The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on October 19, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Respondent manufactures and supplies residential windows and doors. On June 15, 2015, Petitioner was hired by Respondent to work as a Technician 1. Petitioner’s responsibilities included working on the manufacturing assembly line for windows. Petitioner’s employment with Respondent was subject to a 90-day probationary period which would have ended on or about September 15, 2015. However, on or about August 18, 2015, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment, and Petitioner contends that Respondent’s decision to terminate his employment resulted from unlawful discriminatory animus. Respondent disagrees with Petitioner’s allegations and contends that legitimate business reasons motivated its decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment with the company. Background Events Prior to August 4, 2015 The Employment Charge of Discrimination alleges that Petitioner believes that he was the victim of unlawful discrimination while working for Respondent. Petitioner alleges what will generally be described as three categories of conduct in support of his charge of discrimination.1/ First, Petitioner alleges that a white coworker named Adam “made a statement saying black people are a waste of space,” and that Petitioner’s immediate supervisor, Eric Christman, who is also white, laughed in Petitioner’s presence after hearing the offensive statement. Second, Petitioner claims Mr. Christman created a racially charged work environment by routinely segregating employees to work in groups based on race. Third, Petitioner claims that when he complained to Respondent’s office of human resources about Mr. Christman’s behavior, Mr. Christman retaliated against him by terminating his employment with the company, and that the decision to terminate his employment was the result of illegal racial animus. Adam Petitioner and an employee named Adam (last name unknown) were hired at the same time and worked on the same team. Although Adam did not testify during the final hearing, the undisputed evidence is that Adam is an individual who identifies as white. At some point during July 2015, Petitioner, Adam, Mr. Christman, Yvonnte Hartsfield, and a few other workers, were on lunch break when Petitioner and Adam started conversing. During the course of the conversation, Adam stated that “blacks are a waste of space.” Both Petitioner and Ms. Hartsfield were offended by Adam’s statement. Petitioner testified that Mr. Christman laughed in response to Adam’s statement and took no action against Adam for making the offensive remark. Ms. Hartsfield corroborated Petitioner’s testimony and testified that she also witnessed Mr. Christman laughing in response to Adam’s offensive statement. Petitioner did not report the incident to Respondent’s office of human resources or to anyone else working in a managerial capacity at the facility. Segregated Work Environment There were approximately 12 individuals who worked on Petitioner’s team while he was employed by Respondent. Petitioner testified that there were times during his employment when production volume in his assigned work area had decreased which resulted in Mr. Christman temporarily reassigning workers to other work-groups throughout the plant. According to Petitioner, it was routinely the case that Mr. Christman reassigned the black and Hispanic workers to other work-groups, while allowing the white workers to remain in their original work assignments. This practice by Mr. Christman resulted in the minority workers having a more labor intense work day, while the white workers in Mr. Christman’s group were essentially idle due to the lack of work. Two of Petitioner’s coworkers testified that they too had observed how the work environment had been segregated in this manner. According to former PGT employee Chris Russo, who is white, “[i]t was like, there was a bunch of, like, racist redneck people there, and they had black people over there, and they’d always keep us separated.” Ms. Hartsfield testified that it appeared to her that Mr. Christman sent the two black workers (her and Petitioner) and the Mexican worker to other production lines while the Caucasians workers remained at their regular work stations. Personal Cell Phone Usage Respondent provides to all of its employees a “PGT Team Member Handbook” (handbook), which Petitioner received on his first day of employment. The handbook, with respect to personal cell phone usage, provides as follows: While at work, team members are expected to exercise the same discretion using personal cell phones as they would using PGT phones. Personal calls and texting during work hours, regardless of the phone used, can interfere with productivity and be distracting to others. Team members are expected to make personal calls during breaks or lunch and should communicate with friends and family members to ensure they are aware of the policy. Team members must inform their leader of the need to use a cell phone while working on the line and obtain permission (which will be granted/denied on a case-by- case basis). Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action. In addition, company- issued cell phones should be turned off or set to silent or vibrate mode during meetings and in other locations where incoming calls may disrupt normal workflow. During July 2015, Mr. Christman, on several occasions, observed Petitioner using his cell phone while on company time. Apparently, cell phone use by employees while working in the production area had become an issue; so sometime in July 2015, members of Respondent’s management team called a group meeting and reminded Petitioner, and other members of the window assembly team, of the company’s cell phone usage policy. Within a few days of the group meeting, Mr. Christman, on August 4, 2015, received on his cell phone a photo image of Petitioner using a cell phone while on the production line. Adam had taken the picture and sent it to Mr. Christman. Soon after receiving the picture of Petitioner on his phone, Mr. Christman met with Petitioner and issued him a “confirmation of conversation,” which is the second step, following a verbal warning, on Respondent’s progressive discipline scale. The confirmation of conversation provides in part that Petitioner is expected “to be in compliance with company policy, [that] [i]mmediate and sustained improvement is expected, [and] failure to correct the [behavior] may result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment.” On August 5, 2015, the day after Petitioner received the confirmation of conversation, he contacted Respondent’s office of human resources and complained that Mr. Christman had treated him unfairly and was discriminating against him on the basis of race. In response to Petitioner’s concerns, a meeting was held on August 6, 2015, where Petitioner was able to meet with Mr. Christman; Ron Clarke, who was Mr. Christman’s supervisor; and Karla Lugo, a representative from human resources. Petitioner requested a transfer to another unit, but after it was explained to him by Mr. Clarke that he needed to stay in his current unit to better learn the job, Petitioner agreed to remain in his position which was supervised by Mr. Christman. Petitioner suggests that Mr. Christman was motivated by racial animus when he disciplined him for unauthorized cell phone usage. Petitioner admitted during the final hearing that on the day in question he was in violation of Respondent’s cell phone usage policy. Nevertheless, Petitioner contends that employees often use cell phones while working and, to his knowledge, are not disciplined, as he was, for their transgressions. Yvonnte Hartsfield has worked for Respondent for several years assembling doors and windows. Ms. Hartsfield testified that she often observed employees using their cell phones while assembling window frames. Ms. Hartsfield testimony is, however, imprecise regarding when her observations were made in relation to the meeting that management had with employees in July 2015 during which employees were told that they were expected to comply with the company’s cell phone usage policy. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that he was treated differently from other employees who, after being reminded of the company’s cell phone usage policy, continued to use their cell phones while working on the production line. Retaliation In Petitioner’s Employment Charge of Discrimination, he mentions several times that he complained to human resources about Mr. Christman’s alleged racist behavior and that Mr. Christman treated him worse after learning of his complaints. The credible testimony establishes that Petitioner did not complain to management about any issues of discrimination until August 5, 2015, which is the day after Petitioner received the confirmation of conversation resulting from his unauthorized cell phone usage. Petitioner offered no credible evidence of any retaliatory actions taken against him by Mr. Christman between August 5 and August 18, 2015, the date upon which Petitioner’s employment was terminated. Respondent’s Reason for Firing Petitioner On August 13, 2015, Petitioner, while operating machinery known as a frame welder, caused the machine to malfunction, which resulted in damage to a window frame and a three and one-half hour loss of use of the machine while repairs were performed. Corey Marks, who works for Respondent as a maintenance technician, testified that he serviced the frame welder in question on August 13, 2015, after Petitioner caused the machine to fail. Mr. Marks credibly testified that he performed a failure analysis on the machine and determined that the problem in question occurred as a result of Petitioner not operating the machine properly. When questioned by Respondent about what caused the frame welder to malfunction, Petitioner offered two theories, neither of which were confirmed by Respondent’s investigation as to the cause of the malfunction. First, Petitioner advised that the machine unexpectedly started on its own, and second that the machine has a “hair trigger” which resulted in Petitioner inadvertently starting the machine. Mr. Marks’ failure analysis did not substantiate either of Petitioner’s theories as to why the machine failed. Respondent, when considering that Petitioner, while on employment probation, had been disciplined for unauthorized cell phone usage and, through inattentiveness, had caused a substantial delay on productivity by damaging the frame welder, decided to terminate Petitioner’s employment. The decision to terminate Petitioner was made by Respondent’s department of human resources. No Evidence of Pretext Petitioner claims that other individuals had damaged Respondent’s machines and were not terminated as a result thereof. Respondent, on cross-examination, elicited the following testimony from Petitioner: Q: You said earlier that there were white employees who broke machines with no action taken. Do you recall that testimony? A: Yes. Q: Who were those employees? A: I was new at the time. So I don’t know. Q: Can you name a single one? A: Nope. Q: Can you name a single machine that you saw broken by a white employee against whom no action was taken? A: No. Hearing Transcript, pgs. 82-83. Mr. Russo, who is white, testified that a frame welder malfunctioned once while he was operating the machine and that he was not disciplined as a result of the incident. The scenario described by Mr. Russo is not comparable to Petitioner’s situation because Petitioner’s incident occurred as a result of operator error, as opposed to an equipment malfunction. Petitioner has failed to offer evidence which establishes that Respondent’s reason for terminating his employment is simply a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, PGT Industries, did not commit an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, Alain Blaise, and denying Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2017.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, John W. Cohen, Jr., began employment with the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") Duval Detention Center, on June 26, 1976. His position was that of Detention Care Worker I. He continued in that position as a permanent employee until his final dismissal of July 25, 1989, which is the subject of this proceeding. In the course of his employment with the Respondent, the Petitioner has complained of instances of unfair treatment on numerous occasions with both informal complaints and grievances and formal complaints. The current case arises from the Petitioner's claim that his dismissal of July 25, 1989 was discrimination in the form of retaliation, that is, the employer's alleged retaliation as the result of the previously- raised complaints and grievances. The Petitioner maintains that he first became aware that his repeated use of grievance procedures involving his employer was noticed and resented by the circulation of a cartoon in his work place, which depicted his supervisor threatening to shoot the Petitioner with a large firearm in retaliation for using grievance procedures. The Petitioner and his supervisor were named in the cartoon. The Petitioner filed a formal complaint with the Jacksonville Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 3, 1985 as a result of this belief. The Petitioner again felt that he had suffered disparate treatment by his supervisor, Ms. Thelma Menendez, while he worked under her supervision for the Respondent agency. Ms. Menendez found the Petitioner to be a good employee and gave him favorable performance appraisals but stated that she had a problem with the Petitioner because of his tardiness and excessive absence. The Petitioner was ultimately terminated for tardiness and excessive absence and filed a retaliation and harassment complaint with the Jacksonville Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in response to that action by the agency. It developed, apparently in the course of investigation and proceeding with regard to that complaint, that the agency's records revealed that other employees, similarly situated to the Petitioner, some of whom apparently worked on his shift, had exhibited tardiness to the same or to a greater degree than the Petitioner, and that some of them had suffered less severe discipline, as imposed by their supervisor, Ms. Menendez. The Respondent acknowledged this problem and took action by reprimanding Ms. Menendez for her failure to document and respond appropriately to abuses of leave procedures and excessive tardiness by all employees. Because the Petitioner was aware that other employees on his shift had been frequently tardy without experiencing disciplinary actions of the same severity, he filed the retaliation and harassment complaint mentioned above. This complaint ultimately culminated in a negotiated settlement agreement between the Union representatives and attorney, who represented the Petitioner, and the Respondent. This settlement reversed the termination and reduced it to an agreed-upon 30-day suspension. Apparently, the Petitioner initially refused to sign the settlement agreement because he felt that the 30-day suspension, itself, was also harassment. On two occasions, allegations of child abuse against the Petitioner were made, pursuant to Chapter 415, Florida Statutes, apparently in connection with the supervisory duties over children in custody at the Respondent's facility where the Petitioner was employed. It is standard practice with the Respondent that any employee who has such allegations made against him must be removed from supervisory duties over children whenever the allegations are pending and until they are resolved. During the investigatory and resolution process concerning such child abuse allegations, employees are customarily and routinely reassigned to another job with the agency, which does not involve direct supervision of clients or children. Such events frequently occur at the Juvenile Detention Center. On the two occasions involving the Petitioner, the Petitioner was reassigned to maintenance duties at the Respondent's facility. The Petitioner consistently protested this reassignment to maintenance duties because other employees in similar situations had not been reassigned to maintenance duties but, rather, to other employment duties, not involving maintenance. Although he protested the reassignment for this reason, he performed in the maintenance or janitorial capacity for over 13 months. The Petitioner remained in the maintenance position, pursuant to his reassignment, because of the allegations pending against him until an Order of the Division of Administrative Hearings was issued and, presumably, an agency Final Order, which removed the disqualification involving the child abuse allegations, effective July 22, 1987. Upon his second such reassignment to maintenance duties, on August 16, 1988, the Petitioner refused to climb up on the roof of the building to perform roof repair work when asked to do so by his supervisor. Instead, he filed a complaint with one of his supervisors, Sub-district Administrator Lucy Farley. In any event, because both allegations of child abuse were disproved, the Petitioner was reassigned to his normal duties as a Detention Care Worker I. The only reason for reassignment to the maintenance duties was because such removal from child supervision duties is mandatory under Department rules and policies. Although the Petitioner maintains that he was subjected to harassment of some sort because he was the only known employee who was given maintenance duties in the face of such allegations, it was established that he was reassigned to maintenance or janitorial duties because those were the only positions available in order for him to continue employment with the agency at the facility until the charges were resolved. His salary and benefits were not affected by this action. It was not demonstrated that he was singled out for reassignment to maintenance duties for any reasons of harassment, disparagement or disparate treatment of any kind. Likewise, it was not proven that the cartoon allegedly circulated in the Petitioner's work place was published by, authored by, or otherwise done at the instance of or within the knowledge of the Respondent. Thus, it cannot be probative of any intent or motive on the part of the employer to harass the Petitioner on the basis of previously- filed grievances or complaints against the employer or for any other reason. It cannot serve as evidence that the ultimate dismissal, which is the subject of this proceeding, constituted a retaliatory dismissal by the employer. On July 14, 1989, the Petitioner reported to work on the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift, at the Duval Regional Juvenile Detention Center. He was performing his regular duties as a Detention Care Worker I. The client population was high in the facility at that time, and employees were generally unable to take regularly-scheduled breaks from their duties. On that morning, the Petitioner worked without a break from 7:00 a.m. to approximately 11:50 a.m. He then maintained that he felt ill and notified Mr. Arnett Morrell and Mr. Carlton Smith, his coworkers and/or supervisor, that he intended going to the staff lounge to eat. Prior to leaving his work area ("Module A"), the Petitioner advised Mr. Bernard Brock, who was the "Floor Coordinator" between "A" and "B" Modules, that he needed to go eat. He secured Mr. Brock's agreement to cover his module or duties while he took a break. The Petitioner then proceeded to "master control", the control center for the facility. At the master control station, Detention Care Worker Supervisor, Reginald Chambliss, asked the Petitioner why he had not followed proper procedures by calling the master control center before he left his module to come to master control or to leave his module for any reason. The Petitioner responded by explaining that he had secured coverage of his duties and his module from Mr. Brock and two other workers. He also stated to Mr. Chambliss that he had not had a break since 7:00 a.m. that morning and was feeling sick. After some discussion, the Petitioner advised Mr. Chambliss again that he was sick and needed to eat or that he would have to take leave time. Mr. Chambliss then gave the Petitioner his keys so that he could unlock his personal effects. The Petitioner then returned to his module to get his personal effects. The Petitioner later returned to master control to "clock out" because he had apparently decided to leave the work place. Mr. Chambliss approached the Petitioner in the vicinity of the time clock and informed him that he would not be able to authorize him taking leave time that day if the Petitioner left the building. The Petitioner moved toward the time clock in order to carry out his intention to "clock out" of the building while Mr. Chambliss was standing between him and the time clock. Mr. Chambliss repeated his instructions to the Petitioner that if he clocked out, he would not approve his taking leave. The Petitioner ordered Mr. Chambliss to get out of his way, which Mr. Chambliss did not do. Then the Petitioner apparently swore at Mr. Chambliss and said something to the effect of "I am tired of this shit" and then struck Mr. Chambliss one or more times, inflicting a cut in the vicinity of his eye. The Petitioner then apparently left the immediate vicinity of Mr. Chambliss at the master control station. Mr. Chambliss called Supervisor II, Andrea Cash, on the intercom and she came to the area of the master control station where the incident occurred. He informed Ms. Cash of the details of the incident. When Ms. Cash arrived, the altercation was over and the Petitioner appeared relatively calm, although Mr. Chambliss was still upset. Ms. Cash then contacted District Administrator, Lucy Farley, who contacted her immediate supervisor, in turn, by telephone. On instructions from her superiors, Ms. Cash ordered the Petitioner to leave the facility and not to come back. She notified all shifts verbally and by memorandum that if the Petitioner should return to the facility, the Sheriff's Office should be summoned. Mr. Chambliss was advised by superiors to press charges and did so. Ultimately, however, he and the Petitioner entered into an agreement to drop the charges; and the State's Attorney did not prosecute the assault charge. On July 27, 1989, the Petitioner was notified by Administrator, Lucy Farley, that his dismissal would be effective at 5:00 p.m. on July 25, 1989. The Petitioner met with Ms. Farley in the company of an AFSME Union Representative on July 24, 1989 apparently to discuss some sort of resolution to the conflict; however, Ms. Farley terminated the Petitioner. The Department has a policy that any assault or striking of an employee or supervisor is adequate grounds for termination. Mr. Chambliss and other supervisory personnel consider an employee assault to be an unusual and severe incident. The Petitioner was terminated for assaulting another staff member and using abusive language toward that staff member. Because the Petitioner struck his supervisor three times, causing injury to him, in an unprovoked manner, it was determined by the employer to be reasonable grounds for termination. The Department's rules and policies allow for termination for such an offense, and whether or not mitigating circumstances are considered is discretionary with the employer. The Petitioner made no showing of any disparate treatment in this regard. He made no showing that other employees had assaulted a co-employee or supervisor and had not been terminated but, rather, had been subjected to either no discipline or some lesser degree of discipline. In fact, the Petitioner did not demonstrate that any other such assault incident had occurred. The Petitioner simply showed no instances where other employees similarly situated, involved in a similar incident had been subjected to less severe discipline. Consequently, the Petitioner made no showing of a prima facie case of disparate discriminatory treatment in connection with his termination.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petition of John W. Cohen, Jr. be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-7300 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted, but not necessarily as probative of material issues presented. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. 7-10. Accepted, but not as probative of material issues presented, standing alone. 11. Accepted, but not in itself probative of the material dispositive issues presented. 12-14. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 15. Accepted, but not itself dispositive of material issues presented. 16-23. Accepted, but not in themselves dispositive of the material issues presented. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself dispositive of material issues presented. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 27-28. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record. Rejected, as immaterial. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as being immaterial. Accepted as to the first clause, but as to the second, rejected as not being entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record. Rejected, as irrelevant. It was not demonstrated that other employees for whom mitigating circumstances may have been considered were similarly situated to the Petitioner in the instant case situation. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-11. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 D. Ola David Qualified Representative 600 Victory Gardens Drive Tallahassee, FL 32301 Scott Leemis, Esq. HRS District 4 Legal Office P.O. Box 2417 Jacksonville, FL 32231-0083
The Issue Whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to an unlawful employment practice on the basis of religion; or in retaliation to his engagement in a lawful employment activity, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Escambia County, is a political subdivision of the state of Florida that is authorized to carry out county government, pursuant to section 125.01, Florida Statutes (2016). Escambia County is an employer as that term is defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act 1992. Petitioner, Mr. Love, was employed by Blue Arbor, Inc., a staffing agency. Blue Arbor had a contract with Escambia County for temporary labor services. Blue Arbor assigned Mr. Love to a temporary job with Escambia County, Public Works Department, Office of Engineering and Construction, as an engineering project coordinator. The assignment was for one year. Petitioner was assigned to the job from May 26, 2014, until his termination. On January 26, 2015, Escambia County terminated Petitioner’s temporary employment contract. Petitioner was an employee of Escambia County as that term is defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Mr. Love is a Christian. Petitioner timely filed a complaint with the Commission alleging Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by terminating Petitioner on the basis of his religion. As an engineering project coordinator, Petitioner’s job responsibilities included: management of complex projects, ability to prioritize work, and ability to exercise good interpersonal skills with co-workers, supervisors, and the public. Mr. Love earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering Technology and Construction degree in December 2013. Mr. Love had no prior drainage or roadway experience before working for Escambia County. Mr. Love began working for Escambia County following a storm that was declared a disaster. Due to the disaster, staff was expected to be flexible and able to perform job duties without refusal or hesitation. Respondent asserts that it terminated Petitioner’s contract due to his inability to perform job responsibilities without objection or hesitation, work performance, and disruptive behavior. Mr. Love had multiple supervisors during his eight month tenure at Escambia County. While working at Escambia County, Mr. Love’s supervisors had issues with his work performance and his behavior. Mary Bush, a construction manager, supervised Mr. Love in 2014. Ms. Bush had issues with Mr. Love’s file storage practices and behavior. Ms. Bush testified that Mr. Love saved all his work on a personal computer and was told several times to save his work in the shared folder. Mr. Love refused to save his work on the shared drive on the basis that the documents were his work. During the time Ms. Bush supervised Mr. Love, she experienced two incidents with Mr. Love involving outbursts. On one occasion, Mr. Love was in Ms. Bush’s office seeking review of Mr. Love’s work. Mr. Love stated in a raised voice, “you need to review the report so I can do my job.” On another occasion, Ms. Bush directed Mr. Love to identify his documents using a certain description and explained the importance of the practice. Mr. Love objected on the basis that the practice was an asinine process. Mr. Love was reassigned to another supervisor due to the outbursts involving Ms. Bush. At no point did Mr. Love state that his objection to following directions was based on his religion. Chris Curb, an engineering manager for stormwater, also supervised Mr. Love during his tenure at Escambia County. Despite the direction from Ms. Bush, the file-sharing issue continued. On December 30, 2014, Chris Curb notified Mr. Love by email that his file saving was a “problem.” Mr. Curb advised Mr. Love that his file folder was not a standard subfolder and he needed to save all files in the proper shared subfolders. He explained that file sharing is important so Escambia County could comply with state regulations and records requests. He further explained that Mr. Love was not the sole owner of a project record because other employees would need access to the work. He concluded his email with instructions for Mr. Love to use designated file folders. A third supervisor, Jim Duncan, also had issues with Mr. Love’s work performance and behavior. Similar to his practice under prior supervisors, Mr. Love refused to save his files to the shared file folder. Mr. Love also repeatedly refused to attend mandatory meetings without a direct command. For example, on multiple occasions Mr. Love’s supervisor had to locate and direct him to attend the weekly department meetings. Mr. Love testified that he was reluctant to attend the meetings because he believed they “were unproductive and take up too much time.” Similar to other supervisors, Mr. Love engaged in an outburst with Mr. Duncan. Mr. Duncan was a construction manager when he supervised Mr. Love and thus, was responsible for directing Mr. Love to advance projects from conception to completion. One such project was ENG Flood 414-85, which was also referred to as the Beulah Road at Helms Intersection project (“Beulah-Helms project”). Mr. Love was the project coordinator for the project. In October 2014, Roads, Inc., a construction company, submitted a bid for the Beulah-Helms project. Brett Moylan is the vice-president and chief operating officer of Roads, Inc. The project was a pricing agreement contract. Pricing agreement contracts are contracts where prices are established for a period of one year and are adopted by the Escambia County prior to the award of any specific pricing agreement contract. Pricing agreements have a blackout period and bidding process that also takes place prior to acceptance of the pricing agreement. In December 2015, Mr. Love was in the final stages of the procurement process for the Beulah-Helms project. Roads, Inc. was the lowest bidder on the project. Mr. Love corresponded with Mr. Moylan regarding the documents necessary to approve the project. Mr. Love requested a construction schedule and MOT plan for the project before the work order could be approved. Mr. Moylan asserted in an email that the construction schedule would begin after the purchase order is issued. Mr. Moylan later submitted the MOT plan and signed the work order. On January 22, 2015, Mr. Love sent an email to Mr. Moylan requesting the construction schedule and another signed work order with the appropriate dates. Mr. Love advised Mr. Moylan that he would not begin the project until Mr. Moylan submitted the construction schedule. Although Mr. Moylan explained that he usually did not submit a construction schedule, he ultimately provided the construction schedule to Mr. Love indicating that the project would begin the following Monday and “be substantially complete within 60 days of commencement, and have a completion date within 90 days.” The construction schedule provided by Mr. Moylan was an acceptable schedule. For a reason that was not addressed at hearing, Mr. Love asked Mr. Moylan for the construction schedule again, despite receiving it. Mr. Moylan advised Mr. Love to accept the next lowest bidder. As a result of the email exchange with Mr. Moylan, Mr. Love planned to send Mr. Moylan a follow-up email about accepting the next highest bidder, which would purportedly cost Escambia County an additional $20,000 for the project. Before Mr. Love drafted the email, he called Mr. Moylan to discuss the issues referenced in the email. Mr. Love testified that before he called Mr. Moylan he “drove around the block a couple of times, before he could call Mr. Moylan because [he] knew that the conversation was going to get heated.” Mr. Love described the conversation as heated, and they “cut each other off” during the conversation. Mr. Moylan contacted Mr. Duncan to complain about Mr. Love’s behavior related to the Beulah-Helms project. Mr. Duncan approached Mr. Love to discuss the exchange between Mr. Love and Mr. Moylan. Mr. Duncan directed Mr. Love to award the Beulah-Helms project to Roads, Inc. Mr. Love objected to awarding the contract to Roads, Inc. He testified that his objection was based on his religion because “[he] had an obligation to utilize his moral and ethical judgment which is inherent to [his] religion.” Mr. Love stated that the religious accommodation was based on his request for additional information before he could feel comfortable awarding the project to Roads, Inc. Mr. Love testified that he told Mr. Duncan that he refused to award Roads, Inc., without the construction schedule “based on a matter of principal.” Mr. Love did not say he refused to approve the project based on his religion. He did not say he needed an accommodation for his religion. Mr. Duncan directed Mr. Love not to take any further action until they discussed Mr. Love’s objection with the department manager, Joy Jones. During the conversation, Mr. Love became angry and yelled at Mr. Duncan. Sharon Johnson, a project coordinator, witnessed the exchange between Mr. Love and Mr. Duncan. Specifically, Ms. Johnson observed Mr. Love and Mr. Duncan having the discussion about the Beulah-Helms project. Ms. Johnson described Mr. Love’s demeanor as unhappy and upset. She testified that he raised his voice and yelled at Mr. Duncan. At the same time, Mr. Duncan attempted to calm Mr. Love. Ms. Johnson could not recall the substance of the discussion, but she testified without hesitation that Mr. Love did not mention anything about his religion. Ms. Johnson’s testimony is found to be credible. On January 26, 2015, Escambia County terminated Petitioner’s contract. Joy Jones, the Engineering Department manager, made the final decision to terminate Mr. Love’s contract. Although Ms. Jones did not directly supervise Mr. Love, she was aware of the issues concerning his work performance and behavior through complaints from her staff who directly supervised Mr. Love. After several complaints of angry outbursts, difficulty meeting deadlines, failure to save critical documents to the shared drive, inability to move projects in the process without reluctance, and inability to work with several supervisors, Ms. Jones made the decision to terminate Mr. Love’s contract. Based on the evidence, Respondent has demonstrated that Mr. Love’s termination was based on a legitimate business decision due to poor work performance and disruptive behavior. Approximately one year after his termination, Mr. Love sent an email to the Escambia County Administrator, Jack Brown. The email complained of perceived damage to Mr. Love’s reputation, credibility, and career. Mr. Love did not mention any complaint of religious discrimination or retaliation. In his response to Mr. Love, Mr. Brown explained that “in the project coordinator position staff must examine and thoroughly understand applicable process. Refusal and hesitation to perform job duties affect production, grant reimbursement deadlines, and citizen expectations.” Mr. Love did not explicitly mention anything about his religion or religious discrimination to any of his supervisors before he was terminated from Escambia County.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s discrimination complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Benjamin David Love Post Office Box 1132 Gonzalez, Florida 32560 (eServed) Meredith D. Crawford, Esquire Escambia County Board of County Commissioners Suite 430 221 Palafox Place Pensacola, Florida 32502 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Florida Civil Rights Act or the Act).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent at various times beginning in February 1999 and ending in her termination effective September 30, 2004. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. At all relevant times, Respondent is in the hotel business. Respondent provides related services and amenities to its guests and to the general public, including a restaurant and bar on the hotel premises. Petitioner commenced her employment with Respondent as a waitress and was eventually promoted to bartender. At all relevant times, she worked under the supervision of Kurt Pfister (Pfister). At no time prior to the commencement of her employment, nor at any time during her employment, did Petitioner advise Respondent that she was disabled in any way, or that she required any type of accommodation(s) for any medical condition or disability in order to perform her job. Likewise, Petitioner never advised Respondent that she had ever been diagnosed, treated, or hospitalized for any medical condition or disability. In fact, as Petitioner herself admits, she first claimed to be disabled approximately two weeks after she was terminated. Petitioner, as well as all of Respondent's employees, were trained in and required at all times to follow all of Respondent's policies and procedures generally applicable in its workplace. Additionally, every employee was trained in and expected to comply at all times with all policies and procedures applicable to his or her particular job. Violation of any of Respondent's policies or procedures subjected an employee to disciplinary action ranging from counseling to termination. As a bartender, Petitioner was trained and responsible for taking food and beverage orders; to present patrons with their bill(s); and to collect an approved form of payment, including cash. With regard to cash, Petitioner was trained in Respondent's policies and procedures known as "cash control policies." Cash control policies included a specific process for reconciliation of cash and tips at the end of each shift and a process for making cash drops and filling out deposit logs. Petitioner and all similarly situated employees were required to comply with cash control policies and were subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination if they failed to do so. Petitioner was qualified for her bartending position, and from the beginning of her employment through September 16, 2004, Respondent was well satisfied with Petitioner's work. Petitioner was often called upon to train new bartenders with regard to Respondent's policies, including cash control policies. She did so very well. For her efforts, Petitioner achieved the status of Respondent's most senior bartender, and as a reward was given the best shifts. Respondent enforced a policy against smoking on its grounds, except that smoking was permitted in a small, outside area at the south end of the premises. Petitioner was well familiar with the smoking policy and to Respondent's knowledge, complied with it until September 16, 2004. On that date, Petitioner was discovered smoking in a liquor storage room located inside the hotel building. She was given a written reprimand. Apart from the smoking infraction, Petitioner's September 16, 2004, shift was uneventful. She gave no indication to her customers or supervisors that she was in distress or could not perform her duties on account of disability or any other reason, nor that she required any type of accommodation(s) to perform her job. Yet, on that night, Petitioner failed to follow cash control policies at the end of her shift. Of most concern to Respondent was that Petitioner left work with her cash sales short for the evening in the amount of $97.64. On September 17, 2006, Pfister learned of the policy violations and the attendant cash shortage; he thereupon contacted Petitioner by telephone. Petitioner again did not indicate to Respondent that she could not perform her duties on account of disability or any other reason, nor that she required any type of accommodation(s) to perform her job and to comply with cash control policies. Petitioner conversed normally with Pfister and acknowledged that she had the $97.64 belonging to Respondent. Although she was not scheduled to work again until September 21st, she agreed to meet with Pfister and to return the money on September 19, 2004. Petitioner did not show up for the meeting. Neither did she return the money, or contact Pfister to advise when, or if, she would return the money. Respondent was entitled, at that point, to treat the matter as a theft; to terminate Petitioner's employment; and to seek law enforcement's assistance in recovering its money. Instead, Respondent exercised forbearance and gave Petitioner an indefinite suspension to afford her additional time to return the money and to explain to Pfister her reason(s) for failing to follow cash control policies on September 16, 2004. Respondent enforced a policy it called the no-call, no-show rule. Under the rule, employees are required to provide Respondent with four hours’ notice if for any reason they are unable to report on time for a scheduled shift. Absent extraordinary circumstances, which do not exist here, failure to provide the required notice is ground for disciplinary action. On September 21, 2004, and again the next day, Petitioner failed to report for her scheduled shift(s). She also failed to fulfill the four-hour notice requirement of the no call, no-show rule. For these two violations of the no-call, no-show policy, Petitioner was given a written warning. On September 23, 2004, Petitioner telephoned Pfister from an undisclosed location and advised she could not work previously scheduled shifts for the balance of the week. At first, Petitioner claimed she wanted time off on account of her “health.” Pfister offered her the opportunity to submit medical documentation in support of her request. At that point Petitioner stated that she was not seeing a doctor(s), and further stated that she was out of the state with her boyfriend. Petitioner added that she did not care about the hotel; that she was going to take care of herself first. Pfister responded that Petitioner should call him upon her return to town because the issue concerning the $97.64 could not remain unresolved. In the course of this conversation, Petitioner did not advise Respondent that she was disabled in any way, or that she required any type of accommodation(s) for any medical condition or disability in order to perform her job. Petitioner's next contact with Respondent was on September 29, 2004, when Petitioner called Pfister and said she was back in town and wanted to meet with him. It was agreed the meeting would take place the following day at 1:00 p.m. and would also be attended by Rick Reilly (Reilly), Respondent’s senior vice president. Petitioner did not arrive at the appointed time and did not call to explain her absence. Instead, she arrived at 2:10 P.M. Petitioner smelled of alcohol; she swayed, staggered, and slurred her speech. She was profane and belligerent. Petitioner again failed and refused to return Respondent's money or to explain why she took the money. As previously and repeatedly noted, Petitioner did not take this opportunity to advise Respondent that she was disabled in any way, or required any type of accommodation(s) for any medical condition or disability in order to perform her job. She did, however, state that she was "not coming back" and demanded a paycheck and vacation pay. Reilly asked her if she was resigning and she replied, "I guess so." Fearing that Petitioner would attempt to deny or to retract her ambiguous resignation when she sobered up, Pfister and Reilly made a reasonable determination, based upon legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons, to terminate her employment effective September 30, 2006. The termination was not pretextual. There was no evidence regarding who, if anyone, replaced Petitioner. There was no evidence Petitioner was, at any time, treated less favorably than any similarly situated co- worker on account of her membership in any protected class, or for any other reason. Petitioner did not dispute that Respondent had no reason, at any relevant time, to believe she needed accommodations of any sort to perform her job. On October 15, 2004, Pfister received a fax from Petitioner requesting a "leave of absence, medical reason." In apparent support thereof, Pfister also receive a fax purporting to be from a doctor and further purporting to provide a medical explanation for Petitioner's request for "leave of absence, medical reason." In the latter fax, a representation was made that Petitioner was presently hospitalized for "an undetermined amount of time" due to "depression symptoms for the last several month (sic) in context of stressors related to her job and impending hurricanes." This information, such as it was, was untimely and was insufficient to cast doubt upon the bona fides of Petitioner's termination. On November 1, 2004, Petitioner came to Pfister's office to pick up her check(s) and, at last, to return Respondent's money. She made no comment or complaint regarding any alleged disability; neither did she indicate in any way that she believed herself to be a victim of discrimination. In sum, Petitioner could have been terminated as early as September 16, 2004, for legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons. There is no persuasive evidence that disability played any role in Petitioner's termination. Indeed, there was no persuasive evidence that Petitioner was, at any time, disabled within the meaning of the Act, or within the meaning of any other state or federal law. There was no evidence that Petitioner was replaced by a non-disabled individual, nor that she was, at any time, treated less favorably than any similarly situated co-worker.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2006.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Precision Tune Auto Care, on account of his race, or a result of a sexually abusive work environment in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter, an employee of Respondent, is an African-American male. Precision owns and operates five automobile service facilities in northwest Florida. They are generally referred to as the 9th Avenue (Pensacola) facility, the 9-Mile (Pensacola) facility, the Navy Boulevard (Pensacola) facility, the Fort Walton Beach facility, and the Crestview facility. Though there was no direct testimony as to the number of persons employed by Precision, the evidence is persuasive that each facility has a minimum of 4 to 6 full-time employees. Therefore, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish that Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner’s Hiring On June 14, 2013, Petitioner started work at Respondent’s 9th Avenue location in Pensacola, Florida, as a lube-tech. When Petitioner was hired, Ms. Abbott was the manager of the 9th Avenue location, having started in that position in April 2013. Petitioner was not hired by Ms. Abbott. Rather, Mr. Geiger interviewed Petitioner and approved his hiring for the 9th Avenue lube-tech position. Prior to his employment at the 9th Avenue facility, Petitioner worked at Respondent’s Navy Boulevard facility. He was there for a single day. The circumstances of his departure were not explained. When Petitioner started work at 9th Avenue, he was provided with employee procedures handbooks issued by Respondent and by Lyons HR, Respondent’s payroll management company. Both handbooks contained policies prohibiting sexual harassment, and provided means for reporting complaints. On June 6, 2013, Petitioner signed written acknowledgement pages for each of the handbooks. Respondent’s employee procedures handbook had been revised in March 2013. The written acknowledgement page signed by Petitioner for Respondent’s employee procedures handbook was for an earlier revision. The evidence was persuasive that the page signed by Petitioner was one of a stack “kept in a drawer” for that purpose, a stack that had not been replaced when the handbook was updated. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Petitioner received the employee procedures handbooks issued by Respondent and Lyons HR. In addition, current handbooks were available at each of Respondent’s facilities for the employees’ use. Petitioner alleged in his Employment Complaint of Discrimination that he was hired at 9th Avenue because it was the only one of Respondent’s locations at which African- Americans were employed, which Petitioner attributed to Ms. Abbott’s alleged desire “to be with a black guy.”1/ The preponderance of the evidence establishes that Respondent employed African-American workers at its other locations, in positions including those of manager and technician. Lube-techs are employed by Respondent to perform oil changes. As they gain experience, they may be assigned to perform simple maintenance work. Technicians are employed by Respondent to perform a range of automotive repairs. Technicians are required to own a set of mechanics’ tools sufficient to perform more complex work, involving mechanical work, repair and replacement of water pumps, power steering pumps and the like. When he was hired as a lube-tech at 9th Avenue, Petitioner had neither the skills nor the tools to perform work as a technician. When he started work, Petitioner was perceived as a very good employee, doing work without being asked, cleaning, and generally doing extra work around the facility. As a result, Petitioner received a raise of 25 cents per hour after six-to-eight weeks on the job. Technician work is desirable because technicians have the ability to earn commissions. Petitioner soon began asking for technician work. His requests were refused. Although Petitioner was allowed to do some extra work, Mr. Geiger believed that he was not ready to be a full-time technician. On August 5, 2013, Morgan Hancock was hired as a technician at 9th Avenue. He had previously been a technician at another Precision facility. Petitioner felt as though he should have been given the opportunity to work as a technician, and there began to be friction between Petitioner and Mr. Hancock. As a result of the perceived slight at his not being promoted to technician, Petitioner began to exhibit a “bad attitude” and his performance began to “slack off.” His willingness to do more undesirable tasks that were expected of all employees, including cleaning, deteriorated over the ensuing weeks. He made several requests to transfer to a technician’s position at other Precision facilities, discussing the matter with both Ms. Abbott and Mr. Geiger. The dates of the verbal requests are unclear, though it appears that one was made on September 5, 2013, and one was made to Mr. Geiger within two weeks prior to Petitioner’s November 20, 2013, termination. The evidence is persuasive that the requests to transfer were denied for a number of non-discriminatory reasons. First, as set forth above, Petitioner did not have sufficient skills or an adequate set of tools to work as a technician. Second, Precision had been cutting back on employees, and there were no positions open at the other facilities for someone of Petitioner’s level of skill and experience. Finally, one of Petitioner’s requests was for a transfer to the Navy Boulevard facility. Petitioner had previously worked there for a short period, and the manager simply did not want him back. There is no evidence to support a finding that Petitioner’s requests for transfer were denied as a result of some racial animus, or as a result of Ms. Abbott’s alleged sexual desire for Petitioner. By the time Petitioner was at the end of his 90-day probationary period, his performance was such that he did not receive a discretionary salary increase. The evidence is persuasive that the decision was based on Petitioner’s increasingly poor job performance and not, as alleged by Petitioner, retaliation by Ms. Abbott for Petitioner’s failure to satisfy her sexual requests. On September 26, 2013, at Petitioner’s request, Ms. Abbott wrote a letter on Precision letterhead stating that Petitioner had worked for Precision since August 6, 2012. Petitioner had, in fact, started work for Precision in June 2013. Petitioner characterized the letter as evidence of Ms. Abbott’s willingness to falsify a document as a means of gaining favor with Petitioner, and as an enticement for Petitioner to provide sexual favors. Ms. Abbott testified, convincingly, that Petitioner asked her to write the letter so he could show one year of Florida residency, and therefore qualify for in-state tuition at George Stone, a technical center in Pensacola, where he wanted to take classes to gain skills to be a technician. She wanted to help him, and so wrote the letter knowing it to be false. Mr. McCoy witnessed Ms. Abbott giving the letter to Petitioner, and testified it was accompanied by no suggestive remarks. Her agreement to write the letter on Petitioner’s behalf was ill-advised, and upon its discovery, she was reprimanded by Mr. Gerhardt. The letter does not, by any means, suggest that Respondent or Ms. Abbott discriminated against Petitioner in any way, or that Ms. Abbott used the letter as an inducement for Petitioner to provide her with sexual favors. On October 7, 2013, Bret Ramsey was hired at 9th Avenue. Mr. Ramsey, who is Caucasian, was a technician who had previously worked at Respondent’s Navy Boulevard location. Mr. Ramsey worked at 9th Avenue for two weeks, at which time he transferred back to Navy Boulevard. Mr. Geiger could not remember the reason for Mr. Ramsey’s transfer, but assumed that Navy Boulevard was in need of an experienced and qualified technician. As to whether Petitioner would have been a suitable candidate for the transfer, Mr. Gerhardt testified credibly that the manager of the Navy Boulevard location would not accept Petitioner due to his past employment there. Mr. Ramsey’s transfer does not support a finding that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race, or that Ms. Abbott was “keeping” Petitioner at 9th Avenue to satisfy her sexual urges. Respondent required its employees to “clock-out” for their lunch hour and leave the premises. By so doing, it was easier to ensure that work hours were not confused with off-duty lunch hours and to “keep payroll straight.” Respondent’s policy was applied evenly to all employees. Ms. Abbott would occasionally buy lunch for all of the employees at 9th Avenue, either when they were busy, or as thanks for their hard work. Petitioner characterized Ms. Abbott’s acts of kindness and gratitude towards the employees of 9th Avenue as “buying me expensive lunches” to induce cooperation with her requests for sexual favors, a characterization that finds no evidentiary support. Petitioner testified that Ms. Abbott would come to work drunk. Aside from the fact that Ms. Abbott’s state of sobriety, or lack thereof, has no bearing on whether Petitioner was subject to racial discrimination or sexual harassment, the evidence was insufficient to support Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner testified that Ms. Abbott cut his hours as retaliation for his failure to submit to her sexual advances. The time records for Petitioner demonstrates that Petitioner worked 40-hours plus overtime on 19 of the 23 weeks that he was employed at 9th Avenue, including five of his last six full weeks of employment. The other four weeks ranged from 35.90 to 38.68 hours per week. Thus, there is nothing to support the assertion that Petitioner’s hours were cut for any reason. Petitioner’s supposition that Ms. Abbott may have altered his time records--which records are managed and kept by Lyons HR--is not persuasive. Petitioner’s Termination On November 18, 2013, Ms. Abbott, after having spent the day cleaning the service pits, instructed employees to place all cars needing service on the facility’s lift racks, and not over the pits. That day, Petitioner pulled a car into position over a pit. Mr. McCoy advised Petitioner that Ms. Abbott had instructed that all cars were to be put on a rack. Petitioner responded to the effect that if Ms. Abbott wanted the car racked, she could rack it herself, sprinkling his response with some choice profanities. His response was loud enough that Ms. Abbott could overhear it through the window between the shop and the reception area. As a result of what Ms. Abbott understandably perceived as insubordination, she prepared a written warning based on the fact that “employee was told multiple times to place vehicles on lifts not over pit [and] refused.” She presented the Discipline/Discharge Form to Petitioner, who refused to sign the form to acknowledge receipt. Mr. McCoy was called in to witness that Petitioner refused to sign the warning. Petitioner became argumentative with Ms. Abbott, who then instructed him to go home for the day. Upon leaving the premises, Petitioner “peeled out” of the parking lot, spraying gravel in the direction of other parked cars. By that time, Ms. Abbott had called Mr. Geiger to discuss the circumstances of the written warning. Mr. Geiger was able to hear the sound of Petitioner’s exit from the premises. That act was taken by Mr. Geiger and Ms. Abbott as a second instance of misconduct warranting discipline. Ms. Abbott discussed the situation regarding Petitioner with Mr. Geiger and Mr. Gerhardt. The decision was made by the three of them, based upon that day’s behavior and Petitioner’s increasingly bad attitude, that Ms. Abbott should terminate Petitioner from employment. November 19, 2013, was a scheduled day off for Petitioner. When Petitioner returned to work on November 20, 2013, he presented Ms. Abbott with a letter in which he requested a transfer to another Precision location. In his letter, he indicated that he had previously discussed a transfer with Ms. Abbott because of “lack of communication, lack of supervision, lack of procedure standards and underlying personality conflicts.” No mention was made of any discriminatory or sexually inappropriate actions on the part of Precision or Ms. Abbott. Petitioner requested that Ms. Abbott sign the transfer request to acknowledge receipt, which she did. Her acknowledgement of receipt of the transfer request does not support a finding that Respondent or Ms. Abbott discriminated against Petitioner. Ms. Abbott advised Petitioner that a transfer was out of the question, and that he was being terminated from employment. Petitioner demanded that she give him a copy of his termination papers. Ms. Abbott advised that he would be faxed his Termination Record by Respondent’s human resources department. Petitioner then left the premises. He was subsequently sent a copy of the Termination Record as stated. Uniform Return When Petitioner left the employ of Respondent, he failed to return the company-issued uniforms, valued at $466.00. On January 6, 2014, after several verbal attempts by Ms. Abbott to recover the uniforms, Mr. Gerhardt sent a certified letter to Petitioner at his address of record. The address to which the letter was mailed, 6881 Twiggs Lane, Pensacola, Florida 32305, is the same address provided to the FCHR by Petitioner in his December 29, 2013 Employment Complaint of Discrimination, and his July 21, 2014 Petition for Relief. Mr. Gerhardt’s letter advised Petitioner that if he did not return the uniforms by January 31, 2014, the matter would be turned over to the state attorney. Petitioner did not return the uniforms and, as promised, the matter was turned over to law enforcement. Respondent has taken legal action to recover uniforms from former employees in the past, including Caucasian former employees. Ultimate Findings of Fact Up to and including the time of his termination, Petitioner did not contact the employee hotline, file a complaint, discuss with co-workers or management, or otherwise claim that he had been the subject of discrimination because of his race, or that Ms. Abbott had acted in a sexually inappropriate way towards him. No witness, other than Petitioner, testified that they ever saw Ms. Abbott dress “provocatively” or in other than standard work attire, ever heard Ms. Abbott tell off-color or racially-charged jokes, or ever heard or observed Ms. Abbott interacting with Petitioner in an inappropriate manner. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that any personnel decisions regarding Petitioner, including those regarding his requests to transfer, his written warning, and his termination, were made due to Petitioner’s race, or in furtherance of any effort to sexually harass or obtain sexual favors from Petitioner. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that any persons who were not members of the Petitioner’s protected class, i.e., African-American, were treated differently from Petitioner, or were not subject to similar personnel policies and practices.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Precision Tune Auto Care, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Reggie Dancy, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-0068. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2014.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was terminated from her position with Respondent as a picker/stock keeper on or about September 26, 2001, on the basis of her race (African-American) and/or gender (female), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a temporary employee to perform the job of picker/stock keeper at its Parts Distribution Center in Orlando, Florida, during the time period from September 12, 2001, to September 26, 2001, the date she was terminated. Petitioner worked a total of 14 days for Respondent. Petitioner is an African-American female, a member of a protected class. The Parts Distribution Center for Respondent in Orlando, Florida, is a facility that holds automotive parts that are then shipped to dealerships. All temporary employees at Respondent are at-will employees. Temporary employees are told during their orientation that they are at-will employees who can be terminated at any time, for any reason. Temporary employees at Respondent are only eligible to work 119 days. Most temporary employees are not offered full time permanent employment. There is no guarantee that a temporary employee will receive an offer to work as a permanent employee. Petitioner was hired to perform the job of picker/stock keeper. A picker/stock keeper takes parts off of shelves to be shipped to dealerships. Petitioner participated in an orientation, and Petitioner received the same training as every other temporary employee. Petitioner worked the night shift. Respondent maintains written Standards of Conduct to which all employees must adhere. The Standards of Conduct apply to both temporary and permanent employees. The Standards of Conduct were in effect in September 2001, when Petitioner worked as a temporary employee. All employees are given a copy of the Standards of Conduct when they are hired. Petitioner received a copy of the Standards of Conduct when she was hired, and the Standards of Conduct are posted throughout the plant. The Standards of Conduct provide that an employee's "[f]ailure or refusal to follow the instructions of supervision" is grounds for "disciplinary action up to and including discharge." The supervisors who worked at Respondent's Distribution Center during Petitioner's employment were Richard Alvarez ("Alvarez") (Hispanic male), Lenier Sweeting ("Sweeting") (Black male), and Joe Bromley (White male). Alvarez was temporary supervisor for the night shift from June 2001 until December 2001. Alvarez was Petitioner's direct supervisor. Sweeting was a supervisor in September 2001. Sweeting was chosen to become a supervisor by Hal McDougle, a Black male. Sweeting was the supervisor on the day shift when Petitioner worked at the Distribution Center. His shift ended at 3:30 p.m. but he stayed in the building to help with the transition to the night shift. Alvarez would normally walk Sweeting to the front door to discuss what had occurred during the day shift. On September 25, 2001, Sweeting was walking past the bathroom with Alvarez and heard two women talking and laughing in the bathroom. Alvarez recognized one of the voices to be that of Petitioner. Alvarez had heard rumors that Petitioner had been taking a lot of extended breaks and told Sweeting about the complaints he had been receiving. Alvarez received at least two complaints, and possibly four or five, from Petitioner's co- workers that she was taking extended breaks and not on the floor working. Alvarez wanted to wait and see how long Petitioner remained in the bathroom. Sweeting and Alvarez waited outside the bathroom until they saw Petitioner exit the bathroom with Maria Dejesus. Alvarez believes that he and Sweeting waited outside the bathroom for approximately ten to 15 minutes. Alvarez told Petitioner that she had been taking an extensive break and needed to go back to work. Sweeting witnessed Alvarez tell Petitioner to go back to work in a professional tone. Alvarez also told Petitioner that he had heard rumors that she was taking extended breaks. He told her that since he saw it first hand, he wanted to mention it to her and let her know it would not be tolerated. Petitioner asked Alvarez which bathroom she could use in a very sarcastic tone. Sweeting observed Petitioner ask this question. Alvarez told Petitioner that he did not care which bathroom she used, as long as she did not abuse the break period. Petitioner proceeded to ask Alvarez in a sarcastic tone which bathroom she could use several times throughout the night. Despite Petitioner's sarcastic tone, Alvarez answered her questions professionally. Alvarez never asked Petitioner how old she was, whether she was married or how many children she had. Sweeting asked Maria Dejesus to go back to work as well. Sweeting and Alvarez have told other employees to go back to work when they have observed employees taking extended breaks. They have spoken to employees of both genders and all racial groups. On September 26, 2001, Alvarez assigned Petitioner to the "fast rack" area. Petitioner had never previously worked in the fast rack area. Alvarez personally instructed Petitioner in how to perform the assignment. Alvarez told Petitioner to pick the parts and put them on a rack float. After Alvarez gave Petitioner her instructions, Petitioner began her assignment. Petitioner never asked Alvarez any questions about her assignment or expressed that she was having difficulty with the job. Wanda Carithers ("Carithers") saw Petitioner using the wrong equipment to complete her assignment. Petitioner was using a bin cart instead of a float to pick the items. Alvarez noticed that Petitioner's assignment was running late. Alvarez walked over to the fast rack area and asked Petitioner two questions. Alvarez asked Petitioner whether she was going to be able to pick the whole assignment using the bin cart that she was using. Petitioner did not respond to or acknowledge Alvarez. Alvarez then asked Petitioner if she was almost done with her assignment. Petitioner rolled her eyes and said, "Your first question, yes, second question, no." Alvarez was very uncomfortable with Petitioner's response and demeanor. Alvarez told Petitioner that perhaps they had gotten off on the wrong foot. Petitioner asked Alvarez something about her union rights. Alvarez saw Petitioner's co-worker, Carithers, who was a union representative, driving by. Alvarez asked Carithers to explain to Petitioner her union rights as a temporary employee. During this conversation, Alvarez tried repeatedly to talk to Petitioner and on each occasion, Petitioner cut Alvarez off and would not let him speak. When Alvarez realized that he was not making any progress with Petitioner, he asked her to go to the warehouse office so that they could talk to a senior supervisor, Al White ("White") (Black male). Alvarez hoped that they could work out their differences with White's help. Alvarez started to walk approximately ten steps. He turned back and realized that Petitioner was not moving towards the office. Alvarez walked back to Petitioner and asked her a second time to go to the office. Once again, Petitioner did not move. Alvarez told Petitioner, "This is your last chance; go to the warehouse office." Once again, Petitioner did not move. Alvarez, after asking Petitioner to go to the office three times with no response, told Petitioner that her services were no longer needed, that she should gather up her things, and that she was terminated. Alvarez terminated Petitioner for her failure to follow a direct order of her supervisor in violation of Respondent's Standards of Conduct No. 6. Petitioner refused to move even after she was terminated. Petitioner asked Alvarez to reconsider, and he said that he had made up his mind. Alvarez started to walk away. When he saw that Petitioner was still not moving, he told her that he could call law enforcement to escort Petitioner off the property. Alvarez, and ultimately Petitioner, walked to the office. White asked Petitioner if she knew why she was terminated. Petitioner never asked to have someone from the union with her in the office until after she was terminated. At that time, Alvarez and White complied with her request and paged Rodney Witt, a union official, to come to the office. Carithers observed Petitioner fail to follow Alvarez's instruction to go to the office. Carithers recalls that Petitioner told Alvarez that Petitioner did not have to listen to Alvarez. Amber McPherson heard Alvarez call Petitioner to the office several times. Petitioner did not respond to Alvarez's requests. Sweeting has never experienced discrimination from management while working for Respondent for over seven years. Sweeting has never heard Alvarez make any gender or race-related comments or slurs. Sweeting has never heard any management employee at Respondent make a gender or race related comment or slur. Alvarez did not consider Petitioner's gender or race when he made the decision to terminate Petitioner. In addition, Petitioner lied on her application to Respondent and failed to indicate that she had been terminated from a prior employment. Petitioner had been terminated from Walt Disney World Company for theft. If Respondent had known that Petitioner had lied on her application or had been terminated for theft from a prior employer, it would not have hired her. Had Respondent learned that she had lied on her application after she was hired, she would have been terminated. Petitioner had no idea why she thinks she was treated differently based upon her gender or race. She just had a "feeling" or a "hunch." Petitioner had no evidence or information that her termination was based on her gender or race. Petitioner had no idea why she was terminated. She did not believe that it was because she failed to follow a command. Petitioner had no idea whether her supervisor, Alvarez, considered her gender or race when he terminated her employment with Respondent. Petitioner bases her claims that Respondent discriminated against her on the fact that there is general racism and sexism in society. Petitioner checked the "sex" and "race" box on her FCHR Charge of Discrimination simply because she is female and African-American. Petitioner felt as though she was harassed but cannot articulate a reason for it.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie L. Adler, Esquire Susan K. McKenna, Esquire Jackson Lewis LLP 390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1285 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dorothy J. McCrimmon 5361 Commander Drive Number 304 Orlando, Florida 32822 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue : The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Division of Administrative Hearings and the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) have subject matter jurisdiction of this dispute and, aside from the jurisdictional questions, whether the City of Cottondale has engaged in a discriminatory employment action against the Petitioner based upon her race (African-American).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was an unsuccessful applicant for a job vacancy for a position of secretary with the City. The Respondent is the City of Cottondale, Florida, an incorporated municipality under relevant Florida Law. As established by the testimony of Judy Powell, the City Clerk for the City, the City, at all times pertinent hereto, had fewer than 15 employees. City counsel members other than James Elmore, were paid less than $600.00 per year and did not receive forms 1099 for their compensation from the City. They do not meet the relevant criteria to be considered employees. The City's Exhibit One, in evidence, shows that the City had fewer than 15 employees. The Petitioner offered no evidence to contradict the evidence from the City, the Respondent, that it had fewer than 15 employees at all relevant times. On January 30, 2007, the City placed an advertisement in the Graceville News, a newspaper, advertising a job vacancy for the position of secretary. The job description for the position included duties involving collecting utility bills, water deposits, issuing receipts for monies, helping to maintain and record cash journals of all business transactions, preparing billing for utilities, posting ledgers, assisting with daily collections, setting-up accounts, performing customer transfers, maintaining records of water deposits paid and refunded, and preparing of payroll and all related tax reports. Pursuant to that job description, general qualifications which applicants must have included bookkeeping skills and experience. In selecting applicants who would actually be interviewed, Ms. Powell and Willie Cook, who were doing the interviews, looked for individuals who had specific job skills related to the above-referenced duties contained in the job description for that position. Nineteen individuals submitted applications for the position, including the Petitioner. Four individuals were selected to be interviewed out of the 19 individuals who had applied for the position. Those were Melissa Davis, Linda Krauser, Gail Woodham, and Denise White. There was no requirement in City policy that all applicants for a job position be interviewed. There is no evidence to show that race was a factor in determining which applicants were selected to be interviewed for the secretarial position and which were not selected. Rather, the interview selection process involved selecting persons whose application documents appeared to show evidence of some specific job skills which related to accounting, accounts receivable, accounts payable, and the other duties detailed in the job description for the position in question. A white female, Melissa Davis, was selected to be interviewed because her application and cover letter indicated that she was familiar with accounts receivable, accounts payable, payroll, job costing, personnel, handling line telephones, customer service, preparing quarterly reports, and billing purchase orders and had experience in working with 401(k) issues and health and dental insurance. In addition, she had experience as a bank teller handling cash transactions. Another white female, Linda Krauser, was selected to be interviewed as well because her application indicated that she had previously supervised a staff of 40 people and had experience in customer service, maintaining staff records, and experience in accounting and billing. Another white female, Gail Woodham, was selected for interview because her job application and attached documents showed 20 years of experience in payroll, excel, powerpoint, computer skills, veritable spread sheets, and spread sheet tracking. An Hispanic female, Denise White, was also selected to be interviewed because her job application indicated that she had experience as a head bank teller with 17 years in a fast- paced environment and as a supervisor of tellers. She had worked in a doctor's office and had experience with record keeping. She had secretarial and billing experience working with patients for an optometry group, prepared correspondence for doctors and assisted with patient check-out. In her employment with Indian River National Bank, she had gained experience in customer service in handling accounts, and was a supervisor. Prior to that job, while working for another bank, she was a lead teller, supervisor, and handled cash flow. She had also received a prior certification regarding medical billing. The other 15 individuals who applied for the position, including Ms. Russ, were not interviewed. This decision was based upon Ms. Powell and Mr. Cook's review of the applications, and related to the relevant skills, experience, or education shown, or not shown, on those applications. There was no evidence that there was any racially discriminatory animus involved in the selection of individuals for interviews or the rejection of the other individuals who were not interviewed. The job application and resume submitted by the Petitioner indicated that her expertise and experience was primarily in caring for the elderly. There was no indication that she had any experience in bookkeeping, handling invoices, or billing. The decision not to interview the Petitioner was not based upon racial motivation, but rather, as with the case with the other applicants who were not interviewed, was based upon a review of application documents. A decision was made to select the four whose past experience, education, and job skills noted in those documents showed them most likely to be candidates with the appropriate skills and experience for the job in question. During the interviews of the four selected applicants, questions were asked them regarding accounting and bookkeeping issues. Ms. Powell, the City Clerk, finished the interview process and made the selection of the individual to be offered the position of secretary. Ultimately, Ms. White, a Hispanic female, was selected for the secretarial position and accepted the salary range offered, in the amount of $8.00 to $8.25 per hour. The applicants who were not interviewed did not have skills appropriate to the job and did not have skills substantially similar to those of the four individuals who were selected for interviews. They were particularly dissimilar in skills, experience, and education to the person ultimately hired, Ms. White.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is granted. It is further recommended, aside from the finding of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that, alternatively, a final order be entered determining that the Petitioner has not established her claim of racial discrimination in the hiring decision at issue, and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety for this reason as well. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eulinda M. Russ Post Office Box 767 Cottondale, Florida 32431 Timothy W. Warner, Esquire Warner & Wintrode, P.A. Post Office Box 1820 Panama City, Florida 32402 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact James A. Bitting, Petitioner, was first employed by Crawford and Company in its Tampa office as a property appraiser in October 1973, and remained so employed until he was terminated in July 1988. Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident in 1983 while on company business and sustained back injuries which thereafter was the source of lower back pain if he remained in one position (either standing or sitting) for an extended period. However, he made no claim and submitted no medical evidence of this handicap until after his termination from employment by Respondent. In 1987 and 1988, claims cases at Crawford decreased, and the regional office began telling the Tampa office that they should look to a reduction of personnel. Satellite offices at Brooksville and Plant City were closed and the adjustors in charge of those offices were brought in to the Tampa office. At the time of his termination there were four outside adjusters at the Tampa office with Respondent being the only designated property adjuster. The others dealt primarily with casualty claims. Property claims had declined to a point there were insufficient claims to occupy one adjuster full-time and Petitioner was being given a few simple casualty claims. The regional office and the Tampa office generally agreed that one appraiser should be terminated. At the time this determination was made Respondent had the lowest evaluations of the four adjusters. Further, he had received the second phase of a progressive discipline notice (Ex. 2) stating his work performance was unsatisfactory due to non-compliance with work standards. Petitioner presented no evidence to support his contention that his age was a proximate cause of his termination, other than his bare allegation that during this period no employee under 40 was terminated. Substantial evidence was presented that Respondent continues to have numerous people in it's work force older than 50 and 60 years of age. During the presentation of his case, Petitioner referred repeatedly to the failure of Respondent to provide him with a comfortable office chair in which he could sit without hurting his back. Although several employees of Respondent were aware that Petitioner had a back problem, Petitioner, prior to his dismissal, never presented any medical evidence that he needed special equipment, or was physically unable to perform any tasks. He had continued to climb ladders to the roofs of houses when necessary in his job as property adjuster. Following Petitioner's termination, his job was not filled. Respondent, as part of their reorganization, moved another adjuster into the department vacated by Petitioner, but this employee brought with her workers compensation claims which consumed 75-80% of her time. Later Respondent also transferred into the Tampa office a property general adjuster to drum up more casualty business. Upon his arrival he did the property claims formerly done by Petitioner using about 10% of his work time, and spent 80-90% of his time soliciting new business. A property general adjuster is qualified to handle complex claims involving industrial losses while a property adjuster like Petitioner is limited to handling less complex residential claims.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner has failed to prove that his termination from employment by Crawford and Company was influenced by Petitioner's age or handicap, and that his Petition for Relief be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: G. G. Harvey Manager, CFE Post Office Box 5047 Atlanta, GA 30302 James A. Bitting 11730 Marjorie Avenue Tampa, FL 33612 Louis P. DiLorenzo, Esquire One Lincoln Center Syracuse, New York 13202-1355 Dana Baird General Counsel and Acting Executive Director Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1990.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the termination of Petitioner's employment by Respondent constituted discrimination against Petitioner on the basis of gender.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female, a member of a protected group under applicable law, and was at all times material to this case, employed by Respondent until the termination of employment that is the subject of this dispute. Respondent is an employer as the term is defined by relevant sections of the St. Petersburg Municipal Code and the applicable Pinellas County Ordinance. During the period of time relevant to this dispute, Sam Obinwa owned Respondent. During the period of Mr. Obinwa's ownership, Respondent was a business engaged in providing health care supplies, including pharmaceuticals to customers. Beginning in July 1996, Petitioner was employed as a courier by Respondent. Petitioner was primarily assigned to make deliveries of supplies to Respondent's customers. Respondent also employed a second courier, a male, during this period. At some point during Petitioner's employment, Mr. Obinwa hired an office manager, Kim Henderson. Ms. Henderson became Petitioner's supervisor. Ms. Henderson was responsible for the operation of the office, including receiving customer complaints and resolving employee disputes. Mr. Obinwa testified that he received information related to the office operations from Ms. Henderson and relied upon it in making the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. According to Mr. Obinwa's testimony, he received complaints regarding Petitioner's job performance and behavior from both customers and Ms. Henderson. Mr. Obinwa testified that he discussed the complaints with Petitioner during her employment. On December 14, 2003, Mr. Obinwa met with Petitioner and explained that her employment was being terminated. As grounds for the termination, Mr. Obinwa, in a termination letter provided to Petitioner, cited complaints about her behavior from both customers and work associates. The complaints included lack of cooperation, abusiveness, failure to follow instructions or to adhere to the delivery schedule, and missed or late medication deliveries. Petitioner asserts that she was terminated on account of gender. There is no credible evidence, direct or indirect, that Respondent's termination of Petitioner's employment was on account of gender. At the time of Petitioner's termination, Respondent employed eight to nine persons, including six to seven females. The employee most similarly situated to Petitioner (the male courier) was not terminated; however, there is no evidence that there were complaints regarding his behavior from either customers or work associates. At the hearing, Petitioner asserted that the male courier generally received the same treatment as did she. The evidence establishes that Petitioner received an additional benefit that was not provided to the male courier. Petitioner was permitted to use a company delivery vehicle for occasional personal transportation. There is no evidence that the male courier was permitted to take the company vehicle for personal use. Petitioner testified that another male employee identified as Herman Jones was hostile towards her and towards other women working for Respondent. Petitioner claimed that Mr. Jones was somehow responsible for her termination. Mr. Jones was a pharmacy technician. Mr. Jones was responsible for imputing prescription information into the computer system and for preparing the medications according to the prescriptions. Prior to being delivered to the customers by the couriers, the medications were checked by a pharmacist. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Jones had any supervisory duties related to Petitioner. There was testimony suggesting that there were personality conflicts between Petitioner and Mr. Jones. There is no evidence that Mr. Jones was involved in Mr. Obinwa's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment, other than the general consideration Mr. Obinwa gave to the complaints from Petitioner's co-workers related to her behavior in the office. At the hearing, Petitioner presented supportive letters from five customers who were apparently pleased with Petitioner's performance. Petitioner made between 100-200 deliveries each week to Respondent's customers. Mr. Obinwa testified that some of the customers to whom Petitioner made deliveries were happy and that others were not. No evidence related to damages to Petitioner was presented during the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's complaint be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie N. Rugg City of St. Petersburg Post Office Box 2842 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-2842 Suzanne M. Mucklow, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street, Sixth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Willie Mae Curry 2702 4th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33705-3641 Donna J. Buchholz, Esquire D. J. Buchholz, P.A. 4320 El Prado Boulevard, 15 Tampa, Florida 33629
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of race and religion, and retaliated against him, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA").
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Lawrence N. Brown, III, is an African- American male and is of the Christian faith. Petitioner has been employed with Respondent since April 14, 2014, at its store located at 3800 Oakwood Boulevard, Hollywood, Florida (hereafter, the "Store"). As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent at the Store. Respondent is a corporation doing business in Florida. Respondent owns and operates the Store at which Respondent was employed at the time of the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions. Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief Petitioner filed an Employment Charge of Discrimination ("Discrimination Charge") with FCHR on or about March 10, 2016.4/ The pages attached to the Discrimination Charge form (which apparently was filled out in typewritten form by FCHR staff) were prepared by Petitioner. On or about July 18, 2016, Respondent issued a Determination: No Reasonable Cause, determining that Petitioner had not shown reasonable cause to believe that Respondent had committed unlawful employment practices against him. On or about August 16, 2016, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief requesting a hearing to determine whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices against him. The Petition for Relief alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful discrimination against him on the basis of both his race and religion, and also alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful retaliation. These charges, as specifically set forth in the Petition for Relief, are the subject of this de novo proceeding.5/ In the Petition for Relief, Petitioner claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race by failing to promote him into supervisory or managerial positions for which he claims he was qualified; by giving him lower scores on his employment evaluations than were given to a white employee working in the same position (part-time hardlines merchandiser); by not paying him as much as they paid that same white employee; and by retaining that same white employee as a part-time hardlines merchandiser in the Toy Department, while moving Petitioner to another position as cashier. Petitioner also claims that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015, while giving other employees that day off. Additionally, Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal department about having to work on Christmas Day 2015, by removing him as a hardline merchandiser in the Toy Department and reassigning him to a cashier position, then subsequently effectively "terminating" (in his words) his employment. Petitioner seeks an award of $5,000,000 in damages in this proceeding. Background Events As noted above, Petitioner was hired by Respondent on or about April 14, 2014. Petitioner initially was hired in a part-time position as a part-time overnight hardlines replenishment associate. In this position, Petitioner's work scheduling availability was between 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. When Petitioner was hired, Alberto Rodriquez was the Store manager. In his position as a part-time employee with Respondent, Petitioner was not guaranteed any specific number of weeks or hours of employment in any given calendar year, nor was he guaranteed that he would attain full-time employee status. The number of work hours Petitioner was assigned was dependent on the company's business needs and on Petitioner's ability to meet the applicable job performance standards. Petitioner acknowledged these and the other conditions of his employment as evidenced by his signature on the Pre-training Acknowledgment Summary dated April 14, 2014. As a result of the elimination of the overnight replenishment associate position, on or about October 26, 2014, Petitioner was transferred to another position as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. In this position, his work scheduling availability was between 6:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. As a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was responsible for stocking store shelves with merchandise, straightening merchandise on store shelves, putting returned merchandise on shelves, and generally keeping the hardlines departments neat and the shelves fully stocked. The Toy Department at the Store was one of several departments that were categorized as "hardlines" departments. In his duties as a hardlines merchandiser, Petitioner was not assigned to any specific hardlines department, and his responsibilities entailed working in any hardlines department as needed. However, as a practical matter, due to the work demand, Petitioner worked mostly, if not exclusively, in the Toy Department until he was reassigned to the cashier position after Christmas 2015. David Leach became the Store manager in April 2015. At some point before Christmas Day 2015, the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted. Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, December 25, 2015. Petitioner did not volunteer, and had not otherwise requested, to work on Christmas Day 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid holiday for Respondent's employees. On or about December 23, 2015, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, requesting to be removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015. Pursuant to a directive from Respondent's corporate office, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for that day. Petitioner was not required to work on Christmas Day 2015, and he did not work that day. Petitioner was paid for the Christmas Day holiday. Although the Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, some Store employees were scheduled to work, and did work, that day on a volunteer basis, for which they were paid. On December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Petitioner signed the form. The form was marked as showing that Respondent "granted" the religious accommodation. Also on December 28, 2015, Leach informed Petitioner that he had eliminated the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. He offered Petitioner other part-time positions, either as a cashier or in making pizza at the Little Caesar's pizza station in the Store. Leach did not offer any other positions to Petitioner at that time. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, but informed Leach that he was unable to stand in a single place for long periods of time due to injuries he previously had sustained while working on the overnight shift. Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, effective January 3, 2016.6/ Petitioner's hourly wage did not change when his position changed to cashier. He continued to make the same hourly wage that he had made as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. At some point on or after December 28, 2015, Petitioner signed a Personnel Interview Record form that reflected his revised work hours associated with his position change to cashier. The form stated his availability to work between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The evidence is unclear as to whether Petitioner did (or did not) call in to inform the appropriate Store personnel that he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or on Thursday, December 31, 2015. Regardless, the persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner worked on Monday, December 28, 2015; did not work on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015; and worked on Saturday, January 2, 2016. The work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, was computer-generated some time during the week of December 27, 2015, through January 3, 2016. If an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to be excused from work on those days, this situation is termed a "no call-no show," and the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week. This is to ensure that there are cashiers available as needed to work on upcoming dates. Regardless of whether Petitioner did or did not call in to inform Respondent he would not be working on Tuesday, December 29, or Thursday, December 31, 2015, the posted work schedule for the week of January 3 through 10, 2016, showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work that week. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner did, in fact, work a total of 15.90 hours the week of January 3 through 10, 2016. The work schedule posted as of Saturday, January 9, 2016, also showed Petitioner as not being scheduled to work the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. However, the evidence shows that Petitioner worked a total of 15.41 hours the week of January 10 through 16, 2016. At some point between January 13 and January 26, 2016, Petitioner was moved from the cashier position to the Store's date code specialist position. The date code specialist position also is a part-time position, for which Petitioner is paid the same hourly wage as he was paid as a daytime hardlines merchandiser. As of the final hearing, Petitioner continued to be employed by Respondent, working as the Store's date code specialist. Race Discrimination Claims As previously noted, Petitioner began working for Respondent at the Store on April 14, 2014. His initial employment position was as a part-time overnight replenishment associate. In October 2014, he moved to a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position. In both positions, he was responsible for stocking and restocking merchandise in all hardlines departments, so was not assigned exclusively to the Store's Toy Department. However, as noted above, due to work demand in the Toy Department, Petitioner did most, if not all, of his work in that department until he was moved to the cashier position in late December 2015.7/ Petitioner contends that starting in mid-2014,8/ he periodically requested to be promoted to "Toy Lead" or to another supervisory or managerial position. He testified that he had undertaken many activities and implemented various systems to improve the efficiency and productivity of the Toy Department and other departments at the store, and had documented these activities and transmitted that information to the Respondent for inclusion in his personnel file. He testified that rather than promoting him to a supervisory position in the Toy Department, Respondent instead hired a non-African-American person to fill that position.9/ Petitioner additionally testified that he periodically would request to be transferred or promoted to other supervisory positions, but that Respondent did not grant these requests. He contends that since he was qualified for these positions, the only basis for Respondent's decision to fill those positions with other employees was discrimination against him on the basis of his race. In response, Leach testified that there was no formal "Toy Lead" position at the Store; rather, the person supervising the Toy Department is an assistant store manager, a position that entails supervising other hardlines departments besides the Toy Department. Further, Leach testified that in his view, Petitioner was not qualified to occupy certain supervisory positions because of his lack of experience in those areas and his relatively short period of employment with Respondent. Leach also testified that Petitioner had not ever formally applied for a promotion through Respondent's online application process. Petitioner further asserts that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race because he was not paid the same amount as Corey Harper, a white male hardlines merchandiser who also often worked part-time in the Toy Department on the afternoon or evening shift, even though he worked harder and received higher evaluation scores than did Harper.10/ However, Leach credibly testified that Respondent does not currently base its pay rate for part-time employees on job performance evaluation scores, but instead pays them a set hourly pay rate. According to Leach, Respondent has not given an hourly pay rate raise to part-time employees since 2009, so that any pay differential depended on whether employees were hired before or after 2009. Leach credibly testified that Harper has been employed by Respondent since 2004, so had received hourly pay rate raises between 2004 to November 2008; this would result in his hourly pay rate being higher than Petitioner's, even though both are part-time employees. Petitioner testified that when he was moved from the daytime hardlines merchandiser position to the cashier position after Christmas 2015, he made it clear that he wanted to remain in the Toy Department; however, Respondent transferred him out of that department while allowing Harper to remain in a hardlines merchandiser position, which entailed work in the Toy Department. Petitioner also made clear that he wished to return to the hardlines merchandiser position in the Toy Department when such a position became available; however, at some point, Leach reassigned Carol Yaw, who was white, from her previous office manager job to a hardlines merchandiser position. Petitioner asserts that Respondent's actions in allowing Harper to remain as a part-time hardline merchandiser and reassigning Yaw to a hardlines merchandiser position constituted discrimination against him on the basis of his race. However, Leach credibly testified that the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position that Petitioner had occupied was eliminated because of the lack of work in that position, primarily due to declining Toy Department sales after the holiday season. Additionally, immediately after Christmas 2015, Leach consolidated the overnight merchandise unloading and daytime shelf stocking positions and moved the overnight unloading employees to the day shift, where their duties consist of unloading merchandise from trucks and stocking shelves.11/ Leach credibly testified that Harper was not moved from his position because Leach had specifically decided not to move others unaffected by this reorganization out of their existing positions, and that Harper was an afternoon/evening hardlines merchandiser. Leach also credibly testified that he had moved Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position was eliminated because she was a 25-year employee of Respondent, and he felt that she deserved that position out of loyalty for being a long-term employee of Respondent. Petitioner also contends that Respondent's evaluation of his job performance was unfair because it was conducted by an assistant store manager, Marjorie McCue, who was not his direct supervisor. Specifically, he contends that McCue was unfamiliar with his job performance, so did not appropriately consider, in his evaluation, improved Toy Department sales performance and efficiency that were due to measures that he had implemented. Petitioner also contends that McCue initially deliberately gave him an inaccurately low job performance evaluation in an effort to create a record to support terminating his employment, but that when he complained, those lower scores were changed to higher scores. The only performance evaluation regarding Petitioner's job performance that was admitted into evidence is a document titled "Employee Review" that was dated January 31, 2015; Petitioner received a 3.10 overall performance score on this performance evaluation.12/ The Employee Review for Harper dated January 31, 2015, also was admitted into evidence; Harper's overall performance score was 3.00. Upon careful consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden13/ to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his race. To do so, Petitioner must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subject to adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified to do the job; and (4) his employer treated similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class more favorably than he was treated.14/ It is undisputed that Petitioner, as an African- American, is a member of a protected class. However, the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner was subject to adverse employment action. With respect to his assertion that Respondent failed to promote him on the basis of his race, Petitioner needed to show that, in addition to being a member of a protected class, he applied for and was qualified for a promotion; that he was rejected despite his qualifications; and that other equally or less-qualified employees outside of his class were promoted.15/ While Petitioner frequently sent email correspondence to Respondent's corporate legal office requesting to be promoted, the evidence does not show that he followed Respondent's formal online application process for applying for promotions.16/ Further, although the evidence indicates that Petitioner is very hard-working, energetic, bright, and detail-oriented, he did not demonstrate that those characteristics necessarily qualified him for the supervisory positions about which he inquired. He also did not demonstrate that Respondent filled the positions about which he had inquired with less-qualified non-African-American employees. In fact, Petitioner acknowledged, in testimony at the final hearing and in email correspondence with Respondent's corporate legal office, that in his view, some of the individuals who had been promoted were qualified for the positions to which they had been promoted. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not demonstrate adverse employment action by Respondent by failing to promote him on the basis of his race. Petitioner also did not show that he received a lower pay rate and lower evaluation scores than did other similarly- situated employees who were not members of his protected class. The only comparator to which Petitioner referred was Harper, the other part-time hardlines merchandiser that sometimes worked in the Toy Department. However, as discussed above, the evidence showed that Harper actually scored lower than did Petitioner on the January 31, 2015, evaluation.17/ Further, Harper was not similarly situated to Petitioner with respect to pay rate because Harper is a longer-term employee who had received hourly pay rate raises in 2005 through 2008, before Respondent ceased giving raises of hourly pay rates in 2009, but Petitioner was hired in 2014, after Respondent ceased giving hourly pay raises. Petitioner also did not show, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Leach discriminated against him on the basis of his race by electing to reassign him, rather than Harper, to a cashier position after Christmas 2015, and by later reassigning Yaw to fill a full-time hardlines merchandiser position that included responsibilities of working in the Toy Department. As discussed above, when Leach decided to eliminate the part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser position, he chose not to reassign other employees who were not directly affected by the elimination of that position. The evidence shows that Leach did not reassign Harper to a cashier position because Harper's position was not directly affected by the elimination of the daytime hardlines merchandiser position——not because Leach favored Harper over Petitioner due to race. Also as discussed above, Leach reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser position after her office manager position——also a full-time position——was eliminated. Because Yaw was a full-time employee, she did not fill a position for which Petitioner was eligible as a part-time employee; furthermore, under any circumstances, she was not similarly situated to Petitioner because of her longer term of employment with Respondent. For these reasons, neither Harper nor Yaw are similarly situated to Petitioner for purposes of being comparators. For these reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination against him by Respondent on the basis of his race. Further, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of race, Respondent articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions with respect to Petitioner. As discussed above, Respondent did not promote Petitioner because he did not go through Respondent's formal application process for seeking promotions, and also because Leach determined, on the basis of Petitioner's lack of experience and employment longevity, that Petitioner was not qualified for supervisory positions at that time. Additionally, Leach's decisions regarding reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position while retaining Harper and reassigning Yaw to hardlines merchandiser positions were management decisions based on business needs and requirements, rather than on the basis of race. Petitioner did not present evidence showing that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination against him on the basis of his race. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of his race, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Religious Discrimination Claim As previously discussed, shortly before Christmas Day 2015, the employee work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was posted in the Store. This schedule showed Petitioner as being scheduled to work from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Christmas Day, which fell on a Friday in 2015. The Store was closed on Christmas Day 2015, which was a paid employee holiday; however, employees could work that day on a voluntary basis and they would be paid time-and-a-half for doing so. As noted above, Petitioner did not volunteer or otherwise indicate that he was willing to work that day. Upon seeing that he was scheduled to work on Christmas Day, Petitioner contacted Respondent's corporate legal department, which then contacted Leach. Leach had Petitioner removed from the work schedule for December 25, 2015. Petitioner was not required to work that day, did not work that day, and was paid for the Christmas Day 2015 holiday. Petitioner claims that by scheduling him to work on Christmas Day, Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion. Petitioner asserts, as evidence of Respondent's discriminatory intent, that there are others who worked in the Toy Department who were not of the Christian faith, so that if someone was needed to work on Christmas Day, one of those individuals could instead have been scheduled. As previously noted, on December 28, 2015, Leach presented Petitioner with a Request for Religious Accommodation form to sign. Leach credibly testified that the purpose of having Petitioner sign the form was to have a written record of Petitioner's religion so that Petitioner would not again be assigned to work on a Christian religious holiday. Petitioner signed the form, but protested being required to do so, because, in his view, Respondent already was on notice that he is of the Christian faith because he always had Sundays off of work. Petitioner testified that when he was hired in April 2014 (notably, before Leach became Store manager) he had verbally requested Sundays off, effectively placing Respondent on notice that he is of the Christian faith. On this basis, Petitioner asserts that Leach and other managers and supervisors at the Store knew that he is Christian and that they nonetheless intentionally scheduled him to work on Christmas Day. Petitioner acknowledged that he never heard Leach make any comments with respect to his (Petitioner's) religion. Leach credibly testified that before he was contacted by Respondent's corporate office regarding Petitioner's concerns about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015, he did not know that Petitioner was Christian, and he had not inferred that from the fact that Petitioner did not work on Sundays.18/ Leach testified, credibly and persuasively, that Petitioner was scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by mistake. He explained that the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, was generated using a pre-populated "template" method. This method, which is a method by which the Store sets its weekly work schedules, entails week-to-week copying of the regular——i.e., "template"——work schedule for all Store employees, then modifies that schedule as needed to address changes to individual employee work schedules. Leach explained that in using this method to establish the work schedule for the week of December 20 through 26, 2015, Respondent had inadvertently scheduled employees who had not volunteered to work on Christmas Day. He surmised that this was a possible explanation for why Petitioner mistakenly was scheduled to work that day. As noted above, Petitioner was not the only Store employee scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. Upon consideration of the competent substantial evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by Respondent on the basis of his religion. To do so, Petitioner must show that he: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) informed Respondent of this belief; and (3) suffered adverse employment action as a result of failing to comply with the employment requirement that conflicted with his belief. It is undisputed that Petitioner falls within a protected class for purposes of a discrimination claim on the basis of religion. However, Petitioner did not prove the existence of the other two elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of religion. Specifically, Petitioner did not prove that Respondent knew that he was Christian or that his Christian faith prohibited him from working on Christmas Day. As noted above, Petitioner was hired at the Store before Leach became Store manager. Further, because Petitioner had not been required to complete a written religious accommodation form when he was hired in April 2014, Respondent did not have any written notice in its possession that would have informed Leach that Petitioner was Christian or that Petitioner needed certain Christian holidays, such as Christmas Day, off of work. As noted above, Leach credibly testified that he did not know that Petitioner was Christian until Respondent's corporate legal office contacted him regarding Petitioner's religion-based complaint about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The evidence also shows that Petitioner did not suffer any adverse employment action. As soon as Respondent was informed of Petitioner's complaint, Petitioner was removed from the work schedule for Christmas Day 2015, did not work that day, and was paid for that holiday. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination by Respondent against him on the basis of his religion. However, even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of religion, Respondent produced credible, persuasive evidence showing a legitimate, non- discriminatory basis for its action——that is, that through the Store's use of the template work scheduling system, Petitioner was mistakenly scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. As noted above, as soon as Petitioner complained to Respondent, Respondent immediately accommodated his request by removing him from the Christmas Day 2015 work schedule. Petitioner did not present any evidence showing that Respondent's proffered reason for scheduling him to work on Christmas Day 2015 was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of his religion. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a). Retaliation Claim Petitioner claims that Respondent retaliated against him for complaining to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 by reassigning him from his position as a daytime hardlines merchandiser——a position that he clearly liked and at which he believed he excelled——to a cashier position——a position that he clearly considered demeaning and that also was physically difficult for him to perform due to a previous injury. Petitioner was informed that he was being reassigned to a cashier position only five days (and the first workday) after he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day.19/ Petitioner testified that Leach told him that the part- time daytime merchandiser position had been eliminated due to the lack of work demand, particularly in the Toy Department, after the Christmas season was over. Petitioner testified that when he asked Leach about available positions in to which he could transfer, Leach told him that only cashier or pizza-making positions were available. Petitioner provided evidence that a softlines customer service job, which he claims he would have preferred, was open at the time he was reassigned and that Leach did not inform him of that opening or offer him that position. Petitioner also disputes that the part-time daytime merchandiser job that he had occupied had been eliminated. As evidence, he contends that Harper continued to occupy that position, and also that Leach subsequently reassigned Yaw to a full-time hardlines merchandiser rather than transferring him back into a hardlines merchandiser position, as he had requested. The part-time cashier position to which Petitioner was transferred was the same level of employment position in Respondent's employment hierarchy as was the part-time daytime merchandiser position that he previously held. Additionally, as discussed above, as a part-time cashier, Petitioner continued to receive the same hourly pay rate and work scheduling availability as he had received when he was employed as a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser. As discussed above, on or before January 26, 2016, Petitioner was reassigned to the Store's date code specialist position. According to Leach, that position came open after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, and Leach believed that the date code specialist position would play well to Petitioner's strengths of being methodical and detail- oriented. Petitioner bears the burden, by the greater weight of the evidence, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Respondent. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Petitioner must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.20/ For the following reasons, it is found that Petitioner did not satisfy his burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. It is determined that Petitioner engaged in a "protected activity" when he complained to Respondent's corporate legal office, by email dated December 23, 2015, that he had been scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. The email stated: Attn: Legal My schedule states that I am scheduled for Christmas day. I am a Christian I exercise religious right no work on a high religious day. Christmas is the day I celebrate the birth of Christ thus the name Christmas day. A Jewish person was assigned to my department (toys) and was allowed to have off all the Jewish holidays. I was told that is his right and approved, I said fine, I don't know who was arguing this but this was fine with me, because I have many Jewish friends, so I understand. Easter which falls on a Sunday and Christmas are my holidays. I am requesting off. I am requesting Christmas day off with holiday pay as my religious day, just like I requested Sundays off. Only I can change my religious day and work on Sunday, which I might have to when promoted. If management tells me I cannot be promoted because I exercise my religious right not to work on the seventh day, then I will have to do as Jewish people have done for centuries, they are released from the commandment that they may only eat Kosher. If captured by the enemy they may eat to survive. So if I can only be manager if I give up my religious right not to work on Sunday, then I will do what management says is a requirement. Thank you. Lawrence Brown Kmart-Hollywood, Fl Oakwood Plaza To be a "protected activity," the activity giving rise to the alleged retaliatory action must, at the very least, communicate to the employer that the complainant believes the employer is engaging in discrimination against him. Petitioner's email can be read broadly to inform Respondent that he believed he was being discriminated against on the basis of his religion by being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015. To that point, Petitioner specifically compared his circumstances to those of a Jewish employee who had requested and been allowed to have all Jewish holidays off of work. While not specifically using the word "discrimination," Petitioner's email can be reasonably read to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner believed he was being treated differently than a similarly-situated employee who was not a member of Petitioner's protected class and who had been excused from work on the holidays observed by his religion. Additionally, Leach was aware that Petitioner had complained to Respondent's corporate legal department about being scheduled to work on a Christian holiday. Accordingly, it is determined that Petitioner has established the "protected activity" element of his retaliation claim. However, Petitioner did not show that he suffered a materially adverse employment action as a result of having engaged in protected activity. His reassignment to the part-time cashier position effectively was a lateral transfer that did not affect his hourly pay rate or hours of work scheduling availability. Although Petitioner subjectively considered the cashier position to be demeaning and below his skill level21/ and although his job responsibilities changed, the evidence shows that Petitioner was not reassigned to an objectively less prestigious or otherwise inferior employment position. Furthermore, in any event, approximately three weeks after Petitioner was reassigned to the cashier position, Respondent reassigned him to a position as the Store's date code specialist——a position that he has officially held since January 26, 2016, and from which he has not requested to be transferred. In this position, Petitioner earns the same hourly wage and has the same number of hours of work availability as he did in the hardlines merchandiser and cashier positions. He is solely responsible in the Store for ensuring that date-coded merchandise on the shelves has not exceeded its expiration date—— a position that entails significant responsibility and, as Leach put it, is "very important." The evidence also does not support Petitioner's assertion that his removal from the work schedule in early January meant that he was effectively terminated. Although the evidence does not clearly show what days Petitioner did not work during the week after Christmas in 2015, or whether he did (or did not) call in to notify Respondent that he would be absent, the evidence does clearly establish that Petitioner was not scheduled to work the first week of January 2016, and it is also clear that management personnel at the Store did not believe that he had called in to notify them of his absence. Leach explained that if an employee does not report to work when scheduled and does not call in to notify the Store of his or her absence, the employee will not be scheduled to work the following week; this is to ensure that there are enough cashiers available as needed to work in the upcoming week. In any event, when Petitioner noticed that he had not been scheduled to work, he contacted the Store's human relations manager, who told him to come back to work. In fact, Petitioner worked the first and second weeks of January 2016, and thereafter, and he continues to be employed at the Store. Further, Petitioner was never told or otherwise notified, formally or informally, that his employment with Respondent had been terminated. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not suffer a materially adverse employment action by being reassigned for a short period of time from a part-time daytime hardlines merchandiser to a part-time cashier position. Petitioner also did not demonstrate the existence of a "causal link" between a protected activity and adverse employment action. As discussed above, Petitioner's sending an email to Respondent's corporate legal office about being scheduled to work on Christmas Day 2015 constituted a "protected activity." However, as discussed above, it is determined that Respondent did not engage in an adverse employment action; thus, Petitioner's engagement in protected activity did not "cause" Respondent to take any material adverse employment action against him. Furthermore, in any event, Respondent articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reassigning Petitioner to a cashier position shortly after Christmas Day 2015—— specifically, that the part-time daytime merchandiser position that Petitioner had held was eliminated due to seasonal workload decline and other business management decisions reallocating hardlines merchandise-related tasks between the overnight and daytime shifts. For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner did not prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Respondent retaliated against him for engaging in a protected activity, in violation of section 760.10(7). Damages Petitioner has requested an award of damages in the amount of $5,000,000. However, section 760.11(6), which governs the award of remedies in administrative proceedings brought under the FCRA, does not authorize DOAH to award damages. Further, the evidence establishes that Respondent did not engage in any unlawful employment practices with respect to Petitioner, and, in any event, Petitioner did not present any evidence to support his entitlement to an award of damages in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2017.
