The Issue Whether or not the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, is entitled to documentary stamp tax in accordance with Section 201.02, Florida Statutes, in the amount of $1,450.50 and a penalty in the amount of $1,450.50 under Section 201.17, Florida Statutes; and documentary surtax under Section , Florida Statutes, in the amount of $531.85 and penalties thereon in the amount of $531.85, pursuant to Section 201.17, Florida Statutes; as entered by the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, on a transaction between Petitioners and Stam-Mil, Inc., are proper.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners were the stockholders of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. Among the assets of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc., were the rights under a sublease undertaken between B.G.L. Corporation and Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. dated September 25, 1976 and recorded in Official Record Book 5663, at page 261 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida. This sublease was an amendment to a sublease which was dated June 1, 1965, recorded in Official Record Book 5768, Page 176 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, between B.G.L. Corporation, a Florida corporation as lessor, and KSJ Corporation, a Florida corporation as lessee. One of the conditions of Gallagher's lease obligation was responsibility for the payment of a mortgage dated May 1, 1965, recorded in Official Record Book 4592, at Page 161, of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, from KSJ Corporation, a Florida corporation to Joseph Z. Lipsky and Evalyn Lipsky, as amended by agreement dated August 30, l65 between KSJ Corporation and Joseph Z. Lipsky and Evalyn Lipsky. Pursuant to a plan of liquidation of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. that corporation executed and delivered to Petitioners an assignment of the lessee's interest in the aforementioned lease to which Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. was a party. The assignment of lease can be found as Exhibit A to the petition filed by the Petitioners. The contents of such assignment are found to be fact. By letters of July 30, 1975 and March 10, 1975, the Respondent indicated its intention to assess tax in the amount of $326.10 upon the document representing the assignment between Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. and the Petitioners. The amount of documentary stamp tax was premised on the aforementioned mortgage which at the time of the proposed assessment was valued at $108,750. In addition the Respondent indicated its intention to impose a penalty in a like amount of $326.10. The assignment was in fact executed, pursuant to a plan of liquidation, which plan is shown as Petitioner's Exhibit C attached to the petition. The Petitioners' Exhibit C is established as fact. Petitioners in receiving the assignment in liquidation Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. received such assignment in proportion to their stock holdings in that corporation. Subsequent to the assignment of leases and agreement between Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. and the Petitioners a further assignment was made between the Petitioners and Stan-Mil, Inc. of the same property, which took place on December 16, 1974. The Petitioners executed and delivered to Stan-Mil, Inc. a Florida corporation, the assignment of lease of lessee's interest in a lease, as shown in Petitioner's Exhibit A attached to its petition challenging the assessment in the transfer of Petitioners' interest to Stan-Mil, Inc. The facts of Exhibit A are admitted. The assignment was excluded pursuant to an agreement for the sale of a restaurant (Gallagher's Restaurant) , the lease assignment being of the assets of the restaurant which was sold. A copy of the closing statement, upon the sale of the restaurant, a copy of the bill of sale of all assets sold and a copy of an appraisal report allocating the purchase price for the restaurant, among all of the assets sold is attached as Petitioner's Exhibit D to the petition challenging the assessment on the transaction between the Petitioners and Stan-Mil, Inc. The facts of Exhibit D are admitted. The Respondent, through its letter of March 8, 1976, proposes to assess documentary stamp tax under 201.02 F.S. in the amount of $1450.50 and a penalty in like amount under 201.17 P.S. In addition the letter notices a proposed assessment of documentary surtax under 201.021 F.S. in the amount of $531.85 and a penalty of $531.85 pursuant to 201.17 F.S. These amounts represent the tax on the appraised value of the lease-land and building in the amount of $83,500.00 and the leasehold improvements in the amount of $400,000.00. These lease-hold improvements are to be distinguished from such tangible items as furniture, fixtures, equipment, dishes and silverware, which were separately appraised in the valuation of the assets of the restaurant, known as Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. The Petitioners are challenging the proposed assessment of tax on the transaction between the Petitioners and Stan-Mil, Inc.
Recommendation It is recommended that the documentary stamp tax in the amount of $1450.50 and a like penalty of $1450.50, and the documentary surtax in the amount of $531.85 and a like penalty of $531.85, as assessed against the Petitioners, be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lewis M. Kanner, Esquire 1003 DuPont Building 169 E. Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131 Caroline E. Mueller, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
The Issue Whether or not the actions of the petitioner in amending its lease agreement resulted in increased costs which are reimbursable by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services through an interim rate request.
Findings Of Fact Hallandale is a licensed nursing home facility located in Hallandale, Florida, and at all times material hereto, Hallandale was certified to and was participating in the Florida Medicaid Program. The participation was subject to a standard nursing home provider agreement entered into by the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, Hallandale provides nursing care for Medicaid recipients and receives as payment the recognized rate of Medicaid reimbursement established for Hallandale by HRS in accordance with the applicable state and federal laws, regulations, and guidelines. The agreement may be cancelled by either party after giving thirty (30) days notice. In 1971, Hallandale entered into a lease agreement with the owners of the nursing home facility and began operating the nursing home. The lease called for a payment of $84.00 per month, per bed, had no escalation clause, and would not expire until 1986. At the time the lease was negotiated, the owners had been operating the nursing home themselves at a loss. To avoid bankruptcy or having to sell the property at a loss, the owners leased the property to Hallandale. However, within seven or eight years the owners began to put pressure on Hallandale to renegotiate the lease because the owners did not think they were getting a fair return on their investment. In 1981, the owners and Hallandale entered into negotiations to amend the terms of the lease to provide an increased rental rate and an extension of the lease term. The negotiations were not successful, and finally, by letter dated July 6, 1983, the owners issued the following ultimatum: "Although the lease has a renegotiation clause six months prior to expiration, we must renegotiate the terms and conditions of this lease immediately. The partnership has made a decision that we will definitely not renew or extend your lease unless we can come to some satisfactory arrangement regarding terms and conditions, effective immediately." On December 13, 1983, Hallandale and the owners entered into an amendment to the original lease. The amendment increased the lease payments and extended the lease until August of 1998. The amended lease provided for a minimum rental of $110 per month, per bed, as of September 1, 1983, with increases in the rental every year thereafter. Saul Lerner has been president of Hallandale since 1975 and has been associated with the facility since it was first leased in 1971. Mr. Lerner is an astute businessman who has been involved in a variety of businesses for forty years. He was chiefly responsible for renegotiating the lease with the owners. Although the lease was renegotiated due to the owners' threats to sell the facility, 1/ Mr. Lerner did not merely accede to the owners' demands. There were several offers and counteroffers made before the final agreement was reached, and the renegotiated lease provided for a considerably lower rental rate than that demanded by the owners. Prior to entering into the lease amendment Mr. Lerner consulted with people in the industry, had a MAI appraisal performed, discussed the situation with James Beymer, a real estate broker specializing in nursing home and health related facilities, consulted with his accountants who had been in the health care field for 13 years, and talked with Sebastian Gomez of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Mr. Lerner consulted with his business associates, and the pros and cons of renegotiating the lease were carefully considered. Hallandale's determination to renegotiate the lease in 1983 was a reasonable and prudent business decision. By agreeing to increased rental payments for the three years that remained on the original lease, Hallandale gained an additional 12 years to operate the facility. This permitted Hallandale to project its costs and plan for the future. It could make additions and improvements to the building, buy new equipment, and provide for stability in staffing. On the other hand, had Hallandale refused to renegotiate the lease, it faced an uncertain future. There was a strong possibility that the owners would not be willing to renew the lease when it expired, which would result in Hallandale's losing the equipment and improvements it had put into the building. In addition, the owners were threatening to sell the property, and even though Hallandale had the right of first refusal, it would have had difficulty in obtaining the money required to purchase the property. Further, Hallandale realized that even if the owners would be willing to negotiate a new lease in 1986, Hallandale would not have the same leverage or bargaining power in 1986 as it had in 1983. Hallandale has participated in the Medicaid program continuously since 1971. At the time of the hearing the facility had 142 patients, of which 45 were Medicaid patients. 2/ Hallandale has never refused a Medicaid patient, and some of the patients have been there 8 or 9 years. The Medicaid patients are treated the same as the private patients, to such a degree that no one knows which patients are Medicaid patients. Although the agreement with HRS allows a provider to leave the Medicaid program with 30 days notice, Hallandale has no intention to ever discontinue participation in the Medicaid program. The extended term of the renegotiated lease is not only advantageous to Hallandale, it is also beneficial to Hallandale's patients, including Medicaid patients. It secures continuity of care for the patients and ensures that the patients will not have to be moved to a new facility in 1986. The transfer from one facility to another can be a very traumatic event for an elderly person; some patients have died within weeks of a transfer. Further, the patients benefit immediately because the extended term of the lease allows Hallandale to make improvements to the facility and buy equipment that it would not have been able to do without the security of a long term lease. The lease payments called for by the new lease are not out of line with lease payments made by similar institutions. Mr. Lerner looked at other lease payments being made in the community and found that $110 per bed per month was not an exorbitant amount. James Beymer leased nursing home facilities that were not as nice as the Hallandale facility for $138 per bed per month $166 per bed per month, and $225 per bed per month. Had Hallandale purchased the facility for $3 million, the price asked by the owners, the cost per month per bed would have been over twice the amount of the lease payment. 3/ Lease payments are included in a facility's "fixed costs." The fixed costs also include depreciation, real estate taxes and insurance. The state places a cap on reimbursement rates for fixed costs. In June 1983, prior to the renegotiation of the lease, Hallandale's fixed costs were $4.61 per patient day; under the renegotiated lease, the fixed costs would be $5.16 per patient day. Thus, even with the higher lease payment, the fixed costs are considerably under the state cap of $12.50 per patient day. A provider's reimbursement rate is determined by HRS from a cost report submitted by a provider. The rate is a prospective per diem rate. If, during the prospective period, the provider incurs an increase in costs, the provider has a right to submit an interim rate request to HRS. The Department uses the same principles to determine whether costs submitted in an interim rate request should be allowed as in determining whether costs submitted in a cost report should be allowed. Lease payments are allowable expenses under the Medicaid program subject to the Medicaid cost reimbursement principles. In calculating Hallandale's per diem rate, HRS allowed Hallandale $84 per month lease cost for each Medicaid patient in the facility based on the 1971 lease. Prior to executing the new lease, Hallandale contacted HRS to inquire if the new lease cost would be allowable and was informed that the new costs would probably not be allowable. On November 9, 1983, Hallandale submitted an interim rate request to cover the increased cost of the new lease payments. The interim rate request was procedurally correct. By letter dated May 30, 1984, HRS denied the interim rate request because "...the lease cost was negotiated for investment related reasons and is not related to patient care." On June 25, 1984, Hallandale filed its petition for a formal administrative hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the interim rate increase requested by Hallandale be granted. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1985.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint (as amended at the final hearing)? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a Florida-licensed real estate salesperson. He holds license number 0186760. Respondent passed the salesperson examination on November 6, 1995. From November 13, 1995, through February 26, 1997, Respondent was an active salesperson in association with Nicholas Chillemi, an individual broker trading as ReMax 100 (ReMax) and located at 10205 Southern Boulevard in Royal Palm Beach, Florida. From February 27, 1997, through June 24, 1998, Respondent was an active salesperson in association with Bowen Realty, Inc., a broker corporation trading as Bowen Realty and located in Jupiter, Florida. From June 25, 1998, through September 30, 1999, Respondent was an active salesperson in association with Forum Realty, Inc., a broker corporation trading as Realty Executives of the Palm Beaches and located in Lake Worth, Florida. On October 1, 1999, Respondent's salesperson license became involuntary inactive (which is its current status) due to non-renewal. At no time material to the instant case did Respondent hold a real estate broker license At all times material to the instant case, Javier and Maria Velilla owned residential property located at 1290 McDermott Lane in Royal Palm Beach, Florida (McDermott Lane Property). Respondent and Ms. Velilla have known each other for 16 or 17 years. They first met in Chicago, Illinois. Some time prior to September 1, 1996, not very long after he had moved from Chicago to Florida and had begun working as a real estate salesperson for Mr. Chillemi, Respondent returned to Chicago and visited Ms. Velilla. During his visit, Respondent agreed, as a representative of ReMax, 2/ to help the Velillas find a tenant for the McDermott Lane Property. Through the efforts of Respondent, a tenant was ultimately found for the property. The tenant was Belinda Vosatka. On or about August 28, 1996, the Velillas (as lessors) and Ms. Vosatka (as lessee) entered into a Residential Lease for Single Family Home and Duplex (McDermott Lane Property Lease). The McDermott Lane Property Lease covered the one-year period from September 1, 1996, to August 31, 1997, and required Ms. Vosatka to make a security deposit of $850.00 and lease payments of $850.00 a month. Paragraph VI of the McDermott Lane Property Lease provided as follows: NOTICES. Henry Saldana is Landlord's Agent. All notices to Landlord and all Lease Payments must be sent to Landlord's Agent at 10205 Southern BLVD, R.P.B., Fl 33411 unless Landlord gives Tenant written notice of a change. Landlord's Agent may perform inspections on behalf of Landlord. All notices to Landlord shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by hand delivery to Landlord or Landlord's Agent. Any notice to Tenant shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, or delivered to Tenant at the Premises. If Tenant is absent from the Premises, a notice to Tenant may be given by leaving a copy of the notice at the Premises. The Velillas agreed to pay Respondent $50.00 a month for acting as their "agent" under the McDermott Lane Property Lease ("Agent" Fee Arrangement). Respondent entered into this agreement with the Velillas in his individual capacity, not as a ReMax salesperson on behalf of Mr. Chillemi. (As Respondent was aware at the time he entered into the "Agent" Fee Arrangement, collecting lease payments from tenants and providing related property management functions were not among the services that ReMax provided its clients.) Respondent made Mr. Chillemi aware of the McDermott Lane Property Lease, but at no time did he inform Mr. Chillemi about the "Agent" Fee Arrangement, much less share with Mr. Chillemi the $50.00 payments he received from the Velillas for acting as their "agent." On September 1, 1996, Respondent received from Mr. Chillemi a $425.00 commission for his role in the leasing of the McDermott Lane Property. For approximately the first half of the lease period, the Velillas received from Respondent, within five days of the beginning of each month, money orders in the amount of the monthly lease payments Ms. Vosatka was required to make under the McDermott Lane Property Lease, and the Velillas, in turn, paid Respondent (by check payable to Respondent) $50.00 a month in accordance with the "Agent" Fee Arrangement." Thereafter, however, to the dissatisfaction of the Velillas, the money orders began arriving later in the month. Upon looking into the matter, Ms. Velilla discovered that, pursuant to Respondent's instructions (which he had given without the Velillas' express authorization), Ms. Vosatka had been making her monthly lease payments by sending Respondent personal checks payable to Respondent. Displeased with this arrangement, Ms. Velilla had Respondent draft the following Amendment to Lease, which she and her husband (as lessors) and Ms Vosatka (as lessee) signed: It is mutually agreed and understood by the parties [who] entered into a leasing agreement on August 26, 1996 for the property located at 1290 McDermott Ln. Royal Palm Beach, Fl 33411 and herein referred to as, Javier & Maria Victoria Velilla, as the Landlord, and Belinda Vosatka, as the Tenant, that the rent for the above named property shall be due and payable by way of Cashier's Check or Money Order and to the name of the above mentioned Landlord on the same dates as agreed on the original lease. In consideration to the rent being paid by Cashier's Check or Money Order, the Landlord agrees to allow Four D[o]ll[a]rs ($4.00) allowance to the Tenant for expenses incurred for issuance of the payment. Therefore, the actual rent due by the Tenant shall be in the amount of $846 per month. The rest of the terms of the lease stand as originally agreed. Ms. Vosatka paid her rent for two or three months following the execution of this Amendment to Lease with cashier's checks payable to the Velillas. She then stopped making payments. When Ms. Velilla contacted Respondent and inquired about the situation, Respondent told her that Ms. Vosatka had health problems and was not able to work. After not receiving any lease payments for approximately three months, the Velillas, at the urging of a friend, traveled to Florida to inspect the McDermott Lane Property. Upon arriving at the property, they found that Ms. Vosatka had vacated the premises, leaving it in deplorable condition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint (as amended at the final hearing) in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2000.
The Issue The issues are whether Keith Rockman's construction of a dock and other structures on Choctawhatchee Bay in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, is exempt from Wetland Resource Permit requirements, and whether authorization to use sovereign submerged lands for the project should be given.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings of fact are made: On December 19, 2005, Mr. Rockman, who lives at 325 Brooks Street, Southeast, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, filed an application with the Department's Northwest District Office in Pensacola requesting authorization to construct a platform seven feet wide by eight feet long; an access pier three feet long; another access pier four feet wide by forty-five feet long; four mooring pilings outside the slip; and ten mooring pilings inside the proposed slip, totaling 371 square feet. The application indicated that the proposed construction activities would take place in the Choctawhatchee Bay, a Class III water of the State, on which Mr. Rockman's property fronts. (This waterbody is more commonly known as the Santa Rosa Sound or the Intracoastal Waterway.) The property already had an existing 25-foot dock when Mr. Rockman purchased the property sometime in 2005; however, because Mr. Rockman wishes to dock a larger boat than the prior owner, he has requested authorization to build the structures in issue here. Based upon the information supplied by the applicant, Diana Athnos, an Environmental Manager with the Northwest District Office, advised Mr. Rockman by letter dated January 31, 2006, that the Department had "determined that [his] project is exempted from [the Department's] Wetland Resource Permit requirements by Rule 62-312.050(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code." The letter also stated that the "letter is your authorization to use sovereign submerged land (if applicable) for the construction of your project, as required by Chapter 253.77, Florida Statutes and Chapter 18-21, F.A.C." After Department approval was obtained, Mr. Rockman completed construction of the project. Mr. Rockman elected not to publish notice of the Department's decision or provide notice by certified mail to specific individuals. Therefore, third parties were not barred from challenging the Department's decision until after they received actual notice. Petitioner, who lives next door to Mr. Rockman, learned about the Department's decision in a telephone call with the Northwest District Office on March 8, 2006. The papers filed in this case indicate that Petitioner and other neighbors had actually observed construction activities on Mr. Rockman's property in November 2005 and had filed complaints with the Department regarding these unauthorized activities. These complaints evidently led to the filing of an application by Mr. Rockman. On March 17, 2006, Petitioner, who resides at 328 Brooks Street, Southeast, Fort Walton Beach, and has 50 feet of frontage on the water with a dock extending into those waters, filed a letter with the Department, which was treated as a Petition challenging the Department's earlier decision. This Petition was later dismissed by the Department on the ground it raised claims concerning Petitioner's riparian rights, a matter beyond the Department's jurisdiction. Petitioner then filed an Amended Petition on July 11, 2006, in which he again contended that his riparian rights would be severely restricted by the proposed activities, and that the dock would create a navigational hazard. Although Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-312.050(1)(d)3. requires that a project not "create a navigational hazard" in order to be exempt from permitting requirements, Petitioner opted to base his claims on two provisions in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.004(7), which contains the general conditions for authorizations to use sovereign submerged lands. The riparian rights issue was again excluded from consideration at a status conference held on January 5, 2007. The parties advise that this issue is now being pursued in a separate action in circuit court. Through the introduction into evidence of its complete permit file as Department Composite Exhibit 1, the Department established that the proposed activities are exempt from permitting requirements under Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-312.050(1)(d). More specifically, the activity will take place in waters which are not located in Outstanding Florida Waters; the structures are less than 1,000 square feet of surface area over the landward extent of waters of the State; they will be used for recreational purposes; they will be constructed on pilings; they will not substantially impede the flow of water or create a navigational hazard; and the structure is the sole dock constructed pursuant to the exemption as measured along the shoreline for a minimum distance of 65 feet. The dock and associated structures and pilings will be constructed over sovereign submerged lands owned by the State of Florida. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005(1), which specifies the forms of authorization for consent to use sovereign submerged lands, "no application or written authorization is required for an activity that is exempt from the requirements of obtaining a permit," so long as certain conditions are met, including those found in Florida Administrative Code Rules 18-21.004(7). See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.005(1)(b). The only relevant condition raised in the Amended Petition is whether or not the "[s]tructures or activities shall . . . create a navigational hazard." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004(7)(g). In construing this rule, and the similar requirement in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 312.050(1)(d)3., the Department considers whether the structures will create a navigational hazard for boaters on the Intracoastal Waterway, as well as the owners of property who reside on either side of Mr. Rockman. In his Amended Petition, Mr. Woolshlager contended that the proposed structures or activities will create a navigational hazard when he accesses the dock in front of his property. As clarified at hearing, Petitioner does not dispute that he (or any "good boat driver") has adequate ingress and egress for his smaller boat, even with the larger dock on Mr. Rockman's property. Indeed, the record shows that he has been observed leaving his dock and accessing the Intracoastal Waterway. However, Petitioner indicated that if he should die, his wife intends to sell the property. If the new purchaser desires to dock a larger boat, he fears that there will not be sufficient room to do so, and the value of his property will be diminished. Through testimony from a licensed boat captain, it was established that Mr. Rockman's dock does not create a navigational hazard for boaters in the Intracoastal Waterway whose boat channel lies at least 600 feet or so from the shoreline, or for property owners on either side of the applicant's property. Although Petitioner cannot dock a larger boat than he now has (a 21-foot boat), this is because he needs to dredge out the area where his existing dock is built and reconfigure its shape. (Mr. Woolshlager agreed that his dock actually encroaches a few feet onto Mr. Rockman's property; however, Mr. Woolshlager advises that the prior owner (who sold the property to Mr. Rockman) agreed to this encroachment when he purchased the property.) Therefore, all criteria have been satisfied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order granting Mr. Rockman's application for an exemption from permitting requirements and authorization to use state-owned submerged lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John N. C. Ledbetter, Esquire 4641 Gulfstarr Drive Suite 102 Destin, Florida 32541-5324 Nona R. Schaffner, Esquire Amanda G. Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael William Mead, Esquire John S. Mead, Esquire Michael Wm Mead, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1329 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549-1329 Gregory M. Munson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioners were the victims of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to renew the lease of an apartment from Respondents, based upon their race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Vernon and Glenda Shaw are husband and wife. They and their children are African-Americans. Respondent EPI Townsend, LLC owns an apartment community located in Gainesville, Florida, known as Uptown Village. Respondent Epoch Management, Inc. (Epoch) manages Uptown Village on behalf of EPI Townsend, LLC. On June 25, 2010, Ms. Shaw submitted an application to lease an apartment at Uptown Village. She listed herself, her husband, and her two children as the proposed occupants. Ms. Shaw noted the family had a dog. She provided her email address on the application, as requested. At the time of application, prospective tenants of Uptown Village are given a document entitled ?Epoch Management, Inc. Rental Application Approval Criteria.? It contains an ?Equal Housing Opportunity? statement and displays the ?Equal Housing? logo approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (?HUD?). When she submitted her application, Ms. Shaw acknowledged receipt of the Rental Application Approval Criteria form. The Shaws’ application was approved, and Ms. Shaw subsequently signed a one-year lease (?the Lease?) agreement on June 26, 2010. Soon thereafter Ms. Shaw moved into Apartment 2- 201 of Uptown Village with her children and their dog. Mr. Shaw was living in Alabama at the time and planned on moving to Gainesville at a later date to join his family.1/ At the time the Shaws began their tenancy at Uptown Village, Rhonda Hayden served as the property manager and Stacy Brown as the assistant property manager for Epoch. Both were experienced property managers and both had received Fair Housing training. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown testified that Epoch tries to create a sense of community among its tenants. Its efforts include hosting monthly breakfasts and other events for tenants. Information about upcoming community events is sent to all tenants with email addresses on file via Constant Contact, an on-line social and business networking platform. The email address provided on Ms. Shaw's rental application was entered into Epoch’s Constant Contact list. The Uptown Village Lease The Lease contained several provisions intended to ensure a safe and peaceful living environment for tenants. For example, paragraph 4 of the Lease provided that a resident shall ?. . . not permit any disturbance, noises or annoyance whatsoever detrimental to the comfort and peace of any of the inhabitants of the community or its Landlord.? Similarly, paragraph 30(G) provided that the ?Resident shall ensure that the pet(s) does not, at any time, disturb any other Resident of the apartment community.? The Lease reserved to Epoch the right to determine, in its sole discretion, whether a pet was disturbing residents. The Lease also incorporated a code of community rules (?the Rules?) for Uptown Village, which provided in pertinent part, ?all garbage, refuse and other types of waste shall be placed in garbage receptacles? and that ?loud and boisterous noise or any other objectionable behavior by any Resident or guests is not permitted.? The Rules also noted that the "quiet time" hours of the complex were from 10:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. Paragraph 12 of the Lease provided that a tenant must give 60 days’ advance notice of his or her intent not to renew the Lease. If notice was not given, then the Lease would renew on a month-to-month basis at the then current market rate, plus $50.00. The Shaws' Neighbors The Alcubilla family, who are Hispanic, lived across from Petitioners’ apartment, in Apartment 2-202. The Alcubilla family included a husband and wife, as well as the wife’s mother (Mrs. Alcubilla), who spoke little English. A Caucasian graduate student, Amanda Watson, lived on the third floor of the building directly above the Shaws in Apartment 3-201. A Hispanic tenant, Angelo Caruso, lived with his girlfriend on the same floor as Ms. Watson. In October 2010, four months after the Shaws became residents, the Kohl family moved into Apartment 2-101, the first floor apartment directly beneath the Shaws’ apartment. Trouble in Paradise The Shaws' first rent check, dated July 9, 2010, was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease violation. On July 14, 2010, Epoch issued a reminder to Ms. Shaw advising her that a neighbor had complained about her dog barking all hours of the day. This was a violation of the Lease and the Community Rules. Mr. Shaw joined his family at Uptown Village on or about August 8, 2010. On the day he moved in, Epoch leasing agent Breanne Parks was conducting a survey of the community grounds and noticed empty boxes outside the Shaws’ apartment on the walkway, as well as trash outside another tenant’s apartment. She issued a warning notice to the Shaws and the other tenant in the building. Leaving trash outside of an apartment is a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On August 20, 2010, the Shaws’ rent check was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease Violation. On October 8, 2010, the Shaws were notified by Epoch that they were being assessed a late fee for failure to pay their rent on time. One week later, on October 15, 2010, Epoch sent the Shaws notification about an outstanding balance on their account. The notices concerned Lease violations. On October 21, 2010, Ms. Watson complained to the office about loud arguments and sounds emanating from the Shaws’ apartment the night before. One of the noises sounded like someone or something had been thrown against a wall. Though she feared that someone was being physically abused due to the intensity of the impact, she decided not call the police. In response to Ms. Watson's complaint, Epoch posted a notice on the Shaws’ door for a second time warning them about noise and asking them to be considerate of their neighbors. The noise violation was considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. The same day Epoch posted the noise violation notice on the Shaws' door, Ms. Shaw called the management office and lodged a retaliatory noise complaint against Ms. Watson. As a consequence of this complaint, a warning notice was sent by Epoch to Ms. Watson. The noise violation was considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On November 4, 2010, the Shaws’ rent check was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease violation. Epoch allows sworn officers from the Gainesville Police Department to reside on the premises in exchange for services to the community as a Courtesy Officer. At some point during the Shaws' tenancy, Courtesy Officer Farah Lormil, an African-American female police detective, noticed a car belonging to the Shaws parked in an area that was not a designated parking space. This was a violation of Community Rules. Detective Lormil testified that she left a note on the car asking the owner to move the vehicle because "your car doesn't belong here." Detective Lormil also included her name and badge number on the note. At hearing, Ms. Shaw testified that the note read "you don't belong here." Inasmuch as Petitioners did not offer the note in evidence, and given the context in which the note was written (a parking violation), the testimony of Detective Lormil as to the actual wording of the note is the more credible. On December 27, 2010, leasing agent Erin Napolitano wrote a memo to Ms. Parks reporting that Mrs. Alcubilla’s daughter, Mater Alcubilla, had come to the management office the prior weekend to complain about an incident involving Ms. Shaw. Consistent with her memo, Ms. Napolitano testified that Mater Alcubilla had told her that Ms. Shaw had screamed at her family, followed them up and down the stairs to their apartment, and loudly knocked on their door. Mater Alcubilla also accused Ms. Shaw of stating that she knew what type of vehicles the Alcubillas drove and dared them to call the police. The memo recorded Ms. Alcubilla’s daughter as stating the police were called but when they arrived at Building 2, Ms. Shaw already was gone and therefore, no enforcement action was taken. Ms. Napolitano ended her memo to Ms. Parks with a personal observation: ?I just don’t know what to do about all of this but it certainly seems to be escalating.? Whatever the source of the friction between the two families, Ms. Napolitano testified that she had no reason to believe there was any racial animus on the part of the Alcubillas. On December 30, 2010, Ms. Hayden invited Mater Alcubilla to the office to discuss the incident with Ms. Shaw. Following their meeting, Ms. Hayden notated the date of the meeting and substance of their discussion in the Alcubilla’s resident conversation log. Ms. Hayden recorded in her own handwriting: ?Resident very frightened, Resident plans on moving at the end of her lease-Resident claimed Ms. Shaw yelled at her and threatened her and told her she needed to return to her country.? Ms. Hayden considered this to be an interpersonal dispute between the Alcubillas and Ms. Shaw. Also on December 30, 2010, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Parks invited Ms. Shaw to the management office to discuss the Alcubillas’ complaints. Ms. Hayden recorded in the Alcubilla’s resident log that Ms. Shaw denied the Alcubillas’ accusations, became upset and told Ms. Hayden and Ms. Parks that her neighbors needed to mind their own business. Ms. Hayden also noted that the meeting ended when Ms. Shaw got up, stated, ?you wait? and left the office. Based on what she perceived as a threat by Ms. Shaw of continuing trouble with the Alcubillas, Ms. Hayden recorded her intent to notify a Courtesy Officer of the situation. On February 15, 2011, the Shaws received a three-day notice from Epoch for failure to pay rent, and a notice of an outstanding balance due. This was a Lease violation. Three weeks later, on March 4, 2011, the Shaws were issued another three-day notice for failure to pay rent. This concerned a Lease violation. Ms. Watson continued to hear the Shaws' dog barking and loud voices and other noises, included stomping and footsteps, emanating from the Shaws' apartment. On one occasion, the Shaws left Gainesville for the weekend and placed their dog out on the balcony because it barked continuously. The noise and barking interfered with Ms. Watson’s ability to study and to enjoy her residence. On March 5, 2011, Epoch posted a letter on the Shaws' door regarding complaints received from the Shaws' neighbors about the dog barking for hours at a time, often late at night and in particular on March 3, 2011. This concerned a Lease violation. The loud barking, stomping, and talking within the Shaws' apartment did not abate, and on March 9, 2011, Epoch sent the Shaws a "Seven Day Notice to Cure Lease Violation" which cited their violation of Lease Provision 30 and Community Rule Y. On March 17, 2011, Epoch send the Shaws an ?Urgent Outstanding Balance Due? notice regarding their outstanding unpaid utility bill. This concerned a Lease violation. Also on March 17, 2011, an email was generated by Epoch’s answering service which reported that Tara Kohl of Apt. 2-101 had called. The generated message stated Ms. Kohl’s complaint as, ?Apt. Above Very Noisy/Heavy Walking Again.? On March 19, 2011, Ms. Napolitano printed off the email note and called Ms. Kohl to get more information about the complaint. Ms. Napolitano recorded hand-written notes about the conversation on a printed copy of the email which read: ?Last couple nights—beating down on floor–jumping/walking. 3-4 am can hear them all the time.? The email with Ms. Napitano’s hand- written notes was placed in the Kohl’s tenant file. Immediately following Ms. Kohl’s complaint, Ms. Shaw wrote the following note and faxed it to the management office: To Uptown Village On Saturday night, March 19, 2011, I noted a very loud bumping noise coming from my floor. I was home alone and very afraid. I even feared calling the office or security in fear of retaliation. From past experiences when I have voiced a complaint, I receive notes on my door alleging that my dog was barking, that I had trash beside my door, we were stomping, we were too loud and have even found handwritten notes on my car. My family and I can no longer live in such turmoil. Please accept this letter as a formal complaint regarding harassment. If these occurrences continue, I will have no other choice than to contact HUD. Thank you in advance for your help. Glenda Shaw Prior to the date of the faxed letter neither Petitioner had ever complained about discrimination of any kind to anyone at Epoch. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown discussed the content of Ms. Shaw's fax and how to handle its allegations. They viewed Ms. Shaw’s complaint against the Kohls as retaliation against the Kohls for making a complaint about noise from the Shaws’ apartment the day before, and therefore a personal dispute. They also considered whether to respond to Ms. Shaw’s allegation of harassment by Epoch, and decided that any response would just be viewed by Ms. Shaw as evidence of further harassment. They decided to place the faxed letter in the Shaw’s tenant file and take no other action. It was a normal business practice of Epoch to generate a list of tenants whose leases were due to expire within the following 90 days. The list was used to create flyers reminding those tenants to contact the management office regarding renewal. Flyers were sent to each tenant on the list regardless of whether the tenant was in default of the lease or potentially a candidate for non-renewal. A renewal flyer was placed on the Shaws’ door in late March and a second renewal flyer was posted on the Shaws' door the following month. Neither renewal notice elicited a response from the Shaws. On March 25, 2011, Epoch sent the Shaws an ?Urgent Outstanding Balance Due Notice? regarding their overdue utility bill. This concerned a Lease violation. Just prior to Easter, 2011, an Uptown Village tenant asked the management office for permission to hold a private Easter egg hunt for their friends on the community’s volleyball court. Epoch approved the request. Uptown Village residents were not notified of the event through Constant Contact because the Easter egg hunt was not an Epoch-sponsored event. The individual who organized the event made the decision whom to invite. On May 10, 2011, Ms. Shaw came to the management office and was assisted by Ms. Brown. Ms. Shaw accused Brian Kohl of confronting her daughter and calling her ?two-faced.? Ms. Shaw demanded that Epoch take action against Mr. Kohl and stated that if Epoch would not do anything about the situation, she was going to call the police or the Florida Department of Children and Families. Before Ms. Shaw left, Ms. Brown asked about the Shaws' intentions to remain residents upon the expiration of their Lease. Ms. Shaw did not give a definitive answer. Ms. Brown then told Ms. Shaw that if the Shaws decided not to renew, Epoch would not hold them to the 60-day advance notice required by the Lease. Three days after this meeting, Ms. Brown notified Ms. Shaw that Epoch could not send a notice of violation to Mr. Kohl because the accusations against him were not Lease violations. However, Ms. Brown offered to discuss the allegations with Mr. Kohl, a truck-driver who was often on the road. On May 18, 2011, Ms. Brown met with Brian Kohl to discuss Ms. Shaw’s complaint. Mr. Kohl gave his side of the story. After he left, Ms. Brown entered the following note in the Kohl’s resident conversation log: Brian came in wanting to break lease b/c [because] daughter is being harassed by girls in 2-111 and 2-1012/ so badly that she won’t go outside. Told him that one 2-111 should be finish soon (they are on NTV [Notice to Vacate] and the other may too, (2-101) lease expires 6/25. Otherwise would do what I can and to give us the opportunity to help before he moves. Ms. Brown also made an entry in the Shaws' resident conversation log regarding Mr. Kohl’s allegation that the Shaws' daughter was bullying the Kohl’s daughter. The following day, May 19, 2011, Ms. Watson came to the management office and gave notice that she was moving out of Uptown Village when her lease expired in August 2011. She was asked to complete a form entitled ?Notice to Vacate from Resident.? In her own handwriting, she wrote the reason for vacating as ?loud tenants.? The Notice to Vacate from Resident was placed in Ms. Watson’s tenant file as part of Epoch’s regular business practices. At hearing, Ms. Watson testified that she and her fiancé had considered living in her apartment after they married and decided they could not live there due to the continued noise and disturbances emanating from the apartment below. With Ms. Watson’s notice to vacate, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown came to the realization that three tenants in Building 2 had levied complaints against the Shaws and two had made decisions to move out in whole or in part due to the Shaws’ conduct. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown then conducted a more thorough review of the Shaws’ tenant history, and discussed whether the Shaws should continue to reside at Uptown Village. They called Epoch’s attorneys to get legal advice and left a message. On May 29, 2011, Epoch received a handwritten letter from Tara Kohl making numerous complaints against the Shaws, including loud noises late at night, and the Shaws parking one of their cars in a handicapped parking space. On June 8, 2011, the management office received a hand-written letter from Brian Kohl giving notice of his family’s intent to break their lease and move out. The reasons given all centered on the noise being generated in the Shaws' apartment, and alleged threats that had been made by Ms. Shaw against Ms. Kohl. On June 17, 2011, Ms. Shaw called the management office and spoke with Ms. Brown. Ms. Shaw asked for a copy of her lease, inquired about the shortest lease term possible, and the amount of any rent increase. Ms. Brown did not commit that the Shaws' lease would be renewed nor did she quote a renewal rate. Ms. Shaw continued to press the issue and Ms. Brown finally stated that a normal rent increase on renewal was $100 a month. On June 20, 2011, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown spoke to Epoch’s attorneys regarding options for ending the Shaws' tenancy. A decision was made to non-renew their lease as that would cause the least disruption to the Shaws. Ms. Hayden prepared a non-renewal letter, and it was posted on the Shaws' door the same day. Later that afternoon, Mr. and Ms. Shaw came to the management office, met with Ms. Brown, and demanded to know the reason why their Lease would not be renewed. Ms. Shaw insisted that Ms. Brown had told her their Lease would be renewed at a rate of $937.00. Ms. Brown denied she made this statement. Ms. Brown asked Ms. Hayden to intervene in the dispute. Ms. Hayden explained that Epoch had a right to issue a non-renewal notice and that the decision was based on the numerous complaints received about the Shaws. Ms. Shaw insisted that if there were grounds to terminate the Lease for cause, Epoch should issue them a seven-day notice to vacate. Ms. Hayden explained that they had decided to issue a non- renewal notice rather than a notice to vacate to allow the Shaws more time to make arrangements and to foster an amicable parting. Epoch has sent non-African-American, White and Hispanic tenants notices of violation regarding excessive noise and non-payment of rent and fees, and also has terminated leases (through eviction) on these bases. There is no competent substantial evidence in this record to even suggest that the decision to non-renew the Shaws' lease was in any way related to their status as African-Americans. On June 23, 2011, Mr. Caruso’s girlfriend was walking their dog outside Building 2 off leash (in violation of the Rules) when it began to chase the Shaws' son. The dog nipped at their son’s leg but did not draw blood or break his skin. When Mr. Caruso learned of the incident, he came to the Shaws' apartment to apologize. He later returned and asked to take a photo of their son’s leg because he feared Ms. Shaw might bring legal action against him, given her hostility after he had offered her a bag to clean up her dog’s waste on a previous occasion. Ms. Shaw refused to allow Mr. Caruso to photograph her son’s leg. Instead, she told him if he did not leave she would call the police, and if his dog ever attacked again she would report him and have the dog put to sleep. On June 27, 2011, a second non-renewal letter was posted on the Shaws' door to ensure that Petitioner’s understood their lease would not be renewed. The following day the Shaws returned to the management office and insisted that at the end of the June 20th meeting, they had been told their lease would be renewed. Ms. Hayden denied this and reiterated that their lease was being non-renewed based on complaints from neighbors. As the meeting continued, Ms. Shaw became increasingly agitated; she turned to Ms. Brown and asked if Ms. Brown found her to be confrontational. Ms. Brown responded that she thought Ms. Shaw had a ?strong personality.? To that, Ms. Shaw replied, ?It’s my culture.? As the meeting continued, Ms. Shaw began to inject the issue of race into the conversation. For example, in response to Ms. Hayden’s remark that the decision to non-renew was not personal, since she would not even recognize Ms. Shaw if she saw her at a mall, Ms. Shaw stated that ?white people think we all look alike.? As the conversation was taking an uncomfortable turn, Ms. Hayden ended the meeting and referred the Shaws to Epoch’s attorneys if they had any further questions or concerns. In early July 2011, Mr. Caruso was returning to Building 2 after walking his dog on leash and encountered Mr. Shaw. Mr. Shaw told Mr. Caruso to keep his dog away or he would kick it. On July 11, 2011, Ms. Shaw complained to the management office about Mr. Caruso’s dog charging at her while it was on a leash. She noted this was the second incident involving the dog. Ms. Brown told Ms. Shaw she would look into the matter, since this would be considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On July 12, 2011, Ms. Brown spoke with Mr. Caruso’s girlfriend and cautioned her to keep the dog under control. Ms. Brown noted their conversation in both the Shaws’ and Mr. Caruso's resident conversation log. On August 4, 2011, Ms. Watson completed a "Move Out Survey" and in response to a question about what could have been done by management to encourage her to stay, wrote in her own hand-writing: ?Dealt with loud neighbors more consistently and effectively . . .? She added that her reason for leaving was ?loud, inconsiderate tenants.? The Shaws refused to move out by the date given in their non-renewal notice and stopped paying rent. On August 3, 2011, the Shaws dual-filed a charge of housing discrimination (race and color) with the Commission and the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. The charge alleged that Epoch had refused to rent to them, made discriminatory statements, and had offered them less favorable terms, conditions, privileges, services or facilities than other non-African-American tenants. The facts supporting their charge were that they were not invited to the Easter egg hunt; that they had been told their lease would be renewed yet it was not; and that Ms. Hayden had made racist statements. The Shaws did not pay rent for July 2011,3/ and on August 4, 2011, were sent a "Notice to Pay Rent" by Epoch. The Commission investigated the Shaws' charge of housing discrimination and issued a determination on August 31, 2011, finding there was no probable cause to support the claims. On September 29, 2011, the Shaws filed a Petition for Relief from an alleged discriminatory housing practice, giving rise to the instant proceeding. During the pendency of this matter, the Shaws were evicted from Uptown Village for non- payment of rent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon Petitioners’ race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Mini-Warehouses At Kendall, Ltd., d/b/a A+ Mini-Storage (Petitioner) is a business located in Dade County, engaged primarily in the rental of storage space. Petitioner employs 20 to 21 employees and has been operating for 13 to 14 years. Petitioner's property on which its business is located consists of approximately four acres and abuts property owned by the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent), known as Parcel 0739, which contains approximately .0986 acres. On June 28, 1985, Petitioner executed a written lease agreement leasing Parcel 0739 from Respondent. The lease terms provided that it was a year-to- year lease, automatically renewable yearly until terminated by either party upon a 30-day notice, and that the yearly rental cost was $2,400 plus tax. Petitioner leased Parcel 0739 from Respondent because the parcel provides better access to Petitioner's property from the rear and prevents water from encroaching onto Petitioner's property. The same lease agreement was renewed yearly until 1991. In 1991, prior to the expiration of the lease, Respondent notified Petitioner that a new lease form would have to be executed. Respondent provided Petitioner with its Lease Agreement Form 225-080-03, OGC-00031, dated 7/92 (Form Lease) for execution. The Form Lease was developed by Respondent's Office of General Counsel and the General Counsel of each of its Districts, so that there would be a standard lease form statewide with minimal review by Respondent. The Form Lease contains blanks to be completed by Districts to comport with their specific situations. The Form Lease dramatically changed the terms and conditions of leasing Parcel 0739. Petitioner attempted to modify Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Form Lease, but Respondent refused to agree to any modifications. Paragraph 6 of the Form Lease provides: 6. Indemnification. Lessee shall indemnify, defend, save and hold Lessor, its agents and employees, harmless of and from any losses, fines, penalties, costs, damage, claims, demands, suits and liabilities of any nature, including attorneys fees (including regulatory and appellate fees), arising out of, because of, or due to any accident, happening or occurrence on the leased land or arising in any manner on account of the exercise or attempted exercise of Lessee's rights hereunder, whether the same regards person or property of any nature whatsoever, regardless of the apportionment of negligence, unless due to the sole negligence of Lessor. Lessee's obligation to indemnify, defend, and pay for the defense or at the Department's option, to participate and associate with the Department in the defense and trial of any claim and any related settlement negotiations, shall be triggered by the Department's notice of claim for indemnifica- tion to Lessee. Lessee's inability to evaluate liability or its evaluation of liability shall not excuse Lessee's duty to defend and indemnify within seven days after such notice by the Department is given by registered mail. Only an adjudication or judgment after the highest appeal is exhausted specifically finding the Department solely negligent shall excuse performance of this provision by Lessee. Lessee shall pay all costs and fees related to this obligation and its enforcement by the Department. Department's failure to notify Lessee of a claim shall not release Lessee of the above duty to defend. Under Paragraph 6, Respondent intended to limit lessee's liability to its (lessee's) own negligence or damages it causes. Paragraph 8 of the Form Lease provides: 8. Eminent Domain. Lessee acknowledges and agrees that its relationship with Lessor under this Lease is one of Landlord and Tenant and no other relationship either expressed or implied shall be deemed to apply to the parties under this Lease. Termination of this Lease for any cause shall not be deemed a taking under any eminent domain or other law so as to entitle Lessee to compensation for any interest suffered or lost as a result of termination of this Lease, including but not limited to (i) any residual interest in the Lease, or (ii) any other facts or circumstances arising out of or in connection with this Lease. Lessee hereby waives and relinquishes any legal rights and monetary claims which it might have for full compensation, or damages of any sort, including but not limited to special damages, severance damages, removal costs or loss of business profits resulting from its loss of occupancy of the leased property specified in this Agreement, or adjacent properties owned or leased by it, when any or all such properties are taken by eminent domain proceedings or sold under the threat thereof. This waiver and relinquishment applies whether (i) this Lease is still in existence on the date of taking or sale; or, (ii) has been terminated prior thereto. Under Paragraph 8, Respondent did not intend for the lessee to waive any of its eminent domain rights or relinquish such rights subsequent to the termination of the lease, which would be improper. Presently, Respondent refuses to lease the Parcel to Petitioner unless Petitioner executes the Form Lease without modification. However, at hearing Respondent admitted that it has no intention of requiring Petitioner to agree to Paragraph 8 of the Form Lease. Rule Chapter 14-19, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth Respondent's rules on right-of-way property management. Rule 14-19.002 provides that the purpose of Chapter 14-19 is to set forth standardized methods for, among other things, the leasing of surplus property owned by Respondent. In 1992, the Form Lease was incorporated by reference in Rule Chapter 14-19. Rule 14-19.0012 specifically provides that the Form Lease is one of the forms incorporated by reference in and made a part of Chapter 14-19. Moreover, Rule 14-19.013 requires the Form Lease to be used for short term leasing. Chapter 14-19 is silent as to whether the Form Lease must be used in any of Respondent's other lease situations. Rule 14-19.013, Florida Administrative Code, does not apply to the circumstances of this case. Respondent has a Right Of Way Manual (Manual) for statewide use. Chapter 10, Section 6 of the Manual, entitled "Right of Way Property Leases" and effective January 21, 1993, provides in its "Purpose" section that the purpose of Section 6 is to establish uniform procedures for leasing property owned by Respondent. Also, the Manual's "Procedure" section mandates the use of the Form Lease for all of Respondent's leases. Prior to this mandate, Respondent had no standard lease form for its leases. In October 1992, Respondent required the Form Lease to be used in surplus property leases. The Form Lease is applicable statewide and implements procedures and policies involved in leasing surplus property. Parcel 0739 is considered by Respondent to be surplus property. The Manual is silent as to whether the Form Lease may be modified. Since the implementation of the Form Lease for surplus property, Respondent's District Offices have modified the Form Lease but rarely. In the rare instances when modification has been made, it has been on a case-by-case basis and only with approval of the District General Counsel. Respondent's Office of the Right-Of-Way Administrator under which the responsibility for leasing falls has no authority to approve or disapprove modifications made to the Form Lease by District Offices. However, Respondent's Office of General Counsel does have such authority, but it has not exercised its authority in any of the District situations in which the Form Lease has been modified. Even though there have been modifications to the Form Lease by Respondent's District Offices, although rare, no District Office has modified Paragraphs 6 or 8. Respondent admits that Petitioner has standing in this proceeding.
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether the Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section s. 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), by inserting an option provision into a lease agreement without the specific authorization of the tenants and subsequent to the tenants signing the original agreement. At the hearing, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-10 were offered and admitted into evidence. Leslie and Glenn Strickland, the tenants and complainants, testified on behalf of the Petitioner. Wayne Belton testified on his own behalf. Proposed Recommended Orders have been submitted by the parties. Those findings not incorporated in this Recommended Order were not considered relevant to the issues, were not supported by competent and substantial evidence or were considered immaterial to the results reached.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Wayne E. Belton is a licensed real estate broker with his principal place of business at 337 Northeast Second Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. On or about November 23, 1979, the Respondent prepared a one-year rental agreement or lease for property located at 2717 Southwest Sixth Street, Delray Beach, Florida, which was owned by Mrs. Margaret Finlay. Mr. and Mrs. Glenn Strickland executed the agreement as the tenants. The lease was prepared pursuant to an open listing by the owner for either sale or lease. When the Stricklands signed the original agreement it did not contain any provision concerning purchasing the property in the future through an option agreement. Although the Stricklands had discussed an option agreement with the Respondent, they did not specifically agree to an option agreement which required the deposit of additional monies in escrow which would not be refunded if the option were not exercised. The owner of the property, Mrs. Finlay, was primarily interested in selling the property and demanded that Respondent obtain a binding option from the Stricklands. When faced with the conflicting demands of the tenants and the owner, the Respondent inserted an option provision in the lease agreement after the Stricklands had signed the original lease which did not contain such a provision. When the Stricklands failed to deliver the $1,500 option money required by the option provision, Mrs. Finlay, through her attorney, threatened to take legal action against the Respondent. In response to the owner's demand, the Respondent through his attorney, demanded that the Stricklands pay $1,500 for the option pursuant to the lease agreement. When the Stricklands received the demand letter from Respondent's counsel, they contacted an attorney who eventually settled the matter. The Stricklands were required to expend $138.00 in attorney's fees to correct the problem caused by the Respondent. The Respondent admitted inserting the option provision into the lease agreement after the Stricklands executed it, but denied acting with any intent to alter the agreement contrary to what he believed the parties intended. Rather, the Respondent believed that he was remedying his original omission to conform to what he believed the parties had orally agreed to.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) and imposing a reprimand and an administrative fine. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Stephen G. Melcer, Esquire Suite 500 First Bank Building 551 Southeast Eighth Street Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation's intended action to reject all quotes and re-advertise Lease No. 550:0318 was illegal, arbitrary, fraudulent, or dishonest.
Findings Of Fact In October of 1999, the Department advertised for office space for use as the Toll Data Center - Audit Section, Office of Toll Operations (Toll Office) located in Broward County. The lease was clearly advertised as a negotiated lease. It was not advertised as a competitive bid lease. Under the negotiated lease process before letting any lease, the Department must submit to the Department of Management Services (DMS) a Request for Space Need (RSN) and Letter of Agency Staffing (LAS). From DMS the Department receives the authority to directly negotiate a lease for space under 5,000 square feet with prospective lessors. 1/ Consistent with procedure, the Department received approval of the RSN on October 18, 1999. Pursuant to statute, DMS has strongly suggested that prior to selection of the apparent successful lessor, the Department should obtain a minimum of three documented quotes for a lease that has not been competitively bid. The Department has consistently followed that suggestion in negotiated leases. Under special circumstances, where it is clear it is improbable that three quotes cannot be obtained, the Department may waive its requirement that three documented quotes be received. However, the agency must certify to DMS that attempts to receive the required number of documented quotes were unsuccessful and/or special circumstances exist to negotiate the lease with less than three quotes. In this case, no special circumstances exist. In an effort to obtain more than the minimum three documented quotes, the Department opted to advertise for lease space on the Internet. The Internet is utilized by the DMS, among other state agencies, to disseminate information provided in the RSN to the private sector. Additionally, the Internet site may also be used by the private sector to provide notice of space they have available for review by the agency seeking space. A total of three submittal packages were distributed for Lease No. 550:0318. Despite the Department's advertisement over the Internet, only two requests for quote submittal packages were received. Of the three quote submittal packages distributed, the Department received only one documented quote in response to the advertisement for the Toll Office. Atlantic Investment submitted a Quote Submittal Form to the Department in late October for office space in North Fort Lauderdale. Atlantic Investment became aware of the Department's advertisement for lease space from Sheldon M. Schermer, employed by Atlantic Investment as its real estate agent. Mr. Schermer learned of the Department's need for lease space from an advertisement placed on the Internet. On November 8, 1999, the Department informed Atlantic Investment via Sheldon M. Schermer, Real Estate Agent for Atlantic Investment, of the Department's intent to reject all quotes and re-advertise for Lease No. 550:0318. This decision was not arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or dishonest and well within the Department's discretion and procedures for negotiated leases. The basis for the decision was the Department's modification of the lease specifications pursuant to a recommendation by DMS to modify the lease space terms to hopefully generate more interest and more quotes. In a competitive negotiation, DMS was aware of agencies who modified leases and advertised as many as five times before three documented quotes were received. Moreover, the evidence showed that the Broward County commercial real estate market could easily generate three quotes for the space required by the Toll Office.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petitioner's protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2000.
The Issue The issue is whether to approve the City of Gulf Breeze's (City's) application for a Consolidated Wetland Resource Permit and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization to conduct a restoration project in Pensacola Bay.
Findings Of Fact Background This dispute involves a challenge by Petitioners to the third phase of a restoration project by the City designed to preserve the Island and protect its historical resources. The project site is located in sovereign submerged lands adjacent to the Island on the southwest side of the Highway 98 Bay Bridge which traverses Pensacola Bay connecting the Cities of Gulf Breeze and Pensacola. The Island is not a true island, but has always been connected to the mainland by a strip of land referred to as an isthmus, which meets the shoreline at Lot 36 of an older subdivision known as the First Addition to Casablanca Parcel No. 1 and platted almost sixty years ago. The isthmus juts out from Lot 36 into Pensacola Bay in a northwesterly direction for several hundred feet before making a 90-degree turn to the southwest where the Island then runs roughly parallel to the shoreline for around a half mile. See Joint Ex. 5-7, 14, and The Island, isthmus, and shoreline form the boundary around a small body of water known as Gilmore Bayou, an ecologically important and pristine salt marsh area. According to aerial photographs, at its widest point, the Island appears to be no more than a few hundred feet wide. Petitioners reside at Lot 37, which is just northeast of the isthmus on the shoreline. The rear part of Lot 37 faces Pensacola Bay and the City of Pensacola to the northwest. Lots 36, 35, and 34 (running to the southwest along the shoreline and facing Gilmore Bayou), are owned by Patricia Moreland, Robert Ozburn, and Intervenor Paul Tamburro, respectively, all of whom testified at the final hearing. Except for Petitioners, the project is supported by virtually all of the residents of the area as well as numerous civic organizations. See Joint Ex. 33. On July 14, 2008, the City filed with the Department its Joint Application for Works in the Waters of Florida, which would allow the City to complete the third phase of the project by (a) planting native submerged vegetation over approximately three acres of sovereign submerged lands, and (b) placing approximately 16,000 cubic yards of fill material and planting native emergent vegetation to stabilize the fill material on sovereign submerged lands at the north end of the Island. See Joint Ex. 3. The Department has authority under chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code chapter 18-21 to approve the application. After an extensive review of the application, on August 9, 2010, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Intent to Issue Wetland Resource Permit and Consent to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands, which authorized the proposed project. See Joint Ex. 4. The proprietary authorization (letter of consent) was issued under the authority of rule 18- 21.005(1)(c), which identifies a number of activities that qualify for a letter of consent. In this case, because of the range of proposed activities, the project could qualify for a letter of consent under subparagraphs 8., 15., and 16. of the rule. On September 1, 2010, Petitioners filed their petition challenging the proposed agency action. While their initial pleading raised a number of issues, and cited two rules as a basis for reversing the agency action, these allegations have been substantially narrowed over the course of the proceeding and are now limited to the following: whether the project constitutes management activities associated with the protection of a historic site, thus qualifying for a letter of consent under rule 18-21.005(1)(c)16.; and whether the project unreasonably restricts or infringes upon their riparian rights of navigation, boating, swimming, and view, as proscribed by rule 18-21.004(3)(c). They also question whether Intervenor has standing to participate, but that issue is not dispositive of the primary issues in this case. Petitioners do not contest the issuance of a Wetland Resource Permit. Finally, Respondents and Intervenor question whether Petitioners have standing to initiate this action. The Project Site The project is located on sovereign submerged lands adjacent to the Island, a "naturally occurring sandy beach," as that term is contemplated in rule 18-21.005(1)(c)8. This is true even though portions of the "sandy beach" have eroded over time. The City owns the entirety of the Island. See Joint Ex. 14 and 15. This was not disputed by Petitioners. The Island is a public park, natural preserve, and historic site that is owned and maintained by the City exclusively for public use. Deeds by which the property was conveyed to the City require that it be forever used as a natural preserve and maintained in its natural state. See Joint Ex. 14 and 15. The Island and the area immediately adjacent thereto have a long and significant history dating back to the 1700's. Throughout the 1700's and 1800's, various portions of the Island were used as a careening facility for the repair and maintenance of large vessels. A marine railway was also built. In the late 1800's, a quarantine station was constructed on the Island where people who had contracted yellow fever were isolated. A cemetery exists upon the Island containing the remains of many who perished from the yellow fever epidemic. Also, there were many shipwrecks at the Island, of which some of the remains still exist. Accordingly, there are historic resources and artifacts such as shipwrecks and human remains on and around the Island. The Island has sustained significant erosion over the past 70 years. The northeast shoreline has eroded some 450 to 500 feet during that period of time. There has been a significant loss of vegetation and land mass. Without protection, the Island is in a perilous condition and subject to a permanent breach. The peat bog underlying the Island is vital to the stability of the Island and has been greatly damaged. It requires protective measures, such as those contemplated by the proposed project in order to assure its preservation. Due to the effects of hurricanes and storms, the erosion has substantially increased during the past decade. The erosion has caused the unearthing of and damage to historic artifacts and the salt marsh in Gilmore Bayou. There are clearly visible remnants of the former marine railway on the Island, which are being weakened by current weather events and require protection in order to preserve them. Caskets from the cemetery as well as human bone remains have been unearthed and additional damage will occur without protective restoration efforts. If the erosion continues, there will be more damage to the historic artifacts and the salt marsh will be destroyed. The Project To prevent further erosion and to protect the Island and Gilmore Bayou, the City has applied to the Department for three separate phases of a project to stabilize the shoreline. The first two phases of the project involved the construction of an artificial reef breakwater and the planting of shoreline vegetation. See Joint Exhibit 7a. They have already been approved by the Department and are no longer in issue. The first and second phases were challenged by Petitioners but the cases were eventually settled. See Case No. 09-4870, which involved the second phase. The third phase of the project is being conducted primarily for the maintenance of essentially natural conditions and for the propagation of fish and wildlife. This phase can be described as follows: restoration or nourishment of a naturally occurring sandy beach as contemplated by rule 18-21.005(1)(c)8.; habitat restoration or enhancement as contemplated by rule 18-21.005(1)(c)15.; management activity associated with protection of a park as contemplated by rule 18-21.005(1)(c)16.; management activity associated with protection of a preserve as contemplated by rule 18-21.005(1)(c)16.; management activity associated with protection of a historic site as contemplated by rule 18-21.005(1)(c)16.; and management activity associated with protection of habitat restoration or enhancement as contemplated by rule 18- 21.005(1)(c)16. While the project implicates each of the above provisions, the application and proposed agency action indicate that the letter of consent is granted on the theory that the project is associated with protection of historic sites. See Joint Ex. 4. The third phase is also designed to minimize or eliminate adverse impacts on fish and wildlife habitats and other naturally occurring resources. The project consists of the placement of 16,000 cubic yards of fill material in the area between the existing artificial oyster reef and the shoreline to restore and replace conditions that previously existed. The fill will consist of beach compatible sand that will be approximately six inches to a foot above mean high water. This phase also involves the planting of appropriate native wetland vegetation in the fill area, which will help stabilize the fill. The planting of vegetation in the third phase is separate and distinct from the plantings authorized in the second phase of the project. The project is needed in order to prevent further damage to a public park; public preserve; threatened, endangered, or special concern species of vegetation/habitat; and historic artifacts. These protection efforts were requested and recommended by the Florida Department of State. Petitioners contest only the propriety of the fill materials and the planting of the emergent stabilizing grasses on the fill. The fill portion of the project is located a significant distance from Petitioners' property. The closest portion of the project is estimated to be at least 550 feet from Petitioners' property, while the bulk of the project will take place between some 750 to 1,200 feet from their property. The Proposed Vegetation Planting In the third phase of the project, the City proposes to plant and establish emergent grasses (those that grow in water but partially pierce the surface) and sea grasses, all of which are appropriate native wetland vegetation on the Island. The proposed emergent grasses are Spartina alterniflora (also known as smooth cordgrass) and Juncus roemerianus (also known as black needle rush), which will be used for stabilization of wetlands. The proposed submerged seagrasses are Halodule wrightii (a type of shoal grass) and Ruppia maritime (a type of widgeon grass), which will help stabilize the fill. The smooth cordgrass is native to the Island. It will be planted in the fill area to prevent the fill from eroding. It is expected that once they mature, the height of the plants will not exceed two and one-half feet. Due to the water depth in the area, the shoreline slope, the sediment supply, and the wave action, the smooth cordgrass will not spread outside the proposed project area. Also, it will not interfere with navigation, boating, swimming, fishing, or view. The vegetation will, however, help fishing in the area. The black needle rush is also native to the Island. It will only grow to approximately two and one-half feet in height due to stressful conditions caused by the salt content in the water and wave action. It will not spread beyond the proposed project area and will not interfere with navigation, boating, swimming, fishing, or view. Like the smooth cordgrass, it will enhance fishing in the area. Both Halodule wrightii and Ruppia maritime are native to the Island. Both have slow growth rates, which when coupled with the "high energetics of the system," will hinder their ability to spread outside the project area. Neither seagrass will hinder navigation, boating, swimming, fishing, or view. They will afford a greater opportunity for snorkeling, recreation, and fishing; they will serve as a nursery habitat for finfish and shellfish; they will increase the habitat value of the area; and they will improve water quality. Petitioners submitted no evidence to contradict these findings. They also failed to submit any evidence that the fill material or grasses would spread into any riparian area that might be appurtenant to their Lot 37. The above findings are reinforced by the results of a separate project known as Project Greenshores located across Pensacola Bay from the Island. Project Greenshores involved the restoration of wetlands using dredge material to restore islands that are then protected by the construction of a breakwater and are stabilized by the planting of the same grasses that are proposed for the Island project. The two projects are in relatively close proximity to each other and have essentially the same environment. One difference, however, is that Project Greenshores receives a small source of sediment from stormwater outfalls, which means that it has a higher chance of grasses growing than does the Island. Even with the increased sediment, the grasses at that project have not spread beyond the project area, they have not interfered with navigation, boating, swimming, view, or fishing, and they have enhanced fishing in the area. Historical Artifacts Petitioners contend that the project does not qualify for a letter of consent under rule 18-21.005(1)(c)16. That provision authorizes the Department, acting on behalf of the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, to issue a letter of consent for "management activities associated with . . . historical sites . . . provided there is no permanent preemption by structures or exclusion of the general public." As noted above, the Island has a long and significant history dating back to the early 1700's and there are historic resources and artifacts on the Island. See Finding of Fact 10, supra. When there is an archeological site issue in a permit, the Department typically relies on information from the Division of Historical Resources of the Department of State. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004(2)(c)("reports by other agencies with related statutory, management, or regulatory authority may be considered in evaluating specific requests to use sovereignty lands"). Here, the Department relied on information from that agency, which indicates that there are archeological resources at the project site. The Department of State also recommended placing fill over the artifacts to protect them, which will be accomplished by the proposed fill. In addition, the Department relied upon information contained in a survey conducted by Mr. Empie, a registered professional surveyor, to generally show where those artifacts are located. See Joint Exhibit 5, also referred to as the Empie survey. The evidence supports a finding that the project is for management activities associated with historical sites. The record shows that there is strong public support for the project. See Joint Ex. 33. Although many of the artifacts will be covered by the fill, the fill will actually protect them from damage, destruction, theft, and removal. By protecting them, future generations will be able to enjoy the artifacts. No "structures," as that term is defined in rule 18- 21.005(1)(c)16., are part of the project. Therefore, the project will not cause permanent preemption by structures. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the project will not exclude the general public from the fill area. The City contemplates that other activities, such as underwater snorkeling, will encourage the public to utilize the project site. The evidence supports a finding that the project qualifies for a letter of consent under this rule. Riparian Lines The Empie survey provides a reasonable depiction of the various riparian lines in the areas adjacent to the proposed project. See Joint Ex. 5. A professional surveyor with the Division of State Lands, Mr. Maddox, agreed that it was a reasonable depiction of the angle of the riparian lines and a "fair distribution of riparian areas," including that of Lot 37. The only property owner adjacent to the Island is Patricia Moreland, who owns Lot 36 and has resided on that parcel since 1956. As noted above, the isthmus meets the northwest boundary line of Lot 36. By executing a Letter of Concurrence, Ms. Moreland conferred upon the City all rights, both proprietary and riparian, that she has with respect to Lot See Joint Ex. 16. Petitioners contend that they own riparian rights appurtenant to their Lot 37, which is to the east of Lot 36. The City and Intervenor dispute this claim and contend that Lot 37 does not adjoin any navigable water and thus there are no riparian rights appurtenant to Lot 37. Assuming arguendo that Lot 37 adjoins Pensacola Bay, it is still separated from the project site by riparian areas appurtenant to the Moreland property (Lot 36) as well as the riparian areas appurtenant to the City property, i.e., the Island and isthmus. The Empie survey, which reasonably depicts the riparian lines in the project area, shows the project site as being approximately 300 feet inside the existing breakwater, which is shown as being no closer than 48.9 feet away from the westernmost riparian line appurtenant to Lot 37. See Joint Ex. The primary portion of the fill site is located around 370 feet from the closest point of the western riparian line appurtenant to Lot 37. Id. No portion of the project is located within 25 feet of the Lot 37 riparian line. Id. Petitioners presented no evidence disputing the riparian areas identified on the Empie survey or otherwise identifying the areas of riparian rights appurtenant to their property. While they engaged the services of Mr. Barrett, a professional land surveyor to prepare a boundary survey, the purpose of the survey was to show that Lot 37 adjoins Pensacola Bay, rather than depicting the riparian areas appurtenant to that lot. See Petitioners' Ex. 1. Infringement on Riparian Rights Rule 18-21.004(3)(c) requires that "activities [in submerged lands] must be designed and conducted in a manner that will not unreasonably restrict or infringe upon the riparian rights of adjacent upland property owners." (emphasis added) Petitioners contend that, even though they do not routinely use their riparian rights, the project will restrict or infringe upon their riparian rights of boating, swimming, navigation, and view. To make this determination, they assert that the appropriate test under the rule is mere infringement, and not "unreasonable" infringement; however, this interpretation is contrary to the plain wording in the rule. The main living floor of Petitioners' residence is approximately 50 feet above sea level. The emergent grasses will be located no closer than 500 feet from the edge of Lot 37 and 600 feet from their residence and are expected to grow only to a height of no more than two and one-half feet. The concern that the grasses will impair Petitioners' view is without merit. Although Dr. Cope initially believed that fill or grass would be placed or planted "all the way up to and abutting our lot 37," this interpretation of the City's plans was incorrect. A photograph taken from his back yard indicated that he could view the northeastern corner of the Island where new vegetation or fill might be placed, but the photograph depicted an area outside of the Lot 37 riparian area. See Petitioners' Ex. 18. While Dr. Cope initially stated that the new emergent grass would "clearly degrade the view from both the house and the shoreline," he later acknowledged that the project would not have any effect upon his view of Lot 37's riparian areas. There are a boathouse and dock in the waters behind Petitioners' house. However, Petitioners submitted no evidence to support their suggestion that the project might cause the water behind Lot 37 to become more shallow and adversely affect boating and navigation. Contrary evidence by the Department and City was unrefuted. Finally, Dr. Cope stated at hearing that he has never been swimming in Gilmore Bayou or Pensacola Bay and has no intention of doing so. His wife offered no evidence that she ever intends to swim in those waters. In summary, the activities undertaken in the project area will not unreasonably restrict or infringe upon Petitioners' riparian rights of swimming, boating, navigation, or view within the meaning of rule 18-21.004(3)(c). Petitioners' Standing Respondents and Intervenor contend that Petitioners lack standing to bring this action for two reasons: that they do not own Lot 37 individually but rather as trustees, and the petition was not filed in that capacity; and that Lot 37 does not adjoin navigable waters. See § 253.141(1), Fla. Stat. ("[r]iparian rights are those incident to land bordering upon navigable waters"). As described by the City's real estate expert, in June 2010, or before the instant petition in this case was filed, the Copes executed two deeds for estate planning purposes, which resulted in "legal title [being] owned part by Dr. and Ms. Cope as to one-half life estate and for Ms. Cope as to one-half for her life estate [and] then the remainder interest is vested in the trustees [of the D. Nathan Cope or Cynthia Russell Cope revocable trust agreements] for the remainder interests." Put in plainer language, this meant that the ownership of Lot 37 is now divided as follows: an undivided 50 percent is owned by the wife as to a life estate and by the wife's revocable trust as to the remainder interest, and the other undivided 50 percent is owned by the wife and husband as to a life estate for the husband's lifetime and by the husband's revocable trust as to the remainder interest. Therefore, there are four entities or persons with an ownership interest in the property: Dr. Cope, Mrs. Cope, Dr. Cope's trust, and Mrs. Cope's trust. The City presented expert testimony regarding the chain of title of Lot 37, beginning in June 1952 when the subdivision was first platted, and running through June 2010, when Petitioners conveyed the property to themselves as trustees of two revocable trusts. According to the expert, the subdivision plat in 1952 reflects a narrow strip of property (described as a hiatus strip) separating the entire subdivision, including Lot 37, from the waters of Gilmore Bayou, Pensacola Bay, and Woodland Lake, a nearby body of water. The strip was a park that was dedicated to the public. See Joint Ex. 1. In 1962, the developer conveyed by quit claim deed the entire strip to the record title holder of each lot in the subdivision. At that time, Lot 37 was owned by the Blaylocks. The expert found that each conveyance of Lot 37 that occurred after 1962, up to and including the Copes' purchase of the property in February 2008, did not include the hiatus parcel. Therefore, he opined that title in the strip property continues to remain with the Blaylocks. Besides his title search, the expert further corroborated this opinion by referring to a topographic survey of Lot 37 prepared in June 2005, see Joint Ex. 2a; a title insurance policy on Lot 37 issued in 2008 when the Copes purchased the property that specifically excludes title insurance for the hiatus parcel; and a recent Santa Rosa County tax bill describing the property without the hiatus parcel. In response, Petitioners contend that the hiatus strip never existed or the 1952 plat is invalid because it failed to comply with section 177.08, Florida Statutes (1951), which required that "all land within the boundaries of the plat must be accounted for either by blocks, out lots, parks, streets, alleys or excepted parcels." Because a dispute over the exact boundary lines of Lot 37 exists, this issue must be resolved in the appropriate circuit court. See § 26.012(2)(g). For purposes of deciding the merits of this case, however, it is unnecessary that this determination be made. Intervenor's Standing Dr. Tamburro currently resides on Lot 34, which faces Gilmore Bayou, and jointly owns the property with his wife. He uses the Bayou to boat and for other recreational purposes. He also uses the Island to swim, walk, and boat. The preservation of the Island is important to him since it serves as a barrier island in protecting his home during storm events. Although Dr. Tamburro's wife did not join in his petition to intervene (but appeared as his counsel), he still has a recognized ownership interest in the property.1
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order approving the City's application for a Wetland Resource Permit and Letter of Consent to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2011.
