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YVONNE MALONE vs BEACON HILL, LTD, 13-003703 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 24, 2013 Number: 13-003703 Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2014

The Issue The issue is this case is whether the Respondent, Beacon Hill, Ltd., discriminated against Yvonne Malone (Petitioner) based on her religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Act).

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a resident at an apartment complex owned and operated by the Respondent. At the hearing, the Petitioner recited a litany of complaints related to her apartment unit and to the services she has received from the Respondent's staff. Although the Petitioner has previously asserted that the Respondent has discriminated against her based on her religion, the Petitioner testified at the hearing that she had been "harassed" and "abused" by the Respondent's employees and that she did not know the basis for her treatment. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has discriminated against the Petitioner based on her religion. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has treated the Petitioner any differently than any other resident of the apartment complex has been treated. The evidence failed to establish that the Respondent, or any person employed by the Respondent, has "harassed" or "abused" the Petitioner in any manner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Yvonne Malone. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2014.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.37
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RICARDO VEGA vs CLUB DEV., INC., AND FRANK BAREFIELD, 08-006141 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Dec. 09, 2008 Number: 08-006141 Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2009

The Issue Whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations and the Division of Administrative Hearings have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 760.34, Florida Statutes, to consider Petitioner's Petition for Relief; and Whether Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Facts are made: Petitioner contracted to purchase a condominium, "unit 206 in Building 425 at Serravella at Spring Valley" from Respondent. For reasons not relevant to the issues presented for determination, closing was deferred; and on December 22, 2006, Petitioner signed and submitted an "Addendum to Contract" to Respondent that sought "to revise contract closing date to 2/28/2007." Sometime in late December 2006, a telephone conversation took place among Steve Myers, a realtor for Serra Villa, Petitioner, and Barefield. Barefield was in Alabama, and Myers and Petitioner were in Florida on a speakerphone. Barefield advised Petitioner that the addendum would not be accepted by Respondent. Barefield and Petitioner did not speak to each other after this December telephone conversation. All communication was accomplished through third parties. Subsequent to Respondent's refusal to accept Petitioner's addendum, there is lengthy correspondence and litigation involving the parties. For some time after Respondent rejected Petitioner's addendum, Petitioner desired to purchase the condominium and, apparently, indicated so in various offers communicated by his attorneys to Respondent. If an unlawful discriminatory act occurred, the determination of which is not an issue presented for determination, the act occurred in December 2006. Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint dated September 17, 2008, and signed by Petitioner on September 22, 2008, was filed with United States Department of Housing and Urban Development more than one year after the alleged act of discrimination. On November 6, 2008, Petitioner sent a four-page fax transmission to Lisa Sutherland, a FCHR employee, which included a Petition for Relief. On November 13, 2008, Petitioner sent a second fax transmission of seven pages to Lisa Sutherland. Apparently, this second transmission included a Petition for Relief. On December 4, 2008, Petitioner sent a third fax transmission addressed to "Mrs. Crawford/Lisa Sutherland." While the fax transmission cover sheet is dated "11-13-08," the report of transmission shows that this 11-page transmission was sent on "12/04 15:24." The Petition for Relief forwarded by FCHR to DOAH was date-stamped "2008 DEC-4 PM 3:25."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR dismiss the Petition for Relief as being time-barred as a result of the late filing of Petitioner, Ricardo Vega's, Housing Discrimination Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard S. Taylor, Jr., Esquire 531 Dog Track Road Longwood, Florida 32750-6547 Barbara Billiot-Stage, Esquire Law Offices of Barbara Billiot-Stage, PA 5401 South Kirkman Road, Suite 310 Orlando, Florida 32819

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.34760.35
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SHELLEY M. WRIGHT vs SERVITAS MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, 17-002512 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 26, 2017 Number: 17-002512 Latest Update: Jan. 16, 2018

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner because of handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Petitioner Shelley M. Wright ("Wright") was a graduate student at Florida International University ("FIU") in Miami, Florida. Wright has a physical disability that affects her mobility, and, as a result, she uses a wheelchair or scooter to get around. There is no dispute that Wright falls within a class of persons protected against discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). Respondent Servitas Management Group, LLC ("SMG"), manages Bayview Student Living ("Bayview"), a privately owned student housing community located on FIU's campus. Bayview's owner, NCCD — Biscayne Properties, LLC, leases (from FIU) the real estate on which the project is situated. Bayview is a recently built apartment complex, which first opened its doors to students for the 2016-2017 school year. On November 20, 2015, Wright submitted a rental application for a single occupancy efficiency apartment in Bayview, fitted out for residents with disabilities. She was charged an application fee of $100.00, as were all applicants, plus a "convenience fee" of $6.45. Much later, Wright would request that SMG refund the application fee, and SMG would deny her request, although it would give her a credit of $6.45 to erase the convenience fee on the grounds that it had been charged in error. Wright complains that this transaction was tainted with unlawful discrimination, but there is no evidence of such, and thus the fees will not be discussed further. Wright's application was approved, and, accordingly, she soon executed a Student Housing Lease Contract ("First Lease") for a term commencing on August 20, 2016, and ending on July 31, 2017. The First Lease stated that her rent would be $1,153.00 per month, and that the total rent for the lease term would be $12,683.00. Because Wright was one of the first students to sign a lease, she won some incentives, namely $500.00 in Visa gift cards and an iPad Pro. The First Lease provided that she would receive a $200.00 gift card upon lease execution and the balance of $300.00 upon moving in. As it happened, Wright did not receive the gift cards in two installments, but instead accepted five cards worth $500.00, in the aggregate, on August 20, 2016. There were two reasons for this. One was that SMG required lease holders to appear in-person to take possession of the gift cards and sign a receipt acknowledging delivery. Wright was unable (or unwilling) to travel to SMG's office until she moved to Miami in August 2016 to attend FIU. The other was that SMG decided not to use gift cards as the means of paying this particular incentive after integrating its rent collection operation with FIU's student accounts. Instead, SMG would issue a credit to the lease holders' student accounts in the amount of $500.00. Wright, however, insisted upon the gift cards, and so she was given them rather than the $500.00 credit. Wright has alleged that the untimely (or inconvenient) delivery of the gift cards constituted unlawful discrimination, but the evidence fails to sustain the allegation, which merits no further discussion. In May 2016, SMG asked Wright (and all other Bayview lease holders) to sign an amended lease. The revised lease made several changes that SMG called "improvements," most of which stemmed from SMG's entering into a closer working relationship with FIU. (One such change was the aforementioned substitution of a $500.00 credit for gift cards.) The amended lease, however, specified that Wright's total rent for the term would be $13,836.00——an increase of $1,153.00 over the amount stated in the First Lease. The explanation was that, in the First Lease, the total rent had been calculated by multiplying the monthly installment ($1,153.00) by 11, which did not account for the 12 days in August 2016 included in the lease term. SMG claimed that the intent all along had been to charge 12 monthly installments of $1,153.00 without proration (even though the tenant would not have possession of the premises for a full 12 months) and thus that the First Lease had erroneously shown the total rent as $12,683.00. As SMG saw it, the revised lease simply fixed this mistake. Wright executed the amended lease on or about May 10, 2016 (the "Second Lease"). Wright alleges that this rent "increase" was the product of unlawful discrimination, retaliation, or both. There is, however, no persuasive evidence supporting this allegation. The same rental amount was charged to all occupants of the efficiency apartments, regardless of their disabilities or lack thereof, and each of them signed the same amended lease document that Wright executed. To be sure, Wright had reason to be upset about SMG's revision of the total rent amount, which was not an improvement from her standpoint, and perhaps she had (or has) legal or equitable remedies available for breach of lease. But this administrative proceeding is not the forum for redressing such wrongs (if any). Relatedly, some tenants received a rent reduction through the amended leases SMG presented in May 2016, because the rates were reduced therein for two- and four-bedroom apartments. As was made clear at the time, however, rates were not reduced on the one-bedroom studios due to their popularity. Wright alleges that she subsequently requested an "accommodation" in the form of a rent reduction, which she argues was necessary because she leased a more expensive studio apartment, not by choice, but of necessity (since only the one- bedroom unit met her needs in light of her disabilities). This claim fails because allowing Wright to pay less for her apartment than every other tenant is charged for the same type of apartment would amount to preferential treatment, which the law does not require. Wright makes two claims of alleged discrimination that, unlike her other charges, are facially plausible. She asserts that the handicapped parking spaces at Bayview are unreasonably far away for her, given her limited mobility. She further asserts that the main entrance doors (and others in the building) do not afford two-way automatic entry, and that as a result, she has difficulty exiting through these doors. The undersigned believes it is possible, even likely, that the refusal to offer Wright a reasonable and necessary accommodation with regard to the alleged parking situation, her problems with ingress and egress, or both, if properly requested, might afford grounds for relief under the FFHA. The shortcoming in Wright's current case is the absence of persuasive proof that she ever presented an actual request for such an accommodation, explaining the necessity thereof, for SMG's consideration. There is evidence suggesting that Wright complained about the parking and the doors, perhaps even to SMG employees, but a gripe, without more, is not equivalent to a request for reasonable accommodation. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of SMG's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Wright, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Wright. There is no persuasive evidence that SMG denied a request of Wright's for a reasonable accommodation at Bayview. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that SMG did not commit any prohibited act.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding SMG not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Wright no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2017.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.37
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RONALD NEY vs ROYAL HIGHLANDS PROPERTY OWNERS, ASSOCIATION, INC., 12-001945 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Leesburg, Florida May 29, 2012 Number: 12-001945 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 2013

The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his handicap, and whether Respondent refused to make reasonable accommodations in its rules, policies, practices, or services necessary to afford Petitioner equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a homeowner in the Royal Highlands community in Leesburg, Florida, and has been a member of the RHPOA since moving into his home in April 2001.1/ From September 2010, through February 2011, Petitioner served on the RHPOA Board of Directors. Respondent is a property owners? association, membership in which is limited to property owners in the Royal Highlands residential community in Leesburg, Florida. There are 1,499 homes in the Royal Highlands community. The community is divided into twelve “districts.” Respondent?s Board of Directors (Board) consists of one representative from each of the twelve districts. Meetings of the Board are held monthly, except for August when community activities are typically sparsely attended. Leland Management is a community association management company that provides management services to the RHPOA along with other community associations. Petitioner alleged that he suffers from a disability because he walks with the use of a cane, and that his ability to speak is impaired as a lingering effect of a 2004 neck surgery that involved insertion of an endotracheal tube during and immediately after the procedure. During the month of February 2011, Petitioner was running for reelection to the RHPOA Board of Directors. On the day of the election, and prior to the vote of the membership, Petitioner appeared at the RHPOA meeting to make a final statement and thank his supporters. He walked to the front of the community meeting room, known as the Great Hall, but did not want to take the steps up to the elevated stage for fear that he might lose his balance and fall off. Petitioner was given a microphone and he thanked his supporters from the base of the stage. Afterwards, he walked back to his seat. Petitioner was not reelected to the Board, but continued to attend meetings as a member of the RHPOA. A monthly meeting of the RHPOA was held on July 13, 2011. The agenda included four items, including an item that would authorize the Board of Directors to retain legal counsel in the event a threatened lawsuit was filed against Bob Fitzpatrick, who was then the president of the RHPOA. The nature of the potential lawsuit was not in evidence, except that it involved a complaint filed with the Lake County Sheriff by Petitioner against Mr. Fitzpatrick. Mr. Fitzpatrick recused himself from the vote, since any legal fees would be expended on his behalf as president. John Banahan, then the vice-president of the RHPOA, acted as chair during the consideration and vote on the agenda item. The RHPOA allows members to speak regarding any issue on the agenda. Members must sign a “Sign-Up Sheet to Speak to Agenda Item” for each item on which they wish to be heard. Members are allowed three minutes to speak on each issue for which they have signed up. The minutes regarding a particular agenda item typically reflect only whether a motion was made, who seconded the motion, who voted, and the results of the vote. When there is a significant amount of discussion, the minutes may, as did the minutes for the legal counsel agenda item of the July 13, 2011 meeting, include something no more detailed than “[m]uch discussion, residents and Board Members.” Neither the comments of property owners nor the discussions of the Board members as to an agenda item are recorded in the minutes of meetings of the RHPOA. When Petitioner was on the Board, he would routinely take notes at meetings, and then destroy the notes after the meeting was concluded. That was consistent with the practice described by other testifying members of the Board. Petitioner attended the July 13, 2011 meeting of the RHPOA with his wife. He entered the meeting room on his own power and without difficulty, though he used a cane, signed up at the door to speak on the agenda item regarding the Board?s proposal to retain legal counsel, and took a seat at one of the tables. Petitioner made no request for assistance of any kind at the time he signed up to speak. Stacey Peach attended the July 13, 2012 meeting as a representative of Leland Management. Ms. Peach periodically attends meetings of the various associations served by Leland Management. Her attendance at the July 13, 2012 RHPOA meeting was coincidental. Ms. Peach was seated at a table in front of Petitioner. When it was his turn to speak on the legal counsel agenda item, Petitioner was recognized by Mr. Banahan. Petitioner announced, without assistance of a microphone, that he could not go to the podium. Mr. Banahan noted “confusion” in the audience, but did not realize what was going on with regard to Petitioner?s request to speak on the agenda item, though he understood that Petitioner was unable to come to the podium at the front of the room. Mr. Banahan testified convincingly that he had no problem with Petitioner speaking from his seat. He was aware of at least two other instances in which a microphone was taken to an attendee of a Board meeting so as to allow them to speak while seated, one of which occurred when he was a member of the Board. Ms. Peach heard Petitioner state that he was not able to go to the podium to offer his comments. She thereupon got a portable microphone and handed it to Petitioner. Petitioner asked Ms. Peach if she would speak on his behalf. Petitioner had not spoken with Ms. Peach earlier, and his request caught her off guard. Not knowing what Petitioner wanted her to say, she declined to speak for him. Her refusal was based on surprise and uncertainty, and not on any discriminatory motive. After Ms. Peach declined to speak on Petitioner?s behalf, Petitioner took the microphone provided to him, and offered his comments on the agenda item from his seat. Petitioner testified that as long as the microphone was working, he saw no reason why he would not have been heard. Except for Ms. Hoffman, whose testimony is discussed below, the witnesses who were asked indicated they had no problem hearing what Petitioner had to say, though none could remember the substance. Petitioner testified that he made a specific request of Mr. Banahan to allow someone to speak on his behalf, and that Mr. Banahan refused the request. Petitioner?s testimony was contradicted by Ms. Peach, who was directly involved in the incident; Mr. Norden, who was seated next to Petitioner; Mr. Reichel, who attended the meeting as a Board member; and Mr. Banahan. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that no request for another person to speak on Petitioner?s behalf was made to any member of the Board, and that the only such request was made, without prior notice, to Ms. Peach. Petitioner?s claim that his request was denied by Mr. Banahan was supported only by the testimony of Ms. Hoffman. However, Ms. Hoffman?s testimony was undermined by the fact that her overall account of the incident differed in several significant and material respects from the testimony of other witnesses, including that of Petitioner. For example, Ms. Hoffman indicated that Ms. Peach was not asked to speak for Petitioner, that Petitioner asked someone seated next to him to speak, that Petitioner had difficulty reading his notes, that Petitioner was unable to complete his comments, and that Petitioner?s speech was, at best, marginal. Whether Ms. Hoffman?s description of events was the result of a poor vantage point or of poor memory, it is not credited. Mr. Banahan testified that if Petitioner had been unable to speak, he would have allowed someone to read a statement on his behalf.2/ However, Mr. Banahan testified that he was not asked to make such an accommodation, and that Petitioner was able to comment on the agenda item from his seat. Mr. Banahan?s testimony is credible and is accepted. Mr. Banahan testified that he has known Petitioner from his service as a member of the Board and never perceived him as having a handicap. Mr. Banahan knew that Petitioner walked with a cane. However, Mr. Banahan?s wife walks with a cane and he does not consider her to have a handicap. Petitioner provided Respondent with no medical records, letters from his physicians, or competent evidence of any kind to establish that he had a disability or that he required an accommodation in order to participate in the July 13, 2011 meeting, nor did he produce any such evidence at the hearing. At the hearing, based upon the undersigned's observation, Petitioner had little or no difficulty walking or speaking. Petitioner failed to prove that he has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or that he was regarded by any director or member of the RHPOA as having any such physical impairment. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner does not suffer from a handicap as defined in the Fair Housing Act. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Petitioner suffered from a handicap that hindered his ability to actively participate in the July 13, 2011 RHPOA meeting. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent knew of any alleged handicap or regarded Petitioner as being handicapped. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent failed to reasonably accommodate Petitioner when he asserted that he would not be able to walk to the podium. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Petitioner made no direct request to any member of the RHPOA Board of Directors to allow someone to speak on his behalf. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Petitioner was able to clearly state his comments on the legal representation agenda item by using the portable microphone provided to him by Ms. Peach. The evidence did not establish that Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his handicap, or that Respondent refused to make reasonable accommodations in its rules, policies, practices or services necessary to afford Petitioner equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0158. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2012.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.68393.063760.20760.22760.23760.34760.37
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ROSS J. COUPLES vs XUAN REN AND TIMOTHY CLOUD, 20-004633 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Oct. 20, 2020 Number: 20-004633 Latest Update: Jul. 04, 2024

The Issue Whether Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint alleging violations of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2020) (FFHA), was timely filed.1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all federal and state statutory and administrative rule references are to the 2020 versions.

Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and testimony offered at the final hearing, the stipulated facts, and the additional documents accepted for official recognition as indicated above. The Lease Petitioner, Ross Couples, leased a house located at 11635 Meadowrun Circle in Fort Meyers, Florida (Property), from Respondent Xuan Ren. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Ren owned the Property. At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Timothy Cloud managed the Property and served as an agent for Respondent Ren. The Property was part of Marina Bay Homeowners' Association (HOA) and subject to the HOA's rules and regulations regarding lease arrangements. On December 12, 2018, Respondent Ren and Petitioner executed a year lease for the Property from January 15, 2018, to January 15, 2019. The lease included the following provision for its renewal: 18. RENEWAL/EXTENSION. The Lease can be renewed or extended only by a written agreement signed by both Landlord and Tenant, but the term of a renewal or extension together with the original Lease Term may not exceed 12 months. … A new lease is required for each period of lease. At some point prior to January 15, 2019, Respondent offered Petitioner another lease agreement. Petitioner refused to pay a $100 leasing fee required by the HOA. The parties did not renew or enter into another 12-month lease, nor did Petitioner move out. As a result, after January 15, 2019, the parties switched to a month-to- month arrangement.4 This arrangement, however, was not approved by the HOA. On February 23, 2019, Petitioner sent an email to the HOA manager and Respondent Cloud. In that email, Petitioner made numerous complaints and mentioned the need for a larger hot water heater for his hydrotherapy tub, which he claimed he needed for health issues. He also discussed at length his opposition to the $100 fee imposed by the HOA for entering into a new lease. On February 27, 2019, Respondent Cloud issued a "Notice of Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy Notice to Vacate" (Notice) to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that the current leasing arrangement had 4 No written lease agreement for the month-to-month arrangement was offered into evidence. been terminated and Petitioner was to vacate the Property on or before May 15, 2019. Petitioner did not move out of the Property on or before May 15, 2019. On May 20, 2019, Respondent Ren filed the eviction action against Petitioner in the appropriate court. A final judgment in the eviction action was rendered on June 6, 2019, and a writ of possession was issued for the Property on June 7, 2019. Petitioner vacated the Property and turned over possession to the Lee County Sheriff on June 12, 2019. Housing Complaints Petitioner testified that on April 5, 2019, he filed a complaint of discrimination with the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regarding his claim of disability discrimination against Respondents. On January 17, 2020, HUD issued a letter to Respondent Cloud (HUD Letter) indicating it was dismissing the case brought by Petitioner, and specifically finding "that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred. … No evidence was found to support Petitioner's contention that his disability was used as a basis to evict him." The HUD Letter does not indicate Petitioner could re-open the HUD case or file anything else with HUD based on the same facts. It does not mention the FFHA or FCHR, and it does not provide any instruction or information on how to pursue claims pursuant to state housing discrimination laws.5 Petitioner claims a HUD employee, Mr. Jordan, told him he had a year from his last date of possession of the Property to "file the proper paperwork." 5 The HUD Letter does mention that Petitioner could file a civil lawsuit "in an appropriate federal district court or state court within two (2) years of the date on which the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred or ended." The letter also has instructions as to what Petitioner may be able to file if he was retaliated against for filing the HUD complaint. This proceeding does not involve either of those situations. Petitioner also states Mr. Jordon told him he could file a claim with either HUD or the Florida Fair Housing Commission.6 It is unclear when this conversation occurred, what Mr. Jordan's role was at HUD, and whether the discussion was in person or over the phone. Regardless, this testimony is hearsay and not corroborated by any non-hearsay evidence or documentation. There is no credible evidence to establish that anyone at either HUD or FCHR informed Petitioner that he had one year from the last date of possession of the Property to file an FFHA discrimination complaint with FCHR. The date Petitioner filed his FFHA Complaint with FCHR is contested. Petitioner testified he contacted the "Florida Fair Housing Commission" on June 10, 2020, regarding his FFHA claim. He admits he did not file his FFHA complaint immediately. Rather, at that time, he spoke with an "intake clerk," who sent him a complaint form, which he then filled out and returned. There is no competent evidence corroborating Petitioner's assertion in his Response that he filed the Complaint with FCHR on June 10, 2021. Rather, the top of the front page of the Complaint is dated July 22, 2020, and indicates Petitioner verified the facts in the Complaint on July 21, 2020. Moreover, the Determination dated September 18, 2020, also references that the Complaint was submitted on July 21, 2020. Based on Petitioner's testimony and the date that Petitioner verified the Complaint with his signature, the undersigned finds Petitioner's Complaint was filed with FCHR on July 21, 2020. 6 The undersigned is unaware of an agency operating under the name of "Florida Fair Housing Commission." The undersigned assumes that Petitioner is referring to FCHR. See § 760.22(1), Fla. Stat. (defining “Commission” to mean the Florida Commission on Human Relations).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Ross J. Couples. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2021. Ross Joseph Couples Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Steven Klaus Teuber, Esquire Teuber Law, PLLC Post Office Box 49885 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Timothy Cloud D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Mahshie & DeCosta 1560 Matthew Drive, Suite E Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Suite 202-200 13650 Fiddlesticks Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Xuan Ren D-15 # 514 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Paul Edward Olah, Esquire Law Offices of Wells Olah, P.A. 1800 Second Street, Suite 808 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020

Florida Laws (10) 120.569760.22760.23760.34760.3590.20295.01195.05195.28195.36 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.213 DOAH Case (1) 20-4633
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JAMES E. TOWNSEND SR., CONTESSA IDLEBURG vs ASSAD F. MALATY, 18-004634 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Sep. 04, 2018 Number: 18-004634 Latest Update: Apr. 06, 2020

The Issue Whether Respondent, Assad F. Malaty, discriminated against Petitioners, Dr. James E. Townsend and his niece, Contessa Idleburg (formerly, Ms. Rogers), in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act and, if so, the appropriate remedy therefor.

Findings Of Fact Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Dr. Townsend has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. He suffered a stroke in May 2014, upon which the requested modifications and accommodations were based. The stroke substantially limited one or more major life activities, given his need for using a wheelchair and walker. § 760.22(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Mr. Malaty conceded as much at the hearing.3/ Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Ms. Idleburg has a qualifying handicap under the FFHA. She has a shunt to drain fluid from her brain, has received Supplemental Social Security Income since at least 2014, and also has used a walker. That said, the evidence is undisputed that Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodations solely to assist Dr. Townsend after he suffered the stroke. Thus, Ms. Idleburg’s handicap is not relevant to the claims at issue. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Petitioners informed Mr. Malaty in May 2014 that Dr. Townsend suffered a stroke and requested that he make several modifications to the Unit, including handrails in the bathroom, and handrails and a ramp at the front door, and to accommodate them by assigning them a parking spot outside the Unit. There is no dispute that the requested modifications and accommodation were never made. Importantly, however, the evidence does not establish that Petitioners’ renewed those requests again before they filed complaints with the Department of Justice in late 2016 and HUD in early 2017.4/ Although Dr. Townsend reminded Mr. Malaty in a December 2016 letter that he had failed to make the requested the modifications, the undersigned finds that letter to be more in the nature of a response to Mr. Malaty’s threat of eviction rather than a renewed request to accommodate them. The weight of the credible evidence also confirms that Petitioners never offered to pay for the handrails, ramp, or signage for the requested parking spot. Indeed, Dr. Townsend testified that he believed Mr. Malaty was responsible for making such modifications as the owner of the Unit. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Mr. Malaty did not evict Petitioners because of their handicaps or their requests for modifications or an accommodation. Mr. Malaty initially threatened to evict them for failing to pay rent in January 2013, reducing their rent in September and December 2016, and failing to take care of the lawn as required in the lease. It had been three years since Petitioners requested the modifications and accommodation due to Dr. Townsend’s stroke and they did not re-raise those issues again until after Mr. Malaty threatened to evict them for failing to pay the rent. The evidence also is clear that Petitioners could have avoided eviction by paying the missed rent by December 29, 2016. But, they failed to do so and then did not pay their rent in January 2017, which ultimately led to Mr. Malaty filing the eviction action.

Conclusions For Petitioners: James E. Townsend, Sr., pro se Contessa Idleburg, pro se Apartment 2101 140 Aida Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 For Respondent: Charlann Jackson Sanders, Esquire Law Office of Charlann Jackson Sanders 2225 East Edgewood Drive, Suite 8 Lakeland, Florida 33803

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioners’ Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2019.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.22760.23760.32760.34760.35760.37 DOAH Case (1) 18-4634
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APRIL WILLIAMS vs ORION REAL ESTATE SERVICES, AND HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF WINTER PARK, 20-002125 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Altamonte Springs, Florida May 06, 2020 Number: 20-002125 Latest Update: Jul. 04, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondents Orion Real Estate Services (Orion) and the Housing Authority of the City of Winter Park (Housing Authority) subjected Petitioner April Williams to discriminatory housing practices based on her race (African American, non-Hispanic), in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2019) (FHA).1

Findings Of Fact Ms. Williams, an African American female, lives in an apartment in the Meadows, a low-income housing complex located in Winter Park, Florida. The Housing Authority is a governmental entity that provides low- income housing through federal funds provided by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. It contracts with outside companies to manage the properties it owns. The Housing Authority owns the Meadows. Orion is a real estate services company that manages residential properties for landlords and investors. At the time relevant to these proceedings, Orion managed the Meadows for the Housing Authority. Ms. Williams had to climb up a stairwell to reach her unit. Her apartment was located above one unit and next to another. She shared a front porch with her next-door neighbor. The Meadows housed 300 residents during the relevant time period. Of those residents, 264 identified themselves as "Black" and 280 identified themselves as "Ethnic." There was no testimony or evidence as to how many identified as Hispanic. The Housing Authority claims it took no action against Ms. Williams, and therefore cannot be liable for discrimination. The Community Manager for the Meadows, LiMarys Rivera, testified she was an employee of Orion. However, she issued documentation on letterhead titled "The Housing Authority of the City of Winter Park." Ms. Rivera's signature line states that her title is "Property Manager Agent for the Winter Park Housing Authority." As such, the undersigned finds Ms. Rivera was a dual agent for both Orion and the Housing Authority. Ms. Rivera testified that once she received a complaint against a tenant, regardless of who made the complaint, it was standard procedure to first reach out to the alleged violator by telephone as a courtesy, and then if there was a subsequent complaint to send out a written "Notice to Cure" or "Notice of Material Non-Compliance with Opportunity to Cure and Proposed Adverse Action" (non-compliance notice) to that tenant. Respondents provided numerous non-compliance notices to tenants regarding various types of complaints. Ms. Rivera testified these non- compliance notices were issued to tenants of all races, and both Hispanic and non-Hispanic tenants. Over the course of a year to 18 months, Ms. Williams had made somewhere between 20 and 29 complaints against her next-door neighbor and her downstairs neighbor. Ms. Williams described both of these neighbors as Hispanic. Ms. Williams complained that her next-door neighbor was noisy and would smoke (and allow guests to smoke) on the front porch even though her building was designated as a non-smoking area. Ms. Williams also complained that the downstairs neighbor left items on the stairwell causing a hazard. These items included pizza boxes, shoes, rugs, and bags of trash. As a result of these complaints, both of Ms. Williams's neighbors were issued non-compliance notices. The downstairs neighbor received a non- compliance notice for leaving pizza boxes, trash, and the other objects outside her front door. Similarly, the next-door neighbor received a non-compliance notice for smoking in her apartment and common areas. Additionally, Respondents issued community flyers to all the tenants in the Meadows reminding them of basic rules, including not smoking, not leaving trash and debris outside, and keeping front porches clean. Ms. Williams also complained to Respondents that workmen who were performing maintenance in her unit were speaking Spanish. She requested that Respondents provide workmen that speak only English while on the Meadows property. At some point, Ms. Williams's neighbors made noise complaints against her. Respondents did not initially issue a non-compliance notice to Ms. Williams because she and her neighbors had numerous complaints against each other. Instead, Ms. Rivera attempted to hold a conciliation or mediation meeting with all of them. Ms. Williams refused. She did not see the point of the meeting, and believed Ms. Rivera would take the neighbors' side because Ms. Rivera, like the neighbors, was Hispanic. After Ms. Williams refused to meet, Respondents issued her a non- compliance notice for excessive noise. There was no evidence that she was required to pay any fees or fines as a result of the non-compliance notice against her. Ms. Williams testified she felt Ms. Rivera gave preferential treatment to Hispanics. When asked how they were treated better, Ms. Williams testified that her neighbors were not evicted despite the complaints made against them. Ms. Williams admitted, however, that Respondents did not evict her either.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by April Williams. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Ricardo L. Gilmore, Esquire Saxon, Gilmore, Carraway and Gibbons, P.A. 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 600 Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Kevin Fulton, Esquire Fulton Strahan Law Group, PLLC 7676 Hillmont Street, Suite 191 Houston, Texas 77040 (eServed) April Williams 746 Margaret Square Winter Park, Florida 32789 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.23760.34760.35760.37 DOAH Case (1) 20-2125
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LINDA D. SMITH vs SAUL SILBER PROPERTIES, LLC, 18-002698 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida May 23, 2018 Number: 18-002698 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling based on her race, in violation of Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2015).

Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the exhibit admitted into evidence and testimony offered by witnesses at the final hearing. Ms. Smith is a Black female and currently resides in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber Properties is a company that manages Oak Glade located at 3427 Southwest 30th Terrace, Gainesville, Florida 32608. Respondent provides residential rental apartments in Gainesville, Florida. Saul Silber is the owner of Saul Silber Properties. Ms. Smith is a former resident of apartment number 54I of Oak Glade.1/ Ms. Smith rented the apartment pursuant to a residential lease agreement entered into on January 15, 2014.2/ The lease was for a one-year renewable term. Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the Commission alleging Respondent issued her a Notice of Non-Renewal of her lease agreement on the basis of her race. The Commission issued a “No Cause” determination and Ms. Smith filed a Petition for Relief, which is the matter before the undersigned. During her tenancy at Oak Glade, Ms. Smith had raised numerous complaints with the property manager regarding matters involving her neighbor, Anne E. Dowling. Ms. Dowling, who was White, was a former resident of apartment number 54H. Ms. Smith’s issues with Ms. Dowling included complaints concerning smoking, loud music, non-residents living in the apartment, the number of visitors outside Ms. Dowling’s apartment, and Ms. Dowling’s cat scratching her car. All of the complaints were addressed and resolved by the property manager. The incident that led to the major blow-up between the neighbors involved Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter. Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter were involved in a verbal altercation after Ms. Smith verbally reprimanded Ms. Dowling’s granddaughter (age range of 7-9 years old) and her friend. Ms. Smith testified that the two girls turned their backs to her, bent over, and wiggled their buttocks in a side-to-side motion. Ms. Smith understood this gesture to be disrespectful and a suggestion to “kiss their behinds.” Ms. Dowling’s daughter was not a resident of the apartment complex. The altercation was so loud that Ms. Osteen heard people “screaming” while she was in her office. Ms. Osteen discovered Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling’s daughter involved in a screaming match. Ms. Osteen later consulted with the senior property manager about the incident and it was determined that both Ms. Dowling and Ms. Smith would be issued a Notice of Non-Renewal. On March 15, 2016, Respondent issued Ms. Smith and Ms. Dowling a Notice of Non-Renewal, which was posted on the door of each tenant’s respective apartment. The notices did not state a reason for non-renewal. Ms. Dowling’s lease would expire effective May 30, 2016; and Ms. Smith’s lease would expire effective December 30, 2016. Prior to expiration of her lease, Ms. Dowling advised Ms. Osteen that she was terminally ill and requested that she be permitted to stay at Oak Glade. Ms. Dowling explained that her support system was located in the area and due to financial limitations, moving from the complex would create a hardship for her. For these reasons, Ms. Dowling was permitted to enter a new lease and was moved to a different apartment. The decision to permit Ms. Dowling to remain at the complex was made by the senior property manager. Ms. Dowling passed away approximately four months later, on September 28, 2016. Other than her mistaken belief that Ms. Dowling did not receive a Notice of Non-Renewal, Ms. Smith did not offer any evidence to support her claim of housing discrimination in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order: finding that Respondent, Saul Silber Properties, LLC, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner, Ms. Smith; and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2017H0320. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2018.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68760.20760.23760.34760.37
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PATRICIA MCDONOUGH vs OSCEOLA COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, 03-004845 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Kissimmee, Florida Dec. 24, 2003 Number: 03-004845 Latest Update: Jun. 03, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner, Patricia McDonough, on the basis of her race, violating Subsections 760.23(1), (2), or (4), Florida Statutes (2002). If discriminatory conduct has been proven, whether quantifiable damages, or other allowable remedies, have been proven under Section 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2002).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Patricia McDonough, is a Caucasian female who, at one time, qualified for housing assistance under the Section 8 Rental Voucher (Voucher) Program and is a protected person under the FHA. Respondent, Osceola County Housing Authority, is a department of the Osceola County Board of County Commissioners, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and is the local housing authority (HA) under the Federal FHA. In 1997, Petitioner participated in the Voucher program, which is administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Vouchers are portable, which allows a participant to move to another jurisdiction and request a transfer from one local HA to another. A portability packet of necessary paperwork is prepared by the originating HA and mailed directly to the receiving HA to facilitate the transfer and to prevent fraud. If the receiving HA accepts the transferred Voucher to administer, the originating HA pays the receiving HA 80 percent of the administrative fee it receives from HUD, in addition to the rental and utility assistance payments. Petitioner had a valid Voucher in 1997 that was administered at the local level by the Maryland Housing Opportunity Commission located at 10400 Detrick Avenue, Kensington, Maryland 20895 (Maryland). Petitioner requested Maryland to transfer her Voucher to the City of Kissimmee, Florida (Kissimmee), in 1997, which was the local HA for Osceola County, Florida, at that time. Kissimmee accepted the Maryland Voucher on August 28, 1997, and agreed to administer it on behalf of Maryland. Respondent assumed responsibility for the Voucher program from Kissimmee on October 1, 2000. From 1997 to the present, Kissimmee and Respondent contracted with HUD for a total of 193 Vouchers. This does not include any transferred Vouchers administered through the portability requirements of the HUD program. Kissimmee created a waiting list in 1998 that contained more than 500 names of eligible participants for the 193 Vouchers. The waiting list has not been reopened since it was created. The list was created and is administered in a nondiscriminatory and race-neutral manner by the HA. Respondent accepts and administers transferred Vouchers and currently administers in excess of 700 such Vouchers. A transferred Voucher does not affect the 193 contracted Vouchers. A participant must be recertified annually to keep one of the 193 Vouchers. As participants surrender one of these 193 Vouchers, a new participant is awarded the Voucher from Respondent's waiting list. As participants surrender one of the 700 transferred Vouchers, Respondent has no authority to award it to anyone, whether on the waiting list or not. Petitioner was never on Respondent's waiting list, since Petitioner's Voucher was a transferred Voucher from Maryland. On or about July 13, 2000, Petitioner requested Kissimmee to transfer her Voucher to the County of Fairfax, Department of Housing, Fairfax, Virginia (Virginia). Kissimmee prepared the transfer packet and mailed it to Virginia at Petitioner's request. Petitioner moved from Virginia back to Osceola County in early May 2001. Petitioner testified that when she moved back to Osceola County, she brought her paperwork with her. She then requested Respondent, in a letter dated May 10, 2001, to reinstate her transfer Voucher from Virginia. Petitioner testified that she included her paperwork with the letter. However, there is no credible evidence to support her position. Petitioner has not shown that she had a valid portable Voucher from another HA to transfer to Respondent when she returned from Virginia in May 2001, nor did she offer proof that she requested Virginia to mail her voucher and transfer request directly to Respondent, as HUD policy requires. Respondent has never received paperwork for a transfer Voucher for Petitioner from another jurisdiction, including Maryland or Virginia, after Kissimmee transferred Petitioner's Voucher to Virginia in 2000. Respondent cannot reinstate a Voucher from another HA. Respondent has policies and procedures in place to prevent racial discrimination. Respondent denied Petitioner's request based upon its policies and procedures. Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner based upon her race. Petitioner is not eligible for one of the 193 Vouchers Respondent is contracted for through HUD. Respondent does not have any Vouchers available to award to Petitioner and has not reopened the waiting list since it was created in 1998. Petitioner has failed to produce any evidence that Respondent racially discriminated against her in regard to the administration of the Voucher program or failed to rent her a dwelling unit for which she was eligible.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the relief sought and dismissing the petition filed in this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patricia McDonough 5121 Violet Lane Kissimmee, Florida 34758 Scott Polodna, Esquire Osceola County Housing Authority One Courthouse Square, Suite 4200 Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.23760.3590.803
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