The Issue Whether Respondent, Residential Acceptance Corporation, subjected Petitioner, Mary R. Setzer, to unlawful employment practices on the basis of her sex or marital status, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and exhibits offered at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made. At all times material this matter, Petitioner was an unmarried woman. Petitioner, a resident of the state of Tennessee, was licensed to originate loans in Tennessee and Kentucky. She has been employed with RAC as a retail mortgage loan officer since December 22, 2014, without any gaps in employment. At all times material to this matter, Petitioner has not been terminated, nor has she voluntarily resigned from her employment with RAC. Respondent is a lender that operates a business engaging in underwriting, processing, and funding loans submitted by third-party loan originators. Respondent works with mortgage brokers, originators, and processors to approve and close loans. Respondent, a full-service mortgage company, operates in 25 states throughout the United States. Respondent is based in Tampa, Florida. The RAC procedure for processing loans requires the mortgage loan officer to submit a loan package to a designated loan processor. The loan processor then assigns the loan package to an underwriter for processing. Once the loan officer has submitted the loan package to the loan processor, the loan officer is responsible for “supervising” the transaction by providing additional information necessary for completion. Mortgage loan officers are then paid commission on each loan that closes, which they receive by submitting the corresponding pay sheet and credit invoices through payroll. Respondent employs six mortgage loan officers. Three of these loan officers are female, and three are male. Petitioner was one of the three female loan officers. As a loan officer employed by RAC, Petitioner agreed to submit her loans exclusively to RAC for origination, processing, underwriting, and funding. Petitioner maintained a Kentucky mortgage license sponsorship with Respondent until February 2018. However, as of the date of the hearing, she continued to maintain her company-sponsored license in Tennessee. Throughout her employment with Respondent, Petitioner was supervised by Nick Ball, and she submitted loans for processing to Carol Estrada, a loan processor. Between 2015 and 2016, Petitioner submitted and received commissions on 12 loans. Although Petitioner remains employed, and is able to submit loans to Respondent for processing, she has not submitted a loan since 2016. Petitioner alleged Respondent discriminated against her based on her sex and marital status. The first allegation relates to Petitioner’s claim that Respondent colluded with her former employer regarding an unrelated discrimination complaint. By way of background, Petitioner was employed by First Choice Lending (“FCL”), a loan service company with offices in Tennessee and Kentucky. Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination against FCL in Tennessee alleging she had been wrongfully terminated based on her sex and marital status. Petitioner testified that she did not disclose the FCL discrimination complaint to Respondent. However, one month after she began working with Respondent, James Mannion, an account executive for Respondent, contacted Petitioner regarding her former employment with FCL. Petitioner testified that she disclosed to Mr. Mannion that she had been wrongfully terminated by FCL due to her sex and marital status. Petitioner testified that Mr. Mannion shared this information with Ms. Estrada. Petitioner alleged, without more than her own belief, that after learning about the FCL complaint, Ms. Estrada caused intentional and prolonged turnaround times for loan processing which delayed her closings. Petitioner claimed that Ms. Estrada would not process her loans as quickly as she did for male loan officers. Petitioner alleged that the delays in loan processing resulted in loss when borrowers withdrew their loans. Petitioner testified that she reported the issues she had with Ms. Estrada to Mr. Ball. According to Petitioner, Mr. Ball did nothing to resolve the issues. However, on March 18, 2015, Mr. Ball sent an email to Petitioner and other RAC employees scheduling a meeting to discuss loan submissions. Ms. Estrada was one of the employees instructed to attend the meeting. Regarding any subsequent concerns about Ms. Estrada’s processing performance, Mr. Ball suggested that Petitioner call Ms. Estrada to follow up on requests. In an email dated March 25, 2015, Mr. Ball stated, “glad you two could clear the air … let me know if you have any more issues.” Finally, when Ms. Estrada was out sick, he suggested that Petitioner could assist with processing to move the loan packages along in the process. The evidence did not establish that Ms. Estrada’s processing of Petitioner’s loans was related to discrimination based on her sex or marital status. The alleged comparator Petitioner offered as someone who was treated better than her was a married, male mortgage loan officer. Petitioner testified that at some point after the telephonic meeting with Mr. Ball, she was contacted by one of the male loan officers who had also been on the call. Petitioner testified that the loan officer shared with her that Ms. Estrada had done a good job processing his loans and that his loans had been closing quickly. However, Petitioner was unable to identify the name or any personal identifying information about the male loan officer. Petitioner did not offer any evidence to demonstrate the marital status of the alleged comparator. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that neither the FCL complaint nor the allegations alleged regarding RACs collusion with FCL involved any claim of discrimination recognized under the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”). More importantly, the claim involved a different employer. In her Complaint, Petitioner also alleged that Respondent caused the devaluation of her reputation and customer base. One of her past clients, Ms. Moore, is one of the clients she alleges had an issue with the delayed processing of her loan. Ms. Moore filed a complaint in July 2015. Respondent received the complaint filed with the Consumer Resources Division of the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions regarding Respondent’s services (“Moore Complaint”). In the Moore Complaint, Ms. Moore claimed Respondent unprofessionally handled her loan application, which caused delays and expenses to complete the transaction. Upon receipt of the complaint, Respondent investigated the loan transaction history, and correspondence between Respondent and the complainant. After investigating the Moore Complaint, Respondent determined that Ms. Moore’s complaints related to issues that could commonly arise during loan processing. Respondent then sent a letter to Ms. Moore, notifying her that they found no irregular activity associated with the loan transaction. Regarding the allegation that RAC caused Petitioner’s reputation to be devalued in her profession, and that RAC made her less valuable to clients, Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. Petitioner also testified that in July 2016, Mr. Ball shared her contact information with a recruiter in an attempt to get Petitioner to leave the company. While Petitioner testified that the recruiter reached out to her numerous times beginning in September 2016, Petitioner admitted that she never actually spoke to the recruiter and, therefore, could not confirm whether her beliefs were correct. On or about February 1, 2018, Respondent received notice from the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System & Registry (NMLS) that Petitioner had ended her Kentucky mortgage license sponsorship with the company. Mr. Ball emailed Petitioner and asked whether she was leaving RAC. Petitioner responded that she was not leaving the company. In January 2019, Respondent received a Cease and Desist Letter from Petitioner alleging RAC shared Petitioner’s personal information with FCL; participated in retaliation initiated by FCL; violated her constitutional rights; and caused harm to her business and professional reputation. In a letter dated February 13, 2019, RAC denied the allegations. Petitioner also alleged that Respondent hacked into her LinkedIn account to harass her. However, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner’s anniversary post was automatically generated by LinkedIn. Based on the LinkedIn programming, the system automatically shares the employment anniversary with an employer and other significant dates (entered by the user upon creation of their account) on the user’s network account. In addition, the platform generates reminders or notices based on the user’s connections and background. Overall, the evidence offered at hearing was insufficient to demonstrate any adverse action has been taken against Respondent due to her sex or marital status. There are also no similarly situated employees outside of Petitioner's protected class to which Petitioner can be compared. Moreover, Petitioner offered no evidence at the hearing that she lost any commission or income due to the alleged discrimination. Rather, the evidence demonstrates she has not submitted a loan for processing, which is necessary for her to be paid commission, since 2016. The evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that RAC subjected Petitioner to discriminatory action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Residential Acceptance Corporation, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Mary Setzer, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Mary Setzer 813 Chickamauga Avenue Knoxville, Tennessee 37917 Phillip Harris, Esquire Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3350 Tampa, Florida 33602-5832 Jordan Elizabeth Koziol, Esquire Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3350 Tampa, Florida 33602-5830 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and/or costs, pursuant to section 120.595(4); and, if so, the amounts of attorney's fees and/or costs to which he is entitled.
Findings Of Fact On March 3, 2017, DOAH entered an Amended Final Order in Case No. 16-6127RU, determining that a portion of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Procedure Manual TL-10, dated April 30, 2014, and Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18, dated October 20, 2014 (hereafter, the "Unadopted Rules"), are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). "Stephen J. Williams, as a Trustee for the Sparkhill Trust," is Petitioner in this proceeding, and also was Petitioner in Case No. 16-6127RU. Petitioner appeared in Case No. 16-6127RU as a trustee of the Sparkhill Trust ("Trust"), which holds title to the motor vehicle for which a certificate of title was denied by Respondent and its agent, the Lee County Tax Collector, in 2014. As previously found in Case No. 16-6127RU, Petitioner also is the beneficiary of the Trust. Petitioner is not licensed to practice law in Florida, and has neither alleged nor shown that he was licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in Florida at any point during the pendency of Case No. 16-6127RU.2/ Petitioner received a law degree from the University of Connecticut School of Law and is licensed to practice law in Connecticut, New York, and the District of Columbia; however, he currently is suspended from practicing law in those jurisdictions. Petitioner also is a lawyer on the Roll of Solicitors in England and Wales, but is not currently authorized to practice in those jurisdictions because he does not hold a practicing certificate. Petitioner asserts in the Motion that he is an attorney acting in a representative capacity as a trustee on behalf of the Trust. Petitioner filed a document titled "Declaration of Stephen J. Williams in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs" ("Declaration") in support of the Motion. Although the Declaration represents that it is made "under penalty of perjury," it does not constitute a legally sufficient oath or affidavit because it does not comply with the requirements of section 92.50(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, it does not contain a jurat or certificate of proof or acknowledgement authenticated by the signature and official seal of a judge, clerk or deputy clerk of court of record in this state, or a United States commissioner or notary public in this state, as required by the statute.3/ Petitioner attached an itemized timesheet to the Declaration. The timesheet lists, for each item for which attorney's fees are sought, the date and description of the legal services alleged to have been rendered for the particular item, and the amount of time alleged to have been spent per item. The timesheet represents that a total of 54.8 hours were spent in prosecuting Case No. 16-6127RU. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a $350.00 per hour attorney's fee, multiplied by a 1.5 loadstar multiplier, and a contingency multiplier of three, for a total of $86,310.00 in attorney's fees. Attached to the Declaration is email correspondence sent to Petitioner by Kiara Guzzo, Respondent's Public Records Coordinator, stating that Petitioner owed $119.73 for Respondent's response to Petitioner's public records request. In the Declaration, Petitioner states that "[t]he attached email of Guzzo email [sic] accurately indicates the out-of-pocket expenses which have been paid." Pursuant to his statement in the Declaration, Petitioner is "exclusively engaged in the practice of law." Pursuant to his statement in the Declaration, Petitioner undertook the prosecution of Case No. 16-6127RU on a contingency basis, with his attorney's fees being "limited to that approved by this tribunal."4/ Petitioner previously challenged the Unadopted Rules in two DOAH proceedings, Case Nos. 14-6005RU and 15-0484RU.5/ Thus, as far back as 2014, Respondent was on notice that its statements (i.e., the Unadopted Rules) may constitute unadopted rules.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner when her employment assignment with Respondent was terminated in November 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 48-year-old African-American female. On or about September 10, 2004, Petitioner was placed with AT&T Wireless as a customer service specialist by a staffing agency, AppleOne. Petitioner's job duties as a customer service specialist included answering phone calls from AT&T Wireless' customers about their bills and assisting them with problems that they were having with their accounts. For the most part, Petitioner received positive feedback regarding her job performance as a customer service specialist. That feedback, which is reflected on the Advisor Evaluation Detail forms received into evidence as Exhibit P7, came from her supervisors as well as from quality assurance specialists. Petitioner testified that she generally got along well with her co-workers,2 but that she preferred getting assistance and taking instruction from men rather than women. After AT&T Wireless was taken over by Cingular, Petitioner and the other customer service specialists working for AT&T Wireless were required to attend a two-week training class regarding Cingular’s policies and procedures. The training class attended by Petitioner was also attended by her supervisor, Wendy Miller. Ms. Miller is a white female. On the first day of the class, Petitioner was having trouble logging into the computer system that was being used in the training class. Ms. Miller, who was sitting directly behind Petitioner, attempted to ask Petitioner a question about the problems that she was having and/or provide her assistance, but Petitioner simply ignored Ms. Miller. According to Petitioner, she ignored Ms. Miller because she was trying to pay attention to the teacher. As a result of this incident, Ms. Miller sent an e-mail to AppleOne dated November 30, 2004, which stated in pertinent part: It has been decided by Sandy Camp and myself to end [Petitioner’s] temporary assignment due to insubordination. She has been coached on her attitude for which she is not receptive to and several other people have mentioned that they do not want to help her due to her not wanting to listen. The last incident was today during our CSE class where she demonstrated insubordination and disrespect to me. In a later e-mail, dated March 7, 2005, Ms. Miller described the incident in the training class as follows: [Petitioner] was one of the reps not able to get into [the computer] system so I was attempting to assist her because she was sitting directly in front of me. I attempted to ask her a question and she turned her back to me & put up her hand as to say “don’t speak to me” and she completely ignored me even as I kept speaking to her. . . . . The descriptions of the incident in Ms. Miller’s e- mails are materially the same as Petitioner’s description of the incident in her testimony at the hearing. On the evening of November 30, 2004, Petitioner was called by someone at AppleOne and told that her assignment with Cingular had been terminated. Petitioner was paid by AppleOne during her entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular. Petitioner’s salary while she was working at AT&T Wireless and Cingular remained constant at $10 per hour. Petitioner’s entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular was approximately two months. Petitioner testified that she did not receive any other assignments through AppleOne after her assignment with Cingular was terminated. She attributed her inability to get other assignments through AppleOne to the fact that AppleOne "sided with" Cingular, who was its client, but there is insufficient evidence to make such a finding. In January 2005, Petitioner filed separate charges of discrimination with the Commission against AppleOne and Cingular. According to Petitioner, she was paid $400 by AppleOne to settle her claim against that company. Petitioner testified that she sold vacation plans and did other “odd jobs” between November 2004 and mid-February 2005 when she was hired by Sears as a home delivery specialist. Her job duties in that position include contacting customers to coordinate the delivery of appliances purchased from Sears. Petitioner testified that her initial salary with Sears was $9 per hour and that as of the date of the hearing her salary was $10 per hour. Petitioner testified that other customer service specialists had “problems” or “personality conflicts” with Ms. Miller, but she was unable to identify any other employee (of any race or age) who was similarly insubordinate or disrespectful towards Ms. Miller (or any other supervisor) and who received discipline less severe than termination. Petitioner’s actions toward Ms. Miller during the training class were disrespectful, at a minimum. Petitioner testified that Ms. Miller acted like a white supremacist, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner also testified that AT&T Wireless and Cingular did not have any permanent customer service specialists that were as old as she, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner presented no credible evidence regarding the race, age, or other characteristics of the person who filled her position at Cingular after her assignment was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing with prejudice Petitioner’s discrimination claim against Cingular. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent aided and abetted an unlicensed contractor to engage in contracting by pulling permits for the unlicensed contractor; whether Respondent failed to qualify a firm for whom he was acting as licensed contractor; whether Respondent acted in the capacity of a contractor other than in his own name; and, whether Respondent violated local building codes as alleged in Second Amended Administrative Complaint filed 6-30-89, and Administrative Complaint filed 7-26-89.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Fred S. Petersen was licensed as a general contractor by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (FCILB) and issued License Nos. CG C023928 and CB CA23929 (Exhibit 1). Neither American Weatherall Industries Inc. (AWI), Mel C. Wyatt, nor Steven C. Wyatt were licensed as contractors by the FCILB (Exhibit 2). Prior to mid-August 1987, Kirk Evenstad was the qualifying general contractor for AWI. By letter dated August 20, 1987, AWI proclaimed Kirk Evenstad to be no longer working for AWI because of mismanagement (Exhibit 3). Mel Wyatt, President of AWI, testified that Everstad had stolen between $30,000 and $50,000 of materials from AWI, leaving AWI in a precarious financial situation. In order to continue in business to work out of the financial hole created by Everstad, AWI, through one of its employees, Danny O'Brien, introduced Mel Wyatt to Respondent. Respondent had known O'Brien for some 20 years and, for the proposed reason of helping O'Brien, Respondent agreed to act as qualifying contractor for AWI. To carry out this project, Respondent entered into a contract (Exhibit 4) or Employment Agreement dated July 31, 1987, in which Respondent agreed to supervise construction of projects contracted for by AWI, but the latter was to provide all material and handle all financial aspects of the contracts. Respondent received $1000 for signing this agreement and was to receive a percentage of the gross proceeds of future contracts entered into by AWI. Respondent authorized O'Brien to pull permits for AWI pursuant to Respondent's contractor's license. Although Respondent testified he gave O'Brien authorization for each specific permit pulled and did not believe he signed Exhibit 11, dated August 11, 1987, a copy of General Authorization for O'Brien to pull permits for AWI under Respondent's license, it is found as a fact that Respondent signed the original of Exhibit 11 which is a copy. Within a short period of time after executing Exhibit 4, Respondent became aware of the financial difficulties facing AWI and ceased his efforts to qualify AWI. In the latter part of 1987 (believed to be November-December), AWI reached the point that it could no longer remain solvent and filed for bankruptcy leaving several contracts unfinished for which AWI had received partial payment. Of the four contracts entered into between AWI and homeowners for additions to their houses (Exhibits 7-9 and 14), all were entered into under a printed document showing Everstad's license number; however, the building permits for Exhibits 7-9 were pulled under Respondent's license. By agreement dated August 10, 1987 (Exhibit 7), Alfred and Marjory Hauk contracted with AWI to convert a garage at their home into an office. Hauk made payments of $1000 and $2300 to AWI, the permit for the work was pulled by O'Brien under Respondent's license, but no work was ever done under this contract. AMI subsequently went out of business, and Hauk received no refund of the monies he had paid to AMI. Hauk never met Respondent. On June 12, 1987, John Davis contracted with AWI to convert an existing garage to bedroom and bath and add a garage to his home. The initial permit for this work was pulled by Kenn Covicc as contractor on June 21, 1987, and a subsequent permit was pulled by O'Brien using Respondent's license. Although Davis paid over $6000 to AWI for this work, the work stopped after the footing for the garage addition was poured. On June 2, 1987, Albert Charette entered into a contract with AWI to add a room to his house. Charette paid some $9300 of the $34,400 contract amount during the progress of the work. Differences arose between Charette and AWI involving whether the construction was being done in accordance with the plans and specifications. In September, 1987, Respondent met with Charette and submitted a proposal (Exhibit 15) to Charette to complete the project in accordance with the plans and specifications. About one week after Exhibit 15 was signed, all work stopped on the project, and Respondent never received compensation or commenced work on this contract, which he had entered into in his own name and not as a representative of AWI.
Recommendation It is recommended that Fred S. Petersen be found guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(e), (f) and (g), Florida Statutes, and assessed a monetary fine of $3000. ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner are accepted, except: Finding #7, penultimate sentence which is rejected as uncorroborated hearsay. Finding #11, that portion stating the purpose of Petersen's visit to Charette was to change the licensure on the permit to Petersen is rejected. See HO #13. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent are accepted, except: Finding #4, Accepted, except with regard to Respondent's notification of termination of his association with AWI. No documentation of this act was submitted and, even though Respondent may have ultimately revoked O'Brien's authority to pull permits, this was done well after the permits were pulled. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Jurand, Esquire G. W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Brian A. Burden, Esquire Post Office Box 2893 Tampa, FL 33601 Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner from her employment based on perceived handicap discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on March 5, 1991, to work as a server at Respondent's restaurant, Bon Appetit. Shortly thereafter, on or about April 8, 1991, Petitioner was promoted to restaurant manager. During her tenure as restaurant manager, Petitioner was counselled about her appearance and personal hygiene. Additionally, Petitioner had problems with Respondent's performance including balancing the cash and credit card receipts collected during her shifts. Respondent required its managers to notify Respondent in advance of any absence due to a medical condition where possible. In all cases; however, managers were required to communicate with Respondent concerning their absence so that Respondent could schedule and plan for a manager's absence to avoid any disruption in its business and the scheduling of other employees. During her employment as restaurant manager, Petitioner was diagnosed as having "hammer toes". Petitioner was out of work for three weeks to have this condition surgically corrected. This absence was approved in advance by Respondent and Petitioner received full compensation for that medical leave. Following the scheduled three week absence for the surgery, there was an additional two to three week period during which Petitioner reported for work late or would leave early. Respondent considered those late arrivals and early departures to be unexcused absences. Following foot surgery, Petitioner returned to her position as manager with the same pay. Subsequently, during May 1992, Petitioner was out of work for surgery to have an ovarian cyst removed. This absence was approved by Respondent and Petitioner was out of work for five days. During this period of medical leave, Petitioner received her pay and returned to work following surgery. Following the cyst surgery, Petitioner complained of lower back pain which her gynecologist attributed to swelling from the cyst surgery. On May 30, 1992, Petitioner went to the emergency room at Morton Plant Hospital in Tampa suffering from lower back pain. Petitioner contacted restaurant manager, Leo Enciso, and told him of her visit to the hospital and "not to count on her reporting for work that day". Petitioner also informed Enciso that she would call as soon as she had been examined to give an update on her status. Subsequent to her initial phone call to Enciso on May 30, 1992, Petitioner did not speak with Enciso nor did he receive any messages from Petitioner concerning her status from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. Following her treatment in the emergency room at Morton Plant, Petitioner sought treatment on that same date, May 30, 1992 from chiropractor Dr. Lynn Colucci. At that time, Petitioner knew she would be out of work until at least one more day. Petitioner did not communicate that information to Respondent or any of its management personnel. Petitioner's next consultation with her chiropractor to evaluate her condition was June 1, 1992. Following that session, Petitioner was advised that she would be out of work for at least two more days. Petitioner did not communicate this information to Respondent or any of its management staff. Petitioner again met with her chiropractor on June 3, 1992 and was told that she would be unable to return to work until June 8, 1992. Petitioner failed to communicate this information to any of Respondent's management or staff. Kailie Borzoni, Peter Kreuziger and Sharon Verhage, all managerial employees of Respondent, made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Petitioner by phone. Verhage left a message on Petitioner's answering machine but Petitioner did not return her phone call. Petitioner was released to return to work by her treating chiropractor on June 9, 1992. There were no restrictions placed on her when she was released for work and her physician related that Petitioner's back problem had "resolved itself". Petitioner was discharged by Respondent on June 9, 1992, when she reported for work. Peter Krueziger made an independent decision to discharge Petitioner based on what he considered to be poor performance, poor appearance, excessive absences and failing to truthfully advise of her work status and whereabouts from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. When Petitioner was initially employed as a restaurant manager, Respondent's manager, Krueziger, noticed that Petitioner's dress apparel did not meet up to the standards of a "four star" restaurant that Respondent was operating. As a result, Respondent spoke with Petitioner about his expectations with regard to her dress and advised the controller to advance Petitioner some funds to purchase a wardrobe. Respondent sent one of its managerial employees to accompany Petitioner on a shopping trip to upgrade her wardrobe to reflect what Respondent considered to be appropriate dress for a restaurant manager. Respondent's managerial staff noted and complained to Petitioner on several occasions after she was given a new wardrobe, that her attire did not measure up to the standards that they expected of a manager. Negative comments were made about Respondent's stained clothing, her fingernails and her unkempt hair. Petitioner conceded that she had an exceptionally hard time balancing her cash and credit card accounts at the end of each shift. While some managers experience difficulty at the outset of their employment because an antiquated accounting system was being used, they soon became proficient in closing out the cash and credit card accounts following their shift. Respondent discharged Petitioner based on her failure to properly notify it of her absence from work during the period May 30, 1992 through June 8, 1992. Petitioner's medical condition, real or perceived, played no part in Respondent's decision to terminate her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's petition for relief as she failed to establish that she was terminated from employment because of a perceived handicap. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 3 adopted as modified, paragraph 2 recommended order. Paragraph 4 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 5 recommended order. Paragraph 5, adopted as modified, paragraph 4 recommended order. Paragraph 7, adopted as modified, paragraphs 9 and 10 recommended order. Paragraph 8 rejected, irrelevant. Paragraphs 9 and 10 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 15 recommended order. Paragraphs 11-16 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraph 17 rejected, irrelevant and unnecessary. Paragraphs 18 and 19 rejected, conclusionary. COPIES FURNISHED: C. A. Sullivan, Esquire 311 S. Missouri Avenue Clearwater, FL 34616 Charles A. Powell, IV, Esquire Peter W. Zinober, Esquire Zinober and McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1750 Tampa, FL 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed with the Respondent from August 3, 1985 until May 10, 1986, as a waitress in the dining room of the Kings Inn Restaurant in Pensacola, Florida. In March, 1987, the Petitioner became pregnant. She then informed her employer, Mr. Judge of her pregnancy. He told her initially that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to. Shortly thereafter, he told her that she could not work after five months of pregnancy. On another occasion, his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, told her that she could not work after she "started showing." Once the Respondent, Mr. Judge, learned of the Petitioner's pregnancy, he began a regime of harassing treatment. For instance, Mr. Judge made her do the "side work," filling up all the salt and pepper shakers and sugar bowls for all of the waitresses and waitress stations. It had always been uniform policy that each waitress had the responsibility to do her own side work for her own station and tables. Mr. Judge also began yelling and cursing at her in front of her workers and customers, causing her great humiliation and embarrassment. He criticized her publicly about her posture and the way she serviced customers, although she had always had an excellent record as a competent waitress and had no complaints from customers or former employers, before announcing that she was pregnant. Mr. Judge also began a practice of constantly questioning other employees about the Petitioner's job performance, although he apparently learned of no substandard performance in both her duties and her attitude toward her customers. He also took her to task about her "charge tips" being less than other employees, apparently the measure he used to determine if a waitress was serving her customers appropriately and adequately. This situation, however, was caused by his discriminatory conduct toward her in giving her fewer tables to serve and thus, reducing her tip income. Mr. Judge additionally assigned her to clean up a portion of the kitchen area, particularly the "bread shelves" when normal policy had been for kitchen personnel to perform all kitchen clean-up duties, with any clean up of the bread shelf area being rotated amongst the dining room personnel. The Petitioner, however, was singled out for this duty exclusively after it became known that she was pregnant. The Petitioner was also required to stay late and perform certain closing duties at the end of business late at night, much more often than other waitresses. In addition to performing restaurant closing duties, she was frequently required to wait on cocktail tables as late as 2:00 in the morning on many of the "late duty" occasions, even though she was hired as, and until she became pregnant worked exclusively as, food waitress. Petitioner's testimony and Petitioner's exhibit 2, in evidence, establishes that, although Petitioner was only scheduled to stay late three times in March, three times in April and once in May that, in fact, she worked late, that is, after all other employees or waitresses had been released for the evening seven out of nine days that she worked in March; nine out of twelve days she worked in April; and six out of the seven days she worked in May. Indeed, on May 10, 1986, the last day she worked for the Respondent, Mr. Judge required her to stay late and to "bus" all the tables, that is clean all the tables, in the dining room, allowing the waitress who was scheduled to stay late that night to leave early. The Petitioner became quite upset at this turn of events and resigned her position, due to the repeated pattern of harassment as described herein. Although Mr. Judge initially told the Petitioner that she could work as long as the doctor allowed her to during her pregnancy, in fact, on April 11, 1986, Mr. Judge hired the Petitioner's replacement. He hired Pamela Modes and had the Petitioner train her in her waitress duties. He stated to Ms. Modes privately when hiring her "that he needed a food waitress" because "he's got a girl that's pregnant." Additionally, he told the Petitioner that he objected to her working because of her pregnancy and claimed his insurance would not allow him to employ her after she was five months pregnant. These statements, coupled with the statement by his assistant manager, Mr. Dungan, to the effect that she would not be employed there "once she started showing" reveal an intent by the employer to terminate the employee, the Petitioner, because of her pregnancy. Instead of terminating her outright, the Respondent chose to put sufficient pressure on the Petitioner through extra, unscheduled work duties and the other above-mentioned forms of harassment, so as to coerce her into leaving the Respondent's employ. The Petitioner thus made a prima facia showing that she was forced to terminate employment due to her sex and her pregnancy, and no countervailing evidence was adduced by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida Human Relations Commission finding that an unlawful employment practice has occurred through the Respondent's discrimination against the Petitioner because of her sex (pregnancy) and that she be accorded all relief allowed under the above- cited section, including backpay and related benefits in accordance with the requirements of Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 21st of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra A. Larson, Pro Se 9742 Aileron Avenue, Apt. 606 Pensacola, Florida 32506 Dracut Corporation d/b/a Kings Inn Restaurant Lawrence F. Judge, Jr. Owner/General Manager 1309 Maldonado Pensacola Beach, Florida 32561-2323 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Has Petitioner been the subject of an unlawful employment practice because of his race, American Indian, and if so, what relief is appropriate?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent operated a citrus processing facility in Bartow, Florida, and employed in excess 15 employees. Petitioner is a full-blooded American Indian who resides in Lakeland, Polk County, Florida. Bobby Branch, Respondent’s Maintenance Supervisor, hired Petitioner as a Maintenance Mechanic. Petitioner commenced employment with Respondent on August 18, 1997. Petitioner was employed at an hourly rate of $10.50. Petitioner was assigned by Bobby Branch to work under the direct supervision of Garry R. Guard, Lead Plant Mechanic. Petitioner had 37 plus years' experience as a mechanic and 15 years' experience with the citrus industry as a mechanic. Petitioner understood at the time he was hired that he would be on probation for a period of 90 days. Shortly after Petitioner began work, Garry Guard told Petitioner “I don’t want to work with an Indian” and “I’m prejudiced and I don’t give a damn who knows it” or words to that effect. Additionally, Guard let it be known that he would prefer working with a Mexican. Approximately one week after this incident, Petitioner complained to Bobby Branch, Maintenance Supervisor, about Guard’s comment to Petitioner. This is supported by the testimony of Charles Palmer, a former employee of Respondent, that he was aware that Petitioner reported Guard's comment to Bobby Branch. There was no remedial action taken by either Branch or any other management personnel concerning Guard’s comment to Petitioner. Subsequently, Petitioner noticed his work being undone and Guard complaining that Petitioner’s work was not done or that his work was done improperly. Petitioner and William Waples, a former employee of Respondent, worked together on one of those projects, rebuilding and installing a pump. Waples considered Petitioner a good mechanic. Later, after Waples and Petitioner were finished with the pump, Guard was observed taking the pump apart. Subsequently, Guard complained that Petitioner failed to install a specific part in the pump. Waples specifically recalls that particular part being installed by himself and Petitioner. Subsequent to that event, Guard, when questioned by another worker about the pump and the problem with it, was over heard by Waples saying words to the effect that the “Damn Indian did it.” On October 22, 1997, Petitioner filed a complaint with Branch that Guard was purposefully sabotaging his work because of his race. Again, there was no remedial action taken by Branch or any other management personnel. Branch neither personally observed deficient work performance by Petitioner nor personally communicated to Petitioner the need for Petitioner to improve his performance if he were to successfully complete his probationary period with Respondent, notwithstanding Branch’s testimony to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. Petitioner was never reprimanded or counseled prior to being terminated. Petitioner was not terminated because of his deficient work performance during his probationary period, but was terminated because of his complaints to Bobby Branch of being discriminated against due to his race, notwithstanding Branch’s testimony to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. Petitioner was terminated by Respondent on November 14, 1997. Petitioner claims lost wages at an hourly rate of $10.50 for 40 hours per week for the period from November 15, 1997 to April 24, 1998. There does not appear to be any evidence of a set-off against the claim for lost wages. Although Petitioner was represented by an attorney, there was no evidence presented as to the amount of Petitioner's attorney's fees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be granted, and as further relief, award Petitioner back wages for the period of November 15, 1997 until April 24, 1998, based on a 40 hour week at an hourly rate of $10.50, and upon motion to the Commission, award reasonable attorney's, in accordance with Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Merette L. Oweis, Esquire DiCeasure, Davidson & Barker, P.A. Post Office Box 7160 Lakeland, Florida 33897 David J. Stefany, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. South Hyde Park Avenue Suite 350 Tampa, Florida 33606 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Azizi M Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Rd, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether respondents are guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, including the pleadings and argument of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Carolyn E. Simmons, is a black female. In 1990, she began employment as a cook with respondent, Inverness Inn (Inn), an employer allegedly subject to the Florida Human Rights Act, as amended. At that time, the Inn was owned by respondent, Cvetko Blazevski. On March 25, 1992, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) alleging that she was "harassed and subjected to racial terms by Mr. Cretko (sic) Blazevski, Owner, from the beginning of (her) employment until the present time." For the purpose of ruling on this motion only, the undersigned has accepted this allegation as being true. The charge of discrimination, and the petition for relief subsequently filed, did not specify the relief being sought. In April 1992, Blazevski's ownership in the Inn was terminated by a court, and the Inn later closed and went out of business. Petitioner continued to work in her position as a cook after Blazevski left the Inn and until it closed. According to petitioner's counsel, Simmons seeks only compensatory damages against respondents for their conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Kenneth S. Stepp, Esquire 305 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450 David L. Wilcox, Esquire 452 Pleasant Grove Road Inverness, Florida 34452
Findings Of Fact Davis was general manager of the Florida Food Industry Credit Union from May 31, 1980 to May 30, 1985. He was a member of the Board of Directors of the Credit Union from 1980 to May 31, 1985. Davis resigned as General Manager and Director of the Credit Union effective May 31, 1985. In his letter of resignation, Davis acknowledged that he had falsely reported delinquent loans in reports to the Board of Directors for the previous eight years (including three years before he became General Manager). These reports understated the status and amount of delinquent loans. A review of loan records of the Credit Union by the Department of Banking and Finance in June, 1985, confirmed that delinquency reports to the Board of Directors and the Department had been understated over $300,000 for at least six months of 1984. Other source documents of actual loan delinquency and reports thereof could not be located by the Credit Union. The amount of loans past due two months and over were significantly understated as follows: DATE REPORTED AMOUNT REPORTED ACTUAL AMOUNT AMOUNT UNDERSTATED 12/84 $90,117.02 $415,054.48 $324,937.46 9/84 $107,792.25 $446,224.48 $348,400.50 6/30/84 $86,378.35 $454,206.15 $367,827.80 5/31/84 $85,003.54 $492,721.49 $407,717.95 4/30/84 $80,538.85 $477,767.97 $397,299.12 The June 30, 1984, Report of Condition of the Credit Union to the Department understated loans delinquent over sixty days by $367,827. Loans past due two months and over as of April 30, 1985, Report of Examination, totaled $520,600. Of this amount $348,700 were classified by the examiner as loss and $57,400 doubtful of collection. The earned net worth of the Credit Union, as of the date of the examination, was 3.8 percent of total assets. Earned net worth, adjusted for loans classified loss and 50.0 percent of loans classified doubtful of collection, was 1.4 percent of total assets. Essentially, the loans classified loss and doubtful of collection are those that were not reported by Davis. By his response to Requests for Admissions and by his letter of resignation, Davis has acknowledged that he knowingly reported the false delinquent loan information. The understatement of delinquent loans as it relates to an inflation of earned net worth could seriously prejudice the interests of the depositors, members or shareholders of the Credit Union in that inflation of earned net worth impacts on future lending policies and declaration of dividends. The Complaint seeking formal removal of Respondent as a director and officer of Florida Food Industry Credit Union was dated and served on August 29, 1985. At the time the Department of Banking and Finance issued and served the Complaint instituting these proceedings, Respondent was not an officer, director, committee member or employee of Florida Food Industry Credit Union or of any other financial institution in the State of Florida, having resigned on May 31, 1985.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Thomas E. Davis, guilty of violating Sections 655.037(1)(a) and (g), Florida Statutes, and prohibiting his participation in the affairs of any financial institution for a period of three years from May 31, 1985. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney C. Wade, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas E. Davis 1775 N. Andrews Avenue, 204W Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles Stutts General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Plaza Level, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed. findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact of Petitioner Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2 and 3. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 7. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact of Respondent Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by subjecting Petitioner to gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Southgate is a student housing and dining facility located in Tallahassee, Florida, near the campuses of Florida State University, Florida A&M University, and Tallahassee Community College. On September 16, 2004, Southgate hired Petitioner Devon Rozier as a dishwasher in the cafeteria dish room. The cafeteria is open seven days a week and currently employs approximately 34 employees, some part-time and some full-time. Petitioner had just turned 16 years old when Ken Mills hired him based upon a long-standing relationship with Petitioner's father, who had worked at Southgate for many years and was an exemplary employee. Petitioner worked as a part-time employee on the night shift, 3:30 p.m. until 8:00 p.m., for a total of 20-25 hours per week. Petitioner later received a promotion out of the dish room to the grill, and also worked other positions such as attendant and greeter. Petitioner also worked in various positions to assist as needed, as did other employees in the cafeteria. At the beginning of his employment, Petitioner exhibited good performance. As time progressed, Petitioner's performance began to decline, and he openly disrespected management. Various disciplinary techniques were employed by his supervisors in efforts to improve his performance, but the improvements always proved to be short-lived. On April 30, 2009, Petitioner and his supervisor, Rasheik Campbell, had an altercation, and Petitioner left the facility. Mr. Campbell warned Petitioner before he left the facility that such action would constitute job abandonment. Despite Mr. Campbell's warning, Petitioner left the facility. Mr. Campbell took the position that Petitioner abandoned his employment with Southgate. Petitioner was no longer placed on the schedule. On May 4, 2009, Southgate sent Petitioner a letter confirming his resignation. As months passed, Petitioner made attempts to regain his position with Southgate by calling his supervisors Mr. Campbell and Mr. Jason McClung. When his attempts were met with resistance by his supervisors, Petitioner bypassed them and went directly to Ken Mills, Southgate's General Manager and Petitioner's former supervisor. Petitioner presented his case to Mr. Mills in July and August 2009, regarding his desire to return to work. Mr. Mills had previously intervened on Petitioner's behalf, out of respect for Petitioner's father, to help him keep his job when difficulties with management had arisen. This time, Mr. Mills instructed Petitioner that Mr. McClung and Mr. Campbell were his direct supervisors and that they had ultimate responsibility regarding his desired return to work at Southgate. In August 2009, at the request of Mr. Mills, once again doing a favor for Petitioner based upon the long-standing work history of Petitioner's father at Southgate, Mr. Mills, Mr. McClung, and Mr. Campbell met with Petitioner and his mother, Jennifer Rozier. At the meeting, they discussed Petitioner's request to return to work at Southgate. During the meeting, Mr. McClung and Mr. Campbell did not feel that Petitioner exhibited any improvement in his behavior and respect for authority. As a result, Mr. McClung and Mr. Campbell chose not to re-hire Petitioner. Petitioner claims the following conduct he witnessed while working at Southgate was discriminatory: a) females were allowed to sit down at tables and eat while on the clock; b) females were allowed to use the computer while on the clock; and c) Petitioner was required to perform the females' work when they failed to show up or wanted to leave early. Petitioner further claims that his firing was retaliatory based upon one complaint he made to Mr. Campbell in February 2009 about having to perform the tasks of others who failed to come to work. Other employees, including Jodece Yant, Petitioner's girlfriend, and Darnell Rozier, Petitioner's own brother, testified that both males and females could be seen eating or using the computer while on the clock, and all were told to perform others' tasks when they failed to come to work or left early. Petitioner conceded that on occasion he engaged in the same behaviors he alleges to be discriminatory. Petitioner obtained a full-time job at Hobbit American Grill on January 21, 2010, and, as of the date of the hearing, continued to work there. His rate of pay at Hobbit American Grill is currently $7.25 per hour, and he testified he is better off there than at his former employer, Southgate. Petitioner is currently earning the same hourly wage ($7.25) as he was earning when employed at Southgate. Southgate had policies and procedures in force that prohibited, among other things, discrimination on the basis of gender or any other protected characteristics. Southgate's policies and procedures also prohibited retaliation. Petitioner received a copy of the employee handbook, which contained Southgate's anti-discrimination policies and was aware that Southgate had such policies in place.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Desiree C. Hill-Henderson, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Magnolia Avenue, Suite 1250 Orlando, Florida 32801 Micah Knight, Esquire 123 North Seventh Avenue Durant, Oklahoma 74701 Devon A. Rozier 7361 Fieldcrest Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
