The Issue Whether or not on or about December 8, 2000, Petitioner possessed the appropriate license to operate a body-piercing salon establishment in accordance with Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented, the testimony, and upon the personal inspection of the undersigned, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material hereto, Respondent, Department of Health, Division of Environmental Health, is the state agency charged with implementation of Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code. At all times material hereto, Petitioner, Rita Moroz, operated a manicure-pedicure, nail-lengthening establishment, "A New Adventure of Tampa Bay," located at 11608 North Dale Mabry Highway, Hillsborough County, Tampa, Florida 33618. Section 381.0075(2)(a), Florida Statutes, defines "BodyPiercing" as for commercial purposes the act of penetrating the skin to make, generally permanent in nature, a hole, mark, or scar. "Bodypiercing" does not include the use of a mechanized, presterilized ear-piercing system that penetrates the outer perimeter of lobe of the ear or both. At all times material hereto, Petitioner admitted that she operated a body-piercing establishment salon and provided body-piercing services without first having obtained a body-piercing license as required by law. At all times pertinent hereto, Petitioner possessed a manicure-pedicure license issued by another country and her foreign license also authorized body-piercing services. Petitioner, upon receipt of the Certificate of Violation, discontinued performing body-piercing services. The representative for the Agency stated that the Department would accept, in consideration of Petitioner's admissions and prompt discontinuation of body-piercing services, a reduced fine in an amount not to exceed $500.00.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht and ship salesman should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons in Florida. Section 326.003, Florida Statutes (1997). On July 28, 1998, the Division received an application for a yacht and ship salesperson's license from Richard Badolato. Question 13 on the application solicits information of the applicant's criminal history as follows: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? NOTE: This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. After Question 15 of the application, the following statement appears in bold type: "If your answer to question 13, 14, or 15 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." Mr. Badolato answered Question 13 in the affirmative, and he signed the application, thereby certifying that "the foregoing information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." Mr. Badolato did not provide the statement of particulars which must be submitted by those answering Question 13 in the affirmative. In a letter dated July 28, 1998, the Division notified Mr. Badolato that his application was incomplete and that he should, among other things, provide a complete written explanation of his criminal history. In response to this letter, Mr. Badolato provided a signed statement in which he stated: "I was arrested and charged with possession of marj. in 1981." Mr. Badolato also provided a telephone number on the statement, indicating that he could be contacted at that number if the Division had any questions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 326.004(15), the Division issued a 90-day temporary license to Mr. Badolato, pending completion of the criminal history analysis that is done on all applicants by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The Division subsequently received a report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation which revealed that Mr. Badolato had three drug-related felony convictions, as well as an arrest on June 22, 1977, which resulted in a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. On August 24, 1981, Mr. Badolato was convicted in federal district court in Brunswick, Georgia, of conspiracy to smuggle marijuana; he was sentenced to ten years in prison and ordered to pay a $30,000 fine. On October 23, 1981, Mr. Badolato was convicted in federal district court in Miami, Florida, of conspiracy to distribute cocaine; he was sentenced to thirty months in prison, to run consecutively with the ten-year sentence in the Georgia case. On January 31, 1989, Mr. Badolato was convicted in federal district court in Maryland of conspiracy to distribute marijuana; he was sentenced to thirty-six months in prison, to run concurrently with any sentence imposed for a violation of parole. Mr. Badolato was released from prison in 1991 and successfully completed parole in December 1996 with respect to the 1989 conviction. In late 1997, Mr. Badolato received a letter advising him that he might be eligible for clemency. An attorney acting on behalf of Mr. Badolato filed an application for clemency with the Florida Parole Commission. Although Mr. Badolato has never seen this application, he assumes that the file developed during review of the application contains complete information regarding his criminal history.2 When the Division received the Federal Bureau of Investigation report, Peter Butler, head of the Division's general enforcement section, contacted Mr. Badolato by telephone, read to him the statement in the application quoted in paragraph 4 above, and asked him if he wanted to amend his application. Because he could not remember the exact dates of his three felony convictions, Mr. Badolato responded by referring Mr. Butler to the Clemency Board if Mr. Butler wanted to obtain further information about Mr. Badolato's criminal history. Mr. Badolato acknowledged in his testimony that he should have been more thorough in completing his application for licensure, that he was lazy and stupid for not being more forthcoming in the application, and that he did not intend to mislead the Division. He believed that, by answering "Yes" to Question 13 and admitting that he was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana in 1981, he had provided enough information to alert the Division that he had a criminal history. He also assumed that it would be very easy for the Division to obtain complete information about his background merely by running a computer check and by reviewing the information in his clemency application file. From 1991, when he was released from prison, until December 1998, Mr. Badolato was involved in the restaurant business in a managerial capacity, and, as part of his duties, he handled large sums of money. No money in his care was ever found missing, and no adverse employment actions were taken against him during this time. In addition, during the time he was on parole, Mr. Badolato periodically submitted to random drug-testing and never failed a test. The evidence presented by Mr. Badolato is not sufficient to establish that he is of good moral character. He admitted in his answer to Question 13 on the application that he had been convicted of a felony, yet he included in the statement which he filed as part of the application a vague, incomplete, misleading, and inaccurate reference to an arrest and charge of possession of marijuana in 1981.3 Furthermore, Mr. Badolato certified by his signature on the application form that the information he provided was "true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief," when he was certainly fully aware that he had three separate felony convictions. Mr. Badolato presented evidence of his good employment history subsequent to his release from prison in 1991, his successful termination of probation, and his faithful payments on the $30,000 fine imposed in 1981, all of which tend to show rehabilitation and good moral character. However, Mr. Badolato's failure to include in his application complete and accurate information regarding his criminal history tends to show lack of rehabilitation and lack of good moral character. On balance, Mr. Badolato's failure to disclose in his application his complete criminal history outweighs the evidence he presented to show rehabilitation and good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order denying Richard Badolato's application for licensure as a yacht and ship salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1999.
The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation properly denied Petitioner’s permit application for a proposed outdoor advertising sign to be erected adjacent to US 98, 0.817 miles west of State Road 87, in Santa Rosa County, Florida, pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 3, 1998, Lamar submitted an application for new sign permits for a proposed outdoor advertising sign along US Highway 98, 0.817 miles west of State Road 87 in Navarre, Santa Rosa County, Florida (new permits) to DOT. The new permits were to be located within 2000 feet of existing permitted signs for which Lamar already possessed permits (the existing permits). The existing permit numbers were AE682-6 and BL256-35. Santa Rosa County’s Land Development Code Section 8.07.00 provides that no off-premise advertising sign, such as involved here, can be located within 2000 feet of any other off-premise sign on the same side of the street right-of- way. Since Lamar's existing permitted sign and the proposed location of the new permitted sign was within 2000 feet of each other, Lamar wished to cancel the existing permits conditioned upon the approval of the new permits. The practice is known as conditional cancellation. Prior to and during 1998, DOT had an established non- rule policy of conditional cancellation for existing sign permits. Conditional cancellation could occur when applying for new permits that would potentially conflict with existing permits. An applicant could simultaneously submit a cancellation certification for the existing permits together with the application for new permits. The old permits would not be canceled until new permits were issued. The exact process for requesting a conditional cancellation was not shown to be uniform throughout the state. However, the policy of allowing conditional cancellations to be made by permittees was accepted statewide. The policy and process for conditional cancellation are now codified in Rule 14-10.004, Florida Administrative Code, after the application in this case had been processed. In this case and in conjunction with the submission of Lamar's new permit application, Lamar submitted a copy of the cancellation certification for its existing permitted signs to the regional District Three DOT office in Chipley, together with its application for the new permits. Simultaneously, on April 3, 1998, Lamar submitted the original cancellation certification to the central office of DOT. The instructions on the certification of cancellation require the cancellation form to be submitted to the Tallahassee office of DOT. Neither the cancellation form nor letter from Lamar indicated that the cancellation was conditional. There was no place on the form to make such an indication. Lamar had been following the above-filing practice when requesting conditional cancellation since 1995. Because of its practice Lamar believed that it had properly notified DOT that cancellation of its existing permits was conditioned upon approval of its application for new permits. Lamar never considered that one office of DOT might not know what occurred at another office of DOT or that one office of DOT might not communicate with another office of DOT. On the other hand, the regional office of DOT in Chipley only recognized that an applicant had requested a conditional cancellation of existing permits when the original and not a copy of the cancellation form was submitted with the application for new permits. Lamar was unaware of the distinction between the filing of an original cancellation form with its application and the filing of a copy of the cancellation form with its application. More importantly, this distinction was not a rule and does not appear to have been communicated to anyone save the officials at the Chipley office of DOT. Consequently, Lamar relied on its established practice when seeking a conditional cancellation. A practice that DOT had recognized on earlier conditional cancellations by Lamar. Lamar reasonably believed, based on its previous experience with the policy of conditional cancellation, that existing permits would not be cancelled until the new permits were granted. Shortly after the filing of Lamar’s application, District Three returned Lamar's permit application without action because it was incomplete. The application was not considered filed by DOT because it was incomplete and the entire application package, including the copy of the cancellation form was returned to Lamar. The application was not logged into the Department’s computer. The Chipley office, even though it knew the old permits were to be cancelled, did not notify the Tallahassee office of the return of Lamar’s application or the lack of approval of that application. On April 7, 1998, the Tallahassee office of DOT processed the cancellation form it had received from Lamar on the existing permits. The existing permits were cancelled and the cancellation was logged into the Department’s computer. Because the Department did not follow its policy of conditional cancellation on which Lamar had relied for a number of years and the Department had knowledge of Lamar’s application for new permits which clearly conflicted with the cancelled permits, the existing permits should not have been cancelled and should have remained in effect since the application had not been approved by DOT. The fact that the knowledge resided in different offices of DOT is irrelevant. On April 10, 1998, Bill Salter Advertising (Salter) submitted an application for sign permits. The proposed sign would be located 0.36 miles west of State Road 87 on the same side of US 98 as the existing permit location for Lamar. The Salter permits would be within 2000 feet of Lamar’s existing permits and not be approved by DOT if the existing Lamar permits were still in effect. On May 6, 1998, Lamar resubmitted its complete application for the new permits. Upon inspection of the site for Lamar’s new permits, it was discovered that a spacing conflict existed with the Bill Salter application site. On May 10, 1998, DOT tentatively denied Salter’s application for incorrect information on the sketch of the site it had submitted with its application. On May 28, 1998, Salter amended its application with a corrected site sketch. By letter dated June 5, 1998 the Department advised Lamar that its application would be held pending resolution of the prior application filed by Salter. On June 26, 1998, DOT granted Salter’s application. On July 6, 1998, permits BU595-55 and BU596-55 were issued to Salter. On August 26, 1998, DOT denied Lamar’s applications. The denial was based on Section 479.15, Florida Statutes, which prohibits DOT from granting a permit which would conflict with a county ordinance such as the Santa Rosa County Land Development Code sign spacing requirements. No other basis for denial of the subject permits exists.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation reinstate the Lamar Advertising Company’s existing permits AE682-6 and BL256-35. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: G. R. Mead, II, Esquire Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry Bond, Stackhouse & Stone 125 West Romana Street, Suite 800 Pensacola, Florida 32591-3010 Sheauching Yu, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The central issue in this case is Petitioner's challenge to part III of the licensure examination as set forth in his letter dated September 8, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert E. Rosser, is a candidate for licensure as a general contractor. Petitioner has taken the examination to become a licensed general contractor consecutively over the last four years. As a result of the twelve attempts at the examination, Petitioner has passed parts I and II on two separate test dates. In his attempts to pass the examination Petitioner has enrolled in and studied for the examination with two approved construction schools. Petitioner scored a 68 on part III of the general contractor's examination for the June 16, 1994 test date. Petitioner timely challenged questions related to part III (Project Management) of the general contractor's examination given on June 16, 1994. Petitioner attended a review session and claimed that as to question 2 his scratch sheet from the examination demonstrates he had used formulas properly and that he had inadvertently marked the incorrect response on the answer grid sheet. The minimum score required to pass part III of the examination was 70. For each of the challenged questions in part III (2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 17, 18, and 20) Respondent presented competent evidence to support the correct answer as scored by the Department. The Petitioner did not present credible evidence to dispute the accuracy of the answers which had been deemed correct by the Department. Based upon those answers, the Petitioner's score sheet was tabulated correctly. The questions challenged were clearly and unambiguously worded and contained sufficient factual information to reach a correct answer. The examination was open book and applicants were allowed to use reference materials. All current techniques were considered before the correct answer was chosen. All knowledge needed to reach a correct answer was within a candidate's expected range of expertise. The Department's scoring of part III was not arbitrary, capricious, or devoid of logic. For each of the challenged questions, the correct answer was scored at a higher percentage than the answers marked by Petitioner. In fact, for question 4, for example, 79 percent of the examinees scored the correct answer while only 3 percent marked the same answer as Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Bureau of Testing enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the general contractor's examination. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5214 Rulings on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Petitioner did not number the paragraphs denoted as "STATEMENT OF FACTS AND FINDINGS". The lettered paragraphs are addressed as listed; but where no letter identified the paragraph, the rulings are as to the paragraphs in the order of presentation. Paragraph [A] is accepted. Paragraph [B] is accepted to the extent it identifies Petitioner as a candidate otherwise rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioner's citation to Rule 21E-16.005 is an error. It is accepted that the minimum passing grade for the challenged part is 70 percent out of 100 percent. Paragraph [C] is accepted in substance; however, Petitioner's citation to Rule 21E-16.003 is an error. The next paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is accepted as a correct statement of procedural review. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 4 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 7 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 9 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 11 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected as not a statement of fact. Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 17 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected as not a statement of fact. Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 18 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 20 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph [D] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is not supported by the evidence. Paragraph [E] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is not supported by the evidence. The next paragraph is merely an address for the Department and is not a statement of fact. Paragraph [F] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [G] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. The next paragraph is merely an address for the Division and is not a statement of fact. Paragraph [H] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [I] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [J] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [K] is rejected as contrary to the record in this case since an order of prehearing instruction was not entered in this case and interrogatories were not served. Paragraph [L] is rejected as irrelevant, not a statement of fact, and contrary to the record. Moreover, Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. Paragraph [M] is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [N] is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [O] is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [P] is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 4 through 11 are accepted. Paragraph 1 is accepted as statement of procedural information. Paragraph 2 is accepted as to the substance but is not a statement of relevant fact. Paragraph 3 is accepted as to the substance but is not a statement of relevant fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert E. Rosser P.O. Box 560541 Miami, Florida 33256-0541 William M. Woodyard Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Richard Hickok Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-6310
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner filed an application or request for reactivation of his license to practice medicine in the State of Florida pursuant to Section 458.313(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Carlos Warter, M.D., 4/ was first issued a license to practice medicine in the State of Florida on August 2, 1977. It was a license by endorsement. For several years following 1977, the Petitioner practiced medicine in Chile. By letter dated July 2, 1980, the Florida Board of Medical Examiners wrote to the Petitioner about the status of his Florida license. The letter included the following: Pursuant to Section 458.051(3), Florida Statutes, a license obtained by endorsement in this State shall become void and of no force and effect unless the recipient utilizes the same by actively engaging in the practice of medicine in the State of Florida within three (3) years after the issuance of the license and continues such practice in this State for a minimum period of one (1) year. This practice requirement may be postponed only if and while the holder of an endorsement license is in the active military service of the United States or in an AMA approved training program. The Petitioner never actively engaged in the practice of medicine in Florida. Accordingly, by operation of Section 458.051(3), Florida Statutes, his Florida license, obtained by endorsement, became void and of no force and effect. After practicing for many years in other jurisdictions, the Petitioner decided he wanted to live in Florida and practice medicine in Florida. To that end, he contacted the staff of the Board of Medicine to inquire as to what would be required of him to obtain a license to practice medicine in Florida. As a result of his conversations with Board staff, the Petitioner believed that he could not reactivate his prior Florida license, which had become void by his failure to ever practice medicine in Florida. 5/ Based on that belief, the Petitioner did not file an application seeking to reactivate his void license. Rather, he filed an application seeking a new license by endorsement pursuant to Section 458.313(1), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner filed an application for licensure by endorsement on or about April 19, 1998. Question 9 on the application form reads: "Are you or have you ever held any professional/medical license in any State in the U.S., to include Canada, Guam, Puerto Rico or U.S. Virgin Islands? (If yes, list profession(s), state(s), license numbers(s), and date(s) of issuance.)" The Petitioner's answer was: "California 1980 to date/A35572." The Petitioner did not list his prior Colorado or New Mexico licenses to practice medicine. More importantly, he did not list his prior, now void, license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Further, the Petitioner's prior license to practice medicine in the State of Florida is not mentioned anywhere else in the Petitioner's application for license by endorsement filed on May 19, 1998. 6/ Following several requests for additional information, the Petitioner's 1998 application was scheduled for consideration at a meeting of the Credentials Committee of the Board of Medicine on November 14, 1998. The Petitioner was present at the November 14, 1998, meeting, at which time he was not represented by legal counsel. At the conclusion of that meeting, the Credentials Committee voted unanimously to recommend that the Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement be denied. During the meeting on November 14, 1998, there was no mention by either the Petitioner or any member of the Credentials Committee of the subject of reactivating the Petitioner's prior void license. The Petitioner was, of course, disappointed with the vote of the Credentials Committee. He was also of the view that the members of the Credentials Committee had treated him in a shabby, rude, and disrespectful manner, and that they had failed to properly perform their duties. Following his first appearance before the Credentials Committee of the Board of Medicine, the Petitioner obtained legal counsel. On January 20, 1999, the Petitioner wrote a letter to Governor Jeb Bush, which included the following comments: I first called the Board of Medicine and asked to have my license reactivated, but was informed that was not possible, and that I would have to reapply for licensure. * * * I then hired an attorney to assist with my application. She notified me that I was eligible to receive a license under a provision that allowed for reactivation of my license in certain circumstances. Therafter, the Petitioner's legal counsel made numerous efforts to persuade the Credentials Committee and the full Board of Medicine to treat the Petitioner's application of May 19, 1998, as an application for reactivation under Section 458.313(8), Florida Statutes. Those efforts were unsuccessful and the Board of Medicine, on March 5, 1999, issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Application for Licensure by Endorsement. The stated grounds in the notice were failures to meet several requirements of Section 458.313(1), Florida Statutes. The notice did not mention Section 458.313(8), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case concluding that the Petitioner, Carlos Warter, M.D., is not eligible for licensure under Section 458.313(1), Florida Statutes, because he admittedly fails to meet all of the requirements for issuance of a license under Section 458.313(1), Florida Statutes, and that he is not eligible for licensure under Section 458.313(8), Florida Statutes, because he has never filed an application for reactivation of his prior voided license pursuant to Section 458.313(8), Florida Statutes, and the statutory deadline for filing such applications has expired. 7/ DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1999.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (Respondent or Division), acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Christian Welvaert’s (Petitioner or Welvaert) application to be licensed as a yacht and ship salesmen under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with regulating and licensing of yacht and ship brokers under Section 326.002(2), Florida Statutes. On October 16, 2001, Welvaert submitted to the Division his application for licensure as a yacht and ship salesman. Licensure is a privilege granted to individuals who affirmatively demonstrate good moral character. The Division is authorized to, and does in fact investigate an applicant's criminal background if one exists. This is done so that the state may determine if the individual's criminal history is of a nature which would warrant denial of licensure. To facilitate the state's investigation, applicants are asked to fully disclose any criminal history. It is required that this question, and all the questions on the application, be answered truthfully. Welvaert falsely stated on his application that his only criminal background was "traffic offense." A Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) background check revealed that Welvaert had been arrested on several occasions on charges relating to possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia; domestic battery and resisting an officer without violence; probation violation by possessing drug paraphernalia and cannabis; and driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Welvaert did not offer any evidence to contradict the FDLE's findings in any material way. He asserted that he never violated probation, claiming that he didn’t know when his court date was because he had moved. This experience did not teach Welvaert the importance of attending to his legal affairs. In this case, he blamed his landlady for his failure to respond to the Division's Request for Admissions, which was properly served upon him at the address he had on file in this case. Welvaert stated, "I thought the person, the landlady I was staying with, I thought she was going to call me or tell me if I had something this important in the mail. I guess she didn't." Petitioner testified that he has "changed his life around" and is now rehabilitated. While he did not unequivocally deny the drug charges, he implied that he "just [took] the time" on the advice of the presiding judge. He further stated, "It was at someone's house. I was in a college town at the time." Nothing in Welvaert's testimony constitutes a legally or factually sufficient excuse for his failure to disclose his criminal background.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application to be licensed as a yacht and ship salesman’s be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Christian P. Welvaert 7 Kenmore Lane Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Ross Fleetwood, Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact In late 1988, information was received by Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) investigators that a Georgia licensed contractor was building Shoney's restaurants in Florida with a permit pulled in the name of a deceased Florida licensed contractor, Donald Loftin. The contractor, Quality Construction Builders, Inc., owned by Fred Pringle, was not licensed in Florida. Prior to 1986, Pringle had worked for a restaurant management services who had built several Shoney's restaurants in Florida and Georgia. Pringle, in 1980, obtained a power of attorney from Donald Loftin, a licensed Florida contractor, to pull permits under Loftin's license. Loftin died in December 1981, but Pringle renewed Loftin's license once or twice after Loftin's death and pulled construction permits under this license. An extensive investigation was commenced with particular emphasis on construction projects commenced under permits pulled with Loftin's license. Some 25 witnesses were interrogated, including contractors who had pulled permits for Shoney's restaurants on which construction had been stopped, or threatened with stoppage by local officials, because of the initial permit being pulled on Loftin's license. One of these contractors contacted in this investigation was Samuel Whitener who had pulled a permit for a Shoney's restaurant under construction in Ellenton, Florida, on which a stop order had been issued because of the invalid permit. Other contractors who had pulled similar permits for a fee were questioned as were numerous subcontractors, the superintendent for Quality Construction Builders, Inc., and officials of Restaurant Management Services. When the restaurant at Ellenton was approximately 80 percent completed, the local construction authorities stopped work on the project because of the invalid permit which had been pulled using Loftin's license. After the stop order was issued, Restaurant Management Services (RMS), an arm of Shoney's restaurants, entered into a contract with Petitioner herein to complete the project for which Petitioner was paid $4000. When questioned by DPR investigators regarding this function, Petitioner acknowledged that he was paid $4000, that the subcontractors working on the restaurant continued on the job, that these subcontractors were paid by RMS, that he could not hire or fire the subcontractors, and the construction was supervised by Shoney's general contractor, Quality Construction Builders, who had built several other Shoney's restaurants in Florida. Petitioner further told, or led the investigators to conclude, that he had no responsibility for the ongoing construction and that he visited the site once or twice per week; and that the superintendent was primarily in charge of the construction. Other Florida contractors who had also pulled permits for Shoney's restaurants admitted that, although they had pulled the permits, they did not hire, fire, or pay subcontractors and that they performed little, if any, supervision of the construction. Based on this information, the investigator concluded that Petitioner and other contractors were aiding and abetting an unlicensed contractor to do contracting in this State, and submitted this investigative report recommending that Petitioner be charged with violation of Section 489.129(1)(e) and (f), Florida Statutes. The investigative file, which also included a copy of the Construction Management Services contract between Whitener and RMS, was forwarded to the Probable Cause Panel with recommendation that probable cause for a violation of the Construction Industry License Law be found. This contract contains six specific management services which Whitener would supply on the Ellenton project. The contract did not provide that Whitener would obtain the building permit, gave Whitener no control over the financial aspects of the construction, provided for RMS to pay all subcontractors, and did not provide for Whitener to be the qualifying contractor for RMS or Quality Construction. After reviewing the investigation file, including the management services contract, the Probable Cause Panel found probable cause that Whitener violated Section 489.129(1)(e) and (f), Florida Statutes.