Findings Of Fact The findings below are based on the undisputed facts set forth in Petitioner's Protest and supplements thereto, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, and representations by the parties during the motion hearing. On October 7, 2009, Respondent electronically posted its final ranking of firms which had submitted proposals to provide mechanical engineering services for six HVAC projects for Respondent in 2010. Respondent's electronic posting of the final ranking of firms included the following language: "Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.57(3), shall constitute a waiver of proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes." On October 12, 2009, Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest the final rankings. On October 22, 2009, Petitioner filed its Protest. Although Petitioner's Protest was timely filed, Petitioner initially did not file a bond or other security. The Protest alleges that Petitioner was not required to file a bond, because Respondent did not include in its final ranking notice that a failure to post a bond would constitute a waiver of proceedings under Subsection 120.57(3)(a), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the Protest alleges that Respondent: (1) failed to provide Petitioner with notice of the estimated contract amounts within 72 hours, exclusive of Saturdays and Sundays and state holidays, of the filing of a notice of protest as required by Subsection 287.042(2)(c), Florida Statutes; and (2) because Respondent had not provided that notice, Petitioner was unable to calculate the amount of the bond required and was, therefore, relieved of the obligation to file a bond. On October 30, 2009, Respondent, through counsel, wrote to Petitioner. In this correspondence, Respondent informed Petitioner that Section 287.042, Florida Statutes, did not apply to Respondent because it was not an "agency" for purposes of that law. Respondent further informed Petitioner that Section 255.0516, Florida Statutes, allowed Respondent to require a bond in the amount of two percent of the lowest accepted bid or $25,000. Respondent also notified Petitioner that because it was protesting all six project awards, all awards must be included in the calculation of the bond amount required. Finally, Petitioner was allowed ten days within which to post a bond. On November 3, 2009, Petitioner submitted to Respondent a cashier's check in the amount of $3,143.70 and noted that the check was intended to serve as security for the Protest "as required by F.S. 287.042(2)(c)." In the letter which accompanied the check, Petitioner also noted that: (1) the amount of the check was determined by calculating one percent of the largest proposed contract award amount of $314,370.00; and (2) Petitioner was providing that amount "under duress," because Respondent had "just published the contract award amounts." The relief requested by Petitioner in the Protest is that: (1) it be awarded one of the six HVAC projects comprising the final ranking; and/or (2) alternatively, all six awards be rescinded and "start the entire process over." The final ranking which Petitioner protests included six separate projects, each of which had a separate construction budget. Those projects and their respective construction budgets are as follows: Northwest--$1,144,000; Tampa Palms--$2,649,081; Yates--$2,770,828; Ferrell--$2,550,758; Stewart--$2,805,437; and Erwin--$4,191,603. The proposed fees for each project were as follows: $97,240 (Northwest); $211,926 (Tampa Palms); $221,666 (Yates); $204,061 (Ferrell); $224,435 (Stewart); and $314,370 (Erwin).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Hillsborough County School Board, issue a final order dismissing the Protest filed by Petitioner, RHC and Associates, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2010.
Conclusions This. cause is before the Department of Community Affairs on an Order Closing File, a copy of which is appended hereto as Exhibit A. On June 22, 2009, the Department published its cumulative Notice of Intent to find the Hernando County comprehensive plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2007-24 on December 12, 2007, and the remedial amendments adopted by Ordinance 2009-03 on May 12, 2009, in compliance with the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Ch. 163, Part II, Florida Statutes (the “Act”). On July 15, 2009, pursuant to Section 163.3184(9), Florida Statutes, the Department forwarded Brooksville Quarry LLC’s Petition for Administrative Hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The case was assigned DOAH case number FINAL ORDER No. DCA09-GM-289 09-3746GM. On August 3, 2009, a Notice of Hearing was entered for September 1 and 2, 2009. On August 10, 2009, Brooksville Quarry, LLC, filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice. There are no other Petitioners in this case, and the time has expired for filing petitions for hearing. Therefore, no disputed issues remain to be resolved. The Florida Supreme Court held that “[a] case is ‘moot’ when it presents no actual controversy or when the issues have ceased to exist.” Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1991). A moot case generally will be dismissed. Id.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030 (b) (1)®) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD. OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER No. DCA09-GM-289 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished by U.S. Mail to, each of the persons listed below on this day of , 2009. Agency Clerk By U.S. Mail The Honorable Bram D. E. Canter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Linda Loomis Shelley, Esquire Karen Brodeen, Esquire Jacob D. Varn, Esquire Fowler White Boggs PA PO Box 11240 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Geoffrey Kirk, Esquire Assistant County Attorney Hernando County 20 North Main Street, Suite 462 Brooksville, Florida 34601-2850 By Hand Delivery Lynette Norr Assistant General. Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
Findings Of Fact In 1987, the Respondent DOT began its review of the public roads within Glades County in order to assign maintenance and jurisdictional responsibility in accordance with the current functional classification of each road. By law, the DOT is required to conduct such a review every five years. Section 05040 of State Road 78 is located within the unincorporated area of Glades County. This paved, two-lane road segment is 14.8 miles in length, and predominantly runs in an east-west direction. Approximately two miles of the eastern portion veers to the north, where the segment then connects with State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27). The western terminus of this road segment adjoins State Road 29, and the eastern terminus as mentioned previously, adjoins State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27). There is a radical change in direction at both ends where the segment connects with the two adjacent roads. At the western terminus, State Road 29 runs in a southwesterly to northeasterly direction. The southwesterly portion of State Road 29 runs in a southwesterly to northeasterly direction. The southwesterly portion of State Road 29 enters into Hendry County and extends to LaBelle, the county seat. At the eastern terminus, State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27) runs for approximately five miles before it reconnects with another portion of State Road 78 which runs in a northeasterly direction around the border of Lake Okeechobee into Okeechobee County, and onto the City of Okeechobee, the county seat. Through the use of approximately four miles of the southwesterly portion of State Road 29 and approximately five miles of the easterly portion of State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27), State Road 78 becomes a transportation corridor which connects Hendry County, Glades County, and Okeechobee County. This corridor is used by members of the Gulf Citrus Growers Association in Hendry County to transport citrus to market in other parts of the state. State Road 29 and State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27) are functionally classified as arterial roads on the state highway system. During the functional classification evaluations within Glades County, Section 05040 of State Road 78 was reviewed by DOT. As part of the process, an inventory worksheet was used to determine how the road would be classified under the current scoring system. A Rural Arterial Inventory Worksheet (Respondent's Exhibit 15) was used to determine the roadway's System Attribute Score (SAS). As part of the evaluation process, the system element coefficient must be located within Table Number 4 of Chapter 14-12, Florida Administrative Code. The Administrator of Transportation Data for District 1 correctly determined that the system element coefficient was 5, and the rural element number was 12. The first attribute reviewed on the worksheet in order to obtain the SAS was the Traffic Factor. Under the definitions found in Table 1 of Chapter 14-12, Florida Administrative Code, the Traffic Factor is calculated by multiplying the Average Daily Traffic Count by the county's normalizing coefficient Tpd of 1.73. Again, the administrator correctly assessed the value of 2,782 on the worksheet. Usually, a score below 3,000 under the Traffic Factor results in an evaluation score of "zero" on the Rural Arterial Inventory Worksheet. However, Table Number 1 of Chapter 14-12, Florida Administrative Code, notes that when 50% of traffic volume is non-local traffic, a score of "one" is placed on the worksheet instead of a "zero." Competent and credible testimony presented at hearing from local citizens, who had the opportunity to know the composition of the traffic on the road segment, revealed that a relatively small percentage of Section 05040 of State Road 78 traffic was local. The majority of the traffic was comprised of out-of-county motorists. Based upon this testimony, the Traffic Factor score on the worksheet should be changed from "zero" to "one." The second attribute reviewed on the worksheet was the Access Factor. This score is calculated by dividing the average daily traffic (ADT) by the number of access points per mile. Instead of using available information with the DOT or asking for information from local authorities regarding this attribute, the administrator grossly overestimated that the road segment contained twenty access points per mile. No reasonable basis was presented at hearing by the administrator for his "estimate" of twenty access points per mile on a rural segment in one of the more remote and under populated areas within his district. The videotape presented at hearing clearly demonstrates that there are not twenty access points per mile on this roadway. Unrefuted testimony presented at hearing revealed that approximately twenty-five families reside along this 14.8 mile stretch of road. There is also a large rock mine, a cemetery, and the county landfill. Respondent's Exhibit 5, the General Highway Map of Glades County, shows that a DOT facility is located on this road segment. There are four roads which intersect the road segment and one railroad grade crossing. A locked gate at the Caloosahatchee Rock Mine has a driveway which connects to the road. To deny the road segment the minimum score of "one" on the access factor, the DOT would have to estimate in its calculation that there are more than ten access points per mile on this road. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, there are far less than ten access points per mile on this road segment. Therefore, the Access Factor score on the worksheet should be changed from "zero" to "one." The Trucks and Network Factor attributes which each received a score of "one" from the administrator. These scores were not challenged by Petitioner. The Extent of Road attribute was not properly tested by the administrator. Under Rule 14-12.015(2), Florida Administrative Code, the entire State Road 78, along with the southwesterly portion of State Road 29, and the eastern portion of State Road 25 (U.S. Highway 27) should be utilized for the Extent of Road (miles) measurement. As the entire length of the extended transportation corridor exceeds twenty miles, the score should be "one" instead of "zero." The Mobility Attribute was not properly assessed. Rule 14-12.015(2), Florida Administrative Code, allows the extended transportation corridor to be used to determine the total number of counties in which the road is located. Testimony presented at hearing regarding the use of the road segment as part of the transport route of citrus from Hendry County through State Road 78 in Glades County to Okeechobee County supports the finding that the road is located in three counties. The score as to the Mobility Attribute should be changed from "zero" to "one." Section 05040 of State Road 78 is in an overall physical condition which is at least commensurate with contemporary roads of like age and existing functional classification (rural major collector) within Glades County.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order that the Department's functional classification of the road segment was incorrect, that the functional classification of the road as a rural minor arterial be reinstated, and that the jurisdiction over the road remain with the Department. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of October 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1227 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Rejected. Not a factual finding. Accepted. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See Statement of the Issues. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #19. Accepted Accept the first sentence. The second sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that the Hearing Officer found the road to be improperly classified. The rest is rejected as conclusionary. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. The financial ability provision within the statute was repealed, and a determination cannot be made on the basis of factors outside rule or statute. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accept the first two sentences. The third sentence is rejected. See HO #2. Fourth sentence is accepted. See HO #5. Fifth sentence is accepted. See HO #7. Sixth sentence is rejected. See HO #7-#18. Seventh sentence is accepted. See HO #8. Eighth sentence is rejected. Improper conclusion. Ninth sentence is accepted. See Conclusions of Law. Tenth sentence is accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See HO #19. Rejected. The financial ability provision within the statute was repealed, and a determination cannot be made on the basis of factors outside the rule or statute. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Rider, Esquire Post Office Box 608 Lake Placid, Florida 33852 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, P.E., Interim Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Edward P. Skiff has been the owner and operator of Petitioner Skiff's Workingman's Nursery. For 28 years the nursery was located on State Road 7 (US 441), one of the busiest traffic arteries in Broward County. In 1981, Respondent Department of Transportation first contacted Skiff to advise him that he would be required to relocate his business due to the construction of I-595, the Port Everglades Expressway. In 1985 Respondent purchased the property on which Skiff's Workingman's Nursery was located and ordered Skiff to vacate the property by January 1, 1986. Between 1981 and 1985 Skiff searched for a comparable piece of property on which to operate a retail nursery in Broward County. As requested by the Respondent, Skiff submitted to the Department a list of six properties he was considering, only 2 or 3 of which were platted. There is no indication that Department employees objected to any of sites under consideration. Skiff closed on his new site located on Hillsboro Boulevard in Broward County in 1985. At the time, that site was not yet platted, and Skiff was required by Broward County to plat the property. Prior to his purchase of the site, no mention was made of impact fees by the Department or anyone else. Skiff began processing his application for plat approval with Broward County. During the processing, he was advised that he would be required to pay impact fees to Broward County for the relocation site, a requirement that had been imposed by Broward County for any site within that county and not just for the relocation site selected by Skiff. The Department of Transportation knew at the time that impact fees had been imposed for any development in Broward County so that relocating businesses would be required to pay such fees. When Skiff was several months into the platting process with Broward County he was further advised that his relocation site had been annexed by the City of Coconut Creek, Broward County, Florida. Accordingly, Skiff became obligated to pay impact fees assessed by the City of Coconut Creek in addition to the impact fees assessed by Broward County. Skiff was required to pay to Broward County transportation impact fees as a condition precedent to recording the plat for Skiff's Workingman's Nursery. He was also required to pay to the City of Coconut Creek water, sewer, and street connection charges as a condition precedent to obtaining a building permit and a certificate of occupancy. Skiff paid to Broward County, in order to record his plat, impact fees in the amount of $32,887.00. Skiff also paid to the City of Coconut Creek water and wastewater impact fees in the amount of $4,499.20 and sewage and street connection charges in the amount of $24,634.00. None of the connection fees paid to the City of Coconut Creek involved bringing the utilities from the right-of-way to a building or improvement upon Skiff's property. The impact fees imposed by the City of Coconut Creek and by Broward County were necessary and reasonable. The fees were derived according to a specific formula which has a correlation to estimated usage, and they were not arbitrary numbers. Likewise, the mandatory sewage connection charges were both reasonable and necessary and involved the construction of a lift station required by the City of Coconut Creek. When Skiff submitted to Respondent his claim for reimbursement of the impact fees paid by him to Broward County and the City of Coconut Creek, Respondent preliminarily denied that claim reasoning that operating expenses of a business are not reimbursable under the Department's relocation assistance program. The Department never considered whether an impact fee is reimbursable as a license, permit, or certification required of a displaced person at the replacement location. The sole basis for the Department's denial was a memorandum written by an employee of the United States Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration in a different case which did not address the question of whether an impact fee qualifies as a reimbursable permit, license, or certification required by a governmental entity prior to the creation of a new business. At the time that Respondent denied Skiff's claim for reimbursement of impact fees, the district relocation administrator believed those fees to be reimbursable. However, the state relocation administrator who was new to her job, who could not define the term "operating expense of a business," who was unaware of the regulations qualifying permits and licenses and certifications as expenses eligible for reimbursement, and who did not consider whether the impact fees were eligible under those provisions, denied the claim. Her successor also believed the claim to be reimbursable. There are no definitional guidelines as to the terms "operating expense", "license, permit or certification", or any of the other terms relevant to these proceedings, contained in either the Code of Federal Regulations or in the Florida Department of Transportation guidelines. Accordingly, those terms must be given their common, everyday meaning. An impact fee is a developmental permit fee, i.e., a one-time fee mandated by a governmental entity which must be paid prior to that governmental entity's permitting development; it is a charge which allows a new or relocating business to start conducting business activities at a new location. An impact fee is therefore a start-up cost and not an operating expense since an operating expense is an ongoing cost of doing business for an existing business. The Department's decision-making personnel who testified in this proceeding all agree that the term "operating expense" assumes that a business is in operation. The Department has failed to consider whether impact fees are reimbursable under the proper criteria. In preparation for its move to the relocation site, Skiff's Workingman's Nursery paid professional consultant's fees (architectural and engineering) in the amount of $14,915.85 for site planning and site preparation planning for the a nursery. Skiff submitted his claim for reimbursement for design services to Respondent. Although the district relocation administrator believed those costs to be reimbursable under the specific provision allowing reimbursement for professional services related to the move of personal property, the claim was denied by the state relocation administrator who was new to her job and who stated that nurseries were excluded, without identifying where in the law such an exclusion was written. While the Department was considering Skiff's claims for reimbursement for impact fees and design services, it conducted its own survey of nurseries asking those nurseries for information pertaining to relocation of a nursery, asking specifically about eligible move costs and necessary land and soil preparations if a nursery had to be relocated to virgin land. Responses received by the Department indicated the importance of site location, plant layout, and soil considerations required by both the plants and customers of the nursery and the importance of paying impact fees. There is no evidence that the information the Department gleaned from its own survey was considered in determining whether the payment of impact fees by a nursery and whether the payment of professional design services by a nursery were reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by a displaced nursery required by the government to relocate to a new site. The Department took the position that although nurseries were an exclusion from the provision that businesses were entitled to be reimbursed for professional services attendant to relocation, an exception to the exclusion could be granted based upon appropriate documentation. It concluded, however, that Skiff's had not submitted the appropriate documentation. Yet it failed to advise Skiff as to what documentation would be appropriate and failed to request any additional documentation. After Skiff's plat was recorded, he filed an application with Broward County to modify that plat in order to provide access to the nursery from Hillsboro Boulevard, the main thoroughfare, rather than requiring customers to gain access to the nursery from the back of the nursery off a side street. Access from Hillsboro Boulevard was approved, and Skiff paid $7,500.00 to construct a traffic turn lane from Hillsboro Boulevard onto the nursery property. The first claim for reimbursement for that cost which would give Skiff's Workingman's Nursery access to a major thoroughfare comparable to the major thoroughfare from which it had been displaced by the Department was made during the course of the final hearing in this cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Granting Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for water and wastewater impact fees imposed by the City of Coconut Creek in the amount of $4,499.20; Granting Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for transportation impact fees imposed by Broward County in the amount of $32,887.00; Granting Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for sewage and street connection charges imposed by the City of Coconut Creek in the amount of $24,634.00; Granting Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for professional consultant's fees for design services in the amount of $14,915.85; and Denying without prejudice Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for the cost of constructing a traffic turn lane in the amount of $7,500.00 which was not properly a part of this proceeding. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of November, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1652 The first unnumbered paragraph of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Petitioner's second through sixth unnumbered paragraphs of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 have been rejected as not being supported in their entirety by the weight of the evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. Philip Landsman, Esquire Emily Tracey, Esquire Broward Financial Centre 500 East Broward Boulevard Suite 1850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas H. Bateman III, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Did Respondent Department of Labor and Employment Security (Department) properly reject the response submitted to the Department's Request For Proposal No. RFP 96-033-VA, For Computer Hardware and Related Equipment Maintenance Including Operating Software (RFP) by Petitioner Knaus Systems, Inc. (Knaus)? Did the Department provide Knaus with a clear point of entry to challenge the Department's decision, and, if so, did Knaus timely file its notice of protest or formal written protest?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: On January 29, 1996, the Department issued an RFP which requested a Vendor Technical Proposal (technical proposal) and a Vendor Cost Proposal (cost proposal). Knaus was on the Department's bidder's list and received a copy of the RFP around the end of January, 1996. Knaus is engaged in the business of selling and servicing computer hardware, and currently has nine contracts with the State of Florida in response to requests for proposals. As required by Rule 60A-1.002(9)(a), Florida Administrative Code, the original RFP contained the Department of Management Services' Form PUR 7033, revised 1/9/95, (cover sheet), which in pertinent part provides: PROPOSALS WILL BE OPENED 3:00 P.M., MARCH 19. 1996 and may not be withdrawn within 30 days after such date and time. POSTING OF PROPOSAL TABULATIONS Proposal tabulations with recommended awards will be posted for review by interested parties at the location where proposals were opened and will remain posted for a period of 72 hours. Failure to file a protest with- in the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Posting will be on or about MARCH 21, 1996 In pertinent part, Sections 2 and 5 of the RFP provide: 2.1 RFP Submission Date Vendors shall submit their proposals on or before the date and time indicated in Section 5.9 and to the location indicated in Section 5.12 of this Request For Proposal. * * * 2.5 Addenda All addenda to this Request For Proposal will be in writing, with content and number of pages described, and sent to all Vendors known to be in receipt of this Request For Proposal. The Vendor must acknowledge receipt of all addenda in in writing and submit with the Proposal. * * * 5.1 Bid Evaluation and Award Proposals which do not meet the requirements specified in this Request for Proposal will not be considered for award. Please return your sealed bid response in the enclosed self-addressed envelope labeled: BID: RFP 96-033-VA TIME: 3:00 p.m. DATE: March 19, 1996 The Proposal number must be clearly marked on the outside of the vendors submittal. Failure to identify a Proposal in the above prescribed manner shall result in automatic disqualification of the Proposal. * * * 5.9 Calendar of Events Listed below are the important date and times by which actions noted must be taken or completed. If the Department finds it necessary to change any of these dates or times, the change will be accomplished by addendum. Date/Time Event February 13, 1996 Written Vendors Inquiries Due February 22, 1996 Pre-proposal Conference (Vendor attendance is mandatory) February 28, 1996 Addenda issued by Department March 19, 1996 Opening of Vendor 3:00 p.m Technical Proposals April 2, 1996 Opening of Vendor 10:30 a.m. Cost Proposals April 4, 1996 Posting of RFP Award * * * Responsiveness and Rejection of Proposals All proposals must be in writing. A responsive proposal is an offer to perform the scope of services called for in the Request For Proposal. A Proposal may be rejected if it fails to meet the general requirements and mandatory specifications as stated in this Request for Proposal. . . . Submission of Proposals Sealed proposals must be received by the Department of Labor and Employment Security at the address noted below, on or before the date and time shown in Section 5.9 "Calendar of Events". . . . * * * The vendor must submit both a technical proposal for evaluation and a cost proposal. Both proposals must be in a separate sealed envelope and clearly marked on the outside stating technical proposal or cost proposal Both proposals must be delivered as stated above. * * * Proposals, including amendments, may be mailed or hand-delivered, but in either case must be received no later than 3:00 P. M. on March 19, 1996. . . . NUMBER OF COPIES: 1 original and 5 copies for each category bid SUBMIT TO: Vonnie Allen -- DLES Computer Maintenance, Department of Labor and Employment Security, 2012 Capitol Circle S.E. 104 Hartman Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2169 DEADLINE: March 19, 1996 at 3:00 p.m * * * 5.16 Posting of Recommended Award Proposal tabulation with recommended award will be posted for review by interested parties at the Department's Office of Purchasing on or about the date noted on the cover sheet of this RFP, and will remain posted for a period of seventy-two (72) hours, not including weekends or holidays. [Emphasis supplied] In accordance with the initial RFP, the technical and cost proposals were to be submitted in separate sealed envelopes within a single envelope to the Department on or before 3:00 p.m. on March 19, 1996, which was also the date for opening the technical proposals. All vendors, including Knaus, understood that for their response to the RFP to be timely both the technical proposal and the cost proposal had be received by the Department on or before 3:00 p.m. on March 19, 1996, the time and date scheduled for opening the technical proposals set out in Section 5.9. The date (March 21, 1996) shown on the cover sheet of the RFP for posting proposal tabulations with recommended awards is different from the date (April 4, 1996) shown in Section 5.9 of the RFP for posting RFP award. It is unclear whether these are two separate events requiring separate dates or a conflict as to the posting date. In accordance with the terms of the RFP, the Department conducted a mandatory Pre-proposal Conference on February 22, 1996. Knaus was represented at this conference. Questions raised by Knaus and other vendors at this conference necessitated an amendment to the RFP. On March 13, 1996, the Department issued Addendum [No.] 1 to the RFP, a copy of which was received by Knaus. In pertinent part, Addendum [No.] 1 provides: March 13, 1996 Addendum: [No.] 1 Bid: [No.] 96-033-VA Opening Date/time: March 19, 1996, changed (Technical) to April 2, 1996 April 2, 1996 changed to April 16, 1996 (Cost) Dear Sir or Madam: The subject Request for Proposal is hereby amended as follows: * * * 5.1, 5.9, 5.12 RFP Technical Opening is to be changed from 3:00 p.m. on March 19, 1996 to 3:00 p.m. on April 2, 1996. The Cost Opening is to be changed from 10:30 a.m. April 2, 1996 to 10:30 a.m. April l6, 1996. Addendum [No.] 1 did not amend or delete the requirement of the RFP that the technical and cost proposals be sealed in separate envelopes and both envelopes to be placed in the self-addressed envelope furnished with the RFP and submitted to the Department. All vendors, other than Knaus, relying only on the RFP and Addendum [No.] 1 concluded that both the technical and cost proposal were to be submitted on or before the opening of the technical proposal and therefore, submitted their technical and cost proposals on or before 3:00 p.m. on April 2, 1996. None of the vendors, including Knaus, submitted their response to the RFP on or before March 19, 1996, the original submittal date for responses and the original opening date for technical proposals. The Department received Knaus' technical proposal on April 1, 1996, and Knaus' cost proposal on April 5, 1996. On April 11, 1996, Vonnie Allen, the Department's Purchasing Specialist, telephoned Anthony J. Knaus, President and Chief Executive Officer for Knaus, to advise him that the Knaus proposal was non-responsive because the Department had not received both the technical and cost proposal before the opening of the technical proposals at 3:00 p.m. on April 2, 1996. During this telephone conversation, Anthony Knaus expressed his understanding of Addendum [No.] 1 as not requiring receipt of the cost proposal by the Department before the opening of the technical proposal at 3:00 p.m. on April 2, 1996. After his conversation with Vonnie Allen on April 11, 1996, Anthony Knaus wrote Allen a letter advising her that based on Addendum [No.] 1 that Knaus intended to file a protest in regards to the RFP. On April 15, 1996, Anthony Knaus again wrote Allen a letter in regards to the April 11, 1996, telephone conversation advising Allen that he had not received written notification from the Department of Knaus' noncompliance with the RFP but that Knaus would proceed with the protest. The letter further advised Allen that Knaus intended to file a formal protest. On April 19, 1996, Barbara Chance, Purchasing Director for the Department, wrote Knaus a letter advising Knaus that its response to the RFP was non-responsive due to the cost proposal not being submitted as stated in the RFP, and returning Knaus' certified check that had been submitted with its proposal. No further explanation of the basis for this determination was included in the letter. Likewise, there was no notice of Knaus' right to challenge the Department's determination as required by Section 120.53(5)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 60A-1.001(7) and (8), Florida Administrative Code. On April 23, 1996, the Department issued what is titled "NOTIFICATION [No.] 2" concerning Cost Opening Date which advised Responsive Vendors that the cost opening had been moved to 9:00 a.m. on April 24, 1996, and such opening was to be held at the Hartman Building, 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast. The letter further advised the Responsive Vendors that posting of the intended award would be "approximately Thursday, April 25, 1996 at 9:00 a.m.". Since the Department did not consider Knaus a responsive vendor, Knaus did not receive a copy of "NOTIFICATION [No.] 2". Knaus was never advised by the Department of the change in dates for the posting of intended award prior to or during the time of posting. On April 25, 1996, Dennis H. McVeen, General Manager for Knaus, wrote the Department's General Counsel concerning Barbara Chance's letter of April 19, 1996, and requested that Knaus be advised of the exact deadline for filing its protest. The Department never responded to this letter. The Department did not respond to any of Knaus' letters, and has yet to advise Knaus of its right to contest the Department's determination that because Knaus' cost proposal was not received by the Department on or before the opening of the technical proposal at 3:00 p.m. on April 2, 1996, Knaus' response to the RFP was non-responsive . On April 25, 1996, the Department posted the bid tabulations for the RFP, which, in pertinent part, states: "FAILURE TO FILE A PROTEST WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 120.53(5). FLORIDA STATUTES, SHALL CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER CHAPTER 120, FLORIDA STATUTES." The Bid Tabulation indicated a Posting Time/Date from 8:00, 4/25 until 8:00, 4/30. The Bid Tabulation does not indicate whether 8:00 was a.m. or p.m. However, Allen testified that it was intended to be a.m. Knaus was listed on the Bid Tabulation as to "Technical only" and was shown as NR or non-responsive. The Department has not fully evaluated Knaus' response to the RFP. Knaus obtained a copy of the Bid Tabulation sometime after 8:00 a.m. on April 30, 1996, which was after the time for posting. Obtaining a copy of the Bid Tabulation was the result of Knaus' own efforts and cannot be attributed to any efforts on the part of the Department. Knaus filed its Petition For Administrative Proceedings, Notice of Protest and Formal Written Protest on May 13, 1996, with the Department. Knaus did not file a Notice of Intent to Protest or Formal Protest addressed to the specifications contained in the RFP or Addendum [No.] 1. There was no evidence that Knaus gained any advantage by submitting the cost proposal after the technical proposals were opened. There is sufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Knaus knew or should have known that the RFP as amended by Addendum [No.] 1 required that both the technical and cost proposal be submitted together on or before April 2, 1996.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is recommended that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a final order that Knaus' failure to timely submit its cost proposal was a minor irregularity and is waived, and directing staff to reevaluate all responses, including Knaus', under the RFP, as amended. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of July, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 96-2365BID The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Knaus' Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 37, 44, 45 and 47 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 25. Proposed findings of fact 38 through 43 go to the weight of the testimony of witness and are not considered as proposed findings of fact. Proposed finding of fact 46 is neither material nor relevant. Proposed finding of fact 48 is covered in the Preliminary Statement. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1 Proposed findings of fact 1 through 14 and 16 through 21 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 25. 2. Proposed finding of fact 15 is neither material nor relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas L. Jamerson, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire Berger and Davis, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 804 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues for determination are whether petitioner, Department of Community Affairs, has standing to maintain this action, and whether the respondent's, Withlacoochee Regional Planning Council's, proposed amendments to Rule 29E-11.001, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The parties Petitioner, Department of Community Affairs (Department), is the state land planning agency under the provisions of Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, [the "Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act" (LGCPA)]. As the state land planning agency for the LGCPA, the Department is charged by law with the duty to provide technical assistance to local governments in preparing comprehensive plans and with the duty to ascertain whether local comprehensive plans are in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. Inherent in the Department's determination of compliance is a finding that the local government comprehensive plan elements are consistent with the state comprehensive plan and the appropriate regional policy plan. Where, as here, a comprehensive regional policy plan is inconsistent with the state comprehensive plan, the performance of the Department's mandated duty is stymied absent the ability to challenge the offensive parts of the regional policy plan, and thereby bring the planning process into harmony. Accordingly, as the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of implementing the LGCPA, the Department has a real and immediate interest in assuring consistency between the state comprehensive plan and the various regional policy plans. Respondent, Withlacoochee Regional Planning Council (Council), is a regional planning council established pursuant to Section 186.504, Florida Statutes, and consists of the Counties of Citrus, Hernando, Levy, Marion, and Sumter. Rule 29E-1.001, Florida Administrative Code. As a regional planning council, the Council is charged by law with the duty to develop a comprehensive regional policy plan that is consistent with, and which furthers, the goals and policies of the state comprehensive plan. Section 186.507(1), Florida Statutes. The existent comprehensive regional policy plan and the proposed amendments The Council has, consistent with the requirement of Section 186.507(1), Florida Statutes, adopted its comprehensive regional policy plan by rule. That rule, codified as Rule 29E- 11.001, Florida Administrative Code, adopts and incorporates by reference the Council's comprehensive regional policy plan, with an effective date of April 13, 1989. On June 9, 1989, the Council duly noticed its intent to amend Rule 29E- 11.001, Florida Administrative Code, and published notice thereof in volume 15, number 23, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. Pertinent to this case, the proposed amendments would alter the policies of the Council's comprehensive plan as they relate to resource extraction (mining) in environmentally sensitive areas. On June 30, 1989, the Department filed a timely petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes, contending that the proposed amendments to Rule 29E-11.001, Florida Administrative Code, were an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The gravamen of the Department's challenge to the validity of the proposed rule amendments is its contention that the amendments are not consistent with the state comprehensive plan policies as they relate to mining in environmentally sensitive areas, and that the amendments fail to establish adequate standards for the Commission's decisions or vest unbridled discretion in the Commission. The policies of the state comprehensive plan pertinent to this case, as set forth in Section 187.201, Florida Statutes, are as follows: (10) NATURAL SYSTEMS AND RECREATIONAL LANDS * * * (b) Policies - 1. Conserve forests, wetlands, fish, marine life, and wildlife to maintain their environmental, economic, aesthetic, and recreational values. * * * 3. Prohibit the destruction of endangered species and protect their habitats. * * * 7. Protect and restore the ecological functions of wetlands systems to ensure their long-term environmental, economic, and recreational value. * * * (14) Mining - (b) Policies - * * * 5. Prohibit resource extraction which will result in an adverse effect on environmentally sensitive areas of the state which cannot be restored. (Emphasis added) The Council's proposed amendments to Rule 29E-11.001, Florida Administrative Code (the comprehensive regional policy plan), are hereinafter set forth, with the proposed amendments in clear text and the existing language of the rule that is to be amended lined through. In such format, the proposed amendments to the existing rule that are under challenge in this proceeding provide as follows: 14.3.1.1. Regional Policy: Resource extraction which will result in an adverse effect on environmentally sensitive areas that cannot be reclaimed or restored to beneficial use shall be prohibited. Examples of such environmentally sensitive areas are: wetlands, rivers, streams, lakes, springs, coastal floodplains, endangered species habitat, prime agricultural lands, prime groundwater recharge areas, and historically significant sites. (Emphasis added) Wetlands, rivers, streams, lakes, springs, coastal, floodplains, endangered species' habitat, prime agricultural lands, prime groundwater recharge areas, and historically significant sites shall be identified and protected by a prohibition on mining activities within those areas and the establishment of buffer zones around them. Additionally, the Council proposes to amend its implementation strategy as to Regional Policies 14.3.1.1, 14.3.1.2, and 14.3.1.3, as follows: GROWTH MANAGEMENT Local governments with assistance from other agencies should inventory their wetlands, rivers, streams, lakes, springs, coastal floodplains, endangered species' habitat, prime agricultural lands, prime groundwater recharge areas, historically significant sites, and important mineral reserves. Local governments should adopt comprehensive plan amendments and ordinances that 1) prohibit mining activities in environmentally sensitive areas if they cannot be reclaimed or restored to beneficial use; define buffer zones around the areas and resources identified above and restrict mining activities to land outside those buffers, 2) require identification and protection of archaeological properties on sites proposed for mining; 3) restrict the use of land that contains economically recoverable mineral deposits and lies outside environmentally sensitive areas to activities that will not preclude later extraction of those minerals. (Emphases added) INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION (1) DNR, GFC, FWS, SCS, DER and WMDs, within their respective areas of expertise, should help local governments to identify and map the above areas and resources and to define appropriate buffer widths. Contrary to the provisions of the state comprehensive plan which prohibit resource extraction that will adversely effect environmentally sensitive areas unless they can be "restored," the proposed amendments would only prohibit such activities if the environmentally sensitive areas could not be "reclaimed or restored to beneficial use." The terms "restored" and "reclaimed," although not defined by the proposed amendments, have commonly accepted meanings. To restore a site means to put back the same thing that had previously existed, i.e.: restore the type, nature, and function of the ecosystem to the condition in existence prior to mining. To reclaim a site is to alter its character such that beneficial use can be made of it, even though the character or function of the site may be entirely different from that which previously existed. To "restore to beneficial use" is a phrase consistent with the definition of "reclamation," and not consistent with the definition of "restoration" as that term is commonly defined. Accordingly, it is found that the proposed amendments to Rule 29E-11.011, Florida Administrative Code, are patently inconsistent with the policies of the state comprehensive plan that relate to the protection of environmentally sensitive areas and, more particularly, the policy of the state comprehensive plan that prohibits resource extraction in such areas unless they can be restored. Notwithstanding the patent inconsistency between the proposed amendments and the state comprehensive plan, the Council argued that it "intends" to interpret the proposed amendment consistent with the state plan. To this end, the Council offered the testimony of its chairman, Nick Bryant, who testified that he would interpret the proposed amendment to require that the post-mining beneficial use be the same beneficial use that existed prior to mining. The Council's vice chairman, Ralph Shepard, testified, however, that he would not interpret the proposed amendment to require that the property be returned to the same character it enjoyed prior to mining, but only that it be reclaimed to the extent necessary to provide a beneficial use. Under such interpretation, the proposed amendment would allow, for example, the total destruction of a wetland by mining even if the net result would be a borrow pit in which people could swim and water ski. The Council's contention that it would interpret the proposed amendment consistent with the state plan is not only irrelevant in view of the patent inconsistency which exists between the proposed amendments and the state plan, but is also not credible. Rather, the clear impact of the rule and the Council's "intent" may be readily gleamed from its notice of proposed rulemaking, federal comparison statement, and economic impact statement. As stated in the Council's notice of proposed rule making: PURPOSE AND EFFECT: The rule is being amended for the purpose of replacing the Comprehensive Regional Policy Plan (CRPP) previously adopted by reference, with a new version in which a policy in the mining chapter and its associated implementation strategies have been changed. The effect of the amendment will be to remove a prohibition on mining in areas that are environmentally sensitive or historically significant. * * * SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATE OF ECONOMIC IMPACT: Opportunities for economic benefit from resource extraction will be afforded land owners and the mining industry in environmentally sensitive areas... Costs will be borne by the general public as a result of lost environmental functions and values.... (Emphasis added) As stated in the Council's federal comparison statement: The revised policy is less restrictive than the current federal wetlands policy of avoiding impacts where there are alternatives, and requiring that unavoidable impacts be fully offset in order to achieve a goal of no net loss as defined by acreage and function. And, as stated in the council's economic impact statement: A potential for economic benefit from resource extract ions will be created in environmentally sensitive areas where the CRPP restricts other development activities. Costs will occur in the form of lower water quality and the loss of wildlife habitat and other functions presently provided by the sites where mining will be allowed. * * * Expectation of benefits and costs to affected parties is based on the assumption that at least some local governments in the region will choose not to be more stringent than the CRPP, and will therefore permit mining where consistency with the Regional Plan would previously have required its prohibition. While not conceding that any inconsistency exists between the proposed amendments and the state comprehensive plan, the Council suggests that, if any inconsistency exists, other existing policies within its plan obviate any inconsistency. In support of its argument, the Council points primarily to policies 14.1.1.1, 14.1.1.3, and 14.3.1.6. An examination of such policies, as well as the Council's entire comprehensive plan, demonstrates, however, that no other policy or policies cure the inconsistency that exists between the proposed amendments and the state comprehensive plan.
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are: (1) whether the decision by Respondent, Department of Transportation, to reject all bids for the contract at issue was illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent; and (2) if so, whether Respondent's actions in cancelling the notice of intent to award the contract at issue to Cyriacks Environmental Consulting Services, Inc., ("CECOS") and requiring the submittal of new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.2/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent is the state agency that issued the RFP to procure the Contract for Respondent's District IV. CECOS is an environmental consulting and services firm that submitted a response to the RFP, seeking award of the Contract. DB is an environmental consulting and services firm that submitted a response to the RFP, seeking award of the Contract. DB was granted party status to DOAH Case No. 16-0769 by Order dated February 29, 2016, and by Order dated March 9, 2016, was determined to have standing in that case as a party whose substantial interests were affected by Respondent's decision to reject all proposals. Overview of the Procurement Process for the Contract Respondent issued the RFP on or about October 1, 2015. The RFP sought to obtain support services related to environmental impacts review for projects in Respondent's District IV work program; wetland mitigation design; construction, monitoring, and maintenance; permitting of mitigation sites; exotic vegetation control and removal in specified locations; relocation of threatened, endangered, or rare flora and fauna; permit compliance monitoring; and other services specified in the RFP. The RFP stated Respondent's intent to award the Contract to the responsive and responsible proposing vendor6/ whose proposal is determined to be most advantageous to Respondent. The responses to the RFP were scored on two components: a technical proposal, worth a total of 60 points, that addressed the proposing vendor's experience, qualifications, and capabilities to provide high-quality desired services; and a price proposal, worth a total of 40 points, that addressed the proposed price without evaluation of the separate cost components and proposed profit of the proposing vendor, compared with that proposed by other vendors. The price proposal evaluation was based on the following formula: (Low Price/Proposer's Price) X Price Points = Proposer's Awarded Points. The Special Conditions section of the Advertisement portion of the RFP, paragraph 3, stated in pertinent part: In accordance with section 287.057(23), Florida Statutes, respondents to this solicitation or persons acting on their behalf may not contact, between the release of the solicitation and the end of the 72- hour period following the agency posting the notice of intended award, . . . any employee or officer of the executive or legislative branch concerning any aspect of this solicitation, except in writing to the procurement officer or as provided in the solicitation documents. Violation of this provision may be grounds for rejecting a response. The period between the release of the solicitation and the 72-hour period after posting of the intended award is commonly referred to as the "cone of silence." The Special Conditions section of the Advertisement portion of the RFP, paragraph 19, informed vendors that Respondent reserved the right to reject any or all proposals it received. Exhibit B to the RFP, addressing compensation, limited compensation for all authorizations for work performed under the Contract to a total of $5,000,000. Exhibit B stated that the schedule of rates listed in the Price Proposal Form C (i.e., the rates submitted for the sections comprising Exhibit C to the RFP) would be used for establishing compensation. On October 7, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 1 to the advertised RFP. Addendum 1 revised Exhibit A to the RFP, the Scope of Services; and also revised Exhibit C to the RFP, the Bid Sheet, to provide it in Excel format. As revised by Addendum 1, Exhibit C consists of an Excel spreadsheet comprised of six sections, each of which was to be used by the responding vendors to propose their rates for the specified services being procured in each section of the Bid Sheet. Section 6 of the Excel spreadsheet, titled "Trees, Schrubs [sic], and Ground Cover, consists of eight columns and 258 rows, each row constituting a plant item on which a price proposal was to be submitted. The columns are titled, from left to right: No.; Scientific Name; Common Name; Unit; Estimated of [sic] number of Unites [sic]; Rate; Extension (Unit X Rate); and Multiplier 2.5 (Price X 2.5). Each row of the spreadsheet in Section 6 identified, as a fixed requirement for this portion of the proposal, the specified type of plant, unit (i.e., plant size), and estimated number of units (i.e., number of plants). For each row of the Section 6 spreadsheet, only the cells under the "Rate" column could be manipulated. Vendors were to insert in the "Rate" cell, for each row, the proposed rate for each plant item. The cells under all other columns for each row were locked, and the RFP stated that any alteration of the locked cells would disqualify the vendor and render its proposal non-responsive. The instructions to Exhibit C, Section 67/ stated: Trees, Schrubs [sic], and Ground Cover Price of plants shall include project management, field supervision, invoicing, installation, mobilization of traffic, water throughout the warranty period, fertilizer and [sic] six (6) month and demobilization, minor maintenance guarantee. Installation of plant material shall be per the Scope of Services. All planting costs shall include the cost to restore area to pre-existing conditions (i.e., dirt, sod, etc.). On October 20, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 2, and on October 29, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 3. Both addenda changed Respondent's schedule for reading the technical proposal scores, opening the sealed price proposals, and posting the intended awards. Addenda 1, 2, and 3 were not challenged. However, a key dispute in these consolidated proceedings is whether the Addendum 1 Bid Sheet in Section 6 and the instructions for completing that Bid Sheet were ambiguous, or whether Respondent reasonably believed them to be ambiguous. The vendors were to submit their responses to the RFP, consisting of their technical proposals and price proposals, by October 16, 2015. CECOS, DB, and four other vendors timely submitted responses to the RFP. On November 2, 2015, the scores for the technical proposals submitted by the vendors were presented to the Selection Committee ("SC") at a noticed meeting. DB received the highest number of points on the technical proposal portion of the RFP. The SC met again on November 3, 2015. At that time, Respondent's Procurement Officer, Jessica Rubio, read the total awarded points for each vendor's price proposal, as well as each vendor's total combined points——i.e., total points for technical proposal and price proposal. CECOS received the highest number of points for the price proposal portion of the RFP, and also received the highest total combined points. Respondent recommended, and the SC concurred, that Respondent should award the Contract to CECOS. At 10:00 a.m. on November 3, 2015, Respondent posted the Proposal Tabulation, constituting its notice of intent that CECOS would be awarded the Contract.8/ CECOS submitted a price proposal of $4,237,603.70. DB submitted a price proposal of $9,083,042.50. The other four vendors' price proposals ranged between $4,540,512.90 and $5,237,598.55. The "cone of silence" commenced upon Respondent's posting of the Proposal Tabulation, and ended 72 hours later, on November 6, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. As discussed in greater detail below, after the Proposal Tabulation was posted, Respondent discovered an apparent ambiguity in Exhibit C, Section 6, regarding the instructions to that section and the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column on the Bid Sheet. After an internal investigation, Respondent decided to cancel its intent to award the Contract to CECOS. On November 5, 2015, Respondent posted a notice that it was cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS. On November 5, 2015, DB filed a Notice of Protest, stating its intent to challenge the award of the Contract to CECOS. Thereafter, on November 9, 2015, DB contacted Respondent by electronic mail ("email") to withdraw its Notice of Protest.9/ Due to the apparent ambiguity in Exhibit C, Section 6, on November 9, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 4 to the RFP. Addendum 4 required the responding vendors to submit new price proposals for all sections (i.e., sections 1 through 6) of Exhibit C to the RFP. Addendum 4 also established a new timeline for a mandatory pre-bid conference to be held on November 12, 2016; set a sealed price proposal due date of November 19, 2016; and identified new dates for opening the price proposals and posting the Notice of Intended Award of the Contract. On November 12, 2015, Respondent conducted a mandatory pre-bid conference to address Addendum 4. The participating vendors expressed confusion and posed numerous questions regarding the submittal of new price proposals and their technical proposals. Immediately following the pre-bid conference, Respondent issued Addendum 5, which consisted of a revised Exhibit A, Scope of Services; revised Exhibit C, Bid Sheet in Excel format for all six sections; and responses to the questions posed at the pre-bid conference.10/ The Addendum 5 Bid Sheet comprising Exhibit C, Section 6, was substantially amended from the version that was published in Addendum 1. Specifically, the column previously titled "Rate" was changed to "Rate Per Unit"; the "Extension (Unit X Rate)" and "Multiplier 2.5" columns were deleted; and a new column titled "Proposed Cost (Rate per Unit X Est. No. of Units)" was added. Additionally, the instructions for Section 6 were substantially amended to read: "'Rate Per Unit' must include all costs associated with the purchase, installation, watering, fertilization, project management, field supervision, travel, invoicing, labor, maintenance of traffic, mobilization and demobilization, staking and guying, maintenance of planting site throughout the 180[-]day plant warranty." These amendments were intended to clarify that the proposed rate for each plant unit was to include all overhead costs associated with performance of the Contract with respect to that particular unit. On November 13, 2015, CECOS filed a Notice of Protest to Respondent's issuance of Addendum 4, requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals. Thereafter, on November 23, 2015, CECOS filed the First Petition challenging Respondent's decision, announced in Addendum 4, to require the responding vendors to submit new proposals for the price proposal portion of the RFP, and its decision to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS.11/ Once CECOS filed its Notice of Protest on November 13, 2015, Respondent ceased all procurement activity directed toward awarding the Contract. On December 17, 2015, Respondent posted notice that it was rejecting all proposals and that the Contract would be re- advertised through issuance of a new RFP. On December 22, 2015, CECOS filed a Notice of Protest, and on January 4, 2016, filed its Second Petition challenging Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and re-advertise the Contract. Bases for Respondent's Actions Shortly after Respondent posted the Proposal Tabulation noticing its intent to award the Contract to CECOS, Christine Perretta, owner and president of DB, sent an email to Respondent, then called Rubio to inquire about Respondent's decision to award the Contract to CECOS. The evidence shows that these contacts occurred sometime on or around November 3, 2016.12/ In her telephone discussion with Rubio, Perretta inquired about how to file a notice of protest13/ and also asked whether Respondent had reviewed the vendors' price proposals for correctness or accuracy, or had simply chosen the lowest price proposal. In the course of the discussion, Perretta informed Rubio that DB had submitted a "loaded" rate for each plant unit ——meaning that DB's rate proposed for each plant item in the "Rate" column on the Section 6 Bid Sheet consisted not only of the cost of the plant item, but also the cost for all associated overhead services listed in the instructions to Section 6 and in the RFP Advertisement, paragraph 18(v), plus compensation.14/ Rubio could not clearly recall whether, in the course of their discussion, Perretta had inquired about the use of the 2.5 multiplier, and there is conflicting evidence as to whether Perretta related her view that CECOS may not be able to perform the Contract based on the price proposal it had submitted. In any event, as a result of Rubio's discussion with Perretta, Rubio determined that she needed to review Exhibit C, Section 6. In the course of her investigation, Rubio called Wendy Cyriaks, owner and president of CECOS.15/ Cyriaks confirmed that CECOS had submitted an "unloaded" rate for each plant item—— meaning that it had included only the cost of each plant item in the "Rate" column on the Section 6 Bid Sheet, and had not included, in the proposed rate for each plant item, the cost of the associated overhead services listed in the instructions to Section 6 or RFP Advertisement, paragraph 18(v), or compensation. Cyriaks told Rubio that CECOS expected that its overhead costs and compensation for each item would be covered through use of the 2.5 multiplier. Also in the course of her investigation, Rubio asked Bogardus whether he had intended the 2.5 multiplier to be used to cover all costs, including vendor compensation, associated with obtaining, installing, and maintaining the plant items listed in Section 6. Bogardus initially confirmed that his intent in including the 2.5 multiplier on the Section 6 Bid Sheet was to cover all of the overhead costs and compensation. However, the persuasive evidence establishes that Bogardus subsequently agreed with Rubio that the 2.5 multiplier should not have been included in Section 6. Pursuant to her discussions with Perretta and Cyriaks, Rubio realized that the wide discrepancy between DB's and CECOS' price proposals was due to their differing interpretations of the instructions in Section 6 regarding plant item rates and the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column in the Section 6 Bid Sheet. Rubio testified, persuasively, that the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column rendered Exhibit C, Section 6, of the RFP ambiguous. To that point, the RFP does not contain any instructions or discussion on the use of the 2.5 multiplier. Therefore, to the extent the multiplier was intended to be used by the vendors to build overhead costs and compensation into their price proposals, the RFP fails to explain that extremely important intended use——leaving the significance and use of the multiplier open to speculation and subject to assumption by the vendors in preparing their price proposals. Rubio reasonably viewed DB's and CECOS' divergent interpretations of the instructions and the inconsistent use of the 2.5 multiplier as further indication that Section 6 was ambiguous. She explained that in order for Respondent to ensure that it is procuring the most advantageous proposal for the State, it is vitally important that the RFP be clear so that responding vendors clearly understand the type of information the RFP is requesting, and where and how to provide that information in their price proposals. Rubio persuasively testified that in her view, the instructions in Section 6 had, in fact, called for a loaded rate, but that CECOS had erroneously assumed, based on the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column in the Section 6 Bid Sheet, that overhead and compensation for each plant item would be covered through use of the 2.5 multiplier, and that as a consequence, CECOS incorrectly proposed unloaded rates for the plant items. In Rubio's view, CECOS' error was due to the ambiguity created by the unexplained and unsupported inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6. Rubio testified that CECOS had been awarded the Contract because it had submitted the lowest price proposal, but that its proposal was based on an unloaded rate for the plant items, contrary to the instructions for Section 6. In Rubio's view, CECOS' price proposal was unresponsive, and CECOS should not have been awarded the Contract. Rubio also testified, credibly and persuasively, that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 for compensation purposes rendered the RFP arbitrary. Respondent's District IV historically has not used a 2.5 multiplier for compensation purposes for commodities contracts, and no data or analyses exist to support such use of a 2.5 multiplier.16/ This rendered the RFP both arbitrary and unverifiable with respect to whether it was structured to obtain the most advantageous proposal for the State. To this point, Rubio credibly explained that Respondent's existing environmental mitigation services contract with Stantec was procured through the "Invitation to Negotiate" ("ITN") process. In that procurement, Respondent negotiated to obtain the best value for the State. The ITN bid sheet contained a 2.5 multiplier that was used only for weighting purposes to evaluate and determine which firms would be "short- listed" for purposes of being invited to negotiate with Respondent for award of the contract. Importantly——and in contrast to the RFP at issue in this case——the multiplier in the ITN was not used to determine the final prices, including compensation, to install trees, shrubs, and ground cover under that contract. Rubio also testified, credibly, that the Bid Sheet was structurally flawed because it did not allow the vendor to clearly indicate the "unit price" inclusive of all overhead costs, and that this defect would result in Respondent being unable to issue letters of authorization to pay invoices for the cost of installing the plant items or compensating for work performed. For these reasons, Respondent determined that it needed to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS. As noted above, Respondent posted the cancellation of the intent to award the Contract on November 5, 2015. At a meeting of the SC conducted on November 9, 2015, Respondent's procurement staff explained that the intent to award the Contract had been cancelled due to ambiguity in the instructions and the Bid Sheet for Exhibit C, Section 6. Ultimately, the SC concurred with Respondent's cancellation of the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and agreed that the vendors should be required to submit new price proposals. Thereafter, on November 9, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 4, announcing its decision to solicit new price proposals from the responding vendors. Respondent conducted a pre-bid meeting with the vendors on November 12, 2015, and immediately thereafter, issued Addendum 5, consisting of a revised Scope of Services and a substantially revised Bid Sheet for all six sections of Exhibit C. As previously discussed, the Section 6 Bid Sheet issued in Addendum 5 was revised to, among other things, delete the "2.5 Multiplier" column and the column previously titled "Rate" was changed to "Rate Per Unit." Also as discussed above, the instructions to Section 6 were revised to clarify that the "Rate Per Unit" provided for each plant unit must contain all costs associated with the purchase, installation, watering, fertilization, project management, field supervision, invoicing, labor, maintenance of traffic, and other costs specified in the instructions——i.e, constitute a loaded rate. All of these changes were made in an effort to clarify, for the benefit of all vendors, the specific information that Respondent needed to be provided in the price proposals. Rubio testified, credibly, that in requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals pursuant to revised Exhibit C, Respondent did not give, or intend to give, any vendor a competitive advantage over any of the other vendors, nor did Respondent place, or intend to place, CECOS at a competitive disadvantage by requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals pursuant to revised Exhibit C. As noted above, once CECOS filed its Notice of Protest, Respondent ceased all procurement activity directed toward awarding the Contract. Consequently, the vendors did not submit new price proposals and the scheduled meetings at which the new price proposals would be opened and the intended awardee announced were cancelled. On December 17, 2015, Rubio briefed the SC regarding the problems with the RFP and described her concerns about proceeding with the procurement. She explained that Respondent's procurement staff was of the view that the instructions in Section 6, as previously published in Addendum 1, were ambiguous because they did not clearly provide direction on how to complete the Bid Sheet for that section. Additionally, the Section 6 Bid Sheet, as structured in Addendum 1, did not allow the vendors to provide a plant unit rate that was inclusive of all overhead costs. To this point, she noted that unless the vendors provided a loaded rate——i.e., one that included all overhead costs——Respondent would not be able to issue work orders for any plant items in Section 6.17/ She explained that these flaws constituted the bases for Respondent's decision, announced on November 9, 2015, to require the submittal of new price proposals. Rubio further explained that in Respondent's rush to issue a revised Scope of Services as part of Addendum 5, mistakes had been made18/ and Respondent's Environmental Office needed more time to carefully review the Scope of Services and Bid Sheet, to ensure the RFP was correctly drafted and structured so that the Contract could be accurately solicited and procured. Additionally, the vendors——including Mark Clark of CECOS——had expressed confusion regarding the revised Bid Sheet and submitting new price proposals, and some vendors had inquired about submitting new technical proposals. Further, under the revised procurement schedule issued as part of Addendum 4 on November 9, 2015, the vendors had a very compressed timeframe in which to prepare and submit their new price proposals, heightening the potential for mistakes to be made. Because of these substantial problems and concerns with the RFP, Rubio recommended that Addendum 5 be rescinded, that all vendor proposals (both technical and price) be rejected, and that the entire procurement process be re-started. The SC concurred with her recommendation. As noted above, on December 17, 2015, Respondent rejected all proposals and announced that the Contract would be re-solicited in the future through issuance of another RFP. CECOS' Position CECOS takes the position that the RFP and the Section 6 Bid Sheet published in Addendum 1 were not ambiguous. Specifically, CECOS contends that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 clearly indicated that Respondent was seeking an unloaded rate for the plant items listed on the Section 6 Bid Sheet. In support of this position, CECOS notes that all of the vendors other than DB had submitted unloaded rates for the plant items in Section 6. CECOS contends that this shows that Section 6 was not ambiguous, and that DB simply did not follow the RFP instructions——of which it was fully aware——in preparing and submitting its price proposal.19/ CECOS also contends that Rubio's failure to contact the other vendors to determine if they found the instructions or use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 ambiguous evidences that Rubio's conclusion that Section 6 was ambiguous lacked any factual basis, so was itself arbitrary. CECOS asserts that Bogardus' intent to use a 2.5 multiplier for compensation purposes was evidenced by its inclusion on the Section 6 Bid Sheet, that its use on the Section 6 Bid Sheet did not render the RFP flawed, and that Bogardus' intent to compensate using the multiplier should control the structure of compensation paid under Section 6.20/ CECOS also notes that the use of the 2.5 multiplier on the Section 6 Bid Sheet mirrors the 2.5 multiplier in the existing environmental mitigation support services contract with the current contractor.21/ CECOs further contends that there was no material difference, with respect to structuring compensation for the plant items, between the ITN process used for procuring the existing contract and the RFP process used to procure this Contract. As additional support for its argument that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 was valid, CECOS points to a request for proposal for environmental mitigation services issued by Respondent's District VI. In that contract, a 2.5 multiplier was used for compensation purposes, albeit for specific plant items that were not contained in the original list of specific plant items for which rate proposals had been solicited in the request for proposal. CECOS further contends that Respondent——and, most particularly, Rubio——did not conduct a thorough investigation into the historic use of 2.5 multipliers in Respondent's commodities contracts. CECOS argues that as a consequence, Respondent's determination that the use of the 2.5 multiplier rendered the Section 6 Bid Sheet structurally flawed and arbitrary was unsupported by facts, so was itself arbitrary and capricious. CECOS asserts that cancelling the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals placed CECOS at a competitive disadvantage and was contrary to competition because once the Proposal Tabulation was posted, the other vendors were informed of the price that CECOS had bid, so knew the price they had to beat when the Contract was re-solicited. CECOS also points to what it contends are procedural irregularities with respect to Respondent's treatment of, and communication with, CECOS and DB once Respondent decided to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS. Specifically, CECOS contends that Respondent did not respond to its calls or email asking why the intent to award the Contract to CECOS had been cancelled. CECOS also contends that Respondent communicated with DB on substantive matters during the "cone of silence." CECOS further notes that Respondent did not convene a resolution meeting within the statutorily- established seven-day period after CECOS filed its First Petition, but instead held the meeting over 60 days later, on January 28, 2015, and that even then, Respondent did not engage in good faith negotiation to resolve the challenge. Finally, CECOS contends that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and start the procurement process anew was predicated on a series of arbitrary and erroneous decisions (discussed above) that created confusion, so that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all proposals was itself arbitrary and capricious. CECOS asserts that it followed the instructions in the RFP in preparing its price proposal, submitted the lowest price proposal, and is ready, willing, and able to perform the Contract at the rates it proposed in its response for Section 6. On that basis, CECOS contends that it is entitled to the award of the Contract. Findings of Ultimate Fact CECOS bears the burden in this proceeding to prove that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals was arbitrary, illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent.22/ Even if CECOS were to meet this burden, in order to prevail it also must demonstrate that Respondent's actions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract and requiring the submittal of new price proposals were clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition. For the reasons discussed herein, it is determined that CECOS did not meet either of these burdens. The Multiplier Rendered Section 6 Ambiguous, Arbitrary, and Structurally Flawed As discussed in detail above, Respondent decided to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and to require the submittal of new price proposals by the vendors only after it had conducted an extensive investigation that included a careful review of numerous provisions in the RFP and the instructions to Section 6 and had analyzed the structure of Section 6 in relation to other provisions in the RFP. That investigation showed that nowhere in the RFP was the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Exhibit C, Section 6, discussed or explained. Thus, to the extent the multiplier was to be used in determining reimbursement for overhead costs and compensation, the RFP failed to explain this extremely important point, leaving the multiplier's purpose, use, and significance open to speculation and assumption by the vendors in submitting their price proposals. This rendered the multiplier's use in Section 6 ambiguous. This ambiguity is further evidenced by DB's and CECOS's widely divergent price proposals for Section 6, and the credible testimony of Perretta and Cyriaks regarding their differing views of the purpose of the 2.5 multiplier. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that the ambiguity in Section 6 caused the vendors to have differing interpretations of the manner in which they were to propose plant unit rates in Section 6; that the vendors submitted plant price proposals predicated on differing assumptions; and that this resulted in Respondent being unable to fairly compare the price proposals for purposes of obtaining the most advantageous proposal for the State. On these bases, Respondent reasonably concluded23/ that the inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6, rendered that portion of the RFP ambiguous. As extensively discussed above, the credible, persuasive evidence also establishes that Respondent concluded, based on its investigation and review of Section 6, that inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier rendered Section 6 both arbitrary and structurally flawed.24/ The credible, persuasive evidence further establishes that Rubio investigated Respondent's use of multipliers in commodities procurements and contracts to the extent necessary and appropriate for her to reasonably conclude that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 rendered this portion of the RFP ambiguous, arbitrary, and structurally flawed.25/ In sum, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent engaged in a thorough and thoughtful investigation before concluding, reasonably, that the inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Exhibit C, Section 6 rendered that portion of the RFP ambiguous. Respondent's Actions Were Not Contrary to Competition Although the evidence shows that CECOS may suffer some competitive disadvantage because competing vendors were informed of the lowest "bottom line" price they would have to beat, it does not support a determination that Respondent's decisions to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require the vendors to submit new price proposals were contrary to competition. To that point, in Addendum 5, Respondent substantially restructured the Section 6 Bid Sheet and also amended the Bid Sheet comprising the other price proposal sections in Exhibit C, so that CECOS' and the other vendors' price proposals submitted in response to Addendum 5 may have substantially changed from those submitted in response to Addendum 1. In any event, it cannot be concluded that Respondent's decisions to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require submittal of new price proposals are contrary to competition such that they should be overturned in this proceeding. Procedural Irregularities CECOS also points to certain procedural irregularities in Respondent's treatment of, and communication with, CECOS once Respondent decided to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require submittal of new price proposals. CECOS apparently raises these issues in an effort to show that Respondent's actions were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. The undisputed evidence establishes that Rubio communicated with both DB and CECOS during the "cone of silence" following the posting of its intent to award the Contract to CECOS. The undersigned determines that the "cone of silence" applied to Rubio and her communications with DB and CECOS within the 72-hour period following Respondent's posting of the intent to award the Contract. Specifically, she is an employee of Respondent's District IV Office, so is an employee of the executive branch of the State of Florida. Further, the evidence shows that her communications with both DB and CECOS during the "cone of silence" period dealt specifically with substantive, rather than "administrative" issues regarding the RFP and the vendors' price proposals. Accordingly, it is determined that these communications did, in fact, violate the "cone of silence." However, this does not require that Respondent's decision to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS be overturned. The credible, persuasive evidence shows that while DB's conversation with Rubio may have spurred Rubio to decide she should investigate the Section 6 instructions and use of the 2.5 multiplier, it was not the reason why Respondent ultimately determined that the intent to award the Contract should be cancelled. Rather, Respondent's discovery of the ambiguity and structural flaws in Section 6, through Rubio's investigation, was the reason that Respondent determined that the intent to award the Contract to CECOS should be cancelled. In sum, the credible, persuasive evidence shows that notwithstanding Rubio's communications on substantive matters during the "cone of silence" with both DB and CECOS, the integrity of the procurement process was not undermined such that Respondent's decision to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. CECOS failed to present persuasive evidence establishing that other procedural irregularities rendered Respondent's actions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Respondent's Decisions to Cancel Intent to Award the Contract and Require Submittal of New Price Proposals Based on the foregoing, it is determined that CECOS did not meet its burden to show that Respondent's decisions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Respondent's Decision to Reject All Proposals As noted above, CECOS contends that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and start the procurement process anew was predicated on a series of arbitrary and erroneous decisions that created confusion, so that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all proposals was itself arbitrary and capricious. However, the credible, persuasive evidence shows that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all bids was factually supported and was reasonable. As discussed above, Respondent initially decided to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and to require the vendors to submit new price proposals after it discovered the ambiguity and structural flaws resulting from the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6. At that point, rather than rejecting all proposals, which would require the vendors to go to the time and expense of preparing completely new proposals, it decided to instead only require the vendors to submit new price proposals. Due to the interrelated nature of the six sections of Exhibit C comprising the complete price proposal for the RFP, Respondent determined revision of Section 6 would also require revision of the other five sections of Exhibit C, in order to ensure that they were internally consistent with each other. At the mandatory pre-bid meeting preceding the issuance of Addendum 5, the participating vendors had numerous questions about the sweeping revisions to all six sections of Exhibit C, and they expressed confusion about the revisions and their effect on preparation of new price proposals. Some vendors also expressed concern that they may have to change their personnel in order to be able to accurately prepare new price proposals, raising the question whether the technical proposals needed to be revised. As a result of vendor confusion and concern, and also because Respondent's Environmental Office needed additional time to carefully review and revise the RFP as needed, Respondent decided to reject all proposals and to start the procurement process anew. Respondent's decision to reject all bids was made after fully considering all of the pertinent information regarding the ambiguity and structural flaws in Section 6, vendor confusion and concern caused by Respondent's revisions to Exhibit C needed to address the ambiguity and flaws in Section 6, and Respondent's need for additional time to ensure that its RFP accurately and clearly solicited the needed environmental mitigation support services. Accordingly, Respondent did not act arbitrarily in deciding to reject all bids. Further, no persuasive evidence was presented to show that Respondent's decision to reject all bids was illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation: Issue a final order in Case No. 16-0769 finding that the rejection of all proposals in response to Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent; and Issue a final order in Case No. 16-3530 finding that the decisions to cancel the award of the Contract for Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM to CECOS and to require the vendors to submit new price proposals for Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM were not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2016.
The Issue Whether the Ochlocknee Management Corporation has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Initial Purchase. In January, 1986, Ochlocknee Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Ochlocknee"), began negotiations for the purchase and development of land located on Buck Lake Road (hereinafter referred to as the "Buck Lake Property"). On January 25, 1986, a document indicating an intent to sell 100 acres of the Buck Lake Property to Ochlocknee was executed. On October 31, 1986, a Contract for Sale was entered into between Ochlocknee and the owners of the Buck Lake Property. Pursuant to the Contract for Sale, Ochlocknee agreed to purchase 100 acres of the Buck Lake Property (hereinafter referred to as the "100 Acres"). The 100 Acres were to be developed in three phases by Ochlocknee. The development was named Avondale. In February of 1987, the 100 Acres were rezoned and platted. The Development of Units I, II and III. Development of Avondale Unit I began in March, 1987. In August, 1987, the Unit I plat was recorded. All roads, utilities and storm water for Unit I were complete. In April, 1988, development of Avondale Unit II began. The development of Unit II began approximately 8 months after the Unit I plat was recorded. In October, 1988, the Unit II plat was recorded. All roads, utilities and storm water for Unit II were complete. In May, 1989, development of Avondale Unit III began. The development of Unit III began approximately 7 months after the Unit II plat was recorded. In November, 1989, the Unit III plat was recorded. All roads, utilities and storm water for Unit III were complete. During the construction of Unit III Ochlocknee intended to purchase an additional parcel of the Buck Lake Property. This property was to be developed as additional phases or units of the Avondale development, including Avondale Unit IV, the development which is the subject of this proceeding. When constructed, the main road running through Units I, II and III was intended to continue through, and serve, Avondale Unit IV. The road is the only road providing access between Unit IV and Buck Lake Road. Utilities for Unit III were designed and stubbed to serve Unit IV. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any action which Leon County took in approving the development of Units I, II, or III could have been reasonably relied upon by Ochlocknee in its development of Unit IV. Most of Leon County's actions in approving the development of Avondale were taken before the Unit IV property was even purchased. Additionally, the evidence failed to prove that Leon County specifically reviewed any plans concerning Ochlocknee's plans to develop Unit IV until after the preliminary plat for Unit IV was filed for approval. The Second Purchase. In November, 1988, Ochlocknee began negotiations for the purchase of the additional parcel of the Buck Lake Property to be developed as Unit IV. The property consisted of 40.5 acres and was to be developed as Unit IV, the development at issue in this proceeding, and Unit V. In March, 1989, the owners of the 40.5 acres applied for rezoning of the 40.5 acre parcel from A-2 (agricultural use) to R-1 (residential use). In March, 1989, Ochlocknee entered into a Contract for Sale and Option, pursuant to which Ochlocknee was to purchase the 40.5 acres. Unit IV was to consist of 10 acres of the parcel. The 10 acres abut Unit III. The remaining 30.5 acres of the parcel were to be developed as Unit V. In May, 1989, the 40.5 acre parcel was rezoned as R-1, limited use. The zoning limited septic tanks on the property to 2.2 units per acre. On June 27, 1989, Ochlocknee purchased the 10 acres to be developed as Unit IV. The Regional Stormwater Facility. In April, 1988, Poole & Associates, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Poole"), prepared plans and designs for a regional stormwater facility for 126 acres of the Buck Lake Property. Poole provided the engineers for Avondale. The plan developed by Poole was intended to handle stormwater for all of Units II and III, all of what was to be Unit IV, part of what was to be Unit V and part of the Buck Lake Property which was not to be developed by Ochlocknee. This regional stormwater facility will hereinafter be referred to as the "Stormwater Facility". The plans and designs for the Stormwater Facility were completed before Unit IV was purchased by Ochlocknee and before Unit IV was rezoned from A-2 to R-1. In July, 1989, Ochlocknee began construction of the Stormwater Facility. Ponds used in the Stormwater Facility are located on Unit III. In November, 1989, when the Unit III plat was recorded, the Stormwater Facility was substantially completed. The Stormwater Facility was generally approved upon the recording of the Unit III plat. Recording of the Unit III plat and the approval of the Stormwater Facility only applied to the use of the Stormwater Facility for Unit III. The use of the Stormwater Facility for Unit IV was not approved or even reviewed by Leon County in November, 1989. Ochlocknee was required to maintain the Stormwater Facility for an additional year after it was approved for Unit III. After approval of the Stormwater Facility for Unit III, problems arose with the Stormwater Facility. These problems began as early as August, 1989 based upon an August 31, 1989, letter from Broward Davis & Assoc., Inc., to Ochlocknee. In a letter dated November 22, 1989, from the Respondent's engineering inspectors, Poole was provided with a "punch list" of problems associated with Units I, II and III, including problems associated with the Stormwater Facility. The punch list was developed during a meeting held on November 21, 1989. Ochlocknee informed Leon County that the problems raised in the letter referred to in finding of fact 29 would be resolved in 30 days. The problems continued, however, into 1990. Efforts continued during the remainder of 1989 and early 1990 to resolve the problems. On January 17, 1990, a new Environmental Management Act became effective in Leon County. Ochlocknee was required to insure that its proposed use of the Stormwater Facility for Unit IV complied with the Act. In a letter dated February 22, 1990, Leon County notified Poole that preliminary plans for the development of Unit IV which had been submitted to Leon County had been reviewed. Poole was informed that additional information concerning the preliminary site plans was needed before Unit IV could be approved for development. Among other things, Leon County informed Poole that additional information concerning the use of the Stormwater Facility for Unit IV would have to be submitted. Unit IV Development. In October, 1988, Poole prepared a preliminary site plan for the development of Unit IV. These plans were prepared before the property which constitutes Unit IV was purchased or rezoned from A-2 to R-1. On June 27, 1989, Ochlocknee purchased the 10 acres of Unit IV for $104,956.50. In November, 1989, Ochlocknee entered into an agreement with Poole to design roadways, utilities and obtain construction approvals for Unit IV. On December 1, 1989, preliminary plat approval for Unit IV was applied for. The preliminary plat was approved by the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department on January 10, 1990. On January 17, 1990, the City of Tallahassee approved the water distribution plans for Unit IV. On January 12, 1990, the City of Tallahassee agreed to provide water and electrical service for Unit IV. On February 2, 1990, a commitment for a construction loan for Unit IV was received by Ochlocknee. The Leon County comprehensive plan was submitted to the Department of Community Affairs on February 1, 1990. Ochlocknee should have been aware of the drafting of the comprehensive plan and the fact that it had been provided to the Department of Community Affairs for approval. 41 In March, 1990, Poole completed final construction drawings for the Unit IV roadways. In April, 1990, Ochlocknee received contracts for the construction of roadways and utilities for Unit IV. In May, 1990, Poole held an onsite pre-construction conference with Leon County officials, utility providers and construction personnel. Poole placed stakes for clearing limits on Unit IV during May, 1990. On June 29, 1990, Leon County approved roadway construction plans for Unit IV. At the time that the preliminary plat for Unit IV was filed by Ochlocknee for approval, Ochlocknee knew that the Stormwater Facility needed to be modified before development of Unit IV would be approved. Despite this knowledge, Ochlocknee chose to continue to propose that the Stormwater Facility be used for Unit IV. These problems continued throughout the time after the preliminary plat for Unit IV was filed. In May, 1990, Leon County informed Ochlocknee that a permit for clearing and grading, the last permit needed to begin construction, would not be issued until the Stormwater Facility proposed for Unit IV was modified and the problems previously identified by Leon County with the Stormwater Facility in 1989, were corrected. Construction on Unit IV has not commenced. Costs Associated with Unit IV. The cost of rezoning the 10 acres of Unit IV was $2,911.25 plus a $300.00 fee. The $300.00 fee was incurred in March, 1989, before the Unit IV property was purchased or the rezoning had taken place. Therefore, the fee was not incurred in reliance upon any representation from Leon County. The $2,911.25 cost was incurred between October, 1988 and May, 1989. This amount was incurred before the purchase of the Unit IV property or the approval of the rezoning. Therefore, this cost was not incurred in reliance upon any representation from Leon County. The cost of purchasing the 10 acres which are to be developed as Unit IV was $104,956.50. This cost was incurred in June of 1989. The only action taken by Leon County concerning any possible development of Unit IV prior to the time this cost was incurred was to approve rezoning Unit IV from A-2 to R-1. The cost of purchasing the 10 acres of Unit IV was not, therefore, incurred in reliance upon any action of Leon County other than approval of the rezoning of Unit IV. The cost of constructing the Stormwater Facility attributable to Unit IV was approximately $8,000.00. This cost was incurred between July, 1989, and November, 1989. Therefore, the cost was incurred after the Unit IV property was rezoned but before the preliminary plat and the development plans for Unit IV were approved by Leon County. Therefore, the cost of the Stormwater Facility attributable to the Unit IV property was not incurred in reliance upon any action of Leon County other than approval of the rezoning of Unit IV. Ochlocknee failed to present sufficient evidence to conclude what expenses were incurred by it in stubbing the road and utilities that run through Units I, II, and III are attributable to Unit IV. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove when any such expenses were incurred. These expenses were incurred sometime after the development of Unit I began (before the Unit IV property was acquired or rezoned) and sometime before Unit III was completed (before the preliminary plat for Unit IV was approved). Therefore, any expenses attributable to Unit IV for the road and utilities were incurred before Leon County took any action with regard to the development of Unit IV or were incurred only in reliance upon the rezoning of the Unit IV property. Engineering, surveying and permitting costs associated with Unit IV totalled $13,384.49. These costs were incurred between January, 1990 and May, 1990. Prior to the expenditure of these funds Leon County had approved the rezoning of Unit IV, the preliminary plat and some of the other plans for the development of Unit IV. All of these costs were incurred after Ochlocknee had been informed that there was a problem with the Stormwater Facility. All of the engineering costs were incurred before Leon County had indicated that it would approve the development of Unit IV. On April 25, 1990, Ochlocknee refinanced the note for the 10 acres of Unit IV. The new note was for $219,750.00. This amount was borrowed to refinance the cost of purchasing the 10 acres and to pay construction costs for the development of Unit IV. The funds intended for construction costs for Unit IV have not, however, been expended. The weight of the evidence failed to prove what costs Ochlocknee incurred in obtaining the $219,750.00 note. All of the costs incurred by Ochlocknee relating to the development of Unit IV were incurred in an effort to obtain approval from Leon County for the development of Unit IV. The costs were incurred before any representation from Leon County that development of Unit IV would be allowed to proceed. Some of the costs were incurred before the Unit IV property was rezoned from an agricultural use to R-1. Leon County had taken no action before approval of the rezoning. Some of the costs were incurred only in reliance upon the rezoning of the Unit IV property. Finally, all of the costs were incurred in an effort to obtain approval to develop Unit IV and before Leon County indicated through any action that development of the property would be allowed to proceed. These costs were incurred at a time when Ochlocknee should have known that the development of Unit IV would probably have to be consistent with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Procedure. On or about August 1, 1990, Ochlocknee filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), with Leon County. The following information concerning the development of Unit IV was contained on the Application: "Ochlocknee Management" is listed as the "Owner/Agent." Question 3 of the Application requests the name of the project, including the name and address of each owner of, and interested party in, the project or property. "AVONDALE UNIT IV" was included as the response to question 3. The project is described as "22 Residential Lots on 10 acres, Proposed with Public Road, Water, and Recorded Plat." The project location is described as "AVONDALE WAY, SOUTH OF AVONDALE III." Total project costs are estimated at "$226,205.95" and it is estimated that "$126,952,24 " have been expended to date. "Progress . . . Towards Completion" is described as: (1) all utility site, drainage plans completed as of May 4, 1990; (2) preliminary plat approval 1/10/90, water plans approved 2/1/90 and environmental permit 6/27/90; and (3) the drainage facility located in Unit III is complete. "Preliminary Plat, Water Plan Approval, Environm. Permits" are included as forms of "government approval." The response to question 10 of the Application, which requests information concerning government action relied upon prior to committing funds towards completing the project, was "[s]ubdivision Ordinance for Preliminary Plat, The Letter of Agreement, Policy & Procedures Manual for Utilities and the Environmental Management Act for the Stormwater Permits." In a letter dated August 7, 1990, Ochlocknee was informed that its Application was being referred to a Staff Committee comprised of Jim English, Mark Gumula, Howard Pardue, Buddie Holshouser and Herb Thiele. By letter dated August 24, 1990, Ochlocknee provided additional information for the Staff Committee to consider. On August 27, 1990, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee. Barry Poole, of Poole, and Jody Elliott, of Ochlocknee, testified. By letter dated August 27, 1990, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department informed Ochlocknee that the Application had been denied. By letter dated September 5, 1990, to Mr. Gumula, counsel for Ochlocknee appealed the decision to deny the Application. By letter dated October 5, 1990, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on October 25, 1990. During the hearing before the undersigned Ochlocknee stipulated that it had sought approval of its Application based upon "common law vesting" and not "statutory vesting" as those terms are defined in Leon County Ordinance 90- 31.
