Findings Of Fact Respondent is Hooshang Hooshmand, a licensed physician at all times relevant to these proceedings. He was issued license number ME 0021496 by the State of Florida. Medicare is a program of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources which is administered by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). The program allows for third party payment, by the federal government, for diagnostic programs and medical treatments administered on an inpatient and outpatient basis to individuals eligible for medicare coverage. Among providers of medical services, only licensed physicians may be paid by the program for rendition of services. Others who may be reimbursed include health care professionals, such as durable medical equipment suppliers, as well as patients themselves in the instance of medical services rendered by a nonparticipating physician. On October 9, 1987, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Respondent was convicted, after a jury trial, of ten counts of submission of fraudulent medicare claims in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. Section 287 and Section 2. He was also convicted on 11 counts of devising a scheme to defraud by mail, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1341 and Section 2. Respondent's sentence upon his conviction included a term of 18 months imprisonment and five years probation upon completion of imprisonment and any parole period; payment of restitution in the amount of $3,101.24; payment of a fine of $250,000; payment of an assessment of $300; performance of 5,000 hours of community service during the five year probationary period following imprisonment. The verdict and sentence are presently on appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The expert testimony of Michael Gutman, M.D., a specialist in forensic psychiatry in the State of Florida, establishes that the practice of medicine in Florida encompasses not only a physician's technical competence; but also the relationship between a physician and the patient. Such a relationship is based upon trust and honesty. While the physician's expectation of payment for services is part of the patient/physician relationship, fraudulent billing for those services by the physician to either the patient or a third party payor directly affects the practice of medicine through its impact on that relationship. A fraudulent billing scheme, such as that of which Respondent was convicted, introduces dishonesty to the physician/patient relationship and prevents a proper evaluation of the patient in favor of a methodology permitting fraudulent billing. Such methodology would necessarily be one chosen to permit fraudulent billing in a way which would escape detection; a choice not necessarily in the best interest of the patient. Gutman's testimony also provides an adequate record upon which to find that fraud, such as that reflected by Respondent's criminal conviction, also directly relates to the ability to practice medicine because the physician's professional judgement and ethical standards are involved. Such judgement has a direct bearing on the ability to practice medicine. How that judgement is exercised could very well affect the life of the patient in some situations. While it is found Respondent's conviction of fraud in the use of the billing apparatus in his practice directly relates to professional judgement and the ability to practice medicine, there has been no showing that the Respondent's judgemental aberration at that time detrimentally affected his patients' health or his technical competence. In mitigation of the charge in the administrative complaint, Respondent provided testimony of witnesses establishing his technical competence and expertise in his areas of specialization; his extremely impressive professional credentials; the high regard in which he is held by certain of his peers and patients; and his previously unblemished record in the practice of medicine. Respondent also provided testimony of witnesses establishing the complexity of medicare billing and the fact that many physicians, while holding ultimate responsibility for the accuracy of such billing, delegate this task to subordinates. Testimony of Respondent establishes that the complexity of medicare procedures played a major role in his violation of the legal requirements in that system of reimbursement and is partially to blame for his criminal conviction. The testimony of Eleanor Breckner, offered by Petitioner to rebut Respondent's testimony, is not credited. In addition to Beckner's demeanor while testifying, her testimony is diminished in view of her admission that she committed perjury and embezzlement on previous occasions. Beckner also admitted to incidents of attempted suicide indicative of mental instability. Her testimony is not credited with any probative value.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent pay an administrative fine of $2,500 and that his license be placed on probation for a period of two years upon terms and conditions to be established by the Board of Medicine. It is further recommended that a condition of such probation require the satisfactory completion by Respondent of a course of study designed to provide him the information and skills necessary to properly comply with medicare reimbursement procedures. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-4. Addressed. 5.-6. Unnecessary to result. 7. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary. 8-10. Unnecessary to result. 11. Addressed in part; remainder unnecessary. 12.-14. Unnecessary to result. Addressed in part; remainder unnecessary. Adopted by this reference. Rejected, not supported by the evidence. Unnecessary to result. 19.-20. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Unnecessary to result; also cumulative. Adopted by this reference. Rejected as cumulative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Unnecessary to result and not relevant. 26.-27. Unnecessary to result. Unnecessary to result and cumulative. Addressed in part; remainder unnecessary to result. 30.-31. Unnecessary to result; cumulative. 32. Reject, not supported by weight of the evidence. 33.-36. Rejected, not relevant. 37.-41. Unnecessary to result. 42.-43. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary. 44.-45. Unnecessary to result reached. 46. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary. 47.-50. Unnecessary to result. Unnecessary and cumulative. Unnecessary to result. Rejected on basis of relevancy. 54.-56. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary. Unnecessary to result reached. Rejected, not relevant. Unnecessary to result reached. Rejected, not relevant. 61.-67. Unnecessary to result reached. Rejected, not credible and not supported by the weight of the evidence. Also a legal conclusion. Addressed. Unnecessary to result. Adopted by this reference. Adopted in substance. Rejected as a legal conclusion. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-7. Adopted in substance. 8.-9. Addressed. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan King, Esq. Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Joesph C. Jacobs, Esq. Melissa Fletcher Allaman, Esq. 305 South Gadsden Street P.O. Box 1170 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1170 Roy L. Glass, Esq. 3000-66th Street North Suite B St. Petersburg, FL 33710
The Issue The issue to be determined is the amount to be paid, pursuant to section 409.910(17)(b), Florida Statutes, from the proceeds of a third-party settlement, in full satisfaction of the agency's Medicaid lien.2
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Armando R. Payas is a court-appointed guardian ad litem for A.D.J., Jr., a minor. Petitioners Carvetta Taylor and Arthur D. Jamison, Sr., are A.D.J., Jr.'s, parents. Respondent, AHCA, is the state agency that administers the Medicaid program in Florida. § 409.902, Fla. Stat. Stipulated Facts In the underlying medical malpractice action, Petitioners alleged that the liable third-party negligently failed to provide proper prenatal care, identify and treat prenatal stress, and timely order a Caesarian section delivery. Petitioners asserted that this caused A.D.J., Jr., to suffer severe and permanent brain damage, which resulted in substantial expenses being incurred for his medical and nursing care. There also is a separate cause of action asserted on behalf of A.D.J., Jr's., parents, Carvetta Taylor and Arthur Jamison, for their own injuries for their loss of services, earnings, companionship, society, and affection of A.D.J., Jr., and for the value and expense of A.D.J., Jr.'s, hospitalizations and medical and nursing care, in the past and future. As a result of the alleged third-party negligence, Petitioner A.D.J., Jr., sustained severe and permanent brain damage, including hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy and neurodevelopment disorder. As a result of those permanent injuries, A.D.J., Jr., requires medical care and treatment for the rest of his life. AHCA, through the Medicaid program, paid $39,854.66 for A.D.J., Jr.'s, medical care related to his claim against the liable third-parties in Petitioners' medical malpractice action. Facts Based on Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing A.D.J., Jr., is a minor child for whom Medicaid paid medical expenses for treatment for injuries resulting from third parties' failure to provide proper prenatal care, identify and treat prenatal distress, and timely order a Caesarian delivery. As stated above, as the result of this negligent treatment, A.D.J., Jr., sustained severe and permanent brain damage, including hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy and neurodevelopment disorder, which results in him suffering from a seizure disorder. As a result of these injuries, he will require a certain level of medical care for the rest of his life. Additionally, his future earnings capacity is negatively affected, due to cognitive impairment resulting from his birth-related injuries. Medicaid first made payments for A.D.J., Jr.'s, medical care in 2012. Petitioners initiated a medical malpractice action against one or more medical providers. The action ultimately settled in 2021, for $775,000.00. AHCA has asserted a Medicaid lien, in the amount of $39,854.66 against the portion of the settlement allocated to A.D.J., Jr.3 3 AHCA may assert a lien only on past medical expenses. Giraldo v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., 248 So. 3d 53, 56 (Fla. 2018). If the formula in section 409.910(11)(f) is applied to the settlement proceeds allocated to A.D.J., Jr., then the full amount of the $39,864.66 Medicaid lien should be paid to AHCA.4 Maria Tejedor, the lead attorney representing A.D.J., Jr., and his parents in the underlying medical malpractice case, testified regarding the value of A.D.J., Jr.'s, medical malpractice claim. Tejedor is a Florida Bar Board-certified attorney in civil trial practice with over 20 years of experience in medical malpractice matters, focusing primarily on civil actions involving infants and children who have sustained brain damage. She has extensive experience in the valuation of these types of cases. Based on Tejedor's experience with similar cases involving children who have sustained brain damage as a result of medical malpractice, she estimated that the full value of A.D.J., Jr.'s, medical malpractice case was $21,939,105.12. Based on A.D.J., Jr.'s, medical history, and on Tejedor's experience in valuing similar medical malpractice cases and allocating settlement amounts, she (Tejedor) testified that the $21,939,105.12 value of the medical malpractice case would properly be allocated as follows: $15,694,185.50 for future medical expenses; $1,204,418.00 for lost earnings' capacity; $5,000,000.00 for pain and suffering; $39,854.66 for the Medicaid lien; and $646.96 for another medical services lien. The underlying medical malpractice case settled for substantially less than its full value, in part because the treating physician was uninsured, and also because one of the birth-related injuries that A.D.J., Jr., incurred, 4 As discussed below, the formula in section 409.910(11)(f) creates a presumptive "default allocation" of the third-party settlement proceeds. This presumptive allocation may be rebutted in an administrative proceeding—such as this proceeding—brought under section 409.910(17)(b), to contest the amount designated as recovered medical expenses under the formula. attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, could partially be attributed to A.D.J., Jr., having inherited the condition. The $775,000.00 settlement amount constitutes 3.5 percent of the full value of $21,939,105.12 of the case. Using the pro rata method to allocate the $775,000.00 settlement to future medical expenses, lost earnings, pain and suffering, the Medicaid lien, and the other medical services lien, the value allocated to each of these categories of damages and expenses, discussed above, is multiplied by 3.5 percent, to determine the portion of the total settlement amount allocated to each of these categories. Multiplying 3.5 percent by $39,854.66, which is the amount of the Medicaid lien, yields $1,394.91. Pursuant to the pro rata allocation method, this is the amount payable to Medicaid in full satisfaction of its Medicaid lien in this case. Tejedor testified, and the case law bears out, that Florida courts and ALJs consistently have accepted the pro rata allocation method as a reasonable, fair, and accurate methodology, consistent with Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006), for allocating the settlement proceeds when the underlying third-party action is settled for less than the full value of the case. Todd Copeland testified as an expert in the valuation of damages in medical malpractice actions and resolution of healthcare liens. Copeland has practiced law for 29 years, representing injured parties in medical malpractice, personal injury, products liability, negligent security, and premises liability cases. He has testified as an expert between 10 and 20 times over the past ten years regarding the valuation of damages and liens in medical malpractice cases. He testified that $21,939,105.12 is a conservative estimate of the full value of the underlying medical malpractice case. In formulating his expert opinion, Copeland relied on the report of Petitioners' non-testifying expert, Dr. Craig H. Lichtblau, M.D.; A.D.J., Jr.'s, medical records; his own communications with A.D.J., Jr.'s, guardian ad litem; the very conservative estimate of A.D.J., Jr.'s, pain and suffering in this case; jury verdicts in similar medical malpractice cases; and his own professional experience regarding the valuation of medical malpractice cases. Copeland confirmed that the pro rata method of allocating the settlement proceeds to each specific category of damages and expenses (i.e., future medical expenses, pain and suffering, lost earnings' capacity, and the Medicaid and other medical services liens) proportional to the amount allocated to that specific category if the total value of the case had been recovered in the third-party settlement, is a fair and reasonable method for allocating the settlement proceeds. He further confirmed that the pro rata methodology is consistent with that ratified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ahlborn. Copeland opined, based on the application of the pro rata allocation method to this case, that AHCA is entitled to payment of 3.5 percent of $39,854.66, which equals $1,394.91, in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should be sanctioned for an alleged violation of Chapters 395 and 401, Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. HCA Raulerson is the only hospital in Okeechobee County, Florida. As such, it serves all of Okeechobee County and parts of the surrounding counties. It is a small community hospital that is best characterized as a primary care receiving facility as opposed to a secondary hospital or a tertiary care or trauma center hospital. The Hospital does not provide heart-bypass surgery, cardiac catherization, neuro-surgery services or even obstetrical services (other than the emergency delivery of babies.) The Hospital provided approximately three million dollars in uncompensated care to indigent residents of Okeechobee County in the year preceding the incident involved in this case. Under existing Florida law, a hospital is not required to provide either orthopedic surgery services or peripheral vascular services and there is no requirement for a hospital to have on its medical staff any orthopedic surgeons or peripheral vascular surgeons. The Hospital does not have the angiography equipment necessary for peripheral vascular surgery. As a result, the Hospital does not provide peripheral vascular surgery and there are no vascular surgeons on staff. Such services were not offered at the Hospital for at least several months prior to the incident in question. The Hospital has a single orthopedic surgeon on staff, Dr. Zafar Kureshi. Dr. Kureshi is board certified in orthopedic surgery. He has been engaged in the private practice of medicine in Okeechobee, Florida since October of 1986. While many of Dr. Kureshi's patients are treated at the Hospital, Dr. Kureshi is not employed by or under contract with the Hospital. This arrangement is not unusual since surgeons, including orthopedic and vascular surgeons, do not typically become employees of hospitals or enter into contracts with hospitals. The Hospital has tried to recruit additional orthopedic surgeons and other specialists for its medical staff, but has been unsuccessful. There is a shortage of orthopedic surgeons in Florida, especially in rural areas, and recruiting orthopedic surgeons to such areas is extremely difficult. It is unrealistic to expect that the Hospital would be able to recruit or retain any orthopedic surgeons if it required them to be "on call" at all times. For a short time after he first obtained staff privileges, Dr. Kureshi provided "on call" services for the Hospital's emergency room several nights per month. On those occasions, he treated patients irrespective of their financial status. At the time of the incident in question, however, Dr. Kureshi had ceased providing "on call" services. His decision was consistent with the Hospital medical staff by-laws. The by-laws of the Hospital medical staff state that, if there is only one physician on staff in a specialty, then that specialty does not have to make emergency department call rosters available to the emergency room. Since he was the only specialist on staff in his area of practice, Dr. Kureshi was not required to provide "on call" coverage. Subsequent to the incident involved in this case, Dr. Kureshi, at the request of the Hospital, has voluntarily agreed to be "on-call" several nights per month. Even when Dr. Kureshi is not formally "on call," the emergency room staff often contacts him when a patient presents at the emergency room in need of orthopedic care. On some such occasions, Dr. Kureshi will treat the patient if he was capable of doing so. When an orthopedic patient or a peripheral vascular patient presents at the Hospital and Dr. Kureshi can not or will not treat the patient, the Hospital (1) provides such care as can be rendered by the emergency room physician or others on HCA Raulerson's medical staff, (2) stabilizes the patient for transfer, (3) calls hospitals and their on-call physicians to arrange transfer, and (4) arranges suitable transportation and transfers the patient. In the months preceding the incident in question, the Hospital arranged the transfer to other hospitals of approximately eleven patients who presented at the Hospital's emergency room in need of orthopedic care. Four of those patients were "paying" patients covered by third party insurers, four were covered by Medicare or Medicaid and the remaining three were self-pay patients. There is no indication that financial status and/or the ability to pay in any way influenced the Hospital's actions with respect to these patients. HRS contends that Sections 395.0142, 395.0143 and 401.45, Florida Statutes, require a hospital that provides any given specialty service (e.g., orthopedic surgery services) to arrange 24-hour a day, seven day a week coverage for that service, either by providing coverage through physicians on staff or entering into advance transfer agreements with other hospitals to cover any such patients who may present in need of such services. The Hospital has attempted, but has been unsuccessful in its attempts, to obtain advance transfer agreements from other hospitals regarding the transfer of patients presenting themselves at the Hospital's emergency room in need of orthopedic surgery services or in need of peripheral vascular surgery services. The Hospital has limited bargaining power in attempting to induce other hospitals to enter into an advance transfer agreement. Because the Hospital is a small rural hospital, virtually all the services it offers are already available at the neighboring hospitals which are potential transfer partners. The only advance transfer agreements that the Hospital has been offered would require the Hospital to assume full responsibility for payment for services rendered to transferred patients by the transferee hospital. Those proposals have been rejected because the financial burden of such an arrangement would probably cause the Hospital to close. As of August 24, 1989, the date of the incident which is the subject of the Administrative Complaint in this case, HRS had not notified the Hospital of any rule or policy interpreting Sections 395.0142, 395.0143, and 401.45, Florida Statutes. As of August 24, 1989, HRS had not adopted any rule which stated a specific requirement that hospitals which provide orthopedic surgery must staff or provide on-call orthopedic surgery services on a continuous basis, i.e. twenty-four (24) hours per day, 365 days per year or have in place an agreement with another hospital(s) to provide such coverage. HRS contends that this requirement is imposed by the clear language of the statutes. On the evening of August 24, 1989 at approximately 7:45 p.m., K.H., a 28 year old male, presented himself at the Hospital's emergency room for treatment of a shotgun wound to his lower left leg. Dr. Charles Vasser, the emergency room physician on duty when K.H. arrived, stabilized the Patient and provided all the treatment that could be provided by an emergency room physician not trained in orthopedic surgery or vascular surgery. The radiology report prepared at the Hospital diagnosed the Patient's condition as follows: "focal soft tissue injury, with multiple metallic fragments of variable size, super imposed over soft tissues of distal right leg are noted. Comminuted compound fracture of distal tibial shaft, as well as linear fracture through distal fibula at same site, are observed. Findings are due to gun shot injury with residual bullet fragments within soft tissues. Correlation with patient's clinical findings is recommended." Because of the nature of the injury and the extent of the damage to the soft tissue of the Patient's lower leg, Dr. Vasser and the attending staff were concerned about the possibility of vascular damage. They frequently checked and charted the Patient's distal pulses. While the distal pulses appeared normal, the presence of distal pulses does not rule out vascular injury. A vascular injury is possible with a comminuted fracture even when the distal pedal pulses appear normal. A vascular problem is especially likely when the wound was inflicted by a shotgun blast and numerous metallic fragments are involved. After providing initial emergency room services to the Patient, Dr. Vasser felt that the assistance of appropriate specialists, i.e., an orthopedic surgeon and at least a consult with a vascular surgeon, would be required for further treatment. Dr. Vasser called the only orthopedic surgeon on the Hospital's medical staff, Dr. Zafar Kureshi, at 8:50 p.m. Dr. Kureshi was not on call that evening. Based on Dr. Vasser's description of K.H.'s condition, Dr. Kureshi stated that he was not capable of treating K.H. without the backup availability of a vascular surgeon and advised that K.H. should be transferred. This recommendation was made not only because Dr. Kureshi was not on call, but also because Dr. Kureshi was not capable of treating the Patient at an acceptable level of medical care without the availability of a vascular surgeon. As indicated in Findings of Fact 3 above, there are no vascular surgeons on staff at the Hospital and the Hospital does not offer vascular surgery services. In determining whether a patient needs the services of a physician in a particular specialty, the Hospital relies upon the medical judgment of the attending physician and any consulting physician. The Hospital did not and should not have ignored the medical determination made by the emergency room physician, in consultation with Dr. Kureshi, that the Patient, K.H., needed vascular backup in order to be properly treated. With the assistance of emergency technician Wendy Johns, Dr. Vasser began placing calls to other hospitals and their on-call physicians at 9:15 p.m. in an effort to arrange a transfer of the Patient. The first physician contacted through another hospital, Dr. Floyd, indicated that he would be unable to treat the Patient because of the extent of the soft-tissue injuries and the corresponding likelihood of vascular involvement. A number of additional hospitals and physicians were contacted and they also refused to accept the transfer of the Patient. All told, nineteen different physicians and/or hospitals were contacted between 9:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. A variety of reasons were cited by those who refused to accept the transfer. Many of the reasons given for refusing the transfer were arguably a pretext and/or contravened the language and intent of Sections 395.0142, 395.0143 and 395.0144, Florida Statutes. Several of the doctors who were contacted confirmed that the treatment of the Patient would require the availability of a vascular surgeon as well as an orthopedist. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to transfer the Patient, Dr. Vasser contacted a general surgeon on the Hospital's medical staff, Dr. Husain, at approximately 12:10 a.m. Dr. Vasser and Dr. Husain again contacted Dr. Kureshi. The three physicians concurred that they were unable to treat the Patient because of the need for a vascular backup and the Hospital's inability to provide the necessary vascular backup. After he talked to Dr. Kureshi the second time, Dr. Vasser resumed calling other hospitals and their on-call physicians. The next call was to a vascular surgeon, Dr. Viamentes. Dr. Viamentes was reached through his beeper, but was unable to accept the transfer because he was out of town. At approximately 12:30 a.m., a social worker for the Hospital, Terry Cooper, contacted St. Mary's Hospital in West Palm Beach. After some discussion and deliberation, St. Mary's agreed to accept the transfer of K.H. The Patient was transferred in stable condition via ambulance to St. Mary's Hospital where he arrived at approximately 3:00 a.m. Surgery was initiated at approximately 4:30 a.m. After the Patient was admitted to St. Mary's Hospital, the administration of that hospital filed a complaint with HRS pursuant to Section 395.0142, Florida Statutes. That complaint recites the facts surrounding the transfer of the Patient and the refusal of several other hospitals to accept the transfer. It is not clear whether St. Mary's was questioning the medical necessity of the transfer or simply the refusal of the other hospitals to accept the transfer. HRS initiated an investigation of the transfer of the Patient and submitted the Patient's medical records from both HCA Raulerson and St. Mary's to its expert, Dr. Slevenski, for review. Dr. Slevenski is an emergency room physician who has no specialized training in orthopedic surgery or vascular surgery. Dr. Slevenski testified that he saw no evidence in the Hospital's medical records that a vascular evaluation or consultation was necessary to treat this Patient and that the Hospital inappropriately transferred the Patient to another hospital. Dr. Slevenski's opinions are rejected. Dr. Slevenski erroneously assumed that the Hospital had not attempted to contact an orthopedic surgeon regarding the Patient. In fact, the Hospital contacted Dr. Kureshi, the only orthopedic surgeon on its staff, who indicated he was not qualified to treat the Patient's injury. The evidence established that both the emergency room physician and the orthopedic surgeon who was contacted at home felt that a vascular consult was necessary. These opinions were reasonable under the circumstances. The testimony of Dr. Henderson, the Respondent's expert, is accepted and confirms that the opinions of the emergency room physician and the orthopedic surgeon were reasonable under the circumstances and given the nature of the Patient's injury. There is no evidence that the Patient's care was deficient in any respect at either St. Mary's or the Hospital. The Patient progressed normally and a good result was achieved. In sum, the evidence established that the Hospital secured appropriate treatment for K.H. by providing an on-site emergency room physician and supporting staff who (1) provided immediate emergency care and stabilized the patient for transfer, (2) confirmed with the orthopedic surgeon on the Hospital's medical staff that a transfer was medically necessary, (3) called hospitals and their on-call physicians to arrange the transfer, and (4) arranged suitable transportation and transfer of the patient. The Hospital provided all the care that it could within its service capability. In view of his injury, the Patient's best interests were served by transferring him rather than treating him at the Hospital. The evidence did not establish whether K.H. was a paying or nonpaying patient. The evidence did establish that the decision to transfer K.H. was not based on his financial status.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint filed against HCA Raulerson Hospital. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1991.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Andrew Logan, M.D., committed a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner, the Department of Health, on April 30, 2003, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving physicians licensed to practice medicine in Florida. Respondent, Andrew Logan, M.D., is, and was at the times material to this matter, a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida, having been issued license number ME 0058658. Dr. Logan's last known business address is 8551 West Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 105, Plantation, Florida 33322. At the times material to this matter, Dr. Logan was certified in ophthalmology. He specializes in medical and surgical ophthalmology. Dr. Logan received a bachelor of arts degree in biology in 1982 from Brown University. He received his medical degree in 1986 from the University of California, San Francisco.2 Dr. Logan completed a residency in ophthalmology. Dr. Logan has practiced medicine in Florida since 1990. At the times relevant to this matter, Dr. Logan worked in a group practice in Plantation, Florida. Most of his practice consisted of an office practice, seeing patients. He also performed some laser and minor surgeries in the office. Approximately once a week, for half a day, he performed surgery out of the office at "three hospitals and surgical centers." Dr. Logan's license to practice medicine has not been previously disciplined. The Department's Administrative Complaint and Dr. Logan's Request for Hearing. On April 30, 2003, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Dr. Logan before the Board of Medicine (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), alleging that his treatment of one patient, identified in the Administrative Complaint as C. S., constituted gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances (the recognized acceptable treatment will hereinafter be referred to as the "Standard of Care"), a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. In particular, it is alleged in the Administrative Complaint that Dr. Logan violated the Standard of Care in "one or more of the following ways": Respondent failed to identify the correct patient for the implantation of the 23 diopter lens; Respondent failed to verify that the lens he implanted into Patient C.S. was the power of lens that he had previously ordered; Respondent implanted the wrong lens into the left eye of Patient C.S. The factual allegations of the Administrative Complaint, although stated differently, essentially allege that Dr. Logan operated on the wrong patient. Dr. Logan filed a request for a formal administrative hearing with the Department, which was filed by the Department with the Division of Administrative hearings. Treatment of Patient C.S. C.S., who was 70 years of age at the time of the incident involved in this matter, began seeing Dr. Logan for eye care in approximately February 1997. C.S. developed cataracts in both eyes, for which Dr. Logan diagnosed and suggested surgical treatment.3 Dr. Logan explained the procedure he believed necessary to remove C.S.'s cataracts to her and obtained her approval thereof. The procedure to be performed on C.S., known as phacoemulisification, consisted of making an very small incision in her eye, breaking up her natural, or intraocular, lens with ultrasound, irrigating the eye, and then suctioning out the destroyed lens and irrigation material. Once the intraocular lens is removed, it is replaced with an artificial lens, the power and model of which is selected by the physician. Dr. Logan determined that the lens needed to restore C.S.'s vision in her left eye after removal of her intraocular lens was a 15-diopter lens. The "diopter" of a lens relates to the corrective power of the lens. C.S. was scheduled for the planned cataract surgery on her left eye at the Surgery Center of Coral Springs (hereinafter referred to as the "Surgery Center") for the morning of September 5, 2000.4 C.S. was one of at least two patients scheduled for surgery by Dr. Logan that morning. The Surgery Center is a free-standing center where various types of surgery are performed. Dr. Logan was not an owner or employee of the Surgery Center. He did not hire, nor could her fire, any employee of the Surgery Center, and none of the equipment utilized in the Surgery Center was owned by him.5 Consistent with established procedures, the Surgery Center was faxed information concerning C.S.'s scheduled surgery. In particular, the facsimile identified C.S. by name, which eye was to be operated on (her left eye), and the power (15-diopter) and model number of the replacement lens Dr. Logan had determined was necessary to restore C.S.'s vision after the surgery. The day before C.S.'s scheduled surgery, Dr. Logan was provided with C.S.'s patient records and the records of the other patient scheduled for surgery on September 5, 2000. He reviewed those records either that afternoon or that night. He also took the records with him to the Surgery Center where he reviewed them again. On or around the morning of September 5, 2000, the Surgery Center's nurse manager took the facsimiles that had previously been sent to the Surgery Center by Dr. Logan's office and retrieved the lens for each patient scheduled for surgery that day. When the nurse manager retrieved the lens, she was expected to ensure that the ordered lens, both as to power and model, were available, and that they were within their expiration date. She then bundled the lens and the facsimile. Three lens per patient were routinely retrieved. The bundles were then placed on a table in the operating room in the order they were supposed to be used. The order of surgery for September 5, 2000, had been prearranged and that information was available on a list prepared by the Surgery Center to all of those involved in the surgery that morning, including Dr. Logan and his surgery team. C.S. had been scheduled to be the second patient seen that morning. When C.S. arrived at the Surgery Center she was eventually taken to a pre-operation room (hereinafter referred to as "pre-op") to be readied for surgery. The patient who had been scheduled for the first surgery of the morning (hereinafter referred to as the "First Scheduled Patient"), had been late arriving on September 5, 2000. C.S. had come early. Therefore, C.S. was taken to pre-op in place of the First Scheduled Patient. What exactly transpired after C.S. was taken to pre-op was not explained. The nurse manager, who had overall responsibility for getting patients ready for surgery did not testify during this proceeding and the circulating nurse, Ann Tuza, was unable to recall what took place in any detail. What was proved is that Dr. Logan was not informed of the switch and the records and lens, which had been placed in the order of the scheduled surgeries for that day, were not changed to reflect that C.S. would be taken to surgery in place of the First Scheduled Patient. Therefore, although C.S. was the first patient into surgery, the records and lenses of the First Scheduled Patient were not replaced with C.S.'s records or lens. As was his practice, before going into the operating room, Dr. Logan went to pre-op to administer a local anesthesia. Dr. Logan, who had not been informed that the second scheduled patient, C.S., had been substituted for the First Scheduled Patient, administered the anesthesia to C.S. Dr. Logan found C.S. asleep. Dr. Logan did not recognize C.S. and he did not speak to her, as would have been his practice had she been awake, or otherwise identify her. Dr. Logan injected a local anesthesia by needle under and behind C.S.'s left eye,6 a procedure referred to as a "block" or "retrobulbar block."7 After the block had time to take effect, which normally took approximately five to ten minutes, Nurse Tuza went to retrieve C.S. from pre-op and bring her to the operating room. C.S. was brought into the operating room by Nurse Tuza and prepared for surgery. She was covered completely except for her feet and her left eye, which had an "X" placed over it to identify the eye to be operated on. Nurse Tuza remained in the operating room, along with a scrub technician, who assisted Dr. Logan, and a nurse anesthetist. None of these individuals apparently checked to ensure that they were correct in their assumption that the patient was the First Scheduled Patient. Dr. Logan, who did not recall what he did between seeing C.S. in pre-op and arriving at the operating room, completed scrubbing and entered the operating room where C.S. awaited. He had placed his charts in the operating room. His routine after arriving in the operating room was to go to the head of the patient and adjust a microscope used during the surgery. It is inferred that he did so on the morning of September 5, 2000. Although C.S. was awake when she was taken into the operating room and during the surgery, no one, including Dr. Logan, asked her her name. Nor did anyone, including Dr. Logan, check to see if she was wearing a wrist-band which identified her. Instead everyone, including Dr. Logan, assumed that they were operating on the First Scheduled Patient. Not actually knowing who he was operating on,8 Dr. Logan performed the surgery scheduled for the First Scheduled Patient on C.S. Although the procedure her performed on C.S., fortunately, was the same one scheduled for C.S., the diopter of the replacement lens was not.9 The First Scheduled Patient was to receive a 23-diopter lens, rather than C.S.'s 15- diopter lens. Dr. Logan placed the 23-diopter lens in C.S.'s eye, completed the procedure, and C.S. was taken to recovery. When Nurse Tuza went to get the next patient for surgery, who she expected to be C.S., she discovered for the first time that C.S. had been substituted for the First Scheduled Patient. She immediately informed Dr. Logan of the error. Dr. Logan went to the recovery room and, after ensuring that C.S. was alert enough to comprehend what he was saying, informed C.S. of the error. She consented to Dr. Logan's suggestion the he take her back into the operating room, remove the 23-diopter lens, and replace it with the correct, 15-diopter lens, which he immediately did. The replacement procedure required no additional trip to the Surgery Center, anesthesia, or incisions. C.S. recovered from the procedures without problem or direct harm. She continued to see Dr. Logan as her eye care until a change in insurance prevented her from doing so. Standard of Care. There was little dispute that Dr. Logan "failed to identify the correct patient for the implantation of the 23 diopter lens"; "failed to verify that the lens he implanted into Patient C.S. was the power of lens that he had previously ordered [for her]"; and "implanted the wrong lens into the left eye of Patient C.S." These facts, which form the factual basis for the Department's allegation that Dr. Logan violated the Standard of Care, have been proved. Including Dr. Logan, five physicians gave opinions in this proceeding as to whether Dr. Logan's actions violated the Standard of Care: Drs. William Cobb, Harry Hamburger, Joel Kramer, and Lowell Sherris. The testimony of Drs. Cobb and Kramer, primarily, and, to a lesser degree, the testimony of the Dr. Logan and the other two physicians, support a finding that Dr. Logan's actions, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, constitute a violation of the Standard of Care. The testimony of Drs. Cobb, Kramer, and Sherris, which was credible and persuasive, have been summarized in the Department's proposed recommended order, and will not, in light of recent changes in Section 456.073(5), Florida Statutes, be summarized in any detail here. All of the physicians who testified, including Dr. Logan, agreed that a physician must know on whom he or she is operating and that operating on the wrong patient or inserting the wrong lens in a patient's eye is inappropriate. Dr. Logan, with Dr. Hamburger's support, attempted to prove that Dr. Logan did not violate the Standard of Care, despite the fact that he "failed to identify the correct patient for the implantation of the 23 diopter lens"; "failed to verify that the lens he implanted into Patient C.S. was the power of lens that he had previously ordered [for her]"; and "implanted the wrong lens into the left eye of Patient C.S.," by suggesting the following: It is reasonable and common practice in the South Florida community for a physician to rely on the staff of a surgical center to identify a patient prior to surgery and bring the patients [sic] back in the order originally anticipated. Dr. Logan had several safeguards in place to avoid the error that occurred in this case. The standard of care does not require that physician act as a supervisor who is responsible for every act of the healthcare provided team. This incident occurred due to an error of the staff at the Surgical Center at Coral Springs. . . . . Respondent's Proposed Final [sic] Order, paragraph 78. The proposed findings quoted in paragraph 37 are based primarily on Dr. Hamburger's, and to a lesser extent, Dr. Logan's, assertion that the surgery was a team effort, that the team had established procedures to identify the patient, and that the team failed in this instance to properly identify the patient. This testimony, and the proposed findings quoted in paragraph 37 are rejected. Nothing in the procedures followed in this instance alleviated Dr. Logan's responsibility to ensure that he actually established for himself who he was about to perform surgery on, a task which would have taken little effort.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the a final order be entered by the Board of Medicine finding that Andrew Logan, M.D., has violated Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2000), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, requiring the payment of an administrative fine of $5,000.00, completion of four hours of continuing medical education in risk management, and attendance at a one hour lecture on wrong patient surgery and how to avoid it, and issuing Dr. Logan a letter of concern from the Board of Medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2004.
