The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act against Petitioner pursuant to Chapter 70 of the Pinellas County Code, as amended, and Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a black female, is a member of a protected group. Respondent is an employer as defined in the Pinellas County Code, as amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Respondent hired Petitioner as a telemarketer on December 8, 1997. Petitioner's job required her to call the telephone numbers on a list furnished by Respondent. After making the call, Petitioner was supposed to solicit the booking of vacations in time-share rental units by reading from a script prepared by Respondent. The script included an offer to sell potential customers three vacations in three locations for $69. When Respondent hired Petitioner, she signed a copy of Respondent's "New Employee Policy and Procedures" manual. Petitioner admits that this manual required her to book 25 vacations each pay period after a two-week training period. She also admits that the manual required her to only use the prepared script, including preplanned rebuttals to customer questions when talking over the telephone. Petitioner understood that during the two-week training period, she would be required to book 14 vacations or be terminated. She knew that Respondent's supervisors would monitor her sales calls. Petitioner sold four vacation packages in her first week at work with no complaints from her supervisors. In fact, one of Respondent's supervisors known as Mike told Petitioner, "You got the juice." On December 15, 1997, Mike monitored one of Petitioner's calls. Petitioner admits that she did not use the scripted rebuttals in answering the customer's questions during the monitored call. Instead, she attempted to answer the customer's questions using her own words. According to Petitioner, she used "baby English" to explain the sales offer in simple terms that the customer could understand. After completing the monitored call on December 15, 1997, Mike told Petitioner to "stick to the shit on the script." Mike admonished Petitioner not to "candy coat it." Petitioner never heard Mike use profanity or curse words with any other employee. Before Petitioner went to work on December 16, 1997, she called a second supervisor known as Kelly. Kelly was the supervisor that originally hired Petitioner. During this call, Petitioner complained about Mike's use of profanity. When Kelly agreed to discuss Petitioner's complaint with Mike, Petitioner said she would talk to Mike herself. Petitioner went to work later on December 16, 1997. When she arrived, Mike confronted Petitioner about her complaint to Kelly. Petitioner advised Mike that she only objected to his language and hoped he was not mad at her. Mike responded, "I don't get mad, I get even." When Petitioner stood to stretch for the first time on December 16, 1997, Mike instructed her to sit down. Mike told Petitioner that he would get her some more leads. Mike also told Petitioner that she was "not the only telemarketer that had not sold a vacation package but that the other person had sixty years on her." Petitioner was aware that Respondent had fired an older native-American male known as Ray. Respondent hired Ray as a telemarketer after hiring Petitioner. When Petitioner was ready to leave work on December 17, 1997, a third supervisor known as Tom asked to speak to Petitioner. During this conversation, Tom told Petitioner that she was good on the telephone but that Respondent could not afford to keep her employed and had to let her go. Tom referred Petitioner to another company that trained telemarketers to take in-coming calls. Tom gave Petitioner her paycheck, telling her that he was doing her a favor. During Petitioner's employment with Respondent, she was the only black employee. However, apart from describing the older native American as a trainee telemarketer, Petitioner did not present any evidence as to the following: (a) whether there were other telemarketers who were members of an unprotected class; (b) whether Petitioner was replaced by a person outside the protected class; (c) whether Petitioner was discharged while other telemarketers from an unprotected class were not discharged for failing to follow the script or failing to book more than four vacations during the first ten days of employment; and (d) whether Petitioner was discharged while other telemarketers from an unprotected class with equal or less competence were retained. Petitioner was never late to work and never called in sick.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the City's Human Relations Review Board enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Boudreau Vacation Break 14020 Roosevelt Boulevard Suite 805 Clearwater, Florida 33762 Donna Conway 3156 Mount Zion Road No. 606 Stockbridge, Georgia 30281 William C. Falkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Stephanie Rugg, Hearing Clerk City of St. Petersburg Community Affairs Department Post Office Box 2842 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs, based on her sex or in retaliation for her opposition to an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013).2/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, was at all times relevant hereto an employee of the Florida Department of Elder Affairs. Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs (Respondent or Department), is the state agency responsible for administering human services programs for the elderly and for developing policy recommendations for long-term care. See § 430.03, Fla. Stat. (2015). Respondent operates a Comprehensive Assessment and Review for Long-Term Care (CARES) program to assess individuals for Medicaid long-term care services, whether in a nursing facility, in a private home, or in another community setting. The CARES program operates 19 offices statewide and one central office in Tallahassee. Medical assessments are conducted by CARES Assessors (CAs), and Senior CAs. CAs and Senior CAs are supervised by a Program Operations Administrator (POA) in each office, who reports to a Regional Program Supervisor (RPS). The RPS reports to the Deputy Bureau Chief in Tallahassee, who reports to the Bureau Chief; who, in turn, reports to the Division Director for Statewide and Community- Based Services. In January 2013, Petitioner began employment as a CA in Respondent’s Gainesville office. Petitioner began in a one-year probationary employment status. The record did not clearly establish how many individuals were employed in the Gainesville office with Petitioner. There was an office assistant, Rose Gonzalez; at least four other CAs, including Justin Keels; a registered nurse; and their supervisor, POA Sam Rutledge. Freadda Zeigler was the RPS for the region, which included the Gainesville, Tallahassee, Pensacola, Jacksonville, and Daytona Beach offices. Ms. Zeigler commuted from her home in Broward County. In Tallahassee, Jay Hudson was the Deputy Bureau Chief, Paula James was the Bureau Chief, Carol Carr was the Deputy Division Director, and Marcy Hajdukiewicz was the Division Director. The Gainesville territory covered from Marion County north to the Florida/Georgia line, west to the Leon County line, and east to the Duval County line. CAs were assigned to particular locations within the office’s jurisdiction. CAs traveled to both health care facilities (e.g., nursing homes, assisted living facilities) and private homes to meet with and personally evaluate the needs of the client. Petitioner was primarily assigned to cover facilities in Jasper, Live Oak, Dowling Park, Mayo, and Lake City. Petitioner was in the field conducting evaluations two to three times per week. Her assignments required some long commutes, up to one and one-half hours to Jasper (just south of the Georgia line) and over an hour to Dowling Park and Live Oak. In February 2013, a senior CA position became open in Gainesville. Both Petitioner and Mr. Keels applied and were interviewed for the position. Mr. Keels was selected for the position in March. As senior CA, Mr. Keels did not supervise other CAs in the Gainesville office, but was “put in charge” when Mr. Rutledge was out of the office. When Petitioner began her employment in Gainesville, she was told that a desk was being ordered for her. She was given a folding table to use in her workspace. Petitioner’s workspace was in an open area of the office. Other employees would pass through and occasionally gather in her workspace on breaks or on their way to lunch. Petitioner testified that Mr. Rutledge often came into the open area to interact with other employees around lunchtime to see if anyone wanted to “get food.” Sexual Harassment Claim4/ One day in late March 2013, Mr. Rutledge and Mr. Keels were in Petitioner’s workspace and began discussing a restaurant with the word “cooter” in its name. During this conversation, the two men stood on opposite sides of Petitioner’s worktable, where Petitioner was seated. One of the men asked Petitioner if she knew what the word “cooter” meant, and she responded that she did not. One of the men stated that it meant “vagina.” Petitioner testified that she was embarrassed, uncomfortable, and felt trapped at her worktable where the men stood on either side of her. Petitioner did not report this incident to anyone at first. Petitioner testified that she was afraid that if she said anything, she would be fired. Petitioner’s ambivalence was due in no small part to the fact that Mr. Rutledge was her supervisor. Petitioner described another incident that occurred shortly before the “cooter” incident. Mr. Rutledge called Petitioner into his office and asked her to look at a picture on his computer screen. The picture was of a woman in a bikini. Mr. Rutledge said something to the effect of “that is what my ex-wife used to look like.” Petitioner was embarrassed and left Mr. Rutledge’s office. Respondent maintains a sexual harassment policy of which Petitioner was aware. The policy provides, in part, that “[a]ny employee who believes that he or she is the victim of sexual harassment . . . may make an oral or written complaint to the General Counsel or Director of Internal & External Affairs within 365 days of the alleged discriminatory action.” In April 2013, approximately a week after the “cooter” incident, Respondent’s Inspector General Taroub King began an investigation of Mr. Rutledge, prompted by an anonymous complaint. Among the allegations investigated were that Mr. Rutledge borrowed money from employees, encouraged employees to participate in an investment scheme (or schemes), and utilized employees to witness signatures and notarize documents of a personal nature. The complaint described Mr. Rutledge as maintaining no management structure, lacking basic documentation, and essentially performing no work of any kind. Petitioner was interviewed in connection with the investigation by Ms. King and another investigator from the Inspector General’s office on April 4, 2013. Petitioner was placed under oath and her interview was audio-recorded. Petitioner was questioned about the allegations in the complaint against Mr. Rutledge, and she fully cooperated with the investigators. At the end of the interview, Ms. King asked Petitioner if she had any other information to relay. At that point, Petitioner reported that inappropriate comments and banter of a sexual nature occurred in the office. Petitioner did not report any other details. Ms. King asked Petitioner for particular examples. In response, Petitioner shared the “cooter” incident and the “bikini” incident. All of the employees in the Gainesville office were interviewed by Ms. King. Mr. Keels was interviewed after Petitioner and was questioned about the “cooter” incident and office banter of a sexual nature. At the final hearing, Petitioner maintained that there was both frequent sexual banter and inappropriate conversations in the Gainesville office. She testified that the staff nurse once referred to a patient as having “balls the size of a bull.” She also reported that Mr. Rutledge made hand gestures indicating that Ms. Gonzalez was large-breasted. Petitioner did not share these details with Ms. King during her interview. As with the “bikini” incident, Petitioner was able to walk away from, or otherwise ignore, the comments and gestures of a sexual nature in the workplace. Upon her return to Tallahassee, Ms. King reported her investigative findings to members of Respondent’s Human Resources Department, the Deputy Secretary, and the Director of Internal and External Affairs. Petitioner testified that she sent Ms. King an email sometime after her interview asking whether more information was needed from Petitioner regarding her complaints of inappropriate sexual comments in the workplace. Ms. King denied that Petitioner sent any follow-up email of that nature. Ms. King did recall an email from Petitioner requesting public records. Respondent terminated Mr. Rutledge on April 8, 2013, four days after Petitioner was interviewed by Ms. King. The decision to terminate Mr. Rutledge was made by management in the Tallahassee office. Both Mr. Hudson, the Deputy Bureau Chief, and Ms. James, the Bureau Chief, traveled from Tallahassee to Gainesville to terminate Mr. Rutledge. Ms. Zeigler was likewise present at the Gainesville office for the termination of Mr. Rutledge. However, Ms. Zeigler claimed not to have been informed ahead of time about the termination. She said the appearance of Mr. Hudson and Ms. James at the Gainesville office on April 8, 2013, was a surprise to her. In early May 2013, a significant remodel of the Gainesville office was initiated. The remodel created confusion in the Gainesville office, with furniture being moved around, office files and equipment being boxed up, and the general mess associated with construction in the workplace. At some point, Petitioner lost track of an entire box of her files and later found them on the floor under a pile of chairs she assumed the painters had moved.5/ Alleged Acts of Retaliation Respondent named Mr. Keels as Acting POA, effective April 8, 2013. Ms. James testified, credibly, that Mr. Keels was named Acting POA because he was the senior CA in the office. Mr. Keels was questioned about the “cooter” incident during his interview by the Inspector General. Thus, there is sufficient evidence from which the undersigned can infer that Mr. Keels was aware Petitioner had reported the “cooter” incident to the Inspector General during the investigation of Mr. Rutledge. Petitioner complained that she was ostracized by other employees in Gainesville after Mr. Rutledge was terminated. Petitioner also complained that Mr. Keels treated her unfairly in his capacity as acting POA. First, Petitioner maintained that Mr. Keels increased her caseload, from about 27 to about 44 cases, which made her job very difficult given the lengthy commutes to her assigned facilities. Petitioner introduced no evidence, other than her testimony, that her caseload substantially increased after Mr. Keels became acting POA. Petitioner complained to the Inspector General on April 4, 2013, that her caseload under Mr. Rutledge’s supervision was inordinately heavy. Petitioner also shared with the Inspector General that Mr. Keels, in his capacity as senior CA, was unfair in case distribution. Further, Petitioner testified that although her caseload was heavy in early May, it later declined. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Keels assigned Petitioner an inordinately heavy caseload following her complaints to the Inspector General and Mr. Keels’ temporary promotion to acting POA. Sometime after Mr. Keels became acting POA, he took away Petitioner’s worktable. According to Petitioner, Mr. Keels said he took the table for use in the conference room for “staffings,” a term that was not explained by any witness. Petitioner testified there were other tables available in the meeting room which could have been used for that purpose. For the next two months, Petitioner completed her in- office work at a window ledge. She placed her laptop and files on the ledge and utilized extra chairs for additional workspace. In June 2013, Petitioner was presented with a new desk. Petitioner’s Termination During Mr. Rutledge’s tenure as POA, the Bureau had rolled out significant changes to the CARES program. Those changes had not been implemented by Mr. Rutledge, much less communicated to the Gainesville staff. After Mr. Rutledge’s termination, CARES management began monitoring the Gainesville office very closely. During the next few months, Ms. Zeigler was more frequently present in the Gainesville office and was in almost constant contact with Mr. Hudson regarding the activities of the Gainesville office. However, Ms. Zeigler was unaware of any discussions Mr. Hudson may have had with the Bureau Chief or the Division Director. Shortly after Mr. Rutledge’s departure, Ms. Zeigler met with the Gainesville staff to explain new procedures. Among the procedures was a requirement to include on employees’ GroupWise calendars, an entry of every planned field visit. The CAs’ GroupWise calendars were accessible not only to their immediate supervising POA, but also to the RPS and higher-level managers. The calendar was an important management tool used by Respondent both to perform quality assurance checks and to monitor employee performance. On May 9, 2013, Ms. Zeigler sent the following email to the CAs in Gainesville: Good afternoon all, As mentioned in the past meeting in your office, it was requested that I be given access to your GroupWise calendars to help monitor accountability for field visits with Specialization. I would like to thank each of you for adhering to the request, and would like to ask each of you to add the following information to your calendars: First and Last name of client visiting Facility name where client will be visited Home address if visiting client in the home Purpose of visit Time of visit (include estimated travel time) * * * This information is needed for accountability purposes, and also used to check that assessments are being entered in CIRTS, per the attached CARES policy #PPH Update No2011_2, that is still currently in place. Effective immediately, I would like for each worker to add this information to their calendars prior to making a visit. You should also add any approved leave time that you will be taking as well. If your visit schedule changes, it needs to be noted on the calendar with the appropriate change. Please revisit this memo for a thorough understanding. On May 14, 2013, Ms. Zeigler sent an email to Petitioner informing Petitioner that information on her calendar was incorrect. On May 31, 2013, Ms. Zeigler issued a formal counseling memorandum to Petitioner for failure to list her client visits on her GroupWise calendar as directed. The following excerpt is especially relevant: You were instructed to submit your plans for field visits [sic] travel at least one day in advance of the actual travel. A review of your calendar clearly showed that you either did not put any information on your calendar as required and/or you entered incorrect data, for the following dates: April 16, 2013, May 6, 2013, May 7, 2013, May 9, 2013, May 10, 2013, and again on May 14, 2013. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not deny that she failed to enter required information on her calendar. Instead, Petitioner offered a series of excuses, including system connectivity issues, her travel schedule, and confusion regarding a transition from GroupWise to the Outlook calendar system. With regard to connectivity, Petitioner explained that there were problems connecting to the Department’s computer system from remote locations and, occasionally, in the Gainesville office. Petitioner likewise testified that she would not return home until 6:00 p.m. or later on days she traveled to Jasper and other remote field locations. Petitioner complained that connectivity issues prevented her access to GroupWise from home, and thus, was unable to enter the visits scheduled for the following day. Petitioner testified that she complained to the information technology department in Tallahassee about connectivity issues and diligently tried to address these concerns. Petitioner introduced in evidence an email exchange between herself and Ms. Zeigler in which she complained about, and Ms. Zeigler resolved, an issue with Petitioner’s access to CIRTS – the Department’s online case input system. The email string is dated July 17, 2013, well after the date of Petitioner’s documented missing calendar entries. Further, the email relates to access to the case input system and is irrelevant to Petitioner’s claim of issues with connectivity to the computer system in general. Finally, Petitioner explained that the Department changed from GroupWise to the Outlook system, and she was confused about whether to continue adding entries on her GroupWise calendar during that transition. In the May 31, 2013, counseling memorandum, Ms. Zeigler referred to the program’s transition from the GroupWise to the Outlook calendaring system, as follows: The Microsoft Outlook Email and Calendar program was installed on all computers in DOEA, migrating existing GroupWise information to the new Outlook program on May 28, 2013. Instruction videos and online documentation were made available to all DOEA employees to learn how to utilize the new program. You were instructed to give proxy access to the RPS via email from the acting Supervisor. It is evident that you were successful in accessing the Outlook Calendar, as you sent the RPS a request to share your calendar on May 30, 2013. On the same date, you left the office to go to the field at 12:55 p.m., and failed to update/place any information on your calendar before departing. The sign in sheet indicated that you were going to a nursing facility. This repeated failure to comply with procedures is unacceptable. As a result of this failure, your supervisor was unaware of what facility and/or client you were seeing and how long it would take time wise for the field visit. You effectively prohibited your supervisor from knowing your whereabouts and/or the client(s) to be seen. In light of the facts, Petitioner’s alleged confusion about whether to continue adding information to her GroupWise calendar is not credible. Petitioner did not send an Outlook calendar-sharing invite to Ms. Zeigler until May 30, 2013, well after her missing GroupWise calendar entries of April 16 and May 6, 7, 9, 10, and 14, 2013. Further, Petitioner failed to calendar her appointments the same day she sent Ms. Zeigler the calendar- sharing invitation, thus belying any excuse that she had connectivity issues, at least on that particular date. In an effort to minimize the significance of her failure to document her field visits on her calendar, Petitioner testified that she noted her field visits on a daily sign-in log physically maintained in the Gainesville office. Petitioner introduced a composite exhibit purporting to be copies of the daily sign-in logs from April, May, June, and July 2013. Even if the exhibit was reliable evidence of Petitioner’s whereabouts, the logs are irrelevant to the issue of whether Petitioner complied with the electronic calendaring requirement. No evidence was introduced to support a finding that the daily sign-in log was an acceptable alternative to Ms. Zeigler’s specific, clear, and repeated direction to all Gainesville employees to use their GroupWise, and later Outlook, calendars to note their planned field visits with required details. The evidence conflicted as to whether Ms. Zeigler’s May 31, 2013, counseling memorandum constituted discipline. Petitioner testified that the memorandum was a training tool. Ms. Zeigler testified alternately, and with hesitancy, that the memorandum was “almost like a verbal warning type of thing,” and “unofficially formal.” On cross-examination, Ms. Zeigler testified, “I don’t think that that would be a reason to fire somebody after one counseling memo. I mean that would be absurd.” Ms. James testified that the memorandum constituted a first-step disciplinary action. Ms. James explained that a counseling memorandum is preceded by a verbal warning from the supervisor. The Department’s disciplinary policy was not introduced in evidence. In light of Petitioner’s probationary employment status, the issue of whether the counseling memorandum constituted discipline is largely irrelevant. The counseling memorandum is evidence of poor job performance during Petitioner’s probationary employment period. At some point after Mr. Rutledge’s termination, the Department advertised for the open POA position. Both Petitioner and Mr. Keels applied for the position. Mr. Hudson and Ms. Zeigler conducted interviews for the position. Petitioner was not responsive to Ms. Zeigler’s efforts to schedule Petitioner’s interview for the position. Eventually, Ms. Zeigler did interview Petitioner for the position. Ms. Zeigler also interviewed Mr. Keels. In June 2013, Ms. Zeigler prepared performance evaluations of the Gainesville staff. Ms. Zeigler had little knowledge of staff performance prior to Mr. Rutledge’s termination, as Ms. Zeigler was new to the region. Ms. Zeigler gave all the Gainesville employees ratings of “3,” satisfactory performance, across the board. In late July 2013, Ms. Carr and Ms. Hajdukiewicz from the Tallahassee office came to the Gainesville office and personally terminated Mr. Keels. Ms. James did not directly make the decision to terminate Mr. Keels, but she agreed with the decision. Ms. James stated that Mr. Keels was terminated based on his actions after he became acting POA in Gainesville. Ms. James did not elaborate and neither counsel asked any follow-up question. On July 31, 2013, Ms. Carr and Ms. James came to the Gainesville office from Tallahassee, met with Petitioner, and offered her a choice of resignation or termination. Petitioner chose termination. That same day, after leaving the office, Petitioner called the Department of Human Resources and requested to change her termination to resignation. The request was granted. Petitioner did not ask why she was being terminated or asked to resign. Petitioner testified that neither Ms. Carr nor Ms. James gave her a reason. Ms. Zeigler resigned from the Department in October 2013. The circumstances of Ms. Zeigler’s resignation were not introduced in evidence. In that regard, Ms. Zeigler testified as follows: I had a lot of questions with the State that probably should not come up here, but there are a lot of questionable things that were going on with the State at the time which led to my resignation. So I did not question it. I did not question [Petitioner’s] termination based off of my ability to run the office, because I almost felt like it was being run above me.[6/] Ms. Zeigler’s testimony was introduced in support of Petitioner’s claims. However, Ms. Zeigler had difficulty recalling events, including the timing of relevant events. Of note, Ms. Zeigler testified that she was the RPS for Gainesville about a year, meaning she would have begun in the position in October 2012. Later, she testified that Mr. Rutledge was terminated “not long after I was there [as RPS].” Her testimony was hesitant, hedging, and sometimes conflicting. Ms. Zeigler testified that she was in daily contact with Mr. Hudson about issues in the Gainesville office after Mr. Rutledge was terminated, but claimed to have had no advance notice of either Mr. Keels’ or Petitioner’s termination. As such, the undersigned finds Ms. Zeigler’s testimony to be both unreliable and unpersuasive. Ms. Zeigler’s counseling memorandum to Petitioner regarding calendaring is credible evidence of Petitioner’s job performance which cannot be discounted by Ms. Zeigler’s after-the-fact, and apparently biased, testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs, did commit an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, and prohibiting the practice. However, under the specific facts of the case, the undersigned recommends no affirmative relief from the effects of the practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a financial company that owns and services student loans. Petitioner is a black female. She was employed in Respondent’s Florida Loan Servicing Center (Service Center) on two separate occasions. The first time she worked for Respondent from September 1989 until September 1990. During that time, Petitioner did not experience anything that she felt was racial discrimination at the Service Center. Petitioner left her initial period of employment with Respondent by resigning and moving to South Florida. Petitioner subsequently returned to Panama City, Florida. Initially, she worked for the Bay County School Board. Thereafter, from July 2001 to November 2001, she returned to work as a Loan Origination Representative (LOR) for Respondent through a temporary agency, Kelly Services. In August 2001, Petitioner received a training evaluation, which indicated that Petitioner was meeting all expectations. In November 2001, Petitioner converted to a regular employee position with Respondent. Petitioner received her 90-day initial review in February 2002. According to her written evaluation, Petitioner needed to improve in two areas: (a) successfully meeting the goals established during the 90-day initial review period; and (b) demonstrating initiative and resourcefulness in work performance. The evaluation states as follows in relevant part: A discussion was held with Millie regarding her productivity for application and phone call processing during the review period. At that time, Millie was placed on a verbal warning for her performance. She currently averages 3.65 applications per hour. The department standard is 5 applications per hour. Millie also currently averages 6.66 calls per hour for the review period. The department standard is 8 calls per hour. Pursuant to this evaluation, Respondent extended Petitioner's 90-day initial review period for a 30-day period in which Petitioner was required to perform according to Respondent's standards. The evaluation advised Petitioner that failure to meet standards might result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment. In March 2002, Respondent selected Petitioner to represent the National Team for Private Credit Originations. This designation required Petitioner to undergo two days of additional training. Respondent has well-disseminated policies prohibiting discrimination and harassment on the basis of race. These policies are available to employees through Respondent’s Employee Reference Manual and Code of Business Conduct. Respondent’s internal website also contains employee-related information such as policies, notices and the company’s equal employment opportunity and anti-harassment policies. Further, Respondent distributes an annual affirmation of its anti- discrimination and anti-harassment/anti-retaliation policies via e-mail. Petitioner knew of Respondent’s commitment to diversity. Petitioner became aware of Respondent’s equal employment opportunity and anti-harassment/anti-retaliation policies immediately upon being employed with Respondent. In November 2001, Petitioner received Respondent’s Employee Reference Manual, Respondent's Code of Business Conduct, and a copy of Respondent’s annual reaffirmation of its anti- harassment/anti-retaliation policies. The annual reaffirmation outlined the procedure an employee should follow to report discrimination or harassment, and provided several avenues for reporting such conduct. Petitioner was also aware that Respondent had an internal website with employee information. Respondent’s anti-harassment policy prohibits retaliation against employees who report harassment. The policy also protects employees who participate in an investigation of a claim of harassment. Petitioner knew individuals in Respondent’s Human Resources Department. For example, when Petitioner first interviewed for a job with Respondent, she met Joni Reich, Respondent’s vice president of human resources. From July 2002 to November 2002, Petitioner’s immediate supervisor was Paul Wunstell. Mr. Wunstell was Respondent's supervisor of Private Credit Originations. In early July 2002, Bobby Wiley, Respondent’s human resources director for the Service Center was counseling an employee for performance issues when the employee made an internal discrimination complaint. The employee stated that a supervisor had made a racially discriminatory comment about the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday. The employee told Mr. Wiley that Petitioner could confirm the racially derogatory comment. On July 19, 2002, Petitioner was asked to go to the human resources department. Upon her arrival, Petitioner met Mr. Wiley for the first time. Mr. Wiley directed Petitioner to a conference room. Mr. Wiley explained that he had asked Petitioner to meet with him because he was investigating a discrimination complaint made by another employee about a supervisor who might have said something derogatory about the Martin Luther King, Jr., holiday. He explained that he had been told that Petitioner might have some knowledge about these events. Several times, Mr. Wiley asked Petitioner whether she knew of any racial discrimination at the Service Center and whether she had heard a supervisor make a racially derogatory comment. Petitioner denied being aware of any race discrimination at Respondent's facility. Petitioner stated that she did not want to talk to Mr. Wiley. Although Petitioner understood that she was required to report discrimination, she did not provide Mr. Wiley any information supporting or corroborating the complaint that he was investigating. During the meeting, Petitioner appeared nervous. She told Mr. Wiley that she was uncomfortable meeting with him. Mr. Wiley replied that their conversation would be confidential, “between the two of them,” or words to that effect. Petitioner mistakenly interpreted Mr. Wiley’s comment to mean that he would do nothing with any information provided by Petitioner and that he simply wanted to “contain” or cover up the issue of possible discrimination. Petitioner did not ask Mr. Wiley to clarify what he meant by his statement that their conversation would be “between the two of them.” During his meeting with Petitioner, Mr. Wiley conducted himself in a professional manner. However, because he was eating ice cream when he met with Petitioner and did not have a note pad, Petitioner mistakenly thought he did not take allegations of discrimination seriously. Mr. Wiley was eating an ice cream bar that had been distributed around the human resources department immediately before Petitioner came to see him. The conversation between Mr. Wiley and Petitioner lasted approximately ten minutes. Mr. Wiley thanked Petitioner for meeting with him. Mr. Wiley stated that he was glad to hear there was no discrimination at Respondent’s facility because Respondent would not tolerate discrimination. Petitioner then left the conference room. After the July 19, 2002, meeting, Petitioner never contacted Mr. Wiley to complain of discrimination or retaliation. Additionally, Petitioner’s supervisor, Mr. Wunstall, never knew about Mr. Wiley’s meeting with Petitioner. On or about July 1, 2002, Respondent advised all employees serving as LORs that they would be required to attend a training class on July 13, 2002. The purpose of the class was to ensure the proper handling of Laureate School Accounts for Private Credit Originations. Each employee needed an active Laureate computer ID and password in order to participate in the hands-on training. As instructed, Petitioner immediately advised Respondent that she did not have access to the Laureate software on her computer. On July 8, 2002, Respondent sent Petitioner an e-mail regarding her Laureate computer password. After receiving the password, Petitioner still could not gain the appropriate computer access. On July 9, 2002, Petitioner informed Respondent that she did not have the Laureate software installed on her personal computer. Respondent then made arrangements for Petitioner to test her password on another computer. Respondent also arranged to have the Laureate icon placed on Petitioner's computer. On July 23, 2002, Petitioner wrote a letter to Ms. Reich complaining about her meeting with Mr. Wiley. The letter stated that, although she had not told Mr. Wiley about it, Petitioner thought there was racial discrimination at the Service Center. Petitioner’s letter indicated that she wanted to make a statement concerning discrimination against blacks. In the letter, Petitioner requested information on Respondent’s policies and procedures to report such discrimination. Mr. Wunstell never knew that Petitioner had sent a letter to Ms. Reich complaining about racial discrimination. On July 29, 2002, Petitioner allegedly fainted at work due to panic attacks. Respondent's staff called an ambulance that took Petitioner to the hospital. Petitioner claims she was absent from work for three consecutive days without calling her supervisor and without being terminated for abandoning her job. On August 2, 2002, Petitioner received a letter from Ms. Reich. In the letter, Ms. Reich apologized for Mr. Wiley's failure to handle the meeting with Petitioner in a manner that Petitioner felt was appropriate. Ms. Reich told Petitioner that Respondent viewed discrimination complaints seriously and she included a copy of the anti-harassment policy, which outlined procedures for reporting harassment or discrimination. Ms. Reich explained several avenues to report discrimination. Ms. Reich’s letter also indicated that she and senior director of human resources, Joyce Shaw, would be in Florida within the next two weeks. In the letter, Ms. Reich asked Petitioner to meet with them to discuss her concerns and to promptly address any alleged discrimination. On August 12, 2002, Petitioner received an e-mail from Ms. Shaw to schedule a meeting on August 19, 2002. The text of the e-mail did not state the reason why Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich wanted to meet with Petitioner, but Petitioner knew the reason for the meeting. The e-mail asked Petitioner to contact Ms. Shaw either on her cellular telephone or by e-mail to schedule the meeting. Mr. Wunstell did not have the capability to access Petitioner’s e-mail messages and there is no evidence that he saw Ms. Shaw’s e-mail. On August 19, 2002, Petitioner met with Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich for approximately one hour. Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich listened to Petitioner’s concerns. They were pleasant to Petitioner during the meeting. During the August 19, 2002, meeting, Petitioner first complained that Mr. Wiley had been disrespectful or inattentive during their July 19, 2002, meeting. Petitioner also told Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich about her feelings that black employees were treated differently in the workplace. This was the first time that Petitioner discussed her race discrimination concerns with anyone who worked for Respondent. When pressed for more specific information, Petitioner stated that: (a) she felt black employees received different training than non-black employees; and (b) black employees’ questions were not answered as promptly or as thoroughly as the questions of non-black employees. Petitioner did not provide Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich with specific examples of racially discriminatory behavior or the names of any minority employees who Petitioner felt experienced discrimination. That same day, after the meeting with Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich, Petitioner provided Ms. Shaw with several e-mails about the Laureate computer training. The e-mails did not illustrate any mistreatment of Petitioner. During the August 19, 2002, meeting, Petitioner told Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich that she was experiencing panic attacks. Ms. Reich suggested that Petitioner take advantage of Respondent’s employee assistance program for the alleged panic attacks. Ms. Reich and Ms. Shaw told Petitioner that they would look into her concerns. They did not tell her they would contact her again in the future. Instead, Ms. Reich gave her business card to Petitioner in case she needed to contact Ms. Reich in the future. After the August 19, 2002 meeting, Petitioner did not contact Ms. Reich or Ms. Shaw again during her employment with Respondent. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that she complained to Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich about the following: (a) supervisor Melanie Childree's reference to the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday as "spook day"; (b) three employees telling an African American manager not to go to the "master cube," which Petitioner felt was a racial reference to "slave talk"; (c) a hearsay statement from a student's mother who called another employee at the Service Center to accuse a white customer service representative of calling her daughter "stupid nigger"; and (d) where a black supervisor was married to a white woman, one employee allegedly said he was "going to string [the black supervisor] up for messing with our women." Apparently all of these alleged incidents occurred before Petitioner's July 19, 2002, meeting with Mr. Wiley. The most persuasive evidence regarding these allegations is that Petitioner did not report them to Ms. Shaw or Ms. Reich or anyone else in Respondent's chain of command. Instead, the complaints that Petitioner shared with Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich on August 19, 2002, were non-specific generalizations. Moreover, Mr. Wunstell was never aware of Petitioner’s meeting with Ms. Reich and Ms. Shaw to complain about discrimination. Petitioner does not know what steps, if any, Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich took after their meeting to look into her concerns. At the hearing, Ms. Shaw testified that she investigated Petitioner’s concerns and found them to be unfounded. First, Ms. Shaw reviewed the e-mails provided by Petitioner but did not find anything inappropriate in their contents. Second, Ms. Shaw interviewed the director in charge of Petitioner’s department, Ann Nelson. Ms. Nelson explained that the process by which employee questions were answered made it unlikely that employees could be singled out due to their race. According to Ms. Nelson, all employee questions were directed to a central telephone helpline staffed by supervisors or senior employees who randomly responded to calls. Ms. Shaw correctly concluded that it would be difficult for racially discriminatory behavior to occur in such context. Third, Ms. Nelson assured Ms. Shaw that training was the same for all employees. Student loans are heavily regulated by federal law and thus, the manner in which employees handle borrowers is regulated, making Petitioner’s concerns about unequal employee training unfounded. Finally, Ms. Shaw spoke to the person in charge at the Service Center, Renee Mang, to determine if Ms. Mang was aware of any racial discrimination concerns at the facility. Ms. Mang, whose office was in close proximity to Petitioner’s cubicle, indicated that she was not aware of any racially discriminatory behavior in the workplace and that no one had complained to her about discrimination. After the investigation, Ms. Shaw was unable to corroborate Petitioner’s racial discrimination allegations. On or about September 30, 2002, Respondent gave Petitioner a verbal warning regarding her phone quality control average. The department's expected call productivity average was 8 calls per hour at the minimum level of customer service. From July 1, 2002, to September 25, 2002, Petitioner's average was 7.5 calls per hour. Once again, Petitioner was given 30 days to meet the department's performance goal of at least 9 calls per hour at Petitioner's level of customer service. On October 8, 2002, while employed with Respondent, Petitioner applied for full-time employment with the Bay County School Board. Petitioner applied for employment in the school system because she felt a lot was going on at Respondent’s facility and her mental health counselor suggested she look for employment elsewhere. Petitioner had followed Ms. Reich’s suggestion and enrolled in mental health counseling through Respondent’s employee assistance program. Respondent accommodated Petitioner by adjusting her work schedule and allowing her to report for work late on the days she had appointments with her mental health counselor. For example, on or about October 24, 2002, Respondent requested an adjustment in her work schedule so she could attend a mental health counseling session. Respondent accommodated Petitioner's request. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that Respondent adjusted the work schedule of a white female LOR to match the work schedule of her husband who also worked for Respondent. The husband's work schedule required him to work until 7:30 p.m. every day. According to Petitioner, the schedule adjustment resulted in the white female employee having no work to perform for 30 minutes per day after the phones shut down at 7:00 p.m. However, there is no evidence that Petitioner or any other employee ever made a similar request for a work schedule accommodation under similar circumstances. On October 29, 2002, Petitioner suffered a workers’ compensation accident. A telephone headpiece flicked off and hit Petitioner across the face, resulting in an uncomfortable feeling and a small chip on her tooth. On October 30, 2002, Petitioner reported the accident to Respondent’s Benefits Specialist, Kristi Scott and requested to see a dentist. From that time on, Petitioner and Ms. Scott communicated directly with each other regarding treatment for Petitioner’s injury. Ms. Scott kept Petitioner updated on her progress locating a dentist that would accept Petitioner as a patient for a workers' compensation claim. Mr. Wunstell was not involved in arranging for treatment for Petitioner’s injury. Petitioner was not required to channel her communications with Ms. Scott through Mr. Wunstell. On October 31, 2002, Ms. Scott sent Petitioner an e-mail stating that Ms. Scott had been unable to locate a dentist who would see Petitioner as a workers' compensation patient. Ms. Scott's e-mail directed Petitioner to see any dentist of her choice to treat her injury. Ms. Scott told Petitioner that Respondent would reimburse her for any out-of- pocket expenses that resulted from her dental visit. Petitioner did not suffer immobilization as a result of the injury to her mouth and she did not have to undergo treatment as a result of her injury. Petitioner did not feel her condition was an emergency. In fact, she did not see a dentist immediately because neither her regular dentist nor other dentists considered her mouth injury an emergency. Following the October 29, 2002, mouth injury, Petitioner continued working. She worked full days the rest of the week: October 30, 2002, through November 1, 2002. On Monday, November 4, 2002, Petitioner did not show up for work. Instead, that morning Petitioner drove herself to her mental health counseling session. After her counseling session, around noon, Petitioner called Mr. Wunstell from home. During this telephone conversation Petitioner told Mr. Wunstell that she had seen a doctor in the morning. She also told Mr. Wunstell that her mouth was in severe pain, and she was trying to find a dentist who would see her. At the time of Petitioner's conversation with Ms. Wunstell, Petitioner had made appointments with two dentists. Petitioner typically worked until 7 p.m. During their noon telephone conversation, Mr. Wunstell specifically asked Petitioner whether she was planning to return to work that day. Petitioner responded that she would be returning to work later that day. Petitioner did not tell him that she was unable to work, nor did she request time off work. Petitioner alleges that she told Mr. Wunstell during their November 4, 2002, telephone conversation that her neck was bothering her, that she needed to see a doctor, in addition to a dentist, that she was unable to work and that she asked Mr. Wunstell to have Ms. Scott call her at home. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner did not mention any of these things during her telephone conversation with Mr. Wunstell. Petitioner made no effort to obtain Ms. Scott’s telephone number. After her November 4, 2002, call to Mr. Wunstell, Petitioner made no effort to contact Ms. Scott directly regarding her workers' compensation injury, despite the fact that Petitioner and Ms. Scott had been communicating directly about the injury until that time. Petitioner did not show up for work the rest of the week of November 4, 2002. She did not call Mr. Wunstell or anyone else at Respondent’s office during the week of November 4, 2002, to inform them of her condition or her expected return to work date. Respondent has a job abandonment policy. An employee who is absent from work for three consecutive days without notifying his/her immediate supervisor will be considered to have voluntarily resigned or abandoned his/her job. Respondent’s job abandonment policy applies to all employees, including those who are injured on the job. When an employee is a no call/no show for three consecutive days, the job abandonment policy is applied in a fairly automatic manner. The employee’s immediate supervisor does not call the employee at home. Instead, the supervisor contacts Teresa Jones in the human resources department, indicates that the employee has been a “no call/no show” for three consecutive days, and directs the human resources department to send a termination letter. This type of transaction is handled by lower-ranking human resources department employees at the Service Center, and neither Mr. Wiley nor Ms. Shaw participated in the process of sending out termination letters. When Petitioner did not come to work and failed to contact Mr. Wunstell after their November 4, 2002, conversation, Mr. Wunstell instructed Ms. Jones to send Petitioner a letter informing of her termination for job abandonment. There is no evidence that Ms. Shaw, Ms. Reich or Mr. Wiley influenced Mr. Wunstell’s decision to request that Respondent send Petitioner a termination letter pursuant to the job abandonment policy. By letter dated November 8, 2002, Respondent informed Petitioner that, pursuant to the company’s job abandonment policy, she was deemed to have voluntarily abandoned her job by being absent for three consecutive days without contacting her supervisor after November 4, 2002. Respondent’s letter encouraged Petitioner to contact Ms. Jones if she had any questions regarding Respondent’s letter. Also attached to the termination letter was an Exit Interview questionnaire and postage pre-paid envelope. The questionnaire asked Petitioner to explain why she had resigned her employment. Petitioner did not return the questionnaire and made no effort to contact Respondent to protest, contest, or clarify her employment status. After receiving the November 8, 2002, letter, Petitioner did not file a petition for unemployment compensation benefits. Instead, on November 17, 2002, exactly two weeks after the last day She came to work for Respondent, Petitioner began working with the Bay County School District. Mr. Wunstell did not apply Respondent’s job abandonment policy to Petitioner for retaliatory reasons because he did not know of her alleged protected activity. Mr. Wunstell may not have terminated Petitioner in July 2002 when she was absent for three days. However, Mr. Wunstell has otherwise consistently and non-discriminatorily enforced the job abandonment policy and has terminated numerous employees pursuant to the job abandonment policy. There is no evidence that Respondent applied its job abandonment policy differently to Petitioner than it did to other employees. During the year 2002 and the first few months of 2003, Respondent terminated 28 employees pursuant to its job abandonment policy. Of these 28 employees, 25 were white, and none had complained about discrimination or participated in a discrimination investigation. Except for Petitioner's three-day absence in July 2002, there is no evidence of any other employee who violated Respondent’s job abandonment policy by being absent from work for three consecutive days without calling and who was not terminated. In January 2003, almost two months after her separation from Respondent, Petitioner wrote a letter to Al Lord, Respondent’s CEO. The letter incorrectly alleged that Respondent had not provided assistance in obtaining dental treatment for Petitioner’s on-the-job tooth injury. The letter for the first time informed Respondent that Petitioner felt she was involuntarily terminated. Unlike Petitioner’s testimony at the final hearing, the letter to Mr. Lord did not allege that Petitioner had told Mr. Wunstell on November 4, 2002, that she needed to see both a dentist and a doctor for her injury. Likewise, the letter did not allege that Petitioner asked Mr. Wunstell to have Ms. Scott call her at home. On February 11, 2003, Petitioner received a letter from Ms. Shaw. The letter informed Petitioner that she had looked into the allegations contained in the letter to Mr. Lord and had found them to be unsupported and inaccurate. Ms. Shaw's letter concluded as follows: (a) Respondent non-discriminatorily and consistently enforced its job abandonment policy; and (b) Respondent had assisted Petitioner in obtaining treatment for her dental injury. Finally, the letter questioned why, if she had not intended to voluntarily quit her job, Petitioner had made no effort to contact Respondent upon receipt of her November 8, 2002, termination letter. On March 15, 2003, Petitioner wrote a letter to Ms. Shaw. In the letter, Petitioner did not allege that she had told Mr. Wunstell on November 4, 2002, that she needed to see a doctor, in addition to a dentist, as a result of her mouth injury. Petitioner’s letter also did not state that she had asked Mr. Wunstell to tell Ms. Scott to call her at home regarding an appointment with a doctor. Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the FCHR on June 2, 2003. During the processing of her charge of discrimination, Petitioner complained that Respondent had improperly withheld from her last payroll check a portion of her pay for 66 hours of accrued, unused vacation time. This was the first time Respondent learned of this allegation. Although Petitioner believed that Mr. Wunstell had given instructions for Respondent to withhold a portion of her vacation pay, she never contacted Mr. Wunstell or Respondent’s human resources department to report or challenge this incorrect deduction. When, after the filing of the charge, Respondent received information about the incorrect deduction, it immediately investigated and reimbursed Petitioner for the incorrect deduction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Millie Carlisle 105 Detroit Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Luisette Gierbolini, Esquire Zinober & McCrea, P.A. Post Office Box 1378 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 800 Tampa, Florida 33601-1378 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received notice of the August 19, 2005, administrative hearing, and if not, whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. In the fall of 2004, Petitioner's cousin, Barry Walker, worked for Respondent as a cook. Mr. Walker recommended that Respondent hire Petitioner as a dishwasher. James Pigneri, Respondent's owner, interviewed Petitioner and decided to hire him as a dishwasher on a trial basis. Petitioner began washing dishes for Respondent in September 2004. In October 2004, Petitioner began a 90-day probationary period as Respondent's dishwasher. At that time, PMI Employee Leasing (PMI) became Petitioner's co-employer. PMI has a contractual relationship with Respondent. Through this contract, PMI assumes responsibility for Respondent's human resource issues, payroll needs, employee benefits, and workers’ compensation coverage. On October 10, 2004, Petitioner signed an acknowledgement that he had received a copy of PMI's employee handbook, which included PMI's policies on discrimination, harassment, or other civil rights violations. The handbook states that employees must immediately notify PMI for certain workplace claims, including but not limited to, claims involving release from work, labor relation problems, and discrimination. The handbook requires employees to inform PMI within 48 hours if employment ceases for any reason. PMI's discrimination and harassment policies provide employees with a toll-free telephone number. When an employee makes a complaint or files a grievance, PMI performs an investigation and takes any corrective action that is required. The cook-line in Respondent's kitchen consist of work stations for all sauté and grill cooks. The cook-line runs parallel to a row of glass windows between the kitchen and the dining room and around the corner between the kitchen and the outside deck. Customers in the dining room and on the deck can see all of the cooks preparing food at the work stations along the cook-line. On the evening of December 18, 2004, Respondent's business was crowded with customers in the dining room and on the deck. On December 18, 2004, Petitioner was working in Respondent's kitchen. Sometime during the dinner shift, Petitioner was standing on the cook-line near the windows, talking to a cook named Bob. Petitioner was discussing a scar on his body. During the discussion, Petitioner raised his shirt, exposing his chest, arm, and armpit. The cook named Bob told Petitioner to put his shirt down. Erin Pigneri, a white male, is the son of Respondent's owner, James Pignari. As one of Respondent's certified food managers, Erin Pigneri must be vigilant about compliance with health code regulations when he works as Respondent's shift manager. Erin Pigneri has authority to recommend that employees be fired, but his father, James Pigneri, makes the final employment decision. On December 18, 2004, Erin Pigneri, was working as Respondent's manager and was in charge of the restaurant because his father was not working that night. When Erin Pigneri saw Petitioner with his shirt raised up, he yelled out for Petitioner put his shirt back on and to get off the cook-line. Erin Pigneri was alarmed to see Petitioner with his shirt off on the cook-line because customers could see Petitioner and because Petitioner's action violated the health code. Petitioner's reaction was immediately insubordinate. Petitioner told Erin Pigneri that he could not speak to Petitioner in that tone of voice. Erin Pigneri had to tell Petitioner several times to put his shirt on, explaining that Petitioner was committing a major health-code violation. When Petitioner walked up to Erin Pigneri, the two men began to confront each other using profanity but no racial slurs. Erin Pigneri finally told Petitioner that, "I'm a 35- year-old man and no 19-year-old punk is going to talk to me in that manner and if you don't like it, you can leave." Erin Pigneri did not use a racial slur or tell Petitioner to "paint yourself white." After the confrontation, Erin Pigneri left the kitchen. Petitioner went back to work, completing his shift without further incident. Petitioner did not have further conversation with Erin Pigneri on the evening of December 18, 2004. Erin Pigneri did not discuss Petitioner or the shirt incident with any of the waiters or any other staff members that night. On Monday evening, December 20, 2004, Erin Pigneri was in the restaurant when Petitioner and his cousin, Mr. Walker, came to work. Petitioner was dressed in nicer clothes than he usually wore to work. Mr. Walker approached Erin and James Pigneri, telling them that they needed to have a meeting. Erin and James Pigneri followed Petitioner and Mr. Walker into the kitchen. The conversation began with Mr. Walker complaining that he understood some racist things were going on at the restaurant. Mr. Walker wanted talk about Erin Pigneri's alleged use of the "N" word. Erin Pigneri did not understand Mr. Walker's concern because Mr. Walker had been at work on the cook-line during the December 18, 2004, shirt incident. According to Petitioner's testimony at the hearing, Mr. Walker had talked to a waiter over the weekend. The waiter was Mr. Walker's girlfriend. Petitioner testified that the waiter/girlfriend told Mr. Walker that she heard Erin Pigneri use the "N" word in reference to Petitioner after Erin Pigneri left the kitchen after the shirt incident on December 18, 2004. Petitioner testified that neither he nor Mr. Walker had first- hand knowledge of Erin Pigneri's alleged use the "N" word in the dining room. Neither Mr. Walker nor the waiter provided testimony at the hearing. Accordingly, this hearsay evidence is not competent evidence that Erin Pigneri used a racial slur in the dining room after the "shirt incident." During the meeting on December 20, 2004, Erin Pigneri explained to Petitioner and Mr. Walker that the incident on December 18, 2004, involved Petitioner's insubordination and not racism. Mr. Walker wanted to know why Erin Pigneri had not fired Petitioner on Saturday night if he had been insubordinate. Erin Pigneri told Mr. Walker that he would have fired Petitioner but he did not want Respondent to lose Mr. Walker as an employee. Apparently, it is relatively easy to replace a dishwasher but not easy to replace a cook like Mr. Walker. Erin Pigneri asked Mr. Walker and another African- American who worked in the kitchen whether they had ever heard him make derogatory racial slurs. There is no persuasive evidence that Erin Pigneri ever made such comments even though Petitioner occasionally, and in a joking manner, called Erin Pigneri slang names like Cracker, Dago, and Guinea. Petitioner was present when Mr. Walker and Erin Pigneri discussed the alleged racial slurs. Petitioner's only contribution to the conversation was to repeatedly ask whether he was fired. Erin Pigneri never told Petitioner he was fired. After hearing Mr. Walker's concern and Erin Pigneri's explanation, James Pigneri specifically told Petitioner that he was not fired. James Pigneri told Petitioner that he needed to talk to Erin Pigneri and that they needed to work things out, man-to-man. After the meeting, Mr. Walker began his work for the evening shift on December 20, 2004. Petitioner walked around talking on his cell phone, telling his mother that he had been fired and she needed to pick him up. James Pigneri told Petitioner again that he was not fired, that Petitioner should go talk to Erin Pigneri, and that Erin Pigneri was waiting to talk to Petitioner. Erin Pigneri waited in his office for Petitioner to come in to see him. Petitioner never took advantage of that opportunity. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that James Pigneri made an alleged racial slur in reference to Petitioner at some unidentified point in time. According to Petitioner, he learned about the alleged racial slur second-hand from a cook named Bob. Bob did not testify at the hearing; therefore, there is no competent evidence that James Pigneri ever made a racial slur in reference to Petitioner or any other employee. Contrary to PMI's reporting procedures, Petitioner never called or informed PMI that he had been harassed, discriminated against, fired, terminated, or ceased working for Respondent for any reason. On December 22, 2004, PMI correctly concluded that Petitioner had voluntarily terminated or abandoned his employment. When Petitioner filed his Employment Complaint of Discrimination on January 11, 2005, Petitioner listed his address as 6526 Lance Street, Panama City, Florida, which is his mother's residence. On April 18, 2005, FCHR sent the Determination: No Cause to Petitioner at 6501 Pridgen Street, Panama City, Florida, which is the address of one of Petitioner's friends. When Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief on May 25, 2005, Petitioner listed his address the same as his mother's home. FCHR transmitted the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings, indicating that Petitioner's address of record was the same as his friend's home. Therefore, the June 9, 2005, Notice of Hearing, and the July 12, 2005, Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing were sent to Petitioner at his friend's address. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that between January 2005 and August 2005, he lived back and forth between his mother's and his friend's residences. When he lived with his friend, Petitioner did not check his mail at his mother's home every day. However, Petitioner admitted that he received the June 9, 2005, Notice of Hearing, scheduling the hearing for July 18, 2005, and the July 12, 2005, Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing for August 19, 2005. Petitioner testified that he knew the first hearing was rescheduled to take place on August 19, 2005. According to Petitioner, he misplaced the "papers" identifying the location of the hearing at the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims in Panama City, Florida. Petitioner asserts that he went to the county courthouse on August 19, 2005, based on his erroneous belief that the hearing was to take place at that location. After determining that there was no administrative hearing scheduled at the county courthouse on August 19, 2005, Petitioner did not attempt to call FCHR or the Division of Administrative Hearings. On December 1, 2005, the undersigned sent Petitioner a Notice of Hearing, scheduling the hearing after remand for January 25, 2005. The December 1, 2005, Notice of Hearing was sent to Petitioner at his mother's and his friend's addresses. The copy of the notice sent to his friend's home was returned as undeliverable. During the hearing on January 25, 2005, Petitioner testified that he used one of the earlier notices (dated June 9, 2005, and/or July 12, 2005) to locate the hearing site for that day. This was necessary because Petitioner had misplaced the December 1, 2005, Notice of Hearing. All three notices have listed the hearing site as the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims, 2401 State Avenue, Panama City, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary R. Wheeler, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod Pope & Weaver, P.A. Post Office Box 550770 Jacksonville, Florida 32255-0770 Marlow Williams 6526 Lance Street Panama City, Florida 32404
The Issue Whether Petitioner failed to timely file her Petition for Relief following the Florida Commission on Human Relations' No Cause Determination? Whether Petitioner failed to timely file a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations with respect to her claim of harassment? Whether Respondent promptly and thoroughly investigated Petitioner's claim of sexual harassment? Whether Respondent took measures reasonably calculated to end and prevent any alleged sexual harassment? Whether Petitioner suffered from a disability, and, if so, what was the nature of her disability. Whether Respondent provided Petitioner with a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability? Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her sex and/or disability? Whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner for complaining of sexual harassment?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed her Charge of Discrimination against Respondent on August 29, 2002. FCHR issued a No Cause Determination and Notice of Determination: No Cause on May 12, 2003. Petitioner filed her Petition for Relief on June 20, 2003. This was 39 days after the No Cause Determination was issued. Petitioner failed to show good cause for the delay in filing. Petitioner worked as an apprentice operator at Respondent's Stanton Energy Center ("Energy Center"), during the relevant time period, under the supervision of Wade Gillingham ("Gillingham"), manager of Operations for the Energy Center. Respondent is an employer under the FCRA. On or about July 5, 2001, Petitioner expressed some concern to Gillingham about a co-worker, Tim Westerman ("Westerman"), potentially hurting himself or others. More specifically, Petitioner told Gillingham that she was concerned Westerman was going to hurt himself or her. Upon learning of Petitioner's concerns, Gillingham notified Respondent's Human Resources Department, and he scheduled a follow-up meeting with Petitioner on Monday, July 9, 2001. Lou Calatayud ("Calatayud") from Human Resources also attended this interview. During these initial meetings, Petitioner did not complain of any inappropriate touching or sexual contact between herself and Westerman. Following her meeting with Calatayud and Gillingham, German Romero, director of Human Resources, held a second interview with Petitioner to discuss her concerns about Westerman. Thereafter, Respondent conducted a thorough investigation into Petitioner's allegations. During the course of the investigation, Petitioner was interviewed twice and Westerman was interviewed twice. Both Westerman and Petitioner admitted to voluntarily participating in several telephone calls with each other, with some lasting as long as two hours. Petitioner did not appear upset or concerned after these calls. Human Resources also interviewed Terry Cox and Tom Dzoba, both watch engineers to whom Petitioner claimed she reported complaints regarding Westerman. Neither Cox nor Dzoba was Petitioner's direct supervisor. Petitioner told Cox that she had issues with another employee. However, she refused to provide Cox with the other employee's name and insisted on handling the matter on her own, despite Cox's asking her for the name of the person. Dzoba has no knowledge of Petitioner ever complaining about any problems with another employee in the workplace. The first person to whom Petitioner reported Westerman's name was her supervisor, Gillingham, who immediately reported Petitioner's complaints to Human Resources. Westerman was not Hanson's supervisor. Westerman never expressed any romantic interest in Petitioner; however, Petitioner had expressed interest in meeting Westerman outside the workplace for dinner. Additionally, Petitioner used to write Westerman "cheer-up notes" while at work. In fact, the only touching that Petitioner later referred to were hand or arm rubbing during voluntary personal conversations with, and counseling or consoling of, Westerman. Similarly, the only touching Westerman recalls was possibly rubbing up against Petitioner in the workplace or maybe putting his hand on her shoulder when they were talking. Westerman never kissed or attempted to kiss Petitioner. In addition to the above, no other employees were able to identify any inappropriate contact between Petitioner and Westerman. After completing its investigation in early August 2001, Respondent determined that sexual harassment had not occurred but instructed Westerman, verbally and in writing, not to have any further contact with Petitioner. Prior to Respondent's instruction, sometime between May and July 2001, Petitioner personally asked Westerman to stop calling her, a request he complied with generally. At the same time, Respondent instructed Petitioner to discontinue counseling employees to protect against any future incidents or allegations of sexual harassment. It is the policy and practice of Respondent to treat all employees equally regardless of their gender and/or disability. Respondent developed and distributed to its employees, via an Employee Handbook, an Equal Opportunity Policy and Policy Against Harassment. Following the conclusion of Respondent's investigation into Petitioner's complaints of sexual harassment, on or about August 6, 2001, Petitioner requested a medically-supported leave of absence for 30 days. This leave was granted by Respondent. However, Petitioner later requested to return to work nearly ten days ahead of schedule, on August 27, 2001, submitting a release from her doctor. Because Petitioner was seeking to return to work so far ahead of schedule, Petitioner was evaluated by Respondent's occupational medical director, Jock M. Sneddon, M.D., before she was released to return to work. Petitioner returned to work in the same position and rate of pay as before her leave. Additionally, Petitioner received disability benefit payments covering the entire duration of her leave. More than seven months later, Petitioner called in sick on April 6 through 8, 2002, after sustaining a house fire at her personal residence. Following the use of 16 hours or more of sick time, employees are required to return to work with a doctor's note authorizing their absence. Here, it was determined that Petitioner was not sick during this time, nor was she even evaluated by a physician. Based on similar previous problems, for which she was twice verbally reminded of Respondent's policy regarding sick leave, Petitioner received a disciplinary write-up. In addition to Petitioner's two verbal reminders, on or about January 7, 2002, Gillingham issued a memorandum to all operations employees, including Petitioner, detailing Respondent's sick leave policy. On or about June 7, 2002, Petitioner and a male co-worker, Tom Moran, were written up by Gillingham for neglect of their job duties as the result of an incident that occurred at the Energy Center on May 14, 2002. More specifically, both Petitioner and Moran were deemed responsible for failing to make sufficient rounds to discover a mechanical failure, which led to severe flooding of a sump basement in the coal yard, causing more than $12,000 in damages. Gillingham estimated it would have taken between six to eight hours to fill the 60-foot by 20-foot sump basement with the seven feet of water that was found the following morning. Although Moran was an auxiliary operator, both "operators," including Petitioner, an apprentice operator, have the same responsibilities and were responsible for making the necessary rounds to ensure that a mechanical failure of this nature is promptly discovered and repaired. In accordance with Respondent's policy, employees with active discipline in their files are not eligible for promotions or transfer. The written discipline Petitioner and Moran received for the May 14, 2002, sump incident remained active in their employee files for nine months. During her employment at the Energy Center, Petitioner's performance evaluations remained relatively unchanged, receiving a "meets" or "good" rating on each evaluation. Additionally, Petitioner received all regularly scheduled wage increases, until she topped out at the salary for her position. Petitioner received the same wage increases as similarly-situated male employees. Further, on or about April 2, 2003, Gillingham notified Human Resources that the discipline in her file had expired, and Petitioner was promoted to auxiliary operator, with the commensurate increase in pay. Petitioner started at the same rate of pay as three of the four other male employees placed in the apprentice operator position at that time. The fourth male employee, David Ziegler, started at a higher rate of pay based on his five years of previous experience working for a contractor at the Energy Center. Further, because of the credit Ziegler was given for his previous work experience, he was promoted to auxiliary operator ahead of Petitioner and all of the other apprentice operators who started at the same time. Vasquez was promoted to auxiliary operator on the standard two-year schedule on or about August 12, 2002; however, Petitioner was not eligible for promotion at that time because of the active discipline in her file. Petitioner failed to prove that she suffered from a recognized disability or that Respondent failed to make a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of her sex. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent retaliated against her for complaining of the alleged sexual harassment which occurred in the Summer of 2001.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief in DOAH Case No. 03-2306, FCHR Case No. 22-02718. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ellen Edith Hanson 5355 Rambling Road St. Cloud, Florida 34771 David C. Netzley, Esquire Ford & Harrison, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by terminating Petitioner due to her pregnancy.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Teresa Mercado, is a female, who was employed by Respondent from March 31, 2003, until April 20, 2004, when she was terminated. Respondent is engaged in the retail sales of second- hand merchandise and operates a retail store (No. 1095) located at 8901 West Colonial Drive in Orlando, Florida. Respondent first employed Petitioner as a "production floater." As a production floater, Petitioner "floated" between the sorting and pricing positions. She later became a "pricer." As a production floater and pricer, Petitioner reported directly to a production supervisor, Celia Roe, who, in turn, reported to the store manager, Hernandez-Lilly. As store manager, Hernandez-Lilly was responsible for, among other things, personnel matters, such as discipline and conducting performance evaluations. In her capacity as a women's clothing pricer, Petitioner was required to price women's clothing and place it on the sales floor. Petitioner was required to meet a quota of 800 pieces per day. Over the course of her employment, Petitioner's job performance frequently did not meet Respondent's expectations. Respondent's policy is to discuss performance issues with employees and afford them the opportunity to correct the deficiencies. This is ordinarily done through either performance logs, verbal corrective actions, or written corrective actions. Respondent was given a series of documents over a six-month period prior to her termination of employment. In each instance, the situation was discussed directly with Petitioner, and she was physically handed the documentation. Moreover, Petitioner signed each performance and corrective action, which detailed her deficiency. The disciplinary actions were as follows: On October 6, 2003, Petitioner was given a verbal corrective action relating to attendance. On January 28, 2004, Petitioner was given a performance log relating to her leaving merchandise in the back area. On February 20, 2004, Petitioner was given a performance log relating to not meeting her quota. The performance log noted that Petitioner's quota had averaged only 525 pieces and that "any further occurrence will result in further documentation." On March 16, 2004, Petitioner was given another performance log, this time relating to attendance issues. On March 16, 2005, Petitioner was given a verbal corrective action for not meeting her quotas on a daily basis. The document stated that Petitioner must consistently "meet her quota and that any further occurrences with this issue will result in additional disciplinary action, up to and including termination." Petitioner admitted that she was aware at this point in time that her not meeting quota was a problem, that it was getting more serious, and that if it continued, she might be terminated. On March 29, 2004, Petitioner received a written corrective action dated March 22, 2004, relating to her failure to meet her quota. The written corrective action stated that Petitioner's "quota is a minimum requirement that is to be met daily" and that "any further occurrences with this issue will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination." On April 5, 2004, after Petitioner continually failed to meet her quotas on a daily basis, she was given a final corrective action. The final corrective action again stated that if Petitioner did not meet her daily quotas, she would be subject to additional disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment. Over the next several weeks, Petitioner was again unable to meet her quotas on a consistent basis. Her employment was, therefore, terminated on April 20, 2004. On or about April 9, 2004, prior to Petitioner's termination, Petitioner approached Hernandez-Lilly. Because Petitioner had just recently received her final written corrective action from Respondent and was concerned about being terminated, she asked Hernandez-Lilly if she was going to be terminated. Hernandez-Lilly did not answer that question yes or no, but stated that "we need to see some form of improvement" in Petitioner's "piece count." Hernandez-Lilly then suggested to Petitioner that she consider moving to a sales clerk position, which did not require meeting quotas. However, when Hernandez- Lilly reminded Petitioner that by moving to that position, she would have to be available to work nights and weekends, Petitioner stated that she was not interested. When the conversation, described in paragraph 8, took place, there was, in fact, an opening for a sales clerk available to which Respondent was willing to move Petitioner. However, given that Petitioner expressly indicated that she was not interested in such a position, Hernandez-Lilly did not seek to transfer Petitioner to a sales clerk position. Furthermore, at no time prior to her termination did Petitioner express any interest in such a transfer. In January or February 2004, prior to her termination, Petitioner had been offered another opportunity to move to an opening in the shoe department, but she did not indicate any interest in that position. Specifically, there was an opening in the shoe department which was announced to all production employees, including Petitioner, at a group meeting. Employees were told that if they were interested in a transfer, they needed to put it in writing and give it to Roe. Fitzpatrick submitted a written document indicating an interest in the position. Petitioner submitted nothing in writing. While this position did have a quota, it was not as stringent as that for the pricer position. Other employees who have experienced problems with meeting their quotas, in the positions that imposed such quotas, have been offered positions in other areas. Specifically, Fitzpatrick was having trouble meeting her quotas and was offered a position as a sales clerk. Unlike Petitioner, however, Fitzpatrick was willing to be available to work nights and weekends. Had Petitioner been willing to work these hours, she likewise would have been offered a sales clerk position. At the time Petitioner was terminated, Hernandez-Lilly was aware that Petitioner was pregnant. Hernandez-Lilly first learned of Petitioner's pregnancy on or about April 16, 2004, when Petitioner made an announcement at work that she was pregnant. Also, on April 20, 2004, the same day she was terminated, Petitioner took a copy of her sonogram picture and showed it to everybody in the workplace. At the time Petitioner first made the announcement that she was pregnant, she had been already provided a "final written corrective action" for performance-related matters and told that if she did not consistently make her quota, she would be subject to termination of employment. Since the issuance of that corrective action, Petitioner had not consistently met her quota and was, therefore, subject to termination. Despite knowing that Petitioner was pregnant at the time of her termination, Hernandez-Lilly testified that Petitioner's pregnancy had nothing to do with her discharge. In the year 2000, while Hernandez-Lilly was working for Respondent as a production supervisor, she became pregnant. Respondent permitted Hernandez-Lilly to take paid time off to deliver and care for her child and then returned to her former position. Roe became pregnant in 2000 while employed by Respondent. Like Hernandez-Lilly, Roe was permitted to take paid time off to deliver and care for her child and was returned to her former position. Respondent's employee, Lashana Bolden, became pregnant on two separate occasions while working for Respondent. She was a pricer who reported to Roe and Hernandez-Lilly. On both occasions, she was permitted to take paid time off to deliver and care for her children and was returned to her former position. Respondent's employee, Jessie Martinez, became pregnant while working for Respondent. She was promoted to a production supervisor by Hernandez-Lilly while she was pregnant. She was then permitted to take paid time off to deliver and care for her child and was returned to her former position. Respondent's employee, Ashley Ball, became pregnant while working for Respondent and while under the supervision of Hernandez-Lilly. She was permitted to take paid time off to deliver and care for her child and was returned to her former position. Respondent's employee, Shanika Gatewood, became pregnant while working for Respondent and while under the supervision of Hernandez-Lilly. She was permitted to take a leave of absence for her pregnancy, and was later returned to her previous position.1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact No findings are made in this case. Petitioner did not appear and did not submit evidence to support findings of fact.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Respondent terminated Petitioner on the basis of her sex or age, or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity; and whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment based on her sex or age.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Frito-Lay, Inc. ("Frito-Lay"), makes and sells snack foods, including many familiar brands of chips. Petitioner Frances G. Danelli ("Danelli") is a former employee of Frito-Lay. Frito-Lay initially hired Danelli in or around 1998 as a packer for its West Valley, Utah, plant. When Danelli's husband was transferred to Florida, she took a job for Frito-Lay in Pompano Beach, Florida, and later moved to the company's West Palm Beach Distribution Center as a route sales representative ("RSR"). Danelli worked in Florida as a Frito-Lay RSR for more than 15 years, and her routes eventually included such large stores as Publix, Walmart, Winn-Dixie, and Target.1/ RSRs sell and deliver Frito-Lay products to retail stores, and these stores, in turn, sell the products to consumers. RSRs are responsible, as well, for presenting the company's products to shoppers in the best way possible to increase sales. So, RSRs not only sell and deliver products to stores, but they also unload the products, stock the shelves, set up displays, and remove unsold items whose sell-by dates have expired. RSRs are paid an hourly wage plus commissions. RSRs are required to compete for sales against other companies' vendors, who (like Frito-Lay's personnel) are trying to place as many of their products as possible onto the shelves of the snack food aisle. Shelf space is essential for growing sales, and competition for product placement can be fierce. There is no dispute that Danelli's performance as an RSR was fine, perhaps even exemplary. Frito-Lay considered her to be a good employee. Danelli went to work early each morning, usually arriving at the warehouse by 4:00 a.m. so that she could get to her first store by 5:00 a.m., which would give her a head start on other vendors. When Danelli got to the warehouse, she would clock in on her handheld computer, which she also used to track the goods she delivered to each store. Upon returning to the warehouse, she had paperwork to complete and print from the handheld computer. In 2013, Frito-Lay started requiring drivers of delivery trucks over a certain size, including RSRs such as Danelli, to comply with U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulations. As relevant, these regulations require an RSR to take at least a ten-hour break before driving a commercial vehicle, and they prohibit an RSR from driving a commercial vehicle after 14 consecutive hours on duty. Frito-Lay programmed its employees' handheld computers so that an employee subject to the DOT regulations would receive a conspicuous warning if he or she attempted to clock in to work less than ten hours after last going off duty. As Danelli testified at hearing, if the computer told her to wait, she would go to the warehouse, pick up some product, fix her truck, and then sign in when the handheld said she could go. Evidently, however, to get the warning, an employee needed to log on as a "regulated" employee; if, by mistake, a "regulated" employee logged on as "non-regulated," she would not get the warning. Danelli found it difficult to comply with the DOT regulations, which led to Frito-Lay's imposing discipline against her in accordance with the company's Corrective Action Process set forth in its Sales National RSR Handbook, which governed Petitioner's employment. The handbook prescribes a process of progressive discipline that begins with "coaching," which is a form of pre- discipline. As the name suggests, a "coaching" is, essentially, a nondisciplinary intervention whose purpose is to correct an issue before the employee's conduct warrants stronger measures. If coaching is ineffective, the Corrective Action Process calls for increasingly severe steps of discipline. The steps of discipline consist of a Step 1 Written Reminder, a Step 2 Written Warning, a Step 3 Final Written Warning, and a Step 4 Termination. The particular discipline to be imposed depends upon the severity of the infraction and the step of discipline, if any, the employee happens to be on when the infraction is committed. Steps of discipline remain "active" for six to nine months, depending on the step. If the employee does not commit any further disciplinary infractions during the active period, the step "falls off." If the employee commits another disciplinary infraction within the "active" period, however, he or she moves to the next disciplinary step in the Corrective Action Process. On June 5, 2014, after having previously been coached to maintain compliance with the DOT regulations, Danelli received a Step 1 Written Reminder for four violations of the 10-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. On July 25, 2014, Danelli received a Step 2 Written Warning for a new violation of the 10-hour rule. Once again, Danelli did not appeal the discipline. On October 7, 2014, Danelli was given another coaching, during which she was informed that (i) an investigation into her DOT hours was in process, and (ii) the company was concerned that she might be getting assistance on her route from her husband in violation of the RSR Performance Standards. On January 27, 2015, Danelli received a Step 3 Final Written Warning for violating the 14-hour rule. She did not appeal this discipline. Under the Corrective Action Process, a Step 3 Final Written Warning remains "active" for nine months and is the final step prior to a Step 4 Termination. On May 2, 2015, Danelli committed another DOT violation. Because she was already on a Step 3 Final Written Warning, she was suspended pending further investigation. Danelli maintains that this violation, and others, resulted from her making a simple mistake with the handheld computer, namely failing to log on as a "regulated" employee, which cost her the electronic warning she otherwise would have received. She points out, too, that in this instance, the violation was minor, merely clocking in ten minutes early. These arguments are not wholly without merit, and if Frito-Lay had fired Danelli for a single, ten-minute violation of the DOT regulations, the undersigned would question the company's motivation. But that is not what happened. Danelli did not just violate the ten-hour rule once or twice, but many times, after multiple warnings, and in the face of increasingly serious disciplinary steps. Further, Frito-Lay did not terminate Danelli's employment over this latest violation of the ten-hour rule, even though it would have been justified in doing so within the parameters of the Corrective Action Process. Instead, the company placed Danelli on a Last Chance Agreement. Last Chance Agreements are not specifically provided for in the Corrective Action Process but are used, at the company's discretion, as a safety valve to avoid the occasional unfortunate termination that might result from strict adherence to rigid rules. In this regard, the agreement given to Danelli, dated May 15, 2015, stated as follows: We strongly considered [terminating your employment]. However, due to the unique facts and circumstances involved here, as well as your 15 years of service with the Company, the Company is willing to issue this Last Chance Warning. This step is over and above our normal progressive disciplinary process, and is being issued on a one-time, non-precedent setting basis. . . . [A]ny subsequent violations by you may result in discipline up to and including immediate termination. More specifically, any future violations [of the DOT regulations] will result in your immediate termination. As Danelli put it, the Last Change Agreement was a "sign of grace" from Frito-Lay. By its terms, it was intended to be "active and in effect for a period of 12 months." The undersigned pauses here to let the Last Chance Agreement sink in, because the fact that Frito-Lay did not fire Danelli in May 2015 when——for objective, easy-to-prove reasons, after a by-the-book application of progressive discipline——it clearly could have, is compelling evidence that the company was not harboring discriminatory animus against Danelli. After all, if Frito-Lay had wanted Danelli gone because of her age or her gender, why in the world would the company not have jumped at this golden opportunity, which Danelli had given it, to fire her with practically no exposure to liability for unlawful discrimination? The irony is that by showing mercy, Frito-Lay set in motion the chain of events that led to this proceeding. In or around November of 2015, Danelli underwent surgery, which required her to take some time off of work. For several years before this leave, Danelli's route had consisted of a Super Walmart and two Publix stores. When she returned, the Super Walmart had been assigned to another RSR, and to make up for its loss, Danelli's supervisor, Stanley Gamble, put a third Publix grocery on Danelli's route, i.e., Publix #1049 located in Tequesta, Florida. Danelli was acquainted with one of the managers at the Tequesta Publix, a Mr. Morgan. On her first day back, Danelli and Mr. Gamble went to that store, where Mr. Morgan told Mr. Gamble that he was "glad Frances is here." Mr. Morgan had complained to Mr. Gamble about the previous RSR, who left the store "all messed up," according to Mr. Gamble. Danelli also met Sarah Oblaczynski, the store's "backdoor receiver," which is the Publix employee who checks in merchandise. On her new route, Danelli usually went to the Tequesta store first, early in the morning. She soon ran into a vendor named Tony who worked for Snyder's of Hanover ("Snyder's"), a snack food company that competes with Frito-Lay. From the start, Tony was nasty to Danelli and aggressive, telling her that "there is no space" for two vendors. Tony was possessive about shelf space within the store, as well as the parking space close to the store's loading dock. Danelli thought, because of Tony's behavior, that he might be using drugs. On Tuesday, April 6, 2016, Petitioner had an argument with Tony over the shelf space that the store manager previously had awarded to her for the display of Frito-Lay products. Tony asserted that he had been promised the same space and said to Danelli, "You're going to take that stuff out of the shelf." Danelli told him, "No, Morgan said that's still my space." At this, Tony began cursing and pushed Danelli's cart into her, yelling, "That fucking Morgan!" Danelli later spoke to Mr. Morgan, who assured Danelli that the shelf space in question was hers and said he would leave a note to that effect for Ms. Oblaczynski. There is a dispute as to when Danelli reported the forgoing incident to Frito-Lay. She claims that, before the end of the day on April 6, she told Mr. Gamble, her supervisor, all about the matter, in detail, and requested that someone be assigned to accompany her on her route the next day because Tony planned on taking her shelf space. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble just laughed and said he did not have anybody to help her. Mr. Gamble testified, to the contrary, that Danelli had neither reported the April 6, 2016, incident to him nor asked for any assistance. (Danelli admits that she did not report the incident to Mr. Canizares, sales zone director, or to Human Resources ("HR")). Without written documentation regarding this alleged discussion, it is hard to say what, if anything, Danelli reported on April 6, 2016. It is likely that Danelli did complain to Mr. Gamble about Tony on some occasion(s), and might well have done so on April 6. What is unlikely, however, is that Danelli notified Mr. Gamble that she felt she was being sexually harassed by Tony. Tony's boorish and bullying behavior, to the extent directed at Danelli, seems to have been directed to her qua competitor, not as a woman. At the very least, the incident is ambiguous in this regard, and one could reasonably conclude, upon hearing about it, that Tony was simply a jerk who resorted to juvenile antics in attempting to gain the upper hand against a rival vendor. The undersigned finds that if Danelli did speak to Mr. Gamble about Tony on April 6, he—— not unreasonably——did not view the incident as one involving sexual harassment. As far as Mr. Gamble's declining to provide Danelli with an escort, assuming she requested one, his response is reasonable if (as found) Mr. Gamble was not clearly on notice that Danelli believed she was being sexually harassed. Danelli, after all, was by this time an experienced and successful RSR who undoubtedly had encountered other difficult vendors during her career. Indeed, as things stood on April 6, a person could reasonably conclude that Danelli in fact had the situation under control, inasmuch as Mr. Morgan had clearly taken Danelli's side and intervened on her behalf. What could a Frito-Lay "bodyguard" reasonably be expected to accomplish, which would justify the risk of escalating the tension between Tony and Danelli into a hostile confrontation? During the evening of April 6, 2016, Danelli talked to her husband about the problem at Publix #1049, and they decided that he would accompany her to the store the next morning before reporting to his own work, to assist if Tony caused a scene. On April 7, 2016, Danelli's husband drove to Publix #1049 in his own vehicle. Although no longer an employee of the company, Danelli's husband entered the store wearing a Frito-Lay hat, and he stayed in the snack aisle while Danelli went to the back to bring the order in. Ms. Oblaczynski, the receiver, presented Tony with a note from Mr. Morgan stating that Danelli's products and sales items were assigned to aisle one. In response, Tony started swearing about Mr. Morgan and the denial of shelf space, made a hand gesture indicative of a man pleasing himself, and told Ms. Oblaczynski that "they can take a fly[ing] F'n leap." Tony had made this particular hand gesture about Mr. Morgan on a number of previous occasions, in front of both men and women. Mr. Danelli left to go to work once Danelli's product was placed, and she left to go to the next store on her route. When Danelli returned to the warehouse, she went to Mr. Gamble's office and told him about the April 7, 2016, incident. According to Danelli, Mr. Gamble laughed in response. Danelli asked Mr. Gamble if the company would conduct an investigation, and he said yes. She recalls that every day thereafter, she asked Mr. Gamble if he had heard anything because she thought "we [Frito-Lay] were investigating" and that HR was on top of it. Danelli admits, however, that she "intentionally" did not tell Mr. Gamble that her husband had accompanied her to Publix #1049 to assist her in the store that morning. She did not report this detail because she knew it was "bad." In conflict with Danelli's account, Mr. Gamble testified that Danelli did not report that Tony made a sexual gesture in front of her or used coarse or profane language in her presence on April 7, 2016. The undersigned finds that Mr. Gamble most likely did not laugh at Danelli or otherwise treat her dismissively upon hearing her report of the incident. If Mr. Gamble had believed the matter were so trivial or amusing, he would not likely have agreed to investigate. The undersigned finds, further, that however Danelli described the incident, she did not make it clear to Mr. Gamble that she perceived Tony's behavior as a form of sexual harassment. Danelli did not make a formal written complaint to that effect at the time, and the situation at Publix #1049 was, at the very least, ambiguous. More likely than not, Mr. Gamble viewed the troublesome vendor from Snyder's as an unwelcome business problem to be dealt with, not as a perpetrator of unlawful, gender-based discrimination. To elaborate, putting Tony's "sexual gesture" to one side momentarily, the rest of his conduct, even the cursing, while certainly objectionable, is not suggestive of sexual harassment; it is just bad behavior. Tony's temper tantrums and outbursts no doubt upset Danelli and others, but that does not turn them into gender discrimination. Further, Danelli seems to have handled the situation well until she resorted to self-help on April 7, 2016. The responsible Publix employees were already aware of the problem, and in due course, they complained to Snyder's, which unsurprisingly removed Tony from that store. Meantime, had Danelli felt physically threatened or afraid as a result of Tony's more aggressive antics, she (or Publix) could have called the police; this, indeed, would have been a safer and more reasonable alternative to bringing along her husband or another civilian for protection, which as mentioned above posed the risk of provoking a fight, given Tony's volatility. Ultimately, it is Tony's "sexual gesture" that provides a colorable basis for Danelli's sexual harassment complaint. But even this gives little grounds for a claim of discrimination, without more context than is present here. To be sure, the "jerk off gesture" or "air jerk" is obscene, and one would not expect to see it in polite company or in the workplace. Yet, although it clearly mimics a sexual practice, the air jerk is generally not understood as being a literal reference to masturbation. That is, the gesture is not typically used to convey a present intention to engage in masturbation or as an invitation to perform the act on the gesturer. Rather, the jerk off gesture usually signifies annoyance, disgust, disinterest, or disbelief. As with its cousin, the "finger" (or bird) gesture, the sexual connotations of the air jerk are (usually) subliminal. Here, there is no allegation or evidence that Tony's jerk off gesture was undertaken in pursuit of sexual gratification or was intended or perceived as a sexual advance on Danelli (or someone else)——or even as being overtly sexual in nature. (Obviously, if the evidence showed that, under the circumstances, Tony was, e.g., inviting Danelli to participate in sexual activity, this would be a different case. The undersigned is not suggesting, just to be clear, that the air jerk gesture is inconsistent with or could never amount to sexual harassment, but only that it is not unequivocally a sign of such harassment, given its commonly understood meanings.) To the contrary, it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that Tony made the gesture to indicate that he regarded Mr. Morgan's note as pointless and annoying. It was roughly the equivalent of giving them the bird, albeit arguably less contemptuous than that. For these reasons, the undersigned finds it unlikely that, assuming Danelli described the gesture (which is in dispute), Mr. Gamble thought Danelli was complaining about sexual harassment, as opposed to a very difficult vendor. On April 13, 2016, Mr. Gamble visited Publix #1049 and spoke to Ms. Oblaczynski about the situation. During this conversation, Ms. Oblaczynski stated that the "Frito-Lay people" did nothing wrong. She further specified that "the person [Danelli] had with her did nothing wrong." After speaking with Ms. Oblaczynski, Mr. Gamble met with Danelli while she was servicing her second account. Right off the bat, Mr. Gamble asked Danelli who was with her at Publix #1049 on April 7, 2016. She eventually admitted that her husband was with her in the store that day. Aware of the seriousness of her offense and the active Last Chance Agreement, Danelli asked Mr. Gamble, several times, if she would be fired. That same day, Mr. Gamble called Carlos Canizares to tell him what he had learned. Mr. Canizares instructed Mr. Gamble to stay with Danelli while she finished servicing her accounts and then to obtain a written statement from her about the incident. Later on April 13, 2016, Danelli provided a written statement in which she confirmed that her husband had been working with her at Publix #1049 the previous week. Danelli has since described this statement as a "full written account of the harassment [and] rude sexual gestures." Danelli knew, of course, that HR would review her statement, and yet she said nothing therein about having complained to Mr. Gamble or any supervisor about harassment generally or Tony in particular; about Tony's use of course or improper language; or about having requested an escort to help keep Tony in line. On the instructions of the company's HR department, Mr. Gamble conducted an investigation into the "rude sexual gesture" about which Danelli had complained. Specifically, he called Mr. Morgan, the Publix manager, and asked him about the incident. Mr. Gamble also requested that he be allowed to review any videotapes and documents concerning the incident. Mr. Morgan informed Mr. Gamble that Publix was investigating the matter. Mr. Gamble's request to allow Frito-Lay access to Publix videotapes and documents was, however, turned down. Tony's boorish behavior aside, the fact remained that Danelli, without prior approval, had allowed a non-employee to perform work or services for Frito-Lay at one of the stores on her route, which the RSR Performance Standards specifically prohibit without express authorization. RSRs who are found to have permitted non-employees to accompany them on their routes are either discharged or issued multiple steps of discipline, as Danelli knew. Because Danelli violated this rule while on an active Last Chance Agreement, Frito-Lay decided to terminate her employment. On April 26, 2016, Mr. Canizares met with Danelli to inform her that she was fired. Danelli timely appealed her termination pursuant to the company's Complaint and Appeal Procedure, electing to have her appeal decided by a neutral, third-party arbitrator. The arbitration hearing took place in January 2017. Three months later, the arbitrator ruled that Danelli's termination had been proper and carried out in accordance with Frito-Lay's employment policies. Danelli does not presently deny that she violated the DOT regulations and the company policy forbidding the use of non-employees as helpers while on duty, nor does she dispute that Frito-Lay had sufficient grounds for imposing the disciplinary steps leading to the Last Chance Agreement. Indeed, she does not contend that it would have been wrongful for Frito-Lay to have fired her in May 2015 instead of offering the Last Chance Agreement. Her position boils down to the argument that because Frito-Lay could have exercised leniency and not fired her for bringing her husband to work at Publix #1049 (which is probably true2/), its failure to do so can only be attributable to gender or age discrimination. Put another way, Danelli claims that but for her being a woman in her 50s, Frito-Lay would have given her another "last chance." This is a heavy lift. As circumstantial evidence of discrimination, Danelli points to the company's treatment of another RSR, a younger man named Ryan McCreath. Like Danelli, Mr. McCreath was caught with a non-employee assisting him on his route. Unlike Danelli, however, Mr. McCreath was not on any active steps of discipline at the time of the incident, much less a Last Chance Agreement. Although Mr. McCreath's disciplinary record was not unblemished, Frito-Lay did not terminate his employment for this violation of the RSR Performance Standards. Instead, he received three steps of discipline and was issued a Final Written Warning. Mr. McCreath's situation is distinguishable because he was not under a Last Chance Agreement at the time of the violation. Moreover, it is not as though Mr. McCreath got off scot-free. He received a serious punishment. Danelli could not have received a comparable punishment for the same offense because she was already beyond Step 3; her record, unlike his, did not have room for the imposition of three steps of discipline at once. The McCreath incident does not give rise to a reasonable inference that Frito-Lay unlawfully discriminated against Danelli when it terminated her employment for committing a "three-step violation" while on an active Last Chance Agreement. There is simply no reason to suppose that if Danelli, like Mr. McCreath, had not had any active steps of discipline when she violated the rule against having non- employees provide on-the-job assistance, Frito-Lay would have terminated her employment for the April 7, 2016, infraction; or that if Mr. McCreath, like Danelli, had been on a Last Chance Agreement when he violated the rule, Frito-Lay would have issued him a Final Written Warning in lieu of termination. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that any of Frito- Lay's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Danelli, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by age- or gender-based discriminatory animus. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful age or gender discrimination could be made. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay took any retaliatory action against Danelli for having opposed or sought redress for an unlawful employment practice. There is no persuasive evidence that Frito-Lay committed or permitted sexual harassment of Danelli or otherwise exposed her to a hostile work environment. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Frito-Lay did not discriminate unlawfully against Danelli on any basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Frito-Lay not liable for gender or age discrimination, retaliation, or creating a hostile work environment. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2018.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's suspension in March 2004 and subsequent dismissal in March 2004 were not, in fact, imposed in consequence of her gross insubordination (which insubordination Respondent allegedly used as a pretext for the adverse employment actions), but rather were in truth retaliatory acts taken by Respondent because Petitioner had filed a charge of discrimination against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction contained a statement of undisputed material facts, which provided as follows: A. [a.] [Petitioner Diane] Scott [("Scott")] was employed as a teacher's aide in the Monroe County Public School System for approximately 13 years. The [Monroe County School] Board [(the "Board"), which is the governing body of Respondent Monroe County School District,] suspended [Scott] without pay in March 2004 pending termination for just cause. Scott timely requested a formal hearing. [b.] On August 18, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Robert E. Meale of the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") conducted a formal hearing in DOAH Case No. 04-2060 to determine whether Scott's employment should be terminated. Judge Meale issued a Recommended Order on October 25, 2004, holding, on the basis of extensive findings of fact, that Scott had "repeatedly refused to obey direct orders, essentially to allow the school system to function as an educational resource, free from her harassment of other employees trying to do their jobs." Judge Meale recommended that the Board terminate Scott's employment for just cause, i.e. gross insubordination. [c.] On November 16, 2004, the Board entered a Final Order adopting Judge Meale's Recommended Order in its entirety. Scott did not appeal the Final Order. B. [d.] In November 2004, Scott filed with the FCHR and the EEOC a Charge of Discrimination, signed November 12, 2004 (the "Charge"), wherein she alleged that the Board had retaliated against her for having filed an earlier charge of discrimination. The Charge was received by the FCHR on or about November 22, 2004, and docketed as Charge No. 150-2005-00405. [e.] In the Charge, Scott stated the "particulars" of her claim against the Board as follows: I am black. I filed a charge of discrimination under 150-2004-00146. In retaliation, Respondent placed papers in my fie [sic] that pertained to someone else and papers that were not signed by me. In further retaliation, Respondent placed me on suspension. I believe all of the above occurred in retaliation for filing the aforementioned charge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.[1] Scott also alleged that the unlawful retaliation took place between the dates of August 18, 2004, and August 24, 2004.2 [f.] . . . Charge No. 150-2004-00146 (the "Prior Charge"), which allegedly triggered the Board's allegedly retaliatory acts, had been brought against the Board in November 2003. . . . [To repeat for emphasis,] the retaliation claim asserted in the [present] Charge is based on alleged adverse employment actions that the Board took, allegedly, in response to Scott's filing the Prior Charge in November 2003. [g.] In her Charge Scott alleged that the Board's unlawful retaliation consisted of (a) placing papers in her personnel file that didn't belong there and (b) putting her on suspension. Regarding the allegedly spurious papers, . . . [f]ive . . . are . . . documents pertaining to another teacher's aide in Monroe County whose name is "Diane M. Scott." (Petitioner Scott is also known as Diane Hill Scott but not, so far as the record reveals, as Diane M. Scott.) The papers relating to the "other" Diane Scott are: (1) an Oath of Public Employee form dated December 20, 1996; (2) an Employer's Statement of Salary and Wages dated April 24, 2001; (3) an Employer's Statement of Salary and Wages dated March 13, 2002; (4) a Civil Applicant Response dated December 20, 1996, which notes that the individual (identified as "Diane Marie Scoh") had failed to disclose a prior arrest; and (5) a copy of the school district's anti-discrimination policy, apparently signed by the other Ms. Scott on August 23, 2002. [h.] In addition to these five papers, Scott claims that her personnel file contained an unsigned copy of the school district's anti-discrimination policy, bearing the handwritten note "Diane Hill Scott refused to sign——8/24/00." Scott asserts that before last year's administrative hearing, she had never seen this particular document. Because of that, she alleges, its presence in her file is evidence of discriminatory retaliation. [i.] Regarding the alleged retaliatory suspension [on which the Charge is based in part], Scott [actually] was referring to three separate suspensions: (1) a three-day suspension in May 2003; (2) a three-day suspension in October 2003; and (3) the suspension in March 2004 that was part and parcel of the proceeding to terminate Scott's employment. It is undisputed that Scott was in fact suspended from employment on each of these three occasions. However, [by] a letter to Scott from the Director of Human Resources dated October 3, 2003, [the Board had] formally rescind[ed], as the product of "error and miscommunication," the three-day suspension Scott was to have served that month. [j.] On April 26, 2005, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on Scott's Charge against the Board. In this notice, the EEOC stated that it was unable to determine whether the Board had violated Scott's civil rights. Thereafter, on May 12, 2005, the FCHR issued Scott a Right to Sue letter. Scott timely filed a Petition for Relief ("Petition") with the FCHR on June 6, 2005. The FCHR immediately transferred the Petition to DOAH, initiating the instant action. The undersigned hereby adopts the foregoing as findings of fact. Following the principle of estoppel by judgment (discussed in the Conclusions of Law below), it is found that, prior to being suspended from employment in March 2004, Scott repeatedly had refused to obey direct orders; she had been, in other words, grossly insubordinate at work. The evidence in the record is insufficient to persuade the undersigned——and consequently he does not find——that the Board used Scott's gross insubordination as a pretext for taking adverse employment actions, namely suspension and dismissal, against Scott. The evidence is likewise insufficient to establish, and thus it is not found, that the Board in fact suspended and discharged Scott in retaliation for filing the Prior Charge. It is determined, therefore, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Board did not unlawfully retaliate against Scott when it terminated her employment on the ground that she had been grossly insubordinate, which misbehavior constitutes just cause for firing a teacher's aide, see §§ 1012.01(2)(e) and 1012.33(1)(a), Fla. Stat., and hence is a legitimate, non- retaliatory basis for taking adverse employment action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding the Monroe County School District not liable to Diane Scott for retaliation or unlawful discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
