The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents, as the owner and operator of a charter school or a private school, or both, engaged in fraudulent activity or otherwise ran the school(s) in a manner contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of students or the public; and, if so, whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' participation in several scholarship programs that provide financial assistance to eligible students who choose to attend private schools.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Silva of South Florida, Inc. ("SSF"), is a Florida nonprofit corporation that, at all times relevant to this case, operated a private school known as New Horizons (the "School"). An employee of SSF, Yudit Silva ("Silva"), served as the School's principal or administrator at all times relevant. The Department of Education ("Department") administers the Gardiner Scholarship Program and the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program. See §§ 1002.385 & 1002.39, Fla. Stat. The Department has some administrative responsibilities in connection with the operation of the Florida Tax Credit ("FTC") Scholarship Program as well. See § 1002.395, Fla. Stat. Gardiner, McKay, and FTC scholarships defray tuition and other qualified educational expenses for eligible students who attend private schools in the state of Florida. It is not necessary to make detailed findings about these scholarship programs. There is no dispute that, during the relevant time, the School participated in the three programs mentioned, and was therefore eligible to accept, and did receive, scholarship funds paid on behalf of its students on scholarships. As will be discussed more thoroughly below, the Commissioner of Education possesses the authority to immediately suspend payment of McKay and FTC scholarship funds to a private school if he or she finds probable cause for believing that, inter alia, the school has engaged in "fraudulent activity." In addition, or alternatively, the commissioner may suspend or revoke a private school's continued participation in the McKay and FTC programs for wrongful conduct, including the operation of an "educational institution" by the private school's owner or operator "in a manner contrary to the health, safety, or welfare of the public." Finally, the commissioner may suspend or revoke a private school's participation in the Gardiner Scholarship Program "for a violation of . . . section" 1002.385, Florida Statutes. On March 30, 2017, Petitioner Pam Stewart, as Commissioner of Education (the "Commissioner"), issued an Administrative Complaint against Silva and SSF stating that she had determined there was probable cause for believing that Silva and SSF had engaged in fraudulent activity during the years 2013 through 2016 while operating a charter school known as Pathways Academy K-8 Center ("Pathways"). On May 2, 2017, the Commissioner issued an Amended Administrative Complaint wherein she expanded the original charges with new allegations that, in 2017, Silva and SSF had engaged in fraudulent activity while operating the School. Based on the alleged wrongdoing of Silva and SSF, the Commissioner immediately suspended payment of all scholarship funds to the School and gave notice of her intent to revoke the School's participation in the Gardiner, McKay, and FTC programs. The Commissioner's immediate and intended actions rested substantially on allegations of misconduct that the Broward County School Board ("BCSB") had asserted previously as grounds for terminating the charter school agreement between BCSB and SSF under which SSF operated Pathways. BCSB had given notice to SSF of its intent to terminate this agreement in April 2016, prompting SSF to request a formal administrative hearing. SSF's request had led, in turn, to the initiation of Broward County School Board v. Silva of South Florida, Inc., DOAH Case No. 16-2576 ("Pathways"). Over the course of several days in July and August 2016, Judge Robert E. Meale had conducted the Pathways hearing. In his Recommended Order dated January 9, 2017, Judge Meale had recommended that BCSB terminate SSF's charter. SSF had submitted exceptions to the Recommended Order, but on February 27, 2017, before BCSB had taken final agency action, SSF filed a Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal of Petition for Hearing, stating that SSF planned not to renew its charter and would, instead, close Pathways. BCSB evidently accepted this notice as sufficient to conclude the Pathways litigation, for it failed to issue a final order. The upshot is that Judge Meale's findings of fact never achieved administrative finality.1/ The relevant BCSB allegations, as the Commissioner summarized them in the administrative complaints, were quoted above in the Preliminary Statement. To prove them, the Commissioner relied primarily on two witnesses: Andrew Ramjit and Patrick Reilly. Neither provided evidence persuasive enough to support findings confirming the BCSB allegations. Mr. Ramjit is a former employee of SSF. He worked at Pathways as an assistant principal for a few months in the summer of 2015, between school years. His brief tenure at the charter school was apparently an unhappy one for all concerned, and when Mr. Ramjit left this job, he took with him (i.e., stole) original files belonging to SSF, to use as evidence of the wrongdoing he would accuse SSF of committing. He later filed several complaints against SSF with the Department, which in August 2015 referred the matter to BCSB to investigate, since BCSB was Pathways' sponsor. BCSB assigned the task of conducting the investigation to Mr. Reilly, a CPA who conducts audits for the school district. Mr. Reilly's months-long investigation resulted in findings that were detailed in an Internal Audit Report presented to the school board in March 2016. Mr. Reilly concluded that Mr. Ramjit's allegations were "substantiated" and that BCSB had good cause to terminate Pathways' charter school agreement. BCSB agreed and, as already noted, took steps to do just that. As a witness at hearing, Mr. Ramjit at times came across as a disgruntled ex-employee anxious to settle some scores. Despite the evident bias, however, the undersigned finds Mr. Ramjit's testimony to be more or less believable, as far as it goes. The problem is, Mr. Ramjit's testimony is superficial or conclusory, or both. For example, he asserts that he observed SSF employees "forging" teacher and parent signatures on various documents, but none of these supposedly falsified documents was produced, no forgery "victim" testified, and no expert testimony about disputed signatures was adduced. Mr. Ramjit claims that Silva and another administrator directed him to "artificially lower" teacher evaluation scores——but, really, what does this mean? Mr. Ramjit, who worked at Pathways during the summer months only, could not himself have evaluated any teacher (for he had not been there to observe anyone teach at the charter school), and therefore, he cannot truly have known whether a particular score was "artificial" or not. Mr. Ramjit accuses SSF personnel of spending public funds on goods purchased for private use, but the items in question, insect repellant and plants, are not inherently personal in nature and could reasonably have been purchased for the school, as Silva testified.2/ This testimony, at bottom, does not amount to much. Mr. Reilly's testimony (which was presented in the form of a transcript from the Pathways hearing) has more substance but is deficient in a different way. Mr. Reilly related the granular findings of his investigation, but he, himself, possesses no personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts he had found. In other words, what he knows, he did not witness or experience; rather, he searched for proof, as an investigator does, and reached conclusions based on the evidence obtained. To be sure, if Mr. Reilly's testimony had consisted in relevant part of expert opinions based on hearsay, such opinions might have been competent substantial evidence. His testimony, however, concerned matters of historical fact that did not require expertise to understand (or, at least, not expertise in accounting). Mr. Reilly's testimony, in short, establishes persuasively that he believes the BCSB allegations to be true, but, consisting largely of hearsay, is insufficient to prove to the undersigned the truth of the allegations. The Commissioner alleged that, while working at the School in March 2017, Silva sent a handful of suspicious faxes to the Broward County School District's Office of Exceptional Student Education. These faxes transmitted eight letters, each of which purported to be from the parent of a student receiving a McKay scholarship. The letters were identical (a form, obviously) and unsigned. In them, the parent (or "parent") complained that the district had "illegal[ly]" changed his or her child's "IEP Matrix Level" from "level 4" to "level 1" "without notifying [the parent] and without an IEP meeting." The letter urged the district to "[p]lease change the IEP Matrix Level back to its correct level within 5 business days" and requested that all future communications be in writing "only through email." Without getting into unnecessary detail, the "IEP Matrix Level" reflects the intensity of services provided to a student with disabilities. The higher the level, the greater the number of services required. There is a correlation between the matrix level and the level of funding available under the McKay scholarship program, so that a reduction in the matrix level might affect a student's McKay scholarship. The requests to increase the matrix level from 1 to 4, therefore, might have been prompted by a concern that, without such action, the students in question would see their scholarships diminished. There was nothing wrongful per se about the form letters at issue; sure, the contentions therein that the district had acted illegally and was preventing students from receiving necessary services might have been overblown or mistaken, but ultimately the decision whether to change the matrix level back to 4, as rather politely, if firmly, requested, was the district's alone to make. If there were a wrongful act, it would have been that Silva sent the letters on the parents' behalf without their approval. On this charge, the only nonhearsay evidence of record is the deposition of E.M., a parent who supposedly sent one of the form letters. E.M. disclaimed knowledge of the letter and denied having authorized the School to write and send it for him. At the same time, though, he professed to know nothing about the scholarship programs and freely acknowledged that he relied entirely upon the School to take care of all the paperwork required "to get that money." E.M.'s testimony persuades the undersigned that regardless of whether E.M. had any involvement in the form letter, he certainly would have expected the School to prepare and submit such "paperwork" if the School believed it necessary to "get that money." Based on this evidence, the undersigned cannot find that the School committed fraud. The remaining allegations against SSF and Silva concern several dozen FTC scholarship applications submitted to Step Up for Students ("SUFS"), a nonprofit scholarship funding organization that helps administer the FTC and Gardiner Scholarship Programs. FTC scholarships are intended to benefit students who, without financial assistance, would be unable to attend private school due to low household income. Because household income is an important factor in determining an FTC scholarship award, any knowingly false, misleading, or incomplete representations made in an application that bear on this material fact would constitute an act of fraud——a point that is stressed in the application forms. The Commissioner argues that, in at least 39 applications, Silva falsely represented facts regarding the household income of students of the School. The disputed applications were submitted, online, in several tranches. Six were submitted between 8:28 p.m. and 9:55 p.m. on February 22, 2017. Five were sent on February 24, 2017, between 11:15 a.m. and 3:48 p.m. On the night of March 12, 2017, from 7:20 p.m. through 11:59 p.m., 12 of these applications were submitted, followed by 13 more on March 13, 2017, sent between 9:22 a.m. and 2:53 p.m. A final group of three was submitted on the morning of March 14, 2017, between 11:29 a.m. and 11:52 a.m. Because it is unlikely that 39 parents acting independently would happen to file their applications in bunches like this, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that the School's staff coordinated these submissions. SSF and Silva admit, at any rate, that the School's staff assisted the parents with these scholarship applications, providing them with email addresses and computer access. Other details about these applications, however, suggest that the assistance provided by the School's staff was more hands-on than SSF and Silva have admitted. The application asks the parent completing the online form to identify his or her "birth city" as the answer to a security question. Every parent gave the same answer, "miami." While it is doubtful that every parent was, in fact, born in Miami, the truth of this assertion is immaterial. Still, that every applicant typed in "miami" raises an eyebrow; that all of them failed, idiosyncratically, to capitalize the proper name strongly implies a common agency, the most likely being the School——an inference further reinforced by the probability that the School's staff did not know the actual birthplace of every parent, and thus would have found it convenient simply to make Miami the ubiquitous choice by default. Another common denominator of the applications is that every parent reported his or her marital status as, "Single. I have never been married." This emphatic statement of lifelong singlehood seems peculiar, suggesting a common hand, but the response might have been a selection from a dropdown menu, a possibility which undermines the inference. Nevertheless, it would be unusual if, in this group of 39 single parents of young children, not one had ever been married——so unusual, in fact, that the undersigned deems that situation highly unlikely; some of these responses, it is inferred, were untrue. That being said, the materiality of the representation that the parent had never been married is unknown, for the record is silent on this point. Like the ubiquitous answer to the "birthplace" security question, however, the shared response to the martial status inquiry implies a common agency——the most obvious candidate being, again, the School. The evidence reviewed so far supports the inference, which the undersigned has drawn, that School personnel provided assistance to the parents in completing applications for FTC scholarships, including supplying requested information. In so doing, the School made each parent say he or she had never been married, making a representation of fact that was probably false in at least some instances. Because that fact was not shown to be material, however, it cannot be concluded, without more, that the School committed fraud. Unfortunately, there is more. Each parent claimed in the application to have "zero" household income. This was a material representation. Obviously, to be a single parent without any income is to experience extreme poverty. While it is theoretically possible that all 39 of the subject parents were destitute, this is highly improbable,3/ and, not surprisingly, the number of zero- income applications coming from the same private school caught the attention of SUFS, which in due course launched an investigation.4/ Meantime, however, SUFS sent the parents two forms, on paper, to be competed and returned. One was called Verification of Household Composition ("Verification Form"), and the other was titled Statement of No Household Income ("Explanation Form"). The Verification Form needed to be filled out by someone neither related to nor living with the applicant, e.g., a friend or neighbor, who was capable of listing, as requested, the names of all adults and children residing in the applicant's household, together with their respective ages and relationships to one another. On the Explanation Form, the parent (applicant) was required to "explain in the space provided how you are able to pay for rent, food, and clothing, etc." with "a household income of zero ($0.00)." Alternatively, if "the entry of a household income of zero ($0.00) was a mistake," the applicant was to "provide proof of the most recent 30 days of income for each person receiving income in your household." Silva completed, signed, and submitted to SUFS a Verification Form for each of the 39 parents. Every form she signed was dated March 15 or March 17, 2017, except for one dated March 21, 2017. The only adult listed on any of these completed forms is the parent or guardian (applicant). The only other members of the households at issue whom Silva listed are minor children. In other words, to be clear, every household Silva described in these 39 Verification Forms consisted of one parent or guardian plus that adult's minor child or children—— and no one else. Above Silva's signature on these forms is a certificate, printed in boldface, which declares: Under penalties of perjury, I certify that the information presented is true and accurate, the persons listed above are personally known to me and the household as shown above is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that providing false representations constitutes an act of fraud. False, misleading or incomplete information may result in the denial of the scholarship application or revocation of a scholarship award. Each completed Explanation Form that SUSF received bears a signature purporting to be that of the parent or guardian and has the same date as the corresponding Verification Form. On every form, except one, the parent states that he or she is able to survive on zero income because "I live with family members" or similar words to the same effect.5/ Above each signature on these forms is a certificate, printed in boldface, which declares: Under penalties of perjury, I certify that the information presented is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. The undersigned further understands that providing false representations herein constitutes an act of fraud. False, misleading or incomplete information may result in the denial of the scholarship application or revocation of a scholarship award. As an explanation for how one is able to get by with zero household income, the statement that "I live with family members" can only be read to mean that the income-less person and his or her dependents are residing in (and thus belong to) the household of generous relatives who have the wherewithal to provide financial support for their impecunious kin; otherwise, it would be nonresponsive to the question posed by the Explanation Form. So understood, however, the statement——if true——logically refutes the applicant's assertion that his or her "household income" is zero because the family members supporting him or her must have had an income, which should have been reported and substantiated per the instructions on the Explanation Form. It seems impossible that not one of the 39 applicants noticed that SUFS was interested in household income as opposed to parental income, and thus likely that some of them (assuming any personally completed these forms) would have been aware that their responses (if true) were contradictory and incomplete to the point of being, arguably, fraudulent. But this inconsistency is of passing interest, as it does not necessarily inculpate the SSF, Silva, or the School. A different discrepancy implicates the School in wrongdoing. The statements of household composition in the Verification Forms that Silva signed, all of which describe a household consisting of one adult (the applicant) and his or her minor dependent(s), belie the statements in the Explanation Forms claiming that the applicant lives with, and relies financially upon, his or her relatives——relatives who, in this context, cannot plausibly be understood as being the applicant's minor children. These statements, clearly, are mutually exclusive and, therefore, cannot both be true. If an applicant lived with family members who supported the applicant's family, as represented in every Explanation Form at issue, then Silva provided false information to SUFS in every Verification Form she executed. While a few instances of inaccurate reporting on Silva's part might be written off as honest mistakes, an error rate of 100 percent would suggest that something else was going on. The other possibility that must be considered, however, is that Silva was truthful, and the applicants (unknown to her) were not. In this scenario, the applicants——operating individually or in concert——falsely claimed to be living with family members (presumably to maintain the "zero income" fiction) without informing Silva of this deception. The undersigned regards this latter possibility as incredible. There is no reasonable likelihood that 39 applicants separately decided to commit the exact same fraud using essentially the very same language; such a coincidence is simply inconceivable. As a practical matter, the applicants would have needed to conspire with one another. But to infer such a conspiracy, one must assume that all 39 applicants (not only the one(s) who came up with the scheme) were sufficiently dishonest to participate and disciplined enough to keep their mouths shut about it. These assumptions defy credulity. This is not to say that the statements in the Explanation Forms were likely truthful. To the contrary, the undersigned infers that they were false or intended to mislead. That is, in all likelihood, the applicants' households were, in fact, composed (for the most part) of the persons listed in the Verification Forms, and the false statements of material fact were that the applicants had no household income and were financially dependent upon family members with whom they lived. It is found, further, that Silva, not any applicant(s), was the driving force behind this deception, because, in view of all the circumstances, no other reasonable inference can account for the fact that 39 applicants happened to make the very same false statements in their applications. Whether the parents, or any of them, knowingly participated in Silva's fraudulent scheme is unclear——but is ultimately immaterial for purposes of this case.6/ Ultimate Factual Determinations The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, to increase the chances that the School's students would receive the maximum amount of FTC scholarship funding, Silva engaged in fraudulent activity, to wit: Silva falsely represented to SUFS that 39 FTC scholarship applicants had "zero household income" and were forced, as a result, to live with family members. Silva made these statements of material fact knowing they were false or in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the representations, which were in fact false.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner enter a final order revoking Respondents' participation in the McKay, FTC, and Gardiner scholarship programs. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2017.
The Issue The issues in this case are: Whether Respondent, Everest University (the "School"), discriminated against Petitioner, Hashim Aboudaya, on the basis of his place of natural origin (Middle Eastern), race (Caucasian), and/or religion (Muslim) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act by twice failing to promote Petitioner to the position of associate dean or director of Student Services; and Whether the School retaliated against Petitioner based on his place of natural origin, race, and/or religion by refusing to pay for his doctoral level college courses.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Caucasian male, born in Lebanon and, therefore, of Middle Eastern heritage. He is a practicing Muslim. In July 2003, Petitioner began teaching as an adjunct professor at the School, teaching computer information services and teaching a few classes per year. In or around August 2007, Petitioner was promoted to senior network administrator, a non-teaching position, for the School. At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner served in that position. He currently teaches classes on an as-needed basis also. The School is a private college formerly known as Florida Metropolitan University. There are ten related campuses in the State of Florida, with one being in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. The Melbourne campus has two locations, one on Sarno Road and the "main" campus on U.S. Highway 1. Petitioner holds two master's degrees, one in management and one in computer resources and information management, from Webster University in Saint Louis, Missouri. He is pursuing a third master's degree, but it is "on hold" pending his completion of studies in a doctoral program. The doctoral program being sought by Petitioner is in the field of business administration with a major field of study in computer security. The degree is being pursued on-line through Capella University based in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Petitioner's resume indicates that the Ph.D. will be "done in the end of 2007," but it has obviously taken longer than planned. Petitioner has applied for several vacancies listed at the School, but for purposes of this proceeding, the following are relevant: (1) The associate academic dean position advertised in January 2010; (2) The associate academic dean position advertised in April 2010; and (3) The director of Student Services position advertised in August 2009. Associate Academic Dean Positions The following qualifications were specified in the School's job description for the associate academic dean positions. The applicant must: Possess the necessary academic credentials and work related experience mandated by the Company, State accreditation agencies and any other regulatory agency that monitors compliance. Have a minimum of 2 years practical work experience in business or education. Have a minimum of 1 year teaching experience, but The years of experience may be waived at the sole discretion of the college president so long as the incumbent meets the accreditations, State and Federal requirements necessary to hold the position. There was also a job posting (as opposed to a job description) for the associate dean position on a website associated with Corinthian Colleges, Inc. ("CCI"), the School's parent company. That job posting indicated that a master's degree was required for the job and included other requirements not set out in the School's official job description. The college president, Mark Judge, could not verify the accuracy of the job posting. There is no persuasive, credible evidence that the job posting was produced by the School or intended to be used as the basis for filling the associate dean position. The first associate dean position was for the Sarno Road site which housed the School's allied health programs, e.g., medical assistant training, pharmacy technician associate degrees, medical insurance billing and coding, and healthcare administration. Besides the requirements set forth in the job description, the School was looking for someone with health- related experience as well. Terri Baker, a registered nurse, was ultimately hired to fill the associate dean position. Baker had approximately 20 years of experience with the School. During that time, Baker had taught classes in the allied health program, had served as a program director, and was an associate dean at other campuses within the CCI system. Baker does not hold a master's degree, but the job description issued by the School does not require that level of education. The job posting, which appeared in a publication issued by the School, does say that a master's degree is required, but there is no competent and substantial evidence to suggest the job posting supersedes the job description. Notwithstanding her level of schooling, it is clear Baker was a perfect fit for the job. The decision to appoint her, rather than Petitioner, to the position was based on factors other than race, national origin or religion. The second associate dean position was advertised in the Spring of 2010. The job description for that job is the same as the previous associate dean position. However, there are many different duties and expectations associated with the second position. For example, while the first position was related directly to the allied health programs at the School, the second position had a different focus. The person filling this position would be working on the main Melbourne campus, rather than the satellite campus. His or her duties would be directed toward tasks such as transfer of credit analysis, scheduling, and registering new students. The dean would also be responsible for monitoring the School's compliance with accreditation standards and internal audit standards. Betty Williams was hired to fill the second associate dean position. Williams had significant management experience in academic settings. She had served as an academic dean for one of the School's competitors and had extensive knowledge and experience with compliance accreditation standards. As compared to Petitioner, Williams was a much better fit for the position. Her experience would allow her to step into the position and begin working on problems immediately without the necessity of a period of training and acclimation. Director of Student Services Position The director of Student Services was expected to help students who were experiencing hardships in their academic progress. The director would help students who were forced to withdraw from school for financial or other personal reasons. He/she would provide support for students taking online classes and assist students trying to re-enroll into school following dismissal or withdrawal. A close working relationship with students was an important factor in this position. The School's job description listed the following requirement for the director of Student Services position: Bachelor's degree required Minimum of 3 years practical work experience or equivalent training Excellent communication and customer service skills Excellent computer skills The person who ultimately was hired for this position, Stacey Jacquot, was an outstanding employee at the School and had been selected as its Employee of the Year in two different positions. Jacquot is a Caucasian female; neither her religion, nor her place of natural origin was alluded to at final hearing. The hiring of Jacquot, as opposed to Petitioner, for this position was based on Jacquot's experience and background. She had worked in the student services department for the school as both an online coordinator and as a re-entry coordinator. Thus, her experience was directly related to the requirements of the position. Petitioner provided unsubstantiated testimony that by virtue of his teaching a number of classes over the past few years, he has some experience in counseling students concerning their issues. However, even if true, his experience did not match that of Jacquot. Request for Reimbursement for Doctoral Coursework Petitioner alleges retaliation by the School. The specific retaliatory action was the denial of his request to be reimbursed for coursework as he pursued a doctorate degree. In February 2010, Petitioner submitted a request to the School, asking that tuition expenses for his coursework be paid under the School's tuition reimbursement program. The program is set forth in policies maintained by the School and is available to "eligible employees for eligible classes." A benchmark for reimbursable tuition is that the courses being taken enable the employee to be more efficient in a current role or prepare them for a role at the next level of their employment. There are a number of written policies addressing the tuition reimbursement program. Those policies are fluid and have changed from time to time over the past few years. The policies are implemented and overseen by the director of Organizational Development for CCI, Jeanne Teeter. Teeter resides and works in California, corporate home of CCI. It is Teeter's duty to ultimately approve or deny all requests for tuition reimbursement by employees of all of CCI's colleges around the country. Teeter reviewed Petitioner's request for tuition reimbursement pursuant to a preliminary approval by the School's president, Mark Judge. It was Judge's initial decision to approve Petitioner's request, but Judge sent it to Teeter for a final decision. Teeter had never met Petitioner and did not know anything about him, except as found in his personnel file and his application for tuition reimbursement. Teeter, as was her normal procedure, considered the relevance of the degree being sought, not only to Petitioner's current role, but as to potential future roles as well. Because the course work for which reimbursement was being sought related to an advanced degree, a doctorate, Teeter was less inclined to approve it. Approval would necessitate a clear line of sight between the employee's current role to a role that would require a Ph.D. Inasmuch as Petitioner's role as senior network administrator did not require a doctorate and there was no clear line of sight between his present position and that of a professor or management employee requiring one, Teeter declined the request. At the time she made her decision, Teeter was not aware that Petitioner had made a discrimination claim against the School. Her decision, therefore, could not be retaliatory in nature. Rather, she acted in concert with the policies that address tuition reimbursement and made a decision based solely upon those policies. Petitioner appears to be an energetic and hard-working member of the School's staff. His testimony was credible, but was sometimes off the point. Although he is a well-educated person with three college degrees and is pursuing others, it is clear that English is his second language.1/ Petitioner seemed to be sincere in his belief that he was discriminated against, but did not provide persuasive evidence to support that claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Hisham Aboudaya in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2011.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has defaulted on student loans and, if so, the principal amounts of the loans, any accrued interest, and any collection costs. Whether Petitioner's employer should be required to withhold payments from Petitioner's pay pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact As will be set forth in more detail, there are three loans at issue in this proceeding. For ease of reference, these loans will be referred to as Loans One, Two, and Three.2 Loans One and Three were issued as Florida Guarantee Student Loans, which are popularly known as Stafford Loans. Loans Two and Four were supplemental loans issued by the Student Loan Services program, which are referred to SLS loans. Loans One, Two, and Three were funded and are at issue in this proceeding. THE STAFFORD LOANS, LOANS ONE AND THREE On September 22, 1986, Petitioner executed an Application and Promissory Note for a Guaranteed Student Loan, number 545967. This Stafford Loan, referred to as Loan One, was in the amount of $5,000. Loan One was disbursed in two equal installments of $2,500 (less appropriate fees). The first installment was disbursed on or about December 4, 1986, and the second installment was disbursed on or about December 11, 1986. On June 1, 1987, Petitioner executed an Application and Promissory Note for a Guaranteed Student Loan, number 586917. This Stafford Loan, referred to as Loan Three, was in the amount of $2,261.00. Loan Three was disbursed in one installment of $2,261.00 (less appropriate fees) on June 25, 1987. The promissory notes and other paper work documenting Loan One and Loan Three provided that interest at the rate of 8% per annum would begin to accrue on these loans six months after Petitioner ceased to attend school on at least a half-time basis. Because a Stafford Loan is guaranteed by the federal government, the obligor may be eligible to receive periods of deferment and periods of forbearance during which the federal government may or may not make interest payments. If the federal government made interest payments during a particular period, Petitioner is not obligated for interest during that period. If the federal government did not pay interest during a particular period, Petitioner is obligated to pay interest for that period. Respondent is not claiming any interest on Loans One and Three for any period while interest was paid by the federal government. While Petitioner was attending school on at least a half-time basis and for six months thereafter (the grace period), Loans One and Three were in periods of forbearance, and the federal government paid the interest for both loans. Petitioner ceased attending school on at least a half-time basis on March 18, 1988. The six month grace period on Loans One and Three ended on September 18, 1988, which is the date interest began to accrue on Loans One and Three. As of that date, the principal balance due on Loan One ($5,000.00) and on Loan Three ($2,261.00) totaled $7,261.00. Between September 18, 1988, and January 23, 1997, interest accrued on Loans One and Three in the total amount of $4,744.75, as follows: Between September 18, 1988, and June 15, 1993, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $2,754.80. Between June 16, 1993, and October 6, 1993, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $245.87. Both loans were in a period of administrative forbearance, but the federal government did not pay the interest. Between October 7, 1993, and January 7, 1994, both loans were in a period of deferment due to Petitioner's unemployment, and the interest was paid by the federal government. Between January 8, 1994 and January 31, 1994, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $51.73. Both loans were in a period of administrative forbearance, but the federal government did not pay the interest. Between February 1, 1994, and April 30, 1994, both loans were in a period of deferment due to Petitioner's unemployment, and the interest was paid by the federal government. Between May 1, 1994, and July 24, 1994, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $189.88. Both loans were in a period of administrative forbearance, but the federal government did not pay the interest. Between July 25, 1994, and April 30, 1995, both loans were in a period of deferment due to Petitioner's unemployment, and the interest was paid by the federal government. Between May 1, 1995, and December 1, 1995, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $492.65. Both loans were in a period of forbearance, but the federal government did not pay the interest. Between December 2, 1995, and January 23, 1997, interest accrued on these two loans in the total amount of $1,009.82. Petitioner defaulted on the repayment of Loan One. Petitioner has not made any principal or interest payment since the loan was disbursed. Petitioner defaulted on the repayment of Loan Three. Petitioner has not made any principal or interest payment since the loan was disbursed. On January 23, 1997, Respondent purchased Loan One and Loan Three.3 As January 23, 1997, the principal and the accrued interest for Loan One, plus the principal and the accrued interest for Loan Three, totaled $12,005.75. THE SLS LOAN: LOAN TWO On January 31, 1987, Petitioner executed Auxiliary Loan Application and Promissory Note number 8914 for a supplemental student loan through the Student Loan Services program (Loan Two). This type loan, generally referred to as an SLS loan, was in the principal amount of $4,000.00. Loan Two was disbursed in one installment of $4,000.00 (less appropriate fees) on or about April 9, 1987. The promissory notes and other paper work documenting Loan Two provided that interest at the rate of 12% per annum would begin to accrue upon disbursement. SLS loans also provide for periods of deferment and forbearance during which no payment is due. The federal government does not make interest payments during a period of deferment or forbearance. The borrower is obligated to pay all of the interest from date of disbursement.4 Petitioner defaulted on the repayment of Loan Two. Petitioner has not made any principal or interest payment since the loan was disbursed. Respondent purchased Loan Two from the holder on September 11, 1997.5 Interest in the amount of $7,348.91 accrued on Loan Two between April 9, 1987, the date the loan was disbursed, and September 11, 1997. The total principal balance and accrued interest for Loan Two as of September 11, 1997, was $11,348.91. COLLECTION COSTS Section 682.410(b)(2) of Title 34, C.F.R., provides that Respondent shall impose collection costs, as follows: (2) Collection charges. Whether or not provided for in the borrower's promissory note and subject to any limitation on the amount of those costs in that note, the guaranty agency shall charge a borrower an amount equal to reasonable costs incurred by the agency in collecting a loan on which the agency has paid a default or bankruptcy claim. These costs may include, but are not limited to, all attorney's fees, collection agency charges, and court costs. Except as provided in §§ 682.401(b)(27) and 682.405(b)(1)(iv), the amount charged a borrower must equal the lesser of-- The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection under the formula in 34 CFR 30.60; or The amount the same borrower would be charged for the cost of collection if the loan was held by the U.S. Department of Education. Respondent established that the amount of the annual collection cost mandated by 34 C.F.R. 682.410(b)(2) for each defaulted loan at issue in this proceeding should be calculated at the rate of 25% of the outstanding principal and accrued interest. PRINCIPAL, INTEREST, AND COLLECTION COSTS AS OF JUNE 1, 1998 Respondent calculated the principal, interest, and collection costs for each loan as of June 1, 1998. For Loan One the amount of the collection costs assessed by the Respondent was $2,231.60. Interest that accrued between January 23, 1997, and June 1, 1998, totaled $895.13. As of June 1, 1998, the total principal, interest, and collection costs for Loan One totaled $11,394.01. For Loan Two the amount of the collection costs assessed by the Respondent was $2,961.20. Interest that accrued between September 11, 1997, and June 1, 1998, totaled $981.29. As of June 1, 1998, the total principal, interest, and collection costs for Loan One totaled $15,291.39. For Loan Three the amount of the collection costs assessed by the Respondent was $1,009.13. Interest that accrued between January 23, 1997, and June 1, 1998, totaled $404.78. As of June 1, 1998, the total principal, interest, and collection costs for Loan One totaled $5,152.39. The total amount due from Petitioner as of June 1, 1998, for Loans One, Two, and Three for principal, interest, and collection costs is $31,837.79. WAGE WITHHOLDING Petitioner is a social worker employed by Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida. As an employee of a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Petitioner is subject to the provisions of Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. These provisions pertain to employees of the State of Florida or its subdivisions who have defaulted on an education loan made or guaranteed by the State of Florida. Respondent notified Petitioner in writing by letter dated October 1, 1997, that Loans One, Two, and Three were in default and offered him the opportunity to make voluntary payments on these loans. The letter also advised Petitioner that the Respondent would seek to make involuntary withholdings if he did not make voluntary payments. Petitioner thereafter elected to request the formal hearing that triggered this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein, finds that Petitioner, as of June 1, 1998, owes the sum of $31,837.79, and orders the involuntary wage withholding of Petitioner's pay through his employer, Dade County, Florida, pursuant to Section 112.175, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 28-40, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1998
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has enough creditable service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(17)(a), Florida Statutes (2009),1 to be "vested" and, therefore, eligible for a retirement benefit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is not currently an employee of any FRS employer. Petitioner was an employee of several different FRS employers during the 1970's and 1980's. Petitioner proved that he had creditable earnings from three FRS employers. The creditable earnings were from Hillsborough County from October 1977 through April 1978, Pasco County from August 1987 through December 1987, and Hernando County from March 1988 through August 1989. Petitioner has 3.09 years of creditable service in the FRS. The creditable service is not sufficient to vest Petitioner and does not entitle Petitioner to retirement benefits. Petitioner was employed with the City of Largo, Florida, for some time. However, that municipality was not an FRS participating employer during the period of employment. Petitioner worked for the U.S. Postal Service for some time. That agency is not an FRS participating employer. Petitioner was a student on work study at both the University of Florida and Florida State University. Paid student positions at state universities were not positions which were included in the FRS during that time. Petitioner also seeks to purchase his military time of approximately 22 months. Members of the FRS are allowed to purchase certain military service after they vest in the FRS. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has sufficient years of service to vest in the FRS and then purchase military service. Petitioner was employed in some state positions prior to 1975. Until 1975, the FRS was a "contributory" system. Employers withheld contributions to the retirement system from the wages of participating members and forwarded the withheld amounts to the Division. It is undisputed from Petitioner's testimony that no retirement contributions were ever withheld from his wages during the period that FRS was a contributory system.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2010.
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are as follows: (1) whether Respondents employed Lorene Walker, who had contact with scholarship students and who did not meet the requisite criteria to pass the Level 2 background screening as required by section 1002.421(1)(m) and (p), Florida Statutes (2019), and if so, what is the appropriate remedy; and (2) whether Respondents engaged in fraud in violation of section 1002.421(3)(d) and, if so, whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' participation in several Florida Scholarship Programs.1
Findings Of Fact Parties, People, and Programs The Department is the government agency charged with administering numerous state scholarship programs pursuant to section 1002.421, Florida Statutes. The Department operates or has administrative responsibilities for the Gardiner Scholarship Program, the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program, the Florida Tax Credit (FTC) Scholarship Program, and the Family Empowerment Scholarship Program. See §§ 1002.385, 1002.39, 1002.394, and 1002.395, Fla. Stat. The Gardiner, McKay, FTC, and Family Empowerment scholarships defray tuition and other qualified educational expenses for eligible students who attend charter, private, or other eligible schools in the state of Florida. The Department also operates or administers the Hope Scholarship Program, which provides tuition assistance to victims of school bullying so that they can enroll in another school. See § 1002.40, Fla. Stat. The scholarship funds are awarded to eligible students to be used at eligible schools. The Commissioner is the agency head of the Department and has the authority to revoke or suspend a school's eligibility to receive scholarship monies on behalf of eligible students. The Independent Education and Parental Choice Office, also referred to as the School Choice Office (Office), is a section of the Department which oversees several school choice options outside Florida's public school system. The Office also oversees the administration of various scholarships programs under chapter 1002. The Office is in regular contact with schools that participate in these scholarship programs. Respondents have been operating as private schools for approximately six years. Since the 2013/2014 school year, they have been found eligible and participated in numerous scholarship programs pursuant to section 1002.421. Respondents operate two campuses: (1) School Code No. 4015 located at 1056 North Pine Hills Road, Orlando, Florida (Pine Hills Campus); and (2) School Code No. 8827 located at 5308 Silver Star Road, Orlando, Florida (Silver Star Campus). The Schools serve 40 to 50 scholarship students and receive approximately $200,000 per year in scholarship funds. Judith Shealey is the owner of the Schools. She carries the title of Executive Director, Principal, Headmistress, and/or Owner. Ms. Shealey has family members who are students and teachers at the Schools. Compliance Requirements As explained by RaShawn Williams, the Office, parents, and eligible schools work closely together to access the scholarship funds. The parents apply for the scholarships through the designated agency and enroll their students directly with an eligible school. The school is responsible for enrolling the student in the scholarship program awarded to that student. Essentially, the student must be deemed eligible to receive scholarship funds, and the school must be eligible to receive those scholarship funds. If a private school is deemed ineligible by the Office for participation in a scholarship program, the students at that school do not lose their eligibility for scholarship funds. Rather, they simply cannot use those funds to enroll in the ineligible school. As private school participants in the Florida Scholarship Programs, the Schools were required to register with the State through the submission of a Private School Annual Survey; and then apply for eligibility through the submission of a yearly Scholarship Compliance Form (Compliance Form). The Compliance Form specifies numerous governing statutory requirements including: (1) submitting background screenings for officers, directors, or other controlling persons; (2) certifying all staff with direct student contact have passed an FDLE Level 2 background screening; and (3) terminating or denying employment to all persons who cannot meet this requirement. The Compliance Form is completed by applicant schools online, and then a signed and notarized hard copy is mailed to the Office. The relevant portions of the Compliance Form are found in "Section 4," and involve background checks: * Has each Owner, Operator, and Chief Administrative Officer undergone a Level 2 background screening through the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and submitted the results to the Florida Department of Education in accordance with section 1002.421(1)(m), Florida Statutes? (Reports must be filed with the private school and made available for public inspection). * * * * Have all employees and contracted personnel with direct student contact submitted their fingerprints to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for state and national background screening in accordance with section 1002.421(1)(m), Florida Statutes? * In accordance with section 1002.421(1)(m), Florida Statutes, does the school deny employment to or terminate an employee or contracted personnel with direct student contact if he or she fails to meet the background screening standards under section 435.04, Florida Statutes? * In accordance with section 1002.421(1)(m), Florida Statutes, does the school disqualify instructional personnel and school administrators from employment in any position that allows direct contact with students if the personnel or administrators are ineligible under section 435.40, Florida Statutes? A "No" answer on any of the above questions would, if unresolved, result in a private school's ineligibility for scholarship funds. The evidence establishes that the Schools answered "Yes" for sections 4A, 4C, 4D, and 4E on the notarized Compliance Forms that were submitted on December 18, 2018, and December 11, 2019. In addition to certifying the information above on the Compliance Forms every year, an eligible school must submit to the Office screening documentation for directors, principals, board members, administrators, and officers as part of the renewal of participation in the scholarship programs. Screening documentation related to other employees must be maintained by the schools and is usually only reviewed by the Office during an audit or a site visit of the school. There is no dispute that the Schools never listed Lorene Walker as an administrator for the Schools. There is no dispute the Schools never submitted any background screening information for Ms. Walker until specifically requested by the Office in November 2019. Employment of Lorene Walker Lorene Walker was hired by the Schools in 2013.3 She had children and/or grandchildren who attend the Schools. The Schools claim Ms. Walker was hired from an entity known as "Career Source." Although Ms. Walker believed that she had been cleared to work at the Schools, there is no employment file or documentation that she had undergone the Level 2 background screening required by law before being employed at the Schools. Originally, Ms. Walker worked as a "floater." As a floater, Ms. Walker cooked, cleaned, and did whatever the school needed at the time. It is unclear whether she had direct contact with students in this position. 3 Ms. Walker testified she began working there in 2015, but later stated she started in 2013. Ms. Shealey indicated by 2014, Ms. Walker had transitioned into the current position. Regardless, in 2014, Ms. Walker transitioned into a more active role at the Schools. Although the Schools claim in response to the Complaints that she was simply an administrative assistant to Ms. Shealey, the evidence establishes that Ms. Walker was the Administrator for the Schools during the time relevant to the Complaints. She reminded teachers to send out grades, attended meetings, oversaw the lunch program, and prepared school-related and financial documentation. Ms. Walker was also responsible for the Schools' students' enrollment into the scholarship programs. As Administrator, Ms. Walker also had authority, either explicit or implicit, from the Schools' owner, Ms. Shealey, to represent the Schools when dealing with the Office. She worked directly with Ms. Williams on compliance issues, including fire safety, health inspections, and completion of the Annual Survey and Compliance Form for the Schools. Ms. Walker also responded to requests for information from Ms. Williams and others in the Department. It was clear Ms. Walker was integral to the operation of the Schools. Ms. Shealey and Ms. Walker were the only two individuals with access to the Schools' email accounts that were used to correspond with the Department. The emails from one of the email addresses usually contained Ms. Shealey's signature block indicating either the title of "Principal" or "Headmistress." Ms. Walker's signature line identified her title as "Administrator." Before being hired by the Schools, Ms. Walker had been arrested for numerous offenses between 1978 and 2001 in Florida. Although most of these offenses were dismissed, dropped, and/or abandoned, she pled nolo contendere to and was found guilty of a 1994 charge for unlawful purchase of a controlled substance, a second-degree felony in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1993). The 1994 charge is a disqualifying offense which rendered Ms. Walker ineligible to be a school employee.4 There was no evidence that Ms. Walker had obtained an exemption for this qualification. As noted above, the Schools never disclosed Ms. Walker's importance in their operations in their Compliance Forms. Prior to November 2019, the Schools had never provided any screening documentation for Ms. Walker to the Office as part of the yearly compliance process. Investigation and Complaints On or around October 14, 2019, the Department received a complaint from another state agency concerning possible abuse by an employee of the School at the Pine Hills campus. Although the abuse investigation was handled outside of the Office, the Office opened an inquiry into the Schools' compliance with background check requirements and other issues. Whitney Blake conducted the investigation on behalf of the Office. The first step in this inquiry was a letter from Ms. Blake's supervisor, dated October 25, 2019, requesting (among other things) a list of all employees (including both teachers and other personnel) and results of current FDLE Level 2 background screenings for all employees. 4 Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, provides the following in relevant part: (2) The security background investigations under this section must ensure that no persons subject to the provisions of this section have been arrested for and are awaiting final disposition of, have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, or have been adjudicated delinquent and the record has not been sealed or expunged for, any offense prohibited under any of the following provisions of state law or similar law of another jurisdiction: * * * (ss) Chapter 893, relating to drug abuse prevention and control, only if the offense was a felony or if any other person involved in the offense was a minor. On November 4, 2020, Ms. Walker sent the Department a list of all the Schools' staff, including herself as "Administrator," along with the results of her background screening, revealing her previous disqualifying offense. On November 15, 2019, Ms. Blake attempted to contact Ms. Shealey by phone because she was concerned that Ms. Walker, who was the disqualified employee, was the person sending the information from the School. When she called the Schools and requested to speak with the owner (Ms. Shealey), the person who answered purportedly claiming to be the Schools' owner did not have a distinguishable accent. Ms. Shealey was known to have a strong accent, whereas Ms. Walker did not. Regardless, on this call, Ms. Blake instructed the person on the other end of the phone line that the Schools would need to terminate Ms. Walker immediately because of her disqualifying offense. On that same day, Ms. Blake then sent a follow-up email to the Schools (at both email addresses utilized by the Schools) indicating there were outstanding items that had not been provided as requested in the October 25 letter. She also specifically requested proof Ms. Walker was no longer at the Schools. Specifically, the Department stated: Upon review of the Level 2 background screenings, it was determined Lorene Walker has disqualifying offenses pursuant to section 435.04, F.S. An employee or contracted personnel with direct student contact means any employee or contracted personnel who has unsupervised access to a scholarship student for whom the private school is responsible. To certify compliance with this requirement, please submit a signed statement indicating Lorene Walker's employment at your school has been terminated or that individual's role with your school no longer puts he/she in proximity to scholarship students. Your attention to this in the next five days will preempt any further action on our part. (emphasis added). That same date, November 15, 2019, the Schools emailed one of the items requested by Ms. Blake, an abuse poster, to the Office. Although Ms. Walker testified she did not send the email, it had her signature block and was from one of the Schools' two email accounts to which she had access. The undersigned finds Ms. Walker sent this email to Ms. Blake. On November 18, 2019, the Schools sent another item previously requested by Ms. Blake, the teaching qualifications for a teacher, to the Office. Again, although Ms. Walker claimed she did not send the email, it had her signature block and was from one of the Schools' two email accounts to which she had access. The undersigned finds Ms. Walker sent this email to Ms. Blake. Ms. Blake did not receive any proof that the Schools had removed Ms. Walker from her position within five days as requested in the November 15 email to the Schools. As a result, on November 22, 2019, Ms. Blake emailed the Schools reiterating the requirements of section 1002.421, and repeating her request for a signed statement that Ms. Walker had been terminated or had no contact with scholarship students. Ms. Blake also added: "Failure to turn in the requested documentation could impact your school's ongoing participation in the Scholarship Program." During this time, Ms. Blake spoke to Ms. Shealey numerous times on the phone regarding the outstanding requests related to another teacher and the signed documentation that Ms. Walker had been removed from her position. Ms. Shealey indicated it would be difficult to remove Ms. Walker due to Ms. Walker's oversight of the school and her familiarity with the scholarship student information. After Ms. Blake did not receive the requested proof of Ms. Walker's removal from the Schools and two other items related to a teacher, the Office issued a Notice of Noncompliance on December 5, 2019. On December 19, 2019, Ms. Shealey sent to Ms. Blake one of the outstanding items related to the teacher by email. There was no mention of Ms. Walker and no signed proof that Ms. Walker had been removed from her position. The next day, Ms. Blake wrote an email to Ms. Shealey indicating that she did not have authority to exempt Ms. Walker from the background screening requirements. She again asked for the outstanding information related to the other teacher and a signed statement indicating Ms. Walker had been removed and no longer had proximity to scholarship students. On December 23, 2019, Ms. Shealey emailed Ms. Blake that the teacher for which there was an outstanding request had resigned and no longer worked for one of the Schools. Ms. Blake responded with yet another request for the signed statement indicating Ms. Walker had been terminated or was no longer in proximity to scholarship students. In response, Ms. Shealey sent an email to Ms. Blake with an attached letter. The letter titled "Termination of your employment" and dated December 9, 2019, indicates that Ms. Shealey terminated Ms. Walker during a meeting held on December 9, 2019. The letter is unsigned. Ms. Shealey indicated in the text of the email that it was the hardest letter she had to write. Being concerned that they had not received a signed statement, Ms. Blake and Ms. Williams requested that a site visit be conducted at the Pine Hills Campus. A visit was scheduled for February 5, 2020, and the Schools were provided notice of the site visit by certified mail, email, and telephone. Additionally, the Schools were provided a checklist of the documents that should be provided to the inspector during the site visit. On February 5, 2020, Scott Earley from the Office conducted the site visit at the Pine Hills Campus. When he arrived, Ms. Shealey was not there and none of the documentation previously requested had been prepared for review. Mr. Earley testified that once Ms. Shealey arrived, she did not know where all the requested documents were, nor could she produce all of them. For example, when asked about a necessary health form, Ms. Shealey indicated that Ms. Walker would know where the document was, but she could not locate it. Mr. Earley did not recall Ms. Shealey stating during the inspection that Ms. Walker was working from home, but she gave Mr. Earley the impression that Ms. Walker's background screening issue had been resolved. Regardless, the Site Visit Staff/Consultant Worksheet filled out for the February 5 site visit does not disclose Ms. Walker as a member of staff or contracted personnel with the Pine Hills Campus. Although Ms. Walker was not at the Pine Hills Campus during the site visit, Mr. Earley believed based on his observations and conversations with Ms. Shealey that Ms. Walker was still employed by the Schools as a director or principal. Almost two weeks later on February 20, 2020, Petitioner filed the Complaints against the Schools. It was not until March 11, 2020, in response to the Complaints that the Schools submitted for the first time a signed copy of a termination letter dated December 9, 2020. Even after the Complaints had been served on the Schools, however, it was unclear what Ms. Walker's involvement was with the Schools. There may have been some confusion because Ms. Walker had been seen after her purported termination on campus. Ms. Walker claimed she was on campus only to pick up her children and grandchildren. Testimony from two of the Schools' teachers indicated that they noticed Ms. Walker was no longer at the Schools, but knew she was taking care of the Schools' paperwork from her home. Neither teacher could establish a date certain for when Ms. Walker stopped working on campus and/or when she began working at home. Prior to the filing of the Complaints in these proceedings, there was no evidence that the Schools ever reported to the Office that Ms. Walker had been working from home. Nothing in the Petition filed on March 4, 2020, indicates Ms. Walker was still employed at the Schools. It was not until March 11, 2020, in response to the Complaints that the Schools submitted for the first time a signed copy of a termination letter dated December 9, 2020. As part of the March 11 submission, Ms. Shealey sent a signed statement indicating she had not terminated Ms. Walker, but rather "had her work from home." This was the first time Ms. Shealey indicated to the Office that Ms. Walker was still working for the Schools. In the Motion filed April 10, 2020, the Schools indicated they were unaware of the specifics of the Level 2 background screening requirement, and that, once aware, "we took action immediately and terminated the employee in question." There was no indication in the body of the Motion the Schools continued to employ Ms. Walker to work at her home. Attached to the Motion, however, was the same letter submitted on March 11 indicating Ms. Walker was working from home. In the Amended Petition filed on May 15, 2020, the Schools state Ms. Walker was terminated: "I terminated Ms. Lorene Walker due to the Department's information in order to come into compliance with the Florida Department of Education." "I rectified this deficiency by terminating Ms. Walker." "Ms. Lorene Walker was terminated on December 9, 2019, as advised by Whitney Blake." Although the Amended Petition does not explicitly state Ms. Walker continued to work for the Schools at home, it does leave room for this interpretation: "As of December 9, 2019, Ms. Lorene Walker no longer works in the Lion of Judah facility." It is unclear on what date Ms. Walker stopped working from home for the Schools. What is clear is that at the time of the final hearing she was no longer working at the Schools in any location or in any capacity. ULTIMATE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS The greater weight of the evidence establishes Ms. Walker, in her role as Administrator, should have been disclosed to the Office as an "operator" or "a person with equivalent decision making authority." The Schools were required to send her background screening documentation to the Office as required by the Compliance Form and section 1002.421(1)(p), and they did not. The Schools employed a person with a disqualifying offense in violation of sections 1002.421(1)(m) and 435.04(2)(ss). Specifically, the Schools employed Ms. Walker from 2014 (if not earlier) through December 2019 (if not later) in a position in which she was in the vicinity of scholarship students, knowing that she had been found guilty of a felony and without obtaining or providing documentation related to a Level 2 background clearance. The Schools continued to allow Ms. Walker to remain in a position that placed her in the vicinity of scholarship students after receiving notification of her ineligibility for almost a month (if not more). The greater weight of the evidence establishes the Schools engaged in fraudulent activity, to wit: (1) Ms. Shealey falsely represented to the Office that the Schools complied with Section 4 of the Compliance Form for 2018 and 2019; (2) the Schools falsely obscured Ms. Walker's role at the School and her criminal background; and (3) the Schools failed to honestly disclose Ms. Walker's employment status when they claimed to terminate her on December 9, 2020, but failed to inform the Office that they had retained (or rehired) her to work at home. The Schools made these statements of material fact either knowing they were false or in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the representations, which were false.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner enter a final order (1) upholding the suspension; and (2) revoking the eligibility of Lion of Judah Academy (4015) and Lion Of Judah Academy (8827) to participate in the following Florida Scholarship Programs: John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program, Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program, Gardiner Scholarship Program, Hope Scholarship Program, and/or Family Empowerment Scholarship Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Jason Douglas Borntreger, Esquire Department of Education Suite 1544 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32310 (eServed) Judith Shealey Lion of Judah Academy 1056 North Pine Hills Road Orlando, Florida 32808 Shawn R. H. Smith, Esquire Law Office of Shawn R. H. Smith, P.A. Post Office Box 547752 Orlando, Florida 32854 (eServed) Chris Emerson, Agency Clerk Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1520 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Richard Corcoran Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed)
