The Issue Whether or not on or about May 25, 1977, the Respondent licensed under the beverage laws and/its agent, servant, or employee, employed by salary or on a contractual basis to entertain, perform or work upon the licensed premises, to wit: Lisa Palov Clark, aka Di Di Bang Bang, did beg or solicit a customer or patron, to wit; Deputy Ernest Weaver, on the Respondent's licensed premises, to purchase a beverage, alcoholic or otherwise, for Respondent, its agent, servant, or employee or entertainer, contrary to Section 562.131(1) F.S. There was noticed for hearing a second count to the Notice to Show Cause which was not heard due to the motion to withdraw the count, made by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Golden Dolphin Number One, doing business as Golden Dolphin, is the holder of license number 15-229, Series 2-COP, held with the Petitioner, State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. This license is for operation at a location at 6107 North Atlantic Avenue, CAPS Canaveral, Florida. The operative period of the license is from October 1, 1976 through September 30, 1977. A copy of the license may be found as part of Petitioner's composite exhibit #1 admitted into evidence. On May 25, 1977, Lisa Palov Clark, also known as Di Di Bang Bang, was actively employed on the licensed premises, by the licensee. Ms. Clark's employment was as an entertainer, specifically a dancer. On the subject evening of May 25, 1977, Officer Ernest Weaver of the Brevard County, Florida Sheriff's Office, and Beverage Officer Eugene P. Fogle, entered the licensed premises around 9:00 p.m. and took seats in separate locations. They observed the floor shows being presented on the licensed premises, which shows were nude dancers and striptease. One of the dancers was Lisa Palov Clark. After completing her dance, Ms. Clark went to the dressing- room area of the licensed premises and then returned to the area occupied by the patrons. When she returned, she approached the table at which Officer Weaver was seated. She approached him without being requested by Officer Weaver either orally or by gesture. When she arrived at the table, she made the comment to Officer Weaver either to the effect "Can I have a drink?" or "Won't you let me order something?". Officer Weaver in his testimony at the hearing was uncertain of the exact statement made by Ms. Clark. Subsequent to the aforementioned comment, in whatever form it took, Ms. Clark stated that she felt hot and that her neck was wet. These comments were directed to Officer Weaver. During the course of this conversation, a waitress came and stood by the table at which Officer Weaver was seated. The waitress did not participate in the conversation between Ms. Clark and Officer Weaver. Officer Weaver, in response to Ms. Clark's comments, asked what she would like to drink, and Ms. Clark indicated that she would like champagne, one drink of which costs $2.75 and a pony bottle cost $6.00. The waitress then stated, "What will it be?" and Officer Weaver said, "Bring one of the $6.00 bottles." The waitress brought a bottle and at least one glass. The bottle was placed on the floor between Officer Weaver and Ms. Clark. The glass was positioned in the place at which Ms. Clark was seated and a drink was poured for her. Officer Weaver paid $6.00 plus a tip to the waitress. (There was some discussion about a possible second bottle which was purchased, but the recollection of witnesses was not sufficient to establish the existence of such a second bottle of champagne.) There was no testimony about the knowledge of the activities between Officer Weaver, Ms. Clark, and the waitress, from the point of view of any of the officers, directors, or owners of the licensed premises. Moreover, it was not established that any manager in charge of the licensed premises observed the interchange between Officer Weaver, Ms. Clark and the waitress. The facts as established, constitute a sufficient basis to show that the employee of the licensee, to wit, Lisa Palov Clark, employed on the licensed premises to entertain, perform or work, did beg or solicit a patron or customer on the licensed premises to purchase a beverage in violation of Section 562.131, F.S. However, even though the employee violated this law, the licensee was not culpable based upon any willful intent, negligence or lack of due diligence. See Trader Jon Inc. vs. State Beverage Department, 119 So.2d 735 (1st DCA 1960). Additionally, the testimony indicated that the licensee in the person of Milton Seidman had instructed the employee Ms. Clark not to solicit drinks. Finally, to penalize the licensee under s. 561.29, F.S., there must be a showing of more than an isolated incident as is the case here. See Taylor v. State Beverage Department, 194 So.2d 321 (2d DCA, 1967).
Recommendation It is recommended that the licensee, Golden Dolphin Number One, d/b/a Golden Dolphin, operating under licensee number 15-229, to do business at 6107 North Atlantic Avenue, CAPS Canaveral, Florida, be relieved of the necessity to make further answer to the Notice to Show Cause which is the subject of this hearing. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson, Esquire Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Lawrence M. Litus, Esquire 231 East New Haven Melbourne, Florida 32901
The Issue Whether Respondent’s statement contained in June 4, 2004, correspondence to the controller of the Daytona Beach Kennel Club, Inc., constitutes a rule of the agency which has not been adopted by the rule making procedures provided in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Statutory references are to Florida Statutes, 2004, absent contrary indication.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are St. Petersburg Kennel Club, Inc; West Flagler Associates, Ltd. (Flagler Greyhound Track); Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. (Ebro Greyhound Track); Daytona Beach Kennel Club, Inc. (Daytona Beach Kennel Club); and Southwest Florida Enterprises, Inc. (Bonita-Ft. Myers Greyhound Track). Respondent is the State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering, an agency created by Section 20.165(2)(f), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, Respondent is vested with general regulatory authority over Petitioners and the operation of cardrooms at licensed and permitted pari-mutuel facilities. Each Petitioner is the holder of a pari-mutuel waging permit and a license issued by Respondent pursuant to provisions of Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, for the conduct of pari-mutuel wagering on greyhound races. Each Petitioner also holds a licensed issued by Respondent pursuant to Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, for conduct of a cardroom at its pari-mutuel facility. Each Petitioner is authorized to conduct a “meet” consisting of live racing. Each authorized meet includes evening performances generally consisting of 14 races. One or more of those races can take place after midnight but before 1:30 a.m. on the next calendar day. Each Petitioner is authorized to accept pari-mutuel wagers on each such race. Petitioner Daytona Kennel Club, by correspondence of May 27, 2004, provided a revised cardroom calendar to Respondent for approval. Respondent, in reply correspondence of June 4, 2004, pointed out that proposed day-long cardroom operation on Sunday as a result of Saturday live racing events that extended into Sunday morning, was not permissible under provisions of Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes. Respondent’s correspondence, in pertinent part, reads as follows: [Y]ou contend that if at least one Saturday race will occur after 12:00 midnight, then Sunday cardroom operation would be permitted, without any additional pari-mutuel events being held that day, under Section 849.086(7)(b), Florida Statutes. The foregoing statutory section states, “[a] cardroom may be operated at the facility only when the facility is authorized to accept wagers on pari-mutuel events during its authorized meet.” A plain reading of this language makes it evident that the Legislature intended that cardrooms be considered an adjunct to live racing, not a replacement or a substitute. As it stands today, you have not been authorized to conduct a pari- mutuel event on Sundays. Respondent’s letter of June 4, 2004, to Petitioner Daytona Beach Kennel Club, was a specific response to matters raised by that Petitioner in its letter of May 27, 2004. A final declaratory judgment issued on July 26, 2004, in the Second Judicial Circuit in Case No. 2002-CA-2971 invalidates changes to Section 550.615(6), Florida Statutes, resulting from passage of Chapter 96-364, Laws of Florida. Presently under appeal and stayed pending further decision, that ruling also invalidates Section 849.086, Florida Statutes, due to the non-severability language contained in Section 550.71, Florida Statutes. In the event of an appellate decision affirming that ruling, Respondent’s authority to regulate the hours of cardroom operation would be rendered inoperative.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Actions in these consolidated cases, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material hereto, Fowler Liquors was licensed by the Division, having been issued license number 46- 04643, Series 3-PS. The license permits Fowler Liquors to make packaged sales of beer, wine, and liquor at its convenience store located at 3450 Fowler Street in Fort Myers. In an Administrative Action dated July 11, 2002, the Division charged Samer Barghouthi, the majority owner and principal officer of Fowler Liquors, with selling alcoholic beverages to a person under the age of 21 on May 19, 2002. Fowler Liquors conceded there were no disputed issues of fact and requested that the matter be resolved in an informal hearing. In a Final Order dated October 25, 2002, the Division ordered Fowler Liquors to pay a fine of $1,000 and serve a seven-day license suspension. The Administrative Action regarding the May 19, 2002, sale arose from an incident in which 20-year-old Tony Cubello was beaten, robbed, and shot to death in the parking lot of Fowler Liquors after making a purchase in the liquor store. The murder of Mr. Cubello was the subject of articles in the Fort Myers newspaper. The Fort Myers Police Department investigated Mr. Cubello's murder and came to believe that Samer Barghouthi could identify the killers but was refusing to cooperate. The Fort Myers police requested the assistance of the Division in securing Mr. Barghouthi's cooperation. The Division commenced an investigation, interviewing young people who had known Mr. Cubello. During the course of these interviews, the Division became aware that Fowler Liquors was widely reputed as a place where underage people could buy alcoholic beverages. During its investigation, the Division also learned that the Department of Revenue had a tax warrant against Fowler Liquors, and that the City of Fort Myers had issued citations against Fowler Liquors for hours-of-sale violations. During its investigation, the Division sent an underage operative into Fowler Liquors to attempt to purchase alcoholic beverages. The operative was wearing a hidden microphone, allowing the Division's officers to hear what transpired in the liquor store. As the sale was about to be completed, a van full of construction workers pulled up outside the store. The person working behind the counter at Fowler Liquors said that there were "cops" in the van, and declined to complete the sale to the operative. On June 14, 2002, Captain Tania Pendarakis, district supervisor for the Division's Fort Myers office, met with Samer Barghouthi. She informed Mr. Barghouthi that the Division might consider filing administrative charges rather than criminal charges against Fowler Liquors, if Mr. Barghouthi would cooperate with the Fort Myers Police Department's murder investigation. During this conversation, Mr. Barghouthi assured Captain Pendarakis that he was going to start checking identifications and stop selling alcoholic beverages to underage children. The next day, June 15, 2002, David P. Green, then sixteen years old, entered Fowler Liquors early in the evening to buy beer. In the liquor store, Mr. Green recognized other people whom he knew from his high school. Mr. Green testified that it was widely known at his school that underage people could purchase alcohol at Fowler Liquors. Mr. Green purchased a twelve-pack of Budweiser Light beer. He tendered ten dollars cash to the cashier and asked if the store sold "dip," i.e., finely ground tobacco. The cashier told him no, but offered to sell Mr. Green cigarettes. The cashier did not ask Mr. Green his age, nor request any identification from Mr. Green to prove that he was at least 21 years of age. At the hearing in this matter, conducted nearly nine months after the fact, Mr. Green looked no older than sixteen. When he purchased the beer at Fowler Liquors, Mr. Green made no attempt to alter his appearance or otherwise disguise the fact that he was only sixteen years old. When Mr. Green exited Fowler Liquors, he saw a police officer parked in a police cruiser directly in front of him. Mr. Green put his twelve-pack of beer down next to a garbage can, then got into his car and drove away. Several of Mr. Green's friends were also in his car. The police officer who witnessed this scene, Officer Bradley J. Ades of the Fort Myers Police Department, testified at the hearing. Officer Ades testified that, because of the ongoing problems the police were having with Fowler Liquors, he stopped by there to check it out as part of his normal duties. As he pulled into the parking lot, he saw a "very young white male" walking out the front door of Fowler Liquors. The boy was carrying a twelve-pack of Budweiser Light beer. Officer Ades stated that he was surprised not to see the boy's father follow him out of the store, because the boy looked so young. The boy got into his car and drove away. Officer Ades followed him for a little more than one block, then pulled him over. Officer Ades interviewed Mr. Green and photographed him. Mr. Green admitted that he bought the beer in Fowler Liquors, and that he and the other boys in his car intended to drink it. Because the sale of alcohol to a minor is a misdemeanor, and he did not witness the sale, Officer Ades could not make an arrest. The next day, he forwarded to the Division the information concerning his stop of Mr. Green. Agent Brian D. Sauls of the Division contacted Mr. Green and asked him to come to the Division's offices for an interview. Mr. Green agreed. Agent Sauls conducted a photographic suspect lineup, and Mr. Green identified Samer Barghouthi as having been behind the counter at Fowler Liquors at the time he purchased the twelve-pack of Budweiser Light on June 15, 2002. The incident involving the sale to Mr. Green formed the basis of the Administrative Action that led to DOAH Case No. 03-0431. Fowler Liquors did not contest the evidence that a sale was made by Fowler Liquors to Mr. Green, an underage person, on June 15, 2002, or that Samer Barghouthi was present at the counter when the sale was made. On the evening of June 17, 2002, Justin C. Bender, then eighteen years of age, entered Fowler Liquors to buy beer. Mr. Bender testified that he had purchased alcohol at Fowler Liquors more than 40 times and had never been asked for any identification. Mr. Bender stated that he has seen friends and other people whom he knew from school inside Fowler Liquor Store. Mr. Bender also testified that he had discussions with other people about Fowler Liquors being a place where underage people could purchase alcoholic beverages. On June 17, 2002, Mr. Bender purchased a twelve-pack of Budweiser beer and a quart of Heineken beer, then left the store. Mr. Bender purchased the beer from Steve Barghouthi, the father of Samer Barghouthi. Steve Barghouthi did not ask Mr. Bender his age, nor request any identification to prove that he was at least 21 years of age. Mr. Bender had made no effort to alter his appearance or make himself look older than eighteen. On June 17, 2002, Anthony J. Smith, the chief of law enforcement for the Division, visited the Fort Myers office. He asked Captain Pendarakis to inform him of cases her office was involved in, and the subject of Fowler Liquors was discussed. After dinner that evening, Chief Smith drove by Fowler Liquors to take a look at the store. As he drove through the parking lot, Chief Smith saw Mr. Bender exiting the store with his beer. Chief Smith stopped him to determine how old he was. Mr. Bender produced a valid driver's license that showed he was eighteen years old. Chief Smith searched Mr. Bender for fake identification, but found none. Chief Smith asked Mr. Bender if he would be willing to return to Fowler Liquors and make another purchase that Chief Smith could observe. Mr. Bender agreed to do so. Chief Smith telephoned Captain Pendarakis and asked her to bring marked cash for Mr. Bender to purchase beer. Captain Pendarakis arrived with the cash. She went into Fowler Liquors to ascertain whether it would be safe for Mr. Bender to return to the store. After Captain Pendarakis determined the store was safe, Mr. Bender entered the store. Chief Smith and Captain Pendarakis watched the transaction from across the street. They had a clear view through the window of the liquor store. They observed Mr. Bender get a carton of beer, put it on the counter, pay for it, and walk out the door. After Chief Smith and Captain Pendarakis viewed the sale to Mr. Bender, they went into the store to arrest the person who had made the sale, Samer Barghouthi. Mr. Barghouthi was arrested and taken to the Lee County Jail. The incident involving the sale to Mr. Bender formed the basis of the Administrative Action that led to DOAH Case No. 03-0217. Fowler Liquors did not contest the evidence that a sale was made by Fowler Liquors to Mr. Bender, an underage person, on June 17, 2002, or that Samer Barghouthi, the licensee, had made the sale. In mitigation, counsel for Fowler Liquors argued that license revocation would be unfair because Samer Barghouthi is no longer involved in the operation of the business, having signed over his interest to his uncle, Shahir Daghara. Counsel contended that Mr. Daghara acted to remove Samer Barghouthi from the premises of Fowler Liquors as soon as he learned that Mr. Barghouthi was making sales to underage persons. This contention is not credible. The two sales that are the subject of these proceedings occurred nearly one month after the murder of Mr. Cubello, which was widely known to have occurred after Mr. Cubello purchased alcoholic beverages in Fowler Liquors. The two sales also occurred after Mr. Barghouthi had been interviewed by Captain Pendarakis about sales of alcoholic beverages to minors. Moreover, Officer Cecil Pendergrass of the Fort Myers Police Department testified that Samer Barghouthi was still working at Fowler Liquors on July 1, 2002, two weeks after his arrest for selling alcoholic beverages to Justin Bender. There is no record evidence that Mr. Barghouthi transferred his interest in the business to Mr. Daghara. At most, the Division's files indicate that at some point, Fowler Liquors represented to the Division that Mr. Daghara had taken a 49 percent interest in the business. The file also contains an undated "Current Licensee Update Data Sheet" on which Samer Barghouthi's name is crossed through, but Fowler Liquors offered no sworn testimony to explain the significance of this document. Further, even if Mr. Daghara did take over the business, there is no evidence that he took any steps to remove Mr. Barghouthi from the premises of Fowler Liquors, or did anything else to address the problem of selling alcoholic beverages to minors. Officer Pendergrass, who is the community coordinator for the area of Fort Myers that includes Fowler Liquors, also testified that he has been called to Fowler Liquors on a regular basis to deal with code enforcement problems, fights between family members, drug sales, robberies in the parking lot, and civil problems between the owners over refrigeration equipment. Officer Pendergrass testified that the police department's statistics establish that Fowler Liquors is the nucleus of criminal complaints in the area, and that in the last year, the Fort Myers Police Department has had over 300 calls for service to Fowler Liquors.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a Final Order revoking the license of Barghouthi Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Fowler Liquor Store. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Martinez, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Captain Tania Pendarkis 4100 Center Point Drive Suite 104 Fort Myers, Florida 33916 John Kyle Shoemaker, Esquire Post Office Box 1601 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Peter Williams, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The following relevant facts are undisputed: The Division is the arm of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation with the duty and responsibility to permit and regulate pari- mutuel wagering facilities throughout the state. §§ 550.002(7) and 550.01215, Fla. Stat. Petitioner is a pari-mutuel permittee that owns and operates the Daytona Beach Racing and Card Club in Volusia County, located at 1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2020 version, which was in effect when the Petition was filed. 2 Petitioner waived the requirement in section 120.56(1)(c) that the final hearing be conducted within 30 days after assignment of the case. 960 South Williamson Boulevard in Daytona Beach, Florida (“Petitioner’s facility”). Intervenor is a pari-mutuel permittee doing business as St. Johns Greyhound Park in St. Johns County, at a leased facility located at 6322 Racetrack Road, St. Johns, Florida (“Bayard’s facility”), approximately 75 miles north of Petitioner’s facility. On July 8, 2020, Bayard filed with the Division a “Notice of Relocation” of Bayard’s facility to an eight-acre parcel in St. Augustine, Florida, which it is under contract to purchase. Bayard’s Notice of Relocation was filed pursuant to section 550.054(14)(b), Florida Statutes, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: The holder of a permit converted pursuant to this subsection or any holder of a permit to conduct greyhound racing located in a county in which it is the only permit issued pursuant to this section who operated at a leased facility pursuant to s. 550.475 may move the location for which the permit has been issued to another location within a 30-mile radius of the location fixed in the permit issued in that county, provided the move does not cross the county boundary and such location is approved under the zoning regulations of the county or municipality in which the permit is located, and upon such relocation may use the permit for the conduct of pari-mutuel wagering and the operation of a cardroom. On September 11, 2020, the Division issued its Notice regarding Bayard’s relocation. Finding that Bayard had satisfied all the criteria for relocation pursuant to section 550.045(14)(b), the Division approved the relocation of Bayard’s permit to 2493 State Road 207 in St. Augustine, St. Johns County, Florida. On December 2, 2020, Petitioner filed the Petition challenging the Notice as an unadopted rule in violation of section 120.56(4). The Petition alleges, in pertinent part, as follows: 10. As part of the [Notice], the Division included a statement summarizing its application of the § 550.054(14)(b) relocation factors, yet failed to set forth any analysis of the conditions for relocation of greyhound permits set forth in § 550.0555(2). Based on this incomplete analysis of Bayard’s Notice of Relocation, the Division approved Bayard’s request to relocate. 12. Consequently, Petitioner is entitled to request a hearing challenging the Division’s agency statement interpreting the applicability of § 550.054(14)(b), and lack of applicability of § 550.0555(2), in the [Notice] as an unpromulgated rule. 21. When analyzing whether to approve Bayard’s request to relocate [Bayard’s facility], the Division reviewed the factors listed in § 550.054(14)(b), but wholly disregarded the factors listed in § 550.0555(2). In other words, the Division determined, that a request, “pursuant to § 550.054(14)(b)” need not satisfy the requirements of § 550.0555(2), despite the fact that such an interpretation finds no support in the relevant statutes themselves. This interpretation of law represents an “agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy[.]” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. Since the Division did not properly adopt this interpretation as a rule, this means it is an invalid unpromulgated rule that cannot support agency action. The crux of Petitioner’s argument is that the Notice reflects an unwritten policy of the Division to apply only the factors in section 550.054(14)(b) to applications to relocate which are filed “pursuant to that section,” and not apply the factors in section 550.0555(2).3 The Notice does not cite, analyze, or otherwise refer to, section 550.0555.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Xencom Facility Management, LLC (Xencom), terminated the employment of Petitioners solely because the contract under which they were working ended.
Findings Of Fact Xencom provides general maintenance, landscaping, housekeeping, and office cleaning services to retail facilities. In September of 2015, Xencom entered three contracts for services with CREFII Market Street Holdings, LLC (CREFII). The contracts were to provide maintenance, landscaping, and office cleaning services for a mall known as Market Street @ Heathbrook (Market Street) in Ocala, Florida. Michael Ponds, Xencom’s president, executed the contracts on behalf of Xencom. Two individuals executed the contracts on behalf of CREFII. One was Gar Herring, identified as manager for Herring Ocala, LLC. The other was Bernard E. McAuley, identified as manager of Tricom Market Street at Heathbrook, LLC. MG Herring was not a party or signatory to the contracts. MG Herring does not own or operate Market Street. A separate entity, The MG Herring Property Group, LLC (Property Group), operated Market Street. The contracts, in terms stated in an exhibit to them, established a fixed price for the year’s work, stated the scope of services, and detailed payment terms. They also identified labor and labor-related costs in detail that included identifying the Xencom employees involved, their compensation, and their weekly number of hours. The contract exhibits also identified operating costs, including equipment amortization, equipment repairs, fuel expenses, vacation costs, health insurance, and storage costs. The contracts ended December 31, 2016. The contracts specify that Xencom is an independent contractor. Each states: “Contractor is an independent contractor and not an employee or agent of the owner. Accordingly, neither Contractor nor any of Contractor’s Representatives shall hold themselves out as, or claim to be acting in the capacity of, an agent or employee of Owner.” The contracts also specify that the property manager may terminate the contract at any time without reason for its convenience. The contracts permit Xencom to engage subcontractors with advance approval of the property manager. They broadly describe the services that Xencom is to provide. Xencom has over 80 such contracts with different facilities. As the contracts contemplate, only Xencom exerted direct control of the Petitioners working at Market Street. Property Group could identify tasks and repairs to be done. Xencom decided who would do them and how. In 2013, Xencom hired Michael Harrison to work as its Operations Manager at Market Street. He was charged with providing services for which Property Group contracted. His immediate supervisor was Xencom’s Regional Manager. In 2016, that was David Snell. Mr. Snell was not located at Market Street. Property Group also did not have a representative on site. Before Xencom hired him, Mr. Harrison worked at Market Street for Property Group. Xencom hired the remaining Petitioners to work at Market Street under Mr. Harrison’s supervision. Each of the Petitioners completed an Application for Employment with Xencom. The application included a statement, initialed by each Petitioner, stating, “Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite period and I may be terminated at any time without previous notice.” All of the Petitioners also received Xencom’s employee handbook. As Xencom’s Operations Manager and supervisor of the other Petitioners, Mr. Harrison was responsible for day-to-day management of Petitioners. He scheduled their work tasks, controlled shifts, established work hours, and assigned tasks. Mr. Harrison also decided when Petitioners took vacations and time off. His supervisor expected him to consult with Property Group to ensure it knew what support would be available and that he knew of any upcoming events or other considerations that should be taken into account in his decisions. As Operations Manager, Mr. Harrison was also responsible for facilitating payroll, procuring supplies, and managing Xencom’s equipment at the site. Xencom provided Petitioners work uniforms that bore Xencom’s name. Xencom required Petitioners to wear the uniforms at work. Xencom provided the supplies and equipment that Petitioners used at work. Only Xencom had authority to hire or fire the employees providing services to fulfill its contracts with the property manager. Only Xencom had authority to modify Petitioners’ conditions of employment. Neither MG Herring, Property Group, nor Xencom held out Petitioners as employees of MG Herring or Property Group. There is no evidence that MG Herring or Property Group employed 15 or more people. Property Group hired Tina Wilson as Market Street’s on- site General Manager on February 1, 2016. Until then there was no Property Group representative at the site. The absence of a Property Group representative on-site left Mr. Harrison with little oversight or accountability under the Xencom contracts for Market Street. His primary Property Group contact was General Manager Norine Bowen, who was not located at the property. Ms. Wilson’s duties included community relations, public relations, marketing, leasing, litigation, tenant coordination, lease management, construction management, and contract management. She managed approximately 40 contracts at Market Street, including Xencom’s three service agreements. Ms. Wilson was responsible for making sure the contracts were properly executed. Managing the Xencom contracts consumed less than 50 percent of Ms. Wilson’s time. During the last weeks of 2016, Mr. Harrison intended to reduce the hours of Kylie Smithers. Ms. Wilson requested that, since Ms. Smithers was to be paid under the contract for full- time work, Ms. Smithers assist her with office work such as filing and making calls. Mr. Harrison agreed and scheduled Ms. Smithers to do the work. This arrangement was limited and temporary. It does not indicate Property Group control over Xencom employees. Ms. Wilson was Xencom’s point of contact with Property Group. She and Mr. Harrison had to interact frequently. Ms. Wilson had limited contact with the other Xencom employees at Market Street. Friction and disagreements arose quickly between Mr. Harrison and Ms. Wilson. They may have been caused by having a property manager representative on-site after Mr. Harrison’s years as either the manager representative himself or as Xencom supervisor without a property manager on-site. They may have been caused by personality differences between the two. They may have been caused by the alleged sexual and crude comments that underlie the claims of discrimination in employment. They may have been caused by a combination of the three factors. On November 21, 2016, Norine Bowen received an email from the address xencomempoyees@gmail.com with the subject of “Open your eyes about Market Street.” It advised that some employees worked at night for an event. It said that Ms. Wilson gave the Xencom employees alcohol to drink while they were still on the clock. The email said that there was a fight among Xencom employees. The email also said that at another event at a restaurant where Xencom employees were drinking, Ms. Wilson gave Ms. Smithers margaritas to drink and that Ms. Smithers was underage. The email claimed that during a tree-lighting event Ms. Wilson started drinking around 3:30 p.m. It also stated that Ms. Wilson offered a Xencom employee a drink. The email went on to say that children from an elementary school and their parents were present and that Ms. Wilson was “three sheets to the wind.” The email concludes stating that Ms. Wilson had been the subject of three employee lawsuits. On December 14, 2016, Ms. Wilson, Ms. Bowen, and Mr. Snell met at Property Group’s office in Market Street for their regular monthly meeting to discuss operations at Market Street. Their discussion covered a number of management issues including a Xencom employee’s failure to show up before 8:00 to clean as arranged, security cameras, tenants who had not paid rent, lease questions, HVAC questions, and rats on the roof. They also discussed the email’s allegations. The participants also discussed a number of dissatisfactions with Mr. Harrison’s performance. Near the end of a discussion about the anonymous email, this exchange occurred:2/ Bowen: Okay, so I know that David [Snell], I think his next step is to conduct his own investigation with his [Xencom] people, and HR is still following up with John Garrett, and you’re meeting with Danny [intended new Xencom manager for Market Street] tonight? David Snell: Yes. Bowen: To finish up paperwork, and, based on his investigation, it will be up to Xencom to figure out what to do with people that are drinking on property, off the clock or on the clock, you know, whatever, what their policy is. * * * Bowen: So, I don’t know what to make of it. I’m just here to do an investigation like I’m supposed to do and David is here to pick up the pieces and meet with his folks one-on- one, and we’ll see where this takes us. This exchange and the remainder of the recording do not support a finding that Property Group controlled Xencom’s actions or attempted to control them. The participants were responsibly discussing a serious complaint they had received, their plan to investigate it, and pre-existing issues with Mr. Harrison. The exchange also makes clear that all agreed the issues involving Xencom employees were for Xencom to address, and the issues involving Property Group employees were for Property Group to address. At the time of the December 14, 2016, meeting, the participants were not aware of any complaints from Mr. Harrison or Mr. Smithers of sexual harassment or discrimination by Ms. Wilson. On December 15, 2016, Gar Herring and Norine Bowen received an email from Mr. Harrison with an attached letter to Xencom’s Human Resources Manager and others. Affidavits from Petitioners asserting various statements and questions by Ms. Wilson about Mr. Harrison’s and Mr. Smithers’ sex life and men’s genitalia and statements about her sex life and the genitalia of men involved were attached. Xencom President Michael Ponds received a similar email with attachments on the same day. On December 21, 2016, Mr. Ponds received a letter from Herring Ocala, LLC, and Tricom Market Street at Heathbrook, LLC, terminating the service agreements. Their agreements with Xencom were going to expire December 31, 2016. They had been negotiating successor agreements. However, they had not executed any. Xencom terminated Petitioners’ employment on December 21, 2016. Xencom no longer needed Petitioners’ services once MG Herring terminated the contract with Xencom. This was the sole reason it terminated Petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the petitions of all Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2018.
The Issue Whether the equipment purchase and lease agreement to which Paul Richards and Florida Seafood Centers, Inc., became parties is an "investment contract" and so a security, within the meaning of Section 517.021, Florida Statutes (1985)? If so, whether it was exempt from registration requirements under Section 517.061(11)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)? If not, whether respondent Ogle solicited an offer, or offered or attempted to dispose of any interest in the agreement for value?
Findings Of Fact William Carl Webster had an idea, but no money. In fact, the business he and his wife owned, Cap'n Carl's Seafood Company, was in bankruptcy. No stranger to the seafood business, wholesale or retail, he had been involved for some twelve years. He came to believe he could profit by adopting a technique he noticed purveyors of pizza and milk used: the "impulse freezer," a topless display freezer rolled into the middle of a grocery store aisle to attract customers' attention. The "concept" was to sell frozen seafood wholesale to licensed food retailers. Webster believed it would be a simple matter of establishing the accounts, installing the freezers, and arranging with a reputable Tampa Bay fish house to deliver "custom packed" seafood. Overhead would be minimal, or so Mr. Webster told Barry Louis Harris, with whom he had played baseball in high school, and from whom he borrowed three thousand dollars for the new venture. None of this money was left by the time Mr. Webster dropped in on Jerry Russell Ogle, an account executive in the Fort Walton Beach office of A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., to discuss the ins and outs of going public, in late April of 1984. Mr. Ogle recommended against going public but expressed a willingness to help for a fee. Both Florida Seafood Centers, Inc., and Florida Seafood Brokers, Inc., came into existence on April 24, 1984. Articles of incorporation drawn by Messrs Webster and Harris, with the help of a kit, were filed that day. Jerry Ogle is registered with petitioner as a securities dealer. One of Mr. Ogle's customers, Paul Richards, had been a builder and developer before he moved to Florida from Ohio. As he sold properties in Ohio, he deposited the proceeds in his account at the Fort Walton Beach office of A. G. Edwards & Son. Since Mr. Richards had expressed an interest in investing in a small business, Mr. Ogle thought some of this money might be available for the enterprise on which Messrs Webster and Harris had embarked. Before taking Mr. Richards to lunch at the Harborlight, Mr. Ogle sought and obtained the oral approval of the A. G. Edwards' branch manager to work as a "marketing consultant" for Florida Seafood Centers, Inc. At lunch, he mentioned Florida Seafood Centers, Inc., and gave a "capsule form" account of the business to Mr. Richards. Mr. Richards expressed interest, and Mr. Ogle arranged a second luncheon meeting a week or two later. Messrs Richards, Webster, Harris and Ogle gathered in Mr. Ogle's office, before setting out for lunch at the High Tide. Mr. Ogle told Mr. Richards he thought that Mr. Webster's idea was a good one, but it was Mr. Webster who presented the idea in detail. Although remarking that he might be "digging a hole and throwing money into it," Mr. Richards decided to purchase 25 freezers from Florida Seafood Centers, Inc. On May 23, 1984, he signed an equipment purchase and lease agreement, but negotiations continued and the final agreement was executed on May 24, 1984, in Mr. Ogle's office. At this meeting, Mr. Richards drew a check for $10,000.00 on his A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. Total Assets Account, Mr. Ogle witnessed the equipment lease agreement Messrs Richards and Webster signed, and Mr. Ogle wrote, at the bottom of the agreement, "Rec'd $10,000 5-24-84 JRO." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 Under the equipment purchase and lease agreement, Mr. Richards purchased freezers to lease to Florida Seafood Centers, Inc. In exchange, he was to receive "one half of the net profit of [each] freezer . . . not [to] exceed $800.00 per month for each freezer." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. As per Ogle's suggestion, he was also to get "1 percent of gross sales revenue of Florida Seafood Centers," Id., all payments to begin after a 180-day "grace period." Mr. Richards' only obligation under the parties' agreement was to pay $1,500.00 for each freezer, or $37,500.00 in all. He had the option to choose among available locations, but had no responsibilities for installation or operation of the freezers or for the sale of seafood. His role was that of a passive investor. Mr. Richards was the only person in Florida who invested in this way, although two of the Alabamians who invested also had houses in Florida. Mr. Richards understood he was the initial investor, but knew others would be approached. The equipment purchase and lease agreement was never registered as a security. Mr. Harris took Mr. Richards' $10,000.00 check to a Barnett Bank branch and opened a bank account for Florida Seafood Centers, Inc., by depositing the check less $2,000.00 cash the bank disbursed and Mr. Webster took to cover expenses already incurred. The first check drawn on Florida Seafood Centers, Inc.'s first bank account was for $500.00 in favor of Mr. Ogle, dated May 28, 1984. Mr. Ogle had told Mr. Webster he expected to be paid for his time and Mr. Webster had agreed, before Mr. Richards signed the equipment lease agreement, to pay Mr. Ogle something if he was ever in a position to do so. At the hearing, they testified the payments to Mr. Ogle - $2,000 in cash from the proceeds of Mr. Richards' second and final check to Florida Seafood Brokers, Inc., dated June 4, 1984, in addition to the $500 check - were for his services as a "marketing consultant." Mr. Ogle never told Mr. Richards he had any sort of agreement with Florida Seafood Brokers, Inc. or Mr. Webster, and Mr. Richards was aware of none before investing in the enterprise. Mr. Ogle did know that bankruptcy had befallen Cap'n Carl's Seafood Company. Mr. Richards never received any payments or sales reports. Some freezers were placed in Piggly Wiggly stores in Birmingham, among other places, without, however, Mr. Richards' advice or assistance, as far as the record shows. Such sales of fish as Messrs Webster and Harris made were in amounts too small to make deliveries of custom-packed seafood economic, so they were obliged to repack the seafood themselves, which entailed renting space and bringing it up to health department standards, all at considerable, unanticipated expense. Eventually the business failed.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license should be revoked for the reasons stated in the Administrative Action.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material hereto, Shahir Daghara Corporation, d/b/a Dunbar Liquors, was licensed by the Division, having been issued License No. 46-04408, Series 3-PS. The license permits Dunbar Liquors to sell alcoholic beverages at its premises located at 3637 Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard, No. 101, Fort Myers, Florida. Shahir Daghara is the sole corporate officer and shareholder of Shahir Daghara Corporation. The Division introduced the license file for Fowler Liquors, which formerly held License No. 46-04643, Series 3-PS. This file was also introduced in Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. Barghouthi Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Fowler Liquor Store, Case Nos. 03-0217 and 03-0431 (DOAH June 5, 2003), the consolidated cases in which Fowler Liquors' license was revoked for repeated sales to minors. As to Mr. Daghara's relationship to Fowler Liquors, the following findings were made by the undersigned: In mitigation, counsel for Fowler Liquors argued that license revocation would be unfair because Samer Barghouthi is no longer involved in the operation of the business, having signed over his interest to his uncle, Shahir Daghara. Counsel contended that Mr. Daghara acted to remove Samer Barghouthi from the premises of Fowler Liquors as soon as he learned that Mr. Barghouthi was making sales to underage persons. This contention is not credible. The two sales that are the subject of these proceedings occurred nearly one month after the murder of Mr. Cubello, which was widely known to have occurred after Mr. Cubello purchased alcoholic beverages in Fowler Liquors. The two sales also occurred after Mr. Barghouthi had been interviewed by Captain Pendarakis about sales of alcoholic beverages to minors. Moreover, Officer Cecil Pendergrass of the Fort Myers Police Department testified that Samer Barghouthi was still working at Fowler Liquors on July 1, 2002, two weeks after his arrest for selling alcoholic beverages to Justin Bender. There is no record evidence that Mr. Barghouthi transferred his interest in the business to Mr. Daghara. At most, the Division's files indicate that at some point, Fowler Liquors represented to the Division that Mr. Daghara had taken a 49 percent interest in the business. The file also contains an undated "Current Licensee Update Data Sheet" on which Samer Barghouthi's name is crossed through, but Fowler Liquors offered no sworn testimony to explain the significance of this document. Further, even if Mr. Daghara did take over the business, there is no evidence that he took any steps to remove Mr. Barghouthi from the premises of Fowler Liquors, or did anything else to address the problem of selling alcoholic beverages to minors. (Emphasis added.) The underscored language referenced a license application filed by Samer Barghouthi that named Mr. Daghara as a 49 percent stockholder. The undersigned found this insufficient to establish Fowler Liquors' claim that Mr. Daghara had taken over the business at the time Mr. Barghouthi was making illegal sales to minors. In any event, Mr. Daghara's ownership status was irrelevant to the revocation decision because there was no evidence that his ownership interest had any impact on the alcoholic beverage sales to minors at Fowler Liquors. In reviewing the Fowler Liquors file in the instant proceeding, the undersigned noted a Division form titled "Personal Data for Partner-Officer-Stockholder" that had been completed by Mr. Daghara himself on March 14, 2000, and bore his notarized signature. On this form, Mr. Daghara himself stated that he was a 49 percent shareholder of Fowler Liquors. Mr. Daghara was present at the hearing in the instant proceeding and had every opportunity to testify in explanation of his relationship to Fowler Liquors. He chose not to testify. The undersigned draws no inference from Mr. Daghara's silence, aside from the fact that it leaves the Division's version of events as the only record evidence in this proceeding. It is found that Mr. Daghara owned 49 percent of the stock of Fowler Liquors at the time that a Final Order of Revocation was entered by the Division. Mr. Daghara's ownership interest was his only proven involvement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Action against Shahir Daghara Corporation, d/b/a Dunbar Liquors. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Michael J. Wheeler, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 6 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Peter Williams, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
