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COASTAL PETROLEUM COMPANY AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 98-001901 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 22, 1998 Number: 98-001901 Latest Update: May 11, 1999

The Issue The issues in these cases include the following: Did Petitioner file completed applications to entitle it to an oil and gas drilling permit? Is the Department's policy of requiring information in support of an offshore oil and gas well drilling permit not specifically set out in existing rules constitute an unadopted rule? If the Department applied an unadopted rule to Petitioner in these cases, does the unadopted rule meet the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes? Is Petitioner entitled to the oil and gas drilling permits it sought by default?

Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Coastal Petroleum Company (hereinafter referred to as "Coastal"), is a Florida corporation. Phillip Ware is the current president of Coastal. Respondent, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with the responsibility of implementing Florida laws and rules regulating the issuance of oil and gas drilling permits. Intervenors are the Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc., Sierra Club, Florida Chapter, and the Florida Audubon Society, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Environmental Intervenors"), and the Department of Legal Affairs (hereinafter referred to as "Legal Affairs"). The Environmental Intervenors and Legal Affairs filed verified petitions to intervene in this proceeding pursuant to Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes. Coastal's Offshore Drilling Rights. On or about December 27, 1944, Coastal's predecessor entered into two leases, Drilling Lease Nos. 224-A and 224-B (hereinafter referred to as the "Original Leases"), with the predecessor to the Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund. The Original Leases gave Coastal the exclusive right to explore for and produce oil and gas on submerged lands of the State of Florida throughout an area extending for a distance of 10.36 statute miles off most of the west coast of Florida. The area extends from approximately Apalachicola, Florida, in the north, to Naples, Florida, in the south. On or about February 27, 1947, the Original Leases were modified to redefine the area covered by the Leases due to claims of the federal government of parts of the area originally covered by the Original Leases (hereinafter referred to as the "Modified Leases"). In 1990 the Legislature enacted Chapter 90-72, Laws of Florida (1990), expressing the current policy of the State concerning offshore drilling. Pursuant to Chapter 90-72 the Legislature prohibited all offshore leasing and drilling. Recognizing Coastal's rights pursuant to the Modified Leases, an exception for drilling in areas governed by the Modified Leases was included in Chapter 90-72. Coastal is currently the only person entitled to explore for, and produce oil and gas on State submerged lands. Coastal's working interests under the Modified Leases were, as a result of litigation between the State and Coastal, subsequently reduced to the width of the area covered by the Modified Leases to between 7 miles and 10.36 miles from the coast. The litigation began during the late 1960's and ended with a settlement in 1976. Following the execution of the Original Leases and continuing through 1968, Coastal was involved with obtaining permits for, and drilling, approximately 9 wells in the area covered by the Original and/or Modified Leases. No permits were obtained by Coastal to drill in the area covered by the Modified Leases after 1968 due to the ongoing litigation between Coastal and the State. After the settlement of the dispute in 1976, Coastal was involved in litigation with Mobil Oil until the 1980's. Due to that litigation, Coastal did not pursue any other drilling operations under the Modified Leases until the 1980's. Because of the significant changes in the state of offshore drilling technology since Coastal had last applied for a permit to drill offshore in Florida, it took Coastal until the early 1990's to file a new application to drill offshore. Permit 1281. In March 1992 Coastal filed five separate applications with the Department seeking permits to drill exploratory oil and gas wells at five separate locations in the Gulf of Mexico within the area of the Modified Leases. Two applications were for proposed sites offshore from northwest Florida and three were for proposed sites offshore from southwest Florida. The applications were designated permit application numbers 1277 through 1281 by the Department. The applications filed by Coastal included a completed one-page Department form (Form 3), a location plat for the proposed drilling sites, and a filing fee. Coastal subsequently withdrew four of the applications. Only permit application 1281 remained. Pursuant to permit application 1281, Coastal sought approval to drill offshore from Franklin County, Florida, near St. George Island. In August 1996 the Department, after protracted negotiations with Coastal, issued notice of its intent to issue Permit 1281. The protracted negotiations involved, among other things, a request of the Department for additional information concerning the proposed location and drilling plans of Coastal. The additional information requested by the Department was essentially the same as the information requested by the Department in these cases. While Coastal provided the information concerning permit application 1281, it did so under protest. The Department's proposed decision to issue Permit 1281 was challenged. Following an administrative hearing, a Recommended Order was entered recommending that the permit be issued. The Department rejected the recommendation by Final Order issued May 22, 1998. That Final Order has been appealed by Coastal. Coastal's Applications for Permits 1296 through 1307. On or about February 25, 1997, Coastal simultaneously filed twelve separate applications (hereinafter referred to as the "Twelve Applications") with the Department seeking permits to drill exploratory oil and gas wells at twelve separate locations in the Gulf of Mexico within the area of the Modified Leases. Coastal Exhibits 49 through 60. The Twelve Applications were designated permit application numbers 1296 through 1307 by the Department. All of the proposed drilling sites are located between 8 and 9 miles offshore in water depths ranging between 50 to 75 feet. The general location of the twelve proposed drilling sites is as follows: Permit applications 1296 and 1297: offshore from St. George Island and Franklin County; Permit application 1298: offshore from the St. Marks River, Wakulla County; Permit application 1299: offshore from the mouth of the Steinhatchee River, Taylor County; Permit applications 1300 and 1301: offshore from Anclote Island, Pasco County; Permit application 1302: offshore from Longboat Key, Sarasota County; Permit applications 1303, 1304, and 1305: offshore from Gasparilla Island, Charlotte County; Permit application 1306: offshore from Sanibel Island, Lee County; and Permit application 1307: offshore from Naples, Collier County. The locations of the proposed exploratory wells are depicted on Coastal Exhibit 27, which is incorporated into this Recommended Order by reference. The Twelve Applications filed by Coastal consisted of the following: A completed Application For Permit to Drill, Form 3, for each well; A check payable to the Petroleum Exploration Bond Trust Fund as performance security for the twelve proposed wells; A navigation chart published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, with the location (latitude and longitude) of each proposed drilling site and the area of Coastal's lease designated on the chart. The scale of the chart provided by Coastal is 1:20,000. A surveyor's report of the coordinates of each proposed drilling site was also included; and A single check in the amount of $24,000.00 in payment of the $2,000.00 application fee for each permit application. Form 3 requires that an applicant provide information concerning the name, phone number, and address of the applicant, the well name and its location, ground elevation, acres assigned to the well, the "field/area" of the well, the county and specific location of the well, proposed depth of the well, and the applicant's mineral interests in the drilling unit. Coastal provided all of this information. Form 3 also requires that the applicant answer a series of questions concerning whether the proposed location of the well will be located within: a municipality; tidal waters within 3 miles of a municipality; an improved beach; submerged land located in any bay or estuary; one mile seaward of the Florida coastline or the boundary of any state, or a local or federal park, or aquatic or wildlife preserve; on the surface of a freshwater body; within one mile inland from the shoreline of the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic Ocean or any bay or estuary; or within one mile of any freshwater body. Coastal answered all of the foregoing questions "no" on the Twelve Applications. Coastal did not provide a copy of its Organization Report (Department "Form 1") because it had already provided one to the Department. As provided in the Department's rules, Coastal informed the Department that its Organization Report was on file with the Department. Coastal did not initially provide casing and cementing plans or a contingency plan for hydrogen sulfide with the Twelve Applications. Ultimately, casing and cementing plans were provided by Coastal. Finally, Coastal requested that the Department conduct a preliminary site inspection, pursuant to the requirement of Rule 62C-26.003(4), Florida Administrative Code. The Department's Notice of Incompleteness. By letter dated March 26, 1997, the Department informed Coastal that the Twelve Applications were incomplete. The Department requested that Coastal provide additional information which it listed under eleven general categories: Location Plat; Environmental and Site Assessments; Zero Discharge; Accidental Pollutant Discharges; Drilling Platform; Hurricane Plan; Geologic Data; Transportation; Test Oil and Gas Plan; Drilling Plan; and H2S Contingency Plan. Coastal's Response to the Department's Notice of Incompleteness and Request for Additional Information. By letter dated September 22, 1997, Mr. Ware, on behalf of Coastal, responded to the Department's March 26, 1997, notice of incompleteness and request for additional information. In general, Coastal provided some of the requested information but indicated that it did not believe the Department had the authority to request most of the information. Therefore, Coastal informed the Department that most of the requested information was not being provided. Despite the fact that Coastal did not provide most of the requested information, Mr. Ware stated the following in the first paragraph of the September 22, 1997, letter: In fact, no statutory or regulatory authority was cited for any request. If Coastal is mistaken on any such request, please inform us of the specific authority allowing the department to require such information and Coastal will respond. [Emphasis added]. The Department's Answer to Coastal's Request for Specific Authority. Coastal's request for citations of specific authority and Coastal's representation that it would provide the information if such authority were given, was reasonably interpreted by the Department as an expression of Coastal's willingness to continue to discuss whether the Twelve Applications were in fact complete. As a consequence, the Department proceeded to respond to Coastal's request rather than proceeding to treat the Twelve Applications as complete and review them on their merits. After extensive research, the Department responded to Coastal's request for authority by letter dated December 16, 1997. The Department provided Coastal with citations to statutes and rules which the Department believed supported the additional information it had requested in its March 26, 1997, letter. See Coastal Exhibit 76. The Department also pointed out inconsistencies in the information Coastal had provided in support of the Twelve Applications. In particular, the Department asked why Coastal's H2S contingency plan referred to a drilling rig different than the one that Coastal had indicated it intended to use. The Department also asked Coastal how it planned to drill twelve wells within the time allowed after a permit is issued with only the one drilling platform that Coastal had indicated it planned to use for all twelve wells. Coastal's First Notice of Completeness. By letter dated December 26, 1997, Coastal informed the Department that it was not convinced that the authorities cited by the Department in its December 16, 1997, letter required that it provide the additional information sought by the Department. Mr. Ware, therefore, informed the Department in the December 26, 1997, letter of the following: As a result of the Department's insistence that Coastal provide such information, Coastal is left with no alternative but to file a petition for administrative hearing concerning whether the materials submitted by Coastal were sufficient to complete the applications so that they should have been processed by the Department. Twelve separate Petitions for Formal Administrative Hearing were filed by Coastal with the December 26, 1997, letter. Pursuant to the petitions, Coastal challenged the Department's request for additional information and sought approval of the Twelve Applications by default. Coastal's December 26, 1997, letter and the petitions filed simultaneously with the letter were the first indication from Coastal that it considered the Twelve Applications complete. On January 22, 1998, the Department entered an Order Dismissing Petitions, dismissing the twelve petitions filed by Coastal. The petitions were dismissed without prejudice to the filing of amended petitions alleging how the Department's December 16, 1997, letter constituted "agency action." No amended petitions were filed by Coastal. The Department also concluded in the Order Dismissing Petitions that Coastal's December 26, 1997, letter constituted Coastal's first notice that it considered the Twelve Applications complete and directed that staff grant or deny the Twelve Applications within 90 days from Coastal's notice. In support of the Department's conclusion that the Twelve Applications should not be considered as complete until Coastal filed its December 26, 1997, letter, the Department noted in its order that Coastal, in response to the Department's December 16, 1997, letter, had requested specific authority for the Department's request and had represented that it would provide the additional information sought by the Department if it were satisfied with authority cited by the Department. I. The Department's Denial of Coastal's Applications. On March 24, 1998, the Department entered a "Final Order" denying the Twelve Applications. It is this Final Order that is the subject of these proceedings. The Department's decision to deny the Twelve Applications was explained as follows: The applications as submitted do not provide the Department with assurance that the issuance of the permits would be in compliance with the standards and criteria of Chapter 377, Part I, F.S., and Rules 62C-25 through 62C-30, F.A.C. The Department cannot determine based on the information submitted, that the proposed drilling activities do not threaten public safety and the state's natural resources. Information critical to making such a determination remains absent. . . . The Department's Final Order denying the Twelve Applications was entered within 90 days after Coastal notified the Department that it did not intend to provide any additional information to support the Twelve Applications and that it considered the applications complete. The Department's decision to deny the Twelve Applications was based solely on the Department's conclusion that it had not been provided sufficient information to review the merits of the Twelve Applications. The Department's Specific Authority Over Oil and Gas Drilling Permits. Part I, Chapter 377, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), establishes the law in Florida governing oil and gas resources of the State. Section 377.06, Florida Statutes, sets out the general public policy of the State concerning oil and gas: It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state to conserve and control the natural resources of oil and gas in said state, and the products made therefrom; to prevent waste of said natural resources; to provide for the protection and adjustment of the correlative rights of the owners of the land wherein said natural resources lie and the owners and producers of oil and gas resources and the products made therefrom, and of others interested therein; to safeguard the health, property, and public welfare of the citizens of said state and other interested persons and for all purposes indicated by the provisions herein. . . . The Department is designated as one of the agencies of the State authorized to carry out the powers, duties, and authority of the Act. Section 377.07, Florida Statutes. The Department's authority includes the authority to adopt rules and enter orders it deems necessary to implement and enforce the provisions of the Act. Section 377.22, Florida Statutes. In particular, the Department has been given broad authority to regulate the drilling for oil and gas in Florida in Sections 377.22(2)(a) through (x), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to this broad authority, the Department has promulgated Chapters 62C-25 through 62C-30, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 62C-25.006, Florida Administrative Code, sets out the general rule concerning the exploration for oil and gas in Florida: Each person who conducts geophysical surveys (unless exempted by Rule 62C-26.007), drills an oil or gas related well (62C-26.003), or operates an oil or gas related well . . . (62C-26.008) shall first obtain a permit from the Department. Each of these activities requires a separate permit. [Emphasis added]. Ordinarily a single permit will be issued for drilling a well and either transporting test oil or injecting test fluids for a period of 90 days after testing is commenced. . . . In these cases, Coastal is seeking a permit to drill an oil or gas-related well and must, therefore, comply with Rule 62C-26.003, Florida Administrative Code, titled "Drilling Applications" (hereinafter referred to as the "Drilling Application Rule"). The Drilling Application Rule establishes certain specific requirements concerning specific information which, by the clear terms of the rule, must be provided by all applicants for oil and gas drilling permits in Florida. Applicants for drilling applications are required to be provide the following: All Applications to Drill (Form 3) shall include an Organization Report (Form 1; 62C- 25.008), performance security (62C-25.008, 62C- 26.002), location plat (62C-26.003(7)), site construction plans (62C-26.003(9)), casing and cementing program (62C-26.003(5)), contingency plan if appropriate (62C-27.001(7)), and application fee (62C-26.003(8)). In addition to these items, an application to drill a nonroutine well shall include a lease map or document and a letter of justification, both as described in 62C-26.004(6)(d). Any of these items already on file with the Department may be included by reference. The application to drill shall be considered incomplete until the applicant requests a preliminary inspection be made by the Department. . . . A proposed casing and cementing program must be included with the application to drill. This program shall at a minimum include setting depths, specified minimum yield strength, grade of pipe, class of cement to be used, cement additives, cement quantity, intended interval to be cemented, hole size, displacement method, special tools to be used, and calculated percent excess cement to be used. . . . . Each application shall be accompanied by a location plat surveyed and prepared by a registered land surveyor licensed under Chapter 472, FS. All such plats shall meet the minimum technical standards for land surveys as specified in Chapter 61G-17-6, FAC, and must: Be drawn to a scale sufficient to show the required detail, preferably 1 inch = 1,000 feet. Show and provide a legal description of all mineral acreage within the drilling unit which is not under lease to the applicant. Show the exact well location (both surface and bottom if different) and unit acreage within the drilling unit and indicate distances to adjacent wells, drilling unit boundaries, quarter-section corners, rivers and other prominent features. With prior notice and explanation to the Department, other established lines, reference points, or methods may be used when section corners are unavailable and an inordinate amount of preliminary surveying would have to be done to establish section corners or other standard reference points. In any case, a standard survey or equivalent with plat shall be made prior to obtaining an operating permit. Show ground elevation, with tolerances, at the drill site. State whether the proposed drilling unit is routine on nonroutine and specify the applicable subsection of s. 62C-26.004 under which the well is located. Each application to drill shall be accompanied by a $2,000 processing and regulatory fee . . . for costs incurred by the Department through well completion or plugging. . . . . . . . The applicant shall describe the provisions made for locating and constructing roads, pads, utility lines and other facilities needed for drilling operations and shall make every effort to minimize related impacts. Applications for permits in wetlands, submerged lands, and other sensitive areas shall be reviewed in accordance with 62C-30.005, FAC. Coastal provided all of the specific information applicable to the Twelve Applications required by the Drilling Application Rule. Much of the information required by the Drilling Application Rule, however, pertains to drilling operations on land and not drilling operations on submerged, offshore lands. The Department's Offshore Drilling Policy. Although Coastal provided all of the specific information required by the Drilling Application Rule, the Department required that a significant amount of additional supporting information be provided in support of the Twelve Applications. The additional information is generally described in Section E of this Recommended Order and is more specifically described, infra. Through the incompleteness letters issued by the Department in these cases, the Department expressed a statement of general applicability which "implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency . . . ." Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes. The Department's statement of general applicability is, in effect, that all applicants for offshore oil and gas wells must provide the information described in the Department's letters of incompleteness to Coastal; information not specifically listed in the Drilling Application Rule. This state of general applicability will hereinafter be referred to as the "Offshore Drilling Policy." The Offshore Drilling Policy is of recent origin. It was not applied during the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's. The policy was only recently developed because only a few offshore drilling permits have been applied for until recently and the technology applied in offshore drilling has changed significantly in the past fifty years. Between the 1960's and 1992, when Coastal filed five applications for permits, only one offshore drilling permit was issued by the Department. That permit was issued in the late 1970's or early 1980's to Getty Oil Company (hereinafter referred to as "Getty") for a test well approximately three miles offshore from Santa Rosa County, Florida. The Offshore Drilling Policy was not applied by the Department to Getty, although most of the information required in these cases was eventually provided by Getty. Getty provided the information not because of Department policy, however, but in an effort to settle a challenge to the Department's proposed decision to issue the permit. Although much of the Department's knowledge concerning offshore drilling was developed as a result of the Getty permit, the Department did not receive another permit application for offshore drilling for ten to twelve years or more. Since 1992, however, the Department has required the same additional information it requested Coastal to provide in these cases for seventeen different proposed well locations located from offshore sites off the northwest coast of Florida near St. George Island and extending to the southwest coast of Florida near Naples. The Offshore Drilling Policy has been adopted by the Department because existing rules were adopted primarily to govern drilling operations on land and not offshore. As a consequence, those rules inadequately address offshore wells. The Department, however, is charged with broad authority under Chapter 377, Florida Statutes, to govern oil and gas drilling operations on and offshore. That authority includes the broad authority to carry out the public policy of the State expressed in Section 377.06, Florida Statutes, to "conserve and control the natural resources of oil and gas . . . ; to prevent waste of said natural resources; . . . to safeguard the health, property and public welfare of the citizens . . . ." When the intent of existing rules is considered in the context of offshore drilling, it is apparent that Drilling Application Rule does not adequately address all the reasonable concerns with offshore drilling. The Department has developed the Offshore Drilling Policy to the point where it has become more than a mere interpretation and application of existing law to offshore drilling applications. The Offshore Drilling Policy has become a uniform statement of policy describing a significant amount of particular information which the Department will require for any application for an offshore drilling permit. The Offshore Drilling Policy has passed the point in its development that it can be considered the Department's reaction to a particular set of circumstances. The Scope of the Department's Application of the Offshore Drilling Policy. The Offshore Drilling Policy has been applied to the last seventeen applications for offshore wells filed with the Department. The first five applications were filed in March 1992. Although four of those applications were withdrawn, the Department developed the Offshore Drilling Policy and applied it to permit application 1281 prior to August 1996 when the Department issued its notice of intent to issue Permit 1281. Although the evidence failed to prove exactly when the Department decided to apply the Offshore Drilling Policy to permit application 1281, the policy had been applied before the Twelve Applications were filed in February 1997. The Offshore Drilling Policy was applied uniformly to the Twelve Applications from the date they were filed through the date of the hearing in these cases. The Offshore Drilling Policy was also sufficiently formulated for the Department to publish notice of its intent to adopt the Offshore Drilling Policy as a rule. That notice was published on November 24, 1998. Therefore, the Offshore Drilling Policy was sufficiently formulated to be proposed for adoption as a rule prior to the commencement of this de novo proceeding. It is apparent that the Department intends to apply the Offshore Drilling Policy to all applications for oil and gas wells proposed for location offshore in the waters of the State. At present, only Coastal has the right to drill in the sovereign submerged lands of the State and Section 377.242(1)(a)5, Florida Statutes, currently prohibits granting drilling permits within the boundaries of the Florida's territorial seas to any person other than Coastal. The evidence failed to prove, however, that Coastal cannot assign its right to drill to other persons, which it has done in the past. Even though Coastal may currently be the only applicant for oil and gas well drilling permits, the Department is at liberty to modify the Offshore Drilling Policy at any time to require different or additional information, without prior notice to Coastal. Coastal has the right to some certainty as to what information the Department may require for approval of an offshore drilling permit. Section 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes; De Novo Review of the Offshore Drilling Policy. Section 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes, requires a de novo review of any unadopted rule which formed the basis of any agency action. The Department's denial of the Twelve Applications in these cases was based solely on its application of the Offshore Drilling Policy. The Offshore Drilling Policy has not been adopted as a rule, although the Department has instituted rule- making procedures. Therefore, if the Offshore Drilling Policy constitutes a rule, the Offshore Drilling Policy must meet the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Each category of information required by the Department pursuant to the Offshore Drilling Policy must be examined in determining whether some of the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes, have been met. The other requirements of Section 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes, can be considered generally without an examination of each category of information required by the Department. Location Plat Information. The Department requested that Coastal provide the following information concerning the location of the proposed wells: For each proposed location, submit a plat on an original nautical chart showing each drilling site relative to the shore. This map should include at least the following surface and bottom hole locations including satellite navigation coordinates so the site can be re-occupied by a preliminary inspection team, boundaries of the working interest area, location of nearby reefs or sensitive aquatic wildlife areas, wildlife migration routes, proposed routing of supply ships, discharge barges, pipelines, helicopter routes, and commonly used shipping lanes. Also submit a diagram showing the orientation of the rig and the location of its major components. Coastal provided only standard nautical charts with a surveyed site location and the lease boundaries noted. The charts did not contain any of the information requested by the Department. Nor did the charts note whether the plotted points were surface or bottom hole locations. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting the Location Plat information: Section 377.22(2)(h), Florida Statutes, and Rule 62C-26.003(7), Florida Administrative Code, quoted, supra. Section 377.22(2)(h), Florida Statutes, provides the following: (2) The department shall adopt such rules and regulations, and shall issue such orders, governing all phases of the exploration, drilling, and production of oil, gas, or other petroleum products in the state . . . as may be necessary for the proper administration and enforcement of this chapter. Rules, regulations, and orders promulgated in accordance with this section shall be for, but shall not be limited to, the following purposes: . . . . (h) To require the making of reports showing the location of all oil and gas wells; the making and filing of logs; the taking and filing of directional surveys; the filing of electrical, sonic, radioactive, and mechanical logs of oil and gas wells; if taken, the saving of cutting and cores, the cuts of which shall be given to the Bureau of Geology; and the making of reports with respect to drilling and production records. . . . The Department's purpose in requiring the information concerning the Location Plat was to allow it to place the proposed drilling site into context with the surrounding environmental and other features of the area. Without the requested information, the Department could not ensure that sensitive resources and significant features would not be damaged by the proposed drilling operations. Rule 62C-26.003(7), Florida Administrative Code, does not directly authorize the Department to request the Location Plat information. That rule was drafted with onshore drilling operations in mind. Requiring the Location Plat information in these cases is not a mere application of that rule. Rule 62C-26.003(7), Florida Administrative Code, however, does support the conclusion that the requested information is needed for offshore, as well as onshore drilling. More importantly, it demonstrates the broad authority of the Department under the Act to require assurances from an applicant for offshore drilling that the proposed drilling will not be detrimental to the environment. The information provided by Coastal concerning archaeological sites, underground sea cables, and sensitive environmental features on the bottom was not sufficient for the Department to fulfill its responsibilities under the Act. The Act in general and the specific cites provided by the Department in support of its request for Location Plat information give the Department sufficient authority to request the information. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting Location Plat information was not arbitrary or capricious. Environmental and Site Assessment. The Department requested that Coastal provide the following information concerning environmental features of the proposed well sites: Submit a professional ecological/biological survey and report for each proposed drill site. Wildlife habitats including living coral reefs, artificial reefs, patch reefs, benthic infauna, sea grasses, and associated communities shall be identified and located if present. Photodocumentation consisting of television and color still photography shall be included with each report. . . . The Department's request included an outline format for the photodocumentation survey report. Coastal provided no information in response to the Department's request for Environmental and Site Assessment information. Instead, Coastal suggested that the Department obtain the information it requested through the preliminary site inspection required by the Department's rules. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting the Environmental and Site Assessment information: Sections 377.21(2), 377.22(2)(i), 377.241(1), and 377.371(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 62C-26.003(10), Florida Administrative Code. While Section 377.21(2), Florida Statutes, gives the Department little authority concerning the protection of the environment, the other statutory provisions cited by the Department do. Section 377.22(2)(i), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to take into consideration the impact of drilling operations on surrounding leases or property. Section 377.241(1), Florida Statutes, requires the Department to take into consideration the nature, character, and location of lands on which drilling will occur and those involved with the drilling. Finally, and most significantly, Section 377.371(1), Florida Statutes, requires that drilling not cause pollution to land or water, "damage aquatic or marine life, wildlife, birds, or public or private property " Rule 62C-26.003(10), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in part, that "[a]pplications for permits in . . . submerged lands, and other sensitive areas shall be reviewed in accordance with 62C-30.005," a rule governing applications for drilling in the Big Cypress Watershed. Rule 62C-30.005(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, sets out the requirements for drilling sites. Among other things, Rule 62C-30.005(2)(b)2, Florida Administrative Code, requires that topographical and engineering surveys of the drill site, along with aerial photography, must be prepared. While this rule does not specifically authorize the Environmental and Site Assessment information the Department has requested, the statutory authority that supports the rule does. Aerial photography is normally required as an aid to the Department in identifying the proposed site and the surrounding area. Obviously, aerial photography would be of little assistance for a submerged site. Therefore, in order for the Department to carry out its responsibility to protect the environment, including sensitive environmental features such as "live bottom areas" as defined in Rule 62C-25.002(49), Florida Administrative Code, the Department requested photodocumentation of the proposed sites. The Department's request that Coastal provide it with an environmental assessment of the proposed drilling sites was also made to give the Department the necessary information for it to ensure that the environmental impacts of the proposed wells would not be detrimental. Such information also relates to the ability of an applicant to ensure that it has adopted adequate plans to deal with possible oil spills and other accidents. By fully considering the environmental features of an area, the applicant will be better able to draft and adopt contingency plans. Unlike onshore drilling, an offshore well entails a relatively large drilling rig with large feet that rest on the bottom to support the drilling platform above the surface of the water. Those feet, if placed on live bottom, can cause significant damage to marine biota which live in crevices, cracks, and permeable portions of some rocks that may be found on the bottom. The preliminary site inspection conducted by the Department is not an adequate substitute for the information requested by the Department. That inspection is only intended to verify the assurances which the applicant is first required to give. After all, it is the applicant that is seeking permission to drill. As a consequence, the applicant should first determine what impact its proposed drilling will have and, if satisfied on its findings, provide assurances to the Department to support its application. The Act in general and the specific cites provided by the Department in support of its request for Environmental and Site Assessment information give the Department sufficient authority to request the information. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting Environmental and Site Assessment information was not arbitrary or capricious. Zero Discharge. The Department requested that Coastal provide the following information concerning a "zero discharge" plan for the proposed wells: Submit a plan which ensures zero discharge operation for each proposed well. The plan must include an environmental monitoring plan which provides for filed sampling around the drill site such that pre-drilling, drilling, and post- drilling sediments may be compared. Coastal, in response, only stated that it intended to use a zero discharge drilling rig at all the proposed sites. A copy of a brochure generally describing the rig was provided. No description of systems for containing discharges was provided. Nor did Coastal provide monitoring and sampling plans. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting a zero discharge plan: Sections 377.21(2), 377.22(2), 377.22(2)(c) and (i), 377.241(1), 377.243, 377.371, and 377.371(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 62C-26.003(10), Florida Administrative Code. A zero discharge plan is the written plan that an applicant is supposed to follow in the event of the discharge of any pollutant into the surrounding environment of a well site. The plan must cover not only discharges from the well shaft, but also from all equipment used, located, or traveling to the site. The purpose of the plan is to prevent spills and, where an accidental spill occurs, to minimize the impact of the spill. While the use of a zero discharge rig may be a significant part of a zero discharge plan, its use alone is not sufficient. The use of zero discharge rig does not provide assurances concerning the operation of other vessels and equipment which may be used at a site. Nor does its use provide assurances as to what will be done to ensure that the rig works properly or what will be done if it does not. Section 377.22, Florida Statutes, provides authority for the Department to ensure that all precautions are taken to prevent pollutants entering the area of a drilling site or any area associated with the well. Section 377.22(2)(a), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to require that drilling operations are done in such a manner as to prevent pollution of the waters, including salt water, and property of the State. Section 377.22(2)(c), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to require safety equipment to minimize the possibility of an escape of oil and other petroleum products. Finally, Section 377.22(2)(i), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to prevent drilling operations that will cause injury to neighboring property. Section 377.243(2), Florida Statutes, also provides the Department with the authority to require assurances concerning an applicant's efforts to protect against discharges into the environment of oil and other pollutants: (2) As a condition precedent to the issuance or renewal of a permit, the division shall require satisfactory evidence that the applicant has implemented or is in the process of implementing, programs for control of pollution related to oil, petroleum products or their byproducts, and other pollutants and the abatement thereof when a discharge occurs. Finally, Section 377.371(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits persons drilling for oil and gas from polluting land or water and from damaging marine or aquatic life. A spill of oil or gas and other pollutants can have a devastating impact on the environment regardless of whether the spill occurs on land or at sea. Such damage could result in loss of tourism in Florida and severe economic damage. The oil industry has progressed significantly in its ability to prevent spills and, where spills occur, to minimize the impacts of the spill on the environment. In order to minimize the chance of spills and the impacts which could occur from a spill, however, an applicant must take the steps necessary to plan ahead of time and provide the Department with the assurances that the applicant has done so. The Act in general and the specific cites provided by the Department in support of its request for zero discharge information give the Department sufficient authority to request the information. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting zero discharge information was not arbitrary or capricious. Accidental Pollutant Discharges. The Department requested that Coastal provide a spill contingency plan for each of the proposed well sites. The requested plan was to include Coastal's plans for dealing with escaped pollutants, modeling of how projected spills might react, plans for deployment of cleanup equipment, inventories of equipment available for dealing with spills, designation of the individuals responsible for cleanup, and general clean-up plans. In response to the request for the spill contingency information the Department insisted it needed, Coastal stated the following: With respect to Coastal's implementation of a program for control of pollution related to oil, petroleum products and their byproducts, and other pollutants, see the letter of Dr. Tom Herbert, and his curriculum vita, as well as the ISO 14,000 Program on file in Permit #1296. With respect to Coastal's implementation of a program for the abatement of pollution discharges related to oil, petroleum products and their byproducts and other pollutants, see attached letter of Shaw Thompson, and his resume on file in Permit #1296. Coastal did not provide the Department with a specific, written oil-spill contingency plan. Dr. Herbert was involved with ensuring compliance of the Getty well off of Santa Rosa County with environmental protection requirements. Dr. Herbert had not, however, reviewed information concerning the Twelve Applications other than the nautical charts showing the location of the wells. In a letter from Dr. Herbert submitted by Coastal to the Department, Dr. Herbert represented the following concerning Coastal's proposed operations: Coastal Petroleum has used the Getty operations as a "template" for designing operations for the permit number 1281 well and for all subsequent drilling permits pending (numbers 1296 through 1307). We have been retained to assist with the development of plans and procedures and to insure that the operations are carried out in an environmentally safe and conscientious manner. . . . . Coastal Petroleum Company has adopted the ISO 14000 standard as the method for implementing long-term environmental compliance for drilling and production operations off Florida's coast. As the issuance date for the 1281 permit draws near we will begin implementing the ISO 14000- program beginning with training provided by the University of Florida TREEO Center. The implementation of the environmental program will extend from Coastal's own employees to others who may be service companies or contractors. Dr. Herbert's representations to the Department in his letter and at hearing do not constitute an actual oil-spill contingency plan for any of the specific proposed well sites. At best, his representations constitute a commitment to deal with the manner in which Coastal will comply with environmental requirements in the future. It does not constitute a commitment to actually draft and implement an oil-spill contingency plan. Dr. Herbert and Coastal also failed to explain how the Getty site, which was located in 11 to 12 feet of water, is sufficiently similar to the proposed sites of the Twelve Applications, which are all located in much deeper waters. Nor did Coastal explain how it would deal with the fact that the Getty site was not in the open waters of the Gulf of Mexico. More importantly, no specific oil-spill contingency plan was provided for the twelve proposed sites. Mr. Thompson is an expert in oil-spill containment and cleanup. Coastal provided a letter from Mr. Thompson providing assurances that he would be working with Coastal during any drilling of the twelve proposed wells. At hearing, Mr. Thompson had little knowledge of the proposed sites. More importantly, Mr. Thompson did not provide a specific oil-spill contingency plan for the twelve proposed sites. The ISO 14000 Guide provided by Dr. Herbert consists of a book containing a generic template suggested by the author for use by any business concerned with environmental impacts. The Guide is not specific to the oil and gas industry. More importantly, it is not specific to Coastal nor any of the proposed well locations. Finally, the Guide would be of little assistance in dealing with an actual emergency. The Guide is not a specific oil-spill contingency plan. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting the oil-spill contingency plan: Sections 377.22, 377.22(2)(c), 377.243, and 377.371, Florida Statutes. The same statutory authority that supports the request for a zero discharge plan, supports the oil-spill contingency plan requested by the Department. Especially Section 377.243(2), Florida Statutes, quoted, supra. While Section 377.243(2), Florida Statutes, allows an applicant to implement or be in the process of implementing an abatement program, merely indicating the intent to implement a program is insufficient. The Department must ensure that an applicant has taken sufficient steps to prevent the pollution of land or water, as well as damage to aquatic or marine life, wildlife, and birds. The environmental damage from a spill or a well blow-out can be significant. One of the worst oil well blow-outs occurred at an exploratory well. Site specific information must be considered by the applicant in its planning and such information must be provided to the Department for it to make its statutorily required evaluation. The Act in general and the specific citation provided by the Department in support of its request for an accidental pollutant discharge plan give the Department sufficient authority to request the plan. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting the accidental pollutant discharge plan was not arbitrary or capricious. Drilling Platforms. The Department requested that Coastal provide information concerning the drilling platform(s) Coastal intended to use at each proposed site. In particular, the Department requested information concerning rig impacts, rig designation, scheduling, commitment from rig owners, zero discharge, auxiliary power equipment, and safety plans concerning karst hazards, including a shallow seismic program to rule out the existence of sinkholes or bottom caverns. In response to the request for the drilling platform information the Department sought, Coastal provided only a brochure for the Nobel Drilling Company's rig, the Paul Wolff. Coastal also indicated that the rig would face north. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting the drilling platform information: Sections 377.22(2)(c), (d), and (i), Florida Statutes; and Rules 62C- 26.003(10), 62C-27.001(4), (5), (6) (cited as 62C-26001(5) and 62C-26001(6) by error in the Department's December 16, 1997, letter), and 62C-28.004(8), Florida Administrative Code. Section 377.22, Florida Statutes, provides authority for the Department to ensure that all precautions are taken to prevent pollutants entering the area of a drilling site and to protect surrounding property. Section 377.22(2)(a), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to require that drilling operations are done in such a manner as to prevent pollution of the waters, including salt water, and property of the State. Section 377.22(2)(c), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to require safety equipment to minimize the possibility of an escape of oil and other petroleum products. Section 377.22(2)(d), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to ensure that drilling is performed in a manner that will prevent the escape of oil from one stratum to another. Finally, Section 377.22(2)(i), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to prevent drilling operations that will cause injury to neighboring property. The rig Coastal proposed to use sits on three large feet, each with a diameter of over 93 feet. Each foot sits 235 feet from the other two. The entire rig is extremely heavy and, therefore, each foot has a great deal of weight placed on it. The Department requested information concerning rig impacts in order to avoid adverse impacts on the sea bottom. The Department requested information on rig designation, scheduling and owner commitment because of the Department's concern that a single rig could not drill all twelve wells within the limited one-year period of time a permit is valid for. Coastal had also provided some inconsistent information in its hydrogen sulfide plan concerning what rig would be used. Without knowing what rig would be used at each location, the Department could not fully evaluate the possible impacts of the rig on the environment. The seismic survey and the sink hole and karst formation safety plans were requested because of concerns that a rig could collapse if it were placed on such a formation. A karst formation is a geologic formation caused by increased porosity and permeability of underground limestone formations. As limestone is eaten away, the potential for a sinkhole or cavern collapse increases. Sinkholes and karst formations are not uncommon in the area of Coastal's proposed wells. If a rig collapsed on a karst formation, it is possible that a blow out or other oil spill could occur. The potential for such a catastrophe is greater in this instance because the rig that Coastal is proposing to use is a tripod design which could tip over if one foot were placed in a sinkhole or karst formation that collapses. A shallow seismic survey would provide information concerning possible karst formations at the sites where Coastal plans to drill its test wells. The Act in general and the specific cites provided by the Department in support of its request for rig impact information give the Department sufficient authority to request the information. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting rig impact information was not arbitrary or capricious. Hurricane Response Plan. The Department requested that Coastal provide a hurricane preparation and response plan for each site. Coastal provided none of the requested information. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting the hurricane response plan: Section 377.22(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rules 62C-27.001(5) and 62C-27.006(1), Florida Administrative Code. Section 377.22(2)(c), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to require safety equipment to minimize the possibility of an escape of oil and other petroleum products in the event of a natural disaster. Although not cited by the Department, Section 377.371, Florida Statutes, gives the Department broad authority to ensure that oil and gas wells do not pollute. The entire area where Coastal proposed to drill is subject to hurricanes for a significant part of every year. Such storms can have a devastating impact on any structure, including an oil rig, which is in its path. Requiring that an applicant for drilling permits anywhere in the coastal waters of Florida plan ahead of time to respond to an approaching hurricane is abundantly reasonable. The Act in general and the specific citation provided by the Department in support of its request for a hurricane preparation and response plan give the Department sufficient authority to request the plan. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting a hurricane preparation and response plan was not arbitrary or capricious. Geologic Data. The Department requested that Coastal provide the following information concerning the geology of each location of its proposed well sites: Submit material in the form of studies, data, cross sections, or maps which support or explain your decision for locating each well as proposed. All interpreted geologic data must be certified by a geologist licensed in Florida. Coastal provided none of the requested information. For applications 1296 and 1297, Coastal referred the Department to its application for Permit 1281. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting the geologic information: Section 377.075(4)(g), 377.21(2), and 377.241(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 62C- 26.004(6)(d), Florida Administrative Code. Section 377.075(4)(g), Florida Statutes, requires that the Department maintain maps identifying information concerning oil and gas activities in Florida. This provision does not, however, authorize the Department to request the geologic information it requested from Coastal. Section 377.21(2), Florida Statutes, gives the Department the authority and the duty to make inquiries to determine whether "waste" exists or is imminent. "Waste" is defined in Section 377.10(10), Florida Statutes. Based upon the definition of "waste," Section 377.21(2), Florida Statutes, gives the Department the authority to request the information it requested concerning the geology of Coastal's proposed locations. Finally, Section 377.241(3), Florida Statutes, requires that the Department take into consideration the "proven or indicated likelihood of the presence of oil, gas or related minerals in such quantities as to warrant the exploration and extraction of such products . . ." before issuing any permit. This provision alone is sufficient for the Department to request the geologic information it requested from Coastal. Oil and gas wells are not drilled without first considering the geology of an area and the likelihood that oil or gas may be found. The determination of a likely successful well is made by a consideration of relevant geologic information such as that requested by the Department. Without such information, the Department would not be able to reasonably carry out its duty under Section 377.231(3), Florida Statutes. Coastal did not dispute the reasonableness of the requested information in determining whether a well should be placed at a proposed location. Instead, Coastal suggested that the Department has all the information it needs to make the determination and, therefore, Coastal shouldn't be required to provide any further information. The information available to the Department, however, is too general in nature. It does not deal with specific locations such as those proposed by Coastal. More importantly, it is Coastal that is seeking permission to drill. Coastal should, therefore, have already gathered and considered the geologic information requested by the Department in deciding where to place its exploratory wells. There have been relatively few wells drilled in Florida offshore waters. None have been productive. One offshore well located near Franklin County was drilled in 1968 and was dry. The only producing offshore well was located off the southern tip of the Florida Keys. Given these facts, the Department was reasonable in seeking assurances from Coastal concerning the possibility that its proposed wells were reasonably placed. Finally, the information Coastal referred to with regard to Permit 1281 was submitted during the formal administrative hearing on that case and was not as part of Coastal's permit application. That information, therefore, was not available to the Department to review. Nor was it provided during the formal hearing on these cases. The Act in general and the specific cites provided by the Department in support of its request for geologic information give the Department sufficient authority to request the information. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting geologic information was not arbitrary or capricious. Transportation. The Department requested that Coastal provide the following information concerning transportation to and from the proposed wells of the drilling rig(s), a description of onshore facilities and the traffic to the rig(s), and a description of, and route to be taken by, transport vessels and helicopters. In response to the Department's request for the transportation information demanded by the Department, Coastal merely stated that no helicopters would be used at any of the proposed sites except in case of an emergency. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting information concerning transportation: Section 377.22(2)(s), Florida Statutes, and Rules 62C-26.006(1) and 62C- 26.003(10), Florida Administrative Code. Section 377.22(2)(s), Florida Statutes, allows the Department to require "certificates of clearance or tenders in connection with the transportation or delivery of oil or gas, or any product." Section 377.371, Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to ensure that a drilling operation is not harmful to the environment. This provision alone gives the Department sufficient authority to request information from Coastal concerning how it intends to deal with transportation issues concerning the proposed wells. Pursuant to the Department's statutory authority, the Department has adopted Chapter 62C-30, Florida Administrative Code, which, among other things, provides rules governing transportation issues for wells located in Big Cypress. Although those rules do not specifically deal with offshore wells, they do support the conclusion that assurances concerning transportation issues surrounding any well can be required by the Department. Accidents, and the resulting damage to the environment, often occur during the transportation of oil and other equipment and supplies used for a rig. The Department needs to be provided with assurances that every effort is made by an applicant to avoid such damage. If provided sufficient information, the Department may be able to require that an applicant use a different route between a rig and an onshore facility in order to avoid a sensitive reef and thereby reduce the potential adverse impacts of an accident to the reef. A different route may also be required due to safety concerns. In addition to the legitimate concerns of the Department about accidental spills of oil, gas, and cuttings, the Department is concerned about the transportation of other noxious or hazardous materials used in drilling operations. Mixed saltwater and oil byproducts of drilling also must be transported away from a well site. Spills of these materials can have adverse impacts on the environment and, therefore, steps must be taken to reduce those impacts. The Act in general and the specific citations provided by the Department in support of its request for transportation information give the Department sufficient authority to request the information. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting transportation information was not arbitrary or capricious. Test Oil and Gas Plan. The Department requested that Coastal provide the following information concerning plans to test for oil and gas at each of the proposed wells: Submit a plan for safely producing, transporting, and storing test oil and gas. What mode of transportation is anticipated? Tankers? Barges? Pipelines? Where will produced test oil/gas be taken? Where will landfall occur? Include a statement from each appropriate local government assuring that all proposed facilities for oil and gas transportation and storage, both onshore and offshore, will be in compliance with local comprehensive plans. Indicate any leasehold interest or other property interests which will need to be secured to transport test oil or gas. Will test gas be vented, flared, or stored? Discuss why. Coastal provided no test oil and gas plan or other information in response to this request. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting the test oil and gas plan: Sections 377.06, 377.22(2)(c) and (s), Florida Statutes, and Rules 62C-25.006(1) and 62C-28.001, Florida Administrative Code. For all the reasons previously discussed concerning the Department's authority to regulate oil and gas wells, the Department's statutory authority is broad enough to require the test oil and gas plan it requested from Coastal. The testing of fluids, their transport, and their storage all can have adverse impacts on the environment. The Act in general and the specific citations provided by the Department in support of its request for a test oil and gas plan give the Department sufficient authority to request the plan. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting a test oil and gas plan was not arbitrary or capricious. Drilling Plan. The Department requested that Coastal provide information concerning drilling plans for the proposed wells, including a blow-out prevention plan. In response, Coastal provided all of the requested information, including a casing plan, cementing plan, and drilling plan, but refused to provide a blow-out prevention plan. The Paul Wolff brochure provided to the Department included a list of blow-out preventers that are standard equipment on the rig, but there was no information concerning how a blow-out would be dealt with. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting the blowout prevention plan: Sections 377.22(2)(a), (c), (d), (e) and (l), Florida Statutes, and Rules 62C-26.003(5), 62C-26.007, and 62C-27.005, Florida Administrative Code. Section 377.22(2)(l), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to adopt rules to prevent blow-outs. That authority, coupled with other provisions of the Act giving the Department the authority to protect the environment from oil and gas well drilling operations, is sufficient authority for the Department to require the requested blow-out prevention plan. A blow-out can cause the release of oil and gas into the environment with serious consequences to the environment. Preventing a blow-out is, therefore, of paramount importance. Proper prevention of blow-outs depends upon the geology of each drilling site. Different sites may require different equipment or different measures to prevent a blow-out. Consequently, a separate plan for each site is reasonable and necessary. The Act in general and the specific citations provided by the Department in support of its request for a blow-out prevention plan give the Department sufficient authority to request the plan. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting a blow-out prevention plan was not arbitrary or capricious. H2S Contingency Plan. The Department requested that Coastal provide a hydrogen sulfide (H2S) contingency plan, including a site specific air dispersion model for each site predicting the transport of any hydrogen sulfide accidentally released into the air. Coastal provided a single hydrogen sulfide contingency plan. No air dispersion modeling was provided. The Department relied upon the following authority in requesting individual plans and modeling: Sections 377.22 and 377.243(2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 62C-27.001(7), Florida Administrative Code. Hydrogen sulfide is a toxic gas which can be released during drilling operations. The gas is colorless. It is also denser than air. If not handled properly, a release can be fatal to anyone coming into contact with the gas. For an offshore well, a release of hydrogen sulfide can injure workers on the rig and boaters or fishermen in the area. Contact with hydrogen sulfide at a concentration of 100 parts per million can kill a person's sense of smell in 3 to 15 minutes. At a concentration of 300 parts per million, it can be fatal, and at 500 parts per million breathing will cease in only a matter of a few seconds. Because hydrogen sulfide is heavier than air, it will remain just above the surface of the water, where people are normally located on the Gulf. Individuals on the Gulf cannot escape to higher ground to avoid the gas like they may be able to do on land. While modeling cannot provide certainty as to how a cloud of hydrogen sulfide might act, it can at least give information concerning the prevailing wind direction of each site, which may be beneficial in being prepared to deal with an accident. Without such information it is difficult to determine whether plans to deal with an accident are adequate. Section 377.243(2), Florida Statutes, provides adequate authority for the Department to require that Coastal provide modeling for each proposed site. The Act in general and the specific citations provided by the Department in support of its request for hydrogen sulfide modeling give the Department sufficient authority to request the modeling. The Department's request did not enlarge, modify, or contravene its grant of authority. The Department's exercise of its authority in requesting modeling was not arbitrary or capricious. Section 120.57(1)(e)2.c., Florida Statutes. None of the required information is vague, establishes inadequate standards, or vests unbridled discretion in the Department. All of the information requested by the Department was understood by Coastal. Coastal knew what the Department was requested because it had already provided the requested information in support of its 1281 permit application. Section 120.57(1)(e)2.e., Florida Statutes. Coastal received adequate notice of the Department's Offshore Drilling Policy. Coastal had been requested to provide the information in support of its 1281 permit application. It was given written notice of the Offshore Drilling Policy in these twelve cases through the March 26, 1997, notice of incompleteness and the December 16, 1997, explanation of authority for the requested information. AA. Section 120.57(1)(e)2.g., Florida Statutes. While there are costs which Coastal would be required to pay in order to provide the information required by the Department, those costs are not excessive; not when the rationale for requesting the information is considered. Coastal did not consider the costs associated with providing the information sought by the Department to be too excessive for it to refuse to provide the information in seeking Permit 1281. On the contrary, Coastal incurred those costs. Although there was testimony that the costs of providing the information for Permit 1281 was in excess of a million dollars, the weight of the evidence failed to support the testimony. The evidence proved that the costs of providing all of the information requested by the Department would be well below a million dollars for each well. As to considering less costly alternatives, Coastal never gave the Department an opportunity to do so. Coastal simply refused to provide the requested information, to propose less-costly alternatives, or to discuss the matter further with the Department. Nor were any, less costly, methods of obtaining the information necessary for the Department to carry out its responsibilities under the Act proved at hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order denying permit applications 1296 through 1307 for failure to file complete applications. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Angerer, Esquire Robert J. Angerer, Jr., Esquire Angerer and Angerer Post Office Box 10468 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Andrew Baumann, Assistant General Counsel John W. Costigan, Deputy General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Monica K. Reimer, Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 S. Ansley Samson, Esquire David G. Guest, Esquire Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund Post Office Box 1329 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David B. Struhs, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Florida Laws (16) 120.52120.54120.56120.569120.57120.60377.06377.07377.075377.10377.21377.22377.241377.243377.371403.412 Florida Administrative Code (10) 62C-25.00262C-25.00662C-26.00362C-26.00462C-27.00162C-27.00562C-27.00662C-28.00162C-28.00462C-30.005
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ROBERT RACKLEFF; FRIENDS OF FRIENDS OF LLOYD, INC.; COUNCIL OF NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION OF TALLAHASSEE/LEON COUNTY, INC. (CONA); AND THE THOMASVILLE ROAD ASSOCIATION vs DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, 89-006100RU (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 06, 1989 Number: 89-006100RU Latest Update: Jan. 04, 1990

Findings Of Fact Friends of Lloyd, Inc. is a Florida non-profit corporation formed for the purpose of protecting Jefferson County from harmful development. The Council of Neighborhood Associations of Tallahassee/Leon County (CONA) is a non- profit Florida corporation whose members are the neighborhood associations in Leon county; members of those associations reside in 42 Leon County neighborhoods dispersed throughout Leon County. CONA's purposes and goals include protection of the quality of life and environment in Leon County. The Thomasville Road Association's members are principally residents of Leon County. The Association was formed to promote responsible growth management in northern Leon County. None of the Petitioners are owners or "developers" of a Development of Regional Impact within the terms or scope of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Rather, Petitioners are members of non-profit organizations interested in the environment and growth management of Leon County. The Department of Community Affairs (the "Department") is the state land planning agency with the power and duty to administer and enforce Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Sections 380.031(18), and 380.032(1), Florida Statutes (1987). Texaco is a business entity that proposes to develop a "tank farm" near the community of Lloyd in Jefferson County, Florida. The Texaco tank farm is a "petroleum storage facility" as that term is used in Rule 28-24.021, F.A.C. Colonial is a business entity that proposes to develop a petroleum pipeline that will connect to the Texaco tank farm. The pipeline is designed to carry and contain petroleum products For purposes of standing, the parties have stipulated that certain environmental hazards can reasonably be expected to occur as a result of the existence of the pipeline/tank farm. No competent evidence was submitted regarding those hazards. As a result of the stipulation, Petitioners have each established injury-in-fact so that they are "adversely affected" by the challenged rule to an extent sufficient to confer upon them standing to maintain this action under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On September 7, 1989, one of the Petitioners sent Respondent a letter suggesting that the proposed tank farm development to be built in Jefferson County should be required to undergo review as a DRI. Enclosed with the letter was a proposed circuit court complaint pursuant to Section 403.412(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Petitioner expressed its intention of filing this circuit court action, but first provided Respondent a copy of the proposed complaint in accordance with the provisions of Section 403.412, Florida Statutes. In two letters dated September 8 and 25, 1989, Petitioner supplied additional information to Respondent concerning the tank farm project and contended that in making its determination as to whether the development must undergo DRI review, Respondent should consider the storage capacity of both the tank farm and the pipeline. On October 9, 1989, Respondent answered Petitioner's first letter, and stated that the proposed project was not required to undergo DRI review because the total storage capacity of the tanks was only seventy-eight percent (78%) of the threshold set out in Chapter 28-24, F.A.C. On October 13, 1989, Respondent answered Petitioner's second and third letters, stating that with respect to the pipeline, it has been long standing departmental policy to interpret "storage facilities" as meaning only the tanks, not the pipeline, when determining whether petroleum storage facilities meet the DRI thresholds set out in Chapter 28-24. The proposed tank farm would have nine tanks with a total capacity of 155,964 barrels, which is, as Respondent determined in its letters, approximately seventy-eight percent (78%) of the applicable DRI threshold for "petroleum storage facilities" set forth in Chapter 28-24, F.A.C. The proposed pipeline's capacity over its approximate forty-five mile length from Bainbridge, Georgia to the tank farm is approximately 34,000 barrels. The proposed pipeline's volume flow capacity from the Florida/Georgia state line to the site of the prosed tank farm is approximately 13,500 barrels over approximately 18 miles. If the pipeline's volume capacity from Bainbridge, Georgia is added to the tank farm's volume capacity, the resulting project would be approximately ninety-five percent (95%) of the applicable DRI threshold in Chapter 28-24. If the pipeline's volume capacity from the state line is added to the tank farm's volume capacity, the resulting project would be approximately eighty-five percent (85%) of the threshold. In either instance, the project would exceed the eighty percent (80%) threshold that may require it to undergo DRI review although the project would be Presumed not to be a DRI under the Statute. The Department does not require developments outside Chapter 28-24's enumeration to undergo DRI review. The Department has never treated petroleum Pipelines as "petroleum storage facilities," or as otherwise subject to DRI review. On Several occasions, the Department has applied the petroleum storage facility guideline and standard to petroleum tank farms without determining whether a pipeline was attached to the tank farm. On one prior occasion, the Department has explicitly stated that Petroleum Pipelines are not subject to DRI review. The Petitioners contend that Department's Position that pipelines are not "petroleum storage facilities" is an invalid policy because it has not been adopted as a rule. There is no dispute the Department's Position on this issue has not been promulgated as a rule. If a facility were represented to be a Petroleum pipeline, but was actually designed as and operating as a petroleum storage facility, the Department would apply the Petroleum storage facility DRI guideline and standard to that facility.

Florida Laws (9) 120.54120.56120.57120.68380.031380.032380.06380.0651403.412 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-24.021
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SONNY WADE BERDEAUX vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 84-004311 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004311 Latest Update: May 21, 1986

Findings Of Fact Prior to July 10, 1984, Son-Mar Propane, Inc. (Son-Mar) was licensed by the Department as a dealer in liquefied petroleum gas, in appliances and in equipment for use of such gas and installation. Virgil Berdeaux was the president of Son-Mar and he and his wife were the sole stockholders. Virgil Berdeaux passed the competency exam which qualified Son-Mar for licensure. Sonny Wade Berdeaux Virgil Berdeaux's son, was the manager of Son-Mar. Son- Mar's business address and place of operation was 16034 U.S. Highway 19 North in Hudson, Florida. Virgil Berdeaux and his wife owned the property located at that address and leased it to Son-Mar. A propane pumping station and a building was located on the property at 16034 U.S. Highway 19. The building housed a pawn shop and supply store for mobile home and RV equipment. Son-Mar operated the pumping station and the stores. It also installed tanks and delivered gas to customers. 1/ On July 10, 1984, a final order was entered by the Department which ordered "[t]hat any and all of [Son-Mar's] licenses issued by the State Fire Marshal Division of Liquefied Petroleum Gas and eligibility to hold said licenses are hereby revoked." The revocation of Son-Mar's licenses was due to its violation of certain safety standards and rules. Specifically, it was found that an employee of Son-Mar, Mr. John Delham, filled a cylinder that had not been recertified, that he lay it horizontally in the customer's van, and that he failed to secure the tank in the van. While the van was still parked at Son-Mar an explosion occurred which destroyed the van and killed its occupant. On July 19, 1984, nine days after Son-Mar's licenses were revoked, Virgil Berdeaux submitted an application for licensure as a dealer in appliances and equipment for use of liquefied petroleum gas, listing the business address as 16034 U.S. Highway 19, Hudson, Florida, and listing the business name as Son- Mar Pawn Shop. On August 3, 1984, twenty-four days after the revocation of Son- Mar's licenses, Sonny Wade Berdeaux submitted an application for licensure as a dealer in liquefied petroleum gas, listing the business address as 16034 U.S. Highway 19, Hudson, Florida. The Department issues several different types of liquefied petroleum gas licenses. A Type 06, Class 02 license, known as a 602 license, is issued to a dealer in appliances and equipment for use of liquefied petroleum gas. The 602 license allows the holder to sell propane appliances and equipment, such as stoves, heaters, and gas grills but it does not permit the holder to install appliances or sell propane gas. A competency examination is not required for this type of license, and there is no inspection of the place of business prior to issuance of the license. Virgil Berdeaux applied for a 602 license. He completed the application and submitted the required fee. The application listed W. C. Johnson, Virgil Berdeaux's son-in-law, as the manager of the business. Bill Johnson had run the pawn shop for Son-Mar. Sonny Wade Berdeaux applied for a Type 06, Class 04 license known as 604 license, which is issued to a dealer in liquefied petroleum gas. This type of license permits the holder to pump liquefied petroleum gas for sale to the public. An applicant for this type of license must pass a competency test and file a surety bond or certificate of insurance. Further, if the licensee has a dispensing station, an inspection of the business location must be performed to ensure that it is in compliance with all safety regulations. Sonny Wade Berdeaux passed the competency examination, filed a certificate of insurance, and submitted the proper fee. Son-Mar held a Type 06, Class 01 license (a 601 license) as a dealer in liquefied petroleum gas, in appliances and in equipment for use of such gas and installation. A 601 license permits the holder to pump liquefied petroleum gas for sale to the public, to sell appliances and equipment for use of liquefied petroleum gas, and to install such appliances and equipment. In essence, it is a combination of a 602 license, a 604 license, and a license to install equipment. Both Sonny Wade Berdeaux and Virgil Berdeaux received letters dated October 8, 1984, which informed them that their applications for licensure had been denied. Both letters referred to the revocation of Son-Mar's licenses and pointed out that the applicants would be operating on the same premises and employing the same staff as Son-Mar. Both letters concluded as follows: Thus, it would appear that your application is seeking licensure for essentially the same entity that has only recently had its liquefied petroleum gas licenses revoked. Therefore, in the interest of public safety, this Bureau cannot permit an Order of Revocation to be obviated by a mere procedural reapplication in your name. The applications for licensure both list the business address as 16034 U.S. Highway 19 in Hudson, Florida. At the time of application Virgil Berdeaux owned that property and Sonny Wade Berdeaux had leased the pumping station. However, on July 1, 1985, the property at 16034 U.S. Highway 19 was sold. The pumping station was moved out along with the inventory that remained in the pawn shop. Neither Virgil Berdeaux or Sonny Wader Berdeaux retained any interest in the property, and at this time neither could operate a business at that location. Although there was testimony concerning the manner in which the business would have been operated and controlled had licensure been granted at the time of applications there was no testimony indicating where or how the business would now be operated. There was no attempt to amend either application to reflect a current business address, and the certificate of insurance entered into evidence lists 16034 U.S. Highway 19, Hudson, Florida, as the location covered. 2/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law; it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying petitioners' applications for licensure. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1986.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57527.02527.061
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CLAY OIL CORPORATION, D/B/A COWARTS 66 vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, 88-000181 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000181 Latest Update: May 11, 1988

Findings Of Fact On November 5, 1987, a customer at Cowarts 66 service station complained of suspected water in the premium unleaded gasoline the customer had purchased at Cowarts 66 service station. Pursuant to the complaint, William Ford, an inspector for the Department, examined the premium unleaded gasoline storage facility at Cowarts 66 service station. The inspector obtained a sample of gasoline from the premium unleaded gasoline tank. The sample was examined by a Department of Agriculture chemist. There was no water found in the sample. However, the sample showed an end point of 455 degrees Fahrenheit which exceeded the maximum end point of 437 degrees Fahrenheit allowed by the Department under its rules governing petroleum products. Rule 5F-2.001(c)(4), F.A.C. The high end point was caused by the gasoline stored in the tank being mixed with or contaminated by another petroleum product with a high end point such as diesel fuel, thereby raising the end point of the premium unleaded. The contamination was caused by Clay Oil when their delivery driver accidentally mixed two fuels together and delivered the contaminated fuel to Cowarts 66. On November 6, 1987, the inspector issued a stop sale notice. The Department then has the right to confiscate the contaminated gasoline. However, the Department may elect to allow the station to post a bond in lieu of confiscation. In this case, the Department allowed Cowarts 66 to post a $1,000.00 bond in return for replacing the contaminated gasoline with gasoline meeting the Department's standards. The bond was posted the same day as the stop sale notice. The gasoline was likewise replaced either the same day or the morning after by Clay Oil. Cowarts 66 was later reimbursed by Clay Oil for the $1,000.00 cash bond. William Ford testified that he had been an inspector for Petitioner in the Jacksonville area for 16 years and had been familiar with Clay Oil Corporation and its operation for the past 10 or 15 years. He knew the corporation to be a reputable company. Prior to the instant case, he had never had any dealings with Clay Oil Corporation regarding dispensing of contaminated fuel. He had never had an occasion to require Clay Oil Corporation to post a bond. Ford, also, testified that the violation was clearly inadvertent and not representative of the normal business practices of Clay Oil Corporation. Furthermore, Ford testified that Clay Oil Corporation had been totally cooperative with the Department and had made immediate efforts to correct the violation regarding the contaminated fuel. Clay Oil Corporation's representative, Peter T. Eyrick, testified that upon being advised that contaminated fuel had been delivered to Cowarts' service station, he immediately instigated measures to replace the contaminated fuel with fuel that met Department standards. Furthermore, he testified that he had no knowledge that contaminated fuel had been delivered or that illegal sales had occurred until being informed by Cowarts' owner and the Department's inspector. The evidence clearly establishes that this violation was inadvertant and isolated. The violation is not representative of the normal business practice of Respondent. The evidence, also, clearly demonstrated that Respondent had no intent to sell adulterated fuel.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department refund to Clay Oil Corporation $750.00 of the $1,000.00 bond. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX CASE NO. 88-0181 Petitioner, Clay Oil Corporation, did not number its paragraphs in its recommended order. I, therefore, have numbered the paragraphs in its recommended order sequentially and utilize those numbers in this appendix. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, have been adopted, in substance, in so far as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, have been adopted, in substance, in so far as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact contained in paragraph 4 has been adopted, in substance, in so far as material, except for the finding regarding the number of gallons sold. The number of gallons sold was not shown by the evidence. Respondent's proposed findings of fact contained in paragraph 5 was not shown by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter T. Eyrick Clay Oil Corporation Post Office Box 8 Doctors Inlet, Florida 32030 Harry Lewis Michael, Esquire Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Paul S. Boone, Esquire 1221 King Street Jacksonville, Florida 32204 Honorable Doyle Connor Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Lab Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1650

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 5F-2.001
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GEORGE E. FAILING COMPANY vs. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 87-001606BID (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001606BID Latest Update: Aug. 28, 1987

Findings Of Fact It was Stipulated by the parties that the Petitioner timely filed a notice of protest and formal written protest (if section 120.53(5), Fla. Stat. (1986) is applicable) and timely filed a petition for formal administrative hearing. The Petitioner did not receive a written notice of the recommended award of the District as intended by paragraph 9 of the General Conditions of the second invitation for bids, and it did file a notice of protest with seventy-two hours of receiving notification of the District's decision to award the contract to Mid America as intended by paragraph 10 of the General Conditions, P. Ex. 3. It was Stipulated by the parties that the substantial interests of the Petitioner are at stake in this proceeding. The Department of Water Resources is involved in groundwater studies throughout the nineteen Florida counties that comprise the District, and is responsible for the District's drilling program. In the past, the District's waterwells have been in the 500 to 800 foot range, and have been constructed of 4, 6, and 8 inch casing. The Water Resources Department is currently constructing a regional groundwater monitoring network in the nineteen counties. The underlying geological formations differ greatly from county to county, and several water tables often have to be Penetrated before the well reaches the Floridan acquifer. To maintain mud circulation, it is often necessary to case off portions of the well from water table to water table. Moreover, wells are often in unconsolidated formations, and casing is needed to provide support for the hole, Particularly in the upper portions of the well. For these reasons, the District plans to construct step or telescoping wells in the regional groundwater monitoring network. The District expects that it will need to set 16 inch casing in the first eighty feet of some of these wells. In about 1984, by competitive bids, the St. Johns River Water Management District (the District) leased a Speedstar 15-III drill rig from Mid America Drilling Equipment, Inc. This rig was a Size larger than the drill rig that is the Subject of this formal administrative hearing, and had been manufactured in 1978. The District was satisfied with the performance of the larger Speedstar drill rig, and had very few problems with it. District staff became familiar with the operation of the rig. As the lease neared the end of its term, the District began to explore the question whether it should continue to lease, or should purchase its own rig. A member of the District Board Suggested that the District consider acquisition of a rig over a period of years by lease-purchase. This suggestion was adopted by the Department of Water Resources of the District. Due to his familiarity with the Speedstar rig, Mr. Munch decided to use that rig as a basis for bid specifications, but to use the next smaller size, a Speedstar SS-135. Mr. Munch copied the specifications from a Speedstar SS-135 specification sheet as the specifications for the first invitation for bids. Mr. Munch has had no education in engineering or in drill rig design. He has a degree and field work experience in geology, and is a licensed water well contractor. He has been a project manager on projects when outside contractors set 16 inch casing in wells as deep as 2,000 feet, but he has not personally set a 16 inch casing. P. Ex. 1 is the first invitation for bids and specifications for the invitation for bids, as well as the bid of the Petitioner, the George F. Failing Company. This invitation for bids was published on or about August 26, 1986. The invitation for bids provided six bid blanks providing six bid alternatives. The bid blanks appeared as follows: One Year Lease $ /month, renewal $ /month Two Year Lease-purchase $ /year, buy-out $ Three Year Lease-purchase $ /year, buy-out $ Four Year Lease/purchase $ /year, buy-out $ Five Year Lease/purchase $ /year, buy-out $ * * * Suggested Purchase Price $ Less 3 percent for payment in 20 days Four bids were received pursuant to this invitation for bids, including the Petitioner's bid and the bid of Mid America Drilling Equipment, Inc., P. Ex. 7. The four bids were opened on September 11, 1986. Mid America was the only bidder that bid a one year lease with an option to renew. Mid America, the Petitioner, and G & R Machine and Welding, Inc., were the only bidders to bid a lease-purchase. The Petitioners bid was $163,565.00 as an outright purchase price for a Failing model CF-15 and, relevant to the second bid, $5,432.00 per month for a three year lease-purchase, with the rig owned at the end of the three year lease period with no further buy-out payment. The Petitioner did not bid a one year lease. P. Ex. 1. Mid America bid $179,823.00 as an outright purchase price on a Speedstar SS135, and $56,340.00 per year for a three year lease-purchase, with a buy-out price of $61,920.00. Mid America also bid a one year lease at $6,125 per month, with a renewal at $5,288.00 per month. P. Ex. 7. Robert Schenk is the District's Director of the Division of General Services, and as such, Mr. Schenk was responsible for District Purchasing and evaluation of the bids received pursuant to the invitation of bids. Mr. Schenk Prepared an analysis of Several of the bids, including G & R Machine, Mid America, and the Petitioner. P. Ex. Mr. Schenk testified that he felt that the Mid America bid was unclear because of the total amount of the bid calculated over the years. He Said that he considered the Mid America bid for a three year lease-purchase to be ridiculous and out of line because it was $50,000 greater than the outright purchase bid. The bid of the Petitioner for a three year lease- purchase was about $32,000 higher than its bid for an outright purchase. P. Ex. 8. G & R Machine also bid a Speedstar SS-15. Mid America's three year lease-purchase bid was about $35,000 higher than the G & R Machine bid for the same three year lease-purchase. ($230,940.00 compared to $195,664.32.) P. Ex. 8. The bid of Mid America was also high compared to the bid of G & R Machine for a four and a five year lease-purchase, but was comparable for a two year lease-purchase and for an outright purchase. The bid of the Petitioner was $16,000 lower than the Mid America or G & R Machine bids for an outright purchase, was $31,000 lower than the G & R Machine bid and $34,000 lower than the Mid America bid for a two year lease-purchase, and was Slightly higher than the G & R Machine bid on all other bids. The bid of the Petitioner was substantially lower than the Mid America bid on all bids analyzed on P. Ex. 8. Although the Mid America bid was high, it was not an unclear bid. The bid of Mid America was clear and unambiguous. P. Ex. 7. Mr. Schenk thought that the Petitioner's bid was the clearest bid received in the first invitation for bids. Apparently on the same day as the bid opening, which was September 11, 1986, Mr. Schenk had one of his assistants telephone Mid America to ask that it clarify its bid. In response, on the same day as the bid opening, September 11, 1986, Mid America sent the District a letter, P. Ex. 9, which effectively lowered its bid for a three year lease-purchase by $36,612.00. This letter was ultimately not considered by the District in the evaluation of the bids. On September 23, 1986, four staff members of the Department of Water Resources, including Mr. Munch and Barbara A. Vergara, Director of that Department, recommended by memorandum to Mr. Schenk that the Mid America bid for a Speedstar SS-135 for an outright purchase price of $179,823.00 be accepted. These staff members were of the opinion that the drill rig bid by the Petitioner "did not meet all of the bid Specifications due to slight manufacturing differences." But they were also of the opinion that "[t]hese differences may not be critical to the performance and capabilities of the equipment." P. Ex. 10. The staff comparison of the Mid America bid and the Petitioner's bid included calculations for rental costs due to the differing delivery times of the equipment, and calculated that the Mid America bid had a net cost of $184,435 compared to the Petitioner's bid having a net cost of $182,013. Attached to the staff recommendation of September 23, 1986, was a comparison of the three drill rigs by specifications. The comparison used the incorrect specification sheet for the Mid America rig, and thus contained the following errors: the rig bid by Mid America had a single sheave, 3 part block, not a double sheave, 4 part block; the rig also had a working hook load of 20,000 pounds, not 32,700 pounds. Two to four days after September 11, 1986, (the date of the letter from Mid America changing its bid for a three year lease-purchase) Robert Auld, the Florida Branch Manager for the Petitioner, learned that such a letter had been requested, written, and received by the District, and called District staff to protest. Mr. Schenk thereafter apparently concluded that solicitation and receipt of the bid change from Mid America had been procedurally erroneous because he testified that as a result of all of the discussion and criticism that surrounded that event, on the second invitation for bids he concluded that he was procedurally unable to contact any of the bidders to request clarification of bids, even though he then thought that the Petitioner's bid was unclear. Mr. Schenk decided to reject all the bids from the first invitation for bids before Mr. Auld's telephone call. P. Ex. 15, p. 10. But he did not communicate this decision to the staff of the Department of Water Resources before they wrote their memorandum that was initiated through the chain of command on September 23, 1986. Mr. Schenk initially decided to reject all of the bids because the bidders had not all bid on all of the requested alternatives. Later, other reasons for rejection of all of the bids became apparent. Another major reason for rejection of all of the bids was because the specifications were drawn from the Speedstar SS-135 specifications, and unfairly eliminated the Petitioner's rig. Mr. Auld admitted that the Failing CF-15 did not meet the specifications of the first invitation for bids because the Failing CF-15 did not have an 8 1/2 inch rotary table, but was of the opinion that it met all other specifications. Mr. Schenk also rejected all of the bids because of the irregularity of having solicited and received the bid change from Mid America. On October 1, 1986, the District informed all bidders that the bids were all rejected and that the purchase would be again advertised for bids. No protest was filed concerning the first invitation for bids, and it was ruled during the formal administrative hearing that the foregoing facts are admissible as explanatory of the basis for the second invitation for bids, and not as a basis for challenge to the first invitation for bids. Mr. Munch then drafted specifications for the second invitation for bids. This time, he Specified "Speedstar SS-135 or equivalent." Mr. Munch had determined from his experience with the rented Speedstar that the Speedstar SS-135 was capable of fulfilling the needs of the District for drilling. His intention was to allow bids for other types of drill rigs that were the equivalent of a Speedstar SS-135. Ms. Vergara defined the term "equivalent" to mean no differences between a Speedstar SS-135 and the alternative drill rig with respect to doing work in the field that needs to be done by the District. At some time before the second invitation for bids was advertised, or at least before the second bids were filed, the District became Primarily (though not exclusively interested in receiving bids on a three year lease-purchase of a drill rig. Both the Petitioner and Mid America knew this before they prepared their second bids. P. Ex. 3 is the second advertisement for bids and was published on November 6, 1986. The advertisement asks for bids on a "lease-purchase of One Rotary Drill Rig." The attached sheet marked "specifications" stated that what was sought was a "[b]id for purchase or one year lease of a new Speedstar 135 rotary drill rig or at least the equivalent equipment with the following options." Following that were eight technical specifications. The second invitation for bids also specified the following: "Bidder must indicate any and all exceptions to specifications. "Bid shall be awarded to the lowest qualified, responsible bidder whose bid meets all specifications in the Invitation to Bid, including delivery, price and other factors most advantageous to the District." All bidders were to bid using the bid blank attached to the invitation for bids. The bid blank was different from the first invitation for bids apparently with the intent to make bid comparisons easier. The bid blank provided the following alternatives for bids: Purchase Price $ Lease Price $ /Month, first year (renewable) $ /Month, second year (renewable) $ /Month, third year One year guarantee non-routine, major maintenance and repair on lease equipment (renewable annually for term of leased $ . Make and Model of Equipment . Manufacturers Warranty . (minimum of 6 months or 1000 hours) Delivery days (from date of order) Delivery Charges $ . Location of Maintenance Services . Since the District was then "primarily" (but not exclusively) "interested in" a three year lease-purchase, the bid blank form was incomplete and unclear. Paragraph A) of the bid blank form clearly provides for a bid for an outright purchase only, not a "lease-purchase." And Paragraph B) provides only for a lease without any mention of purchase; Paragraph B) asks for a price by month for the first year, with the notation that the lease is renewable (apparently at the option of the District, a lease price by month for the second year, with the notation again that the lease is renewable (at the option of the District), and a lease price per month for a third year, with no mention of any further renewability. Paragraph B) says nothing about purchase of the drill rig, ownership at the end of the lease term, or the buy- out price at the end of the lease term. Moreover, the rest of the invitation for bids is similarly incomplete and unclear. Although the first page of the invitation for bids states that bids were requested on a "lease-purchase" of one rotary drill rig, the specification sheet attached to the invitation stated the specification that the bid should be "for purchase or one year lease...." P. Ex. 3 (E.S.). The specification said nothing about a three year lease-purchase. P. Ex. 3, the second invitation for bids, was sent to all entities that had submitted a bid in response to the first invitation for bids. These included five companies that were Speedstar SS-135 dealers and the Petitioner. Only two bids were received in response to the second invitation for bids, one from Mid America and one from the Petitioner. The second Mid America bid is P. Ex. 11. The Petitioner's second bid is P. Ex. 4. The bids were opened on November 20, 1986. The opening was attended by Ron Owens, President of Mid America, and Robert Auld. Mr. Schenk announced that the Petitioner was the apparent low bidder. Mr. Schenk may have only intended his announcement of apparent low bid to have been with relationship to the bid for outright purchase. A bid tabulation sheet was prepared. P. Ex. Mr. Schenk also announced that the recommendation by the staff to the District Board as to which company should be awarded the contract would be made at the next Board meeting. At that time, the next Board meeting was January 14, 1987. The Petitioner's bid, typed on the bid blank required by the District, provided in pertinent part the following: Purchase Price $146,976.00 Lease Price $ NO BID /Month, first year (renewable) (OWNED AT END OF SECOND YEAR) $6,885.00 /Month, second year (renewable) (OWNED AT END OF THIRD YEAR) $4,592.00 /Month, third year One year guaranteed non-routine, major maintenance and repair on lease equipment (renewable annually for term of lease) $NOT AVAILABLE Make and Model of Equipment FAILING MODEL CF-15 Combination Drill GEORGE E. FAILING COMPANY standard Manufacturers Warranty warranty policy will apply, extended for 9 months (minimum of 6 months or 1000 hours) Delivery 120 days (from date of order) Delivery Charges $ NO CHARGE Location of Maintenance Services GEORGE E. FAILING COMPANY 2101 Starkey Road Largo, Florida 33541 Mid America Submitted its bid on the bid blank form as follows: Purchase Price $179,823.00 Lease Price $5,241.00 /Month, first year (renewable) $5,241.00 /Month, Second year (renewable) $5,241.00 /Month, third year (SEE CONDITIONS BELOW) One year guaranteed non-routine, major maintenance and repair on lease equipment (renewable annually for term of lease) $3,000.00 per year Make and Model of Equipment Speedstar SS-135 Manufacturers Warranty 6 months or 1000 hours (minimum of 6 months or 1000 hours) Delivery 21 days (from date of order) Delivery Charges $ Included/No Charge Location of Maintenance Services Ocala, Florida * * * CONDITIONS #1. If the lease is written for a guaranteed 36 month period, there will be a purchase option available at the end for $1.00 #2. If the lease is written as a yearly renewable lease and runs 3 consecutive years there will be a purchase option available after the 36th payment for $8,092.00. The bid of Mid America was for a Speedstar SS-135, and thus complied with the specifications in that respect. The bid of Mid America was clear and enable the District to understand what its annual budgetary obligations might be should the alternatives in the bid be accepted. The Mid America bid provided the following three alternatives: Outright purchase for $179,823, which was $32,847 more than the bid of the petitioner of $146,976. Payment of a total of $188,676 over a three year period plus an additional payment of $8,092 at the end of the lease if the lease were to be written as yearly renewable for 3 consecutive years, for a total cost of $196,768. Payment of a total of $188,676 (plus a $1 buy-out option) over a three year period if the lease were to be written for a guaranteed 36 month period. This is the alternative ultimately accepted by the District. After publication of the second invitation for bids, but before the opening of those bids, Ms. Vergara appeared before the District Board to explain the manner in which the invitation for bids had been drafted. In particular she explained that the invitation used a "brand name or equivalent" specification. She further advised the Board that the staff recommended the Speedstar SS-135 as the equipment most capable of handling the drilling needs of the District, and that any equipment purchased must be at least equivalent to the Speed star SS-135. At some time before the opening of the second set of bids, Mr. Munch and his supervisor, Ms. Vergara, traveled to the offices of Mid America and inspected a Speedstar SS-135. The owner and President of Mid America was Present to explain the design advantages of the Speedstar SS-135. He was a Salesman, and had no background in engineering or drill rig design. None of the District staff visited the Petitioner's place of business to inspect a Failing CF-15. Mr. Munch and Ms. Vergara did not see a Failing CF-15 until preparations began for the formal administrative hearing. In a deposition prior to the formal hearing, Mr. Schenk testified under oath that the staff had already decided that they wanted a Speedstar SS-135 rather than a Failing CF-15 based upon the report of Ms. Vergera to the District Board. In a deposition prior to the formal hearing, Mr. Munch testified that he was never asked which rig he would rather have, that the issue was Strictly a cost decision, that he probably would have had no objection to purchase of the Failing CF-15 had it been cheaper than the Speedstar SS-135, and that the Failing CF-15 would probably have done the job needed by the District to be done. On December 12, 1986, Mr. Schenk sent a memorandum to the District Board concerning the purchase of the rotary drill rig. The memorandum advised the Board that the District had received two bids. It then presented five alternatives for the Board to consider. All of the bid alternatives (alternatives 1 through 4) related to the Mid America bid on the Speedstar SS-135, and presented all of the options bid by Mid America. None of the bid alternatives related to the petitioner's bid. The District Board was not advised as to the comparative purchase prices bid by the two bidders (the Petitioner's price being $32,000 less than Mid America's), it was not advised as to the two interpretations of the three year option in the Petitioner's bid, and it was not advised that under the second interpretation of the Petitioner's three year lease-purchase bid, the Petitioner's bid had a net cost, after accounting for delivery time, that was $9,529 less than the Mid America bid. (See finding of fact 60.) Mr. Schenk thought that paragraph B), as modified by the "CONDITIONS" placed on the bid by Mid America, presented an option to "renew" the lease monthly at $5,241 per month, for an annual cost of $62,892. Evidentially, then, Mr. Schenk thought that the word "renewable" pertained to renewal by month. P. Ex. 15, p. 2, para. 2. With respect to this option, nothing is mentioned about purchase. Mr. Schenk also treated the word "renewable" to be intended to be exercised annually, resulting in a three year lease (renewable annually). The differing use of the word "renewable" came as a result of the modifications placed on the bid form by Mid America. The District Board chose option 3, which was condition number 1 on the bid blank submitted by Mid America, (a guarantee 36 months lease with a purchase option of $1.00) with the addition of the words "Subject to the availability of funds." The Second invitation for bids had Stated in Paragraph 3 of the third page that "all lease-purchase agreements must include a nonappropriation of fund Paragraph as required by Florida Statutes." Thus, the condition that the lease be "guaranteed" was modified by the District consistent with the specification of the invitation for bids relating to the appropriation of funds. On the day of the District Board meeting approving a lease-purchase with Mid America, January 14, 1987, the District entered into a contract with Mid America for the lease-purchase of a Speedstar SS-135. SJRWMD Ex. 3. The lease agreement contains a Paragraph allowing the District to terminate the lease upon nonappropriation of funds, Subject to certain conditions. Id., para. 11. In February, 1987, Mr. Auld learned at a trade show in Orlando that the District had awarded the contract to Mid America. Mr. Auld called Ms. Mildred Horton, the Assistant Executive Director of the District, to ask for the reasons why his bid was not accepted. Ms. Horton wrote a letter to Mr. Auld dated February 17, 1987, Setting forth the reasons for the award to Mid America and attaching two amortization Schedules, one for each bid. The letter and attachments is P. Ex. 6. Ms. Horton stated that the Schedules attached were the only ones in existence, to her knowledge. None of the reasons given by Ms. Horton for the rejection of the Petitioner's bid could have been known prior to the opening of the bids. The amortization schedules attached to Ms. Horton's letter had been prepared by Mr., Schenk. The schedule for the Petitioner's bid showed a total cost over a three year period of $224,344, which resulted in an effective interest rate of 31 percent compared to the outright purchase price on the Petitioner's bid of $146,976. The schedule assumes that the Petitioner's bid was for a monthly payment of $6,885 for two years followed by a monthly payment of $4,592 in the third year. P. Ex. 6. Mr. Schenk testified that he considered the possibility that the Petitioner's bid for a three year lease purchase was $4,592 per month for 36 months, and prepared an alternative amortization table based upon that possible interpretation as well as the amortization table attached to the letter sent to Mr. Auld by Ms. Horton described above. P. Ex. 12. Mr. Schenk concluded, however, that the Petitioner's bid should be interpreted as a bid of $6,885 per month for two years and $4,592 for the third year, for a total cost of $224,344. He testified that it was confusing that the Petitioner's bid did not contain a price for the first year, but he also concluded that the price of $6,885 placed on the second line of paragraph B) of the Petitioner's bid was intended to be a price for both the first year and the second year. He further testified that the Petitioner's bid may have been more understandable had the word "renewable" been stricken on the bid form. Finally, he testified that he disregarded the additions to the Petitioner's bid form because these were "alterations" to the form, but considered the additions to the bid form by Mid America because these were only "additions." As discussed above, after the Second invitation for bids was published, the District was Primarily interested in receiving bids for a three year lease-purchase. The bid blank in the second invitation for bids, however, failed to provide a clear method for bidders to bid that option. Paragraph B) of the bid blank drafted by the District was defective because it did not in any manner state that a purchase (a transfer of ownership) was included in the "lease" for which a price was being asked, because it failed to state whether the District wanted bids on a one year lease- purchase, a two year lease-purchase, a three year lease-purchase, or only a lease for those periods of time, because the word "renewable" was susceptible of being interpreted as renewal from month to month as well as from year to year, as so construed in Mr. Schenk's December 12, 1986 recommendation to the District Board. Paragraph B) was also defective because it failed to provide a place to show the price of the purchase option at the end of the lease, or zero if there were to be none. Without the "CONDITIONS" attached to the Mid America bid, the filled-in blanks of Paragraph B) on the bid form only resulted in a bid on a lease. Mr. Schenk recognized this as he construed Paragraph B) of the form as only asking for a lease bid when he informed the District Board of option number 2 in his memorandum of December 12, 1986. P. Ex. 13. Since the bid form was defective, it was foreseeable that bidders would have to have added additional words to the bid form to make it sensical. It was also foreseeable that different bidders would take different approaches in trying to draft additions to the form to enable them to bid all critical aspects of a lease that included a purchase at the end of the lease. The bid of the Petitioner should have been construed with this foreseeability in mind. In particular, the failure of the Petitioner to place a price on the first line of paragraph B) (relating to the first year) coupled with the placing of a price at the second year line and the third year line, and the addition of the words "owned at end of second year" and "owned at end of third year" should have been construed as the Petitioner's attempt, like the attempt of Mid America, to cure the ambiguities in the bid form. As discussed above, without such words, a price in the first line of paragraph B) of the bid form would have only been a bid for a renewable lease for one year, with no purchase option. The District argues that it did not ask for a bid on a two year lease-purchase, and that the Petitioner's attempt to bid on that as well as on a three year lease-purchase caused confusion. But the problem is that the bid form, as discussed above, did not ask for any purchase associated with a lease, and asked for prices for a lease that could have either a one, two or three year term based upon the option to renew. It was not unreasonable, then, for the Petitioner to have bid a two year lease-purchase. The interpretation of Petitioner's bid as a bid for a total cost of $224,344 over three years is not reasonable. The interpretation of the Petitioner's bid as providing for a total cost of $224,344 over three years results in an interest cost of 31 percent, a rate of interest that is facially unreasonable. But more important if, as assumed in that interpretation, the District were to enter into a contract with the Petitioner at a monthly charge of $6,885 per month for two years, it would own the Failing drill rig at the end of the second year. This is so because the Same line that contains the price ($6,885) also has the added words "owned at end of second year." If it owned the rig after two years, the District Surely would not continue leasing it for the third year at $4,592 per month. Payment of $6,885 for 24 months would cost a total of $165,240, which reasonably compares to Petitioner's outright purchase price of $146,976, plus the cost of paying over a two year period. Since it was more reasonable to construe line two of the Paragraph B) of the Petitioner's bid form as a bid for a two year lease-purchase, the third line should have been given the same construction, that is, to construe the price placed on the line as the price each month for the entire period (here, three years) with ownership automatic at the end of the term. The reasonable interpretation of line 3 of Paragraph B) of the Petitioner's bid is for a lease-purchase for three years at $4,592 per month, for a total cost over three years of $165,312, the rig then being owned by the District at the end of 36 months with no buy-out cost. The reasonableness of this interpretation is further supported by the fact that payment of $165,312 on a machine that cost $146,976 to buy outright results in an interest rate for payment over three years of 7.9 percent, which is a normal and usual interest rate that would be expected in a competitive bid. P. Ex. 12. Mid America's bid offered to deliver in 21 days, while the Petitioner offered to deliver in 120 days. Since the District was then renting drilling equipment at $4,612 per month, it would potentially have incurred about one month extra rental ($4,612) on the Mid America bid, and $18,448 for four months extra rental on the Petitioner's bid, or an additional cost of $13,836 on the Petitioner's bid. Including this cost of rental during the potential delivery period, the net cost of the Petitioner's three year lease-purchase bid was $183,760, and the net cost of the Mid America bid alternative that was accepted by the District was $193,289. Thus, with respect to the bid actually accepted by the District, the Petitioner's bid was $9,529 less than the bid of Mid America. During the formal administrative hearing, it appeared from the evidence that the District relied upon the following additional issues, other than price, as the reasons for selection of the Mid America bid: One year guaranteed non-routine, major maintenance and repair on the lease equipment, renewable annually for the term of the lease. A manufacturers warranty of at least 6 months or 1,000 hours. The delivery date. The location of the maintenance Services. All of the foregoing were bid specifications printed on the bid form. P. Exs. 11 and 4. Of these, only the issue of non-routine maintenance was mentioned in the letter of Ms. Horton to Mr. Auld on February 17, 1987. P. Ex. 6. Mid America bid $3,000 per year for non-routine maintenance. The Petitioner Stated on its bid form that this item was "not available." Non-routine maintenance is needed only at the end of the warranty Period. In the industry, its is well understood that non-routine maintenance normally does not apply and is not Purchased until the end of the warranty period. The District had not purchased the non-routine maintenance at the time of the formal administrative hearing. The prices quoted in the bids, pursuant to the invitation for bids, were to have been fixed only for 90 days. Thus, it is uncertain whether the $3,000 bid of Mid America for non-routine major maintenance would still hold. The term "non-routine, major maintenance and repair" was not further defined by the bid form. Although the Petitioner did not bid on non-routine maintenance, it did offer a one year warranty which was six months beyond the minimum specified by the District. Thus, for this six months period only, the Petitioner effectively provided a free non-routine maintenance offer at least to extent of the warranty. But the Petitioner failed to offer non-routine major maintenance for the 24 month period following the first year of the lease. Both bidders complied with the specifications with respect to the manufacturer's warranty, but the Petitioner offered a warranty that was better by six months. The District Board was incorrectly advised that the Petitioner's warranty was only for 90 days (and thus not in compliance with specifications). P. Ex. 13. The delivery date was considered during the hearing only with respect to the cost of rental of equipment until the new rig would be delivered, and thus was an element of net cost discussed above. The Petitioner's delivery date caused its bid to have an additional rental cost of $13,836 as compared to the Mid America bid, but the Petitioner's total net cost still was lower than the Mid America bid, as discussed above. The Petitioner's location of maintenance services was Largo, Florida, and Mid America's location was Ocala, Florida. Mid America's location is approximately 100 miles closer to Palatka than the Petitioner's location. The difference is a difference of about 4 hours in travel time, roundtrip, or only two hours for delivery of a part. Mr. Schenk testified that this factor carried only "some weight." Mr. Schenk did not know how often maintenance at the seller's location might occur, what percentage of maintenance might be in the field rather than in the seller's shop, or the problems that might occur from lack of a part. From the testimony of Mr. Winchester, who was the only rig expert who testified, and the testimony of Mr. Munch regarding the leased Speedstar rig, it appears that maintenance on the rig for major problems should not occur very often, if at all, and that many problems can be corrected in the field. In most cases, parts will have to come overnight by bus. It is inferred that a part from Ocala will arrive no sooner by overnight bus than a part from Largo by overnight bus. Thus, the closer location of the Mid America shop is of little importance on this record. The February 17, 1987, letter from Ms. Horton to Mr. Auld Stated that the failure of the Petitioner to bid on a one year lease was one of the reasons for not accepting the Petitioner's bid. As discussed above, the District was primarily seeking a three year lease-purchase, not a one year lease, and communicated this to the two bidders. Indeed, it was the existing one year lease that prompted the desire by the Board to explore a purchase over time. The District did not enter into a one year lease with Mid America, either. Thus, a bid on a one year lease was not a material or substantial part of the bid specifications. Specification number 2, listed as a desired option, was that the drill rig have a five speed transmission. The Speedstar SS-135 had a five speed transmission, thus giving it a lower first gear, and the Failing CF-15 did not. There is no evidence that the Petitioner could have have offered a five speed-transmission. On the other hand, there is no evidence that a four speed transmission would not effectively meet the needs of the District. The only evidence was that the five speed transmission would have a lower first gear, but there was not substantial evidence that the District would encounter drilling circumstances needing only the lower gear of the Speedstar SS-135. When the rotary table is retracted on the Speedstar SS- 135, the opening is 18 inches in diameter, thus allowing the Speedstar SS-135 to set 16 inch casing. The Speedstar SS-135 otherwise marginally has the power and related mechanical ability to drill and set 16" casing, particularly lighter PVC casing, to depths of 80 feet in about six hours. Drilling the first 80 feet in six hours is very slow in comparison to the normal operation of either the Speedstar SS-135 or the Failing CF-15, and would be more a matter of use of the mud pump to wear away the soil rather than actually drilling the hole. However, the Speedstar SS-135 is in fact being used in Florida by other owners to drill and set 16 inch casing. When the rotary table is retracted on the Failing CF-15, the opening is 14 1/2 inches in diameter, and thus the Failing CF- 15 does not have any capacity to drill or set 16 inch casing. If the District had chosen the Failing CF-15, in those cases in which it needed to drill and set 16 inch casing, it would have to contract out to a larger drill rig to drill and set such casing. In all other respects the Speedstar SS-135 and the Failing CF-15 are functionally equivalent machines, and are considered to be equivalent in the industry. For the most part, the design differences explained by Mr. Munch with respect to the video tape of views of both machines were not differences causing the machines to be not functional equivalents, except as discussed above. The recommendation of the staff of the District to purchase the Speedstar SS-135 would probably have been the same, based upon factors other than price, had the staff considered the bid of the Petitioner to have been $9,529 less than that of Mid America for a three year lease-purchase, as discussed in finding of fact 60. While the District entered into the process of obtaining bids for the drill rig with a preference for a rig capable of performing like the Speedstar SS-135, it did not intend to favor the Mid America Company over the Petitioner, nor did it act in bad faith. At all times relevant to these invitations for bids and award of the contract, the District did not have rules governing purchasing of commodities or governing the notification to interested persons concerning the procedures for contesting a proposed purchase. It did not have any policy or rule requiring that the lowest bid be accepted without consideration of other factors. It did have written policies, SJRWMD Exs. 1 and 2, providing for the following: Purchases in excess of $5,000 must be advertised in a newspaper of general circulation no less than ten days prior to bid opening. The District Purchasing Director may withdraw the entire proposal, and may reject all bids or parts of bids, if the District's interest will be served by that action. Departments or Divisions of the District submitting requisitions must do so with items described in such terms to allow unrestricted bidding and to afford full opportunity to bid to all qualified bidders. Any purchase order made contrary to the provisions of the purchasing policies shall be of no effect and void.

Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the St. Johns River Water Management District enter its final order that the bid of the George E. Failing Company pursuant to Bid Number 87-01, second call for bids, dated November 6, 1986, was properly rejected because it did not meet all specifications of the invitation to bid. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1987. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1606BID The following are rulings upon findings of fact proposed by the parties which have been rejected. The numbers correspond to the numbers used by the parties. Findings of fact proposed by the George F. Failing Company: 2. The third sentence is rejected because Mr. Munch chose the Speedstar SS-135 as a basis for the Specifications due to his familiarity with the leased drill rig of the same make. 6. Not relevant. 19 and 20. Mr. Auld's testimony that a manufacturer's warranty on a 1985 truck would be less inclusive that on a 1987 truck was hearsay, and cannot support a finding of fact as to that point. Thus, those portions of these proposed findings concerning a 1985 truck are irrelevant. 36. Ms. Vergara did not testify that the planned monitoring wells would be 2,000 feet deep. 38. Subordinate to finding of fact 71. 45. Rejected by finding of fact 42. Rejected by finding of fact 50. There is no evidence that the Speedstar SS-135 bid by Mid America was a display model. The delivery date of the Speedstar SS-135 is not in evidence. Findings of fact proposed by the St. Johns River Water Management District: 4. There is no evidence as to the depths of the proposed monitoring well network, and thus a finding of fact that the depth will be 1000 feet cannot be made. 8. The existence of a buy-out price in the first Mid America bid did not cause the bid to be unclear. 12. The fourth sentence, as to what the District thought the second bid blank "should" contain, is not supported by the evidence. The last sentence is rejected because it is not clear that the bid blank was a "renewable lease-purchase in one year intervals." See findings of fact 34, 55, and 56. 14. The evidence is that the Speedstar SS-135 can set 16 inch casing, not 17 1/2 inch casing. The findings concerning the failure of the Petitioner's bid to give the District the option of being able to "exit the lease" in one year is rejected because that option was securely provided in the invitation for bids, so securely so that it was construed by the District to be an implicit part of the Mid America bid that ultimately was accepted by the District. See finding of fact 50 concerning the non-appropriation of funds condition. Additionally, the findings concerning the inability of the District to construe the bid of the Petitioner to know its first year fiscal obligations are rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 56 through 58. The second sentence is rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 34 and 55. The last sentence is rejected by these findings of fact as well; the ambiguity was created by the bid form, not by the bidders. These findings of fact have essentially been rejected by findings of fact 34 and 55. Further, the word "renewable" was not inconsistent with ownership at the end of a two year period because the word "renewable" could be given the construction given it by Mr. Schenk, renewable from month to month. See finding of fact 49. 22 and 23. Rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 34 and 55 through 58. These proposed findings of fact are essentially correct as a matter of law, but are not facts. These findings of fact are rejected by findings of fact 34 and 55 through 58. 27. The last sentence of proposed finding of fact (4) is rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 66. 29. Subordinate to finding of fact 71. 32. While these Proposed findings are true and have been Substantially adopted, the proposed findings are not relevant in view of the stipulations contained in findings of fact 1 and 2. COPIES FURNISHED: Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Henry Dean, Executive Director St Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32078-1429 Linda M. Hallas, Esquire 9455 Koger Boulevard, Suite 209 St. Petersburg, Florida 33702 Wayne E. Flowers, Esquire Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32078-1429

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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CJC PROPERTIES LTD. vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 06-002007 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 07, 2006 Number: 06-002007 Latest Update: Oct. 07, 2008

The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether CJC Properties, Ltd. (CJC), is eligible for state restoration funding assistance under the Petroleum Contamination Participation Program or the Florida Petroleum Liability and Restoration Insurance Program for one or more discharges of gasoline at DEP Facility No. 378943938 (“the facility”).

Findings Of Fact The Facility CJC is a Florida Limited Partnership. It is the current owner of property located at 5691 U.S. Highway 27 North, in Tallahassee. Prior to CJC’s acquisition of the property, the property was owned by Carolyn J. Chapman, John W. Chapman, Jane Chapman Latina, and Carolyn Chapman Landrum (“the Chapmans”). The property was leased to various entities and operated as a gas station. The tanks and dispensers remained in service until November, 1995. The last operator of the facility was Lake Jackson 76, Inc. There were five underground petroleum storage tanks at the facility. Before 1991, one of the tanks at the facility was used for regular, leaded, gasoline. When leaded gasoline was phased out, the tank was used for unleaded gasoline. Site Assessments and Sampling Data On November 30, 1995, the Chapmans employed Petroleum Contractors, Inc., to remove the five storage tanks. During the tank removal, Environmental and Geotechnical Specialists, Inc. (“EGS”) performed an assessment to determine whether the facility was contaminated with petroleum or petroleum products. The Underground Storage Tank Removal Report prepared by EGS noted that all five tanks appeared to be intact. Soils in the tank pit wall and bottom were not discolored. No significant contamination was observed directly below the tanks. Soil from the tank pit was stockpiled on the site. EGS observed no significant signs of contamination of this soil. The soil stockpile was also screened with a Flame Ionization Detector Organic Vapor Analyzer (OVA). No organic vapors were detected. An OVA detects any organic vapor, but is used as a screening tool to find petroleum vapors. Department rules require that an OVA reading be performed both unfiltered and filtered. The filtered reading screens out everything but methane and is “subtracted” from the unfiltered reading to determine the presence of petroleum vapors. Twenty-four soil samples were taken from various depths at nine locations in the tank pit. These samples were tested using an OVA. Nine of the soil samples, taken from four locations, had corrected OVA readings indicative of petroleum contamination. EGS concluded that “soil contamination detected in the tank pit is likely the result of a leak in the piping” between the dispensers and the tanks. Soil samples were also taken from three borings in the vicinity of the dispenser island and OVA-tested. In boring D-2, organic vapors were detected from the surface to a depth of approximately seven feet. The OVA readings from D-2 declined with depth. EGS reported that “some contamination was detected beneath a dispenser; however, it does not ‘appear’ to significantly extend below six (6) feet.” EGS did not report both filtered and unfiltered OVA readings for the soil samples taken from the dispenser area, as it had done for soil samples taken from the tank pit and the stockpile. For the dispenser area soil samples, EGS reported a single OVA reading for each sample, without indicating whether the reading was “corrected” after filtering. For this reason, the Department contends that these data are unreliable. CJC points out that EGS stated in the text of its report that the soil samples were filtered. CJC also argues that, because the filtered OVA readings for soil samples taken from the tank pit area were not different from their unfiltered readings, the OVA readings for the soil samples from the dispenser area would not have changed after filtering. The preponderance of the evidence is that the contamination in the dispenser area was petroleum. Based on EGS’ findings during the tank removal in November 1995, Petroleum Contractors, Inc., filed a Discharge Reporting Form on December 1, 1995, stating that there had been a discharge of unleaded gasoline at the facility. In January 1996, the Chapmans applied to participate in FPLRIP based on the discharge reported on December 1, 1995. By order dated January 26, 1996, the Department determined that the reported discharge was eligible for state-funded remediation assistance under FPLRIP. In 1997, another consultant, Levine Fricke Recon (LFR) conducted a site assessment at the facility and submitted its Interim Site Assessment Report to the Department. As part of its own soil sampling at the site, LFR collected a “direct push” soil boring in the dispenser island area, near the place where EGS had reported organic vapors. The boring data showed no petroleum vapors until the interval 16-to-20 feet below ground surface. LFR also collected and analyzed groundwater samples from the site. It reported that a sample taken from beneath the former diesel dispenser contained lead. Because lead occurs naturally in soils, its presence in a water sample does not confirm that a discharge of leaded gasoline occurred. In 1998, LFR conducted a second assessment of the facility site. It installed and sampled four shallow monitoring wells, designated MW-1S through MW-4S, and three deep monitoring wells, designated MW-2D through MW-4D. Groundwater samples from MW-3S and MW-3D were analyzed for lead, ethylene dibromide (EDB), and 1,2-Dichloroethane. All three substances are usually detected in a groundwater sample contaminated with leaded gasoline. On August 28, 1998, LFR submitted its Interim Site Assessment II to the Department, which shows lead and EDB were found in a sample taken from MW-3S, but not 1,2-Dichloroethane. LFR did not conclude or express a suspicion in either of its two assessment reports that leaded gasoline had been discharged at the facility. The deadline for submitting a Discharge Reporting Form or written report of contamination was December 31, 1998. A site assessment report received by the Department before January 1, 1999, which contained evidence of a petroleum discharge, was accepted by the Department as a “report of contamination.” The petroleum discharge information received by the Department before January 1, 1999, consisted of the Underground Storage Tank Removal Report, the FPLRIP claim, the Interim Site Assessment Report, and the Interim Site Assessment Report II. Post Deadline Site Assessment Data After the statutory deadline, LFR submitted its Interim Site Assessment III. This report includes January 1999 groundwater sampling data from four monitoring wells which show the presence of low levels of EDB. When EDB is found in a groundwater sample, it is a common practice to re-sample the well from which the sample was taken. Of the wells that showed the presence of EDB, only MW- 10D was re-sampled, after January 1, 1999. There was no EDB present in the groundwater when MS-10D was re-sampled. In June 2000, as part of the remediation of the contamination at the facility, an area of contaminated soil was removed to a depth of 14 feet. The area of soil removed included the former dispenser area. In January 2003, the Department notified CJC that the $300,000 FPLRIP funding cap would soon be reached. In March 2003, CJC signed a Funding Cap Transition Agreement, acknowledging that “At no time will the DEP be obligated to pay for cleanup of this discharge any amount that exceeds the funding cap.” CJC further acknowledged that it “is responsible for completing the remediation of the discharge in accordance with Chapter 62-770, F.A.C.” In 2005, CJC re-sampled one of the monitoring wells for lead and EDB. Neither substance was present. The site is not currently being actively remediated. Periodic groundwater sampling indicates that concentrations of contaminants are dropping. No further active remediation has been proposed. The cost to complete remediation is a matter of speculation. The record evidence is insufficient to make a finding about future remediation costs. Eligibility Determinations On September 2, 2003, CJC submitted a PCPP Affidavit to the Department, seeking state funding under PCPP. On October 30, 2003, the Department denied CJC eligibility for PCPP funding on the basis that the contamination was covered under FPLRIP and, therefore, was excluded from funding under PCPP. The Department has never granted PCPP eligibility for the cleanup of a discharge previously being funded under FPLRIP. Apparently, in 2005, CJC hired Glenn R. MacGraw, an expert in the assessment of petroleum-contaminated sites, to review the EGS and LFR assessments. In a letter to CJC’s attorney dated August 19, 2005, MacGraw expressed the opinion that “at least 2 discharges have occurred on this site, one in the former tank area, and one in the former dispenser area.” MacGraw’s opinion that there had been a discharge of leaded gasoline was based on the detection of EDB and lead in the groundwater. He also thought the presence of methyl tetra-butyl ether (MTBE) in groundwater samples taken from the tank pit area showed a tank leak of unleaded gasoline. CJC requested FPLRIP funding for the other alleged discharges at the facility. On March 23, 2006, the Department issued a letter formally stating its disagreement that there were other reported discharges and denying eligibility for FPLRIP funding. On March 30, 2006, the Department issued an Amended Order of Ineligibility under PCPP. The amended order added a second ground for denial, that the reported discharge was not shown to have occurred before January 1, 1995. Whether There Was A Second Discharge Eligible for Funding CJC argues that the presence of lead and EDB in the groundwater sample taken from MW-3S shows that there was a discharge of leaded gasoline at the facility. However, LFR reported that the well screen for MW-3S had probably been damaged during installation, because a significant amount of filter sand was observed in the purge water. The Department contends, therefore, that the source of the lead detected in the groundwater sample from MW-3S could have been (naturally) in the soil that entered the well. The Department also discounts the detection of EDB in the groundwater sample because EDB is an ingredient of some pesticides and can show up in groundwater when pesticide has been applied to the overlying land. Furthermore, EDB was not detected in the groundwater sample taken from MW-3D, a deeper well located near MW-3S. MacGraw does not think the EDB came from a pesticide application, because the EDB contamination at the site occurs in an elongated “plume,” in the former dispenser area, whereas one would expect to see EDB distributed evenly over the site if the source was a pesticide application. MacGraw mapped the plume of EDB by using data obtained after the discharge reporting deadline. Michael J. Bland, a Department employee and expert in geology and petroleum site assessment, believes the data from the facility are insufficient to confirm the presence of EDB or its distribution. LFR reported in its Interim Site Assessment that no significant soil contamination was found near the dispenser island. Groundwater samples from MW-3D, a deep monitoring well near MW-S3, showed no EDB, lead, or 1,2-dichlorothane. Bland opined that, if the detection of EDB in the shallow well was reliable, EDB would have been detected in the deep well, too, because EDB is a “sinker.” EDB is persistent in groundwater, so when it is not detected when a well is re-sampled, reasonable doubt arises about the detection in the first sample. Of all the wells sampled in 1999 that showed EDB, only MW-10D was re-sampled in 2003. When the well was re-sampled, there was no EDB. CJC contends that EDB was not found in the re-sampling of MW-10D because of the soil removal in 2000, but the Department contends that the soil removal would not have affected the presence of EDB in MW-10D, because the well is significantly down-gradient of the area of soil removal. It was undisputed that the presence of 1,2- dichoroethane in MW-S3 was not reliably determined. There is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that the contamination reported in the dispenser area is the source of contamination which persists at the facility. The reported contamination only affected the top six feet of soil. The soil removal to a depth of 14 feet in that area in 2000 should have fully remediated the reported contamination. The data upon which CJC relies in claiming eligibility under FPLRIP or PCPP for a second discharge are, at best, incomplete and ambiguous. CJC failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a discharge of leaded gasoline occurred. CJC also failed to prove that the reported contamination in the dispenser is associated with a discharge that still exists to be remediated with state assistance.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order determining that CJC is ineligible to participate in the Petroleum Cleanup Participation Program for the discharge reported to the Department on December 1, 1995, and that CJC has not demonstrated eligibility to participate in the Petroleum Cleanup Participation Program or the Florida Petroleum Liability and Restoration Program for any other discharges. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2008.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57376.3071
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PEOPLES GAS SYSTEM vs SOUTH SUMTER GAS COMPANY, LLC, AND CITY OF LEESBURG, 18-004422 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 21, 2018 Number: 18-004422 Latest Update: Sep. 30, 2019

The Issue This proceeding is for the purpose of resolving a territorial dispute regarding the extension of gas service to areas of The Villages of Sumter Lake (“The Villages”) in Sumter County, Florida, pursuant to section 366.04(3)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 25-7.0472; and whether a Natural Gas System Construction, Purchase, and Sale Agreement (“Agreement”) between the City of Leesburg (“Leesburg”) and South Sumter Gas Company (“SSGC”) creates a “hybrid” public utility subject to ratemaking oversight by the Public Service Commission (“Commission”).

Findings Of Fact The Parties and Stipulated Issues PGS is a natural gas local distribution company providing sales and transportation delivery of natural gas throughout many areas of the State of Florida, including portions of Sumter County. PGS is the largest natural gas provider in Florida with approximately 390,000 customers, over 600 full-time employees, and the same number of construction contract crews. PGS’s system consists of approximately 19,000 miles of distribution mains throughout Florida. PGS operates systems in areas that are very rural and areas that are densely populated. PGS currently serves more than 45,000 customers in Sumter and Marion counties. PGS is an investor-owned “natural gas utility,” as defined in section 366.04(3)(c), and is subject to the Commission’s statutory jurisdiction to resolve territorial disputes. Leesburg is a municipality in central Florida with a population of approximately 25,000 within the city limits, and a broader metropolitan service area (“MSA”) population of about 50,000. Leesburg provides natural gas service in portions of Lake and Sumter counties. Leesburg is a “natural gas utility” as defined in section 366.04(3)(c). Leesburg has provided natural gas service to its customers since 1959, and currently serves about 14,000 residential, commercial, and industrial customers both within and outside its city limits via a current system of approximately 276 miles of distribution lines. Leesburg is subject to the Commission’s statutory jurisdiction to resolve territorial disputes. SSGC is a Florida limited liability company and an operating division of The Villages. SSGC is the entity through which The Villages has entered into a written contract with Leesburg authorizing Leesburg to supply natural gas services to, initially, the Bigham developments. The issues of cost of capital and amortization and depreciation are not applicable to this dispute. The Dispute A territorial dispute is a disagreement over which natural gas utility will serve a particular geographic area. In this case, the area in dispute is that encompassed by the Bigham developments. PGS argued that the dispute should be expanded to include areas not subject to current development, but that are within the scope of anticipated Villages expansion. The extension of this territorial dispute beyond the Bigham developments is not warranted or necessary, and would have the effect of establishing a territorial boundary in favor of one of the parties. As a result of the Agreement to be discussed herein, SSGC has constructed residential gas infrastucture within Bigham, and has conveyed that infrastructure to Leesburg. Leesburg supplies natural gas to Bigham, bills and collects for gas service, and is responsible for upkeep, maintenance, and repair of the gas system. The question for disposition in this proceeding is whether service to Bigham is being lawfully provided by Leesburg pursuant to the standards applicable to territorial disputes. Natural Gas Regulation PGS is an investor-owned public utility. It is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission with regard to rates and service. Its profits and return on equity are likewise subject to regulation. Leesburg is a municipal natural gas utility. The Commission does not regulate, or require the reporting of municipal natural gas utility rates, conditions of service, rate-setting, or the billing, collection, or distribution of revenues. The evidence suggests that the reason for the “hands- off” approach to municipal natural gas utilities is due to the ability of municipal voters to self-regulate at the ballot box. PGS argues that customers in The Villages, as is the case with any customer outside of the Leesburg city limits, do not have any direct say in how Leesburg sets rates and terms of service.1/ That may be so, but the Legislature’s approach to the administration and operation of municipal natural gas utilities, with the exception of safety reporting and territorial disputes, is a matter of legislative policy that is not subject to the authority of the undersigned. History of The Villages The Villages is a series of planned residential areas developed under common ownership and development. Its communities are age-restricted, limited to persons age 55 and older. It has been the fastest growing MSA for medium-sized and up communities for the past five years. The Villages started in the 1970s as a mobile home community known as Orange Blossom Gardens in Lake County. That community proved to be successful, and the concept was expanded in the 1980s to include developments with golf courses and clubhouses. Residents began to customize their mobile homes to the point at which the investment in those homes rivaled the cost of site-built homes. In the 1990s, The Villages went to site-built home developments. By then, one of the two original developers had sold his interest to the other, who proceeded to bring his son into the business. They decided that their approach of building homes should be more akin to traditional development patterns in which growth emanates from a central hub. Thus, in 1994, the Spanish Springs Town Center was built, with an entertainment hub surrounded by shopping and amenities. It was a success. By 2000, The Villages had extended southward to County Road (“CR”) 466, and a second town center, Lake Sumter Landing, was constructed. The following years, to the present, saw The Villages continue its southward expansion to State Road (“SR”) 44, where the Brownwood Town Center was constructed, and then to its southernmost communities of Fenney, Bigham North, Bigham West, and Bigham East, which center on the intersection of CR 468 and CR 501. The Villages currently constructs between 200 and 260 residential houses per month. Contractors are on a computerized schedule by which all tasks involved in the construction of the home are set forth in detail. The schedule was described, aptly, as rigorous. A delay by any contractor in the completion of the performance of its task results in a cascading delay for following contractors. Gas Service in the Area Gas mains are generally “arterial” in nature, with relatively large distribution mains operating at high distribution pressure extending outward from a connection to an interstate or intrastate transmission line through a gate station. Smaller mains then “pick up” growth along the line as it develops, with lower pressure service lines completing the system. In 1994, Leesburg constructed a gas supply main from the terminus of its existing facility at the Lake County/Sumter County line along CR 470 to the Coleman Federal Prison. In August 2009, PGS was granted a non-exclusive franchise by the City of Wildwood to provide natural gas service to Wildwood. SSGC Exhibit 6, which depicts the boundaries of the City of Leesburg, the City of Wildwood, and the City of Coleman, demonstrates that most, if not all, of the area encompassed by the Bigham developments is within the Wildwood city limits. In 2015, the interstate Sabal Trail transmission pipeline was being extended south through Sumter County. The line was originally expected to run in close proximity to Interstate 75. Even at that location, Leesburg decided that it would construct a gate station connecting to the Sabal Trail pipeline to provide backfill capabilities for its existing facilities in Lake County, and for its Coleman prison customer. In 2016, the Sabal Trail pipeline was redirected to come much closer to the municipal limits of Leesburg. That decision made the Leesburg determination to locate a gate station connecting to the Sabal Trail pipeline much easier. In addition, construction of the gate station while the Sabal Trail pipeline was under construction made construction simpler and less expensive. By adding the connecting lines to the Sabal Trail pipeline while it was under construction, a “hot tap” was not required. In May 2016, PGS began extending its gas distribution facilities to serve industrial facilities south of Coleman. It started from the terminus of its existing main at the intersection of SR 44 and CR 468 -- roughly a mile and a half west of the Lake County/Sumter County line and the Leesburg city limit -- along CR 468 to the intersection with U.S. Highway 301 (“US 301”), and extending along US 301 to the town of Coleman by January 2017. The distribution line was then extended south along US 301 to Sumterville.2/ In addition, Sumter County built a line off of the PGS line to a proposed industrial customer/industrial park to the south and west of Coleman, which was assigned to PGS. It is common practice for investor-owned utilities to extend service to an anchor customer, and to size the infrastructure to allow for the addition of customers along the route. By so doing, there is an expectation that a line will be fully utilized, resulting in lower customer cost, and a return on the investment. Nonetheless, PGS has not performed an analysis of the CR 468/US 301 line to determine whether PGS would be able to depreciate those lines and recover the costs. The CR 468/US 301 PGS distribution line is an eight- inch line, which is higher capacity in both size and pressure. The entire line is ceramic-coated steel with cathodic protection, which is the most up-to-date material. PGS sized the CR 468/US 301 distribution line to handle additional capacity to serve growth along the corridor. Although PGS had no territorial or developer agreement relating to any area of The Villages when it installed its CR 468/US 301 distribution line, PGS expected growth in the area, whether it was to be from The Villages or from another developer. Although it did not have specific loads identified, the positioning of the distribution line anticipated residential and commercial development along its route. Nonetheless, none of the PGS lines were extended specifically for future Villages developments. PGS had no territorial agreement, and had no discussion with The Villages about serving any development along the mains. PGS constructed a gate station at the intersection of CR 468 and CR 501 connecting to the Sabal Palm pipeline to serve the anchor industrial facilities. The Sabal Trail gate station was not constructed in anticipation of service to The Villages. Gas Service to The Villages In 2017, The Villages decided to extend gas service to its Fenney development, located along CR 468. Prior to that decision, The Villages had not constructed homes with gas appliances at any residential location in The Villages. The Villages has extended gas to commercial facilities associated with its developments north of SR 44, which had generally been provided by PGS. The Villages’ development in Fruitland Park in Lake County included commercial facilities with gas constructed, installed, and served by Leesburg. Prior to the time in which the Fenney development was being planned, The Villages began to require joint trenching agreements with various utilities contracted to serve The Villages, including water, sewer, cable TV, irrigation, and electric lines. Pursuant to these trenching agreements, The Villages’ contractors excavate a trench to serve residential facilities prior to construction of the residences. The trenches are typically four-feet-wide by four-feet-deep. Each of the utilities install their lines in the trench at a designated depth and separation from the other utility lines in order to meet applicable safety requirements. Using a common trench allows for uniformity of installation and avoids installation mishaps that can occur when lines are installed after other lines are in the ground. The trenching agreements proved to be effective in resolving issues of competing and occasionally conflicting utility line development. The PGS CR 468 distribution line runs parallel to CR 468 along the northern boundary of the Fenney development. Therefore, PGS was selected to provide service when the decision was made to extend gas service into Fenney. PGS entered into a developer agreement with The Villages that was limited to work in Fenney. PGS was brought into the Fenney development project in August 2017, after four development units had been completed. Therefore, PGS had to bring gas service lines into residences in those units as a retrofitted element, and not as a participant to the trenching agreements under which other utilities were installed. There were occasions during installation when the PGS installation contractor, R.A.W. Construction, severed telephone and cable TV lines, broke water and sewer lines, and tore up landscaped and sodded areas. As a result, homes in the four completed Fenney development units were delayed resulting in missed closing dates. However, since PGS was not brought in until after the fact for the four completed developments, it is difficult to assign blame for circumstances that were apparently not uncommon before joint trench agreements were implemented, and which formed the rationale for the creation of joint trench agreements.3/ The Villages was not satisfied with the performance of PGS at its Fenney development. The problems described by The Villages related to construction and billing services. The Villages also complained that PGS did not have sufficient manpower to meet its exceedingly rigid and inflexible construction requirements. Mr. McDonough indicated that even in those areas in which PGS was a participant in joint trenching agreements, it was incapable of keeping up with the schedule. Much of that delay was attributed to its contractor at the time, R.A.W. Construction. After some time had passed, PGS changed contractors and went with Hamlet Construction (“Hamlet”), a contractor with which The Villages had a prior satisfactory relationship. After Hamlet was brought in, most of the construction-related issues were resolved. However, Mr. Lovo testified that billing issues with PGS were still unsatisfactory, resulting in delays in transfer of service from The Villages to the residential home buyer, and delays and mistakes in various billing functions, including rebates. In late 2017, as the Fenney development was approaching buildout, The Villages commenced construction of the Bigham developments. The three Bigham developments were adjacent to one another. The Bigham developments will collectively include 4,200 residential homes, along with commercial support facilities. By September 27, 2017, Leesburg officials were having discussions with Mr. Geoffroy, a representative of its gas purchasing cooperative, Florida Gas Utility (“FGU”), as to how it might go about obtaining rights to serve The Villages’ developments. Mr. Rogers inquired, via email, “[w]hat about encroachment into [PGS] territory north of 468, which is where they plan to build next? [PGS] has a line on 468 that is feeding the section currently under development.” Some 15 minutes later, Mr. Geoffroy described the “customer preference” plan that ultimately became a cornerstone of this case as follows: Yes, the areas that the Villages “plans” to build is currently “unserved territory”, so the PSC looks at a lot of factors, such as construction costs, proximity of existing infrastructure and other things; however, the rule goes on to state that customer preference is an over-riding factor; if all else is substantially equal. In this case, simply having the Villages say they will only put gas into the homes if Leesburg serves them, but not TECO/PGS, will do it. (emphasis added). On November 16, 2017, Leesburg was preparing for a meeting with The Villages to be held “tomorrow.” Among the topics raised by Mr. Rogers was “territorial agreement?” to which Mr. Geoffroy responded “[d]epends on which option [The Villages] choose. If they become the utility, then yes. If not, you will eventually need an agreement with [PGS].” During this period of time, PGS had no communication with either Leesburg or The Villages regarding the extension of gas service to Bigham. PGS became aware that Hamlet was installing gas lines along CR 501 and CR 468 in late December 2017. PGS had not authorized those installations. Bigham West adjoined Fenney, and PGS had lines in the Fenney development that could have established a point of connection to the Bigham developments without modification of the lines. In addition, each of the three Bigham developments front onto CR 468 and are contiguous to the CR 468 PGS distribution line. The distance from the PGS line directly into any of the Bigham developments was a matter of 10 to 100 feet. The cost to PGS to extend gas service into Bigham would have been minimal, with “a small amount of labor involved and a couple feet of pipe.” PGS met with Leesburg officials in January 2018 to determine what was being constructed and to avoid a territorial dispute. PGS was directed by Leesburg to contact The Villages for details. Thereafter, PGS met with representatives of The Villages. PGS was advised that The Villages was “unappreciative” of the business model by which The Villages built communities, and a public utility was able to serve the residential customers and collect the gas service revenues for 30 or 40 years. The Agreement The Villages was, after the completion of Fenney, unsure as to whether it would provide gas service to Bigham, or would continue its past practice of providing all electric homes. The Villages rebuffed Leesburg’s initial advances to extend gas service to The Villages’ new developments, including Bigham. Thereafter, The Villages undertook a series of discussions with Leesburg as to how gas service might be provided to additional Villages’ developments in a manner that would avoid what The Villages’ perceived to be the inequity of allowing a public utility to serve The Villages’ homes, with the public utility keeping the revenues from that service. Leesburg and The Villages continued negotiations to come to a means for extending gas service to The Villages’ developments, while allowing The Villages to collect revenues generated from monthly customer charges and monthly “per therm” charges. SSGC was formed as a natural gas construction company to engage in those discussions. SSCG was, by its own acknowledgement, “an affiliate of The Villages, and the de facto proxy for The Villages in this proceeding.” On January 3, 2018, Leesburg internally discussed how to manage the issue of contributions in aid of construction (“CIAC”). It appeared to Mr. Rogers that gas revenues would continue to be shared with The Villages after its infrastructure investment, with interest, was paid off, with Mr. Rogers questioning “is there a legal issue with them continuing to collect revenue after their capital investment is recovered? Admittedly that may not occur for 15 years.” A number of tasks to be undertaken by The Villages “justifying the continued revenue stream” were proposed, with Mr. Geoffroy stating that: While this may seem a large amount for very little infrastructure, I think it would probably be okay. Because [PGS] distribution is so close, and the Villages has used them previously, it would be relatively easy for the Villages to connect to [PGS] and disconnect from [Leesburg], at any point in the future. In order to get and retain the contract, this is what [Leesburg] has to agree to win the deal. Not sure anyone has rate jurisdiction on this anyway, other than [Leesburg]. Those discussions led to the development of the Agreement under which service to Bigham was ultimately provided. The Agreement was a formulaic approach to entice The Villages into allowing Leesburg to be the gas provider for the residents that were to come. The Agreement governs the construction, purchase, and sale of natural gas distribution facilities providing service to residential and commercial customers in The Villages’ developments. On February 12, 2018, the Leesburg City Commission adopted Resolution 10,156, which authorized the Mayor and City Clerk to execute the Agreement on the Leesburg’s behalf. The Agreement was thereupon entered into between Leesburg and SSGC, with an effective date of February 13, 2018. Then, on February 26, 2019, the Leesburg City Commission adopted Ordinance 18-07, which enacted the Villages Natural Gas Rate Structure and Method of Setting Rates established in the Agreement into the Leesburg Code of Ordinances. The Agreement has no specific term of years, but provides for a term “through the expiration or earlier termination of [Leesburg]’s franchise from the City of Wildwood.” Mr. Minner testified that “the length of the agreement is 30 years from when a final home is built, and then over that overlay is the 30-year franchise agreement from the City of Wildwood.” However, SSGC’s response to interrogatories indicates that the Agreement has a 30-year term. Though imprecise, the 30-year term is a fair measure of the term of the Agreement. For the Bigham developments, i.e., the Agreement’s original “service area,” facilities are those installed into Bigham from the regulator station at the end of Leesburg’s new CR 501 distribution line, and include distribution lines along Bigham’s roads and streets, all required service lines, pressure regulator stations, meters and regulators for each customer, and other appurtenances by which natural gas will be distributed to customers. The Agreement acknowledges that Leesburg and SSGC “anticipate that the service Area will expand as The Villages® community grows, and thus, as it may so expand, [Leesburg and SSGC] shall expand the Service Area from time to time by written Amendment to this Agreement.” SSGC is responsible for the design, engineering, and construction of the natural gas facilities within Bigham. SSGC is responsible for complying with all codes and regulations, for obtaining all permits and approvals, and arranging for labor, materials, and contracts necessary to construct the system. Leesburg is entitled to receive notice from SSGC prior to the construction of each portion of the natural gas system, and has “the right but not the obligation” to perform tests and inspections as the system is installed. The evidence indicates that Leesburg has assigned a city inspector who is on-site daily to monitor the installation of distribution and service lines. SSGC has, to date, been using Hamlet as its contractor, the same company used by PGS to complete work at Fenney. Upon completion of each section in the development, SSGC provides Leesburg with a final inspection report and a set of “as-built” drawings. SSGC then conveys ownership of the gas distribution system to Leesburg in the form of a Bill of Sale. Upon the conveyance of the system to Leesburg, Leesburg assumes responsibility for all operation, maintenance, repairs, and upkeep of the system. Leesburg is also responsible for all customer service, emergency and service calls, meter reading, billing, and collections. Upon conveyance, Leesburg operates and provides natural gas service to Bigham through the system and through Leesburg’s facilities “as an integrated part of [Leesburg’s] natural gas utility operations.” In order to “induce” SSGC to enter into the Agreement, and as the “purchase price” for the system constructed by SSGC, Leesburg will pay SSCG a percentage of the monthly customer charge and the “per therm” charge billed to Bigham customers. Leesburg will charge Bigham customers a “Villages Natural Gas Rate” (“Villages Rate”). The “per therm” charge and the monthly customer charge for each Bigham customer are to be equal to the corresponding rates charged by PGS. If PGS lowers its monthly customer charge after the effective date of the agreement, Leesburg is not obligated to lower its Villages Rate. Bigham customers, who are outside of Leesburg’s municipal boundaries and unable to vote in Leesburg municipal elections, will pay a rate for gas that exceeds that of customers inside of Leesburg’s municipal boundaries and those inside of Leesburg’s traditional service area. A preponderance of the evidence indicates that for the term of the agreement, The Villages will collect from 52 percent (per Mr. Minner at hearing) to 55 percent (per Mr. Minner in deposition) of the total gas revenues paid to Leesburg from Bigham customers. The specific breakdown of revenues is included in the Agreement itself, and its recitation here is not necessary. The mechanism by which The Villages, through SSGC, receives revenue from gas service provided by Leesburg, first to its “proxy” customer and then to its end-user customers, is unique and unprecedented. It has skewed both competitive and market forces. Nonetheless, PGS was not able to identify any statute or rule that imposed a regulatory standard applicable to municipal gas utilities that would prevent such an arrangement. The evidence establishes that, under the terms of the Agreement, Leesburg is the “natural gas utility” as that term is defined by statute and rule. The evidence establishes that SSGC is, nominally, a gas system construction contractor building gas facilities for Leesburg’s ownership and operation. The evidence does not establish that the Agreement creates a “hybrid” public utility. Extension of Service to the Bigham Developments Leesburg’s mains nearest to Bigham were at SR 44 at the Lake County/Sumter County line, a distance of approximately 3.5 miles from the nearest Bigham point of connection; and along CR 470, a distance of approximately 2.5 miles to the nearest Bigham point of connection. When the Agreement was entered, neither the Leesburg 501 line nor the Leesburg 468 line were in existence. At the time the Agreement was entered, Leesburg knew that PGS was the closest provider to the three Bigham developments. In order to serve Bigham, Leesburg constructed a distribution line from a point on CR 470 near the Coleman Prison northward along CR 501 for approximately 2.5 miles to the southern boundary between Bigham West and Bigham East. Leesburg constructed a second distribution line from the Lake County line on SR 44 eastward to its intersection with CR 468, and then southward along CR 468 to the Florida Turnpike, just short of the boundary with Bigham East, a total distance of approximately 3.5 miles. The Leesburg CR 468 line will allow Leesburg to connect with the Bigham distribution line and “loop” or “backfeed” its system to provide redundancy and greater reliability of service to Bigham and other projects in The Villages as they are developed. The new Leesburg CR 468 line runs parallel to the existing PGS CR 468 line along its entire CR 468 route, and crosses the PGS line in places. There are no Commission regulations that prohibit crossing lines, or having lines in close proximity. Nonetheless, having lines in close proximity increases the risk of, among other things, complicating emergency response issues where fire and police believe they are responding to one utility's emergency when it is the other’s emergency. Safety Although PGS was the subject of a Commission investigation and violation related to a series of 2013-2015 inspections, those violations have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Commission. Mr. Szelistowski testified that PGS has received no citations or violations from the Commission, either from a construction standpoint or an operation and maintenance standpoint, for the past three years. Mr. Moses testified that both PGS and Leesburg are able to safely provide natural gas service to customers in Sumter County. His testimony is credited. Given the differences in size, geographic range, nature, and density of areas served by the PGS and Leesburg systems, the prior violations are not so concerning as to constitute a material difference in the outcome of this case. All of the distribution and service lines proposed by Leesburg and PGS to serve and for use in the disputed territory are modern, safe, and state-of-the-art. Reliability As stated by Leesburg in its PRO, “[t]he reliability of a natural gas distribution system to serve a designated area depends on the nature, location and capacity of the utility's existing infrastructure, the ability of the utility to secure the necessary quantities of natural gas, and the ability of the natural gas utility to supply gas in a safe manner.” As set forth herein, the location of PGS’s existing infrastructure, vis-a-vis the disputed territory, weighs strongly in its favor. As to the other reliability factors identified by Leesburg, both parties are equally capable of providing reliable service to the disputed territory. Both PGS and Leesburg demonstrated that they have the managerial and operational experience to provide service in the disputed area. There was no evidence to suggest that end-user customers of either Leesburg or PGS, including PGS’s Fenney customers, are dissatisfied with their service. Regulatory Standards for Territorial Disputes Rule 25-7.0472 establishes the criteria for the resolution of territorial disputes regarding gas utilities. Rule 25-7.0472(2)(a) Rule 25-7.0472(2)(a) includes the following issues for consideration in resolving a territorial dispute regarding gas utilities: The capability of each utility to provide reliable natural gas service within the disputed area with its existing facilities and gas supply contracts. Leesburg currently obtains its natural gas supply from the Florida Gas Transmission (“FGT”) distribution system, and purchases natural gas through FGU, a not-for-profit joint action agency, or "co-op" for purchasing natural gas. FGU's membership consists of city or governmental utility systems in Florida that distribute natural gas to end-user customers, or that use natural gas to generate electricity. FGU purchases and provides gas and manages interstate pipeline capacity for its members. FGU's members contractually reserve space in interstate transmission lines. FGU aggregates its members’ contracts into a single consolidated contract between FGU and the interstate pipelines and collectively manages its members’ needs through that contract. FGU has flexibility to transfer pipeline capacity from one member to benefit another member. Leesburg currently takes its natural gas through a "lateral" pipeline from the FGT transmission line. Gas travels through one of two gate stations, one in Haines Creek, and the other near the Leesburg municipal airport, both of which are located in Leesburg’s northeast quadrant. At the gate stations, transmission pressure is reduced to lower distribution pressure, and the gas is metered as it is introduced into Leesburg’s distribution system. The FGT transmission capacity is fully subscribed by FGU. Leesburg has not fully subscribed its lateral pipeline and has sole access to its lateral line capacity. Prior to the entry of the Agreement, and Leesburg/SSGC’s extension of distribution lines along CR 501 and CR 468, Leesburg’s distribution lines extended into Sumter County only along CR 470 to the Coleman Federal Prison. One other Leesburg line extended to the county line along SR 44, and then north to serve a residential area in Lake County. Leesburg argues that it has already extended lines, and is providing service to thousands of homes in Bigham, and that those facilities should be considered in determining whether it can “provide reliable natural gas service within the disputed area with its existing facilities.” PGS did not know of Leesburg’s intent to serve Bigham until late December 2017, when it observed PGS’s Fenney contractor, Hamlet, installing lines along CR 468, lines that it had not approved. PGS met with Leesburg officials in January 2018 to determine what was being constructed and to avoid a territorial dispute. PGS was directed by Leesburg to contact The Villages for details. PGS filed its territorial dispute on February 23, 2018, 10 days from the entry of the Agreement, and three days prior to the adoption of Ordinance 18-07. Construction of the infrastructure to serve Bigham occurred after the filing of the territorial dispute. Given the speed with which The Villages builds, hundreds of homes have been built, and gas facilities to serve have been constructed, since the filing of the territorial dispute. To allow Leesburg to take credit for its facilities in the disputed territory, thus prevailing as a fait accompli, would be contrary to the process and standards for determining a territorial dispute. The territory must be gauged by the conditions in the disputed territory prior to the disputed extension of facilities to serve the area. Leesburg’s existing facilities, i.e., those existing prior to extension to the disputed territory, were sufficient to serve the needs of Leesburg’s existing service area. The existing facilities were not sufficient to serve the disputed territory without substantial extension. 2. The extent to which additional facilities are needed. Both PGS and Leesburg have sufficient interconnections with transmission pipelines. Prior to commencement of construction at Bigham, the area consisted of undeveloped rural land. As discussed herein, the “starting point” for determining the necessity of facilities is the disputed territory property before the installation of site-specific interior distribution and service lines. To find otherwise would reward a “race to serve.” PGS demonstrated that it is capable of serving the disputed territory with no additional facilities needed. Its distribution mains are located directly adjacent to the disputed territory from the Fenney development from the west, and are contiguous to each of the Bigham developments from CR 468. The PGS CR 468 line was not constructed in specific anticipation of serving Bigham, and its cost is not fairly included in PGS’s cost to provide natural gas service to the disputed area presently and in the future. PGS’s existing distribution mains are capable of providing service to Bigham literally within feet of a point of connection. PGS’s cost to reach the disputed territory from its existing facilities in Fenney was estimated at $500 to $1,000. The cost of connecting the interior Bigham service lines to PGS’s CR 468 line is, at most, $10,000. PGS’s total cost of extending gas distribution lines to serve Bigham is, at most, $11,000. The evidence demonstrated that Leesburg required substantial additional facilities to serve the disputed territory. In order to meet the needs for reliable service to Bigham established in the Agreement, Leesburg constructed a new high-pressure distribution line from the existing CR 470 line north along CR 501 to Bigham for a distance of 2.5 miles at a cost of $651,475. The CR 501 line was constructed in specific anticipation of serving Bigham and is fairly included in Leesburg’s cost to provide natural gas service to the disputed area presently and in the future. In order to meet the needs for reliable service to Bigham established in the Agreement, Leesburg constructed a new high-pressure distribution line along SR 44 and CR 468 to Bigham for a distance of 3.5 miles at a cost of $560,732. The CR 468 segment of Leesburg’s line is adjacent and parallel to PGS’s existing CR 468 pipeline. Leesburg plans to connect the CR 468 line with the CR 501 line by way of a regulator station to create a system loop. Although Leesburg’s CR 468 pipeline is, ostensibly, not the primary distribution line for Bigham, it is directly related to the CR 501 line, and provides desired redundancy and reliability for Bigham, as well as infrastructure for the further expansion of Leesburg’s gas system to The Villages. Thus, the cost of extending Leesburg’s CR 468 line is fairly included in Leesburg’s cost as an “additional facility” to provide “reliable natural gas service,” to the disputed area presently and in the future. Leesburg’s total cost of extending gas distribution lines designed as primary distribution or redundant capability to serve Bigham is a minimum of $1,212,207. In addition to the foregoing, Leesburg, in its response to interrogatories, indicated that it “anticipates spending an amount not to exceed approximately $2.2 million dollars for gas lines located on county roads 501 and 468.” Furthermore, Leesburg stated that “[a]n oral agreement exists [between Leesburg and SSGC] that the amount to be paid by Leesburg for the construction of natural gas infrastructure on county roads 468 and 501 will not exceed $2.2 million dollars. This agreement was made . . . on February 12, 2018.” That is the date on which Leesburg adopted Resolution 10,156, which authorized the Mayor and City Clerk to execute the Agreement on Leesburg’s behalf. The context of those statements suggests that the total cost of constructing the gas infrastucture to serve Bigham could be as much as $2.2 million. PGS argues that Leesburg’s cost of connecting to the Sabal Trail transmission line should be included in the cost of serving the disputed territory. Leesburg began planning and discussions to connect to Sabal Trail as early as 2015, when the construction of Sabal Trail through the area became known. Leesburg entered into a contract for the Sabal Trail connection in February 2016. The Sabal Trail connection was intended to provide Leesburg with additional redundant capacity for its system independent of service to The Villages. The cost of constructing the Sabal Trail gate station is not fairly included in Leesburg’s cost to provide natural gas service to the disputed area presently and in the future. Rule 25-7.0472(2)(b) Rule 25-7.0472(2)(b) includes the following issues for consideration in resolving a territorial dispute regarding gas utilities: The nature of the disputed area and the type of utilities seeking to serve it. The area in dispute was, prior to the commencement of construction, essentially rural, with rapidly encroaching residential/commercial development. Although the area was generally rural at the time PGS installed its CR 468/US 301 distribution line, there was a well-founded expectation that development was imminent, if not by The Villages, then by another residential developer. The disputed territory is being developed as a master-planned residential community with associated commercial development. The Bigham developments are currently proximate to the Fenney development. Other non-rural land uses in the area include the Coleman Federal Prison and the American Cement plant. As indicated, Leesburg is a municipal gas utility, and PGS is a public gas utility. The utilities seeking to serve the disputed territory are both capable, established providers with experience serving mixed residential and commercial areas. There is nothing with regard to this factor that would tip the balance in either direction. 2. The degree of urbanization of the area and its proximity to other urban areas. As it currently stands, the disputed territory is bounded to its south and east by generally undeveloped rural property, to its south by rural property along with the Coleman Prison and American Cement plant, to its west by the Fenney development and additional undeveloped rural property, and to its north by low-density residential development. The disputed territory is characterized by residential areas of varying density, interspersed with commercial support areas. The nearest of the “town centers,” which are a prominent feature of The Villages development, is Brownwood Paddock Square, which is located north of SR 44, and a few miles north of Fenney and Bigham. The town center is not in the disputed territory. The terms “urban” and “rural” are not defined in Florida Administrative Code chapter 25-7, or in chapter 366. Thus, application of the common use of the term is appropriate. “Urban” is defined as “of, relating to, characteristic of, or constituting a city.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/urban. “Rural” is defined as “of or relating to the country, country people or life, or agriculture.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/rural. The disputed territory was rural prior to the development of Bigham. The area is becoming more loosely urbanized as The Villages has moved into the area and is expected to experience further urban growth to the south and east. Fenney and Bigham are, aside from their proximity to one another, not currently proximate to other urban areas. There is nothing with regard to this factor that would tip the balance in either direction. 3. The present and reasonably foreseeable future requirements of the area for other utility services. Since the disputed territory is a completely planned development, there are requirements for basic utilities. Leesburg provides other utility services to the greater Leesburg MSA and the Villages Fruitland Park development, including electric, water, and sewer service, and has, or is planning to provide such services to other developments for The Villages in the area. Leesburg’s ability to provide other utility services to The Villages in addition to gas service is a factor in Leesburg’s favor. Rule 25-7.0472(2)(c) Rule 25-7.0472(2)(c) establishes that the cost of each utility to provide natural gas service to the disputed area presently and in the future is an issue for consideration in resolving a territorial dispute regarding gas utilities. Various costs are broken out in subparagraphs 1. through 9. of the rule, and will be addressed individually. However, it is clear, as set forth in the facts related to rule 25-7.0472(2)(a) above, that the cost of extending service into Bigham was substantially greater for Leesburg than for PGS. The individually identified costs include the following: Cost of obtaining rights-of-way and permits. There was no evidence to suggest that the cost of obtaining rights-of-way and permits for the construction of the gas infrastructure described herein varied between Leesburg and PGS. There is nothing with regard to this factor that would tip the balance in either direction. 2. Cost of capital. The parties stipulated that the issue of cost of capital is not applicable to this dispute. 3. Amortization and depreciation. The parties stipulated that the issues of amortization and depreciation are not applicable to this dispute. 4. through 6. Cost-per-home. The cost-per-home for extending service to homes in Bigham includes the costs identified in rule 25-7.0472(2)(c)4. (labor; rate per hour and estimated time to perform each task), rule 25-7.0472(2)(c)5. (mains and pipe; the cost per foot and the number of feet required to complete the job), and rule 25- 7.0472(2)(c)6. (cost of meters, gauges, house regulators, valves, cocks, fittings, etc., needed to complete the job). The cost-per-home for Leesburg and SSGC is $1,800 (see ruling on Motion to Strike). In addition, Leesburg will be installing automated meters at a cost of $72.80 per home. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that the PGS cost-per-home is $1,579, which was the cost-per-home of extending service in the comparable Fenney development. The cost-per-home is a factor -- though slight -- in PGS’s favor. 7. Cost of field compressor station structures and measuring and regulating station structures. None of the parties specifically identified or discussed the cost of field compressor station structures and measuring and regulating station structures in the Joint Pre- hearing Stipulation or their PROs. Thus, there is little to suggest that the parties perceived rule 25-7.0472(2)(c)7. to be a significant factor in the territorial dispute. As a result, there is nothing with regard to this factor that would tip the balance in either direction. 8. Cost of gas contracts for system supply. None of the parties specifically identified or discussed the cost of the respective gas contracts for system supply in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation or their PROs. Thus, there is little to suggest that the parties perceived rule 25-7.0472(2)(c)8. to be a significant factor in the territorial dispute. As a result, there is nothing with regard to this factor that would tip the balance in either direction. 9. Other costs that may be relevant to the circumstances of a particular case. There was considerable evidence and testimony as to the revenues that would flow to SSGC under the 30-year term of the Agreement. SSGC's revenues under the Agreement are not relevant as they are not identified as such in rule 25-7.0472, and are not directly related to the rates, which will likely not exceed PGS’s regulated rate. Rule 25-7.0472(2)(d) Rule 25-7.0472(2)(d) includes that the Commission may consider “other costs that may be relevant to the circumstances of a particular case.” This factor is facially identical to that in rule 25-7.0472(2)(c)9., but is, nonetheless, placed in its own rule section and must therefore include costs distinct from those to provide natural gas service to the disputed area presently and in the future. Cost of service to end-user customers. Due to the nature of the Agreement, Leesburg will charge a “Villages Rate” that will be equal to the fully regulated PGS rate.4/ Thus, as a general rule, the cost of service to end-user customers will be the same for PGS and Leesburg. There is nothing with regard to this factor that would tip the balance in either direction. 2. Uneconomic duplication of facilities. Neither section 366.04(3), nor rule 25-7.0472, pertaining to natural gas territorial disputes, expressly require consideration of “uneconomic duplication of facilities” as a factor in resolving territorial disputes. The Commission does consider whether a natural gas territorial agreement “will eliminate existing or potential uneconomic duplication of facilities” as provided in rule 25-7.0471. A review of Commission Orders indicates that many natural gas territorial dispute cases involve a discussion of uneconomic duplication of facilities because disputes are frequently resolved by negotiation and entry of a territorial agreement. In approving the resultant agreement, the Commission routinely considers that the disposition of the dispute by agreement avoids uneconomic duplication of facilities. See In re: Petition to Resolve Territorial Dispute with Clearwater Gas System, a Division of the City of Clearwater, by Peoples Gas System, Inc., 1995 Fla. PUC LEXIS 742, PSC Docket No. 94-0660-GU; Order No. PSC-95-0620- AS-GU (Fla. PSC May 22, 1995)(“[W]e believe that the territorial agreement is in the public interest, and its adoption will further our longstanding policy of avoiding unnecessary and uneconomic duplication of facilities. We approve the agreement and dismiss the territorial dispute.); In re: Petition by Tampa Electric Company d/b/a Peoples Gas System and Florida Division of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation for Approval of Territorial Boundary Agreement in Hillsborough, Polk, and Osceola Counties, 1999 Fla. PUC LEXIS 2051, Docket No. 990921-GU; Order No. PSC-99-2228-PAA-GU181 (Fla. PSC Nov. 10, 1999)(“Over the years, CUC and PGS have engaged in territorial disputes. As each utility expands its system, the distribution facilities become closer and closer, leading to disputes over which is entitled to the unserved areas. The purpose of this Agreement is to set forth new territorial boundaries to reduce or avoid the potential for future disputes between CUC and PGS, and to prevent the potential duplication of facilities.”); In re: Joint Petition for Approval of Territorial Agreement in DeSoto County by Florida Division of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation and Sebring Gas System, Inc., 2017 Fla. PUC LEXIS 163, Docket No. 170036-GU; Order No. PSC-17-0205-PAA-GU (Fla. PSC May 23, 2017)(“The joint petitioners stated that without the proposed agreement, the joint petitioners’ extension plans would likely result in the uneconomic duplication of facilities and, potentially, a territorial dispute . . . . [W]e find that the proposed agreement is in the public interest, that it eliminates any potential uneconomic duplication of facilities and will not cause a decrease in the reliability of gas service.”). There are Commission Orders that suggest the issue of uneconomic duplication of facilities is an appropriate field of inquiry in a territorial dispute even when it does not result in a territorial agreement. See In re: Petition to Resolve Territorial Dispute with South Florida Natural Gas Company and Atlantic Gas Corporation by West Florida Natural Gas Company, 1994 Fla. PUC LEXIS 1332, Docket No. 940329-GU; Order No. PSC-94-1310-S-GU (Fla. PSC Oct. 24, 1994)(“On March 31, 1994, West Florida filed a Petition to Resolve a Territorial Dispute with South Florida and Atlantic Gas On August 26, 1994, West Florida, South Florida, and Atlantic Gas filed a Joint Petition for Approval of Stipulation, which proposed to resolve the territorial dispute by West Florida's purchase of the Atlantic Gas facilities . . . . We believe that approval of the joint stipulation is in the public interest because its adoption will avoid unnecessary and uneconomic duplication of facilities.”). The evidence in this case firmly establishes that Leesburg’s extension of facilities to the Bigham developments, both through the CR 501 line and the CR 468 line, constituted an uneconomic duplication of PGS’s existing gas facilities. As set forth in the Findings of Fact, PGS’s existing gas line along CR 468 is capable of providing safe and reliable gas service to the Bigham developments at a cost that is negligible. To the contrary, Leesburg extended a total of roughly six miles of high-pressure distribution mains to serve the Bigham developments at a cost of at least $1,212,207, with persuasive evidence to suggest that the cost will total closer to $2,200,000. This difference in cost, even at its lower end, is far from de minimis, and constitutes a significant and entirely duplicative cost for service. Leesburg argues that if uneconomic duplication of facilities is a relevant factor, “the evidence of record demonstrates that the City will suffer significant financial impact if it is not permitted to continue to serve the Bigham Developments.” The fact that Leesburg, with advance knowledge and planning, was able to successfully race to serve Bigham, incurring its “financial impact” after the territorial dispute was filed, does not demonstrate either that PGS meets the standards to prevail in this proceeding, or that PGS should be prevented from serving development directly adjacent to its existing facilities in the disputed territory. Rule 25-7.0472(2)(e) Rule 25-7.0472(2)(e) establishes that customer preference is the “tie-breaker” if all other factors are substantially equal. The Villages is the “customer” for purposes of the selection of the provider of natural gas service to Bigham. There is no dispute that The Villages, as the proxy for the individual end-user customers, has expressed its preference to be served by Leesburg. The direct financial benefit to The Villages, and Leesburg’s willingness to enter into a revenue sharing plan -- a plan that, if proposed by PGS, would likely not be allowed by the Commission in its rate- setting capacity -- no doubt plays a role in that decision. Gas service to end-user customers living in in Bigham will be a revenue-generating venture for The Villages if served by Leesburg, and will not if served by PGS. Leesburg and SSGC have suggested that customer preference should occupy a more prominent role in the dispute since gas service, unlike electric, water, and sewer services, is an optional utility service. SSGC argued that since The Villages expressed that it would forego providing gas service to its developments if PGS is determined to be entitled to serve -- a position oddly presaged by Mr. Geoffroy in his September 27, 2017, email with Leesburg (see paragraph 35) -- and “in consideration of the business practices, size, track record of success, and economic import of The Villages,” the preference of The Villages for service from Leesburg should “be a significant factor in the resolution of this dispute.” Neither of those reasons can serve to elevate customer preference from its tie-breaker status as established by rule.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Andrew M. Brown, Esquire Ansley Watson, Esquire Macfarlane Ferguson & McMullen Suite 2000 201 North Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Frank C. Kruppenbacher, Esquire Frank Kruppenbacher, P.A. 9064 Great Heron Circle Orlando, Florida 32836 For Respondent South Sumter Gas Company: John L. Wharton, Esquire Dean Mead & Dunbar 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 815 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Floyd Self, Esquire Berger Singerman, LLP Suite 301 313 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 For Respondent City of Leesburg: Jon C. Moyle, Esquire Karen Ann Putnal, Esquire Moyle Law Firm, P.A. 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (12) 120.56120.569120.57120.68171.208366.02366.03366.04366.05366.06366.1190.403 Florida Administrative Code (6) 25 -7.047225-22.06025-7.04225-7.047125-7.047228-106.217 DOAH Case (2) 18-00442218-4422
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SOUTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT vs WILLIAM GOING, 08-005528 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tavaner, Florida Nov. 05, 2008 Number: 08-005528 Latest Update: May 01, 2009

The Issue The issue to be decided is whether William Going failed to obtain a permit before installing water wells in Palm Harbor, Pinellas County, Florida, as required by the statutes and rules administered by the District under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes (2007)1, and, if so, whether the District’s proposed penalties are reasonable and appropriate.

Findings Of Fact The District is the regional agency charged with the power and duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 373, Part III, Florida Statutes, entitled “Regulation of Wells,” and the rules the District has promulgated pursuant thereto in Florida Administrative Code Title 40D-3. Respondent William Going is a licensed water well contractor, holding License No. 1564. On June 1, 2007, the District received a complaint alleging that Respondent had constructed water wells at 5068 Kernwood Court in Palm Harbor without first obtaining a well construction permit from the District. A subsequent inspection by the District disclosed that six “sand point” irrigation wells had been constructed at the Palm Harbor property, which is the residence of Stephen and Susan Althoff. The District had no record of a permit application for the wells and no well construction permit had been issued to Respondent to construct the wells at the Althoff property. Respondent admits that he constructed the wells at the Althoff property on June 1, 2007, and that he did so without first obtaining a well construction permit for the work. The District maintains a website where water well contractors can apply for water construction permits by filling out an on-line application. The District’s software program can automatically issue the permit if the information submitted by the applicant meets certain programmed parameters. Respondent testified that his wife attempted to access the website and to apply for the permit to construct the wells at the Althoff property, but she was unable to do so because she is not familiar with computers. Neither Respondent, nor his wife, telephoned the District to speak to the District’s permitting staff before the work was commenced at the Althoff property. Section 373.313(1), Florida Statutes, provides that in any geographic area where the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) determines that prior permission to construct a water well would cause “undue hardship,” prior permission will not be required. Respondent made reference to this statute, but he did not show that the Althoff property is within a geographic area where DEP has declared that prior permission is not required for the construction of water wells. William Permenter, the District’s Field Technician Supervisor, has been regulating water well construction for many years, but is unaware of any such areas being designated. Respondent contends that if he had waited to obtain a permit before constructing wells at the Althoff property, it would have created a hardship for him because (1) water well construction in Pinellas County is very competitive and he probably would have lost the Althoff job if he had not done the work immediately; and (2) he would have paid the wages of his helper without a benefit (to Respondent). Section 337.326, Florida Statutes, establishes a procedure to seek an exemption from District rules to avoid an undue hardship. Respondent did not request an exemption from the District regarding the water wells constructed at the Althoff property. The competitive disadvantage that a water well contractor might face in waiting a day (or hours) to obtain a permit is not an undue hardship. Respondent’s potential loss in having to pay an employee for “down time” is not an undue hardship. On June 12, 2007, Respondent submitted an application to the District for a well construction permit for the wells at the Althoff property and the District issued Respondent a permit the following day. The Pinellas County Licensing Board issued a citation against Respondent pursuant to Section 489.127(5), Florida Statutes. The citation issued by the Board pertained to the same water wells that are the subject of the District’s enforcement case. A hearing was held before a Special Master designated by the Board and was prosecuted by a County employee. The Special Master issued a final order dismissing the case against Respondent. On or about August 15, 2008, the District issued its Complaint against Respondent, which seeks an administrative fine of $500 and the assessment of five points against Respondent’s water well contractor license. These penalties are consistent with the disciplinary guidelines that have been adopted by rule by the District.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the District issue a Final Order that imposes the penalties set forth in its Administrative Complaint and Order, dated August 15, 2008. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 2009.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.65373.119373.308373.313373.333489.127 Florida Administrative Code (1) 40D-3.041
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH vs ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ, D/B/A RODRIGUEZ SEPTICE TANK, INC., 04-003787 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Oct. 14, 2004 Number: 04-003787 Latest Update: Mar. 08, 2005

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant matter, registered as a septic tank contractor with the Department. In July 2002, Respondent entered into a contract with Pro Gold Investments Corp. (Pro Gold), whose president and sole owner is Emerico Kemeny Fuller. The contract provided that Respondent would install a "new septic system" for Pro Gold at 453 Blue Road in Coral Gables, Florida (Blue Road Property) for $4,600.00, a job that should have taken only a "few days" to complete. Pro Gold gave Respondent a "job deposit" of $2,300.00. In July 2003, Pro Gold, by Warranty Deed, conveyed title to the Blue Road Property to Maurits de Blank's company, Mortgage Lending Company LLC (MLC), and it also executed a Bill of Sale, Absolute and Assignments of Contracts, which read as follows: PRO GOLD INVESTMENTS CORP, as Seller, in consideration of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration paid to it by MORTGAGE LENDING COMPANY, LLC, as Buyer, the receipt of which is acknowledged hereby sells, assigns, grants, transfers, and conveys to Buyer all of Seller's right, title, and interest in the following described goods, contracts and personal property: SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A- PROPERTY" AND EXHIBIT "B- CONTRACTS ASSIGNED" Seller covenants and agrees that it is the lawful owner of goods, contracts, rights or interests transferred hereby; that they are free from all encumbrances, except for outstanding amounts due, if any, to those parties set forth on Exhibit "B," and that it has the right to sell, transfer and assign the goods, properties and rights set forth in the attached Exhibit "A," and the right to transfer and assign the contracts, rights or interests shown on Exhibit "B," and will warrant and defend same against the lawful claims and demands or all persons. The "attached Exhibit 'A- Property'" read, in pertinent part, as follows: (Regarding transfer of 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables, Florida, "the Real Property") (Mortgage currently in favor of Mortgage Lending Company, LLC "the Mortgage") All property rights of any kind whatsoever, whether in property that is real, fixed, personal, mixed or otherwise and whether in property that is tangible or intangible, including, without limitation, all property rights in all property of any kind whatsoever that is owned or hereafter acquired by the Company and that is associated with, appurtenant to or used in the operation of the Real Property or is located on, at or upon the Real Property and is associated with or used in connection with or in operation of any business activity conducted on, at or upon the Real Property, and including, without limitation, the following: * * * All right, title, and interest in those certain contracts and agreements [set] forth in the attached Exhibit "B," which are hereby transferred and assigned to Mortgage Lending Company LLC. Among the "contracts and agreements [set] forth in the attached Exhibit 'B,'" was the aforementioned July 2002, contract wherein Respondent agreed to install a "new septic system" for Pro Gold on the Blue Road Property (Septic System Contract). This contract was still executory. Respondent had not done any work on the site in the year that had passed since the contract had been signed. In the beginning of August 2003, Mr. de Blank met with Respondent and advised him that MLC was the new owner of the Blue Road Property and that MLC had also received an assignment of the Septic System Contract from Pro Gold. In response to this advisement, Respondent stated "he did not do assignments." Following this meeting, Mr. de Blank sent Respondent documentation supporting the assertions he had made regarding MLC's ownership of the Blue Road Property and its having been assigned the Septic System Contract. Mr. de Blank then attempted, unsuccessfully, to make contact with Respondent by telephone. He "left messages," but his telephone calls were not returned. These efforts to telephonically communicate with Respondent having failed, Mr. de Blank "decided that it may make some sense to start a letter writing program." As part of that "program," on September 8, 2003, Mr. de Blank sent Respondent the following letter: Re: 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables As background, and in chronological order: Pro Gold Investments purchased the above cited property and obtained a construction loan from our firm. One of the conditions was that all construction contracts would be assignable to our firm in the event of default. Pro Gold Investments entered into contract with your firm to install a new septic tank and drainfield at 453 Blue Road. Pro Gold Investments defaults and forfeits title in lieu of foreclosure. The deed was recorded on August 4, 2003, at Bk/Pg: 21484/4283. Not recorded but attached for your reference is an assignment of contracts to include the contract Pro Gold Investments entered into with your firm. See further attachment. The original can be inspected in my office. At this point, I request you proceed with the work as soon as practical and under identical conditions as originally agreed with Pro Gold Investments. Please call me at . . . to confirm a start date. Mr. de Blank did not receive any response to his letter. He finally was able, however, to reach Respondent on the telephone. During this telephone conversation, Mr. de Blank made arrangements to meet Respondent at the Blue Road Property to discuss Respondent's doing the work Respondent had agreed to do in the Septic System Contract. This meeting between Mr. de Blank and Respondent took place on September 11, 2003. During the meeting, Mr. de Blank went over with Respondent "what the job [was] going to be." Although Respondent indicated that he was "going to put in th[e] septic tank" per the Septic System Contract, Mr. de Blank had his doubts that Respondent would be true to his word. Following the meeting, Mr. de Blank sent Respondent the following letter: Re: 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables We met today to discuss the above referenced job. My understanding is: You will start the job no later than the first week of October and will complete the job no later th[a]n the last week of October. I will obtain a copy of the approved permit. You indicated you will not need a survey.[1] Should you change you[r] mind, you can always refer to a survey I keep on site. You will have your insurance agent mail to my address a certificate of insurance. Though not discussed: I would like a partial release of payments made to date for the job. See further the attachment. Assuming you concur, then please send a signed and notarized copy to Maurits de Blank, Mortgage Lending Company, Post Office Box 430336, Miami, Florida 33143. Note that I prefer for various legal reasons that you use the release form as provided. Once the job has been started, I would like a list of firms supplying materials to the job. Notwithstanding that he had promised Mr. de Blank that he would "start the job no later than the first week of October," by the middle of October Respondent had yet to even "pull a septic tank construction permit from the City of Coral Gables" (that was needed before any on-site work could begin).2 In an attempt to find out from Respondent what was the cause of the delay, Mr. de Blank started a "calling campaign," but Respondent neither answered the telephone when Mr. de Blank called nor returned Mr. de Blank's calls. On October 19, 2003, Mr. de Blank sent the following letter to Respondent (by certified United States Mail, return receipt requested): Re: 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables I need a firm commitment when you will start and finish septic tank at above address. If you cannot perform the work, then I will need a refund of the deposit given to your firm. Please call to discuss. The end of the month was fast approaching, and Respondent had neither contacted Mr. de Blank nor begun the Septic System Contract on-site work. After paying a visit to Coral Gables City Hall and learning that Respondent had still not even "pull[ed] a septic tank construction permit from the City of Coral Gables," Mr. De Blank found another septic tank contractor, Westland Septic Tank Corp., to do the installation work for MLC that Respondent was contractually obligated to perform. MLC paid Westland $4,400.00 to do the work. Westland completed the job some time prior to November 4, 2003. The work passed all of the necessary inspections. Upon learning that MLC had contracted with Westland, Respondent sent Mr. de Blank a letter complaining that Mr. de Blank had not given Respondent an adequate opportunity to meet his obligations under the Septic System Contract. In the letter, Respondent offered to return only $500.00 of the $2,300 down payment he had received from Pro Gold. Mr. de Blank subsequently informed Respondent that this was not satisfactory and that he wanted the "full deposit back." He added that if he did not get it, he would "go to court." Not having received any portion of the "deposit back," Mr. de Blank, acting on behalf of MLC, in mid-November 2003, filed suit against Respondent in Miami-Dade County Court. On May 14, 2004, a Final Judgment was entered in Miami-Dade County Court Case No. 0313813 in favor of MLC and against Respondent "in the amount of $1,675.00 plus court costs in the amount of $121.00." As of the date of the final hearing in this case, Respondent had not made any payments to MLC. In view of the foregoing, it is found that Respondent abandoned for 30 consecutive days, without any apparent good cause, a project in which he was under contractual obligation to complete; and his failure to go forward with the project, combined with his failure to return any of the deposit he had received, caused monetary harm to a party to whom he was contractually obligated.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him therefor by fining him $500.00 and suspending his registration for 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2005.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57381.0065489.552
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HUGHES SUPPLY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 91-008334 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Dec. 24, 1991 Number: 91-008334 Latest Update: Nov. 09, 1992

The Issue Whether Petitioner's site, Hughes Supply, Inc. located at 2920 Ford Street, Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida is eligible for restoration under Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Hughes is a Florida Corporation in good standing and authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The Department's facility no. 36-8519331 (the Facility), owned and operated by Hughes and the subject matter of this proceeding, is located at 2920 Ford Street, Ft. Myers, Lee County, Florida, and is a "Facility" as defined in Section 376.301(5), Florida Statutes. The Facility consisted of (a) two underground storage tanks (USTs), one 4000 gallons UST (gasoline tank) and one 8000 gallons UST (diesel tank), and (b) four monitoring well, and is a "petroleum storage system" as defined in Section 376.301(15), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Hughes held, and was the name insured of, an effective third party pollution liability insurance policy (No. FPL 7622685 - Renewal No. FPL 7621566) applicable to the Facility that was issued in accordance with, and qualified under, Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes. Hughes paid annual premiums exceeding $20,000.00 for the above insurance. In accordance with Sections 376.3072, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 17- 769, Florida Administrative Code; the Department issued to Hughes a Notice of Eligibility pertaining to the Facility and the third party pollution liability insurance referred to in Finding of Fact 4 above. Lee County, Florida has a local program approved by the Department pursuant to Section 376.3073, Florida Statutes, to provide for the administration of the Department's responsibilities under certain sections of Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Diesel fuel was placed into the diesel tank at the Facility on August 12, 1991, and no diesel fuel has been placed in the diesel tank at the Facility since that date. On Thursday, August 29, 1991, a contractor bidding on the removal of the tanks detected free product in one of the monitoring wells at the Facility and told Larry Carman, the Warehouse Manager for Hughes. Mr. Carman told Phillip Ross, the Branch Manager for Hughes, who in turn informed Gene Kendall, the Operations Coordinator for Hughes. All of this occurred on August 29, 1991. On Friday, August 30, 1991, an employee of IT Corporation, acting upon the request of Gene Kendall, sampled the four monitoring wells at the Facility and found six inches of free product in the northwest monitoring well. On Tuesday, September 3, 1991, Fred Kendall discussed the discharge with Bill W. Johnson, Supervisor, Lee County Storage Tank Local Program. During this discussion, Johnson learned that the diesel tank had not been emptied. Johnson advised Kendall that the diesel tank had to be emptied of its product and placed out of service. On Tuesday, September 3, 1991 Mr. Kendall completed the Discharge Reporting Form (DRF) pertaining to the discharge and mailed the DRF to Johnson on September 4, 1991. The DRF indicated August 30, 1992, the day that IT Corporation confirmed the discharge, as the day of discovery of the discharge. The discharge was diesel fuel as indicated by the DRF and a "petroleum product" as defined in Section 376.3-1(14), Florida Statutes. The discharge reported in the DRF constitutes a "discharge" as defined in Section 376.301(4), Florida Statutes, which constitutes an "incident" as defined in Section 376.3072(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and as described in Rule 17-769.600, Florida Administrative Code. On Wednesday, September 4, 1991, Mr. Kendall also mailed a letter to Johnson stating Hughes' intent to seek restoration coverage for the Facility, pursuant to Policy No. FPL 762285, Renewal No. FPL 7621566. On September 13, 1991 when Hooper, Inspector for the Lee County Storage Tank Local Program, inspected the Facility the diesel tank contained a total of 39 5/8 inches of diesel and water, of which 4 3/4 inches was water. On September 16, 1991 when Hooper again inspected the Facility, the diesel tank contained a total of 36 1/2 inches of diesel and water, of which 4 1/2 inches was water. On this date, Hooper advised Hughes that the diesel tank had to be emptied of its product. The inspection report issued on September 16, 1991 by Hooper advised Hughes that the Facility was not in compliance with Chapter 17-761, Florida Administrative Code. On September 17, 1991, Hughes had the diesel tank emptied of all its product. Although Hughes was in the process of emptying the diesel tank by giving diesel away, at no time between August 30, 1991 and September 16, 1991 was the diesel tank completely empty of its product. Between August 30, 1991 and September 16, 1991 Hughes did not test the diesel tank to determine if the diesel tank was leaking and, if so, to pinpoint the source of the leak. There was no evidence that either the Department or Lee County Storage Tank Local Program personnel ever informed Hughes before September 16, 1991 that there was a time frame within which the diesel tank had to be emptied of all of its product, and placed out of service in order for Hughes to be in compliance and eligible for reimbursement for restoration under the FPLIRP. Likewise, Hughes did not request any information from the Department or the Lee County Local Program personnel concerning any time frames within which the diesel tank had to be tested for leaks or emptied of its contents to prevent any further discharge in order to be eligible for reimbursement for restoration under the FPLIRP. Between August 29, 1991 and September 17, 1991 Hughes bailed the monitoring wells at the Facility on a daily basis, removed the free product from the monitoring wells, and placed the free product in a sealed 55-gallon drum. When the discharge was discovered, Hughes made the decision to close the Facility by tank removal, and at this point did not intend to repair or replace the Facility. As a result of an inspection of the Facility by the Lee County Local Program personnel in May, 1991, Hughes was made aware that the Facility was not in compliance with Chapter 17-761, Florida Administrative Code, since the gasoline tank had not been used in over three years, and there had been no closure of the gasoline tank. This noncompliance with Chapter 17-761, Florida Administrative Code, concerning the gasoline tank was also a portion of the noncompliance report filed by Hooper on September 16, 1991. The gasoline tank comes within the definition of "unmaintained" as defined by Rule 17-761.200(2), Florida Administrative Code. Both the diesel tank and the gasoline tank were removed on October 28, 1991 by a Florida licensed storage tank system removal contractor, and the Facility permanently closed by IT Corporation on October 29, 1991. In December, 1991, Hughes filed a tank closure assessment report pertaining to the removal of the diesel and gasoline tanks from, and closure of, the Facility. The tank closure assessment report was prepared by IT Corporation upon a request made by Hughes to IT Corporation on September 3, 1991 for a tank closure assessment proposal which was submitted by IT Corporation to Hughes on September 4, 1991. In April or May, 1992, Hughes filed with Lee County a contamination assessment report prepared by IT Corporation pertaining to the removal of the USTs from and closure of the Facility. Subsequent to discovery of the discharge. Hughes has expended approximately $60,000.00 as of June 10, 1992, on the Facility in connection with the USTs. Site rehabilitation costs for the Facility have been estimated in a range of $220,000.00 to $245,000.00 as of June 10, 1992. In the early part of 1991 water was present in the diesel tank, and approximately six months before discovering the discharge in August, 1991, Hughes had the water pumped out of the diesel tank. Hughes gave no explanation for the presence of water in the diesel tank. Neither the Department nor the Lee County Local Program personnel were notified of this unexplained presence of water in the diesel tank.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order denying Hughes application for restoration coverage under the Florida Petroleum Liability Insurance and Restoration Program. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-8334 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the Proposed Finding(s) of Fact:(1); 2-3(2); 4-5(3); 6- 8(4); 9(5); 10(6); 11(8,9); 12(10,11); 14(15,22); 15(10); 16(19); 18(10); 19(13); 20-21(7); 22-23(24); 24(21); 25(17); 26-29(20); 30(15); 31(16); 32(22); 33(23); 35(23); 36(7); 37(23); 38(24); 39(25); 40(26); 41(27); 42-43(27); and 44(15,22). Proposed Findings of Fact 13, 17 and 34 are neither material nor relevant to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1. The following Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the Proposed Finding(s) of Fact:1-2(2); 3(3); 4-6(5); 7(6); 8(22); 9(7); 10(8); 11(9); 12(10); 13-16(11); 17(12); 18(13): 19(18); 20(17); 21-22(14); 23-24(15); 25-26(28); 27(16); and 28(23). COPIES FURNISHED: Scott E. Wilt, Esquire Maguire, Voorhis and Wells 2 South Orange Plaza Orlando, Florida 32801 Brigette A. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400

Florida Laws (10) 120.56120.57120.68376.30376.301376.303376.305376.3071376.3072376.3073
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