The Issue Whether Petitioner has been the subject of an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact On May 18, 1992, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the date, time, and place for the formal administrative hearing. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Petitioner and his counsel at the addresses listed in the Petition for Relief and accompanying information. Petitoner's attorney appeared at the hearing. However, even though Petitioner received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Petitioner did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Respondent was present at the hearing. The Petitioner did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned or his attorney that he would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. Petitioner was allowed fifteen minutes to appear at the hearing. As a consequence of Petitoner's failure to appear, no evidence was presented to support Petitioner's case. Specifically, no evidence of discrimination based on handicap or race was forthcoming. Therefore, Petitioner's attorney was advised that the Petition for Relief would be dismissed and a Recommended Order entered recommending the Commission do likewise.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Allen, Esquire 322 West Cervantes Street P.O. Box 12322 Pensacola, Florida 32581 Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Margaret A. Jones Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 DIANE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1992.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Black female. As such, she is a member of a protected class. Respondent is a rental and sales company. It rents and sells household furnishings and appliances to consumers. Around the end of June 2008, Petitioner was hired by Respondent as an account manager at its Crawfordville store. Petitioner’s scheduled start time was 7:30 a.m. Petitioner’s account manager duties included delivery of household furniture and appliances to customers, loading and unloading her truck, and collection of money (also known as collecting credits) from customers. Petitioner’s primary delivery route was the south side of Tallahassee, Florida. Her direct supervisor at the Crawfordville store was James Shaw. Mr. Shaw is a Black male. Petitioner alleged that in July 2008, James Shaw began to sexually harass Petitioner, inviting her to a hotel and on one occasion, locking her in the store, pushing her against some furniture, and groping her. Shortly after allegedly being groped, Petitioner reported the incident to Craig Carricino, Store Manager at RAC’s Tallahassee store, and Kevin Besette, the then District Manager. She also called RAC’s complaint hotline. Petitioner reported the incident to Mr. Carricino because she knew him from past dealings with him at the Tallahassee store and felt more comfortable reporting the incident to him. Petitioner made it clear that she did not want to return to the Crawfordville store and desired to be transferred to another location. On the day of Petitioner’s complaint, Brad Donovan, Coworker Relations Manager, initiated an investigation into Petitioner’s claim. Additionally, Mr. Donovan was aware of Petitioner’s desire to transfer to another store and immediately offered Petitioner the opportunity to transfer to RAC’s Tallahassee location. Petitioner readily accepted the offer and was transferred to the Tallahassee store where Mr. Carricino was the manager. After Petitioner’s transfer, Mr. Donovan proceeded with his investigation into her allegations of harassment. He interviewed Mr. Shaw, who denied Petitioner’s allegations. He interviewed Petitioner, who provided him with the name of a witness to Mr. Shaw’s sexual advances. Mr. Donovan interviewed this other witness. The witness reported that he had not seen any inappropriate conduct on the part of Mr. Shaw towards Petitioner. Petitioner never advised Mr. Donovan or any other person at RAC of any other witnesses to the alleged sexual misconduct of Mr. Shaw. In essence, Petitioner’s allegations could not be established because no independent evidence existed to support her allegations of sexual harassment. However, Respondent promptly addressed Petitioner’s allegations of sexual harassment. It investigated her claims and immediately transferred her to another store. Respondent also counseled Mr. Shaw about sexual harassment, but took no further action against him because of the absence of any independent evidence to support Petitioner’s allegations. Clearly, Respondent exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly address Petitioner’s allegations of sexual harassment. Irrespective of whether Petitioner’s allegations against Mr. Shaw are true or believed, RAC did not engage in an unlawful employment action against Petitioner because it acted appropriately in addressing Petitioner’s allegations based on the investigation and conclusions it had reached about Petitioner’s allegations. RAC was not obligated to do more even if Petitioner disagreed with the company’s decision not to discipline Mr. Shaw. After her transfer, Petitioner felt she was harassed/retaliated against by Mr. Carricino when she was “written up” for being late to work. Petitioner identified Scott Taff, who is White, as the only non-minority employee who had allegedly been treated differently than her. She based her assertion on the fact that Scott Taff was not fired when he was late after being ‘written up’ for tardiness. Without going into the mostly hearsay evidence presented at hearing, Petitioner’s own testimony revealed that she was not fired for being late several more times after being ‘written up’ and warned for such tardiness. Additionally, there was no evidence presented regarding Mr. Taff’s disciplinary history or that he had a chronic tardiness problem. Given these facts, the evidence did not demonstrate that non-minority or male employees were treated differently than Petitioner. The evidence, also, did not demonstrate that Petitioner was subjected to any retaliation for her earlier sexual harassment complaint. The evidence did show that her employer wanted her to be at work on time and endeavored to stress its desire to her. Such action does not constitute an unlawful employment practice, especially when the employee has a tardiness problem. Petitioner also alleged she was harassed/retaliated against when she was told that she would have to lift 150-lb. sofas, and, if she complained about the duty, she would be fired. Petitioner did not testify about any specifics regarding this allegation. However, Petitioner’s job required that she be able to deliver a variety of products made available by Respondent, including sofas. Moving furniture, loading and unloading her truck, and picking up and delivering furniture was not specifically required of Petitioner, but was required of all similarly-situated account managers. By her own testimony, Petitioner described times when she had help in moving furniture and times when she did not have help in moving furniture. The store’s manager testified that Petitioner, like other employees, received help moving furniture when other employees including himself, were available to help and not performing their own similar job duties. There was no credible evidence that Petitioner was denied help moving furniture based on her race, sex or in retaliation for her earlier allegations of sexual harassment. Finally, Petitioner alleged that she was harassed/retaliated against when she was not allowed to “collect credits” from customers because she was sent on deliveries and later disciplined for not “running these credits.” However, all account managers were required to collect money from customers and make deliveries. Petitioner was not singled out in being required to collect money from customers and make deliveries. All account managers had to figure out how to perform both functions. Petitioner’s testimony regarding being prohibited from collecting money on Saturday was not established by the evidence. The evidence showed that, for a short time, account managers were instructed not to use the computer system on Saturday mornings to help them in collecting money from customers because of some issue related to the computer system. However, the policy later changed to allow account managers to use the computer system on Saturday mornings. Moreover, there was no evidence that Petitioner could not otherwise collect money from customers without the aid of Respondent’s computer system. The computer may have made the collection process easier because customer contact information was stored in the computer system; however, the lack of use of that system on Saturday mornings did not prevent Petitioner from collecting money from customers. Customer information was available to Petitioner during the rest of Respondent’s time at work. Petitioner, again without any necessary specifics, claims that Mr. Taff was allowed to collect money on Saturdays. No computer records were introduced into evidence and no evidence of the time period when Mr. Taff allegedly collected money on Saturdays was adduced at hearing. Respondent denied that Mr. Taff collected money when he was not supposed to. The evidence did not demonstrate that Mr. Taff or any other similarly-situated employee was treated differently than Petitioner. The evidence did demonstrate that Petitioner had the lowest collection rate at the Tallahassee store and was consistently below that store’s standard for the collection of money. The District manager, Carney Anderson, who is Black, testified that he had no trouble meeting company expectations for collecting money from customers when he was an account manager in a similar, but larger, area and saw no reason why Petitioner could not meet the expectations of the company in the area she was assigned in Tallahassee. Petitioner did not perform up to the Respondent’s standards for the collection of money from customers. Importantly, a former male employee who failed to adequately collect money from customers was similarly disciplined for failing to perform this important job duty. Because Petitioner failed to meet the standards of the Respondent for the collection of money from customers, Mr. Carricino informed Petitioner that she would be terminated for her inability to meet those standards. Mr. Carricino offered Petitioner the option of resigning and assured her that he would provide a favorable recommendation to her, if she did. Petitioner elected to resign and wrote a letter of resignation. The letter did not mention discriminatory or retaliatory treatment and read as follows: “Thank you for everything. I am grateful for the opportunity that you gave me to work at Rent-a-Center, but at this time, I am unable to perform my duties as a mother to my kids due to the overwhelming hours. I am giving my two weeks notice today 11/10/08 in hopes of returning one day in good standing.” Mr. Anderson, who worked at the Tallahassee store every Monday, spoke with Petitioner about the basis of her resignation. She did not mention any belief she had that she had been retaliated or discriminated against. During Petitioner’s final two weeks, Mr. Anderson noticed a serious decline in Petitioner’s attitude and a decline in her work performance. He was not surprised because he had seen other short-term employees have a similar decline. Therefore, on November 15, 2008, Mr. Anderson instructed Mr. Carricino to terminate Petitioner’s employment immediately and Petitioner was terminated that day. There was no evidence that Respondent’s reason for terminating Petitioner was false or a pretext to hide discriminatory or retaliatory behavior. Moreover, given the short time that Petitioner had remaining at RAC and the fact of her resignation; the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner suffered an adverse employment action when she was terminated early during her final two weeks with RAC. Given these facts and the lack of evidence to support Petitioners allegations, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Massa Dionna Hill 1613 Quazar Road Tallahassee, Florida 32311 Andrew Trusevich, Esquire Rent A Center, Inc. 5501 Headquarters Drive Dallas, Texas 75024 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a hostess with Respondent because of her handicap, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, a 47-year-old female, was hired by Respondent on or about July 15, 2003, as a part-time hostess at Respondent's restaurant in Cocoa Beach, Florida. The understanding at that time was that she would be called in to work three to four hours a day, three to four days a week, as a leased, at-will employee from SkilStaf. SkilStaf would be the employer of record for wage and payroll reporting purposes. Respondent, BB & D of Cocoa Beach, Inc., is a franchisee of Perkins Restaurant and Bakery and is an employer under the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner first reported for work on July 17, 2003, and received training as a hostess/cashier by Debra Russell, associate manager, and received the same information about the job requirements, duties, and benefits given to all new hires. During her training, Petitioner was advised that in addition to seating guests and operating the cash register, a hostess would be required to bus tables when the restaurant was busy and the other staff was in need of help, although this requirement was not listed on the printed job description. Petitioner did advise Respondent that she had a disability and that she required a reasonable accommodation in order to perform her job. She stated that several years before she had undergone back surgery as a result of an injury that was not job related and could not perform a job that required heavy lifting. Petitioner advised Russell that she could not bus tables because it would require heavy lifting. Russell asked Petitioner to provide Respondent with a doctor's note advising them of the nature of her disability and what accommodations she required. Petitioner continued to work as a hostess at the Perkins Restaurant through July 22, 2003, and performed the job satisfactorily. She was not asked to bus tables during this period. Petitioner was not called back to work as a hostess after July 22, 2003, and did not receive any notification that she was terminated. Petitioner obtained a note from her physician dated July 28, 2003, which indicated that she was capable of working four to five hours a day as a hostess. This evidence is hearsay. In addition, it is not convincing that Petitioner turned in a copy of the note to management anytime after that date. She tried to talk to management about her status, but was unsuccessful. Although Petitioner did not prove that she is a disabled person, she was perceived to be disabled by her employer. Petitioner testified that she talked to Russell some time in early August. Petitioner claimed that Russell said that she had talked to the owner who said that he did not think Petitioner should be working as a hostess, but should get a desk job sitting down. Russell denied making such a statement. No other evidence was offered to support this statement. Therefore, said statement is uncorroborated hearsay and unreliable, and will not be relied upon as a finding of fact. Petitioner presented evidence that since July 2003, she has been unemployed, in spite of her making reasonable efforts to obtain suitable part-time employment. Respondent demonstrated that Petitioner sought to have several days in a row off after working only three days. Petitioner worked six shifts total during her employment with Respondent. Respondent needed two other part-time hostesses for the other shifts because the restaurant was open seven days a week, 24 hours a day, for a total of 21 shifts per week. Respondent demonstrated that the summer business that year was slower than projected and never picked up. The restaurant business is labor-intensive and accounts for 30 to 40 percent of overhead costs. In order for management to control costs, it must cut back on employees. Petitioner was involuntarily terminated because sales were underperforming projections and labor costs were being controlled by a reduction in force. Petitioner was unable to prove that her termination was the result of her disability or perceived disability and that Respondent's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Shahrooz Banapoor BB & D of Cocoa Beach, Inc. 5590 North Atlantic Avenue Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Anne E. Dorfler 700 North Courtney Parkway Apartment 524 Merritt Island, Florida 32953 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made in this case. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit evidence to support findings of fact.
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against Ida Heaps in violation of the Fair Housing Act and entitlement to any award therefor.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Barbara Strickland owns several houses in Sorrento, Florida. She has rented these houses for the past 15 to 20 years. During the entire period of time that Ms. Strickland has rented property, she has rented to Hispanics, but she has never rented to African-Americans. Ms. Strickland placed an advertisement in the July 3, 2002, Triangle Shopping Guide. The advertisement listed a four- bedroom, doublewide mobile home for rent, for $500 per month and a $500 deposit. The subject house is located on Church Street in Sorrento. Ms. Strickland and her husband had lived in the house until 1997. It had recently been renovated and had new carpet installed in preparation for renting the home. On July 4, 2002, Ida Heaps, who is white, and her boyfriend, Al Greene, who is black, saw the ad in the newspaper while shopping at a grocery store in Sorrento. Ms. Heaps went to a pay phone at the grocery store, called the telephone number listed in the ad and spoke with Ms. Strickland. Ms. Heaps held the telephone so that Mr. Greene could hear the conversation. Ms. Heaps and Mr. Greene live together and have a long- term family relationship. They have four children ages 5 years, 2 and 1/2 years, 14 months, and 3 months. During this phone conversation, Ms. Strickland gave Ms. Heaps information about the house, including the address. Ms. Heaps testified that Ms. Strickland asked whether Ms. Heaps was black; and Ms. Strickland stated, "I do not rent to blacks," or words to that effect. Ms. Heaps told Ms. Strickland that she was not black, but that her boyfriend was. Mr. Greene heard this comment, became upset and walked away from the telephone. He was no longer interested in the house because of Ms. Strickland's comments about race. Ms. Heaps persuaded him to, at least, go by to see the house. Ms. Heaps and Mr. Greene drove to the address where the subject house is located. The house was spacious, with enough room for Mr. Greene to have an office for his lawn care business and a large fenced yard that they felt would be ideal for their small children. The house also was located in a central area that provided easy access to major roadways and the areas where Mr. Greene's lawn care customers are located. Because of the home’s attributes Ms. Heaps talked Mr. Greene into attempting to rent the house because she was hoping that Ms. Strickland would see that "we were good people" and would rent to them. Indeed, Ms. Heaps’ and Mr. Greene’s rental history shows that they have rented houses for at least five years before changing locations and have been at their current residence for at least 2 years. Ms. Heaps returned to the store to call Respondent. Ms. Heaps told Ms. Strickland she had seen the house and was very interested in renting the house and was prepared to give Ms. Strickland a deposit on the house immediately. However, because Ms. Strickland had to take a family member to a medical appointment she could not meet with Ms. Heaps that day. Ms. Heaps told Ms. Strickland she would be going out of town for a few days and she would call Ms. Strickland upon her return to see if the house was still available. Sometime in early July 2002, Ms. Strickland was at the Eagle Club, a social club, talking with her friend Carol Ann Stone. Ms. Stone told her that she knew a lady, by the name of Pat Williams Torres, who was looking for a place to rent. Ms. Stone felt Ms. Torres was very responsible and would make a good tenant for the Church Street house. Ms. Strickland, Ms. Stone, and Ms. Torres met at the house on July 8, 2002, so that Ms. Torres could see the house. Ms. Torres was interested in renting the house, but had to leave town to check on her property in South Dakota that was being threatened by a large wild-fire. Ms. Strickland, tentatively, agreed to hold the house for her. Ms. Strickland agreed to hold the house for Ms. Torres because she was not in a hurry to rent it since her son had taken the air conditioner out of the house and she needed to replace it. Ms. Strickland also preferred renting to Ms. Torres instead of Ms. Heaps because she felt Ms. Torres would take better care of the house. Ms. Strickland testified she was reluctant to rent to Ms. Heaps because Ms. Heaps "had small children." Ms. Strickland testified that she did not know it was illegal to discriminate against families with children. However, no contract or deposit was placed on the house. Therefore, Ms. Strickland felt free to rent the house to another interested party. Ms. Heaps and Mr. Greene stayed in Georgia for several days. After returning from Georgia, on July 11, 2002, Ms. Heaps called Ms. Strickland to inquire about the house. Ms. Heaps was at home when she made this call. Also present at the house were Mr. Greene, and Ms. Heaps' mother, Marlene Heaps. Ms. Heaps testified that Ms. Strickland told her and kept stressing that she was holding the house for a lady named "Pat Torres," whose mother or sister was in a wheelchair. After speaking with Ms. Strickland, Ms. Heaps talked with her mother and stated she was suspicious of the reasons that Ms. Strickland was giving about the house. Approximately 15 minutes after the first call Ms. Heaps asked her mother if she could use her cell phone to call Ms. Strickland back. Ms. Heaps called Ms. Strickland on the cell phone, disguised her voice, identified herself as Marlene and asked about the house. Ms. Strickland gave her information about the house, including the address, and that the house was available to rent. The cell phone records for Ms. Heaps' mother's cell phone corroborate that Ms. Heaps call to Ms. Strickland was made on July 11, 2002, at 11:26 a.m. Ms. Heaps’ mother also corroborated the cell phone call and ensuing conversation. Ms. Heaps then called Ms. Strickland immediately back on her home phone and informed Ms. Strickland that she had just called using Marlene's phone and stated that Ms. Strickland did not want to rent to her because her boyfriend was black. She told Ms. Strickland she would not get by with it. Ms. Heaps was upset and hung up the phone. About one week after July 11, 2002, Ms. Heaps went on the Internet and obtained information about housing discrimination on HUD's website. Ms. Heaps testified that she submitted information to HUD and that several months later HUD informed her that the case was being referred to FCHR for investigation. Ms. Torres left in late July 2002 and came back to Florida in mid-August. Ms. Torres testified that while she was in South Dakota, she had an unexpected truck repair. This unexpected expense is the reason Ms. Torres did not have the money to rent the house from Ms. Strickland. Ms. Strickland testified Ms. Heaps called her several times after returning from Georgia inquiring about the house. She thought the calls involving the cell phone occurred in August. However, Ms. Strickland had also told the investigator for FCHR that the cell phone call had occurred in July. After Ms. Heaps called inquiring about the house, Ms. Strickland "got to thinking" that maybe she should check with Ms. Torres to see if Ms. Torres still wanted to rent the house. Ms. Strickland testified she had misplaced Ms. Torres' phone number so she had to call Ms. Stone to get the number. After getting the phone number Ms. Strickland called Ms. Torres, who told her she could not rent the home. Ms. Strickland testified that about 15 minutes later, she received a call from "Marlene." Ms. Strickland stated that the house was now available, and she informed "Marlene" of the home’s availability. Ms. Strickland testified that a few minutes after this call, Ms. Heaps called back and told her that her sister or mother, "Marlene," had just called. However, Lisa Sutherland, the investigator for FCHR, reviewed Ms. Strickland's phone bills for the months of June, July, and August 2002. There were no records of a long-distance call to South Dakota in any of the reviewed months’ bills. Given the cell phone records, Ms. Heaps' mother's corroboration of Ms. Heaps' testimony, the conflicting statements made by Ms. Strickland regarding the time of these calls and the lack of any records of a call to South Dakota, Ms. Strickland is not credible in regard to either the sequence of events regarding the cell phone call or the continued holding of the house for Ms. Torres. Her rationale for the change in the availability of the house in between the calls is simply pretextual. Ms. Strickland’s husband met Aaron Hoffman, who worked at an air-conditioning company. In September 2002, Ms. Strickland rented the house to Mr. Hoffman. Mr. Hoffman is white. After Mr. Hoffman moved out, Ms. Torres began renting the subject house from Ms. Strickland for $510 in rent. In September 2002, Ms. Heaps found a two-bedroom house in Tavares that she rented for $620 per month and paid a $580 deposit. Her family continues to rent this property. Ms. Heaps testified that if she had rented the house from Ms. Strickland, she planned to live there for several years. The Tavares house is not as large, costs more to rent, does not have a fenced yard, and is about eight miles farther away from the areas where Mr. Greene's customers are located. Ms. Heaps is entitled to the difference in rental and deposit values between the two properties for the period of time she would have reasonably rented Ms. Strickland’s property. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that the eight-mile difference had any significant impact on the mileage otherwise driven by Ms. Heaps or Mr. Greene. No other compensable damages were shown by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter an order finding Respondent guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against Ida Heaps in violation of Section 760.23(1), Florida Statutes, and prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondent; and directing Respondent to pay to Ida Heaps within 30 business days from the date of the final order $7,280.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Vicki D. Johnson, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Merritt, Esquire 1500 East Orange Avenue Eustis, Florida 32726-4399 Ida Heaps 15246 Old Highway 441 Tavares, Florida 32778 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice under section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of handicap or disability, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact North Florida Sales Company (North Florida), the Respondent in this case, is a beer and ale wholesaler that does business in Florida and employs over 15 people. Window Mitchell, Petitioner in this case, began working at North Florida as a custodian in the maintenance department on June 22, 2009. His normal schedule at North Florida was Monday through Friday. Near the time he was hired, Petitioner received a copy of Respondent's "Employee Information Handbook." The handbook advised Petitioner of North Florida's "open door" policy that permitted employees to take any complaints or problems directly to the Human Resources Manager, the General Manager, or the President. It further advised employees that it was North Florida policy to treat all employees equally without regard to race, color, religion, sex, age, marital status, disability, or national origin. It stated that any violation of North Florida's equal opportunity policies must be reported immediately to the Human Resources Manager or General Manager without delay. The employee handbook also advised Petitioner of North Florida's policies on attendance. It required employees to give advance notice of any absence or lateness, and noted that employees who fail to maintain an acceptable attendance record would be subject to disciplinary action. On September 10, 2009, Petitioner received an Employee Warning Report noting that Petitioner had missed six days of work during his 90-day probationary period. The report stated that this amount of absenteeism was considered excessive and that immediate improvement was expected. It was signed by Petitioner and Petitioner's supervisor. On November 10, 2009, Petitioner received another Employee Warning Report. It stated that Petitioner's attendance continued to be a problem and that it was creating a burden on the maintenance department. It stated that further incidents of absenteeism, or arriving late or leaving early, would result in termination. It was signed by Petitioner, Petitioner's supervisor, and Margaret Lombardi, Human Resources Manager. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever received any further "Employee Warning Reports." On June 3, 2010, Petitioner received an Employee Performance Review. In his review, Petitioner was given a rating of "3" out of "10" on "dependability." The comment under that heading indicated that Petitioner was "out from work too many days." Petitioner received two other "3"s on his evaluation and received no evaluation above a "5" in any area. In the final section, entitled "Objectives for the Next Review Period," the first of two objectives listed was "keep all curbs in warehouse painted." The second was, "try to be at work all of the time." On July 17, 2010, Petitioner was returning from a barbecue with four friends. He testified that he had not been drinking. The car he was driving ran into a pole head-on. Petitioner's knee and leg hurt and became badly swollen. He had "little chunks of meat" missing from his left elbow and forearm. He was seen by an emergency doctor at Baptist Medical Center about 9:45 p.m., released, and given discharge instructions. On July 19 or 20, 2010, Ms. Lombardi received a paper entitled Adult Discharge Instructions on a Baptist Health form dated July 17, 2010. It indicated that Petitioner had been in the vehicle collision and had been treated for abrasions and a contusion on his right knee. In the instructions, Petitioner was told to take medications as instructed, follow up with the doctor in two days, and return to the emergency room for worsening symptoms. A box was checked indicating "no work for 2 days." Ms. Lombardi interpreted the note as excusing Petitioner from work on Sunday and Monday, and therefore expected Petitioner to return to work on Tuesday, July 20, 2010. When Petitioner did not return to work on Tuesday, Ms. Lombardi called him. Petitioner said he did not realize that the doctor's note had excused him for only two days. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that it did, and she told him he needed to come to work that day. Petitioner complained that his arm and leg were still hurting. Petitioner said he would return to work that afternoon, but did not. Petitioner did not come to work on Wednesday, July 21, 2010. Petitioner left a message for Ms. Lombardi and she called him about 10 a.m. Petitioner told Ms. Lombardi that he had gone to the doctor the day before and had another note excusing him from work. Ms. Lombardi asked Petitioner why he had not called her or the supervisor to let them know. Petitioner stated that he had called the supervisor, but had been unable to reach him and had been asked to call back. Petitioner said he did not call back because he did not get out of the doctor's office until after 5:00 pm. Ms. Lombardi directed him to have the note sent to her by facsimile transmission (fax). Ms. Lombardi received a form faxed from Baptist Health entitled "Discharge Instruction" about 4:38 p.m. that day, as indicated in her note prepared for Petitioner's file. It had a subtitle of "Work Release Form." The form stated that Petitioner had been seen again on July 21, 2010, and that he could return to work on July 25, 2010. The form had date and time blocks indicating "July 21, 2010" and "4:31 p.m." Ms. Lombardi testified that the form from Baptist Health indicated that Petitioner had been seen by a doctor that same day and that "I received it shortly after-–there was a discharge time on it." On the following day, July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi again called Petitioner. When asked about an excuse from the doctor whom Petitioner had seen on July 20, 2010, Petitioner replied, "Oh, that was a different doctor." Petitioner said that the excuse from the visit on July 21, 2010, was from the same doctor he saw on July 17, 2010. Ms. Lombardi's file note stated that this was "the second time that Mitchell has incurred absences with inconsistency in the facts surrounding that absence." Petitioner gave evasive and inconsistent testimony at hearing about whether there was ever a third doctor's excuse, in addition to the excuses of July 17, 2010 and July 21, 2010. Any of Petitioner's testimony suggesting that there was third excuse was not credible. There were only two doctor's excuses. On July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi filled out a "Status/Payroll Change Report" that discharged Petitioner from employment at North Florida. In the "Reason" portion of the form, Ms. Lombardi wrote, "Excessive absenteeism and multiple incidences of inconsistent facts surrounding his absences." Petitioner was immediately notified by telephone that his employment had been terminated. In that conversation, Petitioner asked Ms. Lombardi why he was being discharged. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that the basis for his discharge was his poor attendance. Petitioner was recovering from the injuries he received in the accident for about a week-and-a-half. After that he was fully recovered. Petitioner's substantial interests are affected by Respondent's decision to discharge him. It has been difficult to find work in the depressed economy and Petitioner has financial responsibilities. Petitioner has three children. Petitioner was employed by Wage Solutions, working the warehouse at Liberty Furniture, unloading furniture and bringing it to the showroom from March 2011 to August 2011. Petitioner lost that job because that business closed. At the time of hearing Petitioner was not employed. Petitioner went to the Florida Commission on Human Relations. He did not complain to them that he had been discriminated against on the basis of a handicap or disability. He just wanted an investigation into his discharge because he believed he had been terminated unfairly. He testified: Doing – I guess, telling my side of the story to file whatever they wanted me to file. I didn't even know it was doing – about the disability or not. I didn't know they signed me up under that. The only thing I thought, they were going to investigate to see why I got terminated. * * * And from there, I guess that – that's it. I knew I had to come to court from there, so I was just really based on that. I knew I had to show up to court for – I wasn't looking for all of this to come down to this. The only thing – I just wanted to know why I got fired, because I – about my attendance or being absent, but I had excuses for them. On October 12, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief against Respondent claiming an unlawful employment practice, alleging that he was wrongfully fired because of a mishap, which was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings the same day.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2012.
