The Issue The issue is the amount payable to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (“Respondent” or “AHCA”), in satisfaction of Respondent’s Medicaid lien from a settlement received by Petitioner (“Petitioner” or “Fabre”) from a third party, pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2019).
Findings Of Fact On March 13, 2017, Fabre, who was then 23 years old, was involved in a car accident. Fabre’s accident occurred at approximately midnight when he was traveling northbound in the left-hand inside lane of Interstate 95 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, at or near Broward Boulevard. The collision occurred when the vehicle Fabre was operating rear-ended a Mack truck (“truck”) that was improperly illuminated and traveling approximately 25 miles per hour in a 65-mile per hour speed limit zone in Fabre’s lane of travel. After the accident, Fabre was treated at Broward General Medical Center and remained hospitalized for several months. Fabre’s automobile accident caused catastrophic, significant, and debilitating injuries including: a traumatic brain injury; open knee fracture; left humerus fracture; comminuted distal femur fracture; right distal radius fracture; right frontal lobe encephalomalacia; required feeding tube; deep venous thrombosis; C7 transverse process fracture; grade three liver laceration; left olecranon fracture; T7 transverse process fracture; left one through three rib fractures; external fixator of the left open femur fracture; open reduction, internal fixation of left femur; significant skin grafting; and an open head injury. Since the accident and the resulting severe brain injury, Fabre has been in a permanently disabled state requiring 24-hour a day, seven days a week care. Fabre will never fully recover from his injuries and will require assistance with his activities of daily living for the rest of his life. Fabre brought a personal injury lawsuit against the various defendants from the collision, alleging dangerous obstruction since the truck was poorly illuminated and traveling at an unsafe speed. Jay Wasserman (“Wasserman”), a civil trial attorney with the law firm of Katman, Wasserman, Bennardina & Rubinstein in Boca Raton, Florida, represented Fabre in his personal injury action. Wasserman handled Fabre’s personal injury case through settlement. The personal injury lawsuit was ultimately settled for the available insurance policy limits in the amount of $1,030,000. AHCA was properly notified of Fabre’s lawsuit against the defendants. AHCA paid $150,645.40 in benefits associated with Fabre’s medical care related injuries and asserted a lien for the same amount against Fabre’s settlement proceeds. Sections 409.910(11)(f) and 409.910(17)(b), as amended, provide for recovery by Medicaid for both past and future medical expenses. Section 409.910(17)(b) also imposes a clear and convincing burden of proof on the Medicaid recipient challenging the amount of the lien calculated by AHCA. However, in Gallardo v. Dudek, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 2017), the court held that the provisions allowing Medicaid to recover future medical expenses and imposing a clear and convincing standard on recipients contesting AHCA’s calculations violate and are preempted by federal law. In this matter, the parties have stipulated that Gallardo limits AHCA in the section 409.910(17)(b) procedure to the past medical expense portion of the recovery and that Petitioner’s burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. See also Giraldo v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., 248 So. 3d 53 (Fla. 2018)(under federal law AHCA may only reach the past medical expenses portion of a Medicaid recipient's tort recovery to satisfy its Medicaid lien). HEARING At hearing, Fabre’s mother, Maria R. Dore, testified about Fabre’s catastrophic injuries, hospital stay, and the extensive care Fabre requires on a daily basis. She explained that he has a short memory span, repeats himself, cannot be left alone, and attends occupational and physical therapy three times a week. Petitioner presented expert testimony from Wasserman, Fabre's Florida trial attorney. Wasserman is a 33-year Florida bar member who practices personal injury law and malpractice law and has handled numerous catastrophic personal injury plaintiff cases including cases similar to Fabre’s case. His cases have ranged in damage amounts up to eight figures. Wasserman is also a member of the Academy of Trial Lawyers and Florida Justice Association and admitted to practice before all Florida courts including the Southern and Middle Districts of Florida. Wasserman testified that when he was first contacted about Fabre’s case, Fabre was in the hospital in a vegetative state, and Wasserman hired experts to determine how the accident occurred. Wasserman explained ordinary fault would have been placed on Fabre for running into the back of a truck, but the experts were able to determine the truck may have been traveling below the speed limit, and may have been improperly lit, opening up liability on the defendants. Wasserman’s expertise also encompasses the regular valuation of damages for injured parties. He reviews clients’ cases daily to determine their value by accessing the economic and non-economic damages. Wasserman explained that as a routine part of his practice, he makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered. He detailed his process for making those assessments. Wasserman credibly made clear the process he took to develop an opinion concerning the value for the damages suffered in Fabre’s case. Wasserman testified that he reviewed Fabre’s condition, including Fabre’s catastrophic brain injury; inability to walk, stand, and push a wheelchair; and memory problems where he cannot remember things two minutes later. Although Wasserman did not retain anyone to complete a life care plan, he consulted with a life care planner regarding Fabre’s care needs. Wasserman testified that Fabre’s need for attendant care for the rest of his life 24 hours a day would exceed $15 million in damages. Wasserman testified that he calculated the economic value by reducing the 24-hour attendant care rate of $30 an hour to the present value of $23 an hour, which added up to about $200,000 annually. Next, Wasserman explained that he multiplied the annual amount of $200,000 by Fabre’s life expectancy of 50 years, which totaled $10 million in only economic damages conservatively. Wasserman further explained that he evaluated Fabre’s non-economic damages based on his loss of enjoyment of life and pain and suffering. He testified that the non-economic damages would have been significant because of Fabre’s personal loss. He evaluated how Fabre would never shower independently, get married, or walk. Wasserman determined that a $5 million value for non-economic damages was based on his experience and research after looking at the results of similar brain injury cases. Wasserman concluded that to determine the total value of Fabre’s damages, he added the $10 million of economic damages and the $5 million of non-economic together for a total conservative value of $15 million in damages for Fabre. Wasserman also testified to a pro rata approach for resolving Fabre’s Medicaid lien. He explained that he was not advocating one way or the other way regarding the use of the pro rata formula but if the conservative valuation of $15 million is accepted, then the $1,030,000 net recovery amount is only 6.87 percent of the full measure of Fabre’s damages. Wasserman further explained reasonably and persuasively that the next step in the pro rata method to reduce the Medicaid lien is to take the lien amount, $150,645.40, and multiply it by 6.87 percent, which he testified he could not do in his head but knew it came to an amount in the $10,000s, which would be the balance owed to AHCA. At hearing, Mark Matovina (“Matovina”) also provided an expert opinion without objection regarding the value of Fabre’s case. Matovina is an 18-year personal injury, Martindale Hubbell AV rated, attorney. He is a partner at Politas and Matovina in Port Orange, Florida, who solely practices personal injury cases and routinely handles valuation of damages for traumatic brain injury cases. Matovina, as part of his law practice, makes daily assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by traumatic brain injury parties and evaluates damages of those catastrophically injured. His process for determining the value of cases is to look at the past and future medical expenses, wages, and pain and suffering based on a life table. During the hearing, Matovina detailed how he determined the value of Fabre’s case. He reviewed the exhibits in this case, talked to the mother about Fabre’s 24-hour day to day care needs, wages, reviewed past medical bills, doctor’s notes, some medical documents, and a simple life care plan.1 He computed Fabre’s life expectancy at 50 years and testified that 24-hour care for 50 years is $10 million in just medical assistance. Matovina further opined that the total damages would be $15 to $20 million since the 24-hour a day medical assistance would be $10 million. Matovina testified that he did not disagree with the conservative $15 million valuation that Wasserman opined was the damages amount. At hearing, Matovina acknowledged the lien reduction process and testified that the pro rata formula should be used to allocate the value of the damages to the amount actually recovered. During his testimony, Matovina also admitted he put his opinion in his affidavit, Petitioner’s Exhibit 2, which further explains pro rata as a “formula with a ratio to be used to value the 1 The undersigned finds Petitioner’s experts to be credible. Wasserman testified he consulted a life care planner but did not pay for a life care planner because of the policy limits for recovery and his attempt to save money for his client. Matovina referred to a simple life care plan on direct examination and clarified on redirect examination that what he reviewed was not a formal life care plan. Matovina’s testimony does not contradict Wasserman’s testimony regarding a life care plan. entire value of the case and reduce medical liens in relation to the ratio of the actual damages incurred versus the actual damages recovered.” Additionally, he opined in his affidavit: In my opinion, based upon past experiences over the last eighteen (18) years, the Ahlborn formula is the only fair and reasonable method to determine past medical expenses as it relates to Medicaid’s lien. I have reviewed numerous orders applying that type of formula and I am not aware of any other formula or way to resolve a Medicaid lien without violating the United States Supreme Court decision in Ahlborn. FINDINGS REGARDING THE TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT THE FINAL HEARING The testimony of Petitioner's two experts regarding the total value of damages was credible, unimpeached, and unrebutted. Petitioner demonstrated that the settlement of $1,030,000 does not begin to fully compensate Fabre for the full value of his damages. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has established by uncontested evidence that the $1,030,000 settlement amount is 6.87 percent of the total value ($15 million) of Petitioner’s damages. Petitioner asserts that the same calculation, 6.87 percent of the settlement proceeds should be the portion of the Medicaid lien paid to AHCA for the past medical expenses. AHCA offered no evidence to counter either Wasserman or Matovina’s testimony or Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 as to valuation or the pro rata formula reduction ratio. Also, AHCA failed to offer any alternative opinions on the damage valuation method suggested by Wasserman or Matovina, both of whom testified knowledgeably and credibly as experienced practitioners. Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent should be reimbursed for its Medicaid lien in a lesser amount than the amount calculated by Respondent pursuant to the formula set forth in section 409.910(11)(f). AHCA’s lien for past medical expenses is $150,645.40. Applying the 6.87 percent pro rata ratio to the Medicaid lien total yields $10,349.33, the portion of the settlement representing reimbursement for past medical expenses and the amount recoverable by AHCA for its lien.
The Issue The issue for the undersigned to determine is the amount payable to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or Respondent), as reimbursement for medical expenses paid on behalf of Robin McBride, pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2020),1 from settlement proceeds the estate received from third parties.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency charged with administering the Florida Medicaid program, pursuant to chapter 409. 1 All references to Florida Statutes are to the 2020 codification, unless otherwise indicated. 2 At the final hearing, the parties stipulated that the total amount recoverable under the lien pursuant to the statutory formula found in section 409.910(11)(f) should be reduced to $39,265.00, to give Petitioner credit for additional taxable costs. On July 12, 2019, Robin McBride was catastrophically injured and died as a result of being struck by a vehicle (a Hummer 2) while riding a bicycle on the sidewalk. The vehicle struck Mrs. McBride after the driver failed to stop at a stop sign. Mrs. McBride was knocked off the bicycle and struck her head on the pavement. Following the accident, Mrs. McBride was initially conscious but incoherent, and was transported by fire rescue to the hospital. After she was admitted to the hospital, Mrs. McBride was placed in a medically-induced coma. Unfortunately, Mrs. McBride did not recover and died at the hospital on August 3, 2019, following a 22-day hospital stay. Mrs. McBride was survived by her husband, adult children, and grandchildren. She had been married to her husband for 35 years. At the time of her death, Mrs. McBride was a homemaker, but she was not employed elsewhere and earned no income. The McBride estate brought a personal injury action to recover for her wrongful death against the tortfeasor and his insurer. In 2020, the McBride estate settled the tort action for a total recovery of $110,000, representing the insurer’s policy limits of $100,000, and $10,000 contributed directly by the tortfeasor from his own funds. The tortfeasor had additional insurance under a commercial policy issued by another insurer. The commercial policy limits were $1 million, but coverage was denied because the vehicle that struck Mrs. McBride was not registered in the name of the tortfeasor’s business. AHCA was properly notified of the lawsuit and indicated it had paid benefits related to the injuries from the accident in the amount of $87,828.24. AHCA has asserted a lien, pursuant to the statutory formula reduction, of $39,265.00, against the settlement proceeds of $110,000. AHCA stipulated that Mrs. McBride’s estate suffered significant economic and non-economic damages due to Mrs. McBride’s injury and death, but did not stipulate as to the value of these damages. Petitioner presented claim valuation testimony from Louis Blanco, Esquire, the attorney who represented the McBride estate in the claim asserted against the tortfeasor and his insurer. Mr. Blanco has practiced personal injury law in Florida since 1994. Mr. Blanco placed a “conservative” value on the McBride claim of $1.1 million. Mr. Blanco estimated that economic damages for loss of support and services to the surviving spouse would range between $150,000 and $200,000 based on Mrs. McBride’s economic value as a homemaker. Economic damages also include past medical care, which was $87,828.24, the amount of the Medicaid lien. Mr. Blanco testified that the non-economic damages due to the estate— including the loss of companionship and pain and suffering—would exceed $800,000. Mr. Blanco also noted that liability was not an issue in the case given that the vehicle struck Mrs. McBride after the driver ran a stop sign. Mr. Blanco conducted an asset search of the tortfeasor and determined that an excess judgment against the tortfeasor would be uncollectible. Mr. Blanco testified that the tortfeasor contributed $10,000 of personal funds to settle the claim because he was very remorseful that he had caused the accident. Mr. Blanco emphasized the fact that the insurer paid its policy limits of $100,000 immediately after the death certificate was provided, an indication that the insurer valued the claim above its policy limits. The commercial insurer also requested the death certificate, but refused to pay after it was determined that there was no coverage due to the vehicle registration. Mr. Blanco testified that he believes the commercial insurer would have quickly tendered its policy limits of $1 million—had the claim been covered—because there was no liability defense and Mrs. McBride was survived by her husband of 35 years. Using the pro rata allocation methodology, Mr. Blanco testified that $8,782.82 of the $110,000 settlement proceeds should be allocated to past medical expenses because the personal injury claim was settled for ten percent of its conservative value. Mr. Blanco’s testimony was credible and persuasive and is accepted. Petitioner also presented valuation testimony from Malcolm Purow, Esquire, an attorney who has practiced personal injury law in Florida for 30 years. Mr. Purow is board certified in Civil Trial Law by the Florida Bar. As to economic damages, Mr. Purow valued the damages for loss of support and services to the surviving spouse at $180,000, and damages for past medical care at $87,828.24, the amount of the Medicaid lien. Mr. Purow testified that adding non-economic damages to the economic damages raises the total value of the claim to $2 million. Mr. Purow conceded, however, that $1.1 million is an acceptable conservative value for the claim. Mr. Purow used the pro rata allocation methodology and found that that $8,782.82 of the $110,000 settlement proceeds should be allocated to past medical expenses because the personal injury claim was settled for ten percent of its conservative value of $1.1 million. AHCA did not present any expert valuation testimony and did not propose a valuation that was less than $1.1 million. There is no reasonable basis to reject the testimony of Mr. Blanco or Mr. Purow, and their testimony that $1.1 million is a reasonable and conservative value for the McBride estate’s claim is accepted. The undersigned finds that the value of the McBride estate’s claim is $1.1 million, and that $8,782.82 of the $110,000 settlement proceeds should be allocated to past medical expenses.
The Issue The issue to be decided in this proceeding is the amount to be paid to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA” or the “Agency”), from the proceeds of a personal injury settlement received by Petitioner, Joseph Pinto Domingo, referred to herein as either “Petitioner” or “Domingo,” to reimburse Medicaid for expenditures made on his behalf.
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are derived from the exhibits and oral testimony at final hearing, as well as from the stipulated facts between the parties. On July 13, 2012, Domingo’s parents took him to a hospital emergency room (“ER”) with complaints of a persistent fever, runny nose, congestion and a cough. He was 24 months old at the time and had been sick for a few days. After evaluation by hospital ER staff, Domingo was found to have a fever of 103 degrees Fahrenheit. He was treated with Tylenol, but minutes later began to have seizures. He experienced on-going seizure activity that compromised his ability to breathe, resulting in a catastrophic hypoxic ischemic brain injury. As a result of his brain injury, Domingo is permanently disabled and unable to stand, walk, ambulate, speak, eat, toilet or care for himself in any manner. As a result of Domingo’s injuries, he suffered both economic and non-economic damages, including but not limited to: pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of ability to enjoy life, disability, disfigurement, lost ability to earn money, and extensive medical expenses, past and future. Of course Domingo’s parents also suffered extensively because of Domingo’s injuries. The medical care Domingo received for treatment of his injuries was paid for by Medicaid. The amount paid by Medicaid for his treatment was $641,174.03 (the “Lien Amount”). Domingo’s parents brought medical malpractice claims against the ER physician, the ER nurse practitioner, a professional association to which the doctor belonged, and the hospital. During the course of litigation, it was determined that a conservative value of Domingo’s claim for damages would be thirty million dollars ($30,000,000.00), referred to herein as the “Claim Amount.” After years of litigation, a settlement was reached wherein Domingo was to be paid ten million dollars ($10,000,000), which will be called the “Settlement Amount.” An undisclosed portion of the Settlement Amount, presumably 25 percent or $2,500,000, was paid for attorneys’ fees. Domingo’s recovery was therefore less than $10,000,000. The Settlement Amount was paid by two separate entities: 1) the physician, nurse practitioner, and their professional associations (collectively the “Association”); and 2) the hospital where Domingo presented to the ER for treatment. The Association paid $2,000,000 of the Settlement Amount and the hospital paid $8,000,000. Both entities entered into settlement agreements with Domingo (through his parents). Domingo offered into evidence a Complete Liability Release from the Association and a General Release from the hospital which Domingo’s representatives had signed. In the releases, the Association and the hospital were released from further liability for and in consideration of payments made to Domingo in the amounts described above. The releases, by their terms, are considered “settlement agreements” between the parties thereto. The hospital’s settlement agreement indicated that $170,937 was being allocated for Domingo’s past medical expenses, recognizing that the Settlement Amount was less than the perceived value of Domingo’s claim. The Association’s settlement agreement did not allocate any of the $2,000,000 sum specifically to past medical expenses; it did acknowledge that the Settlement Amount was less than the value of the Claim Amount. Domingo’s parents and legal counsel signed the releases, wherein all future claims against the defendants were barred. Neither the defendants in the malpractice case nor AHCA were signatories to the releases. The copies of the documents entered into evidence at final hearing were not signed by the Association or the hospital. Oddly, the documents do not even provide a place for the defendants to sign. Nor was there testimony from any principal of the Association or the hospital to verify the terms of the releases-qua-settlement agreements. Nonetheless, the gross Settlement Amount received by Domingo was only one-third, i.e., 33.3 percent, of the Claim Amount. All the parties hereto acknowledge that Domingo did not receive the full potential value of his claim in the Settlement Amount. Domingo continues to reside with his parents, who, despite the difficulties associated with Domingo’s injury and the stress related thereto, have remained married. The parents will be responsible for Domingo’s care for the rest of his life. The parties do not dispute that Domingo’s life situation is grave and serious. But that is not the issue in this proceeding. The economic and non-economic damages for Domingo include several factors: future medical expenses, loss of income, and past medical expenses comprise the economic portion; pain and suffering, loss of consortium, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and disability, to name a few, make up the non-economic damages. Of all the postulated damages, only the past medical expenses (i.e., the Lien Amount) are finite and absolute. In fact, the parties have stipulated that “[Domingo’s] medical care related to the injury was paid by Medicaid and Medicaid provided $641,174.03 associated with [Domingo’s] injury.” All the other damages are estimates by experts, based on comparisons of other cases and/or their professional experience. Domingo asserts that inasmuch as he received only about 33.3 percent of his Claim Amount, he should only have to pay 33.3 percent of the Lien Amount. His assertion is essentially based on a mathematical calculation which seeks to make Domingo as whole as possible. The calculation is offered as an equitable way to provide Domingo with more of the Settlement Amount than he might otherwise retain. As discussed more fully below, the mathematical calculation runs afoul of statutory provisions. The amount allocated by the hospital for Domingo’s past medical expenses ($170,397), is 26.6 percent of the Lien Amount. This is because the hospital’s share of the $10,000,000 settlement ($8,000,000) represents 26.6 percent of the alleged value of the claim, according to Petitioner. (The undersigned could not mathematically reconcile this percentage, but based on the findings and conclusions herein, the calculation is not relevant.) The Association did not allocate a specific amount for past and medical expenses, but Domingo argues that a factor of 33.3 percent should be applied to their settlement payment, as the Settlement Amount is 33.3 percent of the Claim Amount. Other than the accuracy of that mathematical calculation, Petitioner does not provide any basis for applying the percentage to the Lien Amount. AHCA was made aware of the settlement discussions between Domingo and his healthcare providers, but chose not to be involved in the process. Rather, AHCA established the amount of the lien and asserts that the entire Lien Amount should be paid from the Settlement Amount.
The Issue The issue to be decided is the amount to be paid by Petitioner to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA"), out of his settlement proceeds, as reimbursement for past Medicaid expenditures pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On January 1, 2013, Josiah Delva ("Josiah"), who was only 18-months-old, was presented to a hospital with a fever and emesis. He was discharged only one and a half hours later after he was misdiagnosed with a "normal" condition. The following day, Josiah's fever continued, and he began suffering from a purpuric rash on his body and decompensated septic shock. He was taken back to the Emergency Room where he was diagnosed with meningococcal meningitis and meningococcal bacteremia and grew Moraxella catarrhalis in his sputum. Josiah was admitted to and remained in the intensive care unit of the hospital for five months. Due to the necrosis, which was caused by the meningococcus, Josiah's left arm below the elbow, his right leg below his knee, and the toes of his left foot were all amputated. In addition, he required bilateral patellectomies (removal of his knee caps). Josiah's medical care related to the injury was paid by AHCA's Medicaid program. Medicaid provided $237,408.60 of the costs associated with Josiah's injury. The $237,408.60 paid by Medicaid constituted Josiah's entire claim for past medical expenses. Josiah's parents and natural guardians, Jennifer Paulino Delva and Johnny Delva, brought a medical malpractice suit against the medical providers and staff responsible for Josiah's care ("Defendant medical providers") to recover all of Josiah's damages as associated with his injuries. As a condition of Josiah's eligibility for Medicaid, Josiah assigned to AHCA his right to recover from liable third parties any medical expenses paid by Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H); § 409.910(6)(b), Fla. Stat. During the pendency of the medical malpractice action, AHCA was notified of the action, and it asserted a $237,408.60 Medicaid lien against Josiah's cause of action and future settlement of that action. AHCA made payments totaling $237,408.60 related to Josiah's injuries for which the defendant medical providers are liable. Josiah's lawsuit ultimately settled in December of 2018 or January of 2019 for the gross unallocated sum of $550,000.00. Petitioner deposited the full Medicaid lien amount in an interest bearing account for the benefit of AHCA pending an administrative determination of AHCA's rights, and this constitutes "final agency action" for purposes of chapter 120, Florida Statutes, pursuant to section 409.910(17). There were $146,110.61 in attorney's fees and costs incurred to make the recovery. The parties stipulated that operation of the statutory formula to Josiah's settlement would require repayment to AHCA in the amount of $185,694.69. Witness Testimony Zarahi Nunez was accepted, with no objection, as an expert in life care planning. She met with the Delva family and consulted with medical professionals regarding the treatment needs and options for Josiah. She also reviewed the appropriate manuals to determine a course of treatment for Josiah. Ms. Nunez developed a life care plan, along with dollar figures for each aspect of treatment totaling $5,998,080.19.2/ Mrs. Delva testified how she noticed that Josiah developed a fever and was vomiting on New Year's Eve (December 31, 2012). After midnight, he vomited again, so Mrs. Delva brought him to the hospital. He was discharged a few hours later around 4:00 a.m. on New Year's Day (January 1, 2013). Josiah was diagnosed with a stomach flu, and was given a prescription to stop vomiting. Josiah developed a rash, which concerned Mrs. Delva. Upon talking to medical professionals via phone, Mrs. Delva determined that Josiah's rash would not change with pressure on his skin. This apparently indicated that his white blood cell count was low. Mrs. Delva immediately rushed Josiah to the hospital upon the doctor's instruction. At the hospital, Josiah bypassed triage as the rash continued to spread and as symptoms of sepsis became apparent. The doctors diagnosed Josiah as having a bacterial meningitis infection and treated him. His organs began shutting down and his body turned colors from the rash. Mrs. Delva vividly explained the horror of: watching multiple physicians rush to her son's bedside; seeing the Emergency Room go into quarantine due to her son's infection; providing the names of all the people Josiah had come into recent contact so that they could be given precautionary antibiotics; having the health department remove all of Josiah's things from the house to prevent the spread of the infection; and seeing her son essentially die on the table and be resuscitated. Josiah was in the hospital from January 1 through May 2, 2013. Due to the lack of blood circulation, Josiah lost multiple body parts. His left hand at the wrist, his right leg at the ankle, and part of his left foot were amputated, and both knee caps were removed. His skin is tough and scarred. According to Mrs. Delva, had the doctor properly diagnosed Josiah when they first arrived after midnight on New Year's Day, he would not have suffered the extent of his injuries. Mrs. Delva and her husband have four children, including Josiah, and she detailed the extent to which the family facilitates Josiah's needs. Josiah's siblings do not always understand the extra attention needed by Josiah from their parents. She explained every day is a constant struggle, and most notably explained, the need to travel from Miami to Tampa to Shriner's Hospital ten or more times per year for check-ups and to update Josiah's prosthetics. No witness testified to Josiah's or his parents claim for noneconomic damages. While it is clear that the malpractice caused grievous pain and suffering to the family that will last Josiah's entire life, no expert was presented to discuss the valuation of these damages. No testamentary or other evidence was advanced to show how the $550,000.00 settlement amount should be allocated between past medical expense damages and other elements of damages. Petitioner's Theory of the Case Petitioner's counsel argues that the total value of the case that Petitioner should reasonably have expected to be awarded by a jury was $110,735,488.79. Counsel explained that this number represents the past medicals paid by Medicaid, $6 million for future medicals, $20 million for past pain and suffering, $80 million for future pain and suffering, and $2 million each (a total of $4 million) for Mr. and Mrs. Delva's loss of consortium claims. Petitioner argues that the past medicals, as paid by Medicaid in the amount of $234,408.60, represent 0.0021 percent of the total value of the case of $110,735,488.79. Petitioner argues that applying this 0.0021 percent times the actual recovery of $550,000.00 results in Medicaid's pro rata recovery being reduced to $1,155.00 as the portion of the settlement allocable to past medicals.3/ No expert testimony was introduced on the calculation of any element of damages other than future medical expenses.4/ In support of the $110 million dollar plus "total value" of the case, Petitioner provided three jury verdicts to establish comparable pain and suffering awarded in similar circumstances. These cases include: A.H., a minor, et al. v. Trustees of Mease Hospital, Inc., et al., 2018 FL Jury Verdict Rptr. LEXIS 277; Lisa-Marie Carter v. Larry Roy Glazerman, M.D., et al., 2018 FL Jury Verdict Rptr. LEXIS 175; and Cynthia N. Underwood and Stephen R. Underwood v. Katherine Strong, 2017 FL Jury Verdict Rptr. LEXIS 11578. The facts of how the injuries happened and the effects of the injuries, in these cited cases, differ highly from Josiah's case. The first of the three jury verdicts shows a gross verdict award of $9,250,000.00. The third of the jury verdicts show a gross award of $6,132,642. The second of the three jury verdicts shows an award of $109,760,930. This includes the staggering figure of $94 million for pain and suffering damages. The undersigned took official recognition of the docket for the Carter case and the Notice of Appeal filed on March 22, 2018, which show that the Carter verdict is on appeal. Unfortunately, these jury verdicts provide no guidance for calculating Josiah's or his parents' claims for noneconomic damages or the total value of the case.
The Issue The issue to be determined is the amount to be reimbursed to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”), for medical expenses paid on behalf of Ashley Nunez pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2016),1/ from settlement proceeds received by Petitioners from third parties.
Findings Of Fact Facts Pertaining to the Underlying Personal Injury Litigation and the Medicaid Lien On February 13, 2010, Ashley Nunez (“Ashley”), who was three years old at the time, presented to a hospital emergency room with a fever. A chest X-ray indicated that Ashley had left lobe pneumonia. The hospital ordered no blood work or blood cultures and did not investigate the cause of Ashley’s pneumonia. The hospital discharged Ashley with a prescription for Azithromycin. By February 14, 2010, Ashley’s fever was 102.9 degrees, and Ashley’s mother took her to a pediatrician. Rather than attempting to discover the cause of the fever, the pediatrician instructed Ashley’s mother that the prescription needed time to work and instructed her to bring Ashley back if the fever persisted. On February 16, 2010, Ashley’s aunt returned her to the pediatrician because Ashley’s fever was persisting and she had developed abdominal pain. Due to a concern that Ashley was suffering from appendicitis, the pediatrician referred her to an emergency room. Later that day, Ashley’s mother returned her to the emergency room that had treated Ashley on February 13, 2010. A second chest x-ray revealed that Ashley’s pneumonia had gotten much worse, and the hospital admitted her. Ashley’s respiratory condition continued to deteriorate, and blood cultures confirmed that she had streptococcus pneumonia. Two days after her admission, the hospital decided to transfer Ashley to a hospital that could provide a higher level of care. On February 18, 2010, an ambulance transferred Ashley to a second hospital. Even though Ashley’s respiratory condition continued to deteriorate, the paramedics and hospital transport team did not intubate her. Upon her arrival at the second hospital, Ashley had suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest and had to be resuscitated with CPR and medication. The lack of oxygen to Ashley’s brain and other organs resulted in catastrophic harm leading Ashley to be intubated, placed on a ventilator, fed through a gastric feeding tube, and placed on dialysis. The second hospital discharged Ashley two and a half months later. While she no longer required a ventilator or dialysis, the hypoxic brain injury and cardiopulmonary arrest left Ashley in a severely compromised medical condition. Ashley was unable to perform any activities of daily living and was unable to stand, speak, walk, eat, or see. Following her discharge from the second hospital, Ashley required continuous care. She was under a nurse’s care for 12 hours a day, and Ashley’s mother (Anna Patricia Delgado) cared for her during the remaining 12 hours each day. On February 23, 2011, Ashley died due to complications resulting from the hypoxic brain injury. Ashley was survived by her parents, Ms. Delgado and John Nunez. Medicaid (through AHCA) paid $357,407.05 for the medical care related to Ashley’s injury. Ashley’s parents paid $5,805.00 for her funeral. As the Personal Representative of Ashley’s Estate, Ms. Delgado brought a wrongful death action against the first emergency room doctor who treated Ashley, the pediatrician, a pediatric critical care intensivist who treated Ashley after her admission to the first hospital, the two hospitals that treated Ashley, and the ambulance company that transported Ashley to the second hospital. AHCA received notice of the wrongful death action and asserted a Medicaid lien against Ashley’s Estate in order to recover the $357,407.05 paid for Ashley’s past medical expenses. See § 409.910(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (providing that “[b]y applying for or accepting medical assistance, an applicant, recipient, or legal representative automatically assigns to [AHCA] any right, title, and interest such person has to any third party benefit ”). Ms. Delgado ultimately settled the wrongful death action through a series of confidential settlements totaling $2,250,000. No portion of that settlement represents reimbursements for future medical expenses. AHCA has not moved to set aside, void, or otherwise dispute those settlements. Section 409.910(11)(f) sets forth a formula for calculating the amount that AHCA shall recover in the event that a Medicaid recipient or his or her personal representative initiates a tort action against a third party that results in a judgment, award, or settlement from a third party. Applying the formula in section 409.910(11)(f) to the $2,250,000 settlement, results in AHCA being owed $791,814.84 in order to satisfy its lien.2/ Because Ashley’s medical expenses of $357,407.05 were less than the amount produced by the section 409.910(11)(f) formula, AHCA is seeking to recover $357,407.05 in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien. See § 409.910(11)(f)4., Fla. Stat. (providing that “[n]otwithstanding any provision in this section to the contrary, [AHCA] shall be entitled to all medical coverage benefits up to the total amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid.”). Valuation of the Personal Injury Claim Tomas Gamba represented Petitioners during their wrongful death action. Mr. Gamba has practiced law since 1976 and is a partner with Gamba, Lombana and Herrera-Mezzanine, P.A., in Coral Gables, Florida. Mr. Gamba has been Board Certified in Civil Trial Law by the Florida Bar since 1986. Since the mid-1990s, 90 percent of Mr. Gamba’s practice has been devoted to medical malpractice. Over the course of his career, Mr. Gamba has handled 60 to 70 jury trials as first chair, including catastrophic injury cases involving children. In 2015, the Florida Chapter of the American Board of Trial Advocates named Mr. Gamba its Trial Lawyer of the Year. Mr. Gamba is a member of several professional organizations, such as the American Board of Trial Advocates, the American Association for Justice, the Florida Board of Trial Advocates, the Florida Justice Association, and the Miami-Dade County Justice Association. Mr. Gamba was accepted in this proceeding as an expert regarding the valuation of damages suffered by injured parties. Mr. Gamba testified that Petitioners elected against proceeding to a jury trial (in part) because of the family’s need for closure and the stress associated with a trial that could last up to three weeks. Mr. Gamba also noted that the two hospitals that treated Ashley had sovereign immunity, and (at the time pertinent to the instant case) their damages were capped at $200,000 each. In order to collect any damages above the statutory cap, Petitioners would have had to file a claims bill with the Florida Legislature, and Mr. Gamba testified that “the legislature would be very difficult.” As for the three treating physicians who were defendants in the suit, Mr. Gamba testified that Petitioners achieved a favorable settlement by agreeing to accept $2 million when the physicians’ combined insurance coverage was only $3 million. The decision to settle was also influenced by the fact that Ashley had a pre-existing condition known as hemolytic uremic syndrome, a blood disorder. During discovery, Mr. Gamba learned that the defense was prepared to present expert testimony that the aforementioned condition made it impossible for the defendants to save Ashley. Finally, Mr. Gamba testified that 75 percent of medical malpractice cases heard by juries result in defense verdicts. As for whether the $2,250,000 settlement fully compensated Ashley’s estate and her parents for the full value of their damages, Mr. Gamba was adamant that the aforementioned sum was “a small percentage of what we call the full measure of damages in this particular case.” Mr. Gamba opined that $8,857,407.05 was the total value of the damages that Ashley’s parents and her Estate could have reasonably expected to recover if the wrongful death action had proceeded to a jury trial. Mr. Gamba explained that Florida’s Wrongful Death Act enabled Ashley’s parents to recover for the death of their child and for the pain and suffering they incurred from the date of Ashley’s injury. According to Mr. Gamba, $4,250,000 represented a “conservative” estimate of each parent’s individual claim, and the sum of their claims would be $8,500,000. Mr. Gamba further explained that Ashley’s Estate’s claim would consist of the $357,407.05 in medical expenses paid by Medicaid, resulting in an estimate for total damages of $8,857,407.05. Mr. Gamba’s opinion regarding the value of Petitioners’ damages was based on “roundtable” discussions with members of his firm and discussions with several attorneys outside his firm who practice in the personal injury field. Mr. Gamba’s opinion was also based on 10 reported cases contained in Petitioners’ Exhibit 9. According to Mr. Gamba, each of those reported cases involve fact patterns similar to that of the instant case. Therefore, Gamba testified that the jury verdicts in those cases are instructive for formulating an expectation as to what a jury would have awarded if Ashley’s case had proceeded to trial. In sum, Mr. Gamba testified that the $2,250,000 settlement represents a 25.4 percent recovery of the $8,857.407.05 of damages that Ashley’s parents and Ashley’s Estate actually incurred. Therefore, only 25.4 percent (i.e, $90,781.30) of the $357,407.05 in Medicaid payments for Ashley’s care was recovered. Mr. Gamba opined that allocating $90,781.39 of the total settlement to compensate Medicaid for past medical expenses would be reasonable and rational. In doing so, he stated that, “And I think both – if the parents are not getting their full measure of damages, I don’t think the health care provider, in this case Medicaid, that made the payment should get, you know, every cent that they paid out, when mother and father are getting but a small percentage of the value of their claim.” Petitioners also presented the testimony of Herman J. Russomanno. Mr. Russomanno has practiced law since 1976 and is a senior partner with the Miami law firm of Russomanno and Borrello, P.A. Mr. Russomanno has been Board Certified in Civil Trial Law by the Florida Bar since 1986, and he has served as the Chairman of the Florida Bar’s Civil Trial Certification Committee. Mr. Russomanno is also certified in Civil Trial Practice by the National Board of Trial Advocates and has taught trial advocacy and ethics for 33 years as an adjunct professor at the St. Thomas University School of Law. Mr. Russomanno is a past president of the Florida Bar and belongs to several professional organizations, such as the Florida Board of Trial Advocates, the American Board of Trial Advocates, the Dade County Bar Association, and the Miami-Dade County Trial Lawyers Association. Since 1980, Mr. Russomanno’s practice has been focused on medical malpractice, and he has represented hundreds of children who suffered catastrophic injuries. Mr. Russomanno was accepted in the instant case as an expert in the evaluation of damages suffered by injured parties. Prior to his testimony at the final hearing, Mr. Russomanno reviewed Ashley’s medical records, the hospital discharge summaries, and the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation filed in this proceeding. He also discussed Ashley’s case with Mr. Gamba and reviewed Mr. Gamba’s file from the wrongful death action. Mr. Russomanno also viewed videos of Ashley taken before and after her injury so he could gain an understanding of the severity of Ashley’s injury and the suffering experienced by her parents. Mr. Russomanno credibly testified that the damages incurred by Ashley’s parents were between $4,250,000 and $7,500,000 for each parent. Mr. Russomanno echoed Mr. Gamba’s testimony by stating that the $2,250,000 settlement did not fully compensate Ashley’s parents and her Estate for their damages. AHCA presented the testimony of James H.K. Bruner. Mr. Bruner has practiced law since 1983 and is licensed to practice law in Florida, New York, Maine, and Massachusetts. Mr. Bruner is a member of professional organizations such as the American Health Lawyers Association and the Trial Lawyers Sections of the Florida Bar. Between 2003 and 2005, Mr. Bruner served as the Department of Children and Families’ risk attorney. That position required him to evaluate personal injury actions filed against the Department and assess the Department’s exposure to liability. Based on his experience in evaluating approximately 200 cases for the Department, Mr. Bruner authored the Department’s manual on risk management and provided training to Department employees on risk management issues. Mr. Bruner has served as the Director of AHCA’s Bureau of Strategy and Compliance. In that position, he dealt specifically with third-party liability collections and Medicaid liens. Beginning in 2008, Mr. Bruner worked for ACS (now known as Xerox Recovery Services) and was engaged in attempting to recover Medicaid liens from personal injury settlements. Over the last several years, Mr. Bruner has spoken at seminars about Medicaid lien resolution and authored publications on that topic. Since April of 2013, Mr. Bruner has been in private legal practice as a solo practitioner. He describes himself as a “jack of all trades” who engages in a “general practice.” Over the last 20 years, Mr. Bruner has not handled a jury trial involving personal injury; and, over the last four years, he has not negotiated a personal injury settlement. The undersigned accepted Mr. Bruner as an expert witness for evaluating the cases contained in Petitioners’ Exhibit 9 and pointing out distinctions between those cases and the instant case. Mr. Bruner did not offer testimony regarding the specific value of the damages suffered by Petitioners. Findings Regarding the Testimony Presented at the Final Hearing Regardless of whether the reported cases in Petitioners’ Exhibit 9 are analogous to or distinguishable from the instant case, the undersigned finds that the testimony from Mr. Gamba and Mr. Russomanno was compelling and persuasive. While attaching a value to the damages that a plaintiff could reasonably expect to receive from a jury is not an exact science, Mr. Gamba and Russomanno’s substantial credentials and their decades of experience with litigating personal injury lawsuits make them very compelling witnesses regarding the valuation of damages suffered by injured parties such as Petitioners. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence that $90,781.39 constitutes a fair and reasonable recovery for past medical expenses actually paid by Medicaid. However, and as discussed below, AHCA (as a matter of law) is entitled to recover $357,407.05 in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien.3/
The Issue The issue to be decided is the amount payable to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration ("Respondent" or "AHCA"), in satisfaction of Respondent's Medicaid lien from a settlement received by Petitioner, from a third party, pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact On November 8, 2013, Glass, who was then 25 years old, was struck by a car while crossing the road, which caused multiple severe mental and physical injuries. After the accident, Glass was hospitalized. His medical care related to his injuries was paid by Medicaid. Glass, through counsel, brought a personal injury lawsuit against the driver and company that owned the vehicle that struck him ("tortfeasor") to recover all of his damages associated with his injuries. Steven B. Phillips ("Phillips"), a nearly 28-year civil trial attorney with the law firm of Pincus & Currier in Palm Beach, Florida, represented Glass in his personal injury action. During the pendency of the personal injury action, AHCA neither started a civil action to enforce its rights under section 409.910 nor intervened or joined in Glass's action against the tortfeasor. Phillips handled Glass's personal injury case through settlement. The personal injury lawsuit was ultimately settled for the lump-sum unallocated amount of $225,000.00. Glass's taxable costs incurred in securing the $225,000.00 settlement are $29,677.93. By letter, AHCA was notified of Glass's settlement of the personal injury action. AHCA has neither filed an action to set aside, void, or otherwise dispute the settlement. AHCA, through its Medicaid program, spent $145,629.51 in Medicaid benefits on behalf of Glass, all of which represents expenditures paid for Glass's past medical expenses. The formula at section 409.910(11)(f), as applied to the entire $225,000.00 settlement, requires payment of the Medicaid lien in the full amount of the $69,536.04. AHCA is demanding payment of $69,536.04 from the $225,000.00 settlement. Glass deposited the section 409.910(11)(f) formula amount in an interest-bearing account for the benefit of AHCA, pending an administrative determination of AHCA's rights; and this constitutes "final agency action" for purposes of chapter 120, Florida Statutes, pursuant to section 409.910(17). Hearing At the final hearing, Petitioner presented expert testimony from Phillips, Glass's Florida trial attorney. Phillips is a 21-year board-certified civil trial lawyer who practices exclusively in personal injury and insurance law. Phillip's board-certified designation recognizes him as a specialist that has extensive experience in civil trial practice. He is also a member of the Palm Beach Justice Association. Phillips's practice of law is a hundred percent personal injury cases, including catastrophic injuries. He has handled over a hundred jury trials. Phillips currently only represents plaintiffs who are injured, but he also previously was defense counsel for ten years. Phillips's expertise encompasses valuation of personal injury damages and allocation of settlements relating to health care liens. Phillips stays abreast of all State of Florida jury verdicts by reviewing jury verdict reporters and researching cases statewide. He also routinely discusses cases with other plaintiff attorneys. At hearing, Phillips explained that as a routine part of his practice, he makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured parties, and he detailed the steps for making those assessments. Valuation Phillips credibly explained the process he took to develop an opinion concerning the value for the damages suffered in Glass's case. Phillips testified that he met with Glass numerous times; reviewed his approximate 1,400 pages of medical records; assessed the injuries and costs of the medical treatment; evaluated how the accident occurred; assessed liability issues and fault; resolved if there was comparative negligence; verified future medical treatment; and established lost economic damages, such as wages, and any intangibles, such as past and future pain and suffering, loss of capacity to enjoy life, and mental anguish. Phillips analyzed how the accident occurred and detailed that Glass was walking on a main road, Indiantown Road, in Jupiter, Florida. As Glass was walking on a sidewalk, he turned and walked across the roadway. A vehicle was approaching him, and he went back and forth as to whether he was going to cross or step back on the curb; and the car driver did not slow down, hit Glass, and threw him approximately 65 feet in the air. He landed with his face smashed down in the road and was rendered unconscious at the scene. Glass suffered multiple maxillofacial injuries along with numerous broken bones and a traumatic brain injury. As a result, Glass was taken to St. Mary's Hospital, a trauma hospital, for treatment. Phillips explained the importance of assessing each of Glass's injuries in order to properly determine the true value of the case. Next, he went over the injuries in detail describing that Glass had a traumatic head injury that resulted in an acute right and rear frontal lobe hemorrhage, contusion, which bled for several days, and resulted in a traumatic brain injury. He had post-traumatic cephalgia and pain in his head. Glass's optic nerve in his left eye resulted in decreased visual acuity. One side of his lung collapsed, and he had multiple fractured ribs. Glass suffered a functional decline in his short-term memory, and he had cerebral spinal fluid in the subdural space around the brain. Additionally, he had an extensive LeFort II fracture, which involved the roof of the mouth on both sides; his front teeth on the bottom were fractured; and the top of his eyes was fractured and displaced on the left side, as well as several other bones on his face were fractured. His legs and arms also had broken bones. Glass underwent multiple extensive surgeries to repair all the fractures, and he even had surgical debridement to repair the soft tissue and closure of the skin. There was additional surgery to repair the top third of his face and a broken nose. At hearing, Phillips testified that the medical care related to the accident was paid by Medicaid in the amount of $145,629.51. Phillips explained that the accident had a tremendous impact on Glass's life. He was hospitalized for approximately seven months. Some results from the accident are Glass cannot retain short memory, count money, or go to the store alone to purchase something. After he was released from the hospital, he moved in with his mother where he resides now. Glass sued the individual driver and driver's company, Quest Diagnostic, because it was Phillips's position that the driver was negligent in failing to slow down, stop, and take affirmative action to avoid striking Glass on the roadway. As the litigation proceeded, Phillips discovered challenges in the case. One hurdle was that Glass did not remember the accident, and the personal injury case had to be built around the police report. Phillips further explained that another issue existed as to whether Glass had been drinking on the day of the accident and had alcohol in his system. With Glass's memory loss, Phillips ultimately concluded that there was a major issue with comparative negligence in this case, and he determined that it would be difficult to prove the driver of the vehicle was at fault. As a result of the challenges to the personal injury action, Phillips settled the case for $225,000.00. Phillips credibly explained that to determine the true value of Glass's case, he used the routine method of researching the value of damages for each injury. Phillips discovered while researching the jury verdict system that there was not even one case that had half of the injuries Glass had sustained. Phillips discovered memory-loss cases ranged in damages from $160,000.00 upward, depending on the extent. He found that brain injury cases started at $500,000.00 in damages depending on the hemorrhaging and residual effect. Elbow fractures are calculated $50,000.00 upward. Optic nerve damage cases are $200,000.00 upward. Orbital fractures cases were awarded damages from $300,000.00 upward. Phillips put together about ten different jury verdicts adding up the various injuries Glass sustained to calculate a fair value for his injuries. Phillips concluded that a true value of the case conservatively was $1.5 million. Phillips also round tabled the case with other attorneys to finalize a value. The other attorneys all agreed that Glass's damages were in excess of $1.5 million. As a result, Phillips concluded that the low-end conservative number for the value of Glass's damages is $1.5 million. Allocation Phillips also credibly and persuasively testified that he is familiar with and has participated in several hundred allocations of settlements including Medicaid cases,1/ health insurance liens, automobile insurance coverage liens, Medicare set asides, jury verdict setoff for comparative negligence, as well as allocations of judgments. Phillips explained that he has been dealing with Medicaid payment allocations, negotiation of settlements, and reductions of the liens on a routine basis for his 27 years' membership in The Florida Bar. Phillips summarized how common the method of allocation is in the industry and stated about "90 percent of his cases involve some type of allocation of medical expenses versus the true or pure value of the case to determine a fair and reasonable amount to reimburse a lien holder on payments, such as Medicaid." Phillips opined that the settlement was not the full value of Glass's damages and that the settlement only represents 15 percent of the full measure of his damages. Phillips's testimony was uncontradicted and compelling. Phillips explained that the 15 percent is the percentage of the settlement value, $225,000.00, from the true value of $1.5 million. He calculated the percentage by dividing $225,000.00 into $1.5 million which equals 15 percent. Phillips also credibly testified that he utilized the same method that he has been routinely using for over 25 years to properly and reasonably allocate Glass's past medical expenses. Phillips took 15 percent of the $145,629.51 Medicaid lien, which makes the allocation of past medical expenses $21,844.43. Phillips also explained that it is the only allocation method he has ever used. Findings Regarding the Testimony Presented at the Final Hearing The undersigned finds that Petitioner has established by unrebutted uncontested evidence that the $225,000.00 settlement amount is 15 percent of the total value ($1.5 million) of Petitioner's damages. Using the same calculation, Petitioner correctly established that 15 percent of $145,629.51 (Petitioner's lien amount for past medical expenses), $21,844.43, should be the portion of the Medicaid lien paid to AHCA. ACHA offered no evidence to counter either Phillips's opinions or Petitioner's Exhibit 8, Scott S. Warburton's ("Warburton") sworn affidavit. Warburton is opposing counsel in Glass's personal injury case, who corroborates the value of Glass's damages in excess of $1.5 million and also allocates the case with the same 15 percent recovery amount resulting in a $21,844.43 claim for past medical expenses. Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent should be reimbursed for its Medicaid lien in a lesser amount than the amount calculated by Respondent pursuant to the formula set forth in section 409.910(11)(f).
The Issue The issue to be determined is what amount of the $10,652.23 Medicaid lien held by Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration ("Respondent" or "Agency"), is recoverable by Respondent from the $65,000.00 settlement reached by Petitioner, Tya-Marie Savain ("Petitioner" or "Savain"), in her related personal injury action.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulation between the parties, the evidence presented and the record as a whole, the undersigned makes the following findings of fact: On the afternoon of May 27, 2015, Petitioner, who was 19 years of age, was a pedestrian walking northbound across Forrest Hill Boulevard in West Palm Beach, Florida. As she was crossing the road in daylight, she was hit by a vehicle operated by Kenneth Knowles. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 1). As a result of the collision, Petitioner suffered a fractured femur requiring open reduction internal fixation to repair her leg and a second surgery to remove the medical hardware. Petitioner suffered additional injuries (during the accident), including a left eye laceration, and road rash with scarring on her hands, elbows, chin, ears, forehead, mouth, and other body parts. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 2). Respondent expended $10,652.23 in medical assistance through its Medicaid program for the benefit of Petitioner related to her fractured femur and the two resulting surgeries caused in the accident. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 4). Petitioner’s extensive injuries necessitated surgery and resulted in significant medical treatment and related medical expenses (see, e.g., Pet. Exs. 2-12, 23). Petitioner brought a personal injury action for negligence against the liable third party and driver, Kenneth Knowles, in Palm Beach County, Florida. Kenneth Knowles had bodily injury coverage with Allstate Insurance Company in the amount of $15,000.00. Knowles paid an additional $50,000.00 out of his pocket resulting in a gross settlement of $65,000.00 for the personal injury claim brought by Savain.4/ (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 3). Following resolution of Petitioner’s personal injury action, her counsel advised the Agency of the settlement through correspondence dated April 10, 2017. Counsel explained to the Agency that Savain would not be recovering the full value of her damages and requested that Respondent accept a reduced amount in full satisfaction of its Medicaid lien. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 6). Respondent replied to Petitioner’s counsel in writing on June 22, 2017, and stated that Medicaid would not accept any reduction from the full lien amount of $10,652.23. (JPHS p. 6, ¶ 8). There was no evidence that the Agency participated in, approved of, or was consulted concerning Petitioner’s settlement with Kenneth Knowles. In addition to the Medicaid lien, Petitioner had total medical bills of $182,660.42, and has outstanding bills and liens (excluding Respondent’s Medicaid lien) totaling $38,899.51. Accordingly, Petitioner’s total outstanding past medical expenses, including the Agency’s Medicaid lien is $49,551.74. (JPHS p. 6, ¶ 7). Both parties stipulated that the application of the formula at section 409.910(11)(f) to Petitioner’s $65,000.00 settlement requires payment to the Agency in the amount of $10,652.23 in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien. (JPHS p. 5, ¶ 5). There was no evidence presented to prove or suggest that the Agency provided a lesser amount of medical assistance than the $10,652.23 it asserted it had expended. Further, there was no evidence presented to prove what portion of the $65,000.00 settlement was allocated by Petitioner and Kenneth Knowles to her past medical expenses.5/ The affidavit of Attorney Eric Morales, proffered by Petitioner, opined that the "value" of Petitioner’s claim was between $550,000.00 and $750,000.00. (Pet. Ex. 24). These figures supposedly represent the total sum of Petitioner’s range of damages. Morales was of the opinion that the settlement reached by Petitioner represented five percent, on the high end, and 3.6 percent, on the low end, of the actual value of her claim.6/ The undersigned finds and concludes that the affidavit is an out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of the matters asserted in it. It does not supplement or explain other admissible evidence, and Petitioner has advanced no case authority or exception to the hearsay rule which would permit its use or consideration by the undersigned. Morales’s affidavit is classic hearsay. See Fortune v. Fortune, 61 So. 3d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); and B.C.S., S.R.L. v. Wise, 910 So. 2d 871, 874 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). As such, it cannot be considered or used by the undersigned to establish or support any findings of fact in this case and is stricken from consideration or use by the undersigned. Petitioner, therefore, did not present any admissible evidence to support a finding of the actual value of her personal injury claim or to support the "pro-rata" or "proportionality" formula she advanced through her counsel’s arguments.7/ To reiterate, there was no evidence presented by Petitioner to prove that (1) a lesser portion of the total recovery should be allocated as reimbursement for past medical expenses than the amount calculated by the Agency, or (2) that Medicaid provided a lesser amount of medical assistance than the $10,652.23 asserted by the Agency.
The Issue The issue in this case is the amount of the Petitioners' personal injury settlement required to be paid to the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to satisfy its Medicaid lien under section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners are the grandparents and legal guardians of Taya Rose Savasuk-Maldonado, who is 11 years old. On October 2, 2010, Taya and six family members were involved in a horrific car crash. The driver of another car (the tortfeasor) failed to stop at an intersection and slammed into the family van, which rolled over, ejecting three passengers, including Taya and her great-grandparents. The great- grandparents died on the pavement next to Taya, and Taya suffered severe injuries, including a skull fracture, pancreatitis, bleeding in her abdomen, and severe road rash that required multiple skin graft surgeries and dressing changes so painful that anesthesia was required. Taya has significant, permanent scarring, which has left her self-conscious and unwilling to wear any clothing that exposes her scars, including bathing suits and some shorts. Taya's emotional injuries include nightmares and grief over the loss of both great-grandparents. Other family members also suffered injuries. Taya required emergency and subsequent medical care that has totaled $257,567 to date. It is not clear from the evidence how much, if any, of that total was reduced when providers accepted Medicaid. Future medical expenses are anticipated, but there was no evidence as to the amount of future medical expenses. The tortfeasor had a $100,000/$300,000 Hartford insurance liability policy on the car he was driving at the time of the accident. Hartford agreed to pay the policy limits. The injured family members agreed that $200,000 of the policy limits should be paid to Taya. On October 14, 2013, Hartford and the Petitioners agreed that the Petitioners would release Hartford, the tortfeasor and his wife (the other owner of the car) in return for payment of $200,000 to be held in trust by the Petitioners' attorneys for distribution as follows: $60,000 to be paid to the Prudential Assigned Settlement Services Corporation to fund future payments to Taya beginning in year 2020; up to $84,095 to lienholders in amounts to be determined; and the balance to the Petitioners' attorneys. The parties to that agreement, which did not include AHCA, agreed that $51,513 of the $200,000 should be allocated to payment of Taya's medical bills, with the rest allocated to claims other than medical expenses. There was no evidence that anything has been paid to AHCA towards its Medicaid lien, or that anything has been paid into an interest-bearing trust account for the benefit of AHCA pending the determination of the amount of its Medicaid lien, which at the time was claimed to be $55,944. The owner of the family van involved in the accident had a $10,000/$20,000 GEICO underinsured motorist policy, which also paid the policy limits. Although the evidence was not clear, the Petitioners appear to concede that all $20,000 was recovered by them for Taya's benefit. There was no evidence as to when the family's claim against the GEICO policy settled, or as to any agreement how the $20,000 should be allocated between medical expenses and other kinds of damages. There was no evidence that any of the $20,000 was paid to AHCA towards its Medicaid lien, or into an interest-bearing trust account for the benefit of AHCA pending the determination of the amount of its Medicaid lien. In addition to the insurance policy settlements, the owners of the other car paid the family approximately $250,000 from their own assets, which the family members agreed to apportion among themselves in a manner that was not disclosed by the evidence. There was no evidence as to when those funds were paid to the family, or when any of those funds was paid to Taya's benefit, if any. The evidence was not clear whether any of those funds was paid towards Taya's medical expenses that were not paid by Medicaid. The evidence suggested that some of the $250,000 was paid towards Taya's medical expenses to date, but it is possible that some of those expenses were reduced when providers accepted Medicaid. There was no evidence that any of those funds was paid to AHCA towards its Medicaid lien claim, or into an interest-bearing trust account for the benefit of AHCA, pending a determination of the amount of its Medicaid lien. A personal injury lawyer, who also was Taya's guardian ad litem, testified that the value Taya's claims against the owners of the other car was approximately $1.4 to $1.8 million. He did not testify as to the amount future medical expenses would contribute to the total value he estimated. AHCA has paid $55,710.98 in Medicaid benefits to treat Taya for her accident injuries. (The Petitioners stipulated to this amount.) Lee Memorial Hospital provided medical services for Taya and claims that it is owed $38,317.05, for which it appears to claim a statutory lien. The evidence was that Lee Memorial refused to accept Medicaid in payment for those services. If Medicaid were accepted, the amount of AHCA's lien would be more than $55,710.98, but probably not $38,317.05 more.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration's ("AHCA" or "the agency") Medicaid lien of $267,072.91 should be reimbursed in full from the $1 million settlement recovered by Petitioner or whether Petitioner proved that a lesser amount should be paid under section 409.910(17)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulation between the parties (paragraphs 1 through 13 below), the evidence presented, and the record as a whole, the undersigned makes the following Findings of Fact: On January 13, 2016, Mr. Jay Hosek was operating his 1999 Chevy Trailblazer northbound on U.S. Highway 1, near mile marker 56, in Monroe County. At that same time and place, his vehicle was struck by a southbound tractor trailer. Hosek suffered catastrophic physical injuries, including permanent brain damage. Hosek is now unable to walk, stand, eat, toilet, or care for himself in any manner. Hosek's medical care related to the injury was paid by Medicaid, Medicare, and United Healthcare ("UHC"). Medicaid provided $267,072.91 in benefits, Medicare provided $93,952.97 in benefits and UHC provided $65,778.54 in benefits. Accordingly, Hosek's entire claim for past medical expenses was in the amount of $426,804.42. Jirina Hosek was appointed Hosek's legal guardian. As legal guardian, Jirina Hosek brought a personal injury lawsuit against the driver and owner of the tractor trailer that struck Hosek ("defendants") to recover all of Hosek's damages associated with his injuries. The defendants maintained only a $1 million insurance policy and had no other collectable assets. Hosek's personal injury action against the defendants was settled for the available insurance policy limits, resulting in a lump sum unallocated settlement of $1 million. Due to Hosek's incompetence, court approval of the settlement was required and the court approved the settlement by Order of October 5, 2018. During the pendency of Hosek's personal injury action, AHCA was notified of the action and AHCA asserted a $267,072.91 Medicaid lien against Hosek's cause of action and settlement of that action. AHCA did not commence a civil action to enforce its rights under section 409.910 or intervene or join in Hosek's action against the defendants. By letter, AHCA was notified of Hosek's settlement. AHCA has not filed a motion to set aside, void, or otherwise dispute Hosek's settlement. The Medicaid program through AHCA spent $267,072.91 on behalf of Hosek, all of which represents expenditures paid for Hosek's past medical expenses. Application of the formula at section 409.910(11)(f) to Hosek's $1 million settlement requires payment to AHCA of the full $267,072.91 Medicaid lien. Petitioner has deposited AHCA's full Medicaid lien amount in an interest-bearing account for the benefit of AHCA pending an administrative determination of AHCA's rights, and this constitutes "final agency action" for purposes of chapter 120, Florida Statutes, pursuant to section 409.910(17). While driving his vehicle northbound, Hosek drifted into oncoming traffic, crossed over the center line, and struck a southbound vehicle in its lane head on. Petitioner had an indisputable and extremely high degree of comparative negligence in causing this tragic vehicle accident. Petitioner presented the testimony of Brett Rosen ("Rosen"), Esquire, a Florida attorney with 12 years' experience in personal injury law. His practice includes catastrophic and wrongful death cases. Rosen is board-certified in civil trial by the Florida Bar. He is a member of several trial attorney associations. Rosen represented Hosek and his family in the personal injury case. As a routine part of his practice, Rosen makes assessments regarding the value of damages his injured client(s) suffered. He stays abreast of personal injury jury verdicts by reviewing jury verdict reports and searching verdicts on Westlaw. Rosen regularly reads the Daily Business Review containing local verdicts and subscribes to the "Law 360," which allows him to review verdicts throughout the country. Rosen was accepted by the undersigned as an expert in the valuation of damages in personal injury cases, without objection by the agency. Rosen testified that Hosek's case was a difficult case for his client from a liability perspective, since all the witnesses blamed Hosek for the crash and the police report was not favorable to him. In his professional opinion, had Hosek gone to trial, the jury could have attributed a substantial amount of comparative negligence to him based upon the facts of the case. There was also a high possibility that Hosek might not receive any money at all, since Hosek's comparative negligence in the accident was very high. Rosen explained the seriousness of Hosek's injuries, stating that Hosek may have fallen asleep while driving and his car veered over and crossed the centerline. It hit an oncoming commercial truck, which caused his vehicle to flip resulting in severe injuries to him. Rosen testified that Hosek is unable to communicate since he received catastrophic brain injury from the accident and is unable to care for himself. Rosen provided an opinion concerning the value of Hosek's damages. He testified that the case was worth $10 million, and that this amount is a very conservative valuation of Hosek's personal injuries. He also generalized that based on his training and experience, Hosek's damages could range anywhere from $10 to $30 million at trial. He testified that Hosek would need future medical care for the rest of his life. This future medical care has a significant value ranging from $15 to $25 million.1/ Rosen testified that he reviewed other cases and talked to experts in similar cases involving catastrophic injuries. After addressing various ranges of damages, Rosen clarified that the present value of Hosek's damages in this case was more than $10 million dollars. Although he did not state specific amounts, he felt that Hosek's noneconomic damages would have a significant value in addition to his economic damages.2/ Rosen believed that a jury would have returned or assigned a value to the damages of over $10 million. He testified that his valuation of the case only included the potential damages. He did not take into account Hosek's "substantial amount" of comparative negligence and liability.3/ Despite doing so in other personal injury cases, Rosen did not conduct a mock trial in an effort to better assess or determine the damages in Hosek's case. Rosen testified that Hosek sued the truck driver, Alonzo, and Alonzo's employer. He further testified that Hosek was compensated for his damages under the insurance policy carried by the truck driver and his company and settled for the policy limits of $1 million dollars representing 10 percent of the potential total value of his claim. Rosen did not obtain or use a life care plan for Hosek, nor did he consider one in determining his valuation of damages for Hosek's case. Rosen did not provide any specific numbers or valuation concerning Hosek's noneconomic damages. Instead, he provided a broad damage range that he said he "would give the jury" or "be giving them a range of $50 Million for past and future."4/ Rosen testified that he relied on several specific factors in making the valuation of Hosek's case. The most important factor for him was to determine what his client was "going through" and experience his client's "living conditions."5/ Secondly, he considers the client's medical treatment and analyzes the client's medical records. Based on these main factors, he can determine or figure out what the client's future medical care will "look like."6/ Petitioner also presented the testimony of R. Vinson Barrett ("Barrett"), Esquire, a Tallahassee trial attorney. Barrett has more than 40 years' experience in civil litigation. His practice is dedicated to plaintiff's personal injury, as well as medical malpractice and medical products liability. Barrett was previously qualified as an expert in federal court concerning the value of the wrongful death of an elderly person. This testimony was used primarily for tax purposes at that trial. Barrett has been accepted as an expert at DOAH in Medicaid lien cases in excess of 15 times and has provided testimony regarding the value of damages and the allocation of past medical expenses. Barrett has handled cases involving catastrophic brain injuries. He stays abreast of local and state jury verdicts. Barrett has also reviewed several life care plans and economic reports in catastrophic personal injury cases. He routinely makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by parties who have received personal injuries. Barrett determines the value of these damages based primarily on his experience and frequent review of jury verdicts. Barrett was accepted by the undersigned as an expert in the valuation of damages in personal injury cases, without objection by the agency.7/ Barrett testified that Hosek had a catastrophic brain injury with broken facial bones and pneumothoraxes, all sustained during an extremely violent head-on collision with a commercial truck. This assessment was based on the case exhibits and the "fairly limited medical records" he reviewed. He believed that Hosek would need extensive and expensive medical care for the rest of his life. However, no details were offered by Barrett.8/ Barrett provided an opinion concerning the value of Hosek's damages. This was based on his training and experience. Barrett did not provide a firm number for Hosek's damages. Instead, he offered a nonspecific and broad range of damages. Barrett testified that Hosek's damages "probably" have a value in the range of $25 to $50 million, and the range of Hosek's future medical care would be $10 to $20 million. However, he felt that $10 million was a "very, very, very conservative" estimate of damages, primarily because he felt that future medical expenses would be so high. Barrett stated that Hosek's economic damages would have a significant value exceeding $10 million and that Hosek's noneconomic damages would have an additional value exceeding $10 million. Barrett acknowledged that he did not consider or take into account Hosek's "huge comparative negligence" in estimating the total value of the case. Instead, he only considered the amount(s) that would be awarded for damages. He testified that Petitioner's degree of comparative negligence would reduce each element of damages he was awarded. As a result of Hosek's very significant comparative negligence, Barrett testified that a trial would have likely resulted in a "complete defense verdict" against Hosek or with only minor negligence attributed to the truck driver or his company. Barrett felt that a jury in Hosek's case would not have awarded Hosek "more than one million dollars or so." Barrett explained that in a trial for personal injuries that each element of damages awarded by the jury to the plaintiff on the verdict form is reduced by the percentage of the plaintiff's comparative negligence. Barrett also explained that when the jury verdict assigns ten percent of the negligence to the defendant and 90 percent of the negligence to the plaintiff, then the defendant is liable for paying only ten percent of each element of the damages awarded to the plaintiff. Barrett testified that he does not believe that the $1 million settlement fully compensated Hosek for his injuries and that a potential award of $10 million would be a conservative value of Hosek's claim. While both experts provided broad and nonspecific ranges for the value of Hosek's claims, they both summed up their testimony by concluding that $10 million was a very conservative estimate of Hosek's total claim. AHCA did not call any witnesses. The agency presented Exhibit 1, entitled "Provider Processing System Report." This report outlined all the hospital and medical payments that AHCA made on Hosek's behalf, totaling $267,072.91. On the issue of damages, the experts did not provide any details concerning several of Petitioner's claims, including the amount of past medical expenses, loss of earning capacity, or damages for pain and suffering. The burden was on Petitioner to provide persuasive evidence to prove that the "proportionality test" it relied on to present its challenge to the agency's lien under section 409.910(17)(b) was a reliable and competent method to establish what amount of his tort settlement recovery was fairly allocable to past medical expenses. In this case, the undersigned finds that Petitioner failed to carry this burden.9/ There was no credible evidence presented by Petitioner to prove or persuasively explain a logical correlation between the proposed total value of Petitioner's personal injury claim and the amount of the settlement agreement fairly allocable to past medical expenses. Without this proof the proportionality test was not proven to be credible or accurate in this case, and Petitioner did not carry his burden. There was a reasonable basis in the record to reject or question the evidence presented by Petitioner's experts. Their testimony was sufficiently contradicted and impeached during cross-examination and other questioning. Even if the experts' testimony had not been contradicted, the "proportionality test" proposed by Petitioner was not proven to be a reliable or accurate method to carry Petitioner's burden under section 409.910(17)(b). To reiterate, there was no persuasive evidence presented by Petitioner to prove that (1) a lesser portion of the total recovery should be allocated as reimbursement for past medical expenses than the amount calculated by the agency, or (2) that Medicaid provided a lesser amount of medical assistance than that asserted by the agency.
The Issue The issue to be determined is the amount to be reimbursed to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Respondent or AHCA), from settlement proceeds received from third parties by Petitioners, Ray A. Siewert and Rose E. Siewert, for medical expenses paid on behalf of Petitioner, Mr. Siewert.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Findings of Fact On October 15, 2017, the Siewerts were involved in a motorcycle versus automobile crash, which required extensive hospital, skilled nursing, therapy, and other medical treatment including, but not limited to, a four- level spinal fusion procedure and rehabilitative care and services for Mr. Siewert and multiple leg surgeries for Mrs. Siewert, that ultimately led to an above-the-knee amputation (hereinafter referred to as the “auto claims”). On January 3, 2018, Mr. Siewert was discharged from a rehabilitation facility to his home, where he began receiving home health nursing, physician, and therapy services. On January 22, 2018, Mr. Siewert was diagnosed with an abscess near his surgical site, which was allegedly not properly addressed in the days that followed. On January 31, 2018, Mr. Siewert was hospitalized due to worsening neurological deficits, namely in his lower body, and he was transferred to the hospital that had performed his prior spinal surgery. On February 1, 2018, Mr. Siewert had another spinal surgery to address an abscess compressing on his spinal cord, leading to the decreased neurological function. The damage done to his spinal cord preoperatively was significant enough that he has been unable to walk since January 31, 2018, and remains bedbound to present. Mr. Siewert has a neurogenic bladder/bowel, wears diapers, has to be catheterized multiple times per day,1 and is unable to ambulate. To date, he is living with his wife in a single room residence at a skilled nursing facility in the Orlando area, where he is expected to remain.2 The Siewerts brought the following claims: negligence claims relating to the auto claims; nursing home neglect claims under chapter 400, Florida Statutes; and medical malpractice claims under chapter 766, Florida Statutes, each of which were pursued against several companies/entities, individuals, and healthcare providers, seeking, in part, compensable damages to the Siewerts for past bills and future economic needs as well as noneconomic mental pain and suffering and consortium claims for their injuries and losses. In April 2021, the Siewerts settled one of the medical malpractice claims for a limited confidential amount. The Siewerts have had a health plan with Aetna Better Health of Florida, which is a Medicaid plan through AHCA, that has retained the services of Equain relating to the settlement of part of the Siewerts’ medical malpractice claims (referred to below as “Aetna”). Aetna was properly notified of the Siewert’s medical malpractice claims against those defendants and indicated it had paid benefits related to the injuries from the incident in the amount of $75,923.82, as it relates to the settlement at issue. Through their counsel, the Siewerts have asked Aetna to accept a reduced lien amount given the other claims still pending and large 1 The evidence adduced at hearing indicates that Mr. Siewert has now been fitted with a permanent abdominal suprapubic catheter. 2 Though Mrs. Siewert could manage in an assisted living facility, Mr. Siewert could not. Thus, Mrs. Siewert has chosen to stay in the skilled nursing facility to be with her husband. total case value. Nonetheless, Aetna has continued to assert a lien, for the amount of $75,923.82, against the Siewerts’ settlement proceeds relating to the single settlement. Aetna has maintained that it is entitled to application of section 409.910’s formula to determine the lien amount. Applying the statutory reduction formula to this particular settlement would result in no reduction of this lien given the amount of the settlement. The Siewerts also have been covered by AHCA’s fee-for-service Medicaid program. AHCA has contracted with Health Management Systems and Conduent to run its recovery program. AHCA was properly notified of the Siewerts’ medical malpractice claims against those defendants. AHCA provided medical assistance benefits related to the injuries from the incident in the amount of $33,836.09. Through their counsel, the Siewerts have asked AHCA to accept a reduced lien amount. AHCA has continued to assert a lien for the amount of $33,836.09, against the Siewerts’ settlement proceeds relating to the single settlement. AHCA has maintained that it is entitled to application of section 409.910’s formula to determine the lien amount. Applying the statutory reduction formula to this particular settlement would result in no reduction of this lien given the amount of the settlement. AHCA’s $33,836.09 payment and Aetna’s $75,923.82 payment total $109,759.91, and this amount constitutes Mr. Siewert’s claim for past medical expense damages. There remain claims against numerous other defendants which also relate to the AHCA and Aetna liens at issue, including all remaining defendants in the auto and medical malpractice claims. Repayment to AHCA’s Medicaid program is prioritized by law and contract over Medicaid-managed care plans Facts Adduced at Hearing During the pendency of the medical malpractice action, AHCA was notified of the action. AHCA did not commence a civil action to enforce its rights under section 409.910, nor did it intervene or join in the medical malpractice action against the Defendants. AHCA has not filed a motion to set aside, void, or otherwise dispute the settlement. The Medicaid program, through AHCA, spent $33,836.09 on behalf of Mr. Siewert, all of which represents expenditures paid for past medical expenses. No portion of the $33,836.09 paid by AHCA through the Medicaid program on behalf of Mr. Siewert represented expenditures for future medical expenses. The $33,836.09 in Medicaid funds paid by AHCA is the maximum amount that may be recovered by AHCA. There was no evidence of the taxable costs incurred in securing the settlement. Application of the formula at section 409.910(11)(f) to the settlement requires payment to AHCA of the full $33,836.09 Medicaid lien asserted by AHCA, and the full $75,923.82 Medicaid lien asserted by Aetna. Petitioners have deposited the full Medicaid lien amount in an interest-bearing account for the benefit of AHCA pending an administrative determination of AHCA’s rights, and this constitutes “final agency action” for purposes of chapter 120, Florida Statutes, pursuant to section 409.910(17). There was no suggestion that the monetary figure agreed upon by the parties represented anything other than a reasonable settlement. The evidence firmly established that Mr. Siewert incurred economic damages, consisting of lost future earnings, past medical expenses, and future medical expenses. Mr. Gilbert and Mr. Marx testified that those economic damages totaled roughly $2,000,000. However, the economic loss analysis upon which their testimony was based showed a total of $1,770,775 in future life care needs for Mr. Siewert, reduced to present value.3 The only direct evidence of past medical expenses was the $109,759.91 in Medicaid expenditures. There was no evidence of other economic damages. Thus, the evidence established that economic damages total $1,880,534.90. The total amount of damages for Mr. Siewert was calculated to be $10,000,000, which was described as a conservative figure based on the knowledge and experience of Mr. Gilbert and Mr. Marx, and based on an analysis of representative jury verdicts involving comparable facts and damages. However, Mr. Gilbert engaged in a more detailed analysis of Mr. Siewert’s non-economic damages, which requires review. Although comparable jury verdicts suggest that it could be considerably more, Mr. Gilbert testified that his calculation, though subjective, would include $3,000,000 in non-economic damages in the past three years, and an additional $4,000,000 in non-economic damages into the future based upon a projected 12-year life expectancy, for a total amount of non-economic damages of $7,000,000. That figure was accepted by both of the testifying experts. As part of Petitioners’ calculation of the total value of the claim was $1,000,000 in loss-of-consortium damages incurred by Mrs. Siewert. Although the loss of consortium technically applies to the loss of the full marital relationship previously enjoyed by Mrs. Siewert, who is not the Medicaid recipient, that value was included as an element of the claim and settlement. Based on the forgoing, the evidence supports, and it is found that $9,880,534.90, as a full measure of Petitioners’ combined damages, is a conservative and appropriate figure against which to calculate any lesser 3 Respondent objected to the life care plan on the basis of hearsay. However, the plan was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Mr. Siewert would be expected to incur $1,770,775 for future care, but was offered as evidence of the more general value of a claim in litigation. Furthermore, the life care plan, even if inadmissible, could be used as support of an expert opinion as to claim valuation “when those underlying facts are of a type relied upon by experts in the subject to support the opinions expressed.” Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 704.1 (2020 Edition). A life care plan is evidence that, for that purpose, would “be sufficiently trustworthy to make the reliance reasonable.” Id. portion of the total recovery that should be allocated as reimbursement for the Medicaid lien for past medical expenses. The full value of the settlement is 5.06 percent of the $9,880,534.90 value of the claim.
