The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(g) and (1)(j), Florida Statutes (2017), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(2)(c)4.; and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses who testified, the evidence admitted in the record at the final hearing, and the documents officially recognized, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is the agency head of the Florida Department of Education. Petitioner is responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct against individuals holding Florida educator certificates. Upon a finding of probable cause, Petitioner is responsible for filing an administrative complaint, and prosecuting the case in an administrative hearing pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes, if the educator disputes the allegations. Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate 878903, covering the areas of Athletic Coaching and Physical Education, which is valid through June 30, 2025. At the time of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as the athletic director at Evans High School (Evans) in the Orange County School District (District). Respondent was first employed by the District from 2004 to 2008, when he worked at Evans as a basketball coach and physical education teacher. He was re-employed by the District from 2014 until late in the 2017-2018 school year. He worked at Freedom High School (Freedom) as a physical education teacher and assistant athletic director through the end of the 2016-2017 school year. He then was employed at Evans as athletic director for most of the 2017-2018 school year. He resigned on April 5, 2018, pursuant to a settlement agreement with the School Board of Orange County (School Board), which is the District's governing body. Rolando Bailey was the assistant principal at Evans when Respondent was first employed there, and Mr. Bailey was the principal at Freedom when Respondent worked there through the end of the 2016-2017 school year. Mr. Bailey acknowledged "situations" during Respondent's earlier time at Evans and while at Freedom that involved "conflict" and "communications" issues with Respondent and required administrative intervention, but these problems were handled without involving the Employee Relations office (now called the Employee Standards office) to impose discipline. Mr. Bailey left Freedom to become principal at Evans beginning in the 2017-2018 school year. He thought Respondent would be a good candidate for the athletic director position at Evans, because Respondent was familiar with the community and Mr. Bailey thought he would be good at program building, which is what Mr. Bailey thought the athletic department needed. When Mr. Bailey made the move from Freedom to Evans, he brought not only Respondent with him, but also, at least 15 other administrators and teachers. This set a bit of an "us against them" tone between the existing faculty and staff at Evans and the Freedom transplants. Respondent and Mr. Bailey had a close working relationship. The perception among Evans personnel, based on observed interactions between Respondent and Mr. Bailey, was that they were also close personal friends. At the hearing, Mr. Bailey and Respondent both denied being close personal friends, but they were alumni of the same college, members of the same fraternity, and would frequently meet after regular school working hours. Mr. Bailey acknowledged these frequent meetings, although he said that they were work-related: "The role itself gave us the opportunity to talk outside of hours." (Tr. 200-01). These meetings did nothing to dispel the perception among Evans personnel that Mr. Bailey and Respondent were close personal friends. Evans presented challenges for Mr. Bailey as incoming principal. The school had not been performing well academically, with a "D" rating by the state, and he was intent on improving that performance. As for the athletic department, Mr. Bailey saw the need for "program building," noting that facilities were in disrepair and resources such as uniforms and equipment were scarce, resulting in a lack of school pride. Respondent's objective was to turn the Evans sports teams into winning programs. Respondent's charge was to "lead and direct" the athletic department and allow Mr. Bailey to focus on academics. However, Mr. Bailey made a commitment to the Evans coaches who were already in place when Mr. Bailey came over from Freedom. Mr. Bailey told the Evans coaches that the 2017- 2018 school year would be an evaluative year, and there would not be any changes made until after the end of the year. Mr. Bailey committed to personally participating in each coach's evaluation at year-end, along with Respondent, and Mr. Bailey would make the decision then regarding whether changes were needed to move in a different direction. Mr. Bailey was of the view that certain changes would be needed after the evaluative year. For example, he noted that several coaches held more than one head coaching position, which he generally disagreed with except for certain "related" sports, such as cross-country and track, which had separate seasons so one individual could be head coach of both. Mr. Bailey also was of the view that an individual should probably not serve as both a head coach and an administrative dean, although exceptions could be allowed and Mr. Bailey was willing to wait and see if individuals at Evans were handling it well.2 For the 2017-2018 "evaluative" school year, Mr. Bailey was willing— and had committed—to not make changes to conform the staffing to his views, and instead, to await year-end evaluations to make these decisions. Respondent expressed a different view, stating that if it had been up to him, he would have terminated all existing coaches when he started at Evans and he would have made them all reapply. But it was not up to Respondent, and Mr. Bailey's commitment stood. Respondent started working at Evans during the last few days of July 2017. He immediately implemented some changes in how the athletic 2 For example, Mr. Thompson was an administrative dean and head football coach at Evans for years before Mr. Bailey became principal and he remained in both positions after Mr. Bailey became principal. department was run. One change involved employing Ms. Woodard, who came over from Freedom with Mr. Bailey and the others, as assistant athletic director with the responsibility for inputting team roster information, including documenting compliant physicals and grade point averages (GPAs) for the students on the roster. This apparently had the effect of revealing students who were disqualified because they did not meet the minimum requirement of a 2.0 GPA. Previously, coaches were responsible for inputting their own team rosters. The claim asserted at hearing was that coaches were "padding" their rosters with disqualified students3 or inactive students.4 The motive suggested for "padding" a roster would be that for "minor" sports like cross-country, track, swimming, golf, and others, higher roster numbers could result in supplements being authorized for assistant coaching positions. A reduction in roster numbers could mean a reduction or loss of supplements, which could mean that assistant coaches would have to coach on a volunteer basis, or a head coach might have to do without, or without as many, assistant coaches. There was no competent credible evidence proving specific instances of wrongful or inappropriate roster padding.5 3 Respondent explained how students without qualifying GPAs might have been mistakenly listed on rosters showing qualifying GPAs. He acknowledged that coaches did not have access to detailed GPA data, and instead, might input a student's cumulative GPA as shown on the prior year's report card. However, that GPA might include grades for classes that were not eligible for purposes of meeting the minimum GPA required to participate in sports. 4 Ms. Bellamy, the girls' basketball head coach, said she discouraged "her" girls from going out for cross-country, because they "probably" would not be allowed to compete in meets. Her comments were more suggestive of a turf war than credible evidence of roster padding. 5 Several witnesses who were not at Evans until 2017-2018 offered their belief that roster padding occurred before the 2017-2018 school year. The credible testimony established only that when rosters were prepared or updated under Respondent's system beginning in August 2017, inputting updated GPAs resulted in some students being disqualified. Ms. Woodard, who implemented the new system, admitted she was not sure how many supplements were lost or in which sport. She thought cross-country may have lost supplements, but then said the sport previously had four or six supplements and that it had four supplements after she updated the rosters. Whitney Poole claimed that rosters had been padded the previous year, but she did not explain how she could have known that, since she was not at Evans before August 2017, and then was only a math teacher. She did not have any position in the athletic department before January 2018 when she became an assistant coach. In general, Ms. Poole was not a credible witness, and with one exception, her testimony was not credited. Sheree Carter Sheree Carter was a coach and administrative dean at Evans in 2017- 2018, when Mr. Bailey, Respondent, and others came to Evans from Freedom. She had been employed at Evans since 2012. She remains employed at Evans to this day. During the 2016-2017 school year, Ms. Carter held the following positions at Evans: administrative dean over attendance; head coach of girls' cross-country and girls' track; and assistant coach for girls' weightlifting. Ms. Carter was slated for those same positions headed into the 2017-2018 school year. Ms. Carter took comfort from Mr. Bailey's assurance that no changes would be made until he made the decisions after personally participating in the year-end evaluations. Ms. Carter testified that she met Respondent at the end of July, during the two-week pre-planning period before classes started. Within a week or two after they met, Respondent started saying things to let her know that he was interested in her. He made her uncomfortable, and she rebuffed his advances. But rather than discouraging his comments, the intensity and frequency of Respondent's advances escalated. Ms. Carter testified that Respondent would walk by her office, which was at the back of the front office, and he would poke his head in to see if anyone else was with her. Respondent never came into her office if someone else was with her; he waited until she was alone, and then he would come in. His conversation opener was that he was recently divorced and was trying to get his feet wet getting back into the dating game. She responded by saying okay, cool, good luck with that. Respondent then started coming by Ms. Carter's office to ask if she wanted to grab lunch together or come eat lunch in his office. She declined each time he asked. After the rebuffed lunch offers, Respondent started asking Ms. Carter if she wanted to go to the movies with him or grab drinks after work. Again, she turned him down each time. Respondent's next approach was to let Ms. Carter know that he had a sofa in his office, followed by repeated invitations to Ms. Carter to hang out and chill with him on the sofa in his office. These invitations were conveyed with a personal, intimate air. Ms. Carter always turned down these advances and let Respondent know she was uncomfortable with what he was asking. Respondent approached Ms. Carter with these advances not only when she was alone in her office, but also, on the practice fields and in the hallways or courtyard, if she was alone. Respondent only approached Ms. Carter to make these advances when no one else was around.6 Ms. Carter described it as "creepy," like "in a stalking type of way. Like he would just wait for that right moment to approach you when you're by yourself and then throw these advances at me." (Tr. 74). Respondent's stalking-type behavior and frequent approaches affected Ms. Carter's ability to do her job. She delayed or avoided communicating with Respondent about coaching matters, despite needing to communicate with the athletic director. She would check hallways before freely moving around to make sure Respondent was not present, and she took to closing her office door to give the impression she was not there. Ms. Carter's testimony was credible and clear. Her demeanor was earnest and believable. In contrast, Respondent's testimony regarding the advances claimed by Ms. Carter lacked credibility. Respondent was evasive. He frequently avoiding a direct answer to the question, as illustrated by the following: Q: And did you invite her to your office to chill? A: I was hardly ever in the office. I mean, so, it's very hard to chill in there. I was very, very on the go. I was very, very on the go. You know, Mr. Bailey was big on the look and appearance. So there was stuff always that needed to be done with the field and 6 Mr. Bailey testified that he never observed Respondent engage in sexual harassment, but conceded that sexual harassment is not normally something that he sees people doing out in the open. with the cosmetics. So I was hardly ever in the office. The only time I was in the office if I had to be [sic]. But I was hardly ever in the office, so I definitely couldn't be there just to chill because it was just too much work to do. (Tr. 324). * * * Q: Did you ever invite her to eat lunch in your office? A: I never ate lunch. It's hard for me to eat lunch because I had lunch duty and we had three lunches. So, when am I going to eat lunch when I'm constantly being fussed at by Mr. Bailey about not answering e-mails. Because I was never in my office so my e-mails were forwarded to Ms. Woodard so I didn't have to hear from him about why I don't answer e-mails. So I never ate lunch during the day. (Tr. 327). Respondent avoided answering the questions posed—whether he ever invited Ms. Carter to chill or eat lunch in his office. Respondent danced around the subject, never denying or refuting Ms. Carter's clear testimony that he had, in fact, invited her multiple times to eat lunch in his office and to chill on the sofa in his office, but she turned him down each time. Respondent did deny that he had asked Ms. Carter to go to the movies7 or out for drinks with him, but he offered weak explanations, which were not persuasive, for why he would not have extended these invitations. When asked if he ever asked Ms. Carter to go to the movies with him, he responded: "No. I was too busy to be trying to go to the movies and live in a whole different county and try to work. You know, Evans was an hour and 20 minutes away. Freedom was 38. So there's no time to go to the movies. Especially with a person you don't know, you know." (Tr. 325-26). And when 7 Ms. Poole, a witness for Respondent who generally went out of her way attempting to testify favorably for Respondent, said that she had been friendly with Ms. Carter at the beginning of the 2017-2018 school year. Ms. Poole admitted that during this time, Ms. Carter told Ms. Poole that Respondent had asked her out to the movies. To that extent, Ms. Poole's testimony was credible, and it corroborated Ms. Carter's testimony. asked if he ever asked Ms. Carter out for a drink, he said: "No, because I don't drink. … I just never had a drink, never smoked. So I don't drink. And because I don't drink, I'm not going to invite somebody out to watch them drink. So." (Tr. 326-27). Respondent's testimony on these points was less credible than Ms. Carter's testimony, and her testimony is credited. Ms. Carter testified that her discomfort with Respondent's advances came to a head at a soccer game, when he approached her and once again asked her out for drinks, and she got upset. She said that she blew up, emphatically reiterating (punctuated with curse words) that she had told him before she was not interested and expressing her frustration that he had not yet accepted the message that she wanted him to stop making advances at her. This was on a weeknight during the week of December 4, 2017. On Friday, December 8, 2017, Respondent went to Ms. Carter's office and told her: (1) that she was immediately removed, mid-season, from the assistant coach position for weightlifting, though she could keep the supplement; (2) that they would be moving in a different direction and she would no longer be head coach for girls' cross-country (which had ended its season one month earlier); and (3) that they would evaluate her position as head coach for girl's track after the spring. Respondent told Ms. Carter that he and Mr. Bailey had made these decisions because Mr. Bailey did not want her coaching and serving as an administrative dean at the same time.8 Ms. Carter was very upset because she loves coaching. She broke down crying and was so distraught, she was unable to perform her job duties to supervise during either lunch periods that day. Ms. Carter believed that 8 Respondent admitted to delivering this news to Ms. Carter, although he said it was in a routine meeting in his office that he had scheduled to give Ms. Carter her end-of-season evaluation for coaching girls' cross-country (conflicting with Mr. Bailey's clear testimony that he always participated in evaluations, which were done at the end of the year). Curiously, Respondent testified that his evaluation had no meaning, and its only purpose was to give coaches something for possible future employers wanting to see evaluations. Respondent failed to explain, if the meeting was only to address a meaningless end-of-season evaluation for one sport, why he used the occasion to deliver meaningful consequences or why he addressed more than that one sport. Respondent took this action to retaliate against her because she had rebuffed his advances, particularly after her strong rebuke of him earlier that week. Up to this point, Ms. Carter had confided in two different colleagues regarding Respondent's advances and her discomfort with them, but she had not lodged a formal complaint against Respondent with Mr. Bailey. She was concerned that Mr. Bailey would take Respondent's side in a dispute because of their longstanding relationship and apparent close personal friendship. Previously, when she had confided in Mr. Thompson, he had told her she should talk to Respondent regarding her discomfort, but she had tried that repeatedly. When she confided again in Mr. Thompson upon being reduced to tears on December 8, 2017, this time he told her she should not be talking with colleagues rather than going through proper channels, and he urged her to file a complaint. Ms. Carter followed that advice, submitting a complaint in an email to Mr. Bailey, which she sent to him just after midnight, very early on Monday morning, December 11, 2017. She asked if she could meet with Mr. Bailey to discuss what Respondent had told her regarding her coaching responsibilities and her concern that Respondent had taken this action because she had turned down his advances. Directly contradicting Respondent's claim, Mr. Bailey testified that he did not make the decision to remove Ms. Carter from her coaching duties during the 2017-2018 school year, nor did he direct Respondent to tell Ms. Carter in December—in the middle of the "evaluative year"—that she could not remain as coach and administrative dean.9 Instead, as he had committed to do at the beginning of the year, Mr. Bailey waited until the end of the school year to have the conversation with Ms. Carter about changes going forward. At that time, he informed her that he did not want her to continue in the dual roles of coaching and administrative dean in the 2018- 9 When Mr. Bailey found out that Respondent had that conversation with Ms. Carter on December 8, 2017, he had a meeting with Respondent to find out why he did that. 2019 school year. Ms. Carter wanted to remain in coaching to continue building her programs. With Mr. Bailey's agreement, she gave up the administrative dean position and returned to classroom teaching the next school year so she could continue coaching. Mr. Bailey was a witness for Respondent and he attempted to be supportive of Respondent in his testimony. However, Mr. Bailey clearly and directly contradicted Respondent's claim that he had instructed Respondent to remove Ms. Carter from coaching on December 8, 2017. Mr. Bailey was surprised by Ms. Carter's email reporting that Respondent had done so and had attributed the decision to Mr. Bailey. After meeting with Ms. Carter, Mr. Bailey reported Ms. Carter's complaint to the Employee Relations office for investigation.10 In contrast to the "situations" involving Respondent when he was first at Evans and again while at Freedom, which were handled by administrative interventions without involving Employee Relations, this time Mr. Bailey found it necessary to involve Employee Relations. Jamila Mitchell Jamila Mitchell, Ph.D., also provided testimony regarding inappropriate statements and conduct by Respondent that made her feel very uncomfortable and that interfered with her doing her job. Dr. Mitchell has been working at Evans since 2014. Her doctorate degree is in computer science. She has been the computer science instructor at Evans and the sports media sponsor. She held those two positions during the 2017-2018 school year. She was not a coach or assistant coach. As sports media sponsor, Dr. Mitchell is involved in all sports-related media, including film, photography, social media, and the school's website. 10 Two separate investigations were initiated: the first addressed alleged sexual harassment and retaliation by Respondent, pursuant to the District's responsibilities under civil rights laws as Ms. Carter's employer not to commit unlawful employment practices. When that investigation was completed with a finding of probable cause to believe there was sexual harassment, Mr. Ganio, then-manager of the District's Employee Relations office, completed an investigation into whether Respondent had engaged in misconduct, which would provide just cause for the School Board to take action against him as a District employee. Her responsibilities include managing sports-related website content and ensuring information is disseminated for all sports-related events. She must keep up with schedules, rosters, college recruiting activities, and events such as college scholarship signing days and awards banquets. Frequent communications with the Evans athletic director are essential to her job duties, at least by the time sports activities are in full swing after the first couple of weeks of each school year. Dr. Mitchell testified that beginning in September 2017, when her job required her to be in frequent communications with Respondent, he started saying and doing things that made Dr. Mitchell uncomfortable. On several occasions, Respondent referred to Dr. Mitchell as his "little Mexican." Dr. Mitchell is not Mexican. Respondent would say this when passing her in the hallway, if they were both at a game or event, or when he came to her classroom. Sometimes she was alone when he said this, but sometimes other people overheard what Respondent said. She was offended by Respondent's words, and also, uncomfortable having to explain to others who heard Respondent call her his little Mexican that she was not Mexican, but was biracial. Despite taking offense, she tried to ignore it or laugh it off. Respondent frequently came by Dr. Mitchell's classroom during her planning period when she was the only one there. At least initially, they would discuss sports media matters. But then the conversations would turn to Respondent telling Dr. Mitchell that he "liked the way her butt looked" in the pants she was wearing that day, or how whatever she was wearing accentuated some part of her body. She tried to change the subject back to work, but his comments made her feel weird and "creeped out." Respondent's frequent comments about her clothing and body impeded communications regarding sports media issues. Respondent's comments also caused Dr. Mitchell to stop wearing form-fitting clothing, pants that were a little bit tight, or shirts cut a little bit low.11 She began wearing loose clothing and when Respondent came by her classroom, she stayed seated behind her desk so he would not comment on "how her butt looked." Her discomfort and worries distracted from needed communications and interfered with getting the job done. It got to the point where Dr. Mitchell avoided communicating in person with Respondent, resorting to communicating by text or phone call. Dr. Mitchell described the "tipping point" for her was when she was walking through a courtyard to go to the front office and Respondent was coming out of the front office. Dr. Mitchell was wearing her hair down (loose), which she rarely did. When they passed in the courtyard, Respondent commented that he liked it when she wore her hair down because it gave him something to grab onto. There were other people in the courtyard—teachers and students—and Dr. Mitchell testified that she just prayed that nobody heard what Respondent said to her. She was highly embarrassed by what she reasonably interpreted as a sexual reference. Dr. Mitchell did not immediately complain about Respondent's inappropriate conduct, in part because she was embarrassed, but also, because she did not know to whom she could complain. She had seen how Mr. Bailey interacted with Respondent, and observed that they seemed to have a very friendly, personal relationship. She was concerned that if she said anything, it would be her job on the line. But when she was contacted by an investigator looking into Sheree Carter's complaint, who had been told that Respondent may have also harassed Dr. Mitchell, she spoke with the 11 Respondent suggested in his PRO that Dr. Mitchell should be faulted for her choice of attire in a school "full of hormonal high school students that most likely has a dress code, stated or implied, for teachers." (Resp. PRO at 28). No credible evidence supports a finding that Dr. Mitchell's attire was provocative, inappropriate, or contrary to any dress code, and none was cited. Respondent's argument is, in effect, that Dr. Mitchell "asked for it"—a classic means to deflect blame and excuse inappropriate sexual conduct, which is, or should be, a relic of the past. Respondent's veiled hint that Dr. Mitchell asked for it is tantamount to a concession that "it" occurred, necessitating an excuse for his behavior. There is no excuse. investigator and provided the same information about Respondent's offensive conduct to which she testified at the hearing. Dr. Mitchell was very credible and genuinely distraught as she described these uncomfortable encounters with Respondent. As with Ms. Carter's specific complaints, Respondent denied (or gave evasive, less-than-clear answers) that he said or did the things described by Dr. Mitchell.12 Respondent's testimony was not as credible as Dr. Mitchell's testimony. Dr. Mitchell's testimony is credited. Jessica Kendrick Jessica Kendrick was the head swim coach at Evans, coaching both the boys' and girls' swim teams, from 2013 through the 2018-2019 school year. Her testimony was fairly narrow in scope, but clear and to the point: when Respondent was the head of the athletics department in the 2017-2018 school year, he made her uncomfortable by standing very close whenever they talked with no one else nearby—that is, when there were no witnesses. Ms. Kendrick is five feet, eight inches in height. Respondent is six feet, one inch tall. He used his height advantage to intimidate Ms. Kendrick, making her feel like he was towering over her when he stood very close and looked down at her. Ms. Kendrick's vivid description was that Respondent would be standing so close to her that she could tell what he had for lunch. Ms. Kendrick's reaction to these close encounters was to back up to create space between Respondent and herself. But Respondent would quickly move forward to close the space she had created. She would inch back again; he would inch toward her to close the gap again. Respondent made Ms. Kendrick feel very uncomfortable. 12 In contrast, the investigative summary of the District's investigation into Ms. Carter's sexual harassment complaint reported that Respondent stated he "does not recall if he made inappropriate comments to [Dr.] Mitchell." (Pet. Ex. 14, Bates p. 35). Although statements of non-party witnesses reported in the investigative summary are hearsay, and thereby limited in use to supplementing or explaining competent evidence, Respondent's statements reported in the investigative summary that was offered against him are party admissions, excepted from hearsay, and admissible for all purposes. See § 90.803(18)(a), Fla. Stat. Ms. Kendrick had been the head swim head coach at Evans for four years before Respondent became athletic director. He made her so uncomfortable when they spoke in person that she went out of her way to avoid him. She told the two assistant swim coaches, Mr. Rivers and Mr. Ross, about her discomfort with Respondent. She asked her assistants to take her place for in-person meetings or discussions with Respondent so she could avoid any more uncomfortable close encounters with Respondent. It affected her job; communications with the athletic director were necessary for her to function effectively as head coach. Ms. Kendrick testified that rather than having to interact with Respondent, if Respondent had continued on as athletic director at Evans, she would have given up the head coaching position. Instead, Respondent resigned, and Ms. Kendrick decided to remain head swim coach at Evans for the 2018-2019 school year. Respondent testified that he had no idea what Ms. Kendrick was talking about. Ms. Kendrick's testimony was more credible than Respondent's and is credited. At the hearing, Respondent made the blanket statement that all the witnesses testifying against him were lying. He claimed that Ms. Carter and Ms. Kendrick were lying to get back at him for changing the procedures to prevent roster padding and costing them coaching supplements.13 He claimed that their colleagues, in whom they had confided and who corroborated their testimony, were also lying. Respondent's attempted attacks on the credibility 13 Ironically, the suggestion that Ms. Carter was mad because she lost supplements as a result of the changed roster procedures was contradicted by Respondent's own testimony. As for her head coaching positions, Respondent testified that head coaches receive supplemental pay irrespective of roster numbers. Ms. Carter might have lost those supplements as a result of Respondent's unauthorized attempt to remove Ms. Carter from cross-country head coach and to threaten removal from track, had those actions stood, but they were reversed by Mr. Bailey. As for the supplement Ms. Carter received as assistant weightlifting coach, Respondent admitted that when he told Ms. Carter she was relieved of her assistant coaching duties mid-season, he told her she could retain the supplement. Respondent's actions had nothing to do with supplements or rosters; Respondent acted to retaliate against Ms. Carter for rebuffing his repeated advances. of the witnesses testifying against him were not persuasive and did not undermine their clear, credible testimony. Most notably, although Respondent claimed some witnesses had a motive to lie to get back at him because of lost coaching supplements, no such motive was or could be attributed to Dr. Mitchell. Dr. Mitchell was not a coach or an assistant coach. Respondent offered no cogent theory to explain why Dr. Mitchell would fabricate her testimony. Respondent's accusation that Dr. Mitchell's testimony was invented does not square with her display of emotions at the hearing. She was visibly shaken and crying when she described her embarrassment with Respondent's sexual innuendos, and when she explained why she did not complain about Respondent at the time. Ulunda Frazier The pattern of behavior evident from the complaints of Ms. Carter, Dr. Mitchell, and Ms. Kendrick is further buttressed, at least generally, by court records regarding Ulunda Frazier and Respondent. Ms. Frazier is a teacher. At the time pertinent to this case, she taught at Oak Ridge High School (Oak Ridge), within the District. At the hearing, Respondent described Ms. Frazier as a longtime personal friend he has known for 15 or 16 years. He said Ms. Frazier used to babysit for Respondent's 15-year-old son when the teenager was an infant and toddler. Respondent admitted that his personal relationship with Ms. Frazier had turned "toxic." He did not offer any details to explain in what way the relationship turned toxic. Instead, alluding to a close intimate relationship gone bad, he said only that his relationship with Ms. Frazier "had become toxic and out of control that was actually birthed out of both of our pains. We -- she was going through an ugly divorce and I was going through my treatments and stuff. And so the relationship had just got toxic and it had -- it was no longer a friendly environment." (Tr. 351). Court records in Frazier v. Crawford, Case No. 48-2018-DR-000923-O, in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, Florida, were officially recognized. The records reflect that on January 24, 2018, Ms. Frazier filed a Petition for Injunction Against Stalking under section 784.0485, Florida Statutes, seeking to enjoin Respondent from stalking her. That same day, the court issued a Temporary Injunction for Protection Against Stalking. On January 25, 2018, the Polk County Sheriff's Office served the Temporary Injunction, Ms. Frazier's Petition, and a Notice of Hearing on Respondent at his residence. The hearing was scheduled for February 6, 2018, and was held as noticed. Both Ms. Frazier and Respondent attended. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued a Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Stalking (Stalking Injunction). Respondent received a copy by hand delivery in open court, as acknowledged by his signature on the Stalking Injunction. He is therefore "deemed to have knowledge of and to be bound by all matters occurring at the hearing and on the face of" the Stalking Injunction. (Pet. Ex. 18, Bates p. 51-52). The Stalking Injunction contains the following finding: "After hearing the testimony of each party present and of any witnesses, or upon consent of Respondent, the Court finds, based on the specific facts of this case, that Petitioner is a victim of stalking."14 (Pet. Ex. 18, Bates p. 47). On that basis, the Stalking Injunction ordered as follows: "Respondent shall not commit, or cause any other person to commit, any acts of stalking against Petitioner, including stalking, cyberstalking, aggravated stalking, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death. Respondent shall not commit any other violation of the injunction through an intentional unlawful threat, word or act to do violence to Petitioner." (Pet. Ex. 18, Bates p. 50). The Stalking Injunction is in effect until February 26, 2021. 14 "A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree[.]" § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2017). Section 784.0485 creates a cause of action for a person who is a victim of stalking to obtain an injunction for protection against stalking. The Administrative Complaint alleged that the Stalking Injunction "reduced Respondent's effectiveness as an athletic director because it limited his ability to travel to that school and perform his duties." The terms of the Stalking Injunction do not support this allegation. While the Stalking Injunction generally and broadly prohibited Respondent from having any contact with Ms. Frazier, including at Oak Ridge where she worked and at her residence (both of which were in Orlando), there is an express exception to the no-contact prohibition, as follows: "The Respondent may go to Oakridge [sic] High School only for a valid business reason. If any contact occurs, it shall be non-hostile contact." (Pet. Ex. 18, Bates p. 49). In several respects, however, the Stalking Injunction contradicts Respondent's testimony. Respondent denied that he would have made advances on Ms. Carter because he was married and had been married to the same woman since 2010. Yet his close personal relationship with Ms. Frazier predated his marriage by five or six years. Respondent testified that Ms. Frazier babysat for Respondent's 15-year-old son when the teenager was an infant. The fact that Respondent got married to someone else five years later did not prevent Respondent from engaging in a first "friendly" and then "toxic" close relationship with Ms. Frazier, or from stalking Ms. Frazier before the Stalking Injunction was issued against him on February 6, 2018. Whatever the details may be regarding Respondent's stalking of Ms. Frazier, it is noteworthy that she lived and worked in Orlando. This belies Respondent's claim that he could not have harassed Ms. Carter with the repeated advances she described, because he would not have had time to go to the movies or out for drinks near where he worked in Orange County. He attempted to paint the picture that he spent every moment in Orange County working or commuting to and from his home in distant Polk County. The Stalking Injunction stands as evidence that, contrary to Respondent's claim, in addition to working at Evans and commuting to and from Polk County, Respondent found time to have a first friendly, then toxic relationship with Ms. Frazier and to stalk Ms. Frazier where she lived and worked in Orange County. Respondent's Separation from the District The investigation into Ms. Carter's complaint identified individuals who were potential witnesses with relevant information or possible victims. After conducting interviews, the District held a pre-determination meeting on March 7, 2018, to share with Respondent the information learned during the investigation and give him an opportunity to respond. Respondent appeared with a union representative, who instructed him not to respond. On March 27, 2018, Respondent was suspended from work with pay while the District completed its investigation. This "Relief of Duty" status is employed when warranted by the seriousness of the allegations. "Relief of Duty" included an immediate suspension of network access, including email. During the process of completing the investigation, the District discovered a new allegation of inappropriate conduct by Respondent. The District learned of Ms. Frazier's Petition and the resulting Stalking Injunction. It held a second pre-determination meeting on April 3, 2018, to inform Respondent that it had learned about the Stalking Injunction. Again, Respondent was given the chance to respond, but again, he refused to say anything on advice of his union representative. On the same day as the second pre-determination meeting, Barbara Jenkins, the District Superintendent, issued a memorandum to the School Board, transmitting a complaint charging Respondent with misconduct in office and conduct unbecoming a public employee, and recommending that Respondent be terminated from employment for the charged violations. Immediately after the complaint and recommendation for termination were released, Respondent negotiated and finalized a Settlement Agreement and General Release (Agreement) with the School Board. The Agreement expressly stated that it was not to be construed as an admission by Respondent or the District of any wrongdoing. Nonetheless, pursuant to the Agreement, Respondent was required to resign as of April 5, 2018, and to tender a written letter of resignation. Pursuant to the Agreement, Respondent agreed "he will not reapply for or accept employment [at a District school] at any time in the future." Respondent also acknowledged that the District would be submitting its investigation into Respondent's alleged misconduct to the Department of Education Professional Practices Commission, as required by section 1012.796(1)(d), Florida Statutes. In form and substance, the Agreement is a common vehicle utilized for resignation of an employee in lieu of the employee having to answer to charges and face the prospect of termination. Respondent attempted to suggest that his resignation was purely voluntary, based on his decision that he did not want to work in a place where people would lie about him. His claim was not credible. Respondent fully understood when he took the position at Evans, along with at least 15 others brought over from Freedom by Mr. Bailey, that there would be an "us against them" air that he would have to overcome. Mr. Bailey attempted to set the stage for developing good relationships with existing Evans coaches and other staff, by deeming the first year an "evaluative year" in which there would not be any position changes until the evaluative year was discussed with Mr. Bailey, Respondent, and the coach at the end of the year. Respondent knew that Evans had challenging problems to overcome, with scarce resources in terms of facilities, equipment, and uniforms, and that he was expected to build winning programs and instill school pride. He knew he was expected to put in place the systems, policies, and procedures that would allow for program building, and he was well aware that his changes would be unpopular with some. It defies logic and credibility for Respondent to suggest that he chose to walk away from his commitment before completing one school year only because existing Evans coaches and assistant coaches were lying about him. Mr. Bailey acknowledged that, as principal, he was compelled to let the investigation process be carried out. As he put it: "[W]hat I performed is my role as a principal. That when there's conduct that's unbecoming of an employee, or an employee feeling as if they have been, in this case, harassed, I'm going to follow the guidance that has been presented to me in my role as the leader of the school." (Tr. 209). He acknowledged that at the culmination of that process, when it was reported to him, he followed the guidance that he was supposed to follow, and as a result, Respondent was no longer at his school.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission issue a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 1012.795(1)(j) through a violation of rule 6A-10.081(2)(c)4., and imposing the following as penalties: suspension of Respondent's educator's certificate for a period of three years from the date of the final order; probation for a period of three years after the suspension, with conditions to be determined by the Education Practices Commission, which should include a requirement that Respondent take two college level courses, one in professional ethics for educators and one related to women's rights in the workplace; and payment of a $750.00 fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Carol R. Buxton, Esquire Florida Education Association 1516 East Hillcrest Street, Suite 109 Orlando, Florida 32803 Ron Weaver, Esquire Post Office Box 770088 Ocala, Florida 34477-0088 S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2021. Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Lisa M. Forbess, Interim Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 316 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Randy Kosec, Jr., Chief Office of Professional Practices Services Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 224-E 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is entitled to an athletic coaching certificate, as described in section 1012.55(2), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-4.004(4).
Findings Of Fact Early Life: 1960-1978 Petitioner was born on December 22, 1960. Petitioner is the youngest of five sons born to a Bahamian mother, who worked as a beautician, and a Jamaican father, who worked as a custodian. Petitioner's four older brothers have all earned college degrees. Petitioner's oldest brother served as an Army psychiatrist. Two other brothers also served in the military: one as a comptroller and the other as a Navy pilot. Petitioner's youngest brother is the executive director of a well-known hotel on Miami Beach. Petitioner grew up in the Liberty City section of Miami and graduated from Miami Beach Senior High School in 1978. Liberty City was a dangerous area in which to live with gunfire a familiar sound to residents. Two years after Petitioner graduated, Liberty City and other parts of Miami were torn by race riots. Unlike all of his siblings, Petitioner has never attended college. After high school, Petitioner worked as a washer and cook at a local hospital, but continued to pursue his real interest, which was performing as a disc jockey (DJ). Interning nights at a local radio station, Petitioner acquired enough experience to start a mobile DJ business in Liberty City and Miami Beach, where he worked on weekends. Criminal History: Essentially 1979-1986 Respondent's characterizations of Petitioner's criminal history as "extensive," in the Amended Notice of Reasons, or, worse, "storied," in his proposed recommended order at page 7, are unsupported by the record. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, only two criminal incidents are relevant, and they are misdemeanors that occurred over 25 years ago. The rest of Petitioner's criminal history consists entirely of arrests for which the charges were later dropped, except for a 1986 case in which the court withheld adjudication on a felony weapon charge to which Petitioner's plea is not in the record and a 2009 arrest for unpaid child support for which the purge amount was about $10,000. On August 28, 1979, Petitioner, then 18 years old, was arrested in Dade County for reckless display of a firearm and possession of over five grams of marijuana, both felonies. The marijuana charge--Petitioner's only arrest for drugs or alcohol--was dismissed, but Petitioner was convicted of improper exhibition of a firearm, a misdemeanor, and fined $25. This incident will be referred to as the "1979 Misdemeanor." In a letter dated May 7, 2009, to the Miami-Dade School Board Executive Director of Fingerprinting, Petitioner stated that he was in the backyard of his parents' home with one of his brothers and in possession of a bb gun. The small fine corroborates Petitioner's explanation. It is therefore found that a "bb gun" was the weapon in question, although Petitioner's letter misstated that all charges were dropped. On February 12, 1985, Petitioner was arrested in Dade County for loitering and prowling and carrying a concealed weapon, the former a misdemeanor and the latter a felony. By operation of a deemed admission to Respondent's Requests for Admission, Petitioner, while a passenger in a vehicle, was found in possession of a semi-automatic weapon concealed in a ski mask. The misdemeanor charge was dismissed, but the court withheld adjudication of guilt on the felony charge and imposed a fine of an unspecified amount. The record does not disclose Petitioner's plea to this charge. In his May 7, 2009, letter, Petitioner explained that, while he was DJing in a park without a permit, he had a concealed weapon without a permit, but misstated that both charges were dropped. On November 18, 1985, Petitioner was arrested in Dade County for inciting rioting, a felony. This charge was dismissed. In his May 7, 2009, letter, Petitioner explained that he was DJing in a park and was arrested because the music was too loud. On October 4, 1986, Petitioner was arrested in Hillsborough County and charged with grand larceny with a firearm, a felony. Based on a guilty plea, Petitioner was convicted of improper exhibition of a firearm, a misdemeanor, and sentenced to time served. This incident will be referred to as the "1986 Misdemeanor." In his May 7, 2009, letter, Petitioner stated that he was DJing a party in Tampa when a group of men started to beat a young woman in the parking lot. When security refused to intervene, Petitioner displayed a firearm to break up the crowd. Petitioner's letter misstates that the charge was dismissed. His explanation fails to account for the portion of the charge involving grand larceny, but makes sense when applied to the charge of which Petitioner was convicted. On December 13, 1987, Petitioner was arrested in Dade County for two or three counts of aggravated assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon to commit a felony, all felonies. These charges were dismissed. In his May 7, 2009, letter, Petitioner explained that a large fight broke out at a skating rink, but surveillance video revealed that he had not been involved in the fight, nor had he possessed a weapon. On or about June 15, 1993, Petitioner was arrested in Cook County, Illinois, and charged with disorderly conduct. This charge was dismissed. In his May 7, 2009, letter, Petitioner stated that he was staying at the Ritz in Chicago. While shopping along the riverfront, a law enforcement officer asked him if he could afford to shop there. A confrontation ensued, and the officer arrested Petitioner, but the charge was later dropped. On May 17, 1994, Petitioner was arrested in Dade County and charged with aggravated assault with a weapon, a felony. The charge was dismissed. In his May 7, 2009, letter, Petitioner explained that a fight had broken out at a house party, and the police arrested everyone in attendance. There is no record of a 1997 arrest for battery. There is an arrest in July or October 1996 for battery in Louisiana, but Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and the charge was dismissed. In his May 7, 2009, letter, Petitioner mentioned a 1997 case involving a nightclub fight with which he had not been involved. A week later, a complainant claimed that Petitioner had hit him, but the charge was dismissed. On July 5, 1999, Petitioner was arrested in Dade County and charged with battery, a misdemeanor, which may have been raised to aggravated battery, a felony, by the prosecutor. Either way, the charge was dismissed. In his May 7, 2009, letter, Petitioner explained that a fight broke out at a nightclub, but witnesses verified that Petitioner had not hit the complainant, who originally said that another person had hit him. On October 6, 2002, Petitioner was arrested in Dorchester County, South Carolina, and charged with aiding or procuring a person to expose private parts in a lewd and lascivious manner--namely, the insertion of a soda bottle by two strippers into the vagina of a member of the audience who climbed onstage during a performance, as well as several acts of unspecified obscenities by two male members of the audience with the aforesaid strippers. The charge was that these unlawful acts were in the presence of and with the encouragement of Petitioner. The South Carolina documentation is contradictory as to disposition. The most plausible rendering of the disposition comes from the general sessions docket, which reports that, on October 13, 2003, this charge was dismissed with leave to restore, if Petitioner violated an agreement not to appear in South Carolina for five years at a revenue-producing event. Another document completed by the court clerk states that Petitioner was sentenced to six months in the state Department of Corrections, based on a plea not otherwise described, but the sentence was suspended for five years, pursuant to the agreement identified above. A partial transcript of the October 13, 2003, court proceeding quotes the judge as saying that the state was nolle prossing two charges, and the court was sentencing Petitioner to six months on apparently a third offense, even though nothing in the other documents describes three charges, but the judge suspended the sentence for five years, subject to the above-identified agreement. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, the burden of establishing what took place in South Carolina falls on Respondent. Nothing in the record supports the judge's reference to three charges, which renders the judge's description of events unreliable. The most that can be said of the South Carolina incident is that a lone charge was dropped, subject to reinstatement, if Petitioner made a revenue-producing appearance in South Carolina for five years. The evidence fails to establish any finding of guilt by the court, plea of guilty by Petitioner, or subsequent reinstatement of the charge. In his May 7, 2009, letter, Petitioner stated that the club owner had performers on stage, but Petitioner had nothing to do with their performance. Petitioner testified that he had been paid merely to appear at the club and sign autographs. On February 17, 2009, Petitioner was arrested on a writ of bodily attachment in connection with a finding of contempt of court for failing to pay child support. The purge amount was $10,223.36. The disposition of this matter is unclear, although it is obvious that Petitioner was arrested for an unpaid child-support obligation and was released, presumably after paying the purge amount or such lower amount as the court deemed fit. Luke Records and 2 Live Crew: 1987-1992 After graduating from high school, Petitioner grew his DJ business to the point that, by 1987 or 1988, he had started Luke Records, Inc., a record company devoted to the production and sale of hip-hop music. Using funds provided by his brothers, Petitioner eventually employed over 40 persons in Miami and elsewhere around the United States. The growth of Luke Records was largely the result of its association with 2 Live Crew (2LC), a hip-hop group known for its sexually explicit songs. Not yet under contract with a record company, 2LC visited Petitioner in Miami, where the parties agreed to a recording contract. Petitioner appears to have quickly assumed substantial business and performance roles with 2LC and wrote some of the songs that the group performed. Serving as the frontman for 2LC, Petitioner was prominent in the group's performances, which, according to Petitioner, featured dance music informed by the twin themes of sex and comedy. Clearly, 2LC's songs were dance music that featured sex. Regardless of the role of comedy in 2LC's music, Petitioner himself acknowledges that its sexual themes rendered the music inappropriate for minors. The evidentiary record does not include the lyrics to 2LC's songs, but the more offensive titles include vulgar references to male and female genitalia and a reference to women as "hoes," meaning "whores, as well as at least one album cover featuring Petitioner surrounded by scantily clad women. Given the explicit sexual content of the titles and lyrics, Petitioner helped promote the use of parental advisory stickers to be applied to albums, tapes, and CDs, including those of 2LC, that contained lyrics inappropriate for minors and thus constituted a form of adult entertainment. On the other hand, two unimpeachable sources--the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals--found serious elements in at least certain of the 2LC songs of this era. In a copyright infringement case that arose after Luke Records had sold over 250,000 copies of 2LC's adaptation of Roy Orbison's, "Oh, Pretty Woman," the Supreme Court held, in a case of first impression, that commercial parody could be protected under the fair-use exception to copyright law. Describing the song itself, the Supreme Court opinion states: While we might not assign a high rank to the parodic element here, we think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew's song reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree. 2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the naivete of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies. It is this joinder of reference and ridicule that marks off the author's choice of parody from the other types of comment and criticism that traditionally have had a claim to fair use protection as transformative works. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994). In Luke Records v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022 (1992), Petitioner and others won a reversal of a district court declaratory judgment that the 2LC musical recording, "As Nasty As They Wanna Be," was obscene under state and federal law. In another case of first impression--this time applying the obscenity test in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), to a musical composition containing instrumental music and lyrics--the appellate court relied on the testimony of two newspaper music critics that the subject music possessed serious musical or artistic value. More interestingly, the court relied on the testimony of a Rhodes scholar who was soon to undertake employment as an assistant professor of political science at Columbia University. This testimony, which focused on the lyrics, traced "As Nasty As They Wanna Be" to three oral traditions of African-American music: the "call and response," "doing the dozens," and "boasting." Noting that the lyrics of "As Nasty As They Wanna Be" reflected many aspects of poor, inner-city blacks, this witness added that some of the lyrics contained statements of political significance or used literary devices, such as alliteration, allusion, metaphor, rhyme, and personification. Assuming without deciding that the trial judge had correctly determined that "As Nasty As They Wanna Be" met the first two prongs of the Miller test--i.e., the work as a whole appeals to prurient interest based on contemporary community standards and the work depicts in a patently offensive way sexual conduct specifically defined by state law--the appellate court rejected the trial court's determination that "As Nasty As They Wanna Be" fails the third prong of the Miller test--i.e., that it "lacks serious artistic, scientific, literary or political value." 960 F.2d at 138 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24). After 2LC: 1992-2008 Petitioner and 2LC parted ways in 1992. Three years later, Petitioner and Luke Records, Inc. filed for bankruptcy, which resulted in the assignment of all masters and copyrights owned by Petitioner or Luke Records, Inc., to a company formed by a former in-house counsel of Luke Records. Thompkins v. Lil' Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1299-1301, and 1314n.22 (11th Cir. 2007). To some extent, perhaps due to the bankruptcy, Petitioner lost exclusive use of names associated with him, such as "Uncle Luke." As an asset of Petitioner, the Luther Campbell brand suffered a loss in value. The evidentiary record provides an incomplete picture of what Petitioner did during the ten years following his departure from 2LC. The arrests and Petitioner's explanations suggest that he DJed at house parties, made paid appearances at autograph-signing events, and attended nightclubs, although whether as a performer, audience member, or promoter is not clear. Petitioner released four hip-hop albums from 1992-2006. As always, Petitioner remained in Miami. In 1991 or 1992, Petitioner was among the persons who started the Liberty City Optimist youth football program. Competing with the local John Doe gang, Petitioner and other founders of the Optimist youth football program got kids off the dangerous streets and onto the football field. During the early years of his involvement with the youth football program, Petitioner invested considerable time and money, contributing at least $80,000. Petitioner helped lobby the Miami-Dade County Commission for what was eventually an expenditure of an estimated $14 million in facilities to serve organized football at local parks. Now, the Liberty City Optimist youth programs serve 6000 boys and girls, from 4-16 years of age, through a variety of sports and academic programs. Petitioner's wife, a local attorney and former FSU cheerleader, chairs the Liberty City Optimist youth cheerleading program. Although there have been some football-famous graduates of the program, such as Chad Johnson, the program's larger success is that 90 percent of the first group of youth to complete the program started college. Until 2005, Petitioner was not directly involved with the children in the Optimist youth programs. In 2005, realizing that his entertaining career had "taken a turn," Petitioner began coaching an Optimist youth football team. As he dialed up his involvement with youth, Petitioner tapered off his performances and appearances. Petitioner's two most recent albums are Somethin' Nasty, which was released in 2001, and My Life and Freaky Times, which was released in 2006. In contrast to the earlier cover art of 2LC, the cover art for the last album depicted Petitioner surrounded by fully clothed women. But some of Petitioner's titles would fit easily among the oeuvre of 2LC in its heyday. Somethin' Nasty includes "Suck This Dick," "We Want Big Dick," and "Hoes," and My Life and Freaky Times includes "Pop That Pussy" and "South Beach Bitches." In 2008, Petitioner made his last appearance, to date, with 2LC, at what was limited to an autograph-signing event. At the beginning of this period of Petitioner's life, in 1993, he became acquainted with James Harbor, Jr. Mr. Harbor was working for a state representative and met Petitioner through Congressman Alcee Hastings. Mr. Harbor later did an internship with Petitioner. Still later, Mr. Harbor was elected as a state representative from Palm Beach County and enlisted Petitioner in get-out-the-vote campaigns throughout Florida. Interestingly, Mr. Harbor testified that, as part of a voter-recruitment campaign, Petitioner appeared "in character." Mr. Harbor stressed repeatedly the distinction between the public persona of Petitioner and his private personality. Not a party person, during the time that Mr. Harbor has known him, Petitioner has always been "structured," hard-working and responsible, respectful toward women, and a firm disciplinarian when it came to his children. Mr. Harbor's testimony about the distinction between Petitioner's public persona and private personality finds support throughout the record, including a careful examination of the timelines. The 1979 Misdemeanor and 1986 Misdemeanor both involved weapons, not sex, and 2LC's main theme appears to have been sex, not violence or weapons. Whatever image of garish defiance that Petitioner may have cultivated during his 2LC-era, by the start of that era, he was never arrested again on charges that resulted in an admission of guilt, a no-contest plea, or a finding of guilt, except for the child-support arrest. Although the certification of Petitioner must take into consideration his public persona, to the extent that it still derives from his short-lived career with 2LC, there is no indication over the past 20 years that, outside of his performances and appearances, Petitioner has resembled the sex- song impresario, whom he portrayed with 2LC and in his later albums. High School Football: 2009-Present Starting in the 2009-10 school year, Petitioner turned from coaching Optimist youth football to coaching local high school football. During the 2009-10 and 2010-11 school years, Petitioner served as an assistant football coach at Miami Central Senior High School, where his wife teaches a law class. For the 2011-12 school year, Petitioner served as an assistant football coach at Miami Northwestern Senior High School. Although he would be willing to work as an unpaid volunteer, Petitioner has been required, due to insurance requirements in the school district, to accept the pay of a part-time contract football coach, which is $1000-$1200 per year. No longer living in Liberty City, Petitioner lives closer to another Miami-Dade County high school whose students are less exposed to violence and less at-risk than the students attending Miami Central or Miami Northwestern. Nearby Broward County public high schools do not require an athletic coaching certificate because school district policy allows a volunteer to coach. But Petitioner has decided to help the most vulnerable, most at-risk students from the inner-city neighborhood where he grew up. Petitioner has served these students in ways that other persons would find difficult, if not impossible, to replicate. Trying to combat the sense of hopelessness that sometimes afflicts at-risk youth, Petitioner has worked at both schools to install a sense of school pride in football and academics. When he arrived at Miami Central, the school was an F school, but Petitioner joined a school-wide effort to improve learning conditions, and, when he left two years later, the school was a B school. Similarly, when Petitioner arrived at Miami Northwestern, it was a D school, but it earned a B during the most recent school year. Miami Northwestern is located directly across the street from housing projects, and its students are regularly the targets of violence, often involving weapons. About one-quarter of its students are required to attend gun programs. The football team includes many homeless children and children with children. In the month preceding the hearing, two Miami Northwestern students had been killed. On a positive note, about 70 percent of the 95 students on the Miami Northwestern football team are graduates of the Optimist youth football program. Also, as many as 90 percent of the students who played on the high school football teams that Petitioner has coached are attending college. The students with whom Petitioner works appreciate his dedication and hard work. They know that Petitioner has spent his entire life in Miami and has known some hard times. Generally, they know that, before they were born, Petitioner had been a celebrity as a member and promoter of a hip-hop group, itself known for its frank defiance of convention, at least in terms of graphic sexual language. As Petitioner testified, his students' mothers know Petitioner from when he was a DJ on a streetcorner, through his association with 2LC and discovery of new talent, such as the hip-hop artist Pitbull, and now from his work with youth. This familiarity presents unique mentoring opportunities to Petitioner. For instance, Petitioner knew one student's father, who later went to prison where he was murdered. One day, the student's mother approached Petitioner and asked him to tell her child about the good things that his father had done before he went to prison and died. Reflecting Petitioner's dedication to at-risk youth, for at least the past four years, Petitioner has rented one or two 15-passenger vans and, at his expense, transported interested players to schools in the southeast where they might be able to attend college. Petitioner does not reserve his attention to potential stars; instead, he tries to find colleges and junior colleges at every level that might be interested in admitting an individual student. Steven Field, the head coach of the Miami Northwestern football team, testified on Petitioner's behalf. Coach Field, who has most recently coached at University of Miami and Hampton University in Virginia, also coached at Miami Central from 2000- 2004. Coach Field testified that Petitioner is an "essential" member of his coaching staff, not for his name or past career, but for his way with the students. Petitioner leads by example and always fulfills any promises that he makes to the students--things that may otherwise be lacking in the lives of some of these inner-city youth. According to Coach Field, Petitioner's "no-nonsense, professional" style of dealing with the students commands their attention and respect. For example, as the coach in charge of the weight room, Petitioner does not allow swearing. When one student became disrespectful to another coach, Petitioner ordered the student to leave the premises. Neither Petitioner nor Coach Field would allow 2LC music to be played in the weight room due to its inappropriate adult content. Petitioner testified that, in trying to save students, he will "talk 'till I'm blue in the face," revealing not only the necessary dedication, but, more importantly, the insight that that there are no shortcuts or quick fixes in trying to communicate with at-risk children. Reinforcing the realism evident in Petitioner's testimony, Coach Stevens described his and Petitioner's efforts with the students as not much more than reinforcing the notions of living right at home and "getting your books at school." Coach Stevens stressed that he and Petitioner do not concentrate exclusively on the students who are talented enough to play football in college. At least a half dozen students are in felony programs. With these students, Coach Stevens testified that he and Petitioner do not speak about "getting into Georgia Tech"; they speak about finishing high school and getting a job. Coach Stevens has never heard Petitioner speak to the students about mistakes that he has made, nor does he wish Petitioner to do so. Coach Stevens, Petitioner, and the other coaches try to set a positive tone, so they talk to the students about what they need to do, not about mistakes that the students--or coaches--may have made in the past. However, if the school resource officer tells Petitioner about problems that an individual student is having, Petitioner will talk to the student one-on-one. In such conversations, Petitioner does not shy away from relating personally to what the student is going through. The Application Received on April 27, 2010, the Application answers "yes" to the following questions: Have you ever been found guilty of a criminal offense? Have you ever had adjudication withheld on a criminal offense? Have you ever pled guilty to a criminal offense? The Application answers "no" to the following questions: Have you ever been convicted of a criminal offense? Have you ever pled nolo contendere to a criminal offense? The Application lists the following arrests and states that the disposition of all charges was dismissal, except for the South Carolina charge, which is reported as "guilty/adjudication withheld": Miami--8/79--reckless display of firearm Miami--2/85--loitering/prowling Miami--11/85--inciting riot Miami--12/87--aggravated assault Hillsborough--12/87--aggravated assault Miami--5/94--aggravated assault Miami--7/99--battery Dorchester County--10/22--"dissem promote" The Application is flawed in its disclosure of Petitioner's criminal history. As alleged in the Amended Notice of Reasons, the disclosure of the "loitering/prowling" arrest fails to mention the felony weapons charge, which was part of the same incident, and thus fails to note that the court withheld adjudication on this charge. Also, as alleged in the Amended Notice of Hearing, the Application fails to disclose the 1986 Misdemeanor, which occurred in Hillsborough County. Although the Application discloses a Hillsborough County arrest, it seems to confuse the incident with a later arrest in Dade County, but, more importantly, omits mention of the finding of guilt on this misdemeanor weapon charge. However, these flaws do not prove that Petitioner intentionally concealed information or was less than honest in completing the Application. Obviously, he has had many arrests, so the potential for confusion or even omission exists, and there are comparatively few inaccuracies. On these facts, it is found only that Petitioner filed an inaccurate application, but not that he filed an application with fraudulent or dishonest intent. Petitioner: At Present Petitioner does not pose a risk to the safety of the students entrusted to him. For the past seven years, Petitioner has had significant direct contact with vulnerable youth without any reported problems. In light of this critical fact, the 1979 Misdemeanor, 1986 Misdemeanor, and Petitioner's former involvement with 2LC and the adult entertainment industry lose whatever contrary predictive value that they might otherwise have. Simply put, Petitioner does not resemble the youth who committed the 1979 Misdemeanor or 1986 Misdemeanor or the man who performed with and promoted 2LC 20 years ago. Petitioner resembles the middle-aged man who released sexually explicit songs in 2001 and 2006, but this is addressed below. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, good moral character requires consideration of a person's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and the law, so consideration of student safety, although important, is not sufficient. But the 1979 Misdemeanor and 1986 Misdemeanor, as old misdemeanors, provide insufficient support for a finding that, today, Petitioner lacks honesty, fairness, or respect for the rights of others and the law. Nor do these criminal offenses support findings that Petitioner has been guilty of gross immorality or moral turpitude, as those terms are defined in the Conclusions of Law. Likewise, Petitioner's 2LC career 20 years ago and even his more recent releases of 2LC-like albums in 2001 and 2006 do not support a finding that he lacks honesty, fairness, or respect for the rights of others and the law or that he is guilty of gross immorality or moral turpitude. For the reasons noted above, the redeeming value to be found in the releases means that they do not violate the law, provided they also conform to any laws restricting their dissemination, such as not to minors or not on television during certain hours of family viewing. Absent an attempt to market the offensive material in some broadly accessible fashion, such as on billboards or the sides of public buses, such non-obscene works similarly do not violate the rights of others. As noted above, the flaws of the Application do not support a finding of dishonesty or fraud. But, in his proposed recommended order, Respondent fairly questions Petitioner's initial refusal to identify his Application at the hearing. This failing of Petitioner, as well as the two others discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, cannot serve as standalone grounds for denial because: 1) they arose at the hearing and thus were not available as grounds in the Amended Notice of Reasons and even if alleged, they do not rise to the level of a lack of good moral character, as in a lack of honesty or fairness. But they do provide part of the justification for adding conditions to any certificate issued to Petitioner. Petitioner's failure at the hearing initially to identify his Application was not due to any confusion. There were not multiple versions of applications from which to choose. There was one Application on the table, and Petitioner initially testified, more than once, that he could not identify it. The temptation appeared palpable for Petitioner to off-load the responsibility for an obviously flawed application onto someone else who may have completed it for Petitioner, who nonetheless signed it. Cannily, Respondent's counsel moved for a summary order. The Administrative Law Judge warned Petitioner that the Division of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction in the absence of an application. Petitioner and his attorney made good use of a short recess to confer. After the recess, Petitioner identified Respondent Exhibit 1 as the Application that he had filed for an athletic coaching certificate. Petitioner's second failing of this type, also noted in Respondent's proposed recommended order, consists of his unwillingness to own up to his role or roles in any of the salacious songs that he has performed or produced. While it is possible that Petitioner might not have been responsible for the more salacious songs performed by 2LC, he clearly was responsible for the five sexually graphic titles on the two most recent, post-2LC albums, which, as discussed above, were released in 2001 and 2006. Petitioner's third failing of this type occurred when he testified about his bad period from 1979 to 1986. Petitioner admitted only to not living a "perfect" life and associating with bad persons. This seems a little lean for two misdemeanor weapons convictions and a withholding of adjudication of guilt on a felony weapon charge--all in the span of seven years. As Respondent points out, Petitioner has displayed minimal contrition for the bad choices that he made during this period. At minimum, he missed an opportunity to describe how he has changed when he "admitted" only that he was not perfect or implied that his legal problems were caused by bad associations. In these three instances, Petitioner sought to escape personal responsibility by claiming or implying that other persons prepared the flawed Application that he was somehow compelled to sign, other persons forced him to perform songs with five salacious titles in 2001 and 2006, and other persons got him into trouble during the bad period over 25 years ago. Although not evidence of a lack of honesty, Petitioner's failure to affirmatively own up to these acts suggest a lack of self- insight and perhaps even a misapprehension of the extent to which he must subject himself to the regulatory oversight that is imposed on applicants for certificates and, later, certificateholders. The other justification for adding conditions to any certificate issued to Petitioner is the prospect of his return to adult entertainment. In addition to part-time coaching at Miami Northwestern, Petitioner also owns a company, Luke Holdings, which deals in movie scripts and produces elements of television commercials, among other pursuits in the entertainment industry. In recent years, extreme examples of adult entertainment, such as pornography, have emerged bearing the Luther Campbell brand, but Petitioner denied that he has been involved in the production of such material. His denial is credited, although it would have been more persuasive, absent Petitioner's failings described in the preceding paragraphs. As noted above, Petitioner lost exclusive control of his brand after the bankruptcy in 1996, and, presumably, given the shadowy nature of the pornography industry, illegal use of his name is not out of the question. The distinction between past and present involvement in adult entertainment is an important one. In a recent case, EPC did not treat past involvement in the adult entertainment industry the same as involvement while a certificateholder. See In re: The Denial of the Application for Teacher's Certificate of Shawn J. Loftis, EPC Case No. 11-0464D (April 5, 2012) available at http://www.myfloridateacher.com/discipline/icmsorders/101-2590- FO-040512155402.pdf). In Loftis, Respondent denied Mr. Loftis's application for a Florida Educator's Certificate on the grounds of a lack of good moral character, gross immorality, and moral turpitude, as well as personal conduct that seriously reduces one's effectiveness as a school board employee, which violates section 1012.795(1)(g). The factual bases for the denial was that, between 2006 and 2008, Mr. Loftis had appeared in over 20 pornographic films featuring him engaged in explicit sexual activity, and the films were still available for viewing, including on the internet, although this employment had ended prior to Mr. Loftis's temporary employment as an instructor in Miami-Dade County public schools. After an informal hearing, EPC ordered that Mr. Loftis be allowed to continue to pursue certification. EPC stated that, if "found qualified," Mr. Loftis would be issued a Florida Educator's Certificate, subject to the conditions that he obtain from an approved, Florida-licensed provider written verification that he poses no risk to children and is capable of assuming the responsibilities of an educator and that, upon employment that requires possession of a Florida Educator's Certificate, Mr. Loftis be placed on probation, subject to the following conditions: 1) he immediately notify the DOE investigative office upon employment or termination of employment requiring a Florida Educator's Certificate; 2) his immediate supervisor send annual performance reports to the DOE investigative office; he pay EPC $150 for the costs of monitoring his probation; and 4) he violate no law or rules, satisfactorily perform all assigned duties in a professional manner, and bear all costs of compliance with the final order. The Loftis final order illustrates EPC's ability to issue a conditional certificate, even without a finding that the applicant had failed to meet the qualifications for certification. In considering the requirement stated in section 1012.795(1)(g) concerning personal conduct that seriously reduces the effectiveness of the certificateholder as a school board employee, the Notice of Reasons in Loftis, when compared to the Amended Notice of Reasons in the subject case, more closely approaches the most elastic requirement of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a) that a certificateholder (or applicant) "[s]hall make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student's mental and/or physical health and/or safety." Juxtapose this broader, objective requirement of protecting the student from conditions harmful to learning or harmful to the student's mental health with: 1) Petitioner and Coach Field's efforts to inculcate in their at-risk students such values as strength of character, perseverance, dedication, and hard work in the pursuit of ambitious goals and 2) the future release of more artistic or entertainment efforts along the lines of "Suck This Dick," "We Want Big Dick," "Hoes," "Pop That Pussy," and "South Beach Bitches." Consider the bewildering effect on students if, one afternoon, in the weight room and on the field, Coach Campbell were to promote rectitude and grit and, that night, the same man were to don the garb of the sex-song impresario and promote the escapist pursuit of sexual gratification. The addition of music or elements of African boasting and literary allusion in, say, "Pop That Pussy" or "Suck This Dick," which would rightfully spare these works from successful prosecution as obscenity, would not have any bearing on the extent to which the superficial appeal of this form of adult entertainment could undermine the hard, patient work of these students' coaches, teachers, and parents in trying to shape them into responsible young men. Impressionable inner- city youth might be easily confused by these competing messages, as they compared the paltry sums paid their contract coaches and modest sums paid their regular coaches and teachers with the riches lavished upon the producers of adult entertainment. Although the Loftis final order emphasizes that the applicant no longer is engaged in the making of pornographic films, neither that authority nor the record in this case provides a sufficient basis for attaching a condition to Petitioner's certificate prohibiting his engaging in the adult entertainment industry. Such litigation awaits another day and, one hopes, another certificateholder than Petitioner or Mr. Loftis. However, conditions attached to Petitioner's certificate could focus his attention on the ethical obligations that he has assumed as a certificateholder and the very real possibility that that his return to the performance or production of adult entertainment, while a certificateholder, would be at crosspurposes with the broad mission of education and expose his certificate to suspension or revocation. Petitioner should receive an athletic coaching certificate because he generally meets the substantive certification requirements that call for consideration of such broad criteria as good moral character and the absence of gross immorality and moral turpitude, he possesses unique attributes for reaching at-risk, inner-city youth, and he has demonstrated his commitment to, and effectiveness with, working with these children for at least seven years.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that EPC issue an athletic coaching certificate to Petitioner, subject to the following conditions: The certificateholder shall be placed on probation for five years, immediately upon issuance or, if later, employment that requires a certificate. Upon issuance of the certificate and on each anniversary of issuance, during the term of probation, EPC or its agent shall contact the Department of Revenue and inquire if Petitioner owes any child support arrearages. Upon receipt of written notice of such arrearages from the Department of Revenue or a circuit court, EPC shall immediately suspend the certificate until the arrearages are paid in full. The payment of a purge amount that leaves an arrearage owing does not satisfy this condition. Within six months of issuance of the certificate and within six months of each anniversary of issuance, during the term of probation, Petitioner shall complete 10 hours in coursework in the area of ethics with emphasis on the Principles of Professional Conduct, Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006 and shall deliver to the DOE investigative office written proof of such coursework. At the start of every school year, during the term of probation, Petitioner and his immediate supervisor will sign a statement certifying that each has read the Principles of Professional Conduct and deliver the signed statement to the DOE investigative office within 20 days of the first day of school. The supervisor's statement shall confirm that he or she understands that his or her professional obligations include the obligation of Rule 6B-1.006(5)(l) that he or she "shall not assist entry into or continuance in the profession of any person known to be unqualified in accordance with these Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida and other applicable Florida Statutes and State Board of Education Rules." Petitioner's statement shall confirm that he understands that his professional obligations include the obligation of Rule 6B-1.006(3)(a) that he "shall make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student's mental and/ or physical health and/or safety." If Petitioner's immediate supervisor changes during the school year, the new supervisor shall sign a supervisor's statement within 30 days of his or her assumption of supervisory duties over Petitioner and deliver the signed statement to the DOE investigative office within 60 days of his or her assumption of supervisory duties over Petitioner. Within 30 days of the preparation and delivery of an evaluation to Petitioner, during the term of probation, he shall submit a copy to the DOE investigative office. During the term of probation, if Petitioner becomes actively involved in the adult entertainment industry, in any manner, he shall notify the DOE investigative office, in writing, within 30 days of first involvement. For the purpose of this paragraph, the performance or production of a sexually explicit song that would be inappropriate for the football team weight room or the appearance at an autograph- signing event promoted on the basis of Petitioner's former involvement with 2LC is active involvement in the adult entertainment industry. During the term of probation, the certificateholder shall reimburse EPC or its agent its reasonable costs of monitoring. If any of these conditions, except for the condition stated in paragraph 2, are not timely performed by Petitioner or, if applicable, his supervisor, EPC may suspend the certificate until Petitioner demonstrates compliance (or the term of the certificate expires) or, at its discretion, revoke the certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 224 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Charles M. Deal, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Marian Lambeth, Bureau Chief Bureau of Professional Practices Services Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 224-E 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael John Carney, Esquire Kubicki Draper, P.A. Wachovia Bank Building, Suite 1600 One East Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 mjc@kubickidraper.com Charles T. Whitelock, Esquire Charles T. Whitelock, P.A. Suite E 300 Southeast Thirteenth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 charles@ctwpalaw.com
The Issue Whether Respondent’s termination for alleged misconduct should be upheld based on the reasons stated in the termination letter dated July 25, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Gregory V. Black was employed as an assistant football coach at FAMU from July 1, 1998 to July 25, 2005. Head Football Coach William (Billie) Joe was Mr. Black’s supervisor. During his employment, Coach Black received excellent to superior evaluation ratings. Coach Black was employed under an annual contract with FAMU. Until his termination, Coach Black was paid his regular salary and received the normal and customary retirement benefits and perks for his position. The last fully executed contract with the University ran from January 1, 2004, to December 31, 2004. However, a printout generated from the University’s personnel department indicates a beginning date of August 8, 2004, and an ending date of August 7, 2005. Additionally, there was a partially executed contract signed by the University’s interim president, Castell Bryant. The term of the partially executed contract ran from January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2005. The contract incorporated NCAA regulation 11.2 regarding contractual agreements between coaches and an NCAA member institution. The incorporated provisions state, in relevant part: Stipulation That NCAA Enforcement Provisions Apply. Contractual agreements . . . shall include the stipulation that a coach who is found in violation of NCAA regulations shall be subject to disciplinary or corrective action as set forth in the provisions of the NCAA enforcement procedures. Termination of Employment. Contractual agreements . . . shall include the stipulation that the coach may be suspended for a period of time, without pay, or that the coach’s employment may be terminated if the coach is found to be involved in deliberate and serious violations of the NCAA regulations. FAMU is a member of the NCAA. Member institutions of the NCAA are obligated to apply and enforce NCAA regulations and are responsible for operating their intercollegiate athletics program in compliance with the regulations of the NCAA. As part of that responsibility, FAMU has adopted the NCAA By-Laws as part of its rules and regulations governing the University. Member institutions also are responsible for governing staff members involved with athletics. Penalties for violations of NCAA regulations generally apply to member institutions and their programs. Occasionally penalties can apply to individual staff members who are directly involved in violations of NCAA regulations. In cases where an individual is the subject of an NCAA investigation, the NCAA issues a Notice of Allegations. In this case no Notice of Allegations was issued to Coach Black or any other member of the football coaching staff. In fact, the NCAA did not conclude or find that Coach Black committed any NCAA rule violation and the NCAA report only mentions his name in reference to being interviewed. There is no mention of Coach Black in reference to being involved in or knowing about any of the NCAA violations referenced in the report. Indeed Coach Black has never been the subject of an NCAA rule violation. Coach Black was primarily responsible for coaching and developing the offensive line. He ran practices and monitored the progress of his players. Coach Black did not generally monitor his player’s academics, unless the athletic office advised him of a problem. Likewise, Coach Black was not generally responsible for ensuring various student eligibility forms were completed and on file with the University. Nor was he generally responsible for recruitment activities. He was required to have general knowledge of NCAA regulations and responsible for reporting any violations of those regulations that he had knowledge of to the proper authorities at the University. The evidence showed that Coach Black did have such knowledge of the NCAA regulations and that he understood the reporting requirements of those regulations. It was Coach Black’s practice to be present when the offensive line was practicing. Generally, if he was on the field, the offensive line was out there with him. At some point FAMU became aware that their were allegations of NCAA violations at FAMU and that an NCAA investigation might occur. In light of those allegations, FAMU completed a Self-Report concerning violations of NCAA regulations. The Self-Report identified multiple alleged violations, of which the University’s football program allegedly constituted the bulk of the violations. No one who was involved with the Self-Report testified at the hearing. There was no competent evidence introduced at the hearing corroborating the allegations of the report. Uncorroborated hearsay statements made in the report about alleged violations cannot be used to prove that Coach Black violated NCAA regulations or knew about such alleged violations and failed to report those violations. In addition to the Self-Report, the NCAA conducted an investigation and issued a report concerning such alleged violations. The NCAA investigated numerous violations of NCAA regulations, including exceeding the daily practice time limitation, exceeding the weekly practice time limitation and not observing the day-off requirement regarding its football program. No NCAA official or investigator testified at the hearing. No corroborating evidence was offered at the hearing. As with the Self-Report, uncorroborated hearsay statements made in the report about alleged violations cannot be used to prove that Coach Black violated NCAA regulations or knew about such alleged violations and failed to report those violations. As a result of the NCAA conducting an investigation, the University retained a consultant, Mr. Nelson Townsend, to assist in interpreting exactly what the NCAA findings meant to the University. Mr. Townsend generally recommended the University make staff changes in the football program. There was no evidence that Mr. Townsend considered The University’s personnel rules in making his recommendation. On July 25, 2006, FAMU issued a letter of termination to Coach Black terminating his employment “contract” with FAMU. The termination was based on alleged NCAA violations regarding daily and weekly hours of practice, not permitting a day off to the players and failure to report such violations. The letter treated Coach Black as if he had a contract with FAMU and provided him rights under FAMU’s personnel rules regarding just cause and a right to a hearing. The letter, also, clearly had the effect of stigmatizing Coach Black in his profession as an assistant football coach. The allegations and termination were on the news. Indeed, Coach Black had difficulty finding suitable employment equivalent to what he possessed at FAMU after his termination. However, FAMU, in this proceeding, has admitted that Coach Black did not commit any NCAA violations. Indeed, there was no competent evidence that Coach Black was aware of or should have been aware of any alleged violations. Given this lack of evidence FAMU has failed to establish just cause for terminating Coach Black, and he is entitled to be reinstated for the remaining term of his contract, if any. The University’s interim president decided to withhold the employment contracts of all of the assistant football coaches. The evidence showed that there were many times that Coach Black’s employment contracts were executed after the start date of the contract period. However, the employment contract clearly states: . . . Neither this employment contract nor any action or commitment taken pursuant to it, is final or binding upon the parties until, and unless, the signature of the University President or President’s designee, . . . and the signature of the employee have been affixed and the employment contract has been returned to the appropriate authority . . . . Irrespective of the language and terms of the contract, FAMU treated this matter as one arising under employment that can only be terminated for just cause. For purposes of this action, FAMU is estopped from claiming that Coach Black was an at-will employee. Additionally, the issue of whether Coach Black had an employment contract with FAMU need not be addressed since Coach Black was not terminated based on the expiration or absence of his contract. It is the reasons regarding NCAA violations stated in the termination letter that are at issue here. As noted, there was an absence of proof to support those allegations. Therefore, Coach Black is entitled to reinstatement and to have his name cleared of the stigma that termination for those allegations have caused.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by FAMU reinstating Respondent and clearing his name from the allegations made in the termination letter. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. 1882 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Antoneia L. Roe, Esquire Florida A&M University Office of the General Counsel Lee Hall, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32307 Robert E. Larkin, III Allen, Norton and Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Elizabeth T. McBride, Esquire Florida A & M University Office of the General Counsel 300 Lee Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32307-3100 Dr. Castell V. Bryant, Interim President Florida A & M University 400 Lee Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32307-3100
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent completed the applicable probationary period while employed as a teacher with the Polk County School System.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was employed as an eighth grade teacher at Boone Middle School from the beginning of the 1998-1999 school year until October 6, 1998. The Boone Middle School principal and an assigned peer teacher observed the Respondent’s teaching techniques. The observers had certain concerns related to the Respondent’s methods, and on October 2, 1998, the principal met with the Petitioner to discuss the concerns. A second conference was scheduled for October 6, 1998. When the Petitioner arrived at the conference, she announced that she was resigning her employment. At the time of the resignation, the Respondent was asked to submit a written resignation. Although the written resignation was never received, on October 12, 1998, the Respondent turned in her grade book and other documents. By statute, a teacher employed under an "initial annual contract" must complete a 97-work day probationary period, during which time the employment may be terminated without cause and the teacher may resign without being in breach of the employment contract. The Respondent was employed at Boone Middle School for 47 days. She did not complete the probationary period. The Respondent asserts that she did not resign from Boone Middle School, but transferred from Boone Middle School to Cypress Lake Middle School. The evidence fails to establish that a transfer took place. Polk County School Board policy requires that the principals of the employing schools approve teacher transfers. There is no evidence that either the Boone Middle School or the Cypress Lake Middle School principals approved of an official transfer between the schools. There is no evidence that the Boone Middle School principal was aware of the Respondent’s intention to leave until October 6, 1998, when the Respondent announced her resignation from employment. At the hearing, the Boone principal testified that, given the difficulty in hiring math teachers, she would not have approved a transfer in the middle of the school term. The Respondent asserts that she took October 7, 1998, as pre-approved leave time. There is no credible evidence that October 7, 1998, was approved for the Respondent as a personal leave day by any appropriate authority. She had resigned her employment from Boone Middle School, and had not begun her employment at Crystal Lake Middle School. It is unclear as to which employer would have approved a request for leave. The Respondent began employment at Crystal Lake Middle School on October 8, 1998. The Petitioner worked at Crystal Lake until February 12, 1999. After the first grading period was completed, Crystal Lake administrators were concerned about the number of failing grades the Respondent had assigned to her students. Crystal Lake administrators met with the Respondent and asked that she reconsider the grading scale. On February 1, 1999, the Respondent submitted her resignation to Crystal Lake administrators. The Respondent was employed at Crystal Lake Middle School for 82 days. She did not complete the probationary period. Following her resignation from Crystal Lake, she occasionally worked as a substitute teacher. The Respondent was employed at Bartow High School at the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year. She taught nutrition and wellness courses. She was assigned a peer teacher. After classes began, the Bartow High School principal began to receive complaints from students, parents, and others regarding the Respondent’s teaching performance. Based upon the complaints, the principal terminated the Respondent’s employment effective September 28, 1999. The Respondent was employed at Bartow High School for 42 days. She did not complete the probationary period. The Respondent asserts that her employment at Bartow High School was as a "re-appointee" not under an "initial contract," that the probationary period is inapplicable, and that she may not be terminated without cause. The Respondent testified that an employee of the Polk County School Board personnel department told her upon her employment at Bartow High School that she would be considered a "re-appointee." The Respondent was unable to specifically identify which employee allegedly provided the information; however, employees of the personnel office testified that they did not recall speaking to the Respondent about this issue, but further testified that Respondent’s recollection is contrary to school board policy. The employees testified that a teacher, once resigned, who later returns to employment, is treated as a "new" employee and receives an "initial" annual contract. The board policy was further confirmed by the testimony of the Petitioner’s director of employee relations. The Respondent asserts that she was not in fact treated as a new teacher, in that she was not required to complete a new employment application and was not asked to provide fingerprints or medical documents which are required of a new hire. The personnel department employees testified that generally it is not necessary for a person in the Respondent’s position to resubmit such materials when those already on file are of recent vintage.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the School Board of Polk County enter a Final Order terminating the employment of Rita Clarkson. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald H. Wilson, Jr., Esquire Boswell & Dunlap, LLP 245 South Central Avenue Post Office Drawer 30 Bartow, Florida 33831-4620 Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 2595 Tampa Road, Suite J Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Mr. Glenn Reynolds School Board of Polk County 1915 South Floral Avenue Bartow, Florida 33830-0391 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues involved in this case, Respondent, Bruce M. Williams, held Florida teacher certificate number 414669 authorizing him to serve as a substitute teacher. On March 21, 1984, after a trial by bury in the County Court of Alachua County, Florida, on Case No. 83-4274-MM-A , Respondent was found guilty of the offense of trespass after warning. On April 30, 1984, the Judge of the County Court entered a Judgement of Guilt and placed the Respondent on one year's probation with the stipulation that, among other things, he not go onto the University of Florida campus unless his probation officer gave him prior permission. This judicial determination of guilt. It was the culmination of a series of events involving the Respondent and his repeated entrances onto property owned by the University for which he was repeatedly warned and directed not to return. Respondent contends that he had legitimate reasons to be on the University property each of the times in question and contests the use of these reports branding them a violation of his rights. He overlooks the fact that the conviction came after several instances of unauthorized entrance and that the conviction was based on proven violations. Nonetheless, it appears that on December 30, 1982, Respondent was observed by Kenneth E. Solomon, an investigator with the University police department, in the parking lot of Diamond Village, a University married students' housing area not open to the public. Mr. Solomon attempted to identify the Respondent who was at first reluctant to identify himself but who finally agreed and indicated that his wife was inside doing their laundry. Since this is an area reserved for university students and their families, Mr. Solomon issued a warning to Respondent not to trespass on University property and thereafter filled out and filed a report of the incident. Thereafter, on March 15, 1983, Keith B. Reddick, who was at that time an officer with the University police was called to University Hospital (Shands), where he was met by a Mrs. Fugate and a guard who had Respondent in custody. Mrs. Fugate advised at that time that Respondent had previously been at the hospital on March 7 with no legitimate reason for being in the area. On that occasion, when asked why he was there, Respondent indicated he had been given permission to be there by a member of the medical school faculty, Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz categorically denies ever having given Respondent permission to be where he was. In fact, she met him only once when he stopped her and asked her about the possibility of a job with the hospital. At that time she told him there were none available except for fellowships for which an applicant had to be a physician already. Nonetheless, he gave her a resume and she believes he indicated he was involved in research. With this one exception, she has had no contact with him and never gave him authority to work with patients in her department or be there for any reason. On this latter occasion, when asked what he was doing there, Respondent replied that he had become lost while looking for a laboratory. He also said he was looking for a doctor friend whose name he could not remember and as a chemistry major, was working on his thesis. On this occasion, Officer Reddick took Respondent to the police station, showed him a map of the campus, told him where he could and could not go on the campus by pointing to the map areas, and told him not to return again to the university unless on official business or for public functions. The following day, on March 16, 1983, Respondent was observed in the Shands Hospital cafeteria by Officer Rogers of the University police. When asked for his identification and reason for being there, Respondent indicated he had paid a bill in the laboratory, so Rogers let him go. When Rogers checked the story out, however, he found that the bill which was alleged to have been for unauthorized use of the hospital copying machine, had in reality been paid three hours before the Respondent was contacted. Rogers again saw Respondent on March 29, 1983 in the hub area of the University book store on campus. Rogers had been notified by Reddick that Respondent was on campus and when he had approached the Respondent, Respondent walked off and into the book store. Rogers and three other officers contacted Respondent in the book store where Respondent indicated he had met with a Mrs. Greene, a University affirmative actions officer and upon receiving that explanation, the officers let him go. Respondent was again identified on July 6, 1983, by officer Edward Miles who observed him in an off-limits gynecological area on the 4th floor of the University hospital. When Miles arrived at the scene, a contract security officer was talking with Respondent. This officer had seen Respondent in the area and had asked for identification in response to which request, Respondent showed a student identification card which was no longer valid since Respondent was no longer a student. Asked what business he had in this particular area, Respondent indicated he was looking for work but when, after 30 minutes, he could not verify this story, Officer Miles placed Respondent under arrest and took him to campus police headquarters. From all of the above, it is clear that though Respondent may have felt he had a legitimate basis for being on the campus and, in fact, may have had when he went to speak with Mrs. Green and went to pay the bill at the hospital, he stretched these occasions into several unauthorized occasions even after he had been warned with full knowledge that his presence on the campus was not authorized. The conviction in County Court was not contested at the time and on the basis of the above evidence, appears to have been warranted. On July 8, 1983, an arrest warrant was issued out of the Circuit Court for the 8th Judicial Circuit in Alachua County alleging sexual battery in violation of Section 794.011, Florida Statutes. This warrant contained allegations that Respondent had committed a sexual battery against his 9-year- old stepdaughter. However, Respondent was tried on a reduced charge of lewd and lascivious assault upon a child and at his trial he entered a plea of no contest. Respondent was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years probation the terms of which required him to undergo mental health counseling among other requirements. Respondent continues to deny his commission of the offenses to which he pleaded no contest at the trial. However, in a statement he made at the time of his arrest, he admitted several factors which contradict that. He admitted that he had a very physical relationship with his stepdaughter; that he appeared nude in front of her many times; and that he would be in bed with her laying on top of him while both were nude with the child's mother there as well. He also admitted having French kissed his stepdaughter (she indicates he taught her how to do this) but denies having any sexual intercourse with her. Respondent contends that these charges are all a plot to deprive him of the close relationship with his family, instituted by someone unnamed and unidentified. The fact remains that Respondent is delinquent in his probation and has made little progress in the required mental health counseling because of his continued belief that he has done nothing wrong but is the victim of this conspiratorial plot. Sometime in or around February 1984, Respondent entered the restaurant owned and operated by Mrs. Vlahopous, in Gainesville, and asked to speak with her daughter, Alex, who apparently had come to the blood center at which he worked. At this point Respondent identified himself as "Dr. Bruce. When she asked him for his office address and phone number since Alex was not there, he said he didn't have an office, but he wrote his name and phone number on one of her cards for her. After Mrs. Vlahopous thought about this over night, she went to the blood bank where Respondent had said he worked and asked for Dr. Williams. At this point she was told by blood bank personnel that Williams was not a doctor, had been fired, and would be rejected if he came there again. Be that as it may, Sharron A. Sturdevant, an official of the blood bank where Respondent had been working, does recall that at times Respondent was referred to as Dr. Bruce at the center. This was, however, only a term of affection or friendliness and was not in any way intended to authorize him to hold himself out to the public as a doctor. Respondent did work for the City of Gainesville in a conservation project in May and June of 1984 but he was terminated because he had not listed his full police record on the application form. This termination was a matter of necessity under city personnel policies which required termination of anyone who intentionally falsified an application form. It had nothing to do with Respondent's performance or anything that took place while he was employed by the city. Mr. John Middleton, Principal of Ft. Clarke Middle School, knew Respondent as a paraprofessional at the alternative school when Mr. Middleton was principal there and Respondent was employed for approximately a month and a half. While Respondent was working at the alternative school he was working as aide to another teacher. He was apparently unable to accept the fact, however, that when a teacher and a paraprofessional (aide) are in the same classroom, it is the teacher who always is in charge. Respondent was discharged from his employment at the alternative school because of an incident where it was alleged he had usurped the authority of and changed the orders of the teacher for whom he was working, in front of the class. The investigation report, which Mr. Middleton received from the teacher and students who observed the incident indicated that the Respondent was loud and boisterous at the time of the incident. Since these students at the alternative school were emotionally handicapped to start with, a fact which Respondent knew, his misconduct was even more serious than it would have been in a normal situation. These students need calm more than noise. In the situation here, Respondent's actions served only to upset them. Mr. Middleton had observed that prior to this incident, Respondent's dealings with the students aggravated rather than helped them. As a result, this incident was only one factor in the decision to terminate Respondent from employment and after the incident took place, Mr. Middleton wrote an unsatisfactory performance report on the Respondent. Based on his personal observation of the Respondent, and what he now knows of Respondent's criminal record, Mr. Middleton is convinced that a teacher with this record could not be effective in the classroom. His effectiveness would be definitely reduced by his misconduct and his conduct would not set a positive example for students. In his opinion, students should not be exposed to anyone with criminal convictions. These sentiments are reinforced by Mr. Wilford A. Griffin, a career service specialist with the Alachua County School Board, who first met Respondent when Respondent left Newberry High School seeking a place in the Alachua County system. Respondent had been terminated at Newberry High School because of some problem with his certification which had nothing to do with performance or misconduct. After the alternative school termination referenced above, Respondent was placed at Eastside High School but was terminated there because of his difficulties with teachers similar to those he had at the alternative school. As an aide, he disagreed openly with teachers in the classroom and in this case, the teacher complained that he would not follow directions and would not do what the teacher wanted done. In all cases, Mr. Griffin counseled with the Respondent about the problem. Respondent obviously felt that the complaining teacher was demeaning him. He felt that he was being helpful and had been rebuffed. Based on his experience with this Respondent, Mr. Griffin would never again try to place him within the school system. Considering Respondent's record in and out of the classroom, Mr. Griffin could not recommend Respondent for employment in the school system. He believes Respondent could not be an effective teacher because of his inability to understand the ramifications of his actions. This does not even consider the convictions which merely aggravate the situation even more. There is no evidence to counter these professional opinions of Respondent's fitness to teach and they are accepted and adopted as fact.
