The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant matter, registered as a septic tank contractor with the Department. In July 2002, Respondent entered into a contract with Pro Gold Investments Corp. (Pro Gold), whose president and sole owner is Emerico Kemeny Fuller. The contract provided that Respondent would install a "new septic system" for Pro Gold at 453 Blue Road in Coral Gables, Florida (Blue Road Property) for $4,600.00, a job that should have taken only a "few days" to complete. Pro Gold gave Respondent a "job deposit" of $2,300.00. In July 2003, Pro Gold, by Warranty Deed, conveyed title to the Blue Road Property to Maurits de Blank's company, Mortgage Lending Company LLC (MLC), and it also executed a Bill of Sale, Absolute and Assignments of Contracts, which read as follows: PRO GOLD INVESTMENTS CORP, as Seller, in consideration of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration paid to it by MORTGAGE LENDING COMPANY, LLC, as Buyer, the receipt of which is acknowledged hereby sells, assigns, grants, transfers, and conveys to Buyer all of Seller's right, title, and interest in the following described goods, contracts and personal property: SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A- PROPERTY" AND EXHIBIT "B- CONTRACTS ASSIGNED" Seller covenants and agrees that it is the lawful owner of goods, contracts, rights or interests transferred hereby; that they are free from all encumbrances, except for outstanding amounts due, if any, to those parties set forth on Exhibit "B," and that it has the right to sell, transfer and assign the goods, properties and rights set forth in the attached Exhibit "A," and the right to transfer and assign the contracts, rights or interests shown on Exhibit "B," and will warrant and defend same against the lawful claims and demands or all persons. The "attached Exhibit 'A- Property'" read, in pertinent part, as follows: (Regarding transfer of 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables, Florida, "the Real Property") (Mortgage currently in favor of Mortgage Lending Company, LLC "the Mortgage") All property rights of any kind whatsoever, whether in property that is real, fixed, personal, mixed or otherwise and whether in property that is tangible or intangible, including, without limitation, all property rights in all property of any kind whatsoever that is owned or hereafter acquired by the Company and that is associated with, appurtenant to or used in the operation of the Real Property or is located on, at or upon the Real Property and is associated with or used in connection with or in operation of any business activity conducted on, at or upon the Real Property, and including, without limitation, the following: * * * All right, title, and interest in those certain contracts and agreements [set] forth in the attached Exhibit "B," which are hereby transferred and assigned to Mortgage Lending Company LLC. Among the "contracts and agreements [set] forth in the attached Exhibit 'B,'" was the aforementioned July 2002, contract wherein Respondent agreed to install a "new septic system" for Pro Gold on the Blue Road Property (Septic System Contract). This contract was still executory. Respondent had not done any work on the site in the year that had passed since the contract had been signed. In the beginning of August 2003, Mr. de Blank met with Respondent and advised him that MLC was the new owner of the Blue Road Property and that MLC had also received an assignment of the Septic System Contract from Pro Gold. In response to this advisement, Respondent stated "he did not do assignments." Following this meeting, Mr. de Blank sent Respondent documentation supporting the assertions he had made regarding MLC's ownership of the Blue Road Property and its having been assigned the Septic System Contract. Mr. de Blank then attempted, unsuccessfully, to make contact with Respondent by telephone. He "left messages," but his telephone calls were not returned. These efforts to telephonically communicate with Respondent having failed, Mr. de Blank "decided that it may make some sense to start a letter writing program." As part of that "program," on September 8, 2003, Mr. de Blank sent Respondent the following letter: Re: 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables As background, and in chronological order: Pro Gold Investments purchased the above cited property and obtained a construction loan from our firm. One of the conditions was that all construction contracts would be assignable to our firm in the event of default. Pro Gold Investments entered into contract with your firm to install a new septic tank and drainfield at 453 Blue Road. Pro Gold Investments defaults and forfeits title in lieu of foreclosure. The deed was recorded on August 4, 2003, at Bk/Pg: 21484/4283. Not recorded but attached for your reference is an assignment of contracts to include the contract Pro Gold Investments entered into with your firm. See further attachment. The original can be inspected in my office. At this point, I request you proceed with the work as soon as practical and under identical conditions as originally agreed with Pro Gold Investments. Please call me at . . . to confirm a start date. Mr. de Blank did not receive any response to his letter. He finally was able, however, to reach Respondent on the telephone. During this telephone conversation, Mr. de Blank made arrangements to meet Respondent at the Blue Road Property to discuss Respondent's doing the work Respondent had agreed to do in the Septic System Contract. This meeting between Mr. de Blank and Respondent took place on September 11, 2003. During the meeting, Mr. de Blank went over with Respondent "what the job [was] going to be." Although Respondent indicated that he was "going to put in th[e] septic tank" per the Septic System Contract, Mr. de Blank had his doubts that Respondent would be true to his word. Following the meeting, Mr. de Blank sent Respondent the following letter: Re: 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables We met today to discuss the above referenced job. My understanding is: You will start the job no later than the first week of October and will complete the job no later th[a]n the last week of October. I will obtain a copy of the approved permit. You indicated you will not need a survey.[1] Should you change you[r] mind, you can always refer to a survey I keep on site. You will have your insurance agent mail to my address a certificate of insurance. Though not discussed: I would like a partial release of payments made to date for the job. See further the attachment. Assuming you concur, then please send a signed and notarized copy to Maurits de Blank, Mortgage Lending Company, Post Office Box 430336, Miami, Florida 33143. Note that I prefer for various legal reasons that you use the release form as provided. Once the job has been started, I would like a list of firms supplying materials to the job. Notwithstanding that he had promised Mr. de Blank that he would "start the job no later than the first week of October," by the middle of October Respondent had yet to even "pull a septic tank construction permit from the City of Coral Gables" (that was needed before any on-site work could begin).2 In an attempt to find out from Respondent what was the cause of the delay, Mr. de Blank started a "calling campaign," but Respondent neither answered the telephone when Mr. de Blank called nor returned Mr. de Blank's calls. On October 19, 2003, Mr. de Blank sent the following letter to Respondent (by certified United States Mail, return receipt requested): Re: 453 Blue Road, Coral Gables I need a firm commitment when you will start and finish septic tank at above address. If you cannot perform the work, then I will need a refund of the deposit given to your firm. Please call to discuss. The end of the month was fast approaching, and Respondent had neither contacted Mr. de Blank nor begun the Septic System Contract on-site work. After paying a visit to Coral Gables City Hall and learning that Respondent had still not even "pull[ed] a septic tank construction permit from the City of Coral Gables," Mr. De Blank found another septic tank contractor, Westland Septic Tank Corp., to do the installation work for MLC that Respondent was contractually obligated to perform. MLC paid Westland $4,400.00 to do the work. Westland completed the job some time prior to November 4, 2003. The work passed all of the necessary inspections. Upon learning that MLC had contracted with Westland, Respondent sent Mr. de Blank a letter complaining that Mr. de Blank had not given Respondent an adequate opportunity to meet his obligations under the Septic System Contract. In the letter, Respondent offered to return only $500.00 of the $2,300 down payment he had received from Pro Gold. Mr. de Blank subsequently informed Respondent that this was not satisfactory and that he wanted the "full deposit back." He added that if he did not get it, he would "go to court." Not having received any portion of the "deposit back," Mr. de Blank, acting on behalf of MLC, in mid-November 2003, filed suit against Respondent in Miami-Dade County Court. On May 14, 2004, a Final Judgment was entered in Miami-Dade County Court Case No. 0313813 in favor of MLC and against Respondent "in the amount of $1,675.00 plus court costs in the amount of $121.00." As of the date of the final hearing in this case, Respondent had not made any payments to MLC. In view of the foregoing, it is found that Respondent abandoned for 30 consecutive days, without any apparent good cause, a project in which he was under contractual obligation to complete; and his failure to go forward with the project, combined with his failure to return any of the deposit he had received, caused monetary harm to a party to whom he was contractually obligated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint and disciplining him therefor by fining him $500.00 and suspending his registration for 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2005.
The Issue Petitioner and Lyell Hintz protest the Department's intent to award the bid for Lease No. 550-0209 to Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc. Issues derived from the pleadings, the joint prehearing stipulation and the evidence and argument at hearing are: Whether Petitioner has standing to protest the bid award; Whether Petitioner and Lyell Hintz have waived the right to contest evaluation criteria; If not, whether those criteria are valid; Whether the Respondent has properly applied the criteria to the bid proposals; Whether Southeastern's bid was nonresponsive; Whether Southeastern changed its bid after opening; Whether Petitioner's bid was defective for failure to include a waiver of existing lease; Whether the bid should be awarded to Lyell Hintz or Petitioner; and Whether all bids should be rejected and the lease re-bid.
Findings Of Fact The Bid Solicitation On or about January 31, 1991, the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) advertised its request for proposals (RFP) for a full service lease for its District Five, Operations and Planning Office, Public Transportation Office and Construction Office. The RFP is identified as lease #550:0209. Specifications include net square footage of 13,640 + 3% (13,231 - 14,049), divided into 90% office and 10% storage space, to be available by July 1, 1991, or within 30 days of notice of bid award, whichever occurs last. The space is to be available in a northern section of Orange County designated on a map attached to the RFP, in the Winter Park/Maitland/Orlando area surrounding the intersection of Lee Road and I-4. The following evaluation criteria (award factors) are included in the RFP: The successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using total present value methodology for basic term of lease... (weighting: 15) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors). (weighting: 10) Provision of the aggregate square footage on a single floor. Proposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two floors. (weighting: 25) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on the efficient and economical conduct of Departmental operation planned for the requested space. (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors) (weighting: 10) Offers providing 100 s.f. of street-level secured storage. (weighting: 10) * * * [deleted criteria given 0 weight and not relevant] Option period rental rate proposed is within projected budgetary restraints of the department. (weighting: 15) Accessibility to an I-4 Interchange. (weighting: 15) total award factors = 100 (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 7 of 10) Paragraph D.1., General Provisions, includes a notice that failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), F.S., constitutes a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, F.S. The notice references an attachment which includes the text of Chapter 90-224, Laws of Florida, requiring posting of a bond at the time of formal written protest. Paragraph D.6.A., General Provisions states: Each proposal shall be signed by the owner(s), corporate officers, or legal representatives(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. If the agent is to execute the lease, the authority must be supported by a properly executed Power of Attorney. If the Bid Submittal is offered by anyone other than the owner or owner's agent, proof of the bidder's authority to offer the facility, i.e., copy of bidder's Option to Purchase, must accompany the proposal. This option must be valid through the validity date established for bids. If a corporation foreign to the State of Florida is the owner of record, written evidence of authority to conduct business in Florida must accompany the Bid Submittal. If there is an existing lease extending beyond the required availability date for all or any portion of the premises being offered to the agency a release of the applicable lease must accompany the Bid Submittal. (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 8 of 10) Paragraph D.8., General Provisions, provides the Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals, waive any minor informality or technicality in bids, to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. Paragraphs D.12 and 13, General Provisions, establish a March 4, 1991 bid opening and a February 11, 1991 preproposal conference, respectively. On the RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal form, below the bidder's signature space, there is a list of required attachments and notice that failure to include such, if applicable, "...shall render the proposal nonresponsive and such proposal shall be rejected". (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 10 of 10) The relevant attachments include a map with location of the facility, photograph, floor plan, authorization as agent for bidder, and release of existing leases. The RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal Form was furnished to the DOT by the Department of General Services (DGS). As permitted, DOT made some modifications to the criteria to meet the specific needs of the agency. No protests of the bid solicitation were filed by any party. The Bid Responses Four proposals were timely received at the bid opening deadline, March 4, 1991: Clayton's Realty (Petitioner) submitted two proposals, Lyell Hintz submitted one proposal, and Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., submitted one proposal. Clayton's bid for its building at 611 Wymore Road, Winter Park ("Clayton Bldg.") offers 13,984 square feet for $1,136,200.00 for the five-year rental period and $1,398,400.00 for the option years. Some of DOT's offices are already in this building. Clayton's bid for its building at 5600 Diplomat Circle, Orlando, ("Promenade Building") offers 14,049 square feet at $965,868.75 for the 5-year rental term, and $1,229,287.50 for the option period. Both of Clayton's buildings offer space on two floors. Lyell Hintz offers 14,049 square feet at 1241 S. Orlando Avenue, Maitland. The five year rental cost is $895,623.75, and the option period rental is $1,123,920.00. All of the space is offered on a single first floor. Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., offers 14,049 square feet in the Adlee Building at 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, for $1,009,139.67 for the 5- year rental term and $1,288,012.32 for the option period. Southeastern contends that it is offering 100 square feet of storage space on the first floor and the remainder of space on the second floor. Committee Analysis of the Bids An evaluation committee comprised of four DOT employees met on March 6, and March 12, 1991, to evaluate the bids. Their evaluation included a visit to each site with pre-established questions. The four employees were Nancy Houston, District Five District Director for Planning and Public Transportation; Donna Sovern, Ms. Houston's Administrative Assistant; Jim Hamelin, Resident Engineer in charge of construction in District Five; and Steven J. Nunnery, Office Manager for District Five Construction. The committee had prior experience in the leasing process on only one occasion. In November 1990, this same lease #550:0209 was bid. Lyell Hintz and Southeastern were the bidders. All bids were rejected after it was discovered that Southeastern's bids included typewritten language added by the bidder and in conflict with standard requirements. No protest was filed from that agency decision. In the November bid the committee simply utilized the criteria provided in the DGS packet. Later the Committee learned that criteria could be modified by the individual agency. With this understanding, the Committee changed the criteria for the March 1991 bids to provide that space be offered on no more than two floors, rather than two buildings; that points would be awarded for offers of 100 square feet of street level storage space, rather than all space on the street level; and that accessibility to an I-4 Interchange would be an additional evaluation factor. The committee felt these criteria appropriately addressed agency need to collocate programs and share facilities, to have ground floor storage for heavy samples and equipment, and to provide easy access by field staff and others using I-4 regularly. The committee devised a methodology for awarding points to each bidder in each category described in paragraph 3, above. The methodology is stated in the minutes of the evaluation committee meeting dated March 6, 1991. For item no. 1, the committee awarded 15 points (the highest) to the lowest bid. The percentage of difference between each bid and the lowest bid was multiplied by 15 to determine the point value. Hintz received 15 points; Clayton (Promenade Building) received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and Clayton (Clayton Building) received 12 points. For item no 2, the committee stated it would take into account the design and other factors in the description of this item, including the parking requirement addressed in the invitation to bid. Southeastern received the maximum, 10 points; Hintz received 8 points; and the two Clayton buildings received 6 points each. As part of the November bid process, when the agency initially intended to make the award to Southeastern, Nancy Houston's husband, an architect in private practice, prepared without charge a layout of Southeastern's building to see if Southeastern could meet DOT's needs. At Clayton's and Southeastern's requests, that layout was provided to the bidders, except for Hintz. Since Hintz' building is basically a shell, and he assured DOT he would make the renovations they needed, Ms. Houston did not feel that he needed the floor plan. After the bids were rejected in November, the layout became a public record, available to anyone upon request. However, Ms. Houston opined at hearing that they could not get a good layout that would work for the Hintz building. This contradicts Mr. Hintz' testimony that the suggested floor plan attached to the RFP could easily fit in his building. The floor plan attached to the RFP is not the same floor plan prepared by Ms. Houston's husband for the Southeastern building and the fact that Hintz' building is a shell capable of a vast variety of layouts impeaches Ms. Houston's opinion. Item no. 3 requests aggregate square footage on a single floor, with fewer points for space on two floors. The committee methodology was to give 25 points for space on one floor and "reduction given accordingly" for two floors. (Joint Exhibit #6, attachment A, page 1) Hintz and Southeastern were each granted 25 (maximum) points. Although various committee members testified that two floors should have warranted 1/2 the points, or 13, Clayton's buildings were awarded 16 points each. Southeastern is not proposing to provide all space on one floor, as it is offering storage on the first floor and office space on the second floor. The committee considered this worthy of full points, as all of the office space is on one floor. Item no. 4 is related to environmental factors such as aesthetics of the building and surrounding areas. The committee methodology states that aesthetics of the building and area would be considered along with "...the economical factor relating to the conduct of our everyday activities from and in each space proposed." (Joint Exhibit #6, Attachment A) Southeastern was awarded 10 points (maximum); Clayton's Clayton Building and Promenade Building were awarded 6 and 8 points respectively; and Hintz was awarded 3 points. Item no. 5 relates to provision of 100 square feet of storage on the street level. The committee methodology provides that full ten points will be awarded if this is met; if not, the score would be "adjusted accordingly". Each bid was awarded the full 10 points. The committee members learned that Southeastern was willing to provide street level storage when they made their site visit and inquired. The space was not described in Southeastern's written proposal. Item no. 11 relates to rental cost for the option period. The methodology adopted by the committee for this item is the same as for item no. Hintz, the lowest bidder for the option term, received 15 points; Clayton's Promenade Building received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and the Clayton Building received 12 points. Item no. 12, accessibility to an I-4 Interchange, is worth 15 points maximum. For its methodology the committee devised a formula of granting the closest building a full 15 points. The I-4/Lee Road interchange was selected as the reference hub. The Clayton Building, .2 miles from the interchange, was given 15 points. Southeastern's building .6 miles away, three times as far, was given 1/3 value, 5 points; the Promenade Building, .4 miles away, or twice as far, was given 1/2 full value, or 7.5, rounded to 8 points; and Hintz' building, 2 miles away, or 10 times as far, was given 1.5 points, rounded to 2. The total values thus awarded by the committee were: 86 points to Southeastern; 78 points to Hintz; 77 points to Clayton (Clayton Bldg.); and 76 points to Clayton (Promenade Bldg.). The committee, after meeting on March 6th and making its awards, decided to meet again on March 12th, after obtaining more information on phone service, zoning regulations, crime, and bidder's previous experience in renovations. Although some additional information was obtained and the committee did meet again, it determined that the additional information (not clearly related to any of the seven criteria above) did not warrant changing any of the scores. The committee recommended award of the lease to Southeastern. Southeastern's Bid Allegedly Defective Southeastern's bid is signed by Gilmore E. Daniel, Vice President of Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., as agent for the owner, Cynwyd Investments, a partnership which operates under about 150 different partnerships. The building in issue is owned by an entity designated "Adlee Building, Cynwyd Investments General Partnership". Attached to Southeastern's bid is a letter on Cynwyd Investments letterhead, dated February 7, 1991, addressed to Mr. Gil Daniel, re: Adlee Building, 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, Florida, stating: As leasing and managing agent for the above captioned property, you are hereby authorized to negotiate on our behalf with the State of Florida in order to procure the Department of Transportation as a tenant in our building. (Joint Exhibit #5) The letter is signed by Stephen Cravitz, CSM. Although the language of the letter is inartful (the agent was not "negotiating" a lease), the intent is plain on its face that the agent procure a lease. This is sufficient to convey authority for Gil Daniel to act on behalf of the owner. The requirement of the RFP, paragraph 6.A. is met. (see paragraph 5, above) There are several tenants currently occupying space proposed to be leased to DOT under lease no. 550:0209. There are three "agreements" attached to Southeastern's bid proposal for three tenants. Each agreement provides the tenant will move by April 15, 1991 "...contingent upon the landlord being the successful bidder for the State of Florida Department of Transportation lease no. 550:0209, and having an executed lease with the State." (Joint Exhibit #5) The tenants have not moved, but neither has the contingency been satisfied; and when or if it is, the tenants will move. These agreements are sufficient "release" to meet the requirements of RFP paragraph 6.A. The remaining tenant does not have a lease. Clayton's Bid Allegedly Defective Clayton's bids did not include any releases from tenants. There is a tenant currently in part of the space offered in the Clayton Building. There is also a lease agreement dated August 28, 1989, between the Claytons and Canam Steel Corporation describing a lease term of three years and termination date of September 14, 1992. Edward Fielding, Jr. is Director of Operations in the Leasing Department for Charles and Malcolm Clayton. He is well aware of the requirements for state leasing as he and the Claytons have been involved for several years in leasing space to state agencies. Canam Steel Corporation provided a letter in April 26, 1990, stating that it is closing its Orlando operation and requesting that its lease be terminated. It still occupies the space, but Edward Fielding is assured that it wishes to leave, and will do so immediately upon approval by Clayton. The lease and release was not included with the bid packet, as Fielding properly determined that it was no longer binding on the landlord. The Clayton Building bid does not violate the requirement of RFP, Paragraph 6.A. F. Alleged Bias of the Committee in Favor of Southeastern and Improper Award of Points Hintz and Clayton contend that the bid process was thoroughly tainted with a bias in favor of an award to Southeastern. Clayton did not respond to the November bid; Hintz did, and did not protest the earlier process, although he apparently brought to DOT's attention the language added to Southeastern's bid response that led to the rejection of all bids and reinitiation of the process. The committee changed its evaluation criteria when it learned that DGS's form criteria are not binding on the agency. The committee's alterations and addition of the I-4 accessibility requirement were intended to better meet the specific needs of the programs that would be using the space. The changes did not specifically benefit Southeastern; it was neither the closest nor next closest building to the I-4 interchange. For those criteria which could be objectively quantified, such as rental rate and proximity to I-4, the committee attempted in good faith to devise formulae. That the point spread for the I-4 criteria was substantially wider than for rental rates does not invalidate those formulae. For those criteria requiring a subjective analysis, the conformance/design and environmental factors, Petitioner and Hintz failed to prove the committee's point awards were patently wrong or fraudulent. One committee member, James Hamelin, admitted that Clayton should have received 13, rather than 16 points for providing space on more than one floor, but that error, if it indeed was an error, inured to the benefit of Petitioner and made no impact on Hintz, the next highest scorer. None of the floor plans presented by the bidders with their proposals are attached to the exhibits received in evidence, and those floor plans are not part of the record in this proceeding. One committee member, Donna Sovern, admitted that all of the square footage proposed by Southeastern was initially on the second floor. When the site visit was made and the committee discussed the space, Southeastern offered 100 square feet of storage on the first floor. (Transcript, pp 200-201) Because of this, Southeastern was awarded the full 10 points for Item No. 5, requiring 100 square feet of street-level secured storage. Allowing Southeastern to change its bid thus provided an advantage of 10 additional points. Assuming that the change was appropriate, Southeastern should not have also received the full 25 points for Item No. 3, provision of aggregate square footage on a single floor, since the remainder of its space is on the second floor. The award of points in these two items by the committee is inconsistent and erroneous. Page 4 of 10 of the RFP describes the space to be included in the 13,640 square feet to be leased. The description includes storage areas. (Joint Exhibit #1) The bidders were on notice that "aggregate" square footage includes storage space. The total number of points awarded to Southeastern must be reduced by either 10 (the after-the-fact storage space on the first floor) or 9 (the difference between the full 25 points and 16, the points awarded to Clayton for space on two floors). This results in a total of either 76 or 77 points for Southeastern. In either case, Hintz becomes the highest scorer, and Clayton and Southeastern are tied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its Final Order awarding lease no. 550:0209 to Lyell Hintz. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 12th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 7. - 5. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in summary in paragraph 18. Rejected as immaterial. and 11. Adopted in part in paragraph 5, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Southeastern's name is typewritten. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 31, otherwise rejected as immaterial. and 15. Adopted in part in paragraph 33, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in paragraph 19. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraphs 20 and 27, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 21, 26 and 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 37. Adopted in part in paragraph 29, otherwise rejected as irrelevant as points were not awarded or subtracted for the additional factors. Rejected as irrelevant. Lyell Hintz' Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraphs 13, 15, 16 and 21. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 31 and 32. - 11. Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the weight of evidence. The letter attached to the bid was sufficient authority. 12. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 13. and 14. 15. Adopted Adopted in in paragraph 25. paragraphs 3 and 25. 16. Adopted in paragraph 38. 17. - 21. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 22. 22. Rejected as argument rather than finding of fact. 23. Rejected as immaterial and unsupported by the evidence. 24. Adopted in paragraph 3. 25. - 34. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 23, 14 and 16. 35. and 36. Adopted in paragraph 38. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 24. - 50. Rejected as immaterial. According to the evidence these factors did not change the committee's evaluation. 51. - 53. Rejected as immaterial and, as to the DGS requirement, unsupported by the record. Respondent and Southeastern's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 17. Adopted in paragraphs 18 and 19. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in part in paragraph 3, otherwise unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 25. Adopted in paragraph 19. Adopted in paragraph 27. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 28. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as contrary to the evidence, specifically the RFP which unambiguously included all storage and office space in the "aggregate." - 19. Rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the record. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in part in paragraph 34, but the letter requesting its lease be terminated is sufficient release. Adopted in part in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Marvin L. Beaman, Jr., Esquire 605 North Wymore Road Winter Park, FL 32789 Wings L. Benton, Esquire P. O. Box 5676 Tallahassee, FL 32314-5676 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire 423 Country Club Drive Winter Park, FL 32789 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. #58 Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Dept. of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue There are three legal issues which remain for determination: (1) Whether Florida Petroleum has standing in this case; (2) Whether proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b), requiring constructive notice to residents or business tenants of real property into which the temporary point of compliance is allowed to extend is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes; and (3) Whether proposed rule 62-770.220(4), requiring additional constructive notice of the status of site rehabilitation is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes.i
Findings Of Fact On December 23, 2004, the Department published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding amendments to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770. In particular, proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) and (4), provides: Subsequent Notice of Contamination Beyond Source Property Boundaries for Establishment of a Temporary Point of Compliance (TPOC) - Prior to the Department authorizing a temporary extension of the point of compliance beyond the boundary of the source property (i.e., the location from which the contamination originates) in conjunction with Natural Attenuation Monitoring pursuant to Rule 62-770.690, F.A.C., or Active Remediation pursuant to Rule 62-770.700, F.A.C., the PRSP shall provide the following notices: * * * (b) Constructive notice to residents [if different from the real property owner(s) notified pursuant to paragraph 62- 770.220(3)(a), F.A.C.] and business tenants of any real property into which the point of compliance is allowed to extend. Such constructive notice, which shall include the same information as required in the actual notice, shall be provided by complying with the following: * * * Status Update 5-Year Notice - When utilizing a TPOC beyond the boundary of the source property to facilitate natural attenuation monitoring or active remediation, an additional notice concerning the status of the site rehabilitation shall be similarly provided every five years to [the classes of] those persons who received notice pursuant to subsection 62-770.220(3), F.A.C., unless in the intervening time, such persons have been informed that the contamination no longer affects the property into which the point of compliance was allowed to extend. * * * (The language in brackets was added pursuant to the Department's Notice of Change and "those" was deleted.) The proposed rule implements Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes. The specific authority for the proposed rule is Sections 376.303 and 376.3071, Florida Statutes. On February 2, 2005, the Environmental Regulation Commission held a public hearing on the proposed rules and approved the proposed rules with certain amendments. On February 14, 2005, Florida Petroleum filed a Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Proposed Rule (Petition) challenging the validity of proposed amendments to proposed rule 62-770.220(3)(b) and (4). The Petition was filed pursuant to Section 120.56(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, and in each instance, Florida Petroleum alleges that the proposed rule violates Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes. On March 4, 2005, the Department published a Notice of Change regarding the above-referenced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. With respect to the pending proceeding, the Notice of Change reflects revisions to language of proposed rule 62- 770.220(4), which are not subject to challenge. See Finding of Fact 1. On May 16, 2005, without objection, official recognition was taken of the Department's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Change. Florida Petroleum is a Florida voluntary, non-profit trade association, which comprise, in part, approximately 194 Marketer Members who own and/or operate petroleum storage system facilities in Florida. Florida Petroleum’s purposes include providing representation on behalf of its members in legislative and regulatory matters before the Florida legislature and agencies. Florida Petroleum routinely represents its members in rule development proceeding and other regulatory matters before the Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Revenue, and Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Florida Petroleum’s By-Laws state that its purposes include advancing the business concerns of its members, pooling the energy and resources of its members, and communicating with elected officials at the national, state, and local levels of government. Towards those ends, Florida Petroleum has represented it members before the Florida Legislature in matters relating to the regulation of petroleum facilities under Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and has appeared before the Department in rulemaking proceedings involving the regulation of petroleum cleanups, and the various state restoration funding assistance programs. The subject matter of the rule at issue is within the general scope of interest and activity of Florida Petroleum, in particular, its marketer members, who own or operate facilities that store petroleum products for consumption, use, or sale. Florida Petroleum submitted oral and written comments, recommendations, objections, and proposed amendments to the Department and the Environmental Regulation Commission in connection with the rules at issue in this case. A substantial number of Florida Petroleum marketer members are "persons responsible" for assessment and remediation of one or more petroleum-contaminated sites. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-770, governs the remediation of petroleum-contaminated sites. A substantial number of Florida Petroleum’s marketer members are "persons responsible" for assessment and remediation of sites identified by the Department as "confirmed" or "suspected" sources of contamination beyond the boundary of the facility (i.e., "off-site contamination"). In certain instances, the Department's rules allow for the use of No Further Action with Conditions procedures in cases of petroleum contamination where applicable regulatory requirements are met because the use of conditions, such as institutional and engineering controls, may be more cost- effective than active remediation. As of February 2005, the Department estimated that it had reports of approximately 23,000 petroleum-contaminated sites. In 2004, the Department received an estimated 539 Discharge Report Forms in connection with petroleum storage facilities. As of March 2005, the Department had information indicating that approximately 2,000 "off-site" properties have been affected by contamination. Assessment Reports filed with the Department indicate that a substantial number of these sites may have been affected by discharges of petroleum or petroleum products. Petroleum discharges will in all likelihood continue to occur in the future at petroleum facilities. Petroleum discharges will in all likelihood continue to affect off-site properties in the future.
Findings Of Fact On August 6, 1981, an inspector employed by the Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services took gasoline samples from "super lead free" and "lead free" pumps Identified as "Ben 2096" and "Ben 1693", respectively, at Barnett's Texaco Station, in Fort Meade, Florida. The samples were tested for suspicious substances and it was found that the "super lead free" had an octane level of 87.8. The sample from the "lead free" pump contained an octane level of 91.5. Based upon this information, the chemist noted that the "super lead free" and "lead free" gasolines were probably placed in the wrong pumps at the station. The "super lead free" sample was legal as "lead free" and the "lead free" sample had an octane which would qualify it as "super lead free." As a result of the test results, a stop-sale notice was issued by the Department against the "super lead free" pump. Since approximately 350 gallons of "lead free" regular was sold as "super unleaded", an assessment was made by the Department equal to retail value of the product sold to retail customers. Upon investigation, it was determined that the "super lead free" and "lead free" gasolines were not placed in the wrong pumps but rather an employee of Barnett's Texaco inadvertently placed the wrong panel indicator on the two adjacent pumps during a price change. The problem was quickly resolved and special precautionary procedures have been instituted to prevent this error from happening in the future. These procedures include a double check by different personnel each time a price change requires removal of panels. Additionally, Smith Brothers Oil Co., Inc., will double check the dealer to insure this procedure is followed. The facts set forth above are not in dispute. The only dispute between the parties 15 whether under the facts of this case the Respondent Smith Brothers Oil Co. Inc. will entitled to a return of all or part of its $490.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order returning $245 to the Respondent. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1982 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Chastain, Esquire Doyle Conner, Commissioner General Counsel Department of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and Consumer Services The Capitol Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wallace W. Storey, Esquire 160 South Broadway Bartow, Florida 33830
The Issue Whether or not the agency may, pursuant to Section 525.06 F.S., assess $390.04 for sale of substandard product due to a violation of the petroleum inspection laws and also set off that amount against Petitioner's bond.
Findings Of Fact Coleman Oil Co., Inc. d/b/a Shell Oil Co. at I-75 and SR 26 Gainesville, Florida, is in the business of selling kerosene, among other petroleum products. On November 15, 1990, Randy Herring, an inspector employed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and who works under the direction of John Whitton, Chief of its Bureau of Petroleum, visited the seller to conduct an inspection of the petroleum products being offered for sale to the public. Mr. Herring drew a sample of "1-K" kerosene being offered for sale, sealed it, and forwarded it to the agency laboratory in Tallahassee where Nancy Fisher, an agency chemist, tested it to determine whether it met agency standards. The testing revealed that the sampled kerosene contained .22% by weight of sulfur. This is in excess of the percentage by weight permitted by Rule 5F- 2.001(2) F.A.C. for this product. A "Stop Sale Notice" was issued, and on the date of that notice (November 20, 1990) the inspector's comparison of the seller's delivery sheets and the kerosene physically remaining in his tanks resulted in the determination that 196 gallons of kerosene had been sold to the public. Based on a posted price of $1.99 per gallon, the retail value of the product sold was determined, and the agency accordingly assessed a $390.04 penalty. The agency also permitted the seller to post a bond for the $390.04 on November 21, 1990. The assessment is reasonable and conforms to the amount of assessments imposed in similar cases.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the $390.04 assessment and offsetting the bond against it. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED TO: CLINTON H. COULTER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 510 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800 MR. RANDAL W. COLEMAN COLEMAN OIL COMPANY POST OFFICE BOX 248 GAINESVILLE, FL 32602 HONORABLE BOB CRAWFORD COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE THE CAPITOL, PL-10 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0810 RICHARD TRITSCHLER, GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 515 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Notice of Violation (NOV) and Orders for Corrective Action (OCA) filed by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) against Respondents, Thomas Kerper (Kerper) and All Salvaged Auto Parts, Inc. (ASAP) , in DEP OGC File No. 02-0447 should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact 1. The real property located at 3141 Sharpe Road, Apopka, Florida, is owned by the heirs of Donald Joynt, who owned it for the 30 years prior to his death in 2002. The property consists of approximately 40 acres in the shape of a right triangle with the west side bordered by Sharpe Road, the south side by a potting soil business, and the northeast side (the hypotenuse of the right triangle) bordered by a railroad track. Prior to his death, Joynt used the property primarily for the purpose of operating a junkyard and recycling business ultimately entitled Don's Auto Recycling. 2. At some time before 2000, Joynt became desirous of selling his property. He offered it to a neighbor named José Luis Benitez for $600,000. Benitez counter-offered for between $350,000 and $400,000 because he thought it would cost $200,000 to $250,000 to clean the property up. Joynt rejected the counter-offer, and asked Benitez to help him find a buyer who would pay more than Benitez. At some point, Joynt listed the property with a real estate broker for $600,000. 3. In 1999, Kerper was operating an automobile parts salvage business at a location near Joynt's property. Kerper needed a new location to move his business and inventory. A real estate broker showed him Joynt's property. The broker told Kerper that the seller's broker said the property was clean and had no environmental problems. The broker also told Kerper that Orange County had recently purchased an easement for $300,000 to run a drainage ditch through the property to a local lake, which was true. While this gave Kerper some level of assurance, the broker advised Kerper to have an environmental assessment done before going forward with the sale. 4. After being shown the property by the broker, Kerper spoke with Joynt directly. It was agreed that they could save the real estate commission and split the savings by waiting until the listing expired. Joynt personally assured Kerper that there were no environmental issues, as evidenced by Orange County's purchase of the easement for a drainage ditch. In late March of 2000, after expiration of the real estate commission, Kerper and Joynt entered into an informal agreement allegedly written on a scrap of paper, which was not placed in evidence. Kerper testified that the agreement was for him to buy the property for $500,000, with $100,000 down, and the balance payable over time at seven percent interest. He also testified that the required $100,000 down payment would be payable in installments, with $25,000 payable whenever Joynt cleaned 25 percent of the site to make it usable by Kerper for his business operations. 5. When it came time for Kerper to move onto Joynt's property, Kerper discovered that Joynt had not done any clean-up or removed any of his property from the site. Used cars, car parts, and tires that belonged to Joynt remained throughout the site. According to Kerper, it was agreed that Kerper would help Joynt clean off the western half of the property, which was split approximately in half by a stream, while Joynt worked on cleaning off the eastern half of the property.” 6. Starting from the gate at Sharpe Road, Kerper began removing junk from the western side to the eastern side of the site for Joynt to remove from the property. Pieces of equipment and used car parts that had been left there by Joynt were removed from this section of the property. When enough space was cleared off, Kerper began setting up his auto salvage operations on the western side. He used a bulldozer to level the driveways and spread powdered concrete where the ground was soft. He also used the bulldozer to level an area near the scale house, which was on the western side of the property, but continued to be used by Joynt for Don's Auto Recycling business. In doing this work, his workers encountered steel reinforcement bars, which Kerper had them cut with a torch. Some tires and battery casings also were visible in the ground. Kerper had several truckloads of fill dumped in the area and installed a concrete pad for storing and dismantling automobiles. 7. In September or October of 2000, Kerper was evicted from his prior business location, and he had to move to Joynt's property regardless of its condition. As he increased business operations on the cleared spaces, Kerper continued to clear more space on the western side of the property. Another concrete pad was installed farther to the north. Eventually, Kerper was operating ASAP on approximately ten acres on the western side of the 40-acre site. 8. As Kerper continued to move north, his heavy equipment began encountering assorted kinds of buried material. When a buried propane tank exploded, Kerper stopped working his heavy equipment in the area and confronted Joynt. Joynt denied any knowledge of buried tanks and stated they must have been placed there by someone else. Joynt told Kerper he would let Kerper move his operations to the east side of the property when Joynt finished cleaning it up, and then Joynt would finish clearing the western side for Kerper. Kerper agreed, and continued making payments on the required down payment. According to Kerper, he eventually paid $90,000 of the down payment. 9. By August of 2001, Kerper began to have serious misgivings about Joynt's promises and the condition of the site, and he decided to seek advice. Kerper hired David Beerbower, vice-president of Universal Engineering, to perform an assessment of the northern portion of his side of the site (in the vicinity where the exploding tanks were encountered). During his assessment on August 20, 2001, Beerbower observed various automotive parts including numerous crushed fuel tanks, antifreeze containers, and motor oil containers being excavated from the upper three feet of soil. It was determined by Beerbower, and stated in his written report to Kerper, dated September 21, 2001, that these parts appeared to have been buried there several years ago. This determination, which DEP does not dispute, was based on the high level of compaction of the soil found around these items that could be attributed to either the passing of a significant amount of time or a bulldozer passing over the items. Since the excavations Beerbower observed were in a separate location from where Kerper had already bulldozed, the soil compaction around these items could not be attributed to Kerper's bulldozing. It was stated in Beerbower's letter that the “amount of buried automotive debris qualifies this area essentially as an illicit landfill." ad 10. Mark Naughton from the Risk Management Division of the Orange County Environmental Protection Division (OCEPD), which runs the petroleum storage tank and cleanup program for Orange County under contract with DEP, was also present during the time Beerbower conducted his assessment. Naughton agreed with Beerbower's assessment that Kerper is not liable for the assessment or remediation of this area. Naughton also advised Kerper to move ASAP off Naughton's property and to seek legal advice from attorney Anna Long, who used to be the Manager of OCEPD. 11. Meanwhile, according to Kerper, Joynt changed his position and began to maintain that it was Kerper's responsibility to clean up the western side of the property. Given the newly-discovered environmental condition of the property, Kerper did not feel it was in his best interest to purchase the property "as is," and contacted Long to help him negotiate to extricate himself from his arrangement with Joynt. While negotiations proceeded, Kerper began to scale down ASAP's operations in anticipation of relocating. Kerper began fixing up more whole automobiles for resale, and had a car crusher used in connection with ASAP's business begin crushing more cars for removal from the site for recycling. 12. Eventually, Long had Beerbower conduct another assessment of portions of Joynt's property to try to establish responsibility for contamination as between Kerper and Joynt. On 10 February 13, 2001, Beerbower took a surface water sample froma "drain pipe under the north driveway," a soil sample "where the car crusher was," and another soil sample from "the sandblasting area." The evidence was not clear as to the exact location of these samples, particularly the soil samples, as described in Beerbower's written report to Long dated March 11, 2002. But it appears that the "car crusher" refers to the location of Respondents' car crusher operation in the northern part of the site, just across the northern driveway; it appears that the sandblasting area refers to a location used by Joynt on the eastern side of the property, but located just east of the trailers used by Kerper for his offices. These samples were analyzed and found not to contain volatile organic compounds (VOC) or total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons (TRPH) in excess of Florida's cleanup target levels. 13. Kerper continued to operate his junkyard until the beginning of March of 2002. On March 5, 2002, Long filed a citizen's complaint with OCEPD on Kerper's behalf. While acknowledging that Kerper was operating on the site at the same time as Joynt in recent years, the complaint alleged Kerper's discovery that Joynt had been burying waste batteries, tires, and gasoline tanks on the property and covering the burial sites with broken concrete pieces. The complaint alleged that Kerper had been moving his personal property off of the site since August of 2001, when he backed out of his "lease to purchase" agreement 11 with Joynt, and would be "completely off the property by 3/10/02." 414. It is not clear exactly when Kerper and ASAP were completely off the property. The testimony and evidence on the point is inconsistent. Kerper, after some confusion, placed the date at March 9, 2002. His wife said it was March 2, 2002. An attorney representing Kerper and ASAP in an eviction proceeding filed by Joynt and his wife, filed a notice "that as of the evening of March 15, 2002, [ASAP had] vacated the property." In any event, the evidence seemed clear that Kerper and ASAP did not go on Joynt's property on or after March 15, 2002. 15. On March 15, 2002, DEP representatives inspected Joynt's property in response to Long's complaint. Kerper remained outside the front gate of the property and did not participate in the inspection. This inspection covered the entire property including the section that had been occupied by Kerper and ASAP. 16. doynt told the DEP inspectors that Respondents were responsible for a 55-gallon drum found tipped over on its side on the western half of the site and leaking a substance that appeared to be used oil from a hole in the side of the drum. DEP's inspectors righted the drum, which still was partly full of its contents. There also were several other unlabeled 55-gallon drums and 5-gallon containers "of unknown fluids"; a burn pile containing burned oil filters, battery casings, and electrical 12 wiring; other broken battery casings; and an area of dark-stained soil which appeared to be soaked with used oil. Joynt accepted responsibility for other contamination on the site, but told DEP that Kerper and ASAP were responsible for these items. Kerper denied the allegations. 17. As to the leaking oil drum, Kerper first contended that DEP did not prove that the overturned drum contained used oil. But the evidence was clear that DEP's inspectors were ina position to determine that the liquid was oily. Respondents also contended that the drum would have been empty, not still partly full, if Kerper or ASAP had left it on its side at the site when they vacated the property several days earlier. Kerper alleged that Joynt could have put the hole in the drum and turned it over shortly before the arrival of DEP's inspectors. But, as stated, it was not clear when Kerper and ASAP vacated the site, and it was not clear from the evidence that Respondents were not responsible. 18. Similarly, the other unlabeled drums and containers were in a part of the site occupied and used by Respondents. Despite Kerper's denials, it is not clear from the evidence that they belonged to Joynt or that they were placed where DEP found them after Respondents vacated the site. Testimony that Respondents had containers properly labeled "used oil," "antifreeze," and "gasoline" inside one of the trailers on the site did not negate the existence of unlabeled drums and 13 containers on the site. However, there was no proof whatsoever as to what the closed drums and containers held. But some were open, and DEP's inspectors could see that these held an oily substance (possibly hydraulic fluid), mixed with other substances. 19. As to the dark-stained soil, none of it was tested, and Respondents contended that it was just naturally darker in color or possibly wet from water or some other liquid, DEP's witness conceded could explain the color variation. (Natural reasons such as different soil or rainwater probably do not explain the color variations in the site.) Joynt told DEP's inspectors that the discoloration seen by them on March 15, 2002, was froma hydraulic hose on a piece of heavy equipment that burst earlier. The evidence was not clear who Joynt was saying owned and operated the equipment. But Respondents also blamed Joynt's employees for repeatedly blowing hoses on aged heavy equipment all over the site. It is found that the dark-stained soil probably was the result of one or more releases of hydraulic fluid or motor oil. However, the testimony and evidence was not clear that all of the releases were Joynt's doing and that Respondents bear no responsibility at all for the releases observed on March 15, 2002, in the areas where Respondents were operating. 20. Respondents were able only to produce documentation of proper disposal of 232 gallons of oily water through IPC/Magnum, 14 dated February 13, 2002, and 29 batteries through Battery World, dated March 8 and 14, 2002. 21. The testimony of Kerper and others was that Respondents generally removed gasoline from automobiles and placed it ina marked container for reuse within a day or two by Respondents and their employees. The testimony was that used oil and antifreeze generally also were removed from automobiles and placed in marked containers until proper disposition. The testimony was that batteries were removed from automobiles and that most were given to one of the employees to sell for a dollar apiece. There was no documentation to support this testimony. 22. There was testimony that, when Respondents had cars crushed, E & H Car Crushing Co., Inc., managed the collection and proper disposition of gasoline, used oil, and batteries. But the documentation placed in evidence contained no description of the wastes removed, but only provided a weight calculation of the materials removed from Respondents’ facility. 23. There was testimony that Gabriel Lynch, who was properly licensed, removed freon from automobiles at Respondents’ facility every two to three days, or upon request. Respondents would trade the freon Lynch recovered and used in his business, Gabe's Auto Tech, for repair work on Respondents' vehicles. However, no documentation of these transactions was produced. (Lynch testified that he did not know it was required that he provide documentation to Respondents.) 15 24. Runoff from where Respondents were operating on Joynt's property entered the stream running north-south through the center of the property. Neither Joynt nor Respondents had a stormwater permit or an exemption from stormwater permitting. 25. Kerper argued that his duties were limited to managerial responsibilities for ASAP, and that he was not at any time responsible for ASAP's day-to-day operations and did not conduct any activities that may or could have resulted in hazardous waste or petroleum discharge violations so as to be liable as an "operator." But the evidence was clear that Kerper was involved in ASAP's day-to-day operations. 26. While the evidence did not totally absolve Respondents from the allegations in the NOV, several people testified on Respondents' behalf as to their practice of properly disposing of hazardous materials generated by his business. For example, Rafael Rivera, a former employee, testified that Kerper would get mad at him if any gas or oil was spilled and left on the ground or was not disposed of properly. Meanwhile, it appeared that environmental problems at Joynt's site existed for years before the arrival of Respondents. Mrs. Sandra Lovejoy, a neighboring property owner for the past 30 years, testified that she had experienced problems with her water quality, such as a foul smell or funny taste, for many years before Respondents moved onto Joynt's property. An inspection was conducted by OCEPD in September of 2000, in response to Lovejoy's complaint regarding 16 fuel odor and a drinking well which was no longer in service. In part, OCEPD's written report on the complaint found "[m]any spots of surficial petroleum contamination . . . from gasoline, motor oil and other petroleum products leaking or spilled from the junk vehicles" at Don's Auto Recycling and included a recommendation "referring this site to the FDEP task force that has been put together to inspect and deal with junk yard facilities," although "[n]o Petroleum Cleanup issues were found at [that] time." For reasons not explained by the evidence, it does not appear that Don's Recycling was referred to any task force, or that OCEPD followed up on the reported contamination. 27. Respondents contend that this entire proceeding against them was part of a vendetta against Kerper for going to the local television station to expose the condition of the site, the failure of OCEPD and DEP to follow up on the September 2000, report and recommendation, and Orange County's purchase of a north-south drainage easement through the western portion of the property in 2000. The evidence did not prove this contention. However, it is clear that Joynt was responsible for the condition of most of the 40-acre site, not Respondents, and that Joynt shared responsibility with Respondents for the conditions alleged in the NOV. 28. While this case has been pending, Joynt's heirs have cooperated with DEP in cleaning up the site, and DEP acknowledged in its PRO that several items in the OCA--specifically, those 17 relating to Counts II, III, and VII of the NOV--are moot and unnecessary in light of Respondents' eviction from the property and subsequent cleanup operations by Joynt's heirs. It also is suggested that the corrective actions requested in DEP's PRO to address Counts IV, V, and VI of the NOV--relating to failure to document proper disposal of wastes--are unnecessary. It seems clear that, to the extent such disposals occurred, any available documentation would have been placed in evidence during the final hearing. Ordering that they be produced within 30 days of the Final Order, as suggested in DEP's PRO, would be a futile act. 29. Count VIII of the NOV alleged costs "of not less than $500. In its PRO, DEP requested recovery of $1,367.31 of costs. Some of these costs--$867.31--were itemized in the PRO. The balance appears to relate to the $500 alleged in the NOV. There was no evidence introduced at the final hearing as to any of these alleged costs, and the costs itemized in the PRO seem to represent travel costs of counsel for DEP.
Conclusions David J. Tarbert, Esquire Jason Sherman, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Albert E. Ford II, Esquire Webb, Wells & Williams, P.A. 994 Lake Destiny Road Suite 102 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order providing: 1. Under Count I of the NOV, Respondents shall be jointly and severally liable, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, for cleaning up the releases of used oil evidenced by the discolored soils photographed by DEP's inspectors on 24 March 15, 2002 (DEP Exhibit 20, photographs 5 and 7 on page 2 of the exhibit). As such, they shall be responsible, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, for implementation of DEP's Initial Site Screening Plan to assess and remove all contaminated soils resulting from those releases. If the results of the Initial Site Screening indicate that further assessment and/or remediation of the contamination is required, Respondents shall also participate, along with Donald Joynt and Don's Auto Recycling, in completing the required work, consistent with the "Corrective Actions for Contaminated Site Cases" (DEP Exhibit 16). 2. Counts II through VIII of the NOV are dismissed. 3. Respondents' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Vane ya J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2003. 25
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, ADI and Youngquist Brothers were licensed well drilling contractors and qualified to bid on Bid Request No. 9237 issued by Southwest Florida Water Management District ("SWFWMD" or "District"), Respondent. On July 23, 1992 the District mailed packets for bid requests to ADI, Youngquist Brothers, Inc., and others. On August 12, 1992 a mandatory pre-bid meeting for Bid Request No. 9237 was conducted at the District office. Representatives of ADI and Youngquist attended the pre-bid meeting. Responses to Bid Request No. 9237 were opened by the District on August 26, 1992. ADI's bid was for $159.50 per hour, and Youngquist's bid was for $200.00 per hour. Greg McQuown, District Manager of the Geohydrologic Data Section prepared the technical portions of this bid request and, following the bid opening, visited the facilities of both ADI and Youngquist as provided in Section 2.1.1.19 of the bid specifications to observe the equipment they proposed to use. Request for Bid No. 9237 requested bidders to submit an hourly rate for furnishing an experienced crew, the drilling rig and all equipment, materials, fuel and services necessary for the proper operation and maintenance of the drilling rig to be used in drilling numerous monitoring wells as directed by the District. Although the bid is for one year, it is renewable for two additional years. Drilling contracts on an hourly basis are not frequently used in water well drilling contracts, but for this project, this type contract appeared preferable to the District due to the wide variations in well depths and drilling conditions. Speed of drilling is a very significant element in an hourly rate drilling contract. Section 1.17 of the general conditions of Request for Bid No. 9237 provides in pertinent part: If bids are based on equivalent products, indicate on the bid form the manufacturer name and number. * * * The bidder shall explain in detail the reason(s) hoe (sic) the proposed equivalent will meet the specifications and not be considered an exception thereto. Bids which do not comply with these requirements are subject to rejection. Bids lacking any written indication of intent to quote an alternate brand will be received and considered in complete compliance with the specifications as listed on the bid form. Section 1.11 of the general specifications provides: 1.11 BID DATA. Bidders shall furnish complete and detailed Bid Data as specified on the Request for Bid Form. Bids furnished without data, or incomplete submissions may be rejected at the discretion of the District. Exceptions to the requirements, if any, shall be noted in complete detail. Failure by the bidder to detail each exception to a bid specification or a requirement results in the bidder being required to meet each specification or requirement exactly as stated. Section 2.2.2.3 under Contractor Equipment and Services (exhibit 2) lists the following equipment: API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe, no hard banding, square shoulders acceptable, 1,400 feet. API 4 3/4 inch steel drill collars 10,000 lbs. (approximately 200 feet). API 7 to 7 1/2 inch steel drill collars, 13, 500 lbs. (approximately 100 feet) are acceptable equivalent. Rig equipped with hydraulic torque equipment for drill collars and drill pipe. The drilling contemplated by this Bid Request is reverse air drilling in which an air hose is inserted inside the drill pipe and air from this hose facilitates a removal of the material through which the drill bit penetrates. ADI's Bid Proposal (exhibit 4) under Equipment List provides in pertinent part: Drill stem 4 1/2" flush joint 2 1/8 ID Collars 2 @ 3 1/2" X 20' 1 @ 6" X 20' -2 @ 7 3/4" X 30' * * * Above listed tools available, we will make available any other specified tools. The inside diameter (ID) of API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe is 2 11/16 inches. This size pipe will allow use of a 3/4 inch air hose and still provide adequate area for the drilled material to be excavated from the hole being drilled. Further, this Bid Request proposed the use of 6 inch PVC casing to be provided by the District. Thus, the drill pipe and drilling equipment needed to pass through this size casing. The function of the drill collar is to provide weight on the drill bit to insure a straight hole as well as increase the speed of drilling. All else being equal (especially speed of rotation of drill bit) the greater the weight the faster the drilling. Standard API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe has an outside diameter of 4 3/4 inches and is the largest standard drill pipe that can be used in the 6 inch casing here proposed. Not only does the 4 1/2 inch drill pipe proposed for use by ADI have a smaller ID than API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe specified, but also this is not a constant ID but constricts to this 2 1/8 inch ID where pipe sections are connected. This constriction can increase the turbulence in the pipe and slow the removal of the drilled material. The cross section area of a 2 1/8 inch ID pipe is 5/8 the area of a 2 11/16 inch ID pipe. Accordingly, drilling with the API 3 1/2 inch pipe can be much faster than with a drill pipe with a 2 1/8 inch ID due solely to the greater volume flowing through the 3 1/2 inch pipe. The 4 1/2 inch drill collars listed in ADI's bid proposal weighed in at 1100 pounds in lieu of the 4 3/4 drill collars and 10,000 pounds specified in Request for Bid. ADI contends that by adding the words "above listed tools available, we will make available any other specified tools" they clearly intended to provide all equipment demanded by the District. This is the type language which leads to contract disputes. All of Petitioner's witnesses testified that they intended to commence the work, if awarded the contract, with the equipment listed on their bid proposal. On an hourly drilling contract this equipment is inadequate. All of these witnesses also testified they would use the equipment listed in the Request for Bid specifications if required to do so by the District. Neither Dave Robinson, Petitioner's superintendent who prepared its bid and attended the pre-bid conference, nor Jerry C. Howell, President of Petitioner who modified and approved the bids submitted, had ever used API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe and were not familiar with the dimensions of that item. Yet they did not check to ascertain how the inside diameter of that drill pipe compared with the inside diameter of the 4 1/2 drill stem flush joint they had on hand. Petitioner further contended that the cost of the API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe was insignificant in determining the bid price submitted, and therefore, this discrepancy was immaterial and should not lead to rejection of the bid. Petitioner's bid failed to comply with General Conditions 1.17 in that it failed to explain in detail the reasons the 4 1/2 inch drill stem proposed for use meets the specifications which required a drill pipe with a substantially larger minimum interior cross section area. Petitioner's challenge to Youngquist's bid proposal as being non- responsive for not listing the API 3 1/2 inch pipe is without merit. Youngquist's bid complied with the provision of Section 1.11 of the General Specifications and McQuown's visit to Youngquist's facility confirmed that Youngquist had on hand all of the equipment specified in the Request for Bid Proposal. Petitioner was represented at the compulsory pre-bid conference by David Robinson, ADI's superintendent, who prepared ADI's bid package. Robinson testified that at the pre-bid conference he asked Mr. McQuown what was the inside diameter of the API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe and McQuown responded 1 7/8 inches. Several other witnesses, including McQuown, testified that no questions were asked at the pre-bid conference about the API 3 1/2 inch pipe and all of these witnesses were fully aware that the pipe has an ID greater than 2 1/2 inches. McQuown's testimony that Robinson asked only about the inside diameter of the 4 3/4 inch drill collar shown in the bid specifications and he responded 1 7/8 inches to that question is deemed the more credible evidence. Robinson testified that he thought McQuown has misspoke when he said 1 7/8 inches but did not check available catalogues to determine the actual ID of this pipe to shed some light on the adequacy of the 4 1/2 inch drill pipe proposed in ADI's bid. The more credible testimony is that Robinson was not misinformed about the ID API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe at the pre-bid conference.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the formal bid protest filed by American Drilling, Inc. to challenge the award of Bid Request 9237 be dismissed and that the contract be awarded to Youngquist Brothers, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-6618BID Proposed findings listed by Petitioner are accepted except as noted below. Those neither noted below nor included in the Hearing Officer's findings were deemed unnecessary to the conclusions reached. 16. Rejected. Although there can be a slight variation in the internal diameter of API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe, there is no API 3 1/2 inch drill pipe with an inside diameter less than 2 1/2 inches. 18. Rejected as contrary to the credible evidence. Rejected. ADI fully intended to use the drill pipe and collars listed on its bid unless or until the District mandated a change to the equipment or tools specified. Both of Petitioner's principle witnesses believed the 4 1/2 inch drill stem listed could satisfactorily perform the required drilling. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Accepted as a fact that after ADI learned it was low bidder inquiries were made to locate a source for the specified drill pipe and collars. At McQuown's visit to ADI, Jerry C. Howell assured him that ADI wanted to fully cooperate with the District in carrying out the contract when issued. Rejected that ADI's response was clear and complete as required by the specifications. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. Rejected as irrelevant. Diversified was not a party to these proceedings. Rejected. Youngquist's bid complied with the bid specifications. By not responding to those items in the bid specification, Youngquist, pursuant to the General Bid Specifications, agreed to provide exactly the equipment specified by the District in the Request for Bid. 32. These omissions have never been deemed by the District to be grounds for rejecting bids. 33 -34. Rejected as immaterial. 36. Although McQuown testified that he did not pay a lot of attention to the general (boiler plate) conditions in the bid proposal, he recognized that the failure of a bidder to list equipment different than that contained in the bid proposal meant that the bidder intended to supply the equipment specified. See 36 above. Rejected as irrelevant. Last sentence rejected as immaterial. First sentence rejected. Rejected. First sentence rejected. 46 - 49. Rejected as immaterial. 51. Rejected insofar as Youngquist's bid is concerned. 53. Last sentence rejected. Rejected as improper and inaccurate interpretation of the contract provisions. Moreover, this is a question of law, not of fact. The bid specifications speak for themselves. Interpretation of these specifications is a legal not a factual matter. Last sentence rejected. Last sentence rejected. Rejected as fact, accepted as a conclusion of law. See 36 above. 63 Generally accepted. However, it is found that all parties recognize that it was not necessary for bidders to have on hand all equipment requested in the bid specification, and that ADI representatives indicated that they would like to start work with the equipment on hand and would do so unless otherwise directed. Proposed joint findings submitted by Respondent and Intervenor are accepted. Those not included in the Hearing Officer's findings were deemed unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas Manson, Esquire Mary Catherine Lamoureaux, Esquire Post Office Box 499 Tampa, Florida 33601-0499 Richard Tschantz, Esquire A. Wayne Alfieri, Esquire 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899 Mark R. Komray, Esquire Thomas Smoot, Esquire Suite 600 12800 University Drive Fort Myers, Florida 33906-6259 Peter G. Hubbell, Executive Director Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899
Findings Of Fact On September 29, 1975 Respondent, R. J. Hunt Construction Company, through its President and qualifying general contractor, Richard J. Hunt, entered into a contract with Richard McCarty to construct two Second Story Additions to Palm Ocean Villas, Pompano Beach, Florida for a price of $53,700. The contract provided that the contractor would complete the building within 8 weeks of the issuance of a building permit and, if not completed, a 5 percent penalty would be deducted until December 10, 1975 and thereafter, if not complete, an additional 5 percent of the contract price would be deducted each week until complete. Building permits were issued on October 3 and 6, 1975 and work proceeded satisfactorily until the end of the 8 weeks contract period on December 1, 1975 when the project was 90 percent to 95 percent complete. At this time the contractor stopped work on the project and transferred his employees to another job. One of the contract provisions not completed was the application of waterproofing on a deck. Despite Hunt's assurances that he would get a subcontractor to complete this waterproofing, it still had not been completed by Christmas and McCarty employed a contractor to apply the waterproofing material in early January for which he paid $1,000 allowed by the contract. Subsequent thereto McCarty received notice of liens filed against his property from 4 subcontractors. These were American Metal Products Company, J. P. Electric Company, Ole Eds Construction, and Margate Plumbing. In order to get a certificate of occupancy it was necessary for McCarty to pay some of these subcontractors. American Metal Products installed an aluminum railing around the balcony for which they filed a notice of lien for $1,200 and subsequently filed a petition in bankruptcy. The present status of this lien was not ascertained. J. P. Electric Company had split their draw into three parts and they were paid by Hunt $700 for the initial work. When they refused to allow final inspection Hunt asked McCarty to pay them and take it off his last draw. McCarty paid $2,000 to J. P. Electric, leaving a balance owed of $781.92. Hunt also asked McCarty to pay Margate Plumbing and take this payment off the draw. Margate had been paid $1,000 upon completion of the rough work. In order to get occupancy McCarty paid Margate $1,800 which satisfied the lien of Margate. Ole Ed installed the septic tank and drain field for which they have filed a lien for $2,500 which is unpaid to date. Numerous miscellaneous items included in the contract for which McCarty advanced funds to keep work progressing amounted to $671.54. Hunt also requested McCarty to order the appliances which were included in the contract price since he (McCarty) could get them at contractor's price. For these appliances (stoves, air conditioners and refrigerators) McCarty expended $2,373.28. Total expenditures made by McCarty are as follows: McCarty paid to Hunt in draws $48,400.00 McCarty paid to J. P. Electric 2,000.00 McCarty paid to Margate Plumbing 1,800.00 McCarty paid for waterproofing deck 1,000.00 Misc. items paid for by McCarty 671.54 Appliances for which McCarty paid 2,373.28 Total paid by McCarty under contract $56,244.82 Balance owed to subcontractors. American Metals Corporation $ 1,200.00 J. P. Electric 781.92 Ole Ed's Construction 2,500.00 Total cost of project $61,736.74 At the time licensee stopped work on the project the railing around the balcony had not been installed, top decking had not been approved by building inspectors and waterproofing of deck had not been done. Extra costs not included in the contract price which were agreed to by McCarty included $300 to $500 extra for larger electric wire and $400 to $500 for larger septic tank than contract called for. These costs totaled approximately $800 which would bring the total contract price to $54,500. The working foreman on the job for the first three or four weeks of the contract, who testified on behalf of Respondent, was unfamiliar with all terms of the contract or with the finances of Hunt. When the existing roof was removed for the second floor addition to be added, conduits had to be replaced and some 2 x 12 joists had to be replaced. This work unexpectedly increased the cost of the contract to the contractor. The septic tank could not be placed where originally intended, and as a result, about 100 fee of sidewalk had to be torn up and replaced. Further, a larger septic tank than originally planned had to be installed. This latter increase was agreed to and paid for by McCarty. One character witness testified that Richard J. Hunt enjoys a good reputation in the construction industry.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's site, Circle K General, Inc., Store #2375, located at U.S. #1 and Pennekamp Park, is eligible for restoration pursuant to the Florida Petroleum Liability and Restoration Program (FPLIRP) set forth in Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Circle K General, Inc., Store #2375 owns and operates a petroleum storage site located at U.S. #1 and John Pennekamp Park, Key Largo, Florida. The DER Facility ID Number for the site is 448624728. Circle K operates at the site three 10,000 gallon fiberglass tanks which contain gasoline. The tanks currently operated at the site were installed in 1987. Four monitoring wells for the site were installed at the same time as the Circle K tanks were installed in 1987. Monthly monitoring well reports were completed each month beginning on December 12, 1987, and ending on July 30, 1989, by Professional Services Industries on behalf of Circle K. Steve Belin is the individual at Circle K responsible for reviewing or supervising the review of the monitoring well reports for Store #2375. The November 26, 1988, monthly monitoring well report indicated the presence of petroleum odor in all four of the monitoring wells at the site. After receipt of the November 26, 1988, monthly monitoring report, neither Steve Belin nor any employee of Circle K filed a Discharge Notification Form with the Department. After receipt of the November 26, 1988, monthly monitoring report, neither Steve Belin nor any employee of Circle K undertook steps to investigate the source or cause of the petroleum odor. The monthly monitoring report dated March 20, 1989, indicates the presence of a petroleum odor in one of the four monitoring wells. After receipt of the March 20, 1989, monitoring well report, neither Steve Belin nor any employee of Circle K filed a Discharge Notification Form with the Department. After receipt of the March 20, 1989, monthly monitoring report, neither Steve Belin nor any employee of Circle K undertook steps to investigate the source or cause of the petroleum odor. The July 30, 1989, monthly monitoring well report indicates the presence of petroleum product in all four monitoring wells. The July 30, 1989, monthly monitoring well report was not received by Steve Belin until September, 1989. On July 31 and August 1, 1989, Combustion Engineering installed a set of four new compliance monitoring wells. Circle K contracted for the installation of new monitoring wells because the four existing monitoring wells were only 15 feet deep and were dry. By letter dated August 17, 1989, Combustion Engineering notified Steve Belin that a petroleum odor was detected in the soils retrieved while drilling one of the new monitoring wells and that a petroleum odor was also detected in one of the old monitoring wells. On August 21, 1989, Steve Belin filed a Discharge Notification Form with the Department for Circle K Store #2375. After the discharge notification was filed on August 21, 1989, none of the tanks were taken out of service. After the filing of the August 21, 1989 Discharge Notification Form, Circle K inspected the inventory records for the site beginning in October, 1988, through September, 1989, and detected no significant loss of petroleum product. On October 6, 1989, an inspection of Circle K Store #2375 was conducted by Leslie Rueth of the South District Office of the Department of Environmental Regulation. At the time of the October 6, 1989, DER inspection, free product was noted in two of the four new monitoring wells, and all of the wells contained a petroleum odor. On October 19, 1989, the South District Office of Department of Environmental Regulation notified Steve Belin of the October 6, 1989, inspection results and requested (1) that a tank and line tightness test be performed to determine if there was a leak in the petroleum storage system and (2), if free product was present, that an initial remedial action (IRA) be implemented as defined in F.A.C. Rule 17-70.006. An Initial Remedial Action consists of the removal of free product through the bailing or pumping of free product off the water table and may include the removal of excessively contaminated soil. On October 30, 1989, Steve Belin submitted tank tightness test results for the three 10,000 gallon tanks located at Circle K Store #2375. All three tanks passed the tank and line tests. By letter of October 17, 1989, Steve Belin requested ATEC Associates, Inc. to have all of the monitoring wells of Store #2375 bailed of free product once a week for one month. The free product present at Store #2375 resulted from old tanks and piping installed by Circle K's predecessor, U Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 17 presence of a layer or odor, or the positive report of a laboratory that the monitoring well sample contains pollutant, shall be treated as a discharge. A properly installed monitoring well should have at least one foot of water in the well in order to be able to take a water sample from the well. If a foot or less of water is present in a monitoring well, a vapor monitoring device should be used to test the wells. From December, 1987, until July, 1989, the Circle K monitoring wells were usually dry. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 17 wells must be constructed such that the bottom of the casing is at least five feet below the water level at the time of drilling but no deeper than 25 feet. The monitoring wells constructed at Circle K Store #2375 did not meet the construction specifications set forth in Chapter 17-61, Florida Administrative Code. Florida Administrative Code Rule 17-61.050(b)(6) requires discharges to be reported to the Department within three working days of discovery. DER was not notified of a discharge subsequent to either the November 26, 1988, or the March 20, 1989, monitoring well reports, nor did Circle K contain the leak.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's application for site restoration pursuant to the Florida Petroleum Liability and Insurance Program (FPLIRP). DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2065 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1989), the following rulings are made on the Respondent's proposed findings of fact (the Petitioner not having filed any): 1.-27. Accepted and incorporated. Cumulative. Accepted; subordinate to facts found. 30.-33. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 34.-38. Accepted and incorporated. 39. Cumulative. 40.-41. Accepted and incorporated. 42. Accepted but subordinate to facts found and unnecessary. 43.-44. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Conclusion of law. Accepted but unnecessary. 47.-48. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 49. Cumulative and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve Belin The Circle K Corporation Regional Environmental Director 500 South Faulkenburg Road Tampa, FL 33619 Janet E. Bowman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
The Issue The issue presented is whether, pursuant to Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes, Petitioner, Asher G. Sullivan, Jr., d/b/a St. Augustine Trust, is eligible for restoration coverage pursuant to the Florida Petroleum Liability Restoration and Insurance Program (FPLRIP), Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Asher G. Sullivan, Jr., owns and is the trustee of the Asher G. Sullivan, Jr. St. Augustine Trust (Trust). The Trust owns a Florida Department of Environmental Protection Facility known as Café Erotica Restaurant, 2620 S.R. 207, Elkton, Florida 32033, FDEP Facility No. 558515938. See Endnote 1. The Trust purchased the property in or around 1995. Neither Mr. Sullivan nor the Trust ever operated a petroleum facility or a gas station on the property. However, the property, when purchased by the Trust, had underground petroleum storage tanks. (The parties stipulated that all of the parties have standing.) Intervenors, Assad O. Knio and Selma Knio, formerly owned the property, and currently hold the mortgage on the property. The Department is charged with the statutory responsibility pursuant to Section 376.3072, to determine whether facilities are eligible to participate in FPLRIP. Insurance and Eligibility A Certificate of Insurance was issued by Commerce & Industry Insurance Company to Asher G. Sullivan, Jr. St. Augustine Trust, certifying "that it has issued liability insurance covering the following underground storage tank(s): CHEVRON-207 2630 SR 207 ELKTON FL 32033 7 Tanks."1 The effective date of the Certificate of Insurance, Policy No. FPL8079861, was September 3, 1997, and the period of coverage was from September 3, 1997, to September 3, 1998. The limits of liability are $1 million for each loss and $1 million for all losses, exclusive of legal defense costs. (Mr. Sullivan believed that a similar certificate of insurance and policy covered the facility's tanks on the property between September 1996 and September 1997 which was renewed thereafter.) The Certificate of Insurance was issued for taking corrective action and compensating third parties for bodily injury and property damage caused by sudden accidental releases and non-sudden accidental releases, in accordance with and subject to the limits of liability exclusions, conditions and other terms of the policy arising from operating the underground storage tank(s) identified above. Subparagraphs 2.d. and e. of the Certificate of Insurance provide: Cancellation or any other termination of the insurance by the 'Insurer', except for non-payment of premium and misrepresentation by the insured, will be effective only upon written notice and only after the expiration of 60 days after a copy of such written notice is received by the insured. Cancellation for non-payment of premium or misrepresentation by the insured will be effective only upon written notice and only after expiration of a minimum of 10 days after a copy of such written notice is received by the insured. The insurance covers claims otherwise covered by the policy that are reported to the 'Insurer' within six months of the effective date of cancellation or non-renewal of the policy except where the new or renewed policy has the same retroactive date or a retroactive date earlier than that of the prior policy, and which arise out of any covered occurrence that commenced after the policy retroactive date if applicable and prior to such policy renewal or termination date. Claims reported under such extended reporting period are subject to the terms, conditions, limits, including limits of liability and exclusions of the policy. The authorized agent of the insurer certified, at the bottom of page two of the Certificate, "that the wording of this instrument is identical to the wording in 40 CFR 280.97(b)(2) and that the 'Insurer' is licensed to transact the business of insurance in one or more states." See 40 C.F.R. Section 280.97(b)(2)2.d. and e. See Finding of Fact 50. Petitioner's Exhibit 1 was issued by Commerce & Industry Insurance Company, and is entitled "Florida Storage Tank Third-Party Liability and Corrective Action Policy (Policy)." It is more than a fair inference that this is the Policy referred to in the Certificate of Insurance. This Policy states that it is a Claims-Made-and-Reported policy for third party liability coverage. It is a Release- Reported Policy for corrective action coverage. This policy is site-specific: only scheduled tanks are covered. This insurance is excess over any restoration (corrective action) funding for storage tanks whose owners qualify for and are eligible for reimbursement from the Florida Inland Protection Trust Fund as part of the Restoration Insurance Program of the Florida Petroleum Liability and Restoration and Insurance Program. The Policy provides conditions for cancellation and non-renewal and, in part, states: "B.1. The NAMED INSURED may cancel this policy by mailing or delivering to the Company advance written notice of cancellation. 2. If this policy has been in effect for more than ninety (90) days the Company may cancel this policy or the coverage afforded by this policy with respect to a particular Storage Tank System only for one or more of the following reasons: a. Nonpayment of premium " (Emphasis in original.) Condition B.3. provides: "If the Company cancels this policy for [nonpayment of premium], the Company will mail or deliver to the Named Insured first listed in the Declarations, written notice of cancellation, accompanied by the reasons for cancellation at least" ten days before the effective date of cancellation. (Emphasis in original.) Conditions B.4.a. and b. of the Policy provide: Non-Renewal: If the Company decides not to renew this policy the Company will mail or deliver to the Named Insured written notice of nonrenewal, accompanied by the reason for nonrenewal, accompanied by the reason for nonrenewal, at least forty-five (45) days prior to the expiration of this policy. Any notice of nonrenewal will be mailed or delivered to the Named Insured's last mailing address known to the Company. If notice is mailed, proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice. (Emphasis in original.) On or about September 12, 1997, the Department issued2 a "Notice of Eligibility" (Notice) to Asher G. Sullivan, Jr. St. Augustine Trust, for a term of eligibility effective September 3, 1997, and an expiration date of September 3, 1998.3 This Notice related to Petroleum Liability and Restoration Insurance Program Coverage. The Notice also stated: The following operator/operator [Asher G. Sullivan Jr. St. Augustine Trust] has demonstrated financial responsibility for third party liability for contamination related to the storage of regulated petroleum products and is therefore eligible for Restoration Coverage under the Petroleum Restoration Insurance Program, Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes, for the facilities listed on the attached sheet(s), contingent upon continued compliance with Chapter 376, F.S., and Chapter 62-761, F.A.C. and/or 62-762, F.A.C. (Consistent with the Certificate of Insurance mentioned above, the facility name is Chevron-207.) FPLRIP provides third-party liability and excess coverage to owners and/or operators who have registered storage tank systems, such as underground storage tanks (USTs). There are several ways to demonstrate financial responsibility, including, but not limited to, obtaining insurance, as here. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-761.400(3). As an owner of USTs, Petitioner was required to demonstrate financial responsibility in the amount of $1 million per occurrence and $1 million on an annual aggregate amount. 40 C.F.R. Section 280.93(a)(1) and (b)(1); Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-761.400(3)(b). Participation in FPLRIP was voluntary to the extent that not every owner or operator of a UST, such as Petitioner, was required to participate in this state program, notwithstanding the state and federal requirements that financial responsibility be demonstrated by virtue of ownership or operation of a UST. See, e.g., Sections 376.301(18) and 376.309; Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-761.400(3); 40 C.F.R. Section 280.93. However, if insurance, such as the insurance policy obtained in this case, was chosen as the financial responsibility mechanism, participation in FPLRIP was required because federal law required first dollar coverage for financial responsibility. 40 C.F.R. Section 280.93(a)(1) and (b)(1). Stated otherwise, here, the Policy had a $150,000 deductible, and FPLRIP provides the first $150,000 worth of coverage, subject to a deductible. Section 376.3072(2)(d)2.d. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-761.400(3)(a)3. ("Financial responsibility requirements for petroleum storage systems containing petroleum products may be supplemented by participation in the [FPLRIP] to the extent provided in Section 376.3072, F.S.") Because Petitioner chose insurance as the financial responsibility mechanism, the Department relied on the Certificate of Insurance to determine the financial responsibility of Petitioner of the Chevron-207 facility. Once this Certificate of Insurance was issued, the Department issued a Notice of Eligibility to the Petitioner, so the facility could be eligible to participate in FPLRIP. See Endnotes 3 and 5. The Department determined that Petitioner demonstrated financial responsibility under FPLRIP for a term of one year, here from September 3, 1997, through September 3, 1998. This meant that, under the Department's interpretation of FPLRIP by Lewis J. Cornman, Environmental Manager for the Department,4 a discharge would be covered under FPLRIP only if it occurred and was discovered during the insurance policy period (here September 3, 1997 through September 3, 1998) set forth in the Notice of Eligibility. See (T: 67-70, 75-77, and 83.) A penalty or deductible amount may be imposed if the discharge is not reported to the Department in a timely fashion, i.e., within 24 hours after discovery of the discharge (suspected release). Section 376.3072(2)(d)2.f.(I). (Thus, the filing of an untimely report would not affect coverage or eligibility under FPLRIP.) (T: 68-69.) Mr. Fagin, an expert witness testifying on behalf of Intervenors, opined that FPLRIP "is a discovery and reporting period program," which means that Petitioner is not eligible under FPLRIP because the date of discovery and report of the discharge was subsequent to the end of the insurance policy period, September 3, 1998, unless the Policy period is extended. Mr. Fagin focused on Section 376.3072(2)(b)4., which states in part: "Upon report of a discharge, the department shall issue an order stating that the site is eligible for restoration coverage unless the insured . . . cannot demonstrate that he or she has obtained and maintained the financial responsibility for third-party claims and excess coverage as required by subparagraph 2."5 Mr. Fagin reads this subsection to require that "upon report of a discharge," a facility owner, such as Petitioner, must maintain financial responsibility (here maintain a policy of insurance) on the date the discharge was discovered, here September 15, 1998, and reported, here September 17, 1998. (T: 106, 108, and 113.) For Mr. Fagin, the crux of the issue is whether Petitioner's insurance policy was effective on September 15, 1998, and September 17, 1998. The answer to this question, for Mr. Fagin, is whether the 10 or 60-day provisions set forth in Subparagraph 2.d. of the Certificate of Insurance, see Finding of Fact 6, apply to extend the Policy past September 3, 1998, and through September 15 and 17, 1998. For Mr. Fagin, it does not matter if the discharge was discovered prior to September 3, 1998, because of his and Mr. Cornman's interpretation of Subsection 376.3072(2)(b)4. See Finding of Fact 39. Mr. Fagin opines that the 10-day provision applies here, extending the Policy expiration date (or the effective date of cancellation or non-renewal) at least until September 21, 1998, 10 days after the September 11, 1998 letter, see Finding of Fact 25. (T: 91-92.) See also Endnote 9. Mr. Fagin believes the Department's (Mr. Cornman) interpretation, see Finding of Fact 15, is reasonable even if, according to Mr. Fagin, it may lead to a potentially absurd result whereby there may be insurance coverage under the terms of the Policy (but no coverage under FPLRIP) when a discharge is reported within the six-month extended reporting period (after the expiration of the Policy) and if the discharge occurred during the term of the Policy, here prior to September 3, 1998. See Findings of Fact 40-44, finding that the discharge occurred at Petitioner's facility prior to September 3, 1998. The Policy is Not Renewed by Petitioner or Terminated by the Insurer By letter dated August 2, 1998, Ben Harrison, Account Manager for FPLIPA,6 wrote Mr. Sullivan a letter addressed to Asher G. Sullivan, Jr. St. Augustine Trust, referencing Policy FPL8079861, the subject of the Notice of Eligibility and Certificate of Insurance, and stated: In May, 1998 we mailed renewal application to be used in renewing reference policy. We requested that application be returned to us by July 3, 1998. To date, we have not received the required paperwork that would allow us to quote this account. Please forward application and affidavit and any tight test information that you have concerning underground tanks. We cannot quote this account without the required paperwork. Policy cannot be renewed if paperwork is not received. Mr. Sullivan received the August 2, 1998, letter prior to September 3, 1998. Mr. Sullivan had the opportunity to renew the Policy before September 3, 1998. (T: 23, 30.) Mr. Sullivan did not respond to the August 2, 1998, letter "[b]ecause [according to Mr. Sullivan] the tanks were due to be pulled out before September the 3rd." (T: 29-30.) Mr. Sullivan thought, in reference to the August 2, 1998, letter, that if he did not "sign and renew the application, there would not be any insurance after September 3rd." In other words, Mr. Sullivan did not make any attempt prior to September 3, 1998, to renew the Policy, including providing any information to the insurance company or its agent, Mr. Harrison. (T: 30.) Mr. Sullivan did not mail or deliver or otherwise give any notice of cancellation of the Policy to the insurance company, or its agent. (T: 41-42.) Mr. Sullivan maintains that he had insurance coverage for the discharge in question "[b]ecause there was a six-month tail-end coverage, and also [he] was supposed to be notified by the insurance company within 10 days of the cancellation of insurance." (T: 40.) (But, Mr. Sullivan defers to his legal counsel regarding coverage issues.) (T: 45.) Mr. Sullivan stated that he did not receive a letter from the insurance company or FPLRIP until the September 11, 1998, letter that the insurance would be cancelled. (T: 40.) He interpreted this letter to mean that the Policy would not be renewed. (T: 20.) On September 11, 1998, Mr. Harrison advised Mr. Sullivan, by letter, that the Policy expired on September 3, 1998, and stated: If policy holder has not been approved by the Department of Environmental Protection under another EPA approved financial responsibility mechanish [sic], policy holder no longer has access to the State Restoration Fund for new discharges. Excess coverage over the State Fund has also expired. We have had no response from the renewal application that we mailed out nor from my letter of Aug [sic] 2, 1998 stating that we could not quote the account nor bound without the application and affidavit. If you have any questions on how to reinstate the policy please call us at 1- 800-475-4055. (Emphasis in original.) Mr. Harrison testified by deposition. In 1989, he began working for the Florida Petroleum Liability Insurance Program Administrators in Cocoa, Florida. His duties included issuing quotes, mailing out renewal paperwork applications, and upon receipt, converting "the indications into policies once the money and appropriate paperwork comes in." FPLIPA began with the issuance of third-party liability insurance. When the State of Florida began reducing the amount that they would provide for cleanup, FPLIPA provided, through AIG, the excess coverage that was required. According to Mr. Harrison, the Policy at issue in this case, was terminated because the Petitioner did not renew it. Mr. Harrison refers to his September 11, 1998, letter, as a "letter informing [Mr. Sullivan] that his coverage had lapsed" or expired. Mr. Harrison did not intend that either his August 2, or September 11, 1998, letters be considered as notice(s) of termination or cancellation of the Policy. Mr. Harrison was the account manager on all of the files related to Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Harrison stated that if the Policy was to be terminated, he would have had to notify Petitioner in writing and if the Policy was not going to be renewed by the insurance company, he would have had to notify Petitioner in writing 60 days prior to the renewal date. Mr. Harrison advised that termination letters are furnished by FPLIPA for an insurance company, here referring to AIG.7 Discovery and Reporting of the Discharge Several petroleum USTs were located at the facility and on the property owned by the Trust. After a one to two-week delay, on or about September 15, 1998, the storage tanks were removed from the property by a contractor who Mr. Sullivan believes was named Pipeline Industries (Pipeline).8 The removal operation was performed over the course of several days. During the course of removal, Pipeline informed him that there was a discharge of petroleum found on the property. The tanks on the property were removed intact on September 15, 1998. At that time, it was certified that the tanks were empty, and were removed without holes in them. (It appears that the Department reported the tanks as empty in February 1996.) (T: 128, 146.) Pipeline filed a Discharge Report Form with the Department on September 17, 1998. This Form recites that a discharge was confirmed on the property on September 15, 1998. Within less than a week, upon learning of the discharge, Mr. Sullivan's right-hand-man, J.C. Brunel, advised Commerce & Industry Insurance Company that the storage tanks had been removed and that there was a discharge. Thereafter, and on some unknown date, the insurance company advised Mr. Sullivan that no coverage would be provided. Mr. Sullivan was made aware of the existence of the storage tanks before the Trust bought the property. He believes that the last time that the site was used as a gasoline station was probably in 1992. Mr. Sullivan was not aware of any other spills or discharges that might have occurred on the property other than what was reported by Pipeline in September 1998. Mr. Sullivan has no personal knowledge when the discharge occurred. He was on the property on and off at the time when Pipeline removed the storage tanks, but probably not on-site when the tanks were actually removed. Pipeline could have caused the discharge, but it is uncertain. Mr. Sullivan relied upon his hired experts (ECT) to determine when the petroleum discharge occurred, the extent of the discharge, and the cost of the clean-up. The Discharge As noted above, the Discharge Report Form indicates confirmation of a discharge on September 15, 1998. The Department contends that the discharge occurred on September 15, 1998, after the insurance policy expired on September 3, 1998. Mr. Cornman determined that the site was ineligible because the site was not properly enrolled in FPLRIP because Petitioner did not maintain financial responsibility when the discharge occurred after the time period of coverage, i.e., after the Policy expired on September 3, 1998. This position was based on the Notice of Eligibility which states the coverage existed from September 3, 1997 through September 3, 1998. See also Findings of Fact 10 and 15. Petitioner contends, in part, that the discharge occurred during the policy period, i.e., prior to September 3, 1998, and was timely reported during the extended reporting period. In the alternative, Petitioner contends that the Policy was never properly terminated or cancelled by the insurance company or its agent (by not providing appropriate notice of termination or cancellation) and, as a result, the Policy was still effective on September 15, 1998, and September 17, 1998, the dates when the discharge was discovered and the report submitted to the Department, respectively. Thus, Petitioner contends that Petitioner is eligible under FPLRIP, having maintained insurance coverage through and including the report of discharge. See Finding of Fact 18. The only scientific evidence presented in this case as to when the petroleum discharge occurred on the property was elicited from Dr. William Case Zegel. Dr. Zegel has a chemical engineering undergraduate degree; and a doctor of science degree in chemical engineering. Dr. Zegel has been associated with Water and Air Research, Incorporated, in Gainesville, Florida, since 1979. He is president of the company and principal engineer. He is a licensed professional engineer in the State of Florida. Dr. Zegel has substantial experience in determining how chemicals are released into the environment. Dr. Zegel is familiar with the property at issue in this proceeding. He was on-site for a day. He spent approximately 100 hours analyzing the site conditions and the petroleum discharge related to the property owned by Petitioner. Further, he reviewed data collected by "ECT," in particular, two sets of data taken about 600 days apart. From this data, he could determine how things changed on the property. He also performed what is called "reverse modeling" to determine when a discharge may have occurred on the property. While stating that the modeling, and the estimates derived therefrom, are not precise as to a particular day or month, Dr. Zegel stated that one estimate indicated that the discharge occurred before March 12, 1999, and a second wave of modeling indicated that the discharge occurred in November 1998. (T: 124, 140.) After identifying specific details of the available data, and his analysis, Dr. Zegel's opined that the discharge occurred prior to September 15, 1998, and that the release into the environment occurred before that date. He also opined that the discharge on the property occurred perhaps as early as 1996. It is not probable that the discharge would have occurred after September 15, 1998. It seems odd that no discharge was detected prior to September 15, 1998, given the status of the tanks. Nevertheless, Dr. Zegel's testimony is credible and persuasive. The weight of the evidence, including no expert opinion to the contrary, supports the finding that the discharge reported to the Department on September 17, 1998, occurred prior to September 3, 1998, although the specific date of the discharge is unknown. Petitioner's Application for Coverage under FPLRIP Mr. Sullivan, on behalf of the Trust, applied, with the Department, for restoration coverage for the discharge under FPLRIP. On October 21, 2002, the Department issued a letter to Mr. Sullivan on behalf of the Trust, denying FPLRIP eligibility, stating that the facility was ineligible because the facility was not "properly enrolled in FRLRIP after September 3, 1998." Stated otherwise, the Department determined that the site was ineligible because the site was not properly enrolled in FPLRIP and Petitioner did not maintain financial responsibility because the discharge occurred after coverage expired on September 3, 1998. The Department relied on the dates in the Notice of Eligibility generated by FPLIPA as agent for the Department in determining the denial of Petitioner's request. As of the October 21, 2002, letter, and when Mr. Cornman testified, the only information provided the Department regarding the date of discharge was the discharge confirmation date (September 15, 1998) reported by Petitioner on September 17, 1998. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Regulations and Interpretations In 1988, the EPA promulgated financial responsibility requirements applicable to owners and operators of USTs containing petroleum, which included amendments to 40 C.F.R. Part 280, Subpart H. See 53 Fed. Reg. 433322, 1988 WL 258482 (Oct. 26, 1988) for the EPA's explanation of the regulations. See also 52 Fed. Reg. 12786, 1987 WL 131023 (April 17, 1987.) In 1989, the EPA amended several provisions of 40 C.F.R. Part 280, Subpart H and, material here, 40 C.F.R. Sections 280.97(b)(1) and (b)(2), pertaining to financial responsibility requirements for UST's containing petroleum. The 1989 amendments refined required language of endorsements to existing insurance policies and certificates of insurance for insurance and risk retention group coverage. See 54 Fed. Reg. 47077-02, 1989 WL 287711 (Nov. 9, 1989) for the EPA's explanation of the amendments. Currently, 40 C.F.R. Section 280.97 deals with "[i]nsurance and risk retention group coverage." Subsection 280.97(a), provides: "An owner or operator may satisfy the requirements of [Section] 290.93 [sic] by obtaining liability insurance that conforms to the requirements of this section from a qualified insurer or risk retention group. Such insurance may be in the form of a separate insurance policy or an endorsement to an existing insurance policy." Subsection 280.97(b) provides in part: "Each insurance policy must be amended by an endorsement, worded as specified in paragraph (b)(1), or evidenced by a certificate of insurance worded as specified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section . . . ." Pertinent here, Subsections 280.97(b)(2)2.d. and e. provide: Cancellation or any other termination of the insurance by the ["Insurer" or "Group"] will be effective only upon written notice and only after the expiration of 60 days after a copy of such written notice is received by the insured. Cancellation for non-payment of premium or misrepresentation by the insured will be effective only upon written notice and only after expiration of a minimum of 10 days after a copy of such written notice is received by the insured. [Insert for claims-made policies: The insurance covers claims otherwise covered by the policy that are reported to the ["Insurer" or "Group"] within six months of the effective date of cancellation or non- renewal of the policy except where the new or renewed policy has the same retroactive date or a retroactive date earlier than that of the prior policy, and which arise out of any covered occurrence that commenced prior to such policy retroactive date, if applicable, and prior to such policy renewal or termination date. Claims reported under such extended reporting period are subject to the terms, conditions, limits, including limits of liability, and exclusions of the policy.] * * * The issues confronting the EPA in 1989, and which prompted the revisions set forth above, pertained to, in part, the EPA's efforts to make clear that the mandatory language in the certificate of insurance (Subsection 280.97(b)(2)2.e.) "requires that a claims-made insurance contract cover claims for any occurrence that commenced during the term of the policy and that is discovered and reported to the insurer within six months of the effective date of the cancellation or other termination of the policy." 54 Fed. Reg. at 47079. "This provision was meant to address concerns that a claims-made policy might leave a gap in coverage if, for example, a claim is reported after the expiration of a policy for a release that began prior to the policy expiration date." Id. The issue for the EPA was whether insurers should be required to provide an extended reporting period and the EPA stated its intention "that insurers provide extended reporting period coverage only where the termination or non-renewal of the policy results in the owner or operator having no coverage for releases that occurred during the time period of the previous policy and which are reported within six months after the termination or non-renewal of that policy. For discussion purposes, EPA has labeled this predicament as a 'gap' in coverage." Id. The EPA identified "only two situations where the termination of a policy results in a 'gap' in coverage, and thus only two situations where the insured whose policy is terminated must obtain extended reporting period coverage. The first situation occurs when the insured renews his existing policy or purchases a new policy and the renewed policy contains a retroactive date subsequent to the retroactive date of the insured's previous insurance policy. The second situation occurs where the policy is terminated or is not otherwise renewed and the insured elects a financial assurance mechanism other than insurance (such as a guarantee, surety bond, etc.) as a replacement. EPA is today promulgating revised language to clarify EPA's intended interpretation of paragraph 2.e. of the Endorsement contained in [Subsection 280.97(b)(1)] and of paragraph 2.e. of the Certification contained in [Subsection] 280.97(b)(2)." Additionally, the EPA defines "termination," as used in Subsections 280.97(b)(1) and (2), to mean "only those changes that could result in a gap in coverage as where the insured has not obtained substitute coverage or has obtained substitute coverage with a different retroactive date than the retroactive date of the original policy." 40 C.F.R. Section 280.92; 54 Fed. Reg. at 47080. Relevant here, the EPA amended Subsections 280.97(b)(1)d., 280.97(b)(2)d., and 280.105(a)(2) [now 280.109(a)(2)] to allow an insurer to terminate an insurance contract for non-payment of premium or misrepresentation by the insured after a 10 day notice period. EPA does not intend for this shortening of the coverage period from 60 to 10 days to apply to termination for any reason other than non-payment of premium or misrepresentation. The Agency is aware that some state insurance laws mandate a longer period following cancellation. In order to accommodate these state-specific situations, the amended language of [Section] 280.97(b)(1) Endorsement paragraph d and [Section] 280.105(a)(2) [now 280.109(a)(2)] specifies that the mandatory coverage period following termination for non-payment of premium or misrepresentation shall be a 'minimum of 10 days.' The insurer is still bound to provide the owner or operator with written notice of cancellation with the 10 day period beginning upon receipt of notice by the owner or operator. 54 Fed. Reg. at 47080. See also Endnote 9. Conversely, the EPA expressly did not amend the requirement for a six-month extended reporting period following cancellation for non-payment of premium or misrepresentation. As noted in the previous section, the [EPA] believes that such a reporting period must be mandatory for all claims-made insurance contracts used to demonstrate financial assurance, regardless for the reason for termination. The six-month extended reporting period is essential to avoiding gaps in coverage that could threaten human health and environment, especially in cases where the owner or operator may have as few as 10 days upon receipt of notice of cancellation to obtain substitute coverage. The distinction between the two provisions, extended reporting period and the effective date of cancellation, is that even if a policy is cancelled for non- payment of premium, the extended reporting period merely extends the time during which an insured may report occurrences covered by the policy for which he or she has already paid. Thus the extended reporting provision does not provide the insured with a benefit for which he or she has not paid. In contrast, any delay in the effective date of a policy cancellation or termination due to regulatory requirements provides insureds who failed to pay their premium coverage for which they have not paid. Id. at 47080-47081.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that Petitioner is not eligible for restoration coverage under FPLRIP. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 2003.
