The Issue Whether the Respondent violated Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by failing to reconcile his accounts, having monies stolen from him by an employee, and withdrawing money from his escrow account as commissions. Whether the Respondent violated Subsection 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes, by failing to maintain funds paid to him as deposits for rentals, sales taxes, and security deposits in his escrow account until after the date of the rental.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed real estate broker and was so licensed at all times relevant to the events which are a part of the Administrative Complaint. The Respondent holds license number 0177110 issued as a broker, t/a Sunspot Realty, 16428 West Highway 98A, Panama City, Florida 32407. On February 10, 1989, Elaine Brantley, an investigator for the Department of Professional Regulation, visited the Respondent's office for the purpose of conducting a financial audit of the records of the business. The Respondent was not present; and Teresa Tuno, the Respondent's secretary and wife, stated she would prefer that Brantley not review the records in her husband's absence. On February 14, 1989, Brantley telephoned the Respondent and made arrangements to audit Respondent's books on February 15, 1989. A review of the records by Brantley on February 15, 1989 revealed that the records were in a state of disarray and the ledgers were not posted. At that time, Brantley advised the Respondent that the records had to be put in order, the ledgers posted, and accounts reconciled by February 17, 1989, when she would reinspect the records. Brantley reinspected the records on February 17, 1989, and all the ledgers had been posted and the accounts had been reconciled through January. The audit revealed that Tuno had received $47,961.45 in security deposits, sales taxes, and rental deposits which were not refundable under the lease agreement. The audit revealed that the balance of the Respondent's escrow account was $33,321.45. The difference between the balance of the escrow account and the money received by the Respondent includes $8,000 which the Respondent paid to himself with checks drawn on the account for "commissions", and $6,540 which had been stolen by an employee of the Respondent. The monies stolen included cash deposits paid by rental customers to the employee and one check on the escrow account endorsed in blank and given to the employee to pay for items purchased for one of the rental units which the employee cashed and converted to his own use. The theft was reported to the local police and their investigation revealed that the employee had disappeared under suspicious circumstances, indicating foul play. The lease agreement states that a deposit of 50% of the rental rate was required to reserve a property and the deposit was refundable only if another tenant could be found for the same period. The Respondent's agreement with the owner of the property called for a commission of 30% of the rental receipts. However, there was no mention of when the commission was earned and under what circumstances it would be paid in the original rental agreement. Upon being criticized for this practice by Brantley, the Respondent repaid the total amount of the draws. Subsequently, he had a new agreement drawn purporting to authorize early payment of management fees. The new agreement states in pertinent part: Owner agrees to compensate Agent a commission of 30% of rental receipts with the exception of long term winter rentals which will be at a rate of 20%. Agent is authorized to draw management fees upon receipt of tenant's non-refundable reservation deposit. The balance of the escrow account was sufficient to meet any potential demands against it. Had the property been leased to another renter for the same period of time, the second renter's deposit would have been deposited to the account making up the funds refunded to the first renter. The audit also revealed that the Respondent had paid monies from the escrow account to a maintenance company operated by the Respondent for work performed on various of the properties. However, the Respondent had not debited the individual property accounts at the time the check was drawn. Each of the properties had a sufficient individual balance to pay for work charged against the property. The appropriate entries were made eventually in the ledgers for the property by the Respondent. The Respondent has amended his agreement with property owners to permit him to bill for repairs on their property on a cost-plus-10% basis to eliminate this problem. None of the actions by the Respondent resulted in financial loss to any of his clients, and the Respondent was cooperative and candid with the auditor.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent: Be required to pay an administrative fine of $1,000 for violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes, by distributing commissions to himself; Be required to pay an administrative fine of $1,000 for violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes, by distributing payments to a maintenance company which he owned without debiting individual property accounts; and Be required to enroll and satisfactorily complete a course on maintenance of escrow funds and accounts. DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX A TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-2681 The Respondent filed a letter in place of proposed findings which contained legal argument which was read and considered. It did not contain any findings. The Petitioner filed proposed findings which were read and considered as follows: Paragraphs 1-3 Adopted Paragraph 4, 1st sentence Adopted Paragraph 4, 2nd sentence Rejected as irrelevant Paragraphs 5-7 Adopted Paragraphs 8-10 Rejected. The terms of the contracts do not address when Tuno was entitled to his commission. Under the terms of the contracts the renters were not entitled to a refund of their advance deposit after a reservation was made unless a new renter could be found for the same time, in which case that renter would have to make a deposit. When Tuno was entitled to his commission was not addressed in the contracts. While findings that Tuno violated the provisions of statute relating to maintenance of funds in his escrow account; this failure was based upon the lack of clarity in the contracts and the high standard of conduct in maintaining escrow accounts which is required of licensees. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. 0. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Robert P. Tuno 16428 West Highway 98A Panama City, Florida 32407
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact: The Respondent, St. Lucie County Expressway Authority, was created by the Florida legislature in 1983, and is governed by Chapter 348, Florida Statutes. The Authority is composed of two members from the Board of County Commissioners of St. Lucie County, two members from the City Commission of Ft. Pierce, two members from the City Council of Port St. Lucie and three members appointed by the governor. Based on the anticipated future growth of St. Lucie County, there is a need for additional East-West traffic arteries in the southern portion of the county to ease expected traffic conditions. The St. Lucie County Expressway Authority employed consultants and conducted public hearings to determine the best location for such a roadway. Prior to selecting the location for the proposed East-West Expressway, the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority examined feasibility studies, traffic count reports and engineering and road design proposals on alternative alignments and found the proposed corridor to be the best choice from both an economic and environmental standpoint. The proposed expressway route connects Interstate 95 to U.S. Highway 1. Phase 1 of the project would begin in the southern portion of St. Lucie County at U.S. Highway 1 and continue east, following existing transmission lines owned by Florida Power and Light Company and extend to a point which is now called East Torino Parkway. The total length of Phase One of the project is approximately 2.6 miles. Phase Two would extend the project to Interstate 95. The St. Lucie County Expressway Authority expects to obtain funding for construction of the East-West Expressway from various sources including the State of Florida's Toll Facilities Revolving Trust Fund, the Florida Department of Transportation and state-backed revenue bonds. The use of state-backed revenue bonds would require St. Lucie County to pledge a certain portion of its gas tax revenue as security to cover the bonds in the event that the expressway did not generate enough money from tolls to pay back the bonds. A public hearing is scheduled for January, 1988 at which the St. Lucie County Commission will review updated feasibility studies and traffic count estimates to determine whether to pledge the necessary funds to support the bonds. Assuming that approval is obtained for state-backed revenue bonds, the letting of a contract to construct the East-West Expressway could be accomplished by July 1, 1989. The time period for construction of a project such as the East-West Expressway is approximately two (2) years from the date that the contract for construction is executed. Thus, under the most optimistic outlook and projections, the proposed East-West Expressway could be completed by July of 1991. However, difficulties in obtaining funding and/or necessary environmental permits could delay completion of the expressway for ten (10) years, or until 1997. In conjunction with the preparation of plans for construction of the East-West Expressway, the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority filed "right-of- way reservation maps" on October 13, 1986, in accordance with Section 337.241, Florida Statutes. The reservation maps were filed and approved by the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority in compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations. The purpose of filing the right-of-way reservation maps by the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority is to preclude development of properties within the proposed corridor of the East-West Expressway while final construction and engineering plans are being prepared, thereby preventing an increase in cost of acquisition of those properties pending eventual eminent domain proceedings. The right-of-way reservation maps will prohibit the granting of development permits, as defined in Section 380.031(4), Florida Statutes, by any governmental entity for a period of five (5) years from the date of recording of the reservation maps. This period may be extended for an additional five years at the option of the Expressway Authority pursuant to Section 337.241(2), Florida Statutes. The reservation maps do not prohibit sale, continued use of the property by its owners nor is any use prohibited which does not require a development permit as defined in Section 380.031(4), Florida Statutes. The engineering construction plans for the East-West Expressway encompass less area than the reservation maps. However, the larger reserved area will be utilized to facilitate construction of the project and for water retention on site. Thus, less private property will ultimately be taken than that which is included in the right-of-way reservation area. The property owned by Petitioners, T. L. Sloan, James Taylor and Bill Stewart (hereinafter referred to as the "Sloan property") consists of a front and rear parcel. The front parcel consists of 6.54 acres of which 2.28 are within the right-of-way reservation area. The rear parcel is physically separated from the front parcel by a drainage canal and consists of approximately 4.25 acres. The rear parcel is not within the reservation map area, but access to this parcel can only be gained by U.S. Highway 1 through the front property. The property owned by Petitioners Mark C. Walters and David J. Gonzalez (hereinafter referred to as the "Walters' property") measures approximately 55,450 square feet of which approximately 46,000 square feet are within the right-of-way reservation area. The Sloan and Walters' properties are located at the easternmost end of the proposed East-West Expressway and front the east side of U.S. Highway 1 in Ft. Pierce, Florida. Both properties were purchased in 1984 as investment property and are presently vacant, unimproved acreage. The front parcel of the Sloan property is zoned commercial general and the rear parcel is zoned multifamily residential at five units per acre. The Walters' property is zoned commercial general and is adjacent to the Florida Power and Light transmission lines. The St. Lucie County Expressway Authority intends to use the property within the reserved area for the construction of the entrance and exit ramps of the proposed expressway. The engineering design of the East-West Expressway was done with as little intrusion upon Petitioner's properties as practical and only that property absolutely necessary for construction will ultimately be taken. Pursuant to the right-of-way reservation maps, all of the highway frontage on U.S. Highway 1 for both properties has been reserved for the expressway construction. Because of existing regulations, the St. Lucie County zoning office will not issue any development permits for property which has no access to a public highway. Therefore, the local zoning office will not issue any development permits for any portion of the Petitioners' properties, whether included in the reservation area or not. Thus, all of the property owned by Petitioners has been affected by the right-of-way reservation maps. The Sloan property was listed for sale prior to the recording of the right-of-way reservation maps. The Walters' property was purchased with the intent to build a gun shop which is now operated by the present owners at another location. After the recording of the reservation maps, the Walters' property was actively listed for sale. After the recording of the reservation maps, purchase inquiries regarding the Sloan property began to rapidly decrease. Inquiries regarding the Walters' property have also been extremely slow. No written offers to purchase the subject properties have been submitted to any of the Petitioners. David Fuller, a real property appraiser called as a witness by Petitioners, prepared an appraisal estimating the effects of recording the right-of-way reservation maps on the Sloan and Walters' property. The testimony of Mr. Fuller is accepted as more credible and pertinent to the issues involved in this cause than the testimony presented by Mr. Davis, the Respondent's expert appraiser. Mr. Davis admitted that the purpose of his appraisal was to estimate the fair market value of the property in fee simple, the part "taken" and damages to the remainder for the purpose of eminent domain. Mr. Davis' analysis is more appropriate for an action sounding in eminent domain. Mr. Fuller used the Sales Comparison or Market Approach combined with a discounted cash flow method of appraisal in determining the difference in the value of the properties before the recording of the right-of-way reservation maps, and the market value of the properties immediately after recording of the reservation maps. The value of real property is directly related to the use to which it can be put. Thus, a particular parcel may have several different value levels under alternative uses. In determining what, if any, substantial impact the record of the right-of-way reservation maps had on the market value of the Sloan and Walters' property, Fuller evaluated the difference in the value of the properties utilizing their highest and best use before the filing of the right- of-way reservation maps and the highest and best use after the recording of the maps. The highest and best use for the Sloan property without the encumbrance of the right-of-way maps would be to improve the front commercial zoned parcel with a commercial use consistent with neighborhood use trends (i.e., strip shopping centers, rental storage buildings and/or automobile dealerships) and improve the rear multifamily zoned parcel with a support use for the front commercial property. The highest and best use of the Sloan property after filing of the right-of-way reservation maps would be to hold the property as vacant until the right-of-way reservation map filing expires. Although the Sloan property could be sold with the right-of-way reservation, a majority of the potential market would be eliminated and the remaining market would require a discount to purchase the property knowing that the restrictions exist. The potential market in the neighborhood consists of generally three types of investors; (1) the owner occupant; (2) the real estate investor seeking income from an improved property; and (3), the short term land speculator. The owner occupant seeking to immediately build would not consider the property in question because the potential to immediately construct a new improvement is not available. Likewise, the investor seeking to build an income producing improvement, either immediately or in the next three years, would not be interested in the property. The short term land speculator would not be interested because there is no certainty that the property would be able to be developed to its highest potential market value within the next two to three years. The highest and best use for the Walters' property without the encumbrance of the right-of-way reservation maps would be to improve the parcel in approximately one to two years with a commercial use consistent with the neighborhood trends (i.e., owner occupied small business and/or mini-storage property). Improved uses such as an automobile dealership or shopping center could not be physically constructed on a site the size and shape of the Walters' property. The highest and best use of the Walters' property after filing of the right-of-way reservation maps would be to hold the parcel vacant until the reservation filing expires. As with the Sloan property, although the parcel could be sold, a majority of the potential market would be eliminated and the remaining market would require a discount to purchase the property knowing that the restrictions exist. Mr. Fuller stated that in his opinion, using the discounted cash flow model of appraisal, the Sloan properties suffered a total loss in value of approximately $441,450.00 on the date the reservation maps were filed. As to the Walters' property, the loss was calculated at $78,480.00. Mr. Fuller's financial calculations as to loss are misleading and not very useful because they were specifically calculated for a period of time of ten years. In other words, Mr. Fuller's total loss of value calculations are based on the assumption that the reservation map restrictions would exist for the full initial five (5) year period and that they would be extended for an additional five (5) year period. The ability to develop vacant and unimproved commercial property and to put the land to its highest and best use is a substantial beneficial ownership interest arising out of the ownership of commercial property. Both of the properties owned by Petitioners are fully capable of development and no other impediments to development exist except for the reservation maps. Substantial payments on the mortgages for the properties are being made by Petitioners each year totalling over $58,000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the St. Lucie County Expressway Authority enter a Final Order in favor of Petitioners after which the Authority shall have 180 days from the date of said order to acquire the Petitioners property or initiate appropriate acquisition proceedings pursuant to the requirements of Section 337.241, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-2279, 87-2517 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 12 and 13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 12, 13 and 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 17 and 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23, 25 and 27. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 26. Matters not contained therein are rejected as misleading and/or argument. Adopted in substance inn Finding of Fact 27. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13 and 14. Adopted in Findings of Fact 13 and 14. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 10. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Matters not contained therein are rejected as misleading and/or not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as misleading. The Petitioners' expert projected that "completion" and not "construction" could possibly take 10 years. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. COPIES FURNISHED: John T. Brennan, Esquire Post Office Box 3779 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33448-3779 Frank J. Lynch, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 4027 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33448-4027 David Stuart Chairman St. Lucie County Expressway Authority Post Office Box 4027 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33448-4027
Findings Of Fact Respondent, at all times pertinent, was a registered real estate salesman holding license number 0314085. This license is currently under suspension as a result of disciplinary action by Petitioner. Respondent was, at all times pertinent, the President and a stock holder in D.S.A.E., Inc. D.S.A.E., in turn, was the owner (or co-owner with another corporation) of a tract of land located adjacent to U.S. Highway 27 in Broward County. Respondent, acting in his capacity as a real estate salesman, sought buyers for segments 1/ of the U.S. 27 property. He had made earlier sales of other property to Mrs. Lottie Kay and her son Michael Kay, and contacted the former in October, 1980, regarding the U.S. 27 property. The D.S.A.E. tract was zoned B-3 (business) on that portion which fronted U.S. 27. The rear segments were zoned A-1 (limited agriculture) and did not front U.S. 27. Initially, Respondent mentioned segments being offered for $60,000 and $24,000. However, Lottie Kay indicated that she could not afford the higher priced segments (which were zoned B-3). Lottie Kay asked Respondent to show her the property, and a visit to the general area was made. However, Respondent told her they could not get to the property which he said was located "on the other side of the construction." After visiting the area, she was not aware of the actual location of her property or of its character. 2/ She continued to believe that the property was "right on" U.S. 27. She based this belief on Respondent's original sales presentation rather than her visit to the area. The segment she purchased is about one quarter of a mile from U.S. 27. Lottie Kay was also confused as to the zoning on the property. She believed it was "commercial" and does not recall being told of the agricultural zoning by Respondent until about a year after the purchase. Her son, Michael Kay, who was present during a part of Respondent's initial sales presentation, heard only the B-3 zoning mentioned. Since he was not present throughout the discussion, he could have missed Respondent's reference, which he claims to have made, to the agricultural zoning on the back segments. On October 8, 1980, Lottie Kay, as buyer, contracted with Respondent on behalf of D.S.A.E. and a third party corporation, as sellers, to purchase "Tract 14" for $24,000 on an "agreement for deed." Under the terms of the contract, Lottie Kay paid $4,000 down and was to pay $215.59 per month thereafter beginning in November, 1980. Lottie Kay made the monthly payments through 1983. When she missed her first two payments in 1984, Respondent offered to reduce the contract price by $2,000 if she would resume monthly payments and make up the missing payments. Lottie Kay agreed to this modification of the contract, but discontinued further payments in April, 1984. Lottie Kay bought this property for speculation in reliance on Respondent's claim that its value would increase substantially in the immediate future. Respondent showed her newspaper clippings which supported his claim that the general area was one of future growth. He predicted her segment would be worth at least $30,000 in one year and stated that as to possible appreciation, "The sky's the limit." Respondent did not, however, point out that Lottie Kay's property could not be resold for any use other than agriculture since her segment was too small for even a home site under the existing zoning. Respondent also neglected to advise her that the property was underwater much of the year, and would have to be filled and probably permitted before any development could take place. The testimony of a real estate appraiser called by Petitioner established that the property was worth about $750 when purchased by Lottie Kay in October, 1980. 3/ This valuation was based on the witness' study of nearby land sales over a period of years as well as his inspection of the area in which the Kay segment is located. Respondent attempted to establish a higher market value by producing various warranty deeds whereby he or his affiliates had sold similar segments to other buyers for amounts approximating that agreed to by Lottie Kay. These sales do not establish value but, rather, indicate the gullibility of other buyers in making such purchases. After she fell behind in her payments, Lottie Kay tried to resell her property through Respondent in reliance on his claim at the time of his initial sales presentation that he could resell it for her in one week. When requested to do so he was unable to produce any prospective buyer. Thus, there appears to be no real market for this property, other than that generated by Respondent in his initial sales campaign. Lottie Kay did not consult an attorney or have the land surveyed or appraised prior to contracting for the purchase. Rather, she trusted Respondent who she knew to be a real estate professional. She was also aware that he was an owner of the property, but still believed she could rely on his statements that the current market value of her segment was at least $24,000 and that future profits were assured. Respondent attacks the fairness of these proceedings on the alleged misconduct of Petitioner's investigator, who encouraged Lottie Kay to come forward after she (with the help of her son) had filed a complaint with Petitioner. The investigator made statements to the Kays which indicated his belief that Respondent was engaged in fraudulent land sales, and was a menace to the public. Although the investigator's statements to the Kays were gratuitous and inconsistent with his fact finding role, there is no indication that such statements resulted in any false testimony or other unreliable evidence. Respondent notes that Lottie Kay continued to make payments on her contract with Respondent even after she had filed a complaint with Petitioner and reasons that she must have considered the property a worthwhile investment. Lottie Kay demonstrated through her testimony and recitation of her dealings with Respondent that she is gullible and imprudent in financial matters. Thus, her continued investment of funds in this property indicated lack of prudence rather than an informed belief that the property had any substantial value.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of misrepresenting property value as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license as a real estate salesman for a period of three years to begin upon completion of his current license suspension period. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Holt is a registered real estate salesman having been issued license number 0334695. She has not been issued a real estate broker's license. Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint concerns a failure by the original Respondents to timely place an earnest money deposit in escrow. These funds came into the hands of Donna Duffy, the broker, and Best Sellers Group, Inc., the brokerage firm, on February 14, 1981, but were not deposited until February 23, 1981. Former Respondent Duffy and Respondent Holt testified on the question of who was responsible for making the deposit. These individuals have had a falling out and their testimony was conflicting as well as self-serving. Other testimony supporting this charge was inconclusive. Counts II and III concern a property lease which Respondent arranged for out of state property owners after she left the Atkins, Green, Stauffer and Clark brokerage. The lease arose out of an exclusive right of sale listing with this firm. However, the brokerage was not interested in handling the lease and Respondent undertook this transaction as a favor to the property owners. Holt located a potential lessee in October, 1980. She then forwarded a copy of the lease agreement to the owners along with a bill for her expenses and her personal check for $495. This amount equaled the first month's rent and security deposit which she had collected from the lessee. Thereafter, the property owners negotiated Holt's check, but it was dishonored by the bank. Subsequently, the property owners were deprived of a further $395 in rent collected by Holt. In August, 1981, Holt made restitution in the amount of $890. In mitigation, Holt stated that her estranged husband had withdrawn the original funds intended to cover the returned check. She also had experienced other expenses of divorce and family problems which led her to spend funds she subsequently collected. In further mitigation, Holt pointed out that she did not seek a commission for obtaining the lease, nor did she charge a monthly fee as is customary in such matters when handled through a brokerage.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent Mary Ann Holt guilty as charged in Counts II through VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and suspending her real estate salesman's license for a period of three years. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1983.
Findings Of Fact The facts here involved were not in dispute. Prior to February, 1973 Respondent, Michael L. Whitman, had a listing on the acreage here involved. On February 26, 1973 Gifford Realty Company procured a buyer for this property and an Option to Purchase was executed. (Exhibit1). This agreement provided that sellers would pay Whitman, for services rendered, a commission of 10 percent of the purchase price and Whitman was to divide the commission equally with Gifford. Thereafter on April 27, 1973 the sellers and buyers entered into an agreement (Exhibit 2) to transfer the property from seller to buyer upon terms and conditions similar to the option, which terms and conditions are contained in Exhibit 2. One condition of the agreement, not relevant to the issues here involved, was that the buyer would be able to have the property rezoned to RPF- 15, which would allow multi-family dwellings to be erected thereon. When application for rezoning request for multi-family dwellings. After general agreement between all parties the Agreement to Purchase the property was assigned to Pinellas County. On December 11, 1973 the original sellers and buyers executed an additional agreement (Exhibit 3) which modified Exhibit 2 respecting zoning, approved the assignment of the contract to the county, and provided for closing after August 1, 1974 but no later than August 7, 1974. In the Agreement (Exhibit 5) between the original buyers and the county, the purchase of the property was contingent upon the county acquiring federal funds. When it subsequently became evident that federal funds could not be obtained the county elected to purchase the property in accordance with the terms of the original agreement a modified by the time of closing as contained in Exhibit 3. During the period in 1974 prior to August, some question arose whether or not the county would purchase the property without the benefit of federal funds, and when the county representative proceeded to the scheduled closing on August 7, 1974, the sellers did not appear. After changes of breach of contract were exchanged between the sellers and the county the closing of the transaction occurred on September 4, 1974. The sale price of the property was $792,4000 and the commission due thereon was $79,240. Unbeknownst to Gifford, Whitman had agreed with the sellers to accept $20,000 case at closing and a promissory note for the remaining $59,240 of the commission payable over a five-year period. Following the closing Respondent Whitman forwarded to Gifford $10,000 and a copy of the promissory note payable to Whitman executed by the sellers. Gifford demanded payment of his full share of the commission ($39,620) forthwith. Alternatively he demanded that his share of the commission be paid in full fro the proceeds of the promissory note prior to Whitman receiving any commission. When these demands were rebuffed Gifford engaged an attorney who proposed litigation. When the first annual installment on the note was due and paid to Whitman, Gifford demanded his share (Exhibit 9). By this time Whitman, too, had engaged the services of an attorney who advised Whitman to withhold disbursement of the note payment received until Gifford agreed to settle the dispute other than by litigation.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.25(1)(b), (e), and (k), Florida Statutes, 1/ by: committing fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or breach of trust in a business transaction; acting as a broker; and failing to place funds with her registered employer; and if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is licensed as a real estate sales person under license number 0555229. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a sales person percentage A.A. Carnes, Inc., 1399 W. Highway 434, Longwood, Florida 32750. In August, 1993, Respondent operated as a licensed real estate sales person for Mannix Realty, Inc. Respondent managed rental property located at 3551 Malona Drive in Orlando, Florida. The rental property was owned by Ramesh and Harjit Zala who lived outside the state (the "Zalas" property). On November 1, 1993, Respondent solicited and negotiated a lease agreement with Scott and Winifred Houldin at the monthly rental of $2,100 (the "tenants"). The tenants paid two months rent to Respondent as a reservation deposit. Respondent appropriated the reservation deposit and rental income for her own personal use. She failed to disclose the rental agreement, reservation deposit, or rental income to Mr. Amos W. Harris, Respondent's broker. Respondent requested the owners and the tenants to direct all correspondence to Respondent's home address. The owners and tenants complied with Respondent's request. Respondent did not disclose the transaction to Mr. Harris. Respondent neither accounted for nor returned the rental funds to her broker or to the owners. In August 1993, Respondent managed rental property located at 1346 Stearman Court in Orlando and owned by Robert and Patricia Sheetz (the "Sheetz" property). The owners lived outside the state. After Respondent assumed responsibility for the Sheetz property, the rental income declined and expenses increased. Although the Sheetz property was rented, Respondent failed to deliver the rental income from the Sheetz property. In December, 1993, the owners discovered that the rental property was in fact occupied. They informed Mr. Harris, and demanded delivery of the rental income. Mr. Harris was unaware that the property was rented or that Respondent had failed to deliver the rental income from the property. On December 29, 1993, Mr. Harris confronted Respondent. Respondent paid $475 of the rental income to the owners of the rental property. Mr. Harris subsequently terminated Respondent's employment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), (e), (k), and 475.42(1)(b); and revoking Respondent's real estate sales license. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March 1996.
The Issue The issues presented for decision herein are whether or not Respondents are guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment and/or breach of trust in a business transaction as is more fully alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein dated February 27, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent, Perry F. Keen, is now, and was at all times material herein, a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0048813. Respondent, Perry F. Koon Agency, Inc., is a corporation licensed as a real estate broker and has been issued license number 0124199 with a business address of 212 East Noble Avenue, Williston, Florida. At all times material herein, Respondent, Perry F. Koon, was licensed and operated as a real estate broker and sole qualifying broker and officer of Respondent, Perry F. Koon Agency, Inc. In September of 1981, Respondents obtained a written open listing agreement from Gracie Williams to sell certain real estate property owned by Williams listed at Southeast Ninth Street, Williston, Florida at an asking price of $8,000 with a 10 percent brokerage commission. (Respondent's Exhibit E) The listing agreement was effective by its terms through June 30, 1982. Respondents were unable to sell the Williams property during the terms of the written listing agreement. However, Respondents continued to market Ms. Williams' property based on an oral agreement. Prior thereto, and specifically during mid-March, 1980, Ms. Gracie Williams borrowed approximately $4,779.60 from Tom and Wilma C. Bailey. Ms. Williams later became injured and was unable to make regular installment payments on the loan from the Baileys. As security for the loan from the Baileys, Ms. Williams gave a mortgage to the Baileys which encumbered the properties here in question (lot 12, block 13 in Williston, Levy County, Florida) as well as other properties owned by Ms. Williams. (Respondent's Exhibit B) The Baileys contacted Ms. Williams, by letter, regarding her past due loan payments and urged her to bring her accounts current as "We cannot continue to carry this account past due." (Respondent's Composite Exhibit H) Being unable to repay the Baileys as agreed, Ms. Williams turned to Respondent 1/ far assistance. Respondent, however, was not interested in an outright purchase of Ms. Williams' property although he agreed to purchase Ms. Williams' property by assuming her loans from the Baileys. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5) On October 26, 1982, Ms. Williams executed a quit claim deed in favor of Respondent's wife, Jettie R. Keen. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Thereafter, Respondent renegotiated the loan that he assumed from Ms. Williams in favor of the Baileys whereby the Baileys agreed to accept annual payments of $1,000 each year. During that time, Rachael Breuton as renting the subject property from Ms. Williams paying $70 per month. Respondents were able to sell the property (Williams) to Rachael Breuton for approximately $6,500 by accepting payments of $100 per month. (Respondent's Exhibit D) Respondent thereafter brought the delinquent Williams loan, in favor of the Baileys, current. Once the subject charges were brought by Ms. Williams, she contacted an attorney and filed other charges which have been settled by Respondent. Respondent, as stated earlier, was not interested in purchasing the Williams property from the outset. He merely attempted to assist Ms. Williams by taking this property and assuming the loan in favor of the Baileys to free up other properties, as well the subject property, for Ms. Williams. Respondents have deeded the subject properties back to Ms. Williams as part of this settlement agreement entered into by and between Respondents and Ms. Williams. Ms. Williams denies that she executed a deed to Respondent or, for that matter, anyone until she was paid for her property. Based on all of the documentary evidence received herein, including Respondents' testimony during the hearing, Respondents' version of the events concerning the allegations herein are credited to the extent that Respondents' version conflicts with the version adduced herein by Ms. Williams.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was organized because its principals perceived a need for a cold storage facility convenient to docks in Tampa where refrigerated cargoes were loaded on and off ships. Negotiations between petitioner and the Tampa Port Authority (TPA) resulted in EPA's leasing petitioner land suitable for such a facility for a term of 25 years, with options to renew the lease. After entering into a contract with a construction firm for erection of a cold storage facility on the land leased from TPA, petitioner sought to borrow money with which to pay for construction of the facility; but lenders petitioner approached objected that a loan could not be secured by a mortgage in the customary fashion, because petitioner did not own the land on which it proposed to build. Mortgage bankers in New York suggested an arrangement to meet this objection and petitioner adopted the suggestion. A new corporation, Edward Stephen of Tampa, INC. (EST), was formed. The lease between petitioner and TPA was vacated; TPA leased the same land on the same terms to EST. Petitioner assigned all its rights under the construction contract to EST. EST borrowed the money for construction from a bank. When construction was completed, EST borrowed money from John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (John Hancock) with which it repaid the bank loan. Petitioner guaranteed repayment of John Hancock`s loan to EST. As an additional inducement to John Hancock, petitioner undertook certain obligations for the life of the loan, with respect to maintenance of a minimum ratio of current assets, minimum working capital, and minimum net worth; petitioner made further undertakings which were similarly designed to increase the likelihood of petitioner's being able to repay John Hancock, in the event of EST's default. Once the cold storage facility was ready for use, EST subleased the property to petitioner. EST used petitioner's payments under the sublease to repay John Hancock, and continues to do so. If petitioner should fail to make the agreed payments under the sublease, EST would he unable to make repayments under its loan agreement with John Hancock, but EST could take possession of the cold storage facility in accordance with Section 30 of the sublease, in much the same way any lessor can dispossess his lessee for a material failure to abide by the terms of the lease. The sublease by EST to petitioner was entered into in conjunction with an option to purchase, a separate document which was subsequently amended. By virtue of the amended option to purchase, petitioner gained the right to acquire title to the cold storage facility, free of all claims except TPA's title to the fee, by paying EST at specified times an amount equivalent to what EST would have to pay John Hancock as full repayment of the loan, plus incidental sums to make EST whole. In this respect, the transaction resembles a loan by John Hancock to petitioner, with provision for prepayment. Petitioner carries the cold storage facility on its books as a capital asset against which depreciation is charged. Petitioner treats its payments to EST under the sublease as though they were repayments of the loan from John Hancock, allocating appropriate portions to principal and interest. On advice of counsel, the transaction is treated in the same fashion for federal income tax purposes.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner pay respondent 4 percent of all sums paid by petitioner to Edward Stephen of Tampa, Inc., under the agreement embodied in Joint Exhibit No. 2, together with interest calculated in accordance with the rule laid down in Lewis v. Creative Developers, Ltd., 350 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Edna Wilson, Esquire Dixon, Shear, Brown, Lima & Moffitt 620 Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Mr. Harold F.X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, William D. Manser (Respondent) was licensed in Florida as a real estate broker, having been issued license number BK 0427410. Respondent was a broker/officer of United Equity Marketing, Inc., located at 6635 West Commercial Boulevard, Tamarac, Florida. Since October 1, 1995, his broker's license has not been on an active status due to non-renewal of the corporate registration. By warranty deed dated February 14, 1992, James and Angela Cunduff became owners of property located at 6531 Southwest Seventh Place, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. By Articles of Agreement for Deed dated February 25, 1992, James and Angela Cunduff agreed to convey the property to Respondent's corporation, United Capital Networks, Inc., if certain conditions were complied with. The conditions included Respondent's corporation making all the mortgage payments and paying the taxes on the property, and keeping the buildings on the property properly insured. In return, James and Angela Cunduff agreed, among other things, to execute a warranty deed to Respondent's corporation and to place the warranty deed in escrow. Respondent and the Cunduffs agreed that the Articles of Agreement for Deed would not be recorded. Respondent looked upon himself and conducted his actions as the owner of the property at 6531 Southwest Seventh Place, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On October 31, 1995, Mary J. Augustine signed a lease agreement for the rental of a portion of the home, the rear of the home, located at 6531 Southwest Seventh Place, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The rear area of the home had its own entrance. The rental was for one year, beginning November 15, 1995, and ending October 30, 1996. Respondent used part of the home as a storage area. At the front of the home, there were two separate entrances. One of the separate entrances was for the storage area. The other separate entrance was for another area of the home. The lease agreement indicated United Equity Markets, Inc., as the managing agent of the property. The lease agreement required signatures of the "Tenant" and the "Lessor." Ms. Augustine signed the lease as "Tenant," and Respondent signed as "Lessor," adding the word "Agent" next to his signature. United Equity Markets, Inc., is Respondent's corporation. Prior to the signing of the lease, Respondent had met with Ms. Augustine at the house at least twice before she signed the lease agreement. Respondent represented himself as the manager of the property. The home was listed as a single-family residence. Ms. Augustine believed that the home would be occupied by Respondent, another tenant, and herself. The evidence is insufficient to show and make a finding that three families would live or had lived at the home. In accordance with the lease agreement, Ms. Augustine gave Respondent $1,290, as a security deposit. Ms. Augustine had also given Respondent, prior to the security deposit, $645 for the first month's rent. Ms. Augustine wanted to move into the rear portion of the home approximately two weeks prior to the beginning of the rental period. Respondent agreed that Ms. Augustine could have access to the home and clean the rear area where she was going to reside. Ms. Augustine had problems with, such things as, the refrigerator, oven, and swimming pool. She decided not to rent the home. Ms. Augustine demanded her deposit and first month's rent from Respondent. However, he refused to return the monies. The lease agreement contained a default provision, providing for the recovery of damages by the lessor if the tenant defaulted. The lease agreement also contained a security provision, providing for the non-refundable nature of the security deposit under certain conditions, including termination of the lease prior to its expiration. Ms. Augustine attempted but could not contact Respondent at his office because he had closed his office prior to October 1995. Ms. Augustine attempted also to contact Respondent at the telephone number that he had provided her, which was his home number. She was again unsuccessful due to Respondent having his telephone disconnected because he had gone to New York to care for his ill sister. Respondent did not provide Ms. Augustine with an accounting of the monies. Respondent was conducting his own personal real estate transaction with Ms. Augustine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against William D. Manser. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1999.
The Issue Whether or not the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, is entitled to documentary stamp tax in accordance with Section 201.02, Florida Statutes, in the amount of $326.10 and penalty in the like amount of $326.10 in accordance with Section 201.17, Florida Statutes, for a transaction between Petitioners in an assignment of interest of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc., to the Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners were the stockholders of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. Among the assets of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc., were the rights under a sublease undertaken between B.G.L. Corporation and Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. dated September 25, 1976 and recorded in Official Record Book 5663, at page 261 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida. This sublease was an amendment to a sublease which was dated June 1, 1976, recorded in Official Record Book 4768, Page 176 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, between B.G.L. Corporation, a Florida corporation as lessor, and KSJ Corporation, a Florida corporation as lessee. One of the conditions of Gallagher's lease obligation was responsibility for the payment of a mortgage dated May 1, 1965, recorded in Official Record Book 4592, at Page 161, of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, from KSJ Corporation, a Florida corporation to Joseph Z. Lipsky and Evalyn Lipsky, as amended by agreement dated August 30, 1965 between KSJ Corporation and Joseph Z. Lipsky and Evalyn Lipsky. Pursuant to a plan of liquidation of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. that corporation executed and delivered to Petitioners an assignment of the lessee's interest in the aforementioned lease to which Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. was a party. The assignment of lease can be found as Exhibit A to the Petition filed by the Petitioners. The contents of such assignment are found to be fact. By letters of July 30, 1975 and March 10, 1975, the Respondent indicated its intention to assess tax in the amount of $326.10 upon the document representing the assignment between Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. and the Petitioners. The amount of documentary stamp tax was premised on the aforementioned mortgage which at the time of the proposed assessment was valued at $108,750. In addition the Respondent indicated its intention to impose a penalty in a like amount of $326.10. The assignment was in fact executed, pursuant to a plan of liquidation, which plan is shown as Petitioners' Exhibit C attached to the petition. The Petitioners' Exhibit C is established as fact. Petitioners in receiving the assignment in liquidation of Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. received such assignment in proportion to their stock holdings in that corporation. The assessments of $326.10 for documentary stamp tax and $326.10 in penalty on such assessment, and the challenge to the assessments are the subject matter in this cause. Subsequent to the assignment of leases and agreement between Gallagher's of Miami, Inc. and the Petitioners a further assignment was made between the Petitioners and Stan-Mil, Inc. of the same property which took place on December 16, 1974.
Recommendation It is recommended that the assessment of documentary stamp tax under 201.02 F.S. in the amount of $326.10 and the penalty in the amount of $326.10, as a penalty pursuant to 201.17 F.S. be set aside. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Lewis M. Kanner, Esquire Williams, Salomon, Kanner & Damian 1003 DuPont Building 169 East Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131 Caroline C. Mueller, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================
