Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Samuel J. Marshall, was born on November 19, 1936. In March 1986 he began employment as a truck driver hauling sand for Taylor Concrete and Supply, Inc. (Taylor) at its Palatka, Florida plant. When he began his employment with Taylor, Marshall advised his supervisor that because of his religious beliefs, he could not work on Saturdays. The name of the religion is not of record. Marshall says that after giving such notification to his employer, he was never required to work on Saturdays during his tenure with Taylor. This was not contradicted. In 1989, Taylor sold the plant to respondent, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac). As an employer with more than fifteen full-time employees, Tarmac is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Shortly after the sale, petitioner was advised that his position as a sand truck driver was being eliminated but he could transfer to a position as a ready-mix driver in the ready-mix division at the same plant. Petitioner accepted this offer effective November 28, 1989. Because the new position required the driver to work every other Saturday, petitioner advised the new plant manager, Byron White, that he could not work on Saturdays because of his religious beliefs. After Marshall produced evidence to verify his claim, White excused Marshall from working on Saturdays. Tarmac employee timecards confirm that Marshall was never required to work on a Saturday. Petitioner was required to undergo a brief period of training by riding for several weeks with a senior driver, James Bolt. During petitioner's training period, Bolt was engaged in the illicit practice of selling any concrete left in his truck at the end of the day to third parties and then pocketing the money. This was obviously contrary to company policy. Petitioner was aware of this activity but said nothing. On occasion, Bolt would give petitioner some of the illicit proceeds, which he accepted. In the first week of February 1990, or after he had completed his training with Bolt, petitioner went to White and told him that there was "illicit" activity being conducted at the plant, but he refused to disclose the nature of the activity or the name of the individual engaged in that enterprise. He also failed to tell White that Bolt had given him money. White communicated this conversation to the regional manager, Jack Stegall, but because they had no specific information on which to proceed, they were unable to investigate the allegations. Tarmac has a number of plants within each division. It is not uncommon for drivers to be transferred from one location to another, based on the varying demands of the different plants. In June 1990 Stegall decided to transfer two drivers from the Palatka plant to the Green Cove Springs plant due to increased business at the latter facility. Petitioner and another driver, Dennis Folmer, then approximately thirty years of age, were selected for transfer since they had the least seniority in the Palatka ready-mix division. After learning of Stegall's decision, petitioner contacted Stegall and advised him that he believed the company policy required that transfer decisions be made based on seniority with the company, rather than seniority in a particular position. Stegall then checked with the human resources department and learned petitioner was correct. Petitioner's name was thereafter removed from the transfer list and James Bolt, who had less seniority than petitioner, was placed on the list. During his meeting with Stegall, petitioner informed him about the illegal concrete sales that had occurred during his training period. After petitioner was told to inform White about this matter, he took White to the locations where he was with Bolt when the concrete was illegally sold. He also turned over to White the $30 he had received from Bolt. Based on Marshall's revelation, on June 25, 1990, Bolt was terminated as an employee for the unauthorized sale of concrete. Because he had come forward and disclosed the illegal activity, petitioner was only given a one-week suspension without pay. Petitioner did not question nor challenge the suspension and admitted to White that he was involved in the sales. Also, on July 11, 1990, he was given a warning notice prepared by White and which read in part as follows: Sam confessed to selling unauthorized concrete on three separate occasions. Sam also reported others involved. For this reason only Sam was given one week off. If for any reason this happens again or attempt (sic) to, Sam will be terminated. Although petitioner was handed a copy of the notice, he refused to sign it, threw it back at White and walked away. At the same time petitioner notified Stegall of the illegal concrete sales, he also asked Stegall about the possibility of transferring to Tarmac's Deland facility, which was closer to his home. Stegall indicated he would try to assist petitioner with a transfer, if possible. The next day, petitioner drive to the Deland facility and spoke with the Deland plant manager who indicated there was a ready-mix driving position available. The plant manager also agreed to contact White on petitioner's behalf. Even so, because the Palatka facility was short two drivers due to the transfer of Bolt and Folmer to Green Cove Springs, White could not afford to allow petitioner to transfer to Deland. He did promise petitioner that he would arrange for a transfer as soon as an opportunity arose which would not adversely impact the Palatka facility. After petitioner's suspension for his participation in the illegal sale of concrete, Tarmac received complaints from other Tarmac employees regarding petitioner. Believing this conduct to be detrimental to the integrity of the company and a disruption of the harmony of the work unit, Minor Turrentine, then the Tarmac area production manager, advised petitioner that if he continued to talk about the illegal sale of concrete with other drivers and customers, he would be terminated for breaching company policy, that is, disclosing confidential information that was contrary to the company's best interests. He was also given a written warning on July 16, 1990, which read as follows: You were recently suspended for your admitted involvement in certain activities that are against company policy. It has been reported that you have openly discussed these matters with employees at various locations. Be advised that any further discussion concerning your suspension and the circum- stances surrounding it will be considered breach of confidentiality, which is a violation of company policy. Any further violation of company policy will subject you to severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. After White received further complaints regarding petitioner, Tarmac terminated petitioner's employment effective August 21, 1990, for breaching company policy. The separation notice, which was dated the same date, gave the following reason for his termination: Employee was formally warned on July 16 to discuss no further his recent suspension. Discharged for further discussion on or about 8/20/90. There is no evidence as to whether petitioner was replaced by another driver, and if so, the age of that driver. When terminating petitioner, Tarmac did not do so because of petitioner's age or religious beliefs. Indeed, Marshall conceded at hearing that he had no direct proof of discrimination but merely believed he was improperly terminated for those reasons. As evidence of age discrimination, petitioner speculated that Tarmac may have been attempting to lower its insurance rates by removing an older person from its payroll, a belief based solely on a conversation he had with an insurance agent a few weeks prior to hearing. However, at least three other ready mix drivers at the Palatka plant are older than Marshall. He also speculated that because he was not required to work on Saturdays, this caused ill-will among his co-workers, and Tarmac terminated him for his religious beliefs. Again, there was no proof, either circumstantial or direct, to support this assertion. Regarding the claim that Tarmac's decision to transfer petitioner to Green Cove Springs in June 1990 was in retaliation for him telling White that working Saturdays was against his religion, the evidence shows that petitioner was removed from the transfer list once his seniority was brought to the company's attention. Petitioner also suggests that he was denied a transfer to the Deland facility in June 1990 as retaliation for his religious beliefs. However, the evidence shows that it was not feasible for Tarmac to transfer him at that time due to a shortage of drivers but Tarmac promised that an effort would be made to comply with his request when it was feasible. Petitioner did not state whether he desires reinstatement to his former position. In his petition for relief, petitioner did request "70 percent of (his) average yearly base pay since August 20 on". However, petitioner's salary at the time of discharge is not of record. Further, there was no evidence presented to establish his salary nor the monetary losses, if any, petitioner has suffered by virtue of his termination. He is currently employed with another company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5927 Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 16-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 20-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 24. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, a conclusion of law, or not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Samuel J. Marshall S. R. Box 1075 Georgetown, Florida 32139 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Donna M. Griffin, Esquire 1408 North Westshore Boulevard Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33607
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and Notice of Rights dated June 16, 2009, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The OFR is the state agency responsible for regulating mortgage brokerage and mortgage lending in the State of Florida and for licensing and regulating mortgage brokers. §§ 494.0011(1); 494.0033(2), Fla. Stat. At the time of the final hearing, Mr. Razor held an inactive mortgage broker's license. The license was inactive because Mr. Razor did not apply for a renewal of his license when it expired on August 31, 2009. His license could be reactivated should he submit an application for renewal. Mr. Razor was a member of the Florida Bar and a practicing attorney in Florida until, in an opinion issued September 11, 2007, the Florida Supreme Court ordered Mr. Razor suspended from the practice of law for a period of 18 months. See Florida Bar v. Razor, 973 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 2007). In its opinion, the court approved the findings of fact contained in the Report of the Referee; approved the Referee's findings that Mr. Razor had violated Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.2, 3-4.3, 4-5.3(b), and 4-8.4(a); and approved the Referee's recommendation that Mr. Razor's license to practice law be suspended for a period of 18 months. Pertinent to this proceeding, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 3.4-3 provides: The standards of professional conduct to be observed by members of the bar are not limited to the observance of rules and avoidance of prohibited acts, and the enumeration herein of certain categories of misconduct as constituting grounds for discipline shall not be deemed to be all- inclusive nor shall the failure to specify any particular act of misconduct be construed as tolerance thereof. The commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is committed in the course of the attorney's relations as an attorney or otherwise, whether committed within or outside the state of Florida, and whether or not the act is a felony or misdemeanor, may constitute a cause for discipline. The Referee based his recommendation that Mr. Razor's license to practice law be suspended for 18 months on "Respondent's [Mr. Razor's] conduct in allowing his collaborator (a suspended attorney) to practice law in an attempt to extort money; his ratification of the misconduct by failing to take immediate remedial action; his attempts to cover for the suspended attorney by defending the letter during the Bar investigation; and his inconsistent defense (lack of knowledge) at the live and final hearings." These acts constitute dishonest dealing. Mr. Razor's license to practice law was suspended 30 days after September 11, 2007, or on October 11, 2007. Mr. Razor did not report the suspension to the OFR because he did not believe it to be a reportable offense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order finding that Arthur Nathan Razor violated Section 494.0041(2)(i) and (p), Florida Statutes, and revoking his Florida mortgage broker's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the Charges of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. Randstad is an employment services provider that assists clients with the placement of qualified candidates for available employment positions. BOA is a national financial institution. Randstad Petitioner applied for a Mortgage Customer Service Position that Randstad posted in August 2012. Petitioner was not hired for the position. Minda Hampel, an assistant branch manager for Randstad, testified that Randstad does not place candidates in every job that it posts. Ranstad's business records show a Mortgage Customer Service position was posted in August 2012; however, there are no facts or information contained in Randstad's business records to demonstrate that it assisted the hiring employer in filling or placing a candidate in that position. Ms. Hampel credibly testified that she had never met or spoken with Petitioner, and, therefore, was unaware of his race when the Mortgage Customer Service position was posted in August 2012. In October 2012, Randstad assisted one of its clients, MDVIP, with filling an available Purchasing Specialist Position. Petitioner applied for the position. Josh Rabine, a Randstad employee, credibly testified that, when Petitioner applied for the position, Mr. Rabine was unaware of Petitioner's race. Mr. Rabine further testified credibly that Petitioner did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position and that another applicant, who possessed over ten years of experience in purchasing management, was qualified for the position. Mr. Rabine did not decide which candidate would be awarded the position, and, ultimately, the position was filled by one of MDVIP's internal candidates. In November 2012, Ranstad assisted one of its clients, CWB Home Solutions, with filling an available position as an Outside Sales Manager. The position required prior experience with sales of audiovisual equipment and home systems. Petitioner applied for the position. Chelsea Arnold, a staffing manager for Randstad, credibly testified that Petitioner did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position. Ms. Arnold further testified that of the 12 applicants for the position, another individual was chosen who possessed over ten years' experience selling audiovisual and video equipment and home integrating security systems. Ms. Arnold credibly testified that she was unaware of Petitioner's race and that the client, CWB Home Solutions, ultimately made the decision to hire the alternative candidate. Bank of America On November 2, 2012, and January 4, 2013, Petitioner submitted online applications for Mortgage Loan Specialist ("MLS") positions with BOA in Boca Raton and Palm Beach Gardens. BOA's online application system is race-neutral. Petitioner did not identify his race on his online applications. Jorge Trujillo, the BOA corporate recruiter for the above-referenced positions, credibly testified that he has never met nor spoken with Petitioner. Mr. Trujillo testified that BOA was seeking candidates with sales experience, mortgage sales experience, and relational ties to the respective communities. Additionally, as the positions were located in South Florida, it was desirable for the candidate to be bilingual. The 2012 position was not filled because BOA cancelled the requisition.1/ Concerning the remaining MLS position, 31 candidates applied. Petitioner was not hired for the position. Petitioner had never worked in the Boca Raton or Palm Beach area and did not possess any mortgage sales experience. Mr. Trujillo testified that the candidate who was hired was an internal BOA candidate who had progressed from teller to personal banker and possessed relational connections with existing customers, as well as in the surrounding market. The hired candidate was bilingual (Creole), and African- American. Mr. Trujillo credibly testified that neither he nor anyone else involved in the hiring process was aware of Petitioner's race or that Petitioner had previously asserted a discrimination claim against BOA. Petitioner Petitioner failed to present any persuasive evidence that Respondents were aware of his race during the application process for any of the above-referenced positions. Petitioner failed to present any evidence regarding his employment qualifications in general or as specifically related to the above-referenced positions. Indeed, Petitioner's only evidence in this regard is his bald assertion that he was qualified for the positions to which he applied. Petitioner failed to present any evidence that he was equally or more qualified than the candidates hired for the above-referenced positions. Petitioner also failed to present any evidence that the above-referenced positions that he applied for remained open or were filled with individuals outside his protected class. The entirety of Petitioner's evidence in support of a retaliatory motive is set forth below: . . . it's been two years since I've been unemployed, seeking employment, and every position that I applied for or that I'm qualified for for different companies have pretty much sent automated response stating that we filled the position, and, for one person to apply for that many jobs for a long period of time, I feel that I'm being retaliated against, and I also was abused. Randstad and Bank of America refused to hire me and denied me of a job opportunity for positions that I'm qualified for. Ranstad also stated that there are other qualified applicants more qualified and they hired them instead of me, which is the statement that I'm making that I'm being retaliated against for full-time jobs that I'm qualified for. And, again, like I said before, a two-year gap in my employment is a sign of retaliation. The undersigned finds that Petitioner failed to present any credible evidence of a causal connection between BOA's failure-to-hire Petitioner and his previously asserted claim of discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the respective Petitions for Relief against Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from his position as a janitor with Respondent because of his handicap, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lee, was hired by Respondent in August 1994 as a custodial worker at the Tallahassee Mall in Tallahassee, Florida. As a janitor Petitioner's duties included bending, stooping, and lifting. He was assigned to zone 3 in the Mall. Up until 1996, when Petitioner was injured, Petitioner received good evaluations on his job performance. Indeed Petitioner was very proud of the quality of his work and took special care to do his job well. Sometime prior to May 20, 1996, Petitioner, while at work and in the scope of his employment, stepped on a set of stairs which were not properly attached to a stage in the Tallahassee Mall. The steps slipped causing Petitioner's feet to come out from under him. Petitioner fell flat on his back. As a consequence Petitioner suffered a permanent back injury for which he received workers' compensation. The injury impairs his ability to work and therefore is a handicap. Around May 20, 1996, Petitioner was released by his doctor and was given orders for light duty with no bending, stooping, or heavy lifting. Petitioner gave these orders to his supervisor, Mr. Navin, when he returned to work on May 20, 1996. Respondent had light duty work available which Petitioner was qualified to perform. However, Respondent did not assign Petitioner to light duty work, but changed his work area from zone 3 to zone 1. Zone 1 is located at the front entrance to the mall and requires more work to maintain. Petitioner attempted to perform his duties but could only work for 3 1/2 hours before being overcome by pain from his injury. Petitioner could not work the next four working days because of the aggravation of his injury. On May 28, 1996, after returning to work, Petitioner was again given full duty work. Petitioner attempted to perform his custodial duties for about 2 weeks. However, the pain from his injury was so severe he again requested light duty work. Petitioner's supervisor asked Petitioner to bring him another notice from his doctor. Petitioner's doctor faxed the supervisor a second notice and Petitioner was placed on light duty work. Once Petitioner was placed on light duty work, the mall manager, Mr. Renninger, followed Petitioner around the mall watching him all the time while he worked. On July 8, 1996, prior to the mall opening for business, Petitioner was helping one of the mall store owners with a problem. Such aid was part of Petitioner's job. The mall manager walked up to Petitioner and began to yell at him in a very rude and disrespectful manner. The manager would not listen to Petitioner's explanation of the event. The manager gave Petitioner a written disciplinary notice for his aid to the mall store owner. The manager continued to follow Petitioner around the mall while he worked. Sometime around August 15, 1996, the mall manager advised the mall's employees that they should take their respective vacations prior to October. Petitioner thought it would be a good time for him to take the 4-day vacation time he had accumulated during his employment with the mall. He could use the time to allow his back to heal more. On August 15, 1996, Petitioner requested vacation leave and vacation pay for the period beginning September 3, 1996 and ending September 9, 1996. Initially, the request was denied. Petitioner's supervisor felt he had missed too much work and been late too often. However, Petitioner had only been absent or late in relation to his back injury. Petitioner explained that fact to his supervisor. His supervisor agreed and approved Petitioner's vacation. Petitioner returned to work on August 10, 1996. An argument with the administrative assistant occurred when she refused to recognize that Petitioner was entitled to be paid for his vacation time. She was not going to turn in any time for him so that Petitioner could get paid while on vacation. Getting a paycheck was a serious matter to Petitioner, and Petitioner, understandably, became gruff with the administrative assistant. Petitioner only raised his voice at the administrative assistant. He was not abusive and did not curse at her. In fact, the administrative assistant yelled at Petitioner when he raised the subject of his pay "Now, before you start bitching." Petitioner called the headquarters of Respondent and confirmed he had vacation time and pay accrued. After this incident Petitioner was fired ostensibly for mistreating the administrative assistant. The administrative assistant, who was incorrect, was not terminated. The reason appears to be a pretext. Petitioner's pay was $5.35 per hour and he worked a 40-hour-work-week. After his termination, Petitioner actively sought employment but could not find any until September 1, 1997. At that time he began work for Tallahassee Community College as a custodial worker with light duties at a higher rate of pay. Petitioner's search for work was reasonable.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner and awarding Petitioner backpay in the amount of $11,770.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2000.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(2). Lloyd A. Perry was formerly an employee of the Respondent, and a public employee within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(3). Dana E. Pratt was formerly an employee of the Respondent, and a public employee within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(3). Prior to February 17, 1976, Lloyd A. Perry was employed by the Citrus County Road Department for a period of over four years. Immediately prior to the time that his employment was terminated, Perry was a roller operator. Except for rare occasions when he performed work as a flagman, or other work in conjunction with his roller work, Perry operated a tandem road roller. For the several months prior to February, 1976, Perry had continuously operated the same roller machine. Prior to February, 1976, none of Perry's supervisors informed him that his work was unsatisfactory, reprimanded him for performing work in an unsatisfactory manner, or indicated to him in any way that his job was in jeopardy for unsatisfactory performance of his duties. Dana E. Pratt had been employed by the Citrus County Road Department for approximately five years prior to February, 1976. For four years prior to that date he had been a motor grader operator. Pratt had annually received formal evaluations and his evaluations had always been very good. Prior to February, 1976, Pratt had never been criticized for below average or unsatisfactory work. He had never received any written reprimand for unsatisfactory performance on the job. From approximately December, 1973 until February, 1976, Perry had operated the newest grader machine in use by the Citrus County Road Department. No one else had operated the machine since it was acquired by the Citrus County Road Department. During February, 1976, Thomas Hutchinson was the Citrus County Road Superintendent. William Hitt was thee Assistant Road Superintendent. Hutchinson and Hitt served under the direction of the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners. Perry, Pratt, and numerous other employees of the Citrus County Road Department had, prior to February, 1976, become dissatisfied with conditions in the Road Department, primarily the manner of direction given the department by Hutchinson and Hitt. On Sunday, February 8, 1976, Perry drafted a petition specifying numerous grievances against Hutchinson and Hitt. It was his intention to secure the signatures of employees of the Road Department on the petition, and to present it to the Board of County Commissioners. Perry sought the assistance of County Commissioner DeBusk in drafting the petition. DeBusk offered several suggestions and his daughter typed the petition for Perry. Perry secured six or seven signatures on that Sunday. He was the first person to sign the petition, and Dana Pratt was the third. On Monday, February 9, Pratt informed his office that he had business to attend to and would not be at work that day. He did not claim sick leave for the time he missed. Prior to work and during the lunch hour he called as many employees of the Road Department as he could. After working hours he waited at a business establishment called the "Country Store" which was located in close proximity to the place where Road Department employees checked out of work. Forty-six employees of the Road Department signed the petition. Dana Pratt assisted in soliciting people to sign the petition. There was no evidence offered at the hearing from which it could be determined that those persons signing the petition did so other than freely and voluntarily. On Tuesday, February 10, 1976, Perry called his supervisor, Mr. Hutchinson, and told him that he had business to attend to. Hutchinson asked him if he was going to solicit more signatures. Perry told him that he was not. The Board of County Commissioners was meeting on that date, and Perry presented the petition to the Board. Members of the Board discussed the petition at length during the meeting. One commissioner asked Perry if he was big enough to go back to work and forget about the matter. Perry said that he was. On February 11, 1976 Perry returned to work at the regular time. Rather than being assigned to his regular duty as a roller operator, he was assigned to flag traffic for a grader operator. He continued in that capacity until Tuesday, February 17. On that date, at approximately 11:00 or 11:30 A.M. Tom Morton, the grader foreman, informed Perry that his employment was terminated as of 1:00 P.M. on that date. Both Morton and William Hitt told Perry that they did not know why he was fired. Dana Pratt attended the County Commission meeting on February 10. He was asked about whether he threatened a Road Department employee named Langley with respect to signing the petition. Pratt told the County Commission that he did not threaten Langley, and no evidence was offered at the hearing to establish that he did. On February 12, 1976, Pratt used the new grader machine that he had been using for some time prior thereto. At the end of that day his supervisors informed him that he would be using the oldest machine in the Department thereafter. He began using it on February 13. It took some time to get it started on that date. It also took some time to get it started on Monday, February 16. This was an old machine, and had been difficult to start for some years prior to the time that it was assigned to Pratt. At 12:30 on February 17, 1976, Tom Morton informed Pratt that his employment was terminated as of 1:00 P.M. on that date. Pratt was never given any reasons for his termination. On February 17, 1976, the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners acted to terminate the employment of Perry and Pratt. These actions were taken upon the recommendation of Mr. Hutchinson. Ostensibly the reason for Pratt's termination was that he had marked out on sick leave on a day when he was not sick. Ostensibly the reason for Perry's termination was that he had been missing from the job for approximately an hour. The evidence would not support a finding that Perry and Pratt were fired for these reasons. These reasons offered by Hutchinson, and followed by the Board of County Commissioners, were used as a ruse. On February 18, 1976, the day after Pratt and Perry were fired, Hutchinson called a meeting of all employees of the Road Department. Hutchinson told the employees that he had nothing to do with the termination, but he also told them that he would tolerate no more petitions and that if anyone did not like working conditions at the Road Department they could leave. He said that he had four County Commissioners in his pocket, and he reminded the employees that unemployment in Citrus County was high. He told the employees that he would take care of any petitions they distributed. During the week the petition was distributed, Hutchinson told one employee of the Road Department, James Johnson, that Johnson could be put in jail for signing the petition. During that same week he told his assistant superintendent, William Hitt, that all of the men who signed the petition had to go. After Perry and Pratt were fired, Hutchinson told Hitt that he got two, and he would get the rest. The basis for Hutchinson's recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners that Perry and Pratt be terminated was the fact that they participated in the distribution of the petition, and presenting it to the Board of County Commissioners. There was no evidence offerred at the hearing to indicate that any members of the Board of County Commissioners knew Hutchinson was presenting false reasons for the terminations; however, they did act to adopt the recommendation. The Board of County Commissioners did know that Pratt and Perry were among the leaders in distributing the petition highly critical of Hutchinson's work, and was clearly on notice that Hutchinson may have ulterior motives in recommending their dismissal.
The Issue Whether Petitioner demonstrated that she was terminated from employment by Respondent, Florida Department of Health- Volusia (Respondent or FDOH-Volusia), as the result of an unlawful employment practice based on her identification with a protected class, or as retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to a practice which is an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a provider of health services in Volusia County, Florida. Among the programs administered by FDOH-Volusia is the Women, Infants, and Children program (WIC). WIC is a federally-funded nutrition program, which provides healthy foods, nutrition education and counseling, breastfeeding support, and referrals for health care and community services. At all times relevant to this proceeding, FDOH-Volusia operated WIC health clinics in Daytona Beach, New Smyrna Beach, Orange City, and Pierson. Petitioner began working for FDOH-Volusia in June 2010, as a nutrition program director. In her capacity as nutrition program director, Petitioner was responsible for certain management activities of WIC. The State of Florida maintains close supervision of WIC. FDOH-Volusia is required to provide an annual Nutrition Plan (the Plan) to the State. The Plan is a report of WIC operations, sites, hours of operation, various objectives, local agency plans for increasing participation, local agency disaster plan, and staffing. As nutrition program director, Petitioner is responsible for preparing the Plan, and submitting it for revisions and/or final approval by FDOH-Volusia’s administrator. Ms. Boswell became the administrator of FDOH-Volusia on or about April 1, 2016. Dr. Husband, who is African-American, became Petitioner’s direct supervisor beginning in July 2016. As Petitioner’s direct supervisor, Dr. Husband provided oversight of WIC. In 2016, FDOH-Volusia consolidated its Deland and Deltona WIC offices into the office in Orange City. Petitioner was very involved in the move and was, during the period of the move, reassigned from her primary duties in Daytona Beach to duties in Orange City. By all accounts, the move went well. On September 23, 2016, Ms. Boswell requested that Petitioner meet with her and Dr. Husband to discuss the draft Plan provided by Petitioner on September 21, 2016, and for Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband to provide comments, suggestions, and revisions to the Plan, which was due for submission to the State of Florida on September 30, 2016. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the steps necessary to get the Plan in final form for submission. At the onset of the September 23, 2016, meeting, Ms. Boswell complimented Petitioner and her staff for getting DOH-Volusia’s new Orange City location “up and going.” Petitioner responded that “it’s good to hear something positive after so much negative.” The comment was directed at Dr. Husband, who Petitioner thought had been negative towards various aspects of her job performance. Petitioner’s comment led to tensions between Petitioner and Dr. Husband. Both said, at one time or another during the meeting, words to the effect of “don’t speak to me like that.” Ms. Boswell became a little uncomfortable with the interaction between the two. During the September 23, 2016, meeting, a number of deficiencies in the draft Plan were identified, including grammatical and syntax errors, discussion that did not align with the corresponding graphs, and a lack of data to support the Plan conclusions. Dr. Husband gave guidance and feedback on the Plan. Ms. Boswell indicated that, but for Petitioner’s comment regarding Dr. Husband’s negativity, the meeting was otherwise professional. At the hearing, Petitioner explained that Dr. Husband made other negative comments to her at various times, stating that at a meeting with the director of nursing regarding WIC work schedules, Dr. Husband said “we’re not going to nitpick”; and that on another occasion during a discussion on the difficulty of recruiting and retaining staff at base salary, Dr. Husband said to Petitioner “that’s the way you designed it.” According to Petitioner, Dr. Husband made similar comments to other of her direct reports. Dr. Husband testified at the hearing that she thought -- before and after the September 23, 2016, meeting -- that Petitioner was insubordinate, disrespectful to employees and supervisors, and rude. Petitioner would take meeting notes in red ink when she perceived instances of “negativity” and “unacceptable behavior” from her direct supervisor, which she described as her “red flag system.” Petitioner argued that since she “spoke up and spoke out” during the September 23, 2016, meeting, she has been the subject of retaliation by Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband. She expressed her belief that Ms. Boswell was upset that Petitioner criticized Dr. Husband because Dr. Husband was Ms. Boswell’s direct report, i.e., that Petitioner’s criticism “was a reflection on her.” On or about October 5, 2016, Petitioner was informed that her duty station was being changed from Daytona Beach to New Smyrna Beach. Petitioner testified that she posed four questions to Dr. Husband as to the reasons for the transfer and that, in her opinion, Dr. Husband’s responses did not justify the action. Petitioner felt that as the WIC nutrition program director, she should be in Daytona Beach, the largest administrative office. Thus, Petitioner could think of no reason for the move other than retaliation for her criticism of Dr. Husband. Ms. Boswell testified credibly that the reason for Petitioner’s transfer was that New Smyrna Beach was reopening WIC services at the office. In light of how well things went with the opening of the Orange City office, she wanted Petitioner to go to New Smyrna Beach to make sure that location was up and running. She testified that the reassignment was not a punishment, rather, “that was her job” to make sure WIC was running well. Her testimony is credited. In addition to the fact that Dr. Boswell had perfectly legitimate reasons for having Petitioner cover the New Smyrna Beach office, it is clear that Petitioner suffered no adverse employment action as a result. Petitioner lives between Daytona Beach and New Smyrna Beach, and the New Smyrna Beach office is no further from her home than the Daytona Beach office. Petitioner’s pay was not changed, her title was not changed, and her benefits were not changed.1/ More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the change in duty station had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. On or about October 18, 2016, Petitioner received a Documented Counseling and Performance Notification (Documented Counseling) from Dr. Husband. The Documented Counseling included a number of deficiencies in performance, and several corrective measures. The deficiencies included: that Petitioner failed to monitor and spend allocated WIC funding during the 2015-16 fiscal year; that the Plan submitted by Petitioner was rejected by the administrator for lack of detail, grammatical errors, and poor work product, and when the Plan was finally completed it was discovered that Petitioner’s staff performed the majority of the work; that the WIC participation rate (65 percent) was significantly less than the program goal (85 percent); and that Petitioner failed to support efforts to refer WIC clients to the dental hygienist at the Orange City location. The Documented Counseling also reflected that Petitioner had been disrespectful to Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband. Petitioner refused to sign the Documented Counseling to acknowledge her receipt. Petitioner provided excuses for the deficiencies noted, e.g., she used most of the allocated WIC funding; the draft Plan was mostly complete, and she had never before been required to submit a draft nine days before its final submission date; she was only required to increase WIC participation by four percent per year; it was not in the WIC scope of work to facilitate clients to get dental services, just to refer them; she objected to co-location of the dental hygienist in the WIC office and, in any event, referrals were not the responsibility of management, only staff. None of Petitioner’s explanations were convincing. Rather, the testimony of Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband that the Documented Counseling was completely performance-based and had nothing to do with the September 23, 2016, meeting, was compelling and is accepted. More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the Documented Counseling had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. On or about December 16, 2016, Petitioner received an oral reprimand. The oral reprimand noted that Petitioner violated prior instruction and FDOH-Volusia written policy regarding absence from work and reporting such absences to her supervisor by telephone. The oral reprimand was documented. Petitioner refused to sign the oral reprimand documentation to acknowledge her receipt. Petitioner acknowledged that prior notice of absences is important so that FDOH-Volusia could make sure personnel were available to perform clinical services. Despite Petitioner’s prior knowledge that she would not be at work on November 28, 2016, she did not call her supervisor, Dr. Husband, until after 8:00 a.m. on November 28, 2016. She left an earlier voicemail with a direct report. The testimony of Ms. Boswell and Dr. Husband that the oral reprimand was completely performance-based and had nothing to do with the September 23, 2016, meeting, was compelling and is accepted. More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the oral reprimand had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. On April 12, 2017, Petitioner was required to participate in an investigatory interview to determine why she was absent from her duty station on numerous occasions between January 4, 2017, and April 10, 2017. Petitioner testified that she saw no problem in coming to work late since, if she was not scheduled for clinic duties, there was no adverse affect on staff or the clinic. Petitioner thought the investigatory interview for her failure to be at work during scheduled hours “was a bit harsh,” and felt that FDOH-Volusia was “monitoring her coming and going.” She testified that the monitoring of her “daily schedule, coming and going,” was related to the September 23, 2016, meeting. Petitioner provided information on her “tardies” to Ms. Ayers. Ms. Ayers had by then been assigned as Petitioner’s supervisor since Petitioner had, in another act of “speaking up and speaking out,” filed a formal grievance against Dr. Husband for retaliation.2/ Ms. Boswell testified convincingly that Petitioner was not authorized to unilaterally “flex” her time; that an agency cannot be run when employees alter their schedules without notice; and that Petitioner’s excessive absences from her duty station violated the Employees’ Handbook. The documentation provided by Petitioner was deemed to be insufficient to justify her absences, and did not explain why Petitioner failed to get approval from a supervisor before modifying her work schedule. Thereafter, on or about June 22, 2017, Petitioner received a written reprimand for the absences. Petitioner refused to sign the written reprimand to acknowledge her receipt. The testimony of Ms. Boswell and Ms. Ayers that the written reprimand was completely performance-based and had nothing to do with the September 23, 2016, meeting, was compelling and is accepted. More to the point, Petitioner neither pled nor proved that the written reprimand had anything to do with discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; that it was taken because Petitioner opposed any practice engaged in by FDOH-Volusia based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status; or that it was based on Petitioner having made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing regarding conduct based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. The June 22, 2017, written reprimand was the last of the retaliatory actions for the September 23, 2016, meeting alleged by Petitioner. Petitioner has alleged that the October 5, 2016, change in duty station; the October 18, 2016, Documented Counseling; the December 16, 2016, oral reprimand; the April 12, 2017, investigatory interview; and the June 22, 2017, written reprimand were all unwarranted retaliation for the statement she made during the September 23, 2016, meeting, i.e., that Dr. Husband had been negative towards her. Petitioner acknowledged that there was “some truth” in the discipline, but lots of “fluff.” To the contrary, the evidence is convincing that, if anything, FDOH-Volusia was, and remains, exceedingly lenient and accommodating to Petitioner with regard to the substantiated discipline meted out. As set forth previously, Petitioner has not been terminated or demoted, and has not suffered a pay decrease or a decrease in benefits. While her duty station was moved from Daytona Beach to New Smyrna Beach, those locations are approximately the same distance from Petitioner’s home, and she has since been moved back to Daytona Beach for “need” related reasons. Respondent in this case presented hours of compelling testimony from multiple credible witnesses regarding Petitioner’s poor management skills, poor interpersonal skills, poor leadership skills; her tense, argumentative, and disrespectful attitude; and more. The testimony was, presumably, offered to demonstrate that FDOH-Volusia had a legitimate, non- discriminatory basis for the alleged adverse employment actions taken against Petitioner. The testimony and evidence was unnecessary. Not once during the course of the hearing did Petitioner allege or argue that the actions taken as described herein had anything to do with discrimination or retaliation based on race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. Petitioner stated that the actions taken against her were the result of her having “spoken up and spoken out” against negative comments from her supervisor, Dr. Husband. There was nothing raised in Petitioner’s Employment Complaint of Discrimination, in her Petition for Relief, in her statement of position in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, in the testimony and evidence that she offered at the final hearing, or in her Proposed Recommended Order that even intimates that FDOH-Volusia committed an unlawful employment practice as established in section 760.10, Florida Statutes. As will be discussed herein, the failure to allege, argue, or prove discrimination or retaliation based on a protected class or opposition to an unlawful act constitutes a failure to meet the most basic jurisdictional element of an unlawful employment practice complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner, Lisa J. Funchess’s Petition for Relief, FCHR No. 201701356. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 2019.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner when her employment assignment with Respondent was terminated in November 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 48-year-old African-American female. On or about September 10, 2004, Petitioner was placed with AT&T Wireless as a customer service specialist by a staffing agency, AppleOne. Petitioner's job duties as a customer service specialist included answering phone calls from AT&T Wireless' customers about their bills and assisting them with problems that they were having with their accounts. For the most part, Petitioner received positive feedback regarding her job performance as a customer service specialist. That feedback, which is reflected on the Advisor Evaluation Detail forms received into evidence as Exhibit P7, came from her supervisors as well as from quality assurance specialists. Petitioner testified that she generally got along well with her co-workers,2 but that she preferred getting assistance and taking instruction from men rather than women. After AT&T Wireless was taken over by Cingular, Petitioner and the other customer service specialists working for AT&T Wireless were required to attend a two-week training class regarding Cingular’s policies and procedures. The training class attended by Petitioner was also attended by her supervisor, Wendy Miller. Ms. Miller is a white female. On the first day of the class, Petitioner was having trouble logging into the computer system that was being used in the training class. Ms. Miller, who was sitting directly behind Petitioner, attempted to ask Petitioner a question about the problems that she was having and/or provide her assistance, but Petitioner simply ignored Ms. Miller. According to Petitioner, she ignored Ms. Miller because she was trying to pay attention to the teacher. As a result of this incident, Ms. Miller sent an e-mail to AppleOne dated November 30, 2004, which stated in pertinent part: It has been decided by Sandy Camp and myself to end [Petitioner’s] temporary assignment due to insubordination. She has been coached on her attitude for which she is not receptive to and several other people have mentioned that they do not want to help her due to her not wanting to listen. The last incident was today during our CSE class where she demonstrated insubordination and disrespect to me. In a later e-mail, dated March 7, 2005, Ms. Miller described the incident in the training class as follows: [Petitioner] was one of the reps not able to get into [the computer] system so I was attempting to assist her because she was sitting directly in front of me. I attempted to ask her a question and she turned her back to me & put up her hand as to say “don’t speak to me” and she completely ignored me even as I kept speaking to her. . . . . The descriptions of the incident in Ms. Miller’s e- mails are materially the same as Petitioner’s description of the incident in her testimony at the hearing. On the evening of November 30, 2004, Petitioner was called by someone at AppleOne and told that her assignment with Cingular had been terminated. Petitioner was paid by AppleOne during her entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular. Petitioner’s salary while she was working at AT&T Wireless and Cingular remained constant at $10 per hour. Petitioner’s entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular was approximately two months. Petitioner testified that she did not receive any other assignments through AppleOne after her assignment with Cingular was terminated. She attributed her inability to get other assignments through AppleOne to the fact that AppleOne "sided with" Cingular, who was its client, but there is insufficient evidence to make such a finding. In January 2005, Petitioner filed separate charges of discrimination with the Commission against AppleOne and Cingular. According to Petitioner, she was paid $400 by AppleOne to settle her claim against that company. Petitioner testified that she sold vacation plans and did other “odd jobs” between November 2004 and mid-February 2005 when she was hired by Sears as a home delivery specialist. Her job duties in that position include contacting customers to coordinate the delivery of appliances purchased from Sears. Petitioner testified that her initial salary with Sears was $9 per hour and that as of the date of the hearing her salary was $10 per hour. Petitioner testified that other customer service specialists had “problems” or “personality conflicts” with Ms. Miller, but she was unable to identify any other employee (of any race or age) who was similarly insubordinate or disrespectful towards Ms. Miller (or any other supervisor) and who received discipline less severe than termination. Petitioner’s actions toward Ms. Miller during the training class were disrespectful, at a minimum. Petitioner testified that Ms. Miller acted like a white supremacist, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner also testified that AT&T Wireless and Cingular did not have any permanent customer service specialists that were as old as she, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner presented no credible evidence regarding the race, age, or other characteristics of the person who filled her position at Cingular after her assignment was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing with prejudice Petitioner’s discrimination claim against Cingular. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent aided and abetted an unlicensed contractor to engage in contracting by pulling permits for the unlicensed contractor; whether Respondent failed to qualify a firm for whom he was acting as licensed contractor; whether Respondent acted in the capacity of a contractor other than in his own name; and, whether Respondent violated local building codes as alleged in Second Amended Administrative Complaint filed 6-30-89, and Administrative Complaint filed 7-26-89.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Fred S. Petersen was licensed as a general contractor by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (FCILB) and issued License Nos. CG C023928 and CB CA23929 (Exhibit 1). Neither American Weatherall Industries Inc. (AWI), Mel C. Wyatt, nor Steven C. Wyatt were licensed as contractors by the FCILB (Exhibit 2). Prior to mid-August 1987, Kirk Evenstad was the qualifying general contractor for AWI. By letter dated August 20, 1987, AWI proclaimed Kirk Evenstad to be no longer working for AWI because of mismanagement (Exhibit 3). Mel Wyatt, President of AWI, testified that Everstad had stolen between $30,000 and $50,000 of materials from AWI, leaving AWI in a precarious financial situation. In order to continue in business to work out of the financial hole created by Everstad, AWI, through one of its employees, Danny O'Brien, introduced Mel Wyatt to Respondent. Respondent had known O'Brien for some 20 years and, for the proposed reason of helping O'Brien, Respondent agreed to act as qualifying contractor for AWI. To carry out this project, Respondent entered into a contract (Exhibit 4) or Employment Agreement dated July 31, 1987, in which Respondent agreed to supervise construction of projects contracted for by AWI, but the latter was to provide all material and handle all financial aspects of the contracts. Respondent received $1000 for signing this agreement and was to receive a percentage of the gross proceeds of future contracts entered into by AWI. Respondent authorized O'Brien to pull permits for AWI pursuant to Respondent's contractor's license. Although Respondent testified he gave O'Brien authorization for each specific permit pulled and did not believe he signed Exhibit 11, dated August 11, 1987, a copy of General Authorization for O'Brien to pull permits for AWI under Respondent's license, it is found as a fact that Respondent signed the original of Exhibit 11 which is a copy. Within a short period of time after executing Exhibit 4, Respondent became aware of the financial difficulties facing AWI and ceased his efforts to qualify AWI. In the latter part of 1987 (believed to be November-December), AWI reached the point that it could no longer remain solvent and filed for bankruptcy leaving several contracts unfinished for which AWI had received partial payment. Of the four contracts entered into between AWI and homeowners for additions to their houses (Exhibits 7-9 and 14), all were entered into under a printed document showing Everstad's license number; however, the building permits for Exhibits 7-9 were pulled under Respondent's license. By agreement dated August 10, 1987 (Exhibit 7), Alfred and Marjory Hauk contracted with AWI to convert a garage at their home into an office. Hauk made payments of $1000 and $2300 to AWI, the permit for the work was pulled by O'Brien under Respondent's license, but no work was ever done under this contract. AMI subsequently went out of business, and Hauk received no refund of the monies he had paid to AMI. Hauk never met Respondent. On June 12, 1987, John Davis contracted with AWI to convert an existing garage to bedroom and bath and add a garage to his home. The initial permit for this work was pulled by Kenn Covicc as contractor on June 21, 1987, and a subsequent permit was pulled by O'Brien using Respondent's license. Although Davis paid over $6000 to AWI for this work, the work stopped after the footing for the garage addition was poured. On June 2, 1987, Albert Charette entered into a contract with AWI to add a room to his house. Charette paid some $9300 of the $34,400 contract amount during the progress of the work. Differences arose between Charette and AWI involving whether the construction was being done in accordance with the plans and specifications. In September, 1987, Respondent met with Charette and submitted a proposal (Exhibit 15) to Charette to complete the project in accordance with the plans and specifications. About one week after Exhibit 15 was signed, all work stopped on the project, and Respondent never received compensation or commenced work on this contract, which he had entered into in his own name and not as a representative of AWI.
Recommendation It is recommended that Fred S. Petersen be found guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(e), (f) and (g), Florida Statutes, and assessed a monetary fine of $3000. ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner are accepted, except: Finding #7, penultimate sentence which is rejected as uncorroborated hearsay. Finding #11, that portion stating the purpose of Petersen's visit to Charette was to change the licensure on the permit to Petersen is rejected. See HO #13. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent are accepted, except: Finding #4, Accepted, except with regard to Respondent's notification of termination of his association with AWI. No documentation of this act was submitted and, even though Respondent may have ultimately revoked O'Brien's authority to pull permits, this was done well after the permits were pulled. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Jurand, Esquire G. W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Brian A. Burden, Esquire Post Office Box 2893 Tampa, FL 33601 Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
