Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as an Accountant II on December 1, 1987 and in December of 1993, was promoted to Tax Auditor II. In September of 1991, the Respondent received a complaint regarding Petitioner from a taxpayer. The taxpayer alleged that the Petitioner had accused the taxpayer of attempting to sabotage the Petitioner's van. When questioned about the complaint, the Petitioner stated that the taxpayer had attempted to damage his van because the Petitioner had denied the taxpayer's refund claim. The Petitioner's supervisor investigated Petitioner's claims, counseled him and suggested that the Petitioner participate in the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The Petitioner declined assistance. In October and November of 1992, the Petitioner began making bizarre allegations about his co-workers and supervisors engaging in outrageous and deviant sexual conduct and activities, and began to behave strangely. The Petitioner told his supervisors that his co-workers were engaging in sex with his mother, aunt, uncle and other members of his family. According to the Petitioner, these sexual activities were taking place in the office. The Petitioner was upset particularly at one co-worker, who Petitioner stated had moved in next door to him or into his neighborhood in order to spy on Petitioner. In addition, Petitioner stated that the "sex police" were observing him at Walmart. The police would get on top of his van to spy on him according to Petitioner. During this time, the Petitioner filed a "sexual harassment" complaint with the Respondent's Inspector General. Petitioner's statement to the investigators repeated the bizarre accusations outlined above regarding his co- workers. After investigating the Petitioner's claim, the Respondent's Inspector General found no evidence to substantiate these allegations and statements. Because the Petitioner's increasingly bizarre behavior, the Respondent became concerned about the Petitioner's ability to perform his duties as a Tax Auditor I. Therefore, the Respondent requested that the Petitioner go to a psychiatrist for an evaluation. The Petitioner agreed and went to the Apalachee Center for Human Services, where he was examined by Dr. Terence Leland, a psychologist and Dr. Inez Bragado-Spence, a psychiatrist. The evaluation consisted of three, one- hour interviews and various written tests. It was understood that the results of this examination would be shared with Respondent. Dr. Leland reported to the Respondent that the Petitioner had made delusional statements of the type made to and investigated by the Inspector General and found to be baseless. The Petitioner reported that co-workers and others were spying on him. The Petitioner reported alleged sexual liaisons at the office between various employees and supervisors. The Petitioner reported plots against him by various conspirators and "hit men" of the Respondent. Dr. Leland's diagnosis was that the Petitioner suffered from a delusional (paranoid) disorder, persecutory type. It was Dr. Leland's opinion that the Petitioner clearly needed treatment. Dr. Leland felt that the Petitioner could not perform his duties without treatment, and recommended requiring treatment as a condition of the Petitioner's continued employment. During this period, the Petitioner's job performance suffered. Based upon Dr. Leland's reports, the Respondent required that the Petitioner obtain treatment as a condition of continued employment. The Petitioner and the Respondent entered into an agreement which required the following as a condition of continued employment: Seeking psychiatric treatment within 40 days. Furnishing documentation that treat- ment had commenced and was continuing for as long as treatment was recommended. Following the prescribed treatment so long as it was recommended. The Petitioner commenced treatment in June of 1993, Dr. Prasad, a psychiatrist, prescribed medication for the control of Petitioner's illness and Suzan Taylor, a counselor associated with Dr. Prasad, held regular counseling sessions with Petitioner. As a result of his treatment, the Petitioner was asymptomatic, his work improved, and he was promoted to Tax Auditor II in December of 1993. In the summer of 1994, approximately one year after commencing treatment, Dr. Prasad and Suzan Taylor began to suspect that the Petitioner was no longer taking his medication when he again began making delusional statements. At the same time, the Petitioner's supervisor began to notice the reoccurrence of Petitioner's prior conduct. When confronted by his doctors in November of 1994 about the failure to take his medication, the Petitioner stated that he had quit taking it. He was given the option of getting shots of the same medication on a regular basis, but he declined. On November 18, 1994, the Petitioner had an altercation with a co- worker and received a one-day suspension. Dr. Prasad had diagnosed the Petitioner as having major depression with psychotic features of persecution and delusion. Dr. Prasad's opinion was that the Petitioner could not perform his essential job functions without treatment. On or about November 21, 1994, the Petitioner told his supervisor that his last visit to Dr. Prasad was on November 16, 1994. Dr. Prasad was contacted by Petitioner's employer, and Dr. Prasad issued a final report dated November 23, 1994, in which she stated that the Petitioner refused to take any further medication or follow her directions; therefore, there was nothing further she could do to help him if he refused her recommended treatment. She did not release Petitioner from treatment. The Respondent issued its proposed letter of termination based upon the Petitioner's refusal to continue treatment contrary to his agreement and the Petitioner's behavior on the job. In a response to the letter of termination, the Petitioner made bizarre statements about the co-worker with whom he had had the altercation with on November 18, 1994. At a pre-determination conference conducted by William Fritchman, the Respondent's Chief of Personnel and Training (at the time), it was suggested that the Petitioner go to another doctor for evaluation and treatment, if necessary. The Petitioner stated that he would not seek further medical help and stated that he would not take any drugs. The Respondent had real concerns about the Petitioner's ability to perform his job duties, his interaction with taxpayers, and potential harm to fellow employees. Based upon Dr. Prasad's diagnosis and opinion that Petitioner required continuing treatment and Petitioner's declining job performance, Mr. Fritchman issued the Final Action Letter of Termination citing the Petitioner's breach of the conditions of employment, as agreed in the letter of April 30, 1993, which constituted insubordination. Petitioner offered no evidence showing he was sexually harassed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's claim be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Franklin Post Office Box 572 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0572 Gene T. Sellers, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32311-6668 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities’ (Agency) intended decision to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification for employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 33-year-old female residing in Lake City, Florida. Petitioner has three children, ages 19, 16, and and 12, from her first marriage. Her first husband is deceased. Petitioner was remarried in April 2015. Petitioner and her husband live with, and care for, her three children, as well as two young grandchildren and her seven-year-old niece. Between November 2015 and September 2016, Petitioner was employed at CARC, a residential group home licensed by the Agency.1/ Petitioner provided personal care to the residents, as well as transportation for the residents to doctor’s appointments, shopping, and occasionally to cash their personal checks. In her capacity with the group home, Petitioner had access to and responsibility for the group home van, as well as the corporate credit card for purchasing gasoline. Since being disqualified from employment serving Agency clients, Petitioner has been employed at “Still Waters,” a residential nursing home facility. She works 12-hour shifts, four days on, three days off. Petitioner testified that the hours make it too difficult to care for her children, grandchildren, and niece. Petitioner wishes to return to her employment in the group home as a direct service provider to clients of the Agency. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust. Specifically, the Agency’s mission includes serving and protecting vulnerable populations, including children and adults with developmental disabilities. Disqualifying Offense On May 23, 2005, Petitioner was arrested for forgery and grand theft, stemming from having cashed a forged check. The check was written for $391.83, payable to a third party and cashed by Petitioner at her bank. Petitioner pled guilty to both charges, which are third- degree felonies. In August 2005, the court withheld adjudication, ordered Petitioner to complete two years’ probation, and entered a final judgment for fines and costs in the amount of $373. Petitioner’s fines and costs were later converted to community service hours, which she completed. Petitioner was also required to pay restitution to the bank, which she satisfied. Petitioner completed probation timely on August 22, 2007. Petitioner was 21 years old at the time of the disqualifying offense. The details are sketchy. Neither Petitioner’s testimony nor her exemption questionnaire provide much of an explanation. The explanation in Petitioner’s exemption questionnaire indicates that a friend gave her a check from the friend’s employer, and Petitioner cashed it at Petitioner’s bank and kept the cash. She explained that she was young and dumb and did not know better. Petitioner’s testimony was brief, stating that she had been hanging around with the wrong crowd, and that a friend got a check from McDonald’s which Petitioner deposited in her own account. In the questionnaire, Petitioner indicated no one else was involved in the crime because “I did not tell on my friend.” She answered “n/a” to questions regarding the degree of harm to the victim or property (permanent or temporary), as well as whether there were any stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying offense. When prompted in the questionnaire to provide any additional comments, Petitioner explained that she knew what she did was wrong; that she does not get in trouble any more; that she has three kids, and only has time to go to work, church, and home; and that she wants to take care of “my people,” which she enjoys. Subsequent Non-Disqualifying Offenses The Agency’s Exemption Review Summary lists two2/ non- disqualifying offenses subsequent to Petitioner’s disqualifying offense.3/ In March 2006, Petitioner was arrested for, and adjudicated guilty of, passing a worthless check to Publix in the amount of $76. On June 8, 2006, Petitioner was ordered to complete 12 months’ probation and pay restitution, court fines, and fees in the amount of $329. Petitioner’s probation was terminated on June 4, 2007, having satisfied all terms thereof. Petitioner wrote the check to Publix on October 3, 2005. Petitioner was 21 years old, caring for her seven-year- old, four-year-old, and infant children, and her husband was incarcerated. Petitioner testified, both in her questionnaire and at final hearing, that she wrote the check knowing she did not have the money to cover it because she needed food for her children and diapers for the baby. On February 20, 2012, Petitioner was charged with leaving the scene of a traffic accident. On March 15, 2012, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and placed on six months’ probation, ordered to complete an eight-hour driver improvement course, and pay court costs and fines in the amount of $416. Petitioner was released from probation on August 14, 2012, having satisfied all probation conditions. Petitioner was 28 years old at the time of the incident. Petitioner was driving with a friend as a passenger, when she crashed her car in a ditch. Petitioner left her car in the ditch and contacted another friend to give them a ride home. The following day, the police came to her home and charged her with leaving the scene of an accident. Petitioner testified that she left the scene because she had no insurance, and that it was late and dark. No evidence was introduced to support a finding that any other vehicle was involved in the accident, or that the accident resulted in any property damage or injury. Educational and Employment History Petitioner graduated from high school in 2002. Petitioner completed the educational requirements to become a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) at Lake City Community College in 2004. However, Petitioner has not passed the written state board exam to become certified. Petitioner lists no employment history prior to 2011, although there is some evidence that she worked as a caregiver at a “cluster home” in Lake City in 2005. Petitioner worked as a caregiver in a group home known as “Open Heart” from January 2011 to October 2014. Petitioner was subsequently employed as a housekeeper with Holiday Inn in Lake City from February to November 2015. Petitioner left Holiday Inn to become a caregiver at CARC in November 2015. As noted previously, subsequent to Petitioner’s disqualification, she has been employed at a nursing home facility. Subsequent Personal History Petitioner divorced her first husband in 2014 and he is now deceased. Petitioner has full custody of all three of her children and has taken on the responsibility of her 19-year-old daughter’s two children, as well as her seven-year-old niece. In April 2015, Petitioner married her current husband Octavius, who is a 13-year employee of Red Lobster. Petitioner is active in her church where she sings in the choir, attends Tuesday night bible study and Wednesday night worship, and has her niece involved in a praise dance for children program on Saturdays. One of Petitioner’s sons is disabled. Petitioner reports that both sons play football and that she is, or has been, a team mom for the football team. Petitioner’s Exemption Request Petitioner’s exemption questionnaire is bereft of details. Most questions are answered in just a few words or are answered as “not applicable.”4/ Petitioner expresses remorse for her disqualifying and non-disqualifying offenses. However, it is not entirely clear that Petitioner understands the ramifications of her forgery offense, since she indicated there was no harm done by her passing of a forged check. Petitioner submitted five personal letters of reference with her exemption application. One is from one of her sons, another from a friend at church, and the remaining letters are from former co-workers at care-giving agencies. Each attests to her compassion for disabled persons and her sincerity in the care of those persons. Petitioner did not submit any letter of reference from a current or former employer or another individual in a position of authority. Petitioner did not offer any witness testimony or additional letters of reference at the final hearing. Ultimate Facts Petitioner’s recent employment history evidences her work ethic and emphasizes a passion for serving persons with disabilities. Petitioner’s personal references support a finding that she is committed to family and community, and has a heart for service. However, Petitioner’s disqualifying offense, and at least one of the subsequent non-disqualifying offenses, involves attempts to attain money to care for her family when times were tough. Petitioner’s failure to describe any stressors in her life at the time, and to clearly distinguish her circumstances at present, substantiates the Agency’s reticence to allow Petitioner to work with the most vulnerable clients. Petitioner has more dependents at present than she did when the disqualifying offenses occurred. The record contains few details of how her situation differs today from the past.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2017.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be exempt from disqualification from employment in a position of trust, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes (2016).1/
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Agency is the state entity which supports vulnerable persons with various developmental disabilities. The Agency contracts with direct service providers and is responsible for regulating the employment of persons serving in positions of trust with these providers. The ARC of Martin County, Inc. (the ARC), is a service provider for the Agency. Ms. Ford applied with the ARC to become an after-school counselor, a position of trust which requires completion of level 2 background screening. The Department of Children and Families conducts initial screening on behalf of the Agency. Background screening and local criminal records revealed a history of involvement with law enforcement, as Ms. Ford admitted in her exemption request paperwork and her testimony at hearing, summarized below. On September 30, 2011, Ms. Ford entered a plea of guilty to forgery, driving on a suspended license, and providing a false name to law enforcement, for events that took place on April 9, 2010. Forgery, a felony of the third degree, is a disqualifying offense for employment in a position of trust. She was ordered to pay court fees and costs, and was put on probation for a period of 18 months for that offense. In her responses in the Exemption Questionnaire, Ms. Ford gave few details as to the events surrounding the disqualifying offense itself. She stated only that she was a witness to an accident on March 20, 2011, almost a year after the forgery incident, and, after identifying herself to the police, was arrested on an outstanding warrant from Martin County for the forgery charge. Ms. Ford wrote in her own words:2/ The forgery was do to traffic when I was pulled over and I gave my sister name to the officer. The officer then allowed me to go to go. I didn't know I had a warrant for Martin County until the night of the crash. In response to inquiries concerning another arrest for driving with a suspended license and providing a false name to a law enforcement officer while being arrested or detained a couple of months later on May 9, 2011, Ms. Ford wrote: I was on my to work and I was running late so I then was doing over milage and I was pulled over and gave officer a other name, cause I didn't want to be late for work. At hearing, in response to inquiries concerning her arrest for shoplifting on January 22, 2013, Ms. Ford acknowledged shoplifting a medical device for her daughter from Wal-Mart. Ms. Ford completed all confinement, supervision, and nonmonetary conditions imposed by the court for her disqualifying offense by March 29, 2013. Mr. Gerry Driscoll is the regional operations manager for the Southeast Region of the Agency. He has served in his current position for three years and has been employed with the Agency for seventeen years. Mr. Driscoll credibly testified that the Agency has responsibility for a very vulnerable population, many of whom are unable to later tell others about the actions of their caregivers. This population is thus very susceptible to exploitation. Mr. Driscoll noted that the Agency must consider any prior criminal conduct or dishonesty very carefully. In her written submission to the Agency, Ms. Ford did not recognize that she caused any harm or injury to any victim. However, at hearing, she admitted that she caused injury to her sister when she provided and signed her sister's name to law enforcement after being detained or arrested on more than one occasion. Ms. Ford submitted three identically worded "form" character reference letters to the Agency, stating generally that she is a responsible, reliable, and honest person. The letters do not indicate the employment status or positions of the individuals signing the references. Ms. Ford further stated that she was remorseful. In her Exemption Questionnaire, Ms. Ford wrote: Yes my remorse is I accepting made bad choose in my life and I accept full responsibility for the actions that I made. I want to move forward and put the pass behind me so I can make a better future for me and my kids. Ms. Ford seems sincere in her desire to assist vulnerable persons and asks for a chance to work with them to demonstrate that she is rehabilitated. However, the statute requires that rehabilitation be shown first; only then may an exemption for disqualification be granted. While Ms. Ford stated that she is rehabilitated, she offered little evidence to clearly demonstrate that. She completed a home health aide course in 2012, but has not participated in other counseling or coursework since the disqualifying offense. Ms. Ford's recent work history includes employment as an administrative assistant with Florida Community Health Centers, Inc., from October 8, 2014, to October 5, 2015, and employment as a mental health technician with Sandy Pines Residential Treatment Center from July 18, 2008, to January 7, 2014. Passage of time is a factor to be considered in determining rehabilitation, and the last disqualifying offense was over five years ago. However, Ms. Ford's history since her disqualifying offense includes more to reflect incidents and does not contain sufficient positive indications of rehabilitation. Ms. Ford failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated and that she will not present a danger if she is exempted from her disqualification from employment in a position of trust.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Ms. Jennifer Ford's application for exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2016.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent materially understated payroll in violation of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2003), and, if so, what penalty, if any, should be imposed against Respondent; and whether Respondent's workers are not employees defined in Section 440.02, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. (2002). Respondent is a corporation domiciled in Florida and engaged in the business of stucco and plastering. On March 2, 2004, Petitioner's compliance officer conducted a random site inspection of a single-family residence under construction at 12061 Cypress Links Drive, Fort Myers, Florida. Two work crews were present on the construction site. One crew was finishing drywall seams inside the house. The other crew was applying stucco to the outside of the house. The compliance officer is the only employee for Petitioner who investigated and developed the substantive information that forms the basis of Petitioner's proposed agency action. Other employees calculated the actual amounts of the proposed penalties. On March 3, 2004, the compliance officer conducted a conference in his office with Ms. Sandra Gomez and Mr. Francesco Zuniga; and Mr. Juan Rivera and Ms. Licia Rivera. Mr. and Mrs. Rivera are the principal officers for Respondent. The compliance officer determined that the crew working inside the house worked for Mr. Zuniga and that the crew working outside the house worked for Ms. Gomez. The compliance officer further determined that Ms. Gomez and Mr. Zuniga were subcontractors for Respondent and that neither Ms. Gomez nor Mr. Zuniga had workers compensation insurance. The compliance officer issued stop work orders against Ms. Gomez and Mr. Zuniga that are not within the purview of this proceeding. The compliance officer determined that Respondent maintained workers' compensation insurance through the Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford) and took no action against Respondent except to issue an order for Respondent to produce its business records for the preceding three years (the business records) for audit by Petitioner. The compliance officer reported to Hartford that Respondent had uninsured subcontractors working for Respondent. The compliance officer also requested and received from Hartford a copy of the last premium audit report for Respondent (the audit report). On March 10, 2004, Respondent produced the business records previously requested by the compliance officer. The production of records fully satisfied the request issued by the compliance officer. The compliance officer determined there was a discrepancy between the audit report's description of employee duties and related information in the business records. The compliance officer determined that Respondent had materially understated or concealed payroll and had materially misrepresented or concealed employee duties by representing that Respondent was in the drywall business and not in the stucco business. On March 10, 2004, Petitioner issued Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order Number 04-94-D6 (the Initial Order). The Initial Order alleged that Respondent violated Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2003), by materially understating or concealing payroll and proposed a penalty equal to the greater of 1.5 times the premiums Respondent would have paid over the preceding three years or $1,000. Petitioner subsequently amended the Initial Order to charge Respondent with materially misrepresenting or concealing employee duties. Petitioner issued the Initial Order without conducting any further review of Respondent or its principals. The compliance officer told Mr. Rivera that it would not be helpful for Respondent to retain counsel and that counsel would only further delay release of the stop work order. The compliance officer did not provide Respondent with any information concerning methods of avoiding the penalty except for Respondent to provide proof of an exemption or proof of insurance for Respondent's subcontractors. The compliance officer did not advise Respondent that proving independent contractor status for some or all of Respondent's subcontractors before the effective date of statutory amendments on October 1, 2003, would reduce the proposed penalty against Respondent. The compliance officer did not interview the Hartford employee who prepared the audit report. The audit report was limited to the period from December 17, 2002, through December 17, 2003. The audit report stated that Hartford had not provided a copy to Respondent and had not audited Respondent's general ledger. The compliance officer did not identify or interview the Hartford employee who had responsibility for Respondent's account, the Hartford agent responsible for Respondent, or the Hartford underwriter. The compliance officer did not request Hartford's complete file for Respondent. The audit report included a copy of an exemption for a person identified in the record as Mr. Stinnett who was included in Petitioner's penalty calculation. The audit report and penalty calculation each identified Mr. Stinnett by the same social security number. On March 16, 2003, Petitioner amended the amount of the proposed fine to $526,593.44 pursuant to Amended Order of Penalty Assessment Number 04-094-D7-2 (the Amended Order). Petitioner issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment Number 04-094-D7-3 (the Second Amended Order) on March 23, 2004. The Second Amended Order reduced the proposed penalty to $90,131.51. Petitioner reduced the $526,593.44 fine proposed in the Amended Order by $426,461.91. The latter sum pertained to penalties assessed for the period preceding October 1, 2003, and for the period following December 31, 2003. The parties agree that statutory amendments authorizing Petitioner to issue a stop work order to an employer that materially misrepresents employee duties or materially understates or conceals payroll became effective on October 1, 2003, and cannot be applied to Petitioner retroactively. In addition, the parties agree that Hartford's audit report for Petitioner did not cover the period after December 31, 2003. Respondent paid the proposed fine of $90,131.51. On March 23, 2004, Petitioner issued a Release of Stop Work Order (the Release) that removed the Stop Work Order issued on March 10, 2004. In a Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment Number 04-094-D7-4 (the Third Amended Order) dated May 26, 2004, Petitioner reduced the proposed penalty by $21,679.28 to $68,432.23. Petitioner discovered errors totaling $16,261.42 that occurred when employees input numbers to calculate the proposed penalties against Respondent. The remaining portion of the reduction in the amount of $5,417.86 was attributable to the deletion of Mr. Sinnett from the penalty calculation. In a Fourth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment Number 04-094-D7-5 (the Fourth Amended Order) dated June 1, 2004, Petitioner further reduced the proposed penalty by $1,531.97 to $66,926.00. Respondent provided additional information concerning exemptions for a few workers. On June 7, 2004, Petitioner issued a Fifth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment Number 04-094-D7-5 (the Fifth Amended Order) deleting the charge that Respondent materially misrepresented or concealed employee duties. Petitioner admits that Hartford committed errors in the audit report and in recording the description of duties that Respondent reported to Hartford. Mr. Rivera personally reported to the appropriate Hartford employee that Respondent's primary business was stucco and that Respondent hired subcontractors to perform drywall plastering. The Fourth Amended Order dated June 1, 2004, as amended by the Fifth Amended Order, remain at issue in this proceeding. The Fourth Amended Order proposes a penalty in the amount of $66,920.26. The Fifth Amended Order limits the grounds for the proposed penalty to the charge that Respondent materially understated or concealed payroll by excluding subcontractors from Respondent's payroll from October 1 through December 31, 2003 (the relevant period), and by excluding either subcontractors or independent contractors thereafter. If a worker included in the penalty calculation were an independent contractor, within the meaning of former Subsection 440.02(15)(d)1, Florida Statutes (2003), the worker should be excluded from the penalty calculation during the relevant period. Effective January 1, 2004, however, Subsection 440.02(15)(d)1, Florida Statutes (2003), no longer excluded independent contractors in the construction industry from the definition of an employee. Thus, a determination of whether a worker was an independent contractor is not probative of that portion of the proposed penalty covering any period after December 31, 2003. Prior to January 1, 2004, former Subsection 440.02(15), Florida Statues (2003), did not except subcontractors from the definition of an employee unless the subcontractor satisfied the definition of an independent contractor. Effective January 1, 2004, Subsection 440.02(15)(c)2, Florida Statutes (2003), excluded from the definition of an employee those subcontractors that did not satisfy the definition of an independent contractor if a subcontractor either executed a valid exemption election or otherwise secured payment of compensation coverage as a subcontractor. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that subcontractors included in that part of the penalty assessment attributable to the period after December 31, 2003, either elected a valid exemption or otherwise secured payment for compensation coverage. These subcontractors would not be excluded from the definition of an employee after December 31, 2004, even if they were independent contractors. Except for constitutional arguments raised by Respondent over which DOAH has no jurisdiction, Respondent owes that part of the penalty attributable to any period after December 31, 2003. It is undisputed that the workers included in that part of the penalty assessment attributable to the relevant period were subcontractors. Respondent's ledger clearly treated those workers as subcontractors and reported their earnings on Form 1099 for purposes of the federal income tax. Petitioner treated those workers as subcontractors in the penalty calculation. The Workers' Compensation Law in effect during the relevant period did not expressly exclude from the definition of an employee those subcontractors who executed a valid exemption election or otherwise secured payment of compensation coverage as a subcontractor. Rather, former Subsection 440.02(15)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), required a subcontractor to be an independent contractor to escape the definition of an employee. Former Subsection 440.02(15)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), required a subcontractor to satisfy all of the following requirements in former Subsection 440.02(15)(d)1, Florida Statutes (2003), in order for the subcontractor to be classified as an independent contractor: The independent contractor maintains a separate business with his or her own work facility, truck, equipment, materials, or similar accommodations; The independent contractor holds or has applied for a federal employer identification number, unless the independent contractor is a sole proprietor who is not required to obtain a federal employer identification number under state or federal requirements; The independent contractor performs or agrees to perform specific services or work for specific amounts of money and controls the means of performing the services or work; The independent contractor incurs the principal expenses related to the service or work that he or she performs or agrees to perform; The independent contractor is responsible for the satisfactory completion of work or services that he or she performs or agrees to perform and is or could be held liable for a failure to complete the work or services; The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services performed for a commission or on a per-job or competitive-bid basis and not on any other basis; The independent contractor may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing work or services; The independent contractor has continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations; and The success or failure of the independent contractor's business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures. There is insufficient evidence to find that the workers included in that part of the penalty assessment attributable to the relevant period were independent contractors within the meaning of former Subsection 440.02(15)(d)1.a.-i., Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner did not exceed its statutory authority by proposing a penalty of $66,920.26 in accordance with the Fourth Amended Order and Fifth Amended Order. Respondent previously paid a fine in excess of that proposed by Petitioner and is entitled to a refund of the excess penalty that Respondent paid.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order sustaining the allegations and penalties in the Fourth Amended Order and the Fifth Amended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Susan McLaughlin, Esquire Law Offices of Michael F. Tew Building 800, Suite 2 6150 Diamond Center Court Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent should be terminated from employment with the school district.
Findings Of Fact On January 4, 1994, Respondent completed an applicant security check form for employment with the Petitioner. The form specified a series of questions related to past or pending criminal charges to which Respondent was to check either a "yes" box or a "no" box. On each occasion, Respondent checked the "no" box. At the conclusion of the form is a certification as follows: I certify that the above responses are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and are made in good faith. I understand that any incompleteness or false information on this form may be just cause for a rejection of my application for employment or dismissal in the event I am employed by the School Board of Palm Beach County. Respondent did not disclose that in 1987 she was charged with aggravated assault and possession of a weapon. As a result of the charges, Respondent was sentenced to one year probation, required to pay a fine and court costs, and fifty hours of community service. When Mr. Lachance learned of the results of the background search (which differed from Respondent's application), he met with Respondent who admitted the criminal charges but who alleged that she had believed them to be resolved. The recommendation was then made to the Board to terminate Respondent's employment as a bus driver.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida enter a final order dismissing the Respondent from her employment with the school district in accordance with the Board action of April 7, 1995. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2884 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee M. Rosenberg, Esq. School District of Palm Beach County Office of the General Counsel 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Ms. Tina King 5030 Elcharo North West Palm Beach, Florida 33415 Dr. Bernard Shulman Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of trust, pursuant to sections 408.809 and 435.07, Florida Statutes,1/ should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is authorized to conduct certain background screenings for employees providing specific types of services within health care facilities licensed under chapters 400, 408, and 429, Florida Statutes. § 408.809, Fla. Stat. Petitioner seeks employment in a position providing direct services to residents of a health care facility licensed under chapter 429 and, as such, is required to participate in Respondent’s background screening process pursuant to section 408.809. Petitioner submitted to the required background screening, which revealed that in 1999, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Felony Grand Theft/Bank Fraud in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Panama City Division, Case No. 5:99CR165PM. This conviction is akin to a felony grand theft conviction under chapter 812, Florida Statutes. The above-referenced criminal conviction makes Petitioner ineligible to provide a service in a health care facility licensed by Respondent unless Petitioner receives an exemption from Respondent, pursuant to section 435.07. Petitioner was also arrested in 2001 for Felony Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon. On that charge, Petitioner pled guilty to a lesser included charge of simple assault, in Leon County Circuit Court, Case No. 01-1020AM. In addition, Petitioner was arrested in 2009 for felony charges of larceny/grand theft and exploitation of the elderly, charges which were ultimately dismissed due to the alleged victim’s death. Petitioner submitted an application for exemption to Respondent in accordance with sections 408.809 and 435.07 on or about April 30, 2014, and attended a telephonic hearing conducted by Respondent on June 17, 2014. The results of the June 17, 2014, teleconference are not at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner submitted another application for exemption to Respondent in accordance with section 435.07 on or about September 29, 2014. A telephonic hearing was conducted by Respondent on that second application for exemption on December 9, 2014, during which Respondent and Petitioner agreed to utilize the information obtained in the June 17, 2014, hearing regarding the 1999 Grand Theft/Bank Fraud and the 2001 Assault convictions, and to only discuss the circumstances surrounding the 2009 allegations of Grand Theft and Exploitation of the Elderly. A panel consisting of Respondent’s Operations and Consulting Manager for the Background Screening Unit, Sherry Ledbetter, and Respondent’s Health and Facilities Consultants, Kelley Goff and Zack Masters, also attended the telephonic hearing. Exhibit A-1, Respondent’s file for Petitioner’s exemption request, contains the exemption denial letter; internal Agency notes; panel hearing notes from both the June 17, 2014, and the December 9, 2014, teleconferences; Petitioner’s criminal history; Petitioner’s exemption application; arrest affidavits; conviction records; probation records; court records; and several letters in support of Petitioner’s requested exemption. Exhibits A-2 and A-3 are audio recordings of Petitioner’s teleconferences from her exemption hearings from June 17, 2014, and December 9, 2014. After the telephonic hearing, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request for an exemption, and Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. At the administrative hearing, Sherry Ledbetter testified that Respondent considered Petitioner’s entire case file, including all submissions received from Petitioner, and her explanations during the teleconferences when it determined that Petitioner’s request for an exemption should be denied. Respondent is legally authorized to consider all subsequent arrests or convictions, even if those arrests or convictions are not disqualifying offenses. Respondent considered Petitioner’s subsequent arrests and convictions during the review of Petitioner’s application for exemption. Respondent also considered the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s most recent arrest, 2009 Grand Theft and Exploitation of the Elderly, even though the charges were dismissed. Petitioner admitted during the December 9, 2014, teleconference that the alleged victim made payments toward Petitioner’s bills while Petitioner was employed as her caregiver. Petitioner did not see any ethical issues with taking payments from a patient for whom she is caring, when she was already being paid by her employer for the services she rendered. Respondent explained, and it is found, that Petitioner did not appear to be totally candid and honest in her responses to the panel’s questions during the teleconferences and did not take responsibility for any of the criminal offenses. Although Respondent allows exemption applicants to have people speak on the applicants’ behalf at the teleconferences, Petitioner did not choose to have anyone speak on her behalf. Respondent considers any training, education, or certificates that an exemption applicant submits, but Petitioner did not have any such submissions, aside from Petitioner’s statement that she attended a budget class after her 1999 conviction. Based on Petitioner’s entire file and her responses during the teleconferences, Respondent determined that Petitioner did not satisfy her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence of demonstrating rehabilitation from her disqualifying offense. Respondent maintains that Petitioner still poses a risk to the vulnerable population she would serve if employed at another health care facility. At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Mutaqee Akbar, her criminal defense attorney for her 2009 charges of Grand Theft and Exploitation of the Elderly, who testified that the 2009 charges against Petitioner were dismissed by the prosecutor. On cross examination, Mr. Akbar admitted that the prosecutor cited the death of the alleged victim as the reason for the case’s dismissal. Mr. Akbar also admitted that law enforcement records reflect that the alleged victim made a statement to law enforcement prior to her death that she did not give her consent for the payments made toward Petitioner’s bills. In her testimony at the final hearing, Petitioner discussed how she is a changed person and has overcome a great deal of adversity to get to where she is now. Petitioner is presently involved in her community, specifically with her church and children’s schools, and takes care of her goddaughter and four children. Petitioner has a daughter who attends community college and Petitioner has been striving to set a good example for her daughter. Petitioner’s daughter, Sierra Thomas, who is in community college, gave credible testimony that she always favored her mother and did not believe the 2009 allegations against her mother. One of Petitioner’s good friends, Sheria Hackett, testified that Petitioner is a good person and deserves to be granted the exemption. Petitioner’s Exhibit P-1 is a composite exhibit consisting of additional information relating to Petitioner’s criminal cases and a letter from her probation officer. Petitioner’s Exhibit P-2 consists of a letter from Respondent dated May 22, 2014, requesting additional information from Petitioner during the exemption application process. Petitioner’s Exhibit P-3 consists of Petitioner’s petition for formal hearing. Although Petitioner appeared remorseful for her criminal convictions, considering all of the facts, circumstances, and evidence presented to AHCA and at the final hearing, it cannot be said that she proved by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated and should not be disqualified from employment. Moreover, AHCA’s intended action of denying Petitioner’s request for exemption was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, Petitioner failed to meet her burden of showing that she is entitled to the exemption she seeks from Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification for employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2015.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, A-1 Block Corp., discriminated against Petitioner, Harold E. Ford, Jr., on the basis of his race and/or color and in retaliation, and, if so, what remedy should be ordered.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a family-owned business that manufactures concrete products, ready-mix concrete, concrete block, and precast concrete. Mr. Freeman has been the president of Respondent for approximately 10 years. Petitioner is an African-American male who was employed by Respondent at two different times. Petitioner was hired to work in several different capacities which included: ready-mix driver; block driver; dump truck driver; and/or loader operator. Mr. Caviglia serves Respondent in a supervisory position, and Mr. Caviglia made the decision to hire Petitioner as a truck driver in December 2009 (first employment). Respondent hired Petitioner at $12.00 an hour. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment in July 2011 (first employment termination). Mr. Freeman described the circumstances under which Petitioner was terminated as: Petitioner failed to unhook some type of ladder or other apparatus at a self-loading dock, and drove off causing approximately $4,000 to $5,000 of damage to Respondent’s truck and/or the dock. Respondent was responsible for making the repairs. At the time of his first employment termination, Petitioner was making $13.00 an hour. Approximately five months later, in December 2011, Mr. Caviglia re-hired Petitioner to be a truck driver for Respondent. The other drivers employed by Respondent wanted Petitioner to return. Petitioner was hired at $13.00 an hour (second employment). At various times during Petitioner’s employment with Respondent, Petitioner inquired about becoming a “dispatcher” for Respondent. Mr. Freeman indicated to Petitioner that he (Mr. Freeman) would think about Petitioner’s dispatcher request. However, one of the requirements for Respondent’s dispatcher position was the availability to work on Saturdays. Mr. Freeman knew that Petitioner had a second job which required Petitioner to work on Saturdays. Since 2004, Petitioner worked part-time as an attendant at a local funeral home, which required Petitioner to work some Saturdays. Petitioner was paid $75 per funeral; however, he did not know how much he had been paid since his second employment termination. Petitioner did not have any pay-stubs to reflect how much he had been paid by the funeral home. Petitioner continues to work for the funeral home. In October 2013, Petitioner caused damage to tires on a truck belonging to Respondent. Respondent incurred a financial loss as a result of the damaged tires. Petitioner was terminated from his second employment with Respondent on November 20, 2013. Petitioner alleged and testified that Mr. Caviglia threatened Petitioner at various times during Respondent’s operational meetings.3/ Two other witnesses, Mr. Timmons and Mr. Sandy, testified that they did not observe Petitioner being threatened at these meetings. Petitioner alleged that he was retaliated against based on his race. Petitioner claimed that he was directed to wash a white man’s truck. Petitioner refused to wash the truck. Respondent requires its drivers to wash the trucks that they drive each day. However, there was no evidence of any retaliation against Petitioner when he did not wash the other man’s truck. Petitioner alleged he asked for raises when he thought it appropriate, and was refused. Mr. Freeman paid his employees the going rate, and it was established that Petitioner was being paid $14 an hour when he was terminated. Mr. Timmons, a former employee of Respondent, received the same rate of pay for working as a driver or as a dispatcher for Respondent. Petitioner’s resumé was admitted into evidence as Exhibit C. Petitioner created this resumé in 2011, and revised it one time to assist in the preparation for the hearing. The resumé does not accurately reflect Petitioner’s separate employment periods at Respondent, nor does it contain a two-week period of employment at another construction company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations DISMISSING the Petition for Relief filed by Mr. Ford. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2014.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to exemption from disqualification by law with regard to working in a position of special trust and responsibility related to children, disabled adults, and elderly persons?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is disqualified from working in a position of special trust because of: a 1991 conviction of grand theft auto; a 1980 conviction of battery; two counts in 1993 of uttering a forged instrument, one count of petty theft and one count of trespassing after warning. Respondent's testimony was direct, candid, and creditable. He previously engaged in a life-style that is no longer compatible with his present involvement with church and community. His testimony was well corroborated by the testimony of eight other witnesses and numerous exhibits. As established by clear and convincing evidence at the final hearing, Respondent is rehabilitated and unlikely again to engage in criminal conduct or present a threat to children, disabled adults, or elderly persons, if employed in a position of special trust. The various criminal offenses for which Petitioner has been convicted, were all committed more than three years prior to his disqualification notice from Respondent for which Petitioner now seeks exemption. Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification to work with children in positions of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Karlier Robinson 1018 Martin Street Blountstown, Florida 32424 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 252-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue On or about August 16, 1996, Petitioner, Betty Osborne, was notified by Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, that she was disqualified from employment in a position of special trust. The disqualification was based on the results of Petitioner's criminal screening. Petitioner challenged this eligibility status and requested an exemption from disqualification. On August 20, 1996, the Department's Exemption Review Committee met and, after reviewing the Petitioner's record, denied her request for an exemption from disqualification. Petitioner filed a timely request for formal hearing and this proceeding followed. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf and offered no exhibits into evidence. Respondent presented one witness, George H. Seibert, Background Screening Coordinator, Department of Children and Family Services. Respondent offered and had admitted into evidence five exhibits. The proceeding was recorded but not transcribed. Neither party filed proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for a license as a child care provider in 1993 in an effort to qualify to open her own day care facility. Based on a criminal screening of Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services (Depatment), determined that Petitioner was disqualified from employment in a position of special trust or responsibility, and thus was ineligible to work or volunteer in child care programs. Pursuant to Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification, the Department convened the Exemption Review Committee (Committee) to consider the requested exemption. The Committee reviewed Petitioner's record relating to her August 19, 1993, plea of nolo contendere to one count of grand theft. On or about January 7, 1993, Petitioner was charged with grand theft. The incident giving rise to the denial of the request for exemption occurred during the course of Petitioner's employment as a supervisor with the Pinellas County Tax Collector's Office. The allegation was that Petitioner had misappropriated $20,000 or more collected by that office for fishing licenses for her personal use or with the intent to deprive the State of Florida of a right to the property or benefit therefrom. On or about August 19, 1993, Petitioner completed a Plea Form on which she indicated that she would plead nolo contendere to one count of grand theft. Paragraph Five of the Plea Form expressly stated that "No one has pressured or forced me to enter this plea.", and that "No one has promised me anything to get me to enter this plea. . . ." Nevertheless, the form noted that Petitioner had an understanding that as a result of the plea, she would serve fifteen (15) years probation; pay $300.00 in court costs; and pay $56,404.00 in restitution. Both Petitioner and her attorney signed the Plea Form. On or about August 19, 1993, an Order of Probation (Order) was entered noting that the "Defendant being present with counsel: entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of grand theft". The Order withheld an adjudication of guilt; placed Petitioner on fifteen (15) months of probation; and required payment of $300.00 in court costs and $56,404.00 in restitution. The amount of restitution was reduced to $27,501.00 by an order issued on January 26, 1994. As of August 20, 1996, the date of the Department Exemption Review and hearing, Petitioner had twelve years of probation remaining to be served. Also, as of that date, Petitioner had paid only $300.00 in restitution. If Petitioner had made restitution payments as scheduled, she would have paid $7,100.00 as of August 1996. At the time of this hearing, Petiitoner had made no additional restitution payments. At hearing, Petitioner presented no evidence of rehabilitation. Several letters of recommendation written by friends on Petitioner's behalf indicate that she is (1) active in her church; works well with children and others; and has a love for children. However, none of these letters reflect that Petitioner has worked in a responsible position or has been engaged in activities that demonstrate rehabilitation since she entered a plea of nolo contendere to grand theft.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner, Betty Osborne, an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position designated by law as one of trust or responsibility. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Betty Osborne 4149 38th Street South St. Petersburg, Florida 33711 Kathleen Harvey, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 34648-1630 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building Two, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building Two, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
