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PINELLAS COUNTY CONSTRUCTION LICENSING BOARD vs LOUISE WOLD-PARENTE, 10-001133 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Mar. 05, 2010 Number: 10-001133 Latest Update: Nov. 23, 2010

The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent, Louise Wold-Parente (Respondent), committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints dated January 30, 2010, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the entity charged by law to regulate and discipline locally-licensed contractors doing business in Pinellas County, Florida. At all times material to the allegations of these cases, Respondent held a license as a general contractor, license number I-CGC1251933, issued by Petitioner. On or about November 30, 2005, Respondent, on behalf of Signature Built Construction, filed a permit application for a single-family home to be constructed for Richard and Constance Wendlek. The contract for the construction of the Wendlek home identified Signature Built by David Helms, Inc., as the “builder” or “seller” of the home. Further, the contract stated that Signature Built Construction, Inc., license numbers CBC1251933/QB32131, was the “contractor/builder” of record for Signature Built by David Helms, Inc. On or about August 14, 2006, Respondent filed a permit application for a single-family home to be built for Alan and Elaine Levitz. The contractor for the permit was identified as Signature Built Construction. The contract for the Levitz home was executed between Signature Built by David Helms, Inc., as “builder” or “seller” with Signature Built Construction, Inc., license numbers CBC1251933/QB32131, as the “contractor/builder” of record for Signature Built by David Helms, Inc. At all times material to the allegations, Respondent was not the qualifying contractor for Signature Built by David Helms, Inc. There is no evidence that Respondent and Signature Built by David Helms, Inc., have entered into an agreement to engage Respondent as the qualifying contractor for Signature Built by David Helms, Inc. Further, there is no evidence that David Helms individually, or through Signature Built by David Helms, Inc., was authorized to act on behalf of Signature Built Construction, Inc., or Respondent. Respondent did not execute the contracts with Levitz and Wendlek. There is no evidence that anyone associated with Signature Built Construction, Inc., executed the contracts with Levitz and Wendlek. Neither Levitz nor Wendlek knew Respondent or had any dealings with her. The Levitz and Wendlek contracts were negotiated and performed (to the extent that they were performed) by David Helms or Signature Built by David Helms, Inc. Respondent is the qualifying agent for Signature Built Construction, Inc., but neither Respondent nor Signature Built Construction, Inc., was bound by the contracts with Levitz and Wendlek. The Administrative Complaints filed against Respondent claim that she improperly obtained the building permits for the Wendlek and Levitz homes. It is determined that Respondent facilitated an unlicensed entity or individual, David Helms or Signature Built by David Helms, Inc., to engage in contracting without first being properly licensed or authorized as provided by law.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding Respondent in violation of Count I as to both Administrative Complaints, dismissing the other abandoned counts, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000.00 together with legal and investigative costs of the proceedings. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Jason Ester, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street, Sixth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756-5165 Warren J. Knaust, Esquire Knaust & Associates, P.A. 2167 Fifth Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 Rodney S. Fischer, Executive Director Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board 12600 Belcher Road, Suite 102 Largo, Florida 33773

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57489.1195489.129
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs MARK P. STANISH, 95-004534 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Crystal River, Florida Sep. 13, 1995 Number: 95-004534 Latest Update: Jul. 17, 2013

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensing of contractors in Florida and regulating the practice of contracting of all types. Specifically, the Petitioner is responsible for enforcing law which prohibits unlicensed persons from engaging in the business of contracting, or advertising themselves or business organizations as available to engage in contracting, without proper licensure. The Respondent is a citizen of the State of Florida, who has embarked on a business of representing owners who desire to construct residences, acting as the agent of those owners in arranging for materials, labor, subcontractors, and the financing of construction. Upon the decision by the owner to construct a residence, the Respondent engages in drafting plans, to some extent, arranging for subcontractors, overseeing the details of the work and any changes or alterations in the work and plans as the project proceeds. The owner in this arrangement does not obtain workers' compensation coverage for the Respondent, as would be the case if the Respondent was an employee of the owner, nor does the owner withhold F.I.C.A. taxes from monies due the Respondent for his services. The Respondent is not licensed as a contractor in the State of Florida. On May 11, 1995, the Respondent signed a contract (hereinafter the "Kassiris Contract") with owner Gus Kassiris, to oversee the erection and construction of a new residence for Mr. Kassiris. The Respondent was to perform the following duties, pursuant to the Kassiris Contract: to make recommendations as to which subcontractor to hire; to inspect progress and review payments; consultations and solutions on construc- tion project; to engage in manpower tracking and coor- dination of resources; monitoring of contract compliance; to provide punch list services; and to engage in the preparation and de- fense of change orders, as well as cost accounting. The "punch list services" mean that the Respondent was to engage in insuring that no work was left undone or done incorrectly at the end of the project. The Respondent admitted that he conducted all inspections on the project and reviewed all requisitions for payment from the subcontractors. The amount he charged for his services was roughly equivalent to the amount a licensed contractor would charge for similar services. The Kassiris Contract did not meet the conditions for a homeowner's exemption, found in Section 489.103(7), Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Kassiris Contract did not provide that the Respondent would work under the supervision of the homeowner. In fact, the Kassiris Contract provided that if the homeowner wanted changes made in the specifications, he could request a change order. The Kassiris Contract also did not provide that the homeowner would deduct F.I.C.A. and withholding taxes from the Respondent's fees or wages, as required in the homeowner's exemption standards. There was no provision requiring that the homeowner provide workers' compensation, as required by the statute, in order to make out the elements of the homeowner's exemption (from the requirement of having a contractor's license). The conditions for exemption from licensure were also not met in the implementation of the Kassiris Contract. Specifically, the homeowner did not act as his own contractor and provide all of the material supervision himself. Although he denies it, in fact, the Respondent negotiated the contracts with the subcontractors and, during the course of performance of the Kassiris Contract, the Respondent approved plan changes for the project, without the involvement or consultation of the owner. The Respondent acted in the capacity of a contractor in the implementation of the contract by overseeing most details of construction of the residence. He performed the on-site inspections, dealt with subcontractors, approved the manner in which work was being performed, approved payment of subcontractors, and, in general, closely managed all details of the contracting effort. Practically, the only involvement the owner had, other than being present on the site frequently, was that the owner actually wrote the checks to pay the subcontractors and delivered them to the Respondent, who, in turn, delivered them to the subcontractors. The owner obtained the building permit at the commencement of the project. The Respondent advertised in the Citrus County Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation, on or about June 25, 1995, that he offered services for hire as a construction consultant and for project management. On or about June 27, 1995, he entered into a contract with Paul and Valerie Stamper (hereinafter the "Stamper Contract"). The Respondent was thus charged with overseeing the erection and construction of a residence located at Lot 15 of Laurel Oak Estates Subdivision in Citrus County, Florida. He acted in the capacity of a contractor in the negotiation and formulation of this contract. According to the Stamper Contract, the Respondent's responsibilities were to include the following: make recommendations as to which subcon- tractor to hire; conduct progress inspections and payment reviews; consult concerning construction problems and arrive at solutions; engage in manpower and tracking and coor- dination of resources; monitor contract compliance; provide "punch list" services; prepare and defend any change orders; engage in cost accounting. The terms of the Stamper Contract indicate that the residence to be constructed was to be purveyed to the owner, rather than a case of the owner being the contractor actually creating the product. In order for the above- referenced exemption to apply, the homeowner must be the party functioning as a contractor on his own behalf. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Stampers gave the Respondent a $3,000.00 deposit. The Stampers later decided that they did not wish to proceed with the contract and requested return of that deposit. The Respondent refused to return the deposit money, although acknowledging that the Stamper Contract was no longer in effect. In his letter to the Stampers, responding to their request for return of the deposit, he proposed, instead, that they continue to proceed with the contract and the construction of the residence, which the Stampers no longer wished to own and occupy, in order that they could sell it. The intention to construct a residence for sale to another party directly belies the possibility that the homeowner can be his own contractor, constructing a residence for his own use in compliance with the homeowner-exemption law. It shows an intention to engage in contracting by the Respondent. The existence of facts supporting this exemption is also belied because the Respondent, in his contract with the Stampers, did not contract to have F.I.C.A. or income taxes withheld from any paychecks due him from the Stampers, nor did the Stampers contract to provide workers' compensation coverage for the Respondent. The contract also did not provide that the owners, the Stampers, would act as their own contractors and provide all material supervision themselves. In fact, the Respondent was to provide supervision. The Petitioner is responsible for enforcing the prohibition against unlicensed contracting in order to protect the public. There are frequent problems with unlicensed contractors in Florida in terms of their competence to provide quality work and their willingness to do so, as well as outright fraud and harm to the public. The contracts which unlicensed contractors enter into are illegal and unenforceable. Homeowners who contract with unlicensed contractors are not eligible for recovery under the Construction Industry Licensing Recovery Fund. On July 2, 1995, the Respondent again advertised in the Citrus County Chronicle, advertising himself as available to manage the construction of residences. Based upon this notice and other information, the Petitioner issued a Notice to Cease and Desist to the Respondent, ordering him to cease and desist the unlicensed practice of contracting. The Respondent contends that he is not a contractor and that he is, instead, a project manager or consultant and, therefore, not governed by the statutory provision authorizing the Notice to Cease and Desist.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00 against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-4534 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-9. Accepted. 10. Rejected, as constituting a conclusion of law. 11-14. Accepted. 15. Rejected, as being irrelevant. 16-17. Accepted. 18. Accepted, except for the next to the last sentence, which constitutes a conclusion of law. 19-20. Accepted. 21. Rejected, as constituting a conclusion of law. 22-31. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as contrary to the unrefuted evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not in accordance with the greater weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as constituting a conclusion of law, but to the extent it might be a proposed finding of fact, as not in accord with unrefuted evidence of record and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not representative of the unrefuted evidence of record and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not itself being dispositive of material issues. Rejected, as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as not being materially dispositive. Rejected, as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as, in part, being a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding of fact. 10-12. Rejected, as constituting a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna Bass, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Mr. Mark P. Stanish 6041 Town Court Springhill, FL 34606 Richard Hickok, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, FL 32211-7467 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (9) 120.57455.228489.103489.105489.127489.128489.141775.082775.083
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GOLDEN/JACKSONVILLE COMPANY (HERITAGE COMMONS SHOPPING CENTER) vs CLAY COUNTY, 92-006947VR (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Green Cove Springs, Florida Nov. 23, 1992 Number: 92-006947VR Latest Update: Feb. 12, 1993

Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this case had previously been owned by an individual who had begun development of the subject property and adjoining property (hereinafter referred to as the "Dawkins' Property"), in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Part of the Dawkins Property was developed and has been sold (hereinafter referred to as the "Bank Tract"). The subject property (hereinafter referred to as the "Golden Tract"), was acquired by Golden/Jacksonville Co. in December, 1986. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied Upon by the Applicant. Most of the Dawkins Property, including most of the Golden Tract, was approved and zoned in 1977 by Clay County for development as a shopping center. A part of the Golden Tract (hereinafter referred to as the "Multifamily Tract"), however, was not zoned for development as a shopping center at that time. Part of the Dawkins Property (the Bank Tract) was fully developed as a bank. Various environmental permits required to further develop the Dawkins Property, less the Bank Tract and the Multifamily Tract, as a shopping center were acquired by the previous owner of the property. Permits were issued by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and the St. Johns Water Management District. Prior to purchasing the Golden Tract, the Applicant sought assurance of Clay County that the Golden Tract (but not the Multifamily Tract) was zoned for development as a shopping center. Clay County, in a letter dated December 9, 1985, confirmed that development of the Golden Tract as a shopping center was consistent with the then current zoning for the property. In confirming the zoning of the Golden Tract, Clay County notified the Applicant that it would be necessary that a traffic signal be installed at an intersection on Blanding Boulevard which would be impacted by the shopping center. In 1987, the Applicant sought and obtained approval of the rezoning of the Multifamily Tract for development as a shopping center. The Applicant submitted a revised site plan for the proposed shopping center dated August 27, 1987 to Clay County for approval in connection with the request to rezone the Multifamily Tract. The site plan included the development of 264,000 square feet of commercial space. The August 27, 1987 revised site plan was approved by Clay County in November, 1987. In May, 1988, the Applicant applied with the Florida Department of Transportation (hereinafter referred to as "DOT"), for a drainage connection permit and a driveway connection permit in connection with providing access to the proposed shopping center. As a condition of issuing the required permit, DOT required that Clay County construct certain intersection improvements on Blanding Boulevard, the main traffic artery adjacent to the Golden Property. The Applicant entered into negotiations with Clay County in order to get the Blanding Boulevard intersection improvements required by DOT completed. On January 9, 1990, the Applicant and Clay County entered into an agreement wherein the Applicant agreed to pay Clay County 50% of the costs (up to a total of $23,000.00) of the DOT-required intersection improvements. The Applicant's Detrimental Reliance. In reliance on Clay County's actions in informing the Applicant that it would be required to provide a traffic signal in order to proceed with the development of the Golden Tract, the Applicant had the traffic signal installed at a cost of $7,500.00. Following approval of the August 27, 1987 revised site plan by Clay County, the Applicant spent approximately $128,000.00 to construct a stormwater retention pond required by the St. Johns River Water Management District. Part of the costs of intersection improvements required by DOT were incurred by the Applicant. The weight of the evidence failed to prove how much the Applicant actually spent, however. The Applicant also proceeded with the development of the Golden Tract, incurring architecture and engineering fees and other costs associated with the proposed development of the Golden Tract. A detailed breakdown of various expenses incurred by the Applicant was included at tab 25 of the documentation filed in support of the Application. Although not all of the expenditures listed at tab 25, i.e., taxes and costs associated with the purchase of the Golden Property, are relevant to the issues in this proceeding, some of the expenditures were incurred in reliance on the actions of Clay County other than approval of zoning of the Golden Tract. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. Pursuant to the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan, there are insufficient "peak hour trips" available on the roads impacted by the Golden Tract to accommodate the peak hour trips required for the Golden Tract if it is developed as a shopping center. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended by Clay County Ordinance 92-22 have been met.

Florida Laws (3) 120.65163.31678.08
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ROBERT STOKY AND RUTH STOKY vs MONROE COUNTY, 00-000377DRI (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Key West, Florida Jan. 21, 2000 Number: 00-000377DRI Latest Update: Oct. 12, 2001

The Issue This is an appeal from Resolution No. P60-99 of the Monroe County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission"), in which the Planning Commission approved the decision of the Monroe County Planning Department ("Planning Department") denying two applications for building permits submitted by the Appellants, Robert and Ruth Stoky ("the Stokys"). One application requested a building permit to reconstruct a screened porch and to build an elevated deck in the rear of the Señor Frijoles/Cactus Jack's restaurants, which are located at 103900 Overseas Highway, Key Largo, Florida; this application was assigned building permit number 99-3-857 ("permit number 99-3-857"). The second application requested a building permit to reconstruct a trellis as a separate structure associated with the Sundowner restaurant, also located at 103900 Overseas Highway, Key Largo, Florida; this application was assigned building permit number 99-3-858 ("permit number 99-3-858"). The instant appeal was forwarded by the Planning Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Article XIV, Monroe County Code, the Hearing Officer Appellate Article, and Monroe County ("the County") has appeared as Appellee in this case. In their Initial Brief, the Stokys abandoned their appeal of the decision of the Planning Commission approving the Planning Department's denial of their application for permit number 99-3-858; therefore, the ultimate issue presented in this appeal is whether the Planning Commission's Resolution No. P60-99 should be affirmed, reversed, or modified with respect to the its decision approving the Planning Department's denial of the Stokys' application for permit number 99-3-857.

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS vs GEORGE H. SANDS; JUDY S. SANDS; PG CONSTRUCTION, INC.; AND MONROE COUNTY, 91-003472DRI (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Homestead, Florida Jun. 04, 1991 Number: 91-003472DRI Latest Update: Sep. 18, 1992

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether a certain development order (permit) issued by Monroe County to George and Judy Sands, as owners, and PG Construction, Inc., as contractor, for the construction of a single family dwelling unit is consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations.

Findings Of Fact The parties Respondents, George and Judy Sands (Sands), are the owners of Lot 15, Tropical Coral Reef Estates, Plantation Key, Monroe County, Florida; a property located within that part of Monroe County designated as an area of critical state concern, and upon which they have received a development order (permit) from Monroe County to construct a single family dwelling unit. Respondent, PG Construction, Inc., is the contractor that applied for the permit on behalf of the Sands. Respondent, Monroe County (Monroe County), is a local government within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern designated by Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for the implementation of, and the issuance of development orders that are consistent with, the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations, as approved and adopted in Chapters 9J-14 and 28-20, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner, Department of Community Affairs (Department), is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and all rules promulgated there-under. Sections 380.031(18) and 380.032(1), Florida Statutes. Here, the Department has filed a timely appeal to the issuance of the subject permit, and contends that construction of the dwelling unit is inconsistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations since it would exceed allowable density limitations. Background The subject property is approximately .45 acres, and was purchased by the Sands in January 1990. At the time of purchase, the property supported a concrete block residence, two bedrooms and one bath, of approximately 900 square feet and a wood-frame residence, two bedrooms and one bath, of approximately 625 square feet. Both buildings were constructed in 1948 and were, pertinent to this case, used by the Sands' predecessor in title as a principal residence prior to and as of the effective date of the Monroe County land development regulations (September 15, 1986). Following their acquisition of the property, the Sands undertook to upgrade both structures with the intention of offering use of the residences to employees of their business, which was located across the street from the property. 2/ Ultimately, however, the Sands decided to replace, rather than remodel, the wood-frame residence, and employed David de Haas-Grosseck (de Haas), a consultant and designer of residential properties, who was of the opinion that such replacement was permissible under the provisions of Section 9.5-268, Monroe County land development regulations (MCLDR), discussed infra, to attend the necessary details. 3/ On February 5, 1991, de Haas, on behalf of the Sands, filed an application with Monroe County for a building permit to construct a modular single family residence upon the property. Thereafter, the County advised de Haas that since the wood-frame structure was to be removed a demolition permit would also be required. Accordingly, on February 11, 1991, de Haas applied for a demolition permit to remove such structure. The demolition permit (permit number 9130002904) was issued by the County on February 11, 1991, and rendered to the Department on February 13, 1991. The building permit (permit number 9130002861) was issued by the County on February 25, 1991, and rendered to the Department on February 27, 1991. Under existing law, such permits were not effective until expiration of the time within which the Department was authorized to appeal their issuance, to-wit: 45 days after they were rendered to the Department. The Sands, having been expressly so advised by de Haas, were acutely aware of the limitations on their building permit. Consequently, the Sands requested a waiver of the Department's appeal period. By letter of March 21, 1991, the Department denied such request and stated: Dear Mr. Sands: Monroe County issued you permit number 913-2861 on February 25, 1991. The DCA received the permit on February 27, 1991. Therefore, the Department's 45-day appeal period expires on April 13, 1991. Subsequent to the issuance of the permit by the County, you requested a waiver of the DCA's appeal period. At this time, the Department declines to issue you the waiver. Changes or additional information may be needed to meet County Code requirements. Our concerns include that the proposed development exceeds the allowable density in a SS zoning district. DCA staff will continue to review your plans and the permit, which may warrant action by the Department . . . . Notwithstanding the Sands' express knowledge that their building permit was not effective, as well as express advice from the Department that it had concerns regarding the propriety of such development, the Sands, following the expiration of the Department's appeal period on their demolition permit, demolished the wood-frame structure on or about April 4, 1991. Thereafter, by petition filed with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission on April 12, 1991, the Department timely challenged the propriety of Monroe County's decision to issue the building permit. 4/ The Sands, notwithstanding express knowledge that their building permit was not effective pending the Department's appeal, proceeded to construct the modular unit on the property. Such unit is approximately 650 square feet in size, excluding the two enclosed screen porches which measure 10' X 20' each, and complies with current building code requirements. The Sands' decision to construct such unit pending appeal was voluntary, and they proceeded with such construction at their own risk considering the nature of this proceeding. Consistency of the building permit with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations The Sands property is located within what the Monroe County land development regulations (MCLDR) define as a sparsely settled residential land use district. The purpose of such district is stated in Section 9.5-209, MCLDR, to be as follows: . . . to establish areas of low density residential development where the predominate character is native or open space lands. Consistent with the purpose of such land use district, the Monroe County land development regulations permit, as of right, only the following uses: Detached residential dwellings; Beekeeping; Home occupations -- Special use permit requiring a public hearing; Accessory uses. Section 9.5-238(a), MCLDR. Moreover, consistent with the purpose of the district, the density or intensity of development is limited by Section 9.5-261, MCLDR. Pertinent to this case, 9.5-261, MCLDR, addresses the issue of land use intensity or density, and provides: No structure or land in Monroe County shall hereafter be developed, used or occupied at an intensity or density greater than the standards set out in this division. . . . And, Section 9.5-262, MCLDR, establishes the maximum residential density in a sparsely settled residential land use district at .5 dwelling units per acre. Accordingly, a minimum of two acres is required under the Monroe County land development regulations to permit, as of right, one detached residential dwelling. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 9.5-262, MCLDR, the Monroe County land development regulations provide an exception to the density limitations otherwise imposed by such section for certain dwelling units existent on the effective date of the regulations. Pertinent to this case, Section 9.5-268, MCLDR, provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9.5-262 . . . the owners of land upon which a dwelling unit . . . used as a principal residence prior to the effective date of the plan was lawful on the effective date of this chapter shall be entitled to a density allocation of one (1) dwelling unit for each such unit in existence on the effective date of this chapter. Here, the Department and Monroe County disagree as to the proper interpretation of the foregoing provision. The Department interprets such provision to apply only to the owner of such residence on the effective date of the plan. Under such interpretation, the density benefits offered by Section 9.5-268, MCLDR, would be lost where, as here, such owner sold the property. In contrast, Monroe County interprets such provision to essentially establish an allowable density on the effective date of the plan, and to accord subsequent owners the benefit of such increased density allocation. 5/ Such interpretation, while not the only possible interpretation, is not inconsistent with the comprehensive plan or clearly erroneous, and therefore permissible. 6/ Accordingly, the subject permit is consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations. 7/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order affirming Monroe County's decision to issue building permit number 9130002861, and dismissing the appeal filed by the Department of Community Affairs. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of June 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June 1992.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57380.031380.032380.0552380.07
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GULF SOUTH REALTY, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-003765BID (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-003765BID Latest Update: Dec. 09, 1988

Findings Of Fact During March 1988, the Respondent issued an Invitation to Bid by which it sought to lease 17,973 net usable square feet of office space to be located within a specified geographic area in Tampa, Florida, under a nine year lease with two additional three year option periods. This Invitation to Bid is referred to as Lease Number 590:1927. Three bids were received in response to the Invitation to Bid, and they were opened on May 13, 1988. Bids were received from the Petitioner, 8900 Centre, Ltd., and the Allen Morris Management Company. All bidders were determined to be responsive to the Invitation to Bid. Despite the fact that petitioner submitted the lowest bid, Respondent notified Petitioner by letter dated June 10, 1988, of its intent to award Lease Number 590:1927 to 8900 Centre, Ltd., as the lowest and best bidder. Petitioner has timely filed its protest seeking review of that decision. It is undisputed that Petitioner submitted the lowest bid. For the first year of the lease, Petitioner bid $7.85 per square foot, while 8900 Centre bid $7.95 per square foot. Thereafter, Petitioner proposed a yearly increase of 50 cents per square foot, reaching $11.85 per square foot in the ninth year of the lease, while 8900 Centre proposed annual increases of approximately 75 cents, reaching $14.00 per square foot in the ninth year. This equates to an actual dollar difference over the nine year term of approximately 185,000. However, using a present value methodology and a present value discount rate of 8.81 percent referred to on page 17 of the bid submittal form, the present value difference in these two bids is approximately $1,000 per month, which would result in a present value difference between Petitioner and 8900 Centre of approximately $108,000 over the nine year period. Neither the Invitation to Bid, bid specifications, nor the actual bids were offered into evidence. One page of the bid submittal form, designated as page 17 of 18, was offered and received in evidence. This portion of the bid submittal form states that the "successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best." It also sets forth evaluation criteria, and assigns weights to each criteria. The evaluation criteria include associated fiscal costs (35 points), location (40 points) and facility factors (25 points) . A synopsis of bids was also offered and received in evidence showing the points awarded to each bidder by the Respondent's bid evaluation committed. Out of a possible 100 points, 8900 Centre received 95.17 points, while Petitioner received 82.25 points and the Allen Morris Management Company received 70.67 points. Petitioner asserts that the members of the evaluation committee were not qualified or knowledgeable in basic construction, design and engineering principles, and therefore could not competently evaluate the bids submitted. However, Petitioner did not offer competent substantial evidence to support this contention. Only the chairperson of the committee, Susan Jennings, was called to testify, and she appeared thoroughly knowledgeable in the bid process, the needs of the agency, the bid requirements and the representations made to the committee members by each bidder, including Petitioner, when the committee made its site visit to each location. Since the actual Invitation to Bid, bid specifications, and evidence about the other committee members were not introduced, it is not possible to know what the specific duties of the committee were, how they were to carry out their duties their qualifications and training, and whether they failed to competently carry out these duties, as alleged by Petitioner. Despite Petitioner's lower bid, Respondent awarded this lease to 8900 Centre, Ltd., based upon the evaluation committee's determination assigning 8900 Centre the highest number of evaluation points. Out of a possible 35 points for fiscal costs, Petitioner received 34 and 8900 Centre received 31.5. Thus, Petitioner's status as low bidder is reflected in the points awarded by the committee. Since neither the bid invitation or specifications were introduced, no finding can be made as to whether the difference between these two bidders comports with any instructions or directions provided by the agency to potential bidders, or whether this difference of 2.5 points on this criteria reasonably reflects and accounts for the dollar difference in these two bids. Petitioner received 34.75 points out of a possible 40 points on the general evaluation criteria "location," while 8900 Centre received the full 40 points. Within this criteria, there were three subcategories, and on the first two subcategories (central area and public transportation) there was an insignificant difference of less than one-half point between Petitioner and 8900 Centre. The major difference between these two bidders which accounts for their significant difference on the location criteria, was in the subcategory of environmental factors, in which Petitioner received 15.17 points and 8900 Centre received the full 20 points. Petitioner did not present competent substantial evidence to discredit or refute the committee's evaluation in the subcategory of environmental factors. To the contrary, the only testimony from a committee member was that of Susan Jennings, and according to her, Petitioner failed to explain the availability of individual air conditioning and heating controls, or the possibility of separate program entrances, which could be made available under its bid. Although Petitioner sought to explain at hearing that these desires of the agency could be accommodated in its bid, there is no evidence that such an explanation was provided in its bid or during the bid process when the evaluation committee visited the Petitioner's site. The committee was aware, however, that 8900 Centre would provide individual heating and air conditioning controls, as well as separate outside entrances for the three programs which would occupy the leased space. Additionally, the committee was concerned, according to Jennings, that parking areas at Petitioner's facility were more remote and removed from the building entrance than at 8900 Centre, and were somewhat obscured by trees and shrubbery, thereby presenting a potential safety concern for employees working after dark. Finally, every employee would either have a window or window access at 8900 Centre, while it was not explained that Petitioner's site would offer a similar feature. Thus, Petitioner failed to establish that the evaluation committee erred in assigning a significantly greater number of points for environmental factors to 8900 Centre than to Petitioner. The evidence reflects a reasonable basis for this difference. The other significant difference between these two bidders was in the subcategory for layout and utilization under the evaluation criteria "facility." Petitioner received 13.67 points while 8900 Centre received a full 20 points. Jennings explained that the separate outside entrances leading directly into the three programs that would occupy this space was preferred to a single reception area for all three programs. Petitioner offered the single reception area in its bid and site visit presentation, while 8900 Centre made it clear that each program would have its own entrance. Since these programs do not have a receptionist position, and none wanted to give up a secretarial position to serve as receptionist for all three programs, the committee did not consider the single reception area entrance to be desirable. Additionally, Petitioner's facility was a two-story building, while 8900 Centre is a single story facility. Jennings explained that the committee considered a ground level facility to be preferable to a two story building, particularly since the Medicaid program was to occupy the major portion of this space. The Medicaid program would have to be split up at Petitioner's facility, either in two separate buildings or on two levels of the same building, while at 8900 Centre, Medicaid could be accommodated in one, single story building, with the other two programs in a second, single story building. Finally, parking at 8900 Centre was directly next to, and outside the entrance of the building, while Petitioner offered to make assigned spaces available in a general parking area which serves its entire 100,000 square foot complex. The parking offered by Petitioner is more remote than that offered by 8900 Centre, and would be less secure at night due to a greater distance from the building entrances and the parking lot. Thus, Petitioner failed to establish that the committee erred in assigning a significantly greater number of points for layout and utilization to 8900 Centre than to Petitioner. There is a reasonable basis for this difference, according to the evidence in the record.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's protest to Lease Number 590:1927. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of December 1988. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December 1988. APPENDIX (DOAH Case Number 88-3765 BID) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted, in part, in Finding of Fact 1, but Rejected in Finding of Fact 10, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 3-5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, but Rejected in 7. 6-7. Rejected in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected in Finding of Fact 10, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Rejected in Findings of Fact 9 and 10, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 1, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 3-4. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 5 and 6, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence in the record of this case. Adopted In Findings of Fact 5, 7-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary since the point difference in this subcategory is insignificant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 11-12. Adopted in Finding of fact 10. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael V. Giordano, Esquire 7821 North Dale Mabry Suite 100 Tampa, Florida 33614 Jack Farley, Esquire W. T. Edwards Facility 4000 West Buffalo Fifth Floor, Room 520 Tampa, Florida 33614 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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