The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Republic Parking System, Inc., operates paid parking lots and facilities at a variety of public and private locations. One of its locations is at the Northwest Florida Beaches International Airport in Panama City, Florida. As part of its operations, Republic maintains an equal- employment opportunity, anti-sexual harassment and non- discrimination policy. The policy also prohibits harassment at work by anyone, including supervisors, co-workers or customers. The evidence showed that the policy is disseminated to its employees in its Employee Handbook and is consistently enforced by the company. Under its Employee Handbook the company generally follows a progressive-disciplinary policy for violations of company policy, with increasing penalties ranging from reprimands to dismissal. However, certain violations of policy, such as use of abusive language or being discourteous to customers, supervisors or fellow employees, may result in immediate dismissal. In October of 2010, Petitioner, Joni Barkley, an African-American, was employed by Respondent as a parking booth cashier at the international airport in Panama City. Upon employment, Ms. Barkley received a copy of Republic Parking System, Inc.’s Employee Handbook and signed an acknowledgement of her receipt of that handbook. She was aware of the company’s policy regarding discrimination and harassment. During her tenure and prior to the end of December 2013 or early 2014, Ms. Barkley had no complaints of racial discrimination or harassment towards her. On the other hand, she had been verbally counseled about a remark she made that co- employees had interpreted as racially motivated. Respondent also had been disciplined for repeated tardiness. Additionally, during her employment, Ms. Barkley was known for misinterpreting statements of others and believing innocent statements or actions by others were directed at her. Towards the end of December 2013 or early January of 2014, one of Ms. Barkley’s co-workers, Eva Bishop, a Caucasian, showed her co-workers, including Ms. Barkley, several photographs and a video of her trip to Alaska. Among the photos she showed to everyone was a picture of a Ketchikan Native American clan house. The picture depicts a rustic blue wooden structure with several Alaskan Native American symbols painted on it to form a face with an open mouth for the front entry. Three large Native American totem poles dominate the front of the structure and are placed at the front corners and in the middle over the front entry way to the structure. When Ms. Barkley was informed that the photo was of a clan house, she mistakenly believed that the photo was related to the Ku Klux Klan and thought Ms. Bishop was referring to a “Klan” house. Unfortunately, Ms. Barkley maintained the correctness of her mistaken belief even though several co- workers who had seen the same picture tried to explain the picture to her. Through January of 2014, Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop had several arguments and animated discussions. Ms. Barkley insisted that Ms. Bishop was a member of the Ku Klux Klan and accused her of the same, with her rank in the Klan growing from member to president of the local chapter. She also insisted that the picture Ms. Bishop had shown Petitioner was related to the Ku Klux Klan. Due to her mistaken beliefs, Ms. Barkley became very anxious and fearful of Ms. Bishop. On February 5, 2014, Ms. Barkley first reluctantly complained about Ms. Bishop to Kim Hall, Republic’s Assistant Manager and Ms. Barkley’s immediate supervisor. She complained that Ms. Bishop had used racial slurs in talking with her and had discussed with her the Ku Klux Klan. Ms. Hall immediately took Ms. Barkley to Kelly Blum, Republic’s General Manager at the Panama City airport. Ms. Barkley made the same complaint, but indicated that she “loved” Ms. Bishop and did not want to see her fired. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Blum met with Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop together, and told them that they could not fight with each other at work. At the conclusion of the meeting, Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop hugged, apologized to each other, said they loved each other and told Ms. Blum they could work together. There was no evidence that demonstrated the manner in which Ms. Blum investigated or handled Ms. Barkley’s complaint was intimidating, harassing or discriminatory. Ms. Blum also stated that she would try to avoid scheduling Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop on the same shift. However, due to limitations in personnel, Ms. Blum could not ensure that the two employees would not be on the same shift. Unfortunately, sometime after this conversation, Ms. Barkley worked two hours with Ms. Bishop because Ms. Bishop’s replacement for the next shift was late or couldn’t make it in to work due to bad weather. The manager that day offered to stay with Ms. Barkley, but Ms. Barkley said it would be alright and that she could work with Ms. Bishop present. The evidence did not demonstrate that the one-time, unanticipated shift overlap was in retaliation for Ms. Barkley’s earlier complaint. Over the next several days and notwithstanding their mutual apologies, Ms. Barkley and Ms. Bishop continued to argue with each other, create a hostile work environment and use abusive, profane language. Eventually, Ms. Barkley called the F.B.I. and continued to accuse Ms. Bishop of being a racist and a member of the Ku Klux Klan. At some point, Ms. Barkley insisted on showing Ms. Bishop some books about the Ku Klux Klan, again accused Ms. Bishop of being a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and indicated that Ms. Bishop’s connection to the Klan scared her. Ms. Bishop told Ms. Barkley, in essence, that the KKK hung niggers, and asked why Ms. Barkley thought she would take a similar action. Ms. Barkley responded and, in essence, referred to Ms. Bishop as a white cracker bitch who would hang niggers from trees and that she better hang her with her pearls on. As a consequence, Ms. Blum looked into the continued behavior and reported her concerns about Ms. Barkley’s and Ms. Bishop’s behavior to her supervisor, Regional Manager Linda Kelleher. Ms. Kelleher requested that Republic’s human resources department investigate the matter. Again, there was no evidence that demonstrated this inquiry was intimidating, harassing or discriminatory towards Ms. Barkley. Jan Veal, Republic Parking System, Inc.’s Director of Human Resources, interviewed all witnesses, including Ms. Barkley, Ms. Bishop, Ms. Williams, Ms. Hall, Ms. Blum, and Ms. Kelleher. During the investigation, Ms. Bishop admitted using racial epithets towards Ms. Barkley. Based upon Ms. Bishop’s admission, Ms. Bishop was suspended, with pay, pending the conclusion of the investigation. Shortly thereafter, following Ms. Veal’s interview with Ms. Barkley and the other witnesses’ report of the racial remarks of Ms. Barkley, Ms. Barkley also was suspended with pay, pending the conclusion of the investigation. Such actions were reasonable since both Ms. Bishop and Petitioner were at fault in their behavior towards each other. On February 25, 2014, Republic Parking Systems, Inc., terminated Ms. Barkley’s employment, having concluded that she used offensive and threatening language of a racial nature including the use of profanities and creation of a hostile work environment in violation of company policies. Republic Parking System, Inc., terminated Ms. Bishop’s employment on the same day for the same reasons. As such, the evidence was clear that both employees engaged in similar behavior and were disciplined in the same manner. Both were terminated. Based on these facts, Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against her based on race or retaliation when it terminated her from employment. As such, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of August, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Joni Marie Barkley 15221 Banks Drive Southport, Florida 32409 (eServed) Jan Veal Republic Parking System, Inc. Suite 2000 633 Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37450 James Scott McDearman, Esquire Grant Konvalinka and Harrison, P.C. 633 Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37450 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over an alleged unlawful employment practice which occurred on the premises of a federal enclave.
Findings Of Fact Respondent asserts that Petitioner's allegations arose during her employment at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Respondent also asserts that Petitioner never worked for it in Florida at a site other than Eglin Air Force Base. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief do not refute these assertions. It is uncontested that Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is a federal enclave. The land on which the base is located was ceded by the State of Florida to the United States on April 26, 1937. At that time, the federal government was given exclusive jurisdiction over the land. The cession deed was recorded on April 27, 1937, and states as follows in pertinent part: I Fred P. Cone, Governor of the State of Florida, in the name and by the authority of said State and pursuant to the statutes of said State in such cases made and provided, do hereby cede to the United States of America, exclusive jurisdiction over said lands so acquired. Secretary of State (Florida), Deeds, Book A, pages 349-352.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order determining that the Division of Administrative Hearings does not have jurisdiction over the issues raised in the instant Petition for Relief and dismissing said petition with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia K. Faulconer 145 Wright Circle Niceville, Florida 32578 Edmund J. McKenna, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact On or about January 1986, Petitioner, Peggy Cobb, looked at the land located at 5712 Bay Forest Drive, Pensacola, Florida, the property under consideration in this action. Ms. Cobb was shown the property by Shirley Higdon who allegedly had an ownership interest in the property. At the time Ms. Cobb looked at the property it was forested and she did not notice that it was low property. The property backed up to a man-made drainage ditch, but was not otherwise located close to any body of water. Ms. Cobb liked the property and gave Ms. Higdon a binder of $1,000. She signed a contract to purchase the property when a house of her specifications had been built on the lot. The contract to build the house was with Higdon Homes, Inc., the actual title holder of the property. Higdon Homes' President was C.R. Higdon, the son of Shirley Higdon. The purchase contract signed by Ms. Cobb made Mr. Higdon and Higdon Homes, Inc. responsible for building the house on the property. Ms. Cobb only supplied the house plans. Higdon Homes, Inc. was responsible for the site plan placing the home on the property, determining grade and elevation, obtaining the necessary permits for items requiring permits, and ensuring that the house was otherwise built according to the house plans supplied by Ms. Cobb. Ms. Cobb had no control over Higdon Homes or over the detailed aspects of building the home Ms. Cobb had selected. Ms. Cobb did not control Higdon Homes' hiring and firing of personnel, the work hours of the personnel, or the scheduling of the personnel, or subcontractors. In all respects, Mr. Higdon and Higdon Homes, Inc., would be independent contractors under the purchase contract since Ms. Cobb could not control either party in his or its performance. The fact that she had a general knowledge of the status of the construction project does not in any way take away from the independent contractor status of Higdon Homes and C.R. Higdon. Mr. Higdon and Higdon Homes, Inc., began construction of Ms. Cobb's home sometime in February 1986. That same month, Higdon Homes placed fill material on the Bay Forest Drive property. At no time did Higdon Homes or Mr. Higdon obtain a fill permit from DER for the placement of the fill on the Bay Forest Drive property. Construction went along in a normal fashion until June 25, 1986 when Charles Harp, Respondent's Environmental Specialist, conducted a field inspection of the property and preliminarily concluded that there was fill placed on wetlands within DER's jurisdiction. Ms. Cobb discovered that DER had conducted a field inspection when an employee of Higdon Homes told her about a "DER person inspecting the property and indicating that it was in violation of DER Rules and Regulations." Ms. Cobb immediately called DER and spoke with Elizabeth Petty, an Enforcement Specialist with DER in dredge and fill and storm water permitting. Ms. Cobb was, understandably, very upset since the field inspector indicated there was a violation regarding the fill's placement and that she may not be able to further fill her very wet backyard. This was her dream home and the dream was suddenly developing problems. She was only two days away from closing on her house and didn't know what to do. Ms. Petty advised her to call back the next day to talk to the field inspector Charles Harp. Ms. Cobb called Mr. Harp the next day. Mr. Harp indicated to her that she would have to remove the fill and perhaps tear down her house since a corner of the house appeared to be in DER jurisdiction. Ms. Cobb became even more upset. At this point, Ms. Cobb was under extreme pressure from Mr. Higdon to close on the house. Mr. Higdon assured her that nothing would happen and DER would only fine him and he would be able to fill the land anyway. She contacted two attorneys who advised her to go ahead and close the sale, but close contingent on the builder correcting any deficiencies or developing DER problems. Ms. Cobb followed the advice of these attorneys and closed on the house on June 27, 1986. That same day Cliff S. Rohlke, Jurisdictional Specialist for DER, performed an inspection to formally determine the landward extent of DER's jurisdiction over the Bay Forest Drive property. His inspection revealed the property was adjacent to a man-made ditch flowing continuously into Ramsey Canal. Ramsey Canal then flows continuously into Perdido Bay. The original soil beneath the fill was hydric soil. There was no canopy on the property. However, the adjacent lots were undisturbed and Mr. Rohlke observed several plant species identified by rule as being submerged wetland plants growing. Based on his observations, it was Mr. Rohlke's opinion that DER's jurisdiction extended across the back of the lot, beginning approximately 20 feet west of the eastern lot line and crossing the property diagonally until exiting the property at the junction of the north and west lot lines. The jurisdictional area included a corner of the house. Fill material was placed in the entire area described by Mr. Rohlke's findings. This area does fall within the landward extend of DER's jurisdiction over wetlands and to the extent fill material was placed in that area without a permit would constitute a violation of Section 403.918, Florida Statutes. On July 8, 1986, approximately two (2) weeks after the closing, Ms. Cobb received a warning letter from DER which outlined the violation and requested removal of the fill and restoration of the property. On June 1, 1987, DER issued Ms. Cobb a Notice of Violation and Order for Corrective Action. The Order of Corrective Action required removal of 45 feet of the illegal fill material and allowed the home and the contiguous fill underneath the home to remain. Under the circumstances the corrections desired by DER are very reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Notice of Violation and Orders for Corrective Action be dismissed against Respondent. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-4169 Petitioner Peggy Cobb's proposed findings Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact Number 5 has been adopted except for the last sentence which was not shown by the evidence. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact Number 6 is subordinate. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Numbers 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13 and 16 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed finding of fact Number 2 is immaterial as to the present and not shown by the evidence as to the time the fill activity occurred. Respondent's proposed finding of fact Number 3 has been adopted except the evidence showed January to be the contract date. Respondent's proposed finding of fact Number 5 is subordinate. Respondent's proposed finding of fact Number 9 has been adopted except the evidence did not show Petitioner consulted with Higdon. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Numbers 12, 14 and 15 are irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Grass, Esquire 120 South Alcaniz Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Richard L. Windsor Assistant General Counsel Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
The Issue Should Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes, be granted?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Prior to August 9, 1996, Petitioner was employed by Avon Park Cluster Home in a position that required background screening. At the request of Petitioner's employer, Avon Park Cluster Home, the Department conducted a background check on Petitioner. As a result of this background check, it was determined that there were potentially disqualifying criminal offenses pending against Petitioner in the State of New York and the State of Florida. Because of the lack of information as to the disposition of these potentially disqualifying offenses the Department was unable to complete the background screening on Petitioner. In accordance with Section 435.05(1)(d), Florida Statutes, the Department, by letter dated August 9, 1996, advised Petitioner that it was his responsibility to provide the Department with the necessary documentation to show the disposition of those offenses so that it could complete its background check of Petitioner. By letter dated September 11, 1996, the Department advised Petitioner that since he had not been able to provide the Department with the necessary information as to the disposition of the potentially disqualifying offenses, the Department could make no screening determination and therefore, Petitioner was not eligible for a position requiring background screening. Subsequent to the Department's letter of September 11, 1996, Petitioner furnished certain information concerning the potentially disqualifying offenses. By letter dated October 9, 1996, the Department again advised Petitioner that it was unable to conduct a proper background screening with the information furnished by Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner was not eligible for a position that required background screening and further advised Petitioner that he could request a hearing to be exempted from this disqualification. Petitioner timely requested a hearing which was afforded to him by the Department. At this hearing, Petitioner was allowed to present evidence to show that he was entitled to be exempted from this disqualification. After hearing Petitioner's evidence, the Department determined that Petitioner had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he was entitled to an exemption from disqualification. Petitioner timely requested a hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Although Petitioner was given ample time and opportunity to present evidence of the disposition of the potentially disqualifying offenses, he failed to present any evidence of the disposition of those offenses. Likewise, Petitioner failed to present any evidence of rehabilitation or circumstances or evidence indicating that Petitioner would not present a danger if continued employment was allowed as required by Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran General Counsel Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32299-0700 William Brown, pro se 504 West Halmcrae Boulevard Avon Park, Florida 33825 Jack Emory Farley Chief Legal Counsel, District 14 Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jo Nees, is a 52 year old caucasian woman who appears to be her age. Ms. Nees first moved to Destin, Florida in or about April, 1982, and upon arrival in the area, submitted an application for employment to the Delchamps store which was accepted, but about which she never heard anything from store personnel. Ms. Nees lives in the Destin East Mobile Home Park with Mr. Emerson, a gentleman with whom she has shared the mobile home for several years. In January or February, 1985, Ms. Nees went to the Delchamps store in Destin, where, she alleges, she spoke with the store manager, Mr. Owens, and asked him for an application for employment. At this point, according to Ms. Nees, he refused, indicating he preferred people younger than Petitioner. She concluded from their discussion that he felt that due to the large number of customers during the crowded summer tourist season, she would not be able to keep up and used the term, she contends, "older people." As a result she became quite upset with Mr. Owens and after this colloquy, she paid for her groceries and left. Ms. Nees contends that the conversation referenced above was overheard by the assistant manager, Mr. Few, and the cashier, Kathy Richardson. Though the cashier did not say anything at the time, she was present at the check-out counter where the conversation took place and must have heard it. The assistant manager, Mr. Few, in Ms. Nees' recollection, tried to smooth things over and calm her down. At approximately 4:30 a.m. in November, 1985, just before Thanksgiving, Ms. Nees was again in the Delchamps store. Mr. Few, she contends, came up to her and spoke to her by name. However, as she was checking out a few moments later, and he was manning the cash register, he advised her that if she filed any sort of complaint against the company, he would not know her. Ms. Nees continued to patronize the Delchamps store after the conversations with Mr. Owens because it is the only major supermarket in the area and she prefers to use it because of the quality of the product and the price. At no time has she been offered an application for employment by the store, nor has she been offered employment. As of the hearing, Ms. Nees had a job at a convenience and package store in Destin where she has worked since May, 1985. At the time she applied for a position with Delchamps she had been unemployed since December, 1984, when she left her prior job as manager of a local motel because of poor wages. In May, 1985, she was earning $4.20 an hour on a 40-hour week. Though complaining about the fact that she was not offered employment or even given an application in January, 1985, Petitioner is nonetheless satisfied that at that time, no employment was available at the Delchamps store. She contends, however, that they could have accepted her application and hired her even though she was not needed so that she would be available later on when the busy season came. At the time of the application, the period was one of low employment in the area. Ms. Nees has also filed a discrimination complaint against the neighboring Eckerd's Drug Store for failure to hire her, also on the basis of age. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that she had applied to Delchamps only once, yet on cross examination it appears she applied once and requested an application a second time. The EEOC form 5 filed in April, 1985, reflects that she applied three times for a position at Delchamps. Ms. Nees explains that the information contained on the form 5, though it bears her signature, was given over the telephone to the clerk at the Commission office and that she only applied once and requested an application form a second time. Inasmuch as Ms. Nees' testimony indicates that she applied in January or February, it is quite possible that in recounting the story over the telephone, the clerk misunderstood her comment and put down that she applied in both January and February, 1985, and that Ms. Nees failed to catch the mistake when she signed the form. This is, however, de minimus. What is more significant is the fact that none of the other parties involved identified by Ms. Nees, have any recollection of the situation being as she describes it. According to Mr. Owens, Ms. Nees at no time ever asked for an application, nor did he ever make to her the comments that she attributes to him. When he saw her at the investigation conducted by CHR, he recalled having seen her previously as a customer in the store, but at no time did she ever discuss employment with him, either alone or in the presence of Mr. Emerson, who, she claims, was a witness to the entire situation. Delchamps' policy is to accept an application form from anyone who asks for it and keep it on file. When employees are needed, people from the filed applications are called and interviewed, and selections are made. It is not company policy to take on as full-time employees, people who have not worked within the company before. Instead, people are hired on a part- time basis and then promoted to full-time positions from part- time status when openings occur. During the winter months, Mr. Owens has a staff of between 70 and 75 people. During the tourist season, that figure increases up to 120. Mr. Few, present at the discussion with Mr. Owens, does not recall any meeting between Nees and Owens and denies age discrimination. He agrees he saw her at the delicatessen counter early one morning as she alleges and greeted her. She seemed to be complaining to the counter clerk about Delchamps employment policy. When she got to the check-out counter he was manning, he offered her an application form in the hope it would put an end to the matter. She refused to accept it, however, and left after paying for her purchases. Kathryn Guidas, the cashier at the time of the alleged conversation between Ms. Nees and Mr. Owens, recalls seeing Petitioner in the store numerous times as a customer, but did not hear any conversation between Petitioner and Mr. Owens regarding employment. In fact, she has never seen Petitioner and Mr. Owens together. She has been asked for application forms by customers from time to time. When this happens, she refers them to either the manager or his assistant. Petitioner has not, to the best of her knowledge, ever asked her for an application form. On one occasion, Mr. Emerson mentioned that he had filed an employment discrimination complaint against the company and expected to hear something soon, but made no mention of any discrimination complaint by Petitioner. In her testimony at the prior inquiry, Ms. Nees identified Vicky White as an employee who was present at the conversation she claims to have had with Mr. Owens. Ms. White has worked in the Destin store as a clerk in the bakery and deli for approximately 10 years, but denies having ever seen Petitioner prior to the hearing. Neither does she know Mr. Emerson and she denies she has ever discussed company hiring policy with either Petitioner or Emerson. She has never been present at any conversation between Owens and Nees. In light of the above, it is most likely that Ms. Nees did not ask for an application at all. It would have been unnecessary for Owens to deny her one in light of the policy when, if she was not wanted, she need not have been called in for an interview. Ms. Nees would like to be compensated for the time she was improperly denied employment by Delchamps and would like to be offered a permanent job at the store. She is concerned, however, that if offered a job as a result of a settlement, she would be discharged shortly thereafter: a result that she does not desire. If she is to be hired, she would like to be assured that she can keep the job and not face layoff as retribution for her actions here. In her post hearing submission, she reiterates her desire for a settlement and a job because she is, apparently, no longer working at the convenience store and the Delchamps store is only two blocks from-her residence. Based on all the evidence, considering the inherent probabilities and improbabilities of the testimony, it is obvious that Ms. Nees is anxious to be employed by Delchamps and/or to receive compensation from them. She has, however, scant evidence to establish that she was discriminated against because of her age. She admits that there were no openings at the time of her alleged conversation with Mr. Owens, and that she also filed a discrimination complaint against Eckerd' s, again knowing that no vacancies existed. When Ms. Nees was not hired, it was clearly for undisclosed reasons other than her age and there is no evidence of any discrimination by Respondent
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Jo Nees be denied. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 9 day of May, 1986. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Jo Nees Box 89 Destin East Mobile Home Park Destin, Florida 32541 William C. Tidwell, Esquire Post Office Box 123 Mobile, AL 36601 - Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether, Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner based upon her race or sex and whether she was subjected to retaliation after complaining to the Respondent concerning the alleged harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner became employed on October 10, 2005, at HOM. She worked as a general laborer and finisher at times pertinent to this case. HOM is a manufacturer of mobile and modular homes at its Lake City, Florida, plant. It has in excess of 15 employees and is therefore a statutory employer with the meaning of Section 760.02(2), Florida Statutes (2006). The Petitioner has a number of blemishes on her employment record with the Respondent. She had performance problems prior to the events leading up to the termination of her employment. She was disciplined for an incident occurring on December 21, 2005, for failure to report to required overtime work, as well as for insubordination. Steve Weeks, the Respondent's Production Manager, deemed the failure to report for required overtime work to be insubordination and a violation of the company's attendance policy. She received an employee warning notice on May 3, 2006, regarding a perceived need for her to "pickup the pace and for her attendance." Mr. Weeks told Ms. Pate that she needed to increase her production pace and needed to work on her attendance and work quality. The Petitioner was given to understand that her employment could be terminated for further violations. The Petitioner maintains she has been subjected to "harassment." Specifically, she complains that her co-workers in the finishing department harassed her by "bumping into me and playing threatening songs, threatening, talking about they were going to beat my behind, you know, just constantly threatening." Her complaints concern Priscilla Berry, Katherine Belford, and Melody Adkins. Melody Adkins is a white female, Priscilla Berry and Katherine Belford are African-American females. Most of the Petitioner's complaints concern Katherine Belford and Priscilla Berry. The Petitioner admits that these individuals never indicated they were committing any alleged harassing acts because of the Petitioner's race or gender. She further acknowledges that the harassment "may not have been for my race" and that the harassment "might have been because I was a female and I was doing my job and I didn't hang with that certain group" of females. No male employees are alleged to have threatened or harassed the Petitioner and she never complained to her direct supervisor, Tommy Smith, concerning any problems related to her race or gender. Ms. Pate spoke to Supervisors Weeks and Smith in an effort to stop the harassment and threats. In response to her complaints Mr. Weeks talked to the supervisors and employees involved in the incidents Ms. Pate complained about and told them they were not to bring personal problems to the work place. Mr. Smith separated the Petitioner from Ms. Belford and Ms. Berry because of the antagonism that had developed between them. He directed her to perform her duties in a different location in order to alleviate the hostilities. The Petitioner called the HOM corporate office on June 27, 2006, and spoke to Mr. Jeff Nugent. Mr. Nugent directed the Regional Human Resources Director, William Allen, to investigate the Petitioner's complaints. Mr. Allen spoke to the Petitioner by phone on June 29, 2006, and arranged a meeting with her for July 11, 2006. The Petitioner told Mr. Allen during that phone conversation that she was being harassed and threatened and that the supervisor was not doing anything to alleviate the matter. She told him that "they" were discriminating against her because she was a black woman and the supervisors were still doing nothing to alleviate her harassment, in her view. The Petitioner met with Mr. Allen on July 11, 2006. Mr. Allen also met with other employees. The plant had been shut down during the first week of July and immediately thereafter on July 11, 2006, the Petitioner had the meeting with Mr. Allen. She found him responsive to her complaints. He took notes during the meeting with the Petitioner and with the other employees he interviewed. The Petitioner complained that she was being harassed and threatened by the above-referenced women on the job, that she "went up the chain of command" to get the harassment to stop but that it had not stopped. She did not complain to Mr. Allen that she was being harassed based on her gender or her race, however. Mr. Allen determined that the problem between Ms. Pate and the other employees was based upon difficulties in "getting along well" or, in effect, personality differences. He also determined that the Respondent had responded to the prior complaints by separating Ms. Pate from working with the employees about whom she had complained. On July 13, 2006, Mr. Smith observed Ms. Pate out of her assigned work area while using a cell phone. The use of a cell phone during working hours, and in working areas, violates company policy. Mr. Smith asked Ms. Pate to report to the plant office to speak to Mr. Weeks. Upon arriving at the office, the Petitioner told Mr. Smith and Mr. Weeks that she was leaving because she did not feel well. Mr. Weeks told Ms. Pate that she could leave the premises, but she would have to bring in a physicians note to prevent the absence from being unexcused. She returned to work the next scheduled work day and did not bring in a physician's note as directed. The previous work day's absence was thus an unexcused absence. Mr. Weeks decided to terminate the Petitioner's employment for her attendance problems and for her failure to submit a doctor's note justifying her absence of July 13, 2006. Her unexcused lack of attendance caused her to have excessive absences in violation of the Respondent's adopted attendance policy. The Petitioner's employment was terminated on July 17, 2006. The Petitioner never told Mr. Weeks that she felt her employment was being terminated in retaliation for her having called the corporate office to complain, or that she was being harassed because of her race and gender.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Pate 862 Northeast Coldwater Street Lake City, Florida 32055 Kevin E. Hyde, Esquire Foley & Lardner LLP One Independent Drive, Suite 1300 Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 32201-0240 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
