless other factors warrant going outside that range by extending or reducing the number of months to the presumptive parole release date. The inmate's presumptive parole release date may also be extended for unsatisfactory institutional behavior while incarcerated. The Commission, in granting or denying parole, considers the total case package including those specific reasons which may serve as a basis for going above or below the matrix time range. When the Commission goes outside the matrix time range it must state its reason for doing so. Prior to March 1983, the forms of the Commission's actions were filed in a central storage area. In March 1983, the mechanism became available for feeding this information into the computer. Using the computer and data which is maintained by the Department of Corrections, the Commission now generates quarterly reports. These reports provide a statistical analysis which indicates whether the guidelines are being following by the Commission. This same data also provides a possible indicator for needed changes in the guidelines. All revisions to the guidelines must now be made based upon such statistical analysis. Sentencing guidelines and objective parole guidelines are separate. The salient-factor scores for the sentencing guidelines and objective parole guidelines are similar, but not the same. Sentencing involves a separate branch of government, a separate function, separate measurements, and separate criteria. Sentencing can be done only by a court of law and is accomplished by court order. Sentencing sets the limit of the incarceration period. The parole function is a function of the executive branch and cannot be ordered by the Commission. An offer of parole is tendered or offered by the Commission and the inmate may accept or reject the offer and its condition. If the inmate accepts an offer of parole, the form used is a contract form which must be signed and agreed to by the inmate. Parole results in release under supervision whereas completion of the sentence results in full release without conditions or supervision. Section 947.165(2), Florida Statutes, was amended by the 1982 legislature. See Session Law 82-171. Prior to this amendment, changes made in the objective parole guidelines were to be based upon the "experience" of the commission. The amended section provides that the Commission shall review the guidelines at least once each year and make any revisions considered necessary by virtue of statistical analysis of Commission actions. The initial report of the data generated by this statistical analysis was to be due January 30, 1983. See Florida Statute 947.13(3)(1982). The Commission and its staff began work immediately after the passage of 82-171 to implement the statistical analysis and reporting requirements.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is now and was at all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, a licensed Registered Nurse in the State of Florida, license number 71601-2. On April 13, 1982, Respondent's Florida nursing license was placed on probation. On April 13, 1982, the Florida State Board of Nursing entered a Final Order placing the Respondent's license on probation for two years, with the following terms and conditions. The licensee shall not violate any applicable federal or state laws, or rules or orders of the Board of Nursing. For the duration of the probationary period, the licensee will report immediately (within seven calendar days) either by telephone or letter to his/her probation supervisor assigned by the Department, and by certified registered mail to the Department of Professional Regulation, Attention Administrator, Office of Investigative Services, 130 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, by license number and licensed name, any change in Respondent's residence address; any change in Respondent's employment (including address); and any arrests. If employed as a nurse, the licensee will be responsible for causing reports to be fur- nished by his/her employer to the Board or the probation supervisor, relative to the licensee's performance, and any problems. These reports shall be submitted every 3 months during probation as scheduled by the probation supervisor. The licensee shall not consume alcohol while on duty as a nurse, nor function as a nurse while under the influence of alcohol. The licensee shall obtain/continue counseling with a psychiatrist, psychologist or other recognized drug/alcohol rehabilita- tion program, and shall cause progress reports to be furnished to the Board or probation supervisor every 3 months during treatment as scheduled by the probation supervisor. Any deviation from the requirements of this probation without the prior written consent of the Board or the Department shall constitute a violation of this probation. Upon a finding of probable cause that a violation of this probation has occurred, the licensee's license to practice nursing in this state shall be immediately and automatically suspended pending the licensee's appearance before the next Board meeting, or such subsequent meeting as may be mutually agreed upon between the licensee and the Department. The licensees will be given notice of the hearing and an opportunity to defend. The Petitioner assigned Investigator Gerry Padgett to be Respondent's probation supervisor. During 1982, the Respondent satisfactorily complied with the terms of her probation. During the latter part of January, 1983, Respondent received a letter from the Board of Nursing indicating that she had not complied with the probationary terms. After receipt of the letter, Respondent went to see her probation supervisor, who in turn informed the Board of Nursing that the Respondent was, in fact, in compliance with the probationary terms. At that meeting in late January 1983, between Respondent and her probation supervisor, the latter told Respondent that she would be seeing her in three months. Prior to that meeting, Respondent had made appearances in her probation supervisor's office every three months. The next date which the probation supervisor had scheduled to see Respondent was April 1, 1983. There was no clear evidence adduced to show that the scheduled date of April 1, 1983, was communicated to Respondent, and she denied being told specifically to return on April 1, 1983. However, Respondent acknowledged that she knew that she was to see her probation supervisor sometime during April 1983. For several months prior to April 1983, Respondent had been employed by Indian River Memorial Hospital. The last day that Respondent worked at Indian River Memorial Hospital was April 19, 1983. On April 27, 1983, the Respondent admitted herself to the Heritage Health Corporation, an alcohol treatment program located in Sebastian, Florida, to he treated for alcohol abuse. At that time, according to the Respondent's own testimony, she could not have functioned as a nurse due to alcohol impairment. The program in Heritage Health Corporation was a 30 day in-patient alcoholic rehabilitation program. During the Respondent's stay at the Heritage Health Corporation, her employment with Indian River Memorial Hospital was terminated. The Respondent did not report her change in employment status nor her change in residence or entry into an alcohol rehabilitation program to her probation supervisor as required by the above quoted order of probation. On May 18, 1983, after not having beard from the Respondent, her probation supervisor attempted to locate her, and did in fact locate Respondent at the Heritage Health Corporation facility. At that time, Respondent informed the probation supervisor that her employment with the Indian River Memorial Hospital had been terminated. The meeting between the probation supervisor and Respondent on May 18, 1983, was the last time until the formal bearing in this matter that the Respondent reported any information to her probation supervisor. On or about June 20, 1983, the Respondent moved her residence address from Vero Beach to Sebastian, Florida. Three weeks prior to the formal bearing in this matter, the Respondent moved her residence address from Sebastian, Florida to Orlando, Florida. Neither changes of residence address were forwarded by Respondent to her probation supervisor or to the DPR administrator, as required by the order of probation. However, she reported the move from Vero Beach to Sebastian, Florida directly to the Board of Nursing office in Jacksonville. Respondent never received written consent to deviate from the terms of the order of probation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a Registered Nurse be suspended until such time as she demonstrates to the Board of Nursing her fitness to practice nursing. This demonstration should include a psychological or psychiatric evaluation, along with a recommendation from a licensed mental health care professional, that Respondent be reinstated. Upon reinstatement, Respondent should be placed on probation with generally the same terms as her previous probation, along with any other reasonable terms, such as urine or blood screens as appropriate under the circumstances. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1984.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Petitioner is eligible for an exemption from disqualification to work in a position of special trust pursuant to the terms of Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner has worked as a certified nursing assistant at Highland Pines Rehabilitation and Nursing Center in Clearwater for the past six years. A recommendation letter from the Director of Nursing characterizes Petitioner as an excellent, reliable, and trustworthy employee. Petitioner is disqualified from working in a position of special trust as a result of a 1991 conviction for grand theft under Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was also been convicted of petit theft in the same case. Both crimes involved passing forged checks. She was initially given a sentence of four years probation, but was imprisoned in 1992 for violation of her probation conditions. In 1996, Petitioner was found guilty of welfare fraud in violation of Section 409.325(1), Florida Statutes (1995). She was placed on community control for a period of one year, to be followed by three years of probation. A letter from the Department of Corrections indicates that Petitioner’s probation is now scheduled to terminate on April 18, 2000, with a possibility of early termination provided all conditions have been satisfied. Petitioner has not violated the terms of her probation on this conviction. Petitioner testified that her criminal activities were due to “financial difficulties” and drug use. She testified that she now believes herself to be rehabilitated and ready to put her past behind her. Petitioner testified that she has not entered into any sort of structural rehabilitation program or received counseling in connection with her rehabilitation efforts. Her testimony was essentially that she has turned her life around on her own. Petitioner applied to Respondent for an exemption. A hearing was held by the Exemption Review Committee on February 17, 1998. The Exemption Review Committee recommended to the District Administrator that the requested exemption be denied. After reviewing the record and the Exemption Review Committee’s recommendation, the District Administrator concurred with the committee’s recommendation and denied Petitioner’s request by letter dated March 18, 1998. Upon consideration of all available information and the record of Petitioner’s adjudication for felony theft and her current placement on probation for welfare fraud, the District Administrator concluded that, due to the serious nature of the adjudications and her current probationary status, there has not been sufficient opportunity for Petitioner to demonstrate rehabilitation. Petitioner failed to offer any evidence of her rehabilitation, beyond her testimony that she has changed her ways and the fact that she has thus far served her current probation without incident. While several years have passed since the grand theft conviction that compelled disqualification, Petitioner’s subsequent history is also relevant to Respondent’s decision. Petitioner’s conviction in 1996 of welfare fraud certainly provided Respondent with reason to believe that Petitioner had not demonstrated rehabilitation.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner an exemption to work in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Susan Floyd, pro se 13149 119th Street North Largo, Florida 33778 Amy V. Archibald, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Two, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
