The Issue The issues for determination in this case are: 1) whether the Respondent’s decision to award a contract to operate a juvenile work release halfway house program to the Henry and Rilla White Foundation was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious; and 2) whether the award of the contract is void as a matter of law because of procedural violations by the selection committee and the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, JUVENILE SERVICES PROGRAM, INC. (JSP), is a Florida-based private not-for-profit corporation which was founded to serve troubled youths and their families. Respondent, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (DJJ), is the agency of the State of Florida with the statutory authorization for planning, coordinating, and managing programs for the delivery of services within the juvenile justice consortium. Section 20.316, Florida Statutes. RFP #16P05 On September 27, 1996, Respondent DJJ advertised and released a Request For Proposal (RFP) #16P05 to provide a Work Release Halfway House for Delinquent Males in District IX, serving Palm Beach County, Florida. In response to the RFP, four bids were submitted to DJJ by the following parties: the Henry and Rilla White Foundation, Total Recovery, Inc., Psychotherapeutic Services Inc., and Petitioner JSP. The DJJ bid selection committee of evaluators for the RFP were Jack Ahern, Steve Brown, Jaque Layne, Patricia Thomas, and from the Office of Budget Finance, Fred Michael Mauterer. The contract manager for the RFP was Diane Rosenfelder. On October 28, 1996, each DJJ evaluator was sent a package consisting of a copy of the RFP, which included the evaluation sheet, a copy of each proposal submitted to DJJ, a conflict of interest questionnaire, a certificate of compliance, a description of the proposal selection process, and instructions. Each package sent to the evaluators had a different colored cover sheet which identified the specific evaluator. After completing the evaluations, each evaluator returned the signed conflict of interest forms, and certificates of compliance to Diane Rosenfelder. The evaluations were identified by the color of the cover sheets, as well as the signed conflict of interest forms and certificates of compliance. DJJ initially intended to provide each evaluator with an Award Preference Form which were to be used in the event the final evaluation scores were very close. The Award Preference Forms, however, were inadvertently omitted from the packages sent to the evaluators. The evaluation process resulted in the Henry and Rilla White Foundation receiving the highest average score of 391.50 points. Petitioner JSP received the second highest average score of 360.50 points. The award of points was determined by each evaluator which is indicated by the evaluator checking the box on Section 5 of the evaluation sheet, or by filling in the appropriate point score. The contract manager, Diane Rosenfelder, corrected addition errors on the scoring sheets. The budget part of the evaluation was completed by Fred Michael Mauterer, Senior Management Analyst Supervisor. In accordance with the evaluation scores, DJJ determined that the best response was submitted by the Henry and Rilla White Foundation which was awarded the contract. On November 8, 1996, Petitioner JSP filed a timely Notice of Protest of the award, which was supplemented on December 9, 1996 with the required posting of a $5000 bond. Alleged Errors and Discrepancies in the Evaluation Process Petitioner JSP alleges that several errors in the evaluation process require that the contract award to the Henry and Rilla White Foundation be set aside and that the RFP be reissued and rebid. Petitioner first alleges that the bid selection committee failed to follow the certain instructions during the evaluation process. The instructions were prepared by the contract manager Diane Rosenfelder. The instructions were not required by rule or policy of DJJ. The contract manager considered the instructions advisory in nature. The instructions stated that the members of the bid selection committee should not contact each other with respect to the proposals under evaluation. The evaluators, however, were permitted to contact the contract manager who would record all questions and answers. There were instances in which the contract manager did not record questions from the evaluators to the contract manager. There is no evidence that the evaluators contacted each other regarding the proposals during the evaluation process. The instructions asked the evaluators to explain high or low scores given to the proposals under consideration. None of the evaluators made specific explanations of high or low scores. The contract manager who prepared the instructions considered this instruction discretionary, and there is no evidence that any score given by an individual evaluator was without basis. The evaluators were instructed to provide page numbers from the proposals used to score each item. None of the evaluators complied with this instruction. As indicated above, however, there is no evidence that the actual scores give by the evaluators were without basis. As set forth above, none of the evaluators received the Award Preference Form. This form was to be used in the case of very close scoring of the proposals. The actual scores from the bid selection committee reflected a clear preference for the proposal submitted by the Henry and Rilla White Foundation. Accordingly, there was no demonstrated need for DJJ to rely upon the Award Preference Forms in making its decision to award the contract. The letter of introduction sent to the bid selection committee members from the contract manager stated that the proposal score sheets and the evaluators award preference and the best interest of the district would be considered in determining the award. The contract manager considered this statement advisory in nature. DJJ has not promulgated specific standards relating to the best interest of District IX; however, the proposal evaluation forms sent to the bid selection committee inherently include criteria setting out standards for the determination of the best proposal for the district. The evidence reflects that one of the evaluators, Patricia Thomas, erroneously checked the box on each proposal which gave each of the proposals fifty points as certified minority enterprises, and erroneously wrote “50” as a point count on one evaluation score sheet. None of the proposals included a copy of the certification for minority enterprise as required by Section 287.0945, Florida Statutes, and the contract manager recognized that the evaluator had made a mistake in this regard. In response to this error, the contract manager consulted her supervisors. Because each proposal was awarded the same points, DJJ did not consider the evaluator’s error as prejudicial to any proposal or to the bid selection process, and did reject the evaluator’s scoring of the proposals. There is no showing that Petitioner JPS was prejudiced by DJJ’s decision in this regard. The contract manager added signature lines to the last page of the evaluation sheets. Some of the sheets were returned unsigned from the evaluators. There is no DJJ requirement that the evaluation sheets specifically contain the signatures of the evaluators. The contract manager did not consider the signature page mandatory, and the evaluation proposal score sheets were clearly identified by both color coding and the certificates of conflict signed by the evaluators. There is no evidence that the procedural discrepancies affected the substance of the evaluator’s scoring of the proposals, nor did the procedural discrepancies prejudice the evaluators’ consideration of Petitioner’s proposal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a final order upholding the proposed agency action to award the contract to the Henry and Rilla White Foundation, and dismissing the Petition filed in this case. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. RICHARD HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Dominic E. Amadio, Esquire Republic Bank Building, Suite 305 100 34th Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 Scott C. Wright, Assistant General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
Findings Of Fact During the tomato growing season involved in this case (November 1982) Max Frosteg, Respondent, was salesman for Isom, Petitioner, under the terms and conditions of the contract admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. The tomatoes were grown by Isom and sent to the packing house where Frosteg's agent, Boyd, acted as salesman for the grower. Boyd contacted various buyers and obtained prices for tomatoes of specified grade at destination and took orders for these tomatoes. The tomatoes were shipped from the packing house and, upon arrival at destination, the buyer did not always pay the invoice price. It is the difference in invoice price and price paid by the buyer that is here in dispute. The contract (Exhibit 1) authorized the salesman to make adjustments in the price that may be necessary, to assign the contract, or use price arrivals in selling the product. The duty of the salesman is to get the best price possible for the grower. The contract further provided, and it is customary in the business, that the salesman apprise the grower of all situations where the buyer fails to pay the invoice price because of alleged grade discrepancies in the product or for any other reason. This gives the grower the option of requesting an inspection of the product at destination to determine if the product, in fact, meets or does not meet specifications; and the option of refusing the offering price if the product does not meet specifications. On the invoices here in question the salesman accepted less than invoice price for the tomatoes but failed to notify the grower and give the grower the option of accepting or refusing the lower price. The money paid for the tomatoes was forwarded to Frosteg, who remitted to Isom his portion of the money received. The amount received by Isom was $9,529.43 less than Isom would have received if the invoice price had been paid for the tomatoes. By failing to notify the grower that he was accepting a less-than- invoice price, the salesman, Boyd, breached his duty to the grower, Isom. No inspection reports were submitted to show that the tomatoes shipped met specifications for the classification shown on the invoices and no inspection reports were submitted to show that the tomatoes failed to meet said invoice specifications at destination. Since neither party was represented by an attorney at this hearing, available evidence may not have been submitted.
The Issue Whether Ketura Bouie suffers from “retardation”, as that term is defined by Section 393.063(43), Florida Statutes, and therefore qualifies for developmental services offered by the Respondent agency under Chapter 393, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ketura Bouie is 15 years old. She currently resides in Tallahassee, Florida. She is enrolled in a new school after transferring from Chatahoochee. Ketura has had several “social” promotions from grade to grade over the years. Her application for developmental services has been denied by the Respondent agency. Wallace Kennedy, Ph.D., is a Board-certified and Florida-licensed clinical psychologist. He was accepted as an expert in clinical psychology and the testing of children. He conducted a psychological evaluation of Ketura on April 12, 1995, for which he has provided a written narrative dated April 13, 1995. His narrative was admitted in evidence. Ketura was 13 years old at the time of Dr. Kennedy’s evaluation. He administered three standardized tests which are recognized and accepted for determining applicants’ eligibility for developmental services. These tests were: a wide range achievement test, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children— Revised (WISC-R), and Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale. (Vineland) The wide range achievement test generally measures literacy. Ketura recognized only half of the upper-case letters of the alphabet and only a few three-letter kindergarten words. Her results indicated that she has the achievement level expected of a five and a half year old kindergarten student, even though she was then placed in the seventh grade. In Dr. Kennedy's view, there is "no chance Ketura will become functionally literate". The WISC-R measures intellectual functioning and academic aptitude without penalizing the child for handicaps. The mean score on this test is 100. To score two or more deviations from this mean, a subject must score 70 or below. All of Ketura’s WISC-R scores on the test administered by Dr. Kennedy in April 1995 were well below 70. They consisted of a verbal score of 46, a performance score of 46, and a full scale score of 40. Ketura’s full scale IQ of 40 is in the lowest tenth of the first percentile and represents a low moderate level of mental retardation. Ketura’s full scale score of 40 is the lowest result that WISC-R can measure. The Vineland measures communication, daily living skills, and socialization. Ketura’s composite score for Dr. Kennedy on the Vineland was 42. In conducting the Vineland test, Dr. Kennedy relied on information obtained through his own observation of Ketura and information obtained from Ketura’s mother. It is typical in the field of clinical psychology to rely on information supplied by parents and caregivers, provided they are determined to be reliable observers. Dr. Kennedy assessed Ketura’s mother to be a reliable observer. Dr. Kennedy’s Vineland test revealed that Ketura has a social maturity level of about six years of age. Her verbal and written communication skills are poor. Ketura has poor judgment regarding her personal safety. She cannot consistently remember to use a seatbelt and cannot safely use a knife. She has poor domestic skills. She has no concept of money or of dates. She does not help with the laundry or any other household task. She cannot use the phone. Ketura’s socialization skills are also poor. She does not have basic social manners. Her table manners and social interactive skills are poor. She has no friends, and at the time of Dr. Kennedy’s evaluation, she was unhappy due to classmates making fun of her for being unable to recite the alphabet. Dr. Kennedy rendered an ultimate diagnosis of moderate mental retardation and opined that Ketura's retardation is permanent. Although Dr. Kennedy observed that Ketura was experiencing low levels of depression and anxiety during his April 1995 tests and interview, he did not make a clinical psychological diagnosis to that effect. He attributed these emotional components to Ketura’s lack of confidence in being able to perform the tasks required during testing. In his opinion, Ketura did not have any behavioral or emotional problems which interfered with the reliability of the tests he administered. Also, there were no other conditions surrounding his evaluation which interfered with the validity or reliability of the test scores, his evaluation, or his determination that Ketura suffers from a degree of retardation which would qualify her for developmental services. In Dr. Kennedy’s expert opinion, even if all of Ketura's depression and anxiety were eliminated during testing, her WISC-R scores would not have placed her above the retarded range in April 1995. The retardation range for qualifying for developmental services is 68 or below. Ketura’s I.Q. was tested several times between 1990 and April 1995 with resulting full scale scores ranging from 40 to All or some of these tests and/or reports on the 1990 - 1995 tests were submitted to the agency with Ketura’s application for developmental services. Also included with Ketura’s application to the agency were mental health reports documenting depression, a recognized mental disorder. The most recent of these was one done as recently as May of 1996. However, none of these reports were offered or admitted in evidence at formal hearing. Respondent’s sole witness and agency representative, was Ms. JoAnne Braun. She is an agency Human Service Counselor III. Ms. Braun is not a Florida-licensed psychologist and she was not tendered as an expert witness in any field. As part of the application process, she visited with Ketura and her mother in their home. She also reviewed Petitioner’s application and mental health records described above. She reviewed the fluctuating psychological test scores beginning in 1990, one of which placed Ketura at 70 and another of which placed her at 74 on a scale of 100. Ms. Braun also reviewed a March 1995 psychological testing series that showed Ketura had a verbal 50, performance 60, and full scale 62 on the WISC-R test, one month before Dr. Kennedy’s April 1995 evaluation described above. However, none of these items which she reviewed was offered or admitted in evidence. The agency has guidelines for assessing eligibility for developmental services. The guidelines were not offered or admitted in evidence. Ms. Braun interpreted the agency's guidelines as requiring her to eliminate the mental health aspect if she felt it could depress Ketura's standard test scores. Because Ms. Braun "could not be sure that the mental health situation did not depress her scores," and because the fluctuation of Ketura’s test scores over the years caused Ms. Braun to think that Ketura’s retardation might not “reasonably be expected to continue indefinitely”, as required by the controlling statute, she opined that Ketura was not eligible for developmental services. Dr. Kennedy's assessment and expert psychological opinion was that if Ketura's scores were once higher and she now tests with lower scores, it might be the result of better testing today; it might be due to what had been required and observed of her during prior school testing situations; it might even be because she was in a particularly good mood on the one day she scored 70 or 74, but his current testing clearly shows she will never again do significantly better on standard tests than she did in April 1995. In his education, training, and experience, it is usual for test scores to deteriorate due to a retarded person's difficulties in learning as that person matures. I do not consider Ms. Braun’s opinion, though in evidence, as sufficient to rebut the expert opinion of Dr. Kennedy. This is particularly so since the items she relied upon are not in evidence and are not the sort of hearsay which may be relied upon for making findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.58(1)(a), Florida Statutes. See, Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Unemployment Appeals Commission and Robert Stack, 654 So.2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); and Tenbroeck v. Castor, 640 So.2d 164, (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Particularly, there is no evidence that the "guidelines" (also not in evidence) she relied upon have any statutory or rule basis. Therefore, the only test scores and psychological evaluation upon which the undersigned can rely in this de novo proceeding are those of Dr. Kennedy. However, I do accept as binding on the agency Ms. Braun’s credible testimony that the agency does not find that the presence of a mental disorder in and of itself precludes an applicant, such as Ketura, from qualifying to receive developmental services; that Ketura is qualified to receive agency services under another program for alcohol, drug, and mental health problems which Ketura also may have; and that Ketura’s eligibility under that program and under the developmental services program, if she qualifies for both, are not mutually exclusive.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families issue a Final Order awarding Ketura Bouie appropriate developmental services for so long as she qualifies under the statute.RECOMMENDED this 24th day of February, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran General Counsel Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Marla Ruth Butler Qualified Representative Children's Advocacy Center Florida State University Tallahassee, FL 32302-0287 Marian Alves, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 100A Tallahassee, FL 32399-2949
The Issue Whether the Rule 12A-1.57 (3), Florida Administrative Code, should be invalidated as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact This case is here presented on the petition of Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., which prays for the determination of the invalidity of an existing rule of the Florida Administrative Code. That rule is Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code. The petition to challenge the rule was filed on May 17, 1979, and in keeping with the provisions of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings entered an Order of Assignment on May 23, 1979, which designated Charles C. Adams as the Hearing Officer to consider this rules challenge. By prior agreement, which is set out in detail in the introductory portion of this Order, the case is presented on the record created in the companion case of State of Florida, Department of Revenue, Petitioner, vs. Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., Respondent, DOAH. Case No. 79-247, and memoranda directed to the rules challenge claim. The pertinent provisions of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, by which this rules challenge is made is that provision found in Subsection 120.56(1), Florida Statutes, which states: Administrative determination of rule by hearing officer Any person substantially affected by a rule may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule on the ground that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Under the language of that subsection of law, the threshold question to be determined in this matter concerns the standing of the Petitioner to bring this claim. Petitioner's standing is assured in view of the fact that through the companion case, DOAH. 79-247, the Respondent in the present dispute has utilized Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, as its basis for claiming tax in the amount of $10,176.18, plus 5 percent penalty and interest accrued thereon. Therefore, the Petitioner in this cause is substantially affected by the subject rule and has the necessary standing to attack the validity of that rule on the grounds that the rule is allegedly an invalid exercise of delegated authority. The language of Rule 12A-1.57 (3), Florida Administrative Code, is as follows: 12A-1.57 Alcoholic and malt beverages. (3) Dealers in alcoholic and malt beverages are required to remit the actual tax collected to the State. In some instances, however, it may be impractical for such dealers to separately record the sales price of the beverage and the tax collected thereon. In such cases, dealers may elect to report tax on the following basis. Package stores who sell no mixed drinks should remit the tax at 4.3 percent of total receipts and dealers who sell mixed drinks or a combination of mixed drinks and packaged goods should remit the tax at the rate of 4.5 percent of total receipts. In those instances where the sales price and the tax have not been separately recorded but where it can be demonstrated that the public has been put on notice means of price lists posted prominently throughout the establishment that the total charge includes tax, the dealer may deduct the tax from the total receipts to arrive at the appropriate tax and gross sales figures using the method shown below: Total receipts divided by the tax rate gross sales. For example, a package store which sells no mixed drinks and whose total receipts are $2,000 could compute sales as follows: $2,000 divided by 1.043 percent gross sales $1,917.54 tax collected 82.46 A dealer who sells drinks or a combination of drinks and package goods and whose total receipts are $2,000 would compute sales as follows: $2,000 divided by 1.045 percent gross sales $1,913.87 tax collected 86.12 When the public has not been put on notice through the posting of price lists that tax is included in the total charge, tax shall be computed by multiplying total receipts by the applicable rates referred to in this rule. The Petitioner sets out its attack on the validity of the aforementioned rule by referring to the statutory provisions of Subsections 212.17(6) and 212.18(2), Florida Statutes. These subsections were also given as the specific authority when the subject rule was enacted. The referenced provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, indicate: 212.17(6) The department shall have the power to make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter, or other laws, or the constitution of this state, or the United States, for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and the collection of revenue hereunder, and such rules and regulations shall when enforced be deemed to be reasonable and just. 212.18(2) The department shall administer and enforce the assessment and collection of the taxes, interest, and penalties imposed by this chapter. It is authorized to make and publish such rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter, as it may deem necessary in enforcing its provisions in order that there shall not be collected on the average more than the rate levied herein. The department is authorized to and it shall provide by rule and regulation a method for accomplishing this end. It shall prepare instructions to all persons required by this chapter to collect and remit the tax to guide such persons in the proper collection and remission of such tax and to instruct such persons in the practices that may be necessary for the purpose of enforcement of this chapter and the collection of the tax imposed hereby. The use of tokens in the collection of this tax is hereby expressly forbidden and prohibited. In analyzing the language of the aforementioned provisions, the Petitioner urges that although the Respondent has the authority and obligation to make rules and regulations to implement the provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, these rules and regulations may not violate the provisions of the statute, other laws of Florida or the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Florida. When the precautionary comment of the statute is read in conjunction with Subsection 212.18(2), Florida Statutes, wherein that subsection states that rules and regulations shall be established in a fashion "in order that there shall not be collected on the average more, than the rate levied herein", the Petitioner believes there is created a prohibition against the assessment of a 4.5 percent sales tax on the sale by the Petitioner of mixed drinks and package goods, as called for by the terms of Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code. Following the Petitioner's line of reasoning, it contends that the overall statutory meaning of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, calls for the imposition of a 4 percent sales tax and to add an additional .5 percent sales tax by the utilization of Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The subject rule according to the Petitioner is a derogation of the controlling provision of Subsection 212.18(2), Florida Statutes, which does not allow tax to be collected on the average more than the rate of 4 percent, thereby causing this Petitioner to pay an additional $10,176.18, together with a 5 percent penalty and interest. In replying to the Petitioner's attack on the rule, the Respondent refers to the same Subsections 212.17(6) and 212.18(2), Florida Statutes, to support its claim of the validity of the questioned rule. The Respondent feels that the application of a 4.5 percent rate on those occasions where a dealer did not keep itemized sales receipts showing the sales price and tax separately recorded for each and every transaction, was in keeping with the proviso that, "There shall not be collected on the average more than the rate levied herein", Subsection 212.18(2), Florida Statutes, supra. The Respondent then cites sane examples of the implementation of the 4.5 percent theory by showing hypothetical known sales prices in one column, tax due on those sales prices in the second column, and the total amount of price and tax in a third column. By this formula the price total was $3.70, the tax due $.17 and the total amount of price and tax, $3.87. The Respondent then applies the 4.5 percent theory found in Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, to that amount by dividing the total receipts which includes sales price figures and the tax, by the 1.045 divisor. This gives a figure of $3.703 as the gross amount of sales, which is then subtracted from $ 3.87 total receipts, the known total of sales and tax due in the hypothetical; revealing a figure of $.167 as tax due, as contrasted with $.17 known amount of tax due in the hypothetical. To the Respondent this demonstrates that The actual tax collected exceeds the amount of speculated tax applying the 4.5 percent rule. The comparison is then taken a step further by utilizing the Petitioner's claimed rate of tax which is 4.1666667 percent (which the Petitioner in its hypothetical has reduced to 4.16667 for its hypothetical computations), and by dividing the known total receipts in the hypothetical by the figure 1.041667, the gross sales amount is $3.715. When this is subtracted from $3.87 total receipts, the amount resulting is $.155, which is less than $.17 tax due under the hypothetical and less exact than the application of the 4.5 percent formula of the rule, which gives $.167 as tax due. The Petitioner has vigorously opposed the utilization of the hypothetical and stated that its formula of 4.1666667 percent his a formula arrived at in view of its claim that all drinks are in increments of $.25 to include tax, thereby making their sales tax percentage infallible when applied to the sales which were made during the time period which is the subject of the audit in the case DOAH. 79-247 and making Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, inapplicable. It is not necessary in this case to resolve the question of the applicability of the subject rule to the Petitioner, nor to determine if the tax is due; having found that the Respondent is attempting to apply the rule to the Petitioner, the sole purpose of this Order is to comment on the validity of Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, when considered in keeping with the conditions of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Within those parameters and after considering the positions of the parties, thee Respondent is found to be correct. Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, sets the rate of sales tax at 4 percent on sale of articles of tangible personal property when sold at retail in the State of Florida. A further refinement to this general statement calling for a 4 percent sales tax is found in the provision Subsection 212.12(10), Florida Statutes, which creates a bracketing system, the effect of which has been seen in, the hypothetical offered by the, Respondent in its argument. That effect includes the possibility that the actual amount of tax will exceed 4 percent. The breakout of the bracketing provisions in Subsection 212.12, Florida Statutes, is as follows: 212.12(10) Taxes imposed by this chapter upon the privilege of the use, consumption, or storage for consumption, or sale of tangible personal property, admissions and rentals, and communication services as herein taxed shall be collected upon the basis of an addition of the tax imposed by this chapter to the total price of such admissions, rentals, communication services or sale price of such article or articles that are purchased, sold or leased at any one time by or to a customer or buyer, and the dealer, or person charged herein, is required to pay a privilege tax in the amount of the tax imposed by this chapter on the total of his gross sales of tangible personal property, admissions, and rentals, communication services and such person or dealer shall add the tax imposed by this chapter to the price, rental or admissions, and communication services and collect the total sum from the purchaser, admittee, lessee or consumer. Notwithstanding the rate of taxes imposed upon the privilege of sales, admissions and rentals, and communication services, the following brackets shall be applicable to all 4 percent taxable transactions: On single sales of less than 10 cents no tax shall be added. On single sales in amounts from 10 cents to 25 cents, both inclusive, 1 cent shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts from 26 cents to 50 cents, both inclusive, 2 cents shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts from 51 cents to 75 cents, both inclusive, 3 cents shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts from 76 cents to $1, both inclusive, 4 cents shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts of more than $1, 4 percent shall be charged upon each dollar of price, plus the above bracket charges upon any fractional part of a dollar. Consequently, Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, in its general call for a 4.5 percent tax as an option to other methods of tax computation, is consistent with the statutes, other laws of Florida and the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Florida and does not cause the collection on the average of more than the 4 percent tax levied by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. As such, it is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The Respondent has submitted Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation and to the extent that those matters are not inconsistent with this Order, they have been utilized. To the extent that those proposals by the Respondent are inconsistent with this Order, they are specifically rejected.
The Issue Validity of Petitioner's reduction in pay pursuant to Chapter 22A-2, Florida Administrative Code. These are appeals of 12 career service employees of the Department of Environmental Regulation to the Career Service Commission, pursuant to Section 110.061, Florida Statutes and Rule 22A-10.05, Florida Administrative Code. The appeals were consolidated for purposes of hearing by Prehearing Conference Order, dated July 14, 1976, by reason of similar issues of law and fact. A list of the appellants is attached hereto and this order applies to all of the cases. Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated to undisputed facts and contested issues of law. Although the Department of Administration objected to the relevancy of the facts and exhibits stipulated to in Paragraph I of the "Pretrial Stipulation", it is determined that such facts and exhibits are relevant to these proceedings and the objection is overruled. (Composite Exhibit 1) The stipulated facts and the exhibits referred to therein are as follow: Stipulation of Facts Petitioners are twelve (12) career service employees of the Department of Environmental Regulation. All have attained the requisite employment status for pursuing this action, and all jurisdictional requirements, including the proper and timely filing of appeals, have been met. This cause arises from a reduction in Petitioners' pay which resulted from actions set forth below. Petitioners seek an order increasing their pay in an amount equal to the reduction, and retroactive reimbursement of the amount of the reduction for each month from January 26, 1976, the effective date of the reduction, plus reasonable attorneys fees and expenses. The amount of reduction for each employee is set forth in Exhibit no. 1 attached hereto. In accordance with Section 4(5), Chapter 75-22, Laws of Florida, the Department of Environmental Regulation collocated their Ft. Lauderdale district office with the Water Management District located in West Palm Beach. This action resulted in the physical relocation of the DER district office from Broward to Palm Beach County, a distance of approximately 40 miles. The Ft. Lauderdale office was closed on January 26, 1976 and all employees reported for work to West Palm Beach on January 27, 1976. No change in the working status of the employees pertinent to this appeal resulted from this move. Nine of the twelve employees continue to reside in or near Ft. Lauderdale. The remaining three employees moved to West Palm Beach after the relocation (collocation) of the district office. The competitive geographical pay differential has also been known as the geographical special appointment rate (GAR). See F.S. s. 110.022 and F.A.C. s. 22A-2.04 & 2.06. This differential represented a salary adjustment for certain positions in areas where the statewide minimum salaries were not competitive with that of local government and subsequently other employers. Its purpose was to meet competition in a local area and act as an incentive to attract qualified employees to state positions. It was not a differential based on a Cost of Living study. The manner in which the petitioners' reduction in pay was calculated by Respondents was: Subtract the statewide minimum salary for the employee's class, as found in the Classification and Pay Plan issued by the Department of Administration, Division of Personnel, from the minimum salary approved for the class for Broward County, as found in the Classification and Pay Plan. This amount is then subtracted from the employee's rate of pay to determine the new rate of pay. if a competitive geographical pay differential had been approved by the Division of Personnel for the class to which the employee was being assigned in Palm Beach County, subtract the statewide minimum salary for the class from the minimum salary approved for the class for Palm Beach County, as found in the Classification and Pay Plan. The amount in (3) would then be added to the employee's rate of pay as determined in (2) above to obtain the new rate of pay. Exhibit 1 attached hereto contains the competitive geographical pay differential (GAR) for each employee as computed in the manner above. No employee's salary prior to reduction (Broward County) would have exceeded the maximum pay scale for Palm Beach County set forth in the Classification and Pay Plan as shown in Exhibit no. 2 attached hereto. The employees were advised by letter of January 8, 1976, copies of which are attached as composite Exhibit no. 3. The Department of Environmental Regulation opposed the reductions in pay of Petitioner employees as well as others not parties to this action. This opposition included a letter, attached as Exhibit no. 4, to Lt. Governor Williams requesting no reductions be made and a conference on the subject between Mr. Steven Wilkerson, Director, Division of Administration for the Department and Mr. William H. Wilder, Chief, Bureau of Classification and Pay, Division of Personnel, Department of Administration. The Ltd. Governor's response is attached as Exhibit no. 5. Competitive geographical pay differentials became a matter of concern between the Division of Personnel and the Department in September of 1975. Mr. Gene Witkowski of the Division of Personnel (DOA) referred to the memorandum of Mr. William H. Wilder of October 1972 as governing the situation. The Department requested a copy of the memorandum. Mr. Witkowski stated the opinion that the Department was bound to follow the guidelines of the October 1972 memorandum, attached as Exhibit 6. This conversation was followed by a letter attached as Exhibit no. 7 from Mr. Conley Kennison, State Personnel Director, essentially reaffirming Mr. Witkowski's remarks. On December 18, 1976, Ms. Yates requested guidance as to whether affected employees could appeal their salary reductions. That letter is attached as Exhibit no. 8. Mr. Kennison, by letter of January 5, 1976, attached as Exhibit 9, stated these reductions were not appealable. The Department processed the reduction in pay pursuant to the October 1972 memorandum of Mr. William H. Wilder. The reductions were effective January 26, 1976. The monthly reduction for each employee is shown by Exhibit no. 1. The Department of Administration objects to the relevancy of the facts and Exhibits stipulated to in this paragraph I, but does not contest the factual truth of the matters or the authenticity of the Exhibits. The Petitioners in this cause are as follows: Patricia A. Murphy was employed June 17, 1974 as Clerk Typist III. She attained permanent status December 17, 1974. She was a Clerk Typist III at the time of her pay reduction January 26, 1976. Her position remained the same after the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Faye W. Stone was employed July 17, 1974 as a Clerk Typist II. She received several promotions and was a Secretary III at the time of her pay reduction January 26, 1976. She achieved permanent status as a Secretary III. Her position remained the same after the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Ruth Seward was employed July 21, 1972 as a Secretary III. She attained permanent status January 21, 1973. She was a Secretary III at the time of her pay reduction January 26, 1976. Her position remained the same after the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Janet Bigelow was employed March 8, 1971 as a Secretary III. On September 29, 1973, she attained permanent status as an Administrative Assistant I (promotion). Her position remained the same after the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Patricia K. Galyon was employed by the state on January 11, 1971 and was transferred to the Department of Pollution Control (now DER) on January 28, 1974 as a Secretary II. At the time of her pay reduction on January 26, 1976, she had achieved permanent status as an Engineering Technician III (promotion). Her position remained the same after the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Clifford S Rohlke was employed May 21, 1974 on OPS, and then on September 6, 1974 received an original appointment as an Engineering Technician IV. At the time of his pay reduction January 26, 1976, he had achieved permanent status as an Engineering Technician IV. His position remained the same after the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Patricia Valkenaar was employed May 15, 1974. She attained permanent status as an Engineering Technician IV November 6, 1975. Her position remained the same after the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Albert W. Townsend was employed January 18, 1971 as an Engineering Technician II. He achieved permanent status as an Engineer I April l, 1975 (promotion). His position remained the same after the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Michael R. Fawley was employed October 16, 1972 as an Engineering Technician II. He was promoted to Engineering Technician III January 4, 1973, prior to attaining permanent status as an Engineering Technician II, and achieved permanent status in that class December 2, 1975. He received several promotions and was a trainee Engineer III as of January 26, 1976. His position remained the same at the time of the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. He is presently a probationary Engineer III. David J. Karsmarski was employed as a federal employee/ state assignee June 1972 in the capacity of Engineer. (GB-9 or Engineer II). He was sequently employed by the state as an Engineer III where he achieved permanent status. His position remained the same at the time of the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Julian A. Bucklin, Jr. was employed November 29, 1974 as an Engineer III. He has achieved permanent status. His position remained the same at the time of the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. Dennis M. Stotts was employed August 23, 1974 as a Pollution Control Specialist II. He requested a voluntary demotion and transfer to Chemist I, a lower position, from the Northeast region to Southeast due to marriage, and attained permanent status in that position on May 29, 1975. His position remained the same at the time of the relocation of the district office to West Palm Beach. An addendum stipulation provides as follows: "The legislative language was understood by Department of Environmental Regulation to be more than just a simple request to study collocation. It was understood to mean if practicable any Department of Environmental Regulation Office should be collocated with a Water Management District Office. The Fort Lauderdale Office was collocated for several reasons. Rent in Fort Lauderdale was $30,000 a year. Rent in the West Palm Beach Central and Southern District Office is $1.00. The Water Management District owned the building which is a multimillion dollar complex with excellent accessibility to the local airport and major transportation arteries. Collocation allowed for fewer meetings for applicants who had to travel between Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach. Greater permit coordination was achieved in terms of Chapter 403 and 373, Florida Statutes, as well as surface water management. The delegation of certain water quality responsibilities was also made possible. Since Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties have local programs the move to West Palm Beach was not considered inconvenient to Palm Beach and other counties in the northern end of the district. The Department knew in advance of collocation there might be salary problems because of the interpretation that might be placed on the GAR by the Department of Administration. In addition to Composite Exhibit 1 (Pretrial Stipulation) and the exhibits attached thereto, the following additional exhibits were received in evidence. Composite Exhibit 2 - Employment status forms Exhibit 3 - Recommendations to the Administration Commission for changes in the personnel rules and regulations. Exhibit 4 - Classification and Pay Plan, effective, July 1, 1974. Composite Exhibit 5 - Attorney's affidavits and attorney's fees. Exhibit 6 - DER Staff Legal Opinion concerning geographic pay differentials, DER, February 10, 1976.
Recommendation That the Petitioner's appeal be denied. Done and Entered this 22nd day of September, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ross A. McVoy, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2562 Executive Center Circle, E. Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 M. Stephen Turner, Esquire THOMPSON, WADSWORTH, MESSER, TURNER AND RHODES 131 N. Gadsden Street P.O. Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida Mr. Conley M. Kennison State Personnel Director Department of Administration Division of Personnel Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Division of Personnel & Retirement Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 APPENDIX LIST OF CLAIMANTS D.O.A.H. Case No. 76-962 - Patricia Galyon - Clifford S. Rohlke - Patricia Ann Murphy - Dennis Stotts - Julian Bucklin - Faye Stone - Michael R. Fawley - Ruth G. Seward - David Karsmarski - Patricia C. Valkenaar - Albert Townsend - Janet Bigelow ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA IN THE APPEAL OF: JANET C. BIGELOW, et al. against REDUCTION IN PAY DOCKET NOS. 76-16, 76-17, and 76-19 thru 76-28 by the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION Chairman Catherine W. Chapin and members Clare C. Leiby and Edwin G. Fraser participating. /
The Issue Were the procedures followed by the Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES) in evaluating the proposals for Diversity Training fraudulent, illegal or arbitrary?
Findings Of Fact In January 1994, the Department issued a request for proposals to provide diversity training. The Petitioners, Hallas and Lyca, and the Intervenor, Davis, all submitted proposals to DLES for evaluation. Intervenor, J. Davis and Associates represented by Julius Davis its principal officer, had presented proposals and bids earlier on previous Request for Proposals, and had complained informally to the Department about the procedures used which he had identified as unfair and potentially illegal. The Department posted the scores of its evaluation of the proposals and awarded the contract to New Day. Gail Hallas discovered that the scoring of the various elements of the proposals was not in accord with values established in the RFP. She also determined there were errors in the totalling of the scores in Hallas' evaluation. She brought this to the attention of Barbara Chance who was the procurement chief for the contract. Although Ms. Chance was initially incredulous, DLES determined there were errors, reevaluated the proposals and reposted the results. Hallas and Lyca both filed timely protests of the Department's conduct in evaluating the proposals and awarding the contract. The diversity training project manager was Aaron Weeks. Mr. Weeks participated in the conference held by the Department to present the RFP and answer questions. The daughter of Geraldine Thompson, the president of New Day which was awarded the contract, is or was engaged to Aaron Weeks. This relationship was made known previously to the contracting and procurement representative of DLES by Julius Davis, the Intervenor, and was the subject of articles in the local paper. Hallas also introduced a report of the Inspector General which brought this matter to the attention of the DLES. New Day included a portion of a letter from the Secretary of Labor on Department letterhead which was a testimonial about New Day's performance on prior contracts. When the evaluators reevaluated the proposals using the scale published in the RFP, the scores of evaluators Berryman and Branton differed inexplicably from their original evaluations, and were not a mathematical interpolation of the original scores. See Petitioner's Exhibit V, which is attached* and made a part of this order. *NOTE: Exhibits V is not a part of this ACCESS document but is available for review in the Division's Clerk Office. Lyca was the second lowest qualified bidder on the project. Lyca was an experienced diversity trainer and had experience in bidding for such projects. As part of its post bid process, Lyca sought certain information to which it was entitled to refine and improve its bidding/proposal process. Lyca was unable to obtain easily information generally provided to bidders. Hallas did the same thing and met with the same or similar impediments. When Lyca and Hallas sought to protest the award, they both got erroneous information from representatives of DLES and were unable to get appropriate information about filing a protest. Hallas accidently discovered the second posting and was able to timely file its protest. Ms. Carter's review of the evaluations forms of her proposal indicated that she was not a minority business enterprise. This was a scored point of evaluation. The forms did not indicate whether the evaluators had considered whether a business was a minority business enterprise. Evaluation of responses appeared to be based upon evaluation sheets and not on criteria in the RFP. There were numerous transpositions and similar arithmetic errors made by the evaluators. None of the errors inured to the benefit of the Petitioner Hallas. Lyca lost revenues and had expenses in filing the RFP. Hallas submitted a detailed proposal containing 111 pages. Her staff represented all areas of diversity, racial, gender, sexual orientation, disability and age. The RFP reflected that diversity of trainers was to be considered, however, Hallas scored lower than New Day which had only racial and gender diversity differences. The reevaluation was suppose to be conducted on the same proposals using the same criteria. Only the number of points assigned each element changed. Gail Hallas obtained copies of the evaluator's first evaluations and their reevaluations, and prepared an extract of their scores comparing the results. See Petitioner's Exhibit V, attached. This extract revealed that three of the evaluators made a mathematical conversion of their first scores to arrive at their second scores, one without error and the other two with minor errors. The evaluations of Berryman and Branton were significantly different on the reevaluation. A review of Exhibit V reveals, for example, that on the second evaluation, Branton evaluated Davis, Human X, and L.O. Wilson as having a total of 35, when Davis and Human X had 40 and L.O. Wilson had a 45 on the first evaluation. On the other hand, the scores for Hallas and Lyca remained almost identical: 27 vs. 29 and 67 vs. 67 respectively. More importantly, Branton's evaluation of Hallas on both occasions was much lower than the rating of the other evaluators (27 and 29), less than one half of score given Lyca (67) by Branton. While this may appear good for Lyca, it virtually eliminated Hallas from consideration. However, Berryman, whose scores of all the proposals were markedly lower than the other evaluators, scored Lyca as her third highest, but so low (28) as to eliminate Lyca. Only New Day received high scores from all the evaluators in both evaluations. All of the other competitors received at least one very low score, which effectively eliminated them from consideration, and the single low scores given by to Lyca and Hallas respectively by Berryman and Branton were inconsistent with their other assessments as indicated above. This technique had been used previously to insure that awards went to New Day, and had been the cause of Davis' earlier informal protest to the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED that: The subject contract not be awarded to New Day, The contract not be awarded to the next highest bidder which was Lyca because the manner in which the proposals were evaluated was tainted, and That prior to reinstituting the RFP, the process be sanitized and insulated from persons having any conflicting interests regarding this RFP and its evaluation. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1994. APPENDIX CASE NO. 94-2354BID Petitioners' proposed findings were read and considered. The following list indicated which findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Paragraphs 1 through 6 Adopted Paragraph 7 Rejected as preliminary statement. Respondent's proposed findings were read and considered. The following list indicated which findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Paragraphs 1 through 4 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lyca Associates, Inc. Lynda V. Carter, President Suite B-6 4403 Vineland Road Orlando, FL 32811 The Hallas Group Gail Hallas, Owner 6822 22nd Avenue N, Suite 329 St. Petersburg, FL 33710 Mr. Julius Davis J. Davis and Associates, Inc. Human Resources Management Consultants 2371 Sunderland Avenue, Suite 4 Wellington, Florida 33414 Edward A. Dion, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2189 and Carolyn Davis Cummings, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2189 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32308
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner sat for the October 1993 administration of the licensure examination for Metallurgical Engineering. When his examination was graded, he was assigned a raw score of 45 points. A raw score of 48 points is the minimum passing grade on the subject examination. The Respondent stipulated at hearing that the Petitioner is entitled to one additional raw score point, which brings the Petitioner's total undisputed raw score to 46. One of the essay questions on the subject examination was Item 258. According to the scoring plan for Item 258, an exam-taker could earn from 0 to 10 points in two-point increments depending on the quality of his answer. The scoring plan for Item 258 specifies that 2 points should be awarded for an answer that demonstrates "rudimentary knowledge" and that 4 points should be awarded for an answer that demonstrates "more than rudimentary knowledge but [is] insufficient to demonstrate competence." When the Petitioner's examination was graded the first time, he was awarded 0 points for his answer to Item 258. When the Petitioner's examination was regraded, he was awarded 2 points for his answer to Item 258. 1/ The evidence at hearing establishes that the Petitioner's answer to Item 258 demonstrates more than rudimentary knowledge, but is insufficient to demonstrate competence. 2/ Accordingly, pursuant to the scoring plan for Item 258 the Petitioner is entitled to receive 4 points for his answer to Item 258.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case concluding that the Petitioner is entitled to a raw score of 48 points on the subject examination, which is a passing grade. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March 1995.
The Issue Whether Respondent Department of Revenue’s (Department) January 27, 2020, Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner B Century 21, Inc. (B Century 21) is incorrect.
Findings Of Fact Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida’s sales and use tax laws, pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. B Century 21 is a Florida S-Corporation that operates two liquor stores (Al’s Liquor and Arlington Liquor), as well as a bar (Overtime Sports Bar), in Jacksonville, Florida. Mr. Altheeb is the sole owner of B Century 21 and testified that he is solely responsible for the operation of it, including the two liquor stores and bar. With respect to the operation of B Century 21, Mr. Altheeb testified, “I do all the paperwork, all the books, all the taxes. I do all the orders.” Matters Deemed Admitted and Conclusively Established2 B Century 21 received correspondence from the Department, dated August 20, 2019. That correspondence, from Ms. Pitre, stated, in part, “I will be conducting an examination of your books and records as authorized under Section 213.34, Florida Statutes.” B Century 21 received the Department’s form DR840, Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, dated August 20, 2019, including the Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist. The form DR-840 indicated that the Department intended to audit B Century 21 for a tax compliance audit for the period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2019. The Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist listed a number of categories of documents the Department intended to review as part of this audit. B Century 21 (through its accountant, power of attorney, and qualified representative, Mr. Isaac) received the Department’s October 30, 2019, correspondence, which referenced the “Audit Scope and Audit Commencement,” and an attached Records Request list. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received an email, dated October 30, 2019, from Ms. Pitre. That email references an attached Audit Commencement Letter. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received an email, dated November 12, 2019, from Ms. Pitre, which inquired of “the status of the records requested during the meeting with you and Mr. Altheeb on October 29, 2019.” B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received the Department’s Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, form DR-1215, dated December 16, 2019. The form DR-1215 reflects a total amount of tax of $170,232.93, a penalty of $42,558.24, and interest through December 16, 2019, of $25,461.86, for a total deficiency of $238,253.04. The form DR-1215 also reflects that if B Century 2 See Order Granting Motion Declaring Matters Admitted and Setting Discovery Deadline. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.370(b). 21 did not agree with these audit changes, or only agreed with a portion, that it had until January 15, 2020, to request a conference or submit a written request for an extension. Further, the form DR-1215 attached a Notice of Taxpayer Rights, which included additional detail on the options available to B Century 21. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received correspondence from Ms. Pitre, dated December 16, 2019, which stated that as of the date of the correspondence, the Department had not received the information previously requested on October 13, 2019, which it needed to complete the audit. The correspondence stated that B Century 21 had 30 days to review the audit changes, provided contact information to B Century 21 if it wished to discuss the findings in the form DR-1215, and noted that if the Department did not hear from B Century 21 within 30 days, it would send the audit file to the Department’s headquarters in Tallahassee, Florida. B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac) received the Department’s Notice of Proposed Assessment, form DR-831, dated January 27, 2020. The form DR- 831 reflects a total amount of tax of $170,232.93, a penalty of $42,558.24, and interest through January 27, 2020, of $27,224.82, for a total deficiency of $240,016.00. For the time period between August 20, 2019, and January 7, 2021, B Century 21 did not provide the Department with: (a) any sales records; (b) any purchase records; or (c) any federal tax returns. For the time period between August 20, 2019, and January 7, 2021, B Century 21 did not provide any records to the Department for examination in conducting the audit. Additional Facts In 2011, for the purpose of enforcing the collection of sales tax on retail sales, the Florida Legislature enacted section 212.133, Florida Statutes, which requires every wholesale seller (wholesaler) of alcoholic beverage and tobacco products (ABT) to annually file information reports of its product sales to any retailer in Florida. See § 212.133(1)(a) and (b), Fla. Stat. Once a year, ABT wholesalers report to the State of Florida their name, beverage license or tobacco permit number, along with each Florida retailer with which they do business, the Florida retailer’s name, retailer’s beverage license or tobacco permit number, retailer’s address, the general items sold, and sales per month. See § 212.133(3), Fla. Stat. The information collected captures the 12-month period between July 1 and June 30, and is due annually, on July 1, for the preceding 12-month period. Id. ABT wholesalers file these reports electronically through the Department’s efiling website and secure file transfer protocol established through the Department’s efiling provider. § 212.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Ms. Baker explained this statutory process further: [W]e annually, every year in the month of May, my unit reaches out to the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulations. We compel them to give us a list of all of the active wholesalers who were licensed to sell to retailers in the state of Florida for the prior fiscal year. Once we receive that list, we then mail a notification to all those wholesalers and state the statute and the requirements and give them a user name and a password that will allow them to then log into that portal and submit their retail—their wholesale—or their wholesale sales to retailers in the state of Florida for the prior fiscal year. Those reports are due on July 1st of each year, but they are not considered late until September 30th of that year. So that gives the wholesaler population a couple of months to compile all of their sales for the prior year, fill out their reports and submit them to the Florida Department of Revenue by the end of September. Additionally, each month, and for each retail location, B Century 21 reports gross monthly sales to the Department, and remits sales tax, utilizing the Department’s form DR-15. Ms. Baker further described the process the Department utilizes in identifying an “audit lead,” utilizing the data that ABT wholesales provide: Specifically for ABT, we have a very, actually, kind of simple comparison that we do. . . . [A]s a taxpayer, as a retailer in the state of Florida, you may purchase from multiple wholesalers. So, part of our job is we compile all of the purchases that each beverage license or tobacco license has purchased, and once we compile all the purchases for the fiscal year, then to say, you know, what were the purchases for the fiscal year versus what were the reported sales for the fiscal year. And, again, a pretty simple comparison we really look to see, did you purchase, or . . . did you report enough sales to cover the amount of purchases that we know you made as a – as a retailer. And if the sales amount does not exceed the purchase amount, then we’ll create a lead on it. The Department’s efiling provider exports the ABT wholesalers’ information to SunVisn, the Department’s database. The Department’s analysts review the ABT wholesalers’ reported data, and taxpayer information, to identify audit leads. The Department then assigns these audit leads to its service centers to conduct an audit. A tax audit period is 36 months. In conducting ABT audits, the Department has 24 months of reported data (i.e., the first 24 months of the audit period) for review. This is because the timing of section 212.133(3) requires ABT wholesalers to report annually on July 1, for the preceding 12- month period of July 1 through June 30. For the ABT reporting data examination period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2018 (a period of 24 months), B Century 21’s gross sales for its two liquor stores was as follows: Liquor Store Reported Gross Sales Al’s Liquor $1,051,128.56 Arlington Liquor $902,195.49 For the same 24-month time period of July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2018, B Century 21’s wholesalers reported the following ABT inventory purchases to the State, as required under section 212.133: Liquor Store ABT Inventory Purchases Al’s Liquor $1,250,055.79 Arlington Liquor $1,174,877.98 As the ABT wholesalers’ reported ABT inventory purchases by B Century 21’s retail outlets were higher than B Century 21’s reported sales, the Department issued an audit lead, which led to the audit that is at issue in this proceeding. The Audit For the 36-month audit period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2019 (audit period), B Century 21’s reported gross sales for each of its locations was: Location Reported Gross Sales Al’s Liquor $1,557,569.74 Arlington Liquor $1,434,551.65 Overtime Sports Bar $968,476.08 On August 20, 2019, Ms. Pitre mailed to B Century 21 (and received by Mr. Altheeb), a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records for the audit period. Included with the Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records was correspondence informing B Century 21 of the audit and requesting records. On August 26, 2019, Ms. Pitre received a telephone call from Mr. Altheeb. Ms. Pitre’s case activity notes for this call state: Received a call from Baligh Altheeb and he said he will be hiring Brett Isaac as his POA [power of attorney]. I informed him to complete the POA form and to give it to Mr. Isaac for signature and send to me. He knows about ABT Data assessments and asked that I note on the case activity that he contacted me regarding the audit. He was worried that his liquor license will be suspended if he does not respond right away. I informed him that once I receive the POA, I will contact Mr. Isaac and discuss the audit. On October 18, 2019, the Department received B Century 21’s executed power of attorney (POA) form naming Mr. Isaac as its POA for the audit. The executed POA form reflects that the Department’s notices and written communications should be sent solely to Mr. Isaac, and not B Century 21. The executed POA form further reflects that “[r]eceipt by either the representative or the taxpayer will be considered receipt by both.” On October 29, 2019, Ms. Pitre met with Mr. Altheeb and Mr. Isaac at Mr. Isaac’s office, for a pre-audit interview. Ms. Pitre’s case activity notes for this meeting state: Met with the taxpayer contact person, POA Brett Isaac and owner Baligh Thaleeb [sic], at the POA’s location to conduct the pre-audit interview. Discussed the scope of the audit, records needed to conduct the audit, availability of electronic records, business organization, nature of the business, internal controls, and the time line of the audit. Discussed sampling for purchases and POA signed sampling agreement. Made appointment to review records on November 12, 2019. Toured one of the location [sic] to observe business operations, Overtime Sports Bar. On October 30, 2019, Ms. Pitre emailed Mr. Isaac a copy of the Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records, which included a “Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist,” which requested specific taxpayer records. After receiving no response from Mr. Isaac, Ms. Pitre, on November 12, 2019, emailed Mr. Isaac concerning “the status of the records requested during the meeting with you and Mr. Altheeb on October 29, 2019.” Section 212.12(5)(b) provides that when a taxpayer fails to provide records “so that no audit or examination has been made of the books and records of” the taxpayer: [I]t shall be the duty of the department to make an assessment from an estimate based upon the best information then available to it for the taxable period of retail sales of such dealer … or of the sales or cost price of all services the sale or use of which is taxable under this chapter, together with interest, plus penalty, if such have accrued, as the case may be. Then the department shall proceed to collect such taxes, interest, and penalty on the basis of such assessment which shall be considered prima facie correct, and the burden to show the contrary shall rest upon the [taxpayer]. Section 212.12(6)(b) further provides: [I]f a dealer does not have adequate records of his or her retail sales or purchases, the department may, upon the basis of a test or sampling of the dealer’s available records or other information relating to the sales or purchases made by such dealer for a representative period, determine the proportion that taxable retail sales bear to total retail sales or the proportion that taxable purchases bear to total purchases. Mr. Collier testified that, in the absence of adequate records, the Department “estimates using best available information, and for this industry … ABT sales are a higher percentage of their taxable sales.” Because B Century 21 did not provide adequate records to Ms. Pitre, she estimated the total taxable sales for the audit period. For each liquor store that B Century 21 operated, she multiplied its total ABT purchases by average markups to calculate total ABT sales. To derive these average markups, Mr. Collier explained that the Department receives data from wholesalers, and then: [W]e take that purchase information, apply average markup to the different ABT product categories, which include cigarettes, other tobacco, beer, wine, and liquor; and then that gets us to total ABT sales number. And then we derive what we call a percentage of ABT sales, percentage of that number represents. And in this particular model, 95.66 percent represents what we believe in a liquor store industry, that this type of business, that 95.66 percent of their sales are ABT products. We derive the markups, and the percentage of ABT sales from a number of liquor store audits that the Department had performed on liquor stores that provided records. The Department utilized markup data from other ABT audits. The Department applied the following markups to these ABT categories: 6.5 percent for cigarettes; 47.5 percent for other tobacco products; 17.33 percent for beer; 29.84 percent for wine; and 24.5 percent for liquor. Applying the Department’s markup for liquor stores to the wholesalers’ reported ABT data and percentage of taxable sales, Ms. Pitre estimated taxable sales for the ABT reporting data examination period and calculated the under-reported sales error ratio as follows: Location Estimated Taxable Sales Error Ratio Al’s Liquor $1,597.544.01 1.519837 Arlington Liquor $1,516,259.34 1.680633 The Department then divided B Century 21’s estimated taxable sales for the examination period, for each liquor store, by its self-reported tax sales in its DR-15s to arrive at the under-reported rate. The Department then multiplied the under-reported rate by the reported taxable monthly sales in the DR-15s to arrive at the estimated taxable sales for the 36-month audit period. The result of this calculation was: Location Estimated Taxable Sales Al’s Liquor $2,367,252.11 Arlington Liquor $2,410,954.82 The Department then multiplied the estimated taxable sales by an effective estimated tax rate which, after giving credit for B Century 21’s remitted sales tax, resulted in tax due for the Al’s Liquor and Arlington Liquor for the audit period, as follows: Location Sales Tax Owed Al’s Liquor $58,367.01 Arlington Liquor $70,068.44 For Overtime Sports Bar, the Department could not use ABT wholesalers’ data to estimate an assessment because the Department does not have audit data averages for bars and lounges. The Department used the “Tax Due Method” in estimating under-reported taxes and calculating under- reported taxable sales. Mr. Collier explained: The Department does not have average markup and percentage of sales for a bar. Though, you know, obviously, we all know that a bar, their main product that they sell and in most cases is ABT products. So, therefore, typically, an auditor would need to get information about that specific location. Bars can vary so much in their type of business that they do, they can be like nightclubs, or they can be like bar and grill that serves a lot of food. So there’s a lot of variances there for that particular type of industry, so we haven’t really come up with average markups, average percentage of sales for bars, per se. It’s a case-by- case situation, and in this case, the auditor decided that the fair, reasonable way to estimate the bar location would be to just average the error ratios that were derived from the Al’s Liquor and the other liquor store location and apply it to the taxable sales reported for the bar. And I think that’s a very fair and reasonable estimate based on what we all know in a bar situation; their markups are significantly higher. And of course, there can be plenty of other non-ABT taxable sales occurring in a bar setting, such as prepared food, you know, just your regular cokes and drinks. So it’s certainly a fair way to estimate in this particular audit and I believe only benefits the taxpayer. The undersigned credits the Department’s methodology for estimating an assessment for Overtime Sports Bar. Further, Mr. Altheeb testified that Overtime Sports Bar operates as both a sports bar and a liquor/package store, and stated: Most of it—it’s a liquor store. I don’t know if you know the area, it’s a liquor store on the Westside. So most of it—the sport bar doesn’t really do too much business in the Westside, mostly the liquor stores. People coming in and buy package, you know, buy bottles and leave. So, most of the business is the drive-through window. The Department’s decision to average the error ratios for the other two liquor stores to derive the additional tax due average for Overtime Sports Bar is reasonable, particularly in light of Mr. Altheeb’s testimony that Overtime Sports Bar operates primarily as a liquor (package) store. The Department calculated the additional tax due average error ratio for Overtime Sports Bar by averaging the error ratios of Al’s Liquor and Arlington Liquor, and then multiplied it by B Century 21’s reported gross sales to arrive at the additional tax due for Overtime Sports Bar of $41,797.49. Ms. Pitre testified that she determined that, for the audit period, B Century 21 owed additional sales tax of $170,232.93. In addition, the Department imposed a penalty and accrued interest. On December 16, 2019, Ms. Pitre sent correspondence, the preliminary assessment, and a copy of the audit work papers to B Century 21 (through Mr. Isaac), informing B Century 21 that it had 30 days to contact the Department’s tax audit supervisor to request an audit conference or submit a written request for an extension. After receiving no response from B Century 21, Ms. Pitre forwarded the audit workpapers to the Department’s headquarters in Tallahassee, Florida, to process the Notice of Proposed Assessment. B Century 21’s Position As mentioned previously, and after initially meeting with the Department, B Century 21 failed to provide requested financial records or respond to any of the numerous letters and notices received from the Department, despite being given adequate opportunity to do so. And, after filing its Amended Petition, it failed to timely respond to discovery requests from the Department which, inter alia, resulted in numerous matters being conclusively established. Mr. Isaac served as the POA for B Century 21 during the audit, and also appeared in this proceeding as a qualified representative. However, Mr. Isaac did not appear at the final hearing, did not testify as a witness at the final hearing, and does not appear to have done anything for B Century 21 in this proceeding, other than filing the Petition and Amended Petition. After Mr. Heekin appeared in this matter, and well after the time to respond to discovery, B Century 21 provided 127 pages of documents to the Department. These documents consist of: 18 pages of summaries of daily sales that Mr. Altheeb prepared for the hearing; 41 pages of sales and use tax returns from B Century 21 locations, covering 25 months (DR-15s); 2 pages of Harbortouch’s 2016 1099K, reporting credit card sales; 43 pages of unsigned federal tax returns from 2016, 2017, and 2018, prepared by Mr. Isaac; and 17 pages of B Century 21’s untimely responses to the Department’s discovery requests. Florida Administrative Code Rule 12-3.0012(3) defines “adequate records” to include: (3) “Adequate records” means books, accounts, and other records sufficient to permit a reliable determination of a tax deficiency or overpayment. Incomplete records can be determined to be inadequate. To be sufficient to make a reliable determination, adequate records, including supporting documentation, must be: Accurate, that is, the records must be free from material error; Inclusive, that is, the records must capture transactions that are needed to determine a tax deficiency or overpayment; Authentic, that is, the records must be worthy of acceptance as based on fact; and Systematic, that is, the records must organize transactions in an orderly manner. The nature of the taxpayer’s business, the nature of the industry, materiality, third-party confirmations and other corroborating evidence such as related supporting documentation, and the audit methods that are suitable for use in the audit, will be used to establish that the taxpayer has adequate records. The undersigned finds that the summaries of daily sales are not adequate records because Mr. Altheeb prepared them for use at the final hearing, rather than in the regular course of business. The undersigned finds that the DR-15s provided by Mr. Altheeb, covering 25 months, are not adequate records because they are incomplete and are not inclusive. The audit period encompassed 36 months, for B Century 21’s three retail locations; however, Mr. Altheeb only provided 25 months of DR-15s. The 2016, 2017, and 2018 federal tax returns that B Century 21 provided are not adequate records because they are not authentic. Mr. Altheeb was unable to verify if these tax returns were correct, and they were unsigned. B Century 21 did not provide any evidence that it had filed any of these federal tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service. Ms. Pitre reviewed the 127 pages of documents that B Century 21 provided and testified that the summaries of daily sales did not provide the “source documents” for verification. The unsigned federal tax returns reflect that B Century 21 reported a cost-of-goods-sold (COGS) of $518,606.00 for 2016; $1,246,839.00 for 2017; and $796,968.00 for 2018. Additionally, the unsigned federal tax returns reflect that B Century 21 reported a beginning inventory (BI) for 2016 of $95,847.00, and a year-end inventory (EI) for 2016 of $200,556.00, EI for 2017 of $280,235.00, and EI for 2018 of $295,628.00. When comparing the unsigned federal tax returns with the ABT wholesalers’ data, the federal tax returns reflect, for 2016, total inventory purchases of $623,315.00 (which is derived from $518,606.00 (COGS) + $200,556.00 (EI) - $95,847.00 (BI)). However, the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2016 reflects that B Century 21’s ABT purchases were $1,174,997.34 – a discrepancy of more than $500,000.00. For 2017, the federal tax returns reflect total inventory purchases of $1,326,518.00 (which is derived from $1,246,839.00 (COGS) + $280,235.00 (EI) for 2017 - $200,556.00 (EI) for 2016). However, the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2016 reflects that B Century 21’s ABT purchases were $1,422,854.79 – a discrepancy of over $96,000.00. And for 2018, the unsigned federal tax returns reflect total inventory purchases of $812,361.00 (which is derived from $796,968.00 (COGS) + $295,628.00 (EI) for 2018 - $280,235.00 (BI) for 2017). However, the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2018 reflects that B Century 21’s ABT purchases were $1,335,814.00 – a discrepancy of over $500,000.00. Mr. Altheeb testified that Arlington Liquor and Overtime Sports Bar opened in 2016 – after B Century 21 began ownership and operation of Al’s Liquor. He stated that he did not purchase inventory for the openings of the newer locations, but instead transferred excess inventory from Al’s Liquor, which resulted in lower total inventory purchases for 2016. Mr. Altheeb also testified that B Century 21’s three locations experienced spoiled inventory. However, B Century 21 should include spoiled inventory in COGS reported in its federal tax returns, and further, B Century 21 provided no additional evidence of the cost of spoilage for the audit period. The undersigned finds that the ABT wholesalers’ data for 2016 through 2018 reflects similar amounts for inventory purchases between 2016 through 2018. The undersigned credits the Department’s reliance on the ABT wholesalers’ data, which reflect fairly consistent purchases for each year. The undersigned does not find the unsigned federal tax returns that B Century 21 provided to be persuasive evidence that the Department’s assessment was incorrect. Mr. Altheeb testified that he believed Mr. Isaac, who B Century 21 designated as POA for the audit, and who appears as a qualified representative in this proceeding, was actively handling the audit. Mr. Altheeb stated that the audit, and the final hearing, “kind of came out of nowhere” and that once he learned of it, he retained Mr. Heekin and provided “everything” to him. However, it is conclusively established that the Department provided correspondence and notice to B Century 21 through its designated POA, and that B Century 21 failed to respond to record requests in a timely manner. Mr. Isaac neither testified nor appeared at the final hearing to corroborate Mr. Altheeb’s claims that Mr. Isaac did not keep Mr. Altheeb or B Century 21 apprised of the status of the audit, including the failure to provide requested records or to communicate with the Department. B Century 21 also attempted to challenge the Department’s use of markup data from other ABT audits, in an attempt to argue that the markups were inflated and not representative of B Century 21’s markups. However, and as previously found, B Century 21’s failure to timely provide records—or respond in any meaningful way to the audit—undermines this attempt. The undersigned credits the Department’s methodology in using the best information available to it for the audit period in calculating the assessment. Although it became apparent during the final hearing that Mr. Altheeb did not treat the audit of B Century 21 with appropriate seriousness, and deflected blame to Mr. Isaac, and that his approach resulted in a legally appropriate and sustainable audit and assessment based on the Department’s best information available, the undersigned does not find that B Century 21, Mr. Isaac, or Mr. Heekin knew that the allegations of the Amended Petition were not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense, or would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts. The undersigned finds that the Department made its assessment based on the best information then available, and is thus prima facie correct, pursuant to section 212.12(5)(b). The undersigned further finds that B Century 21 did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Department’s assessment is incorrect, pursuant to section 212.12(5)(b).
Conclusions For Petitioner: Robert Andrew Heekin, Esquire The Law Office of Rob Heekin, Jr., P.A. 2223 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 For Respondent: Randi Ellen Dincher, Esquire Franklin David Sandrea-Rivero, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau Plaza Level 1, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Department enter a final order sustaining the January 27, 2020, Notice of Proposed Assessment to B Century 21, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Randi Ellen Dincher, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau Plaza Level 1, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Robert Andrew Heekin, Esquire The Law Office of Rob Heekin, Jr., P.A. 2223 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Franklin David Sandrea-Rivero, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Plaza Level 1, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brett J. Isaac 2151 University Boulevard South Jacksonville, Florida 32216 James A Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to receive supported living services from Respondent? See Section 393.066, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 18 years old. He lives with his paternal grandmother and step-grandfather at 3109 Brandywine Drive, Tallahassee, Florida. On March 23, 1994, the Petitioner applied for developmental services. Petitioner's natural mother was institutionalized for retardation for an indeterminate length of time at a Sunland Center. Shortly after the Petitioner's birth, his mother left the Petitioner and his father. Petitioner has lived with his paternal grandmother since he was 13 weeks old. Petitioner's grandmother raised her own three children and has experience in child rearing and the development of children. She noticed that Petitioner's development was slow when Petitioner did not begin walking at age 17 months and did not begin to speak intelligible words until 30 months of age. Petitioner was taken to the Florida State University Psychology Clinic at age 4 years 3 months (4.3 years) in an effort to determine why his development was slow. This was the first time the Petitioner's Intelligence Quotient (IQ) was tested. He obtained a 77 on the Stanford-Binet L-M test, and an 87 on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales. FSU advised the Petitioner's grandmother that Petitioner might have developmental problems and to observe him closely and retest him if he had problems in school. As a result, Petitioner's IQ was tested several times between ages 5 and 17. Testing dates and scores of these test are as follows: October 80 4.3 Stanford-Binet FSU Psy. Clinic IQ 77 Vineland Adaptive FSU Psy. Clinic 87 July 81 5.0 FSU Psy. Clinic Stanford-Binet IQ 84 May 84 7.10 WISC-R FSIQ 84-87 85 9.0 WISC-R FSIQ 80 April 86 9.9 WISC-R Psych. Assoc., Dr.Cook FSIQ 69 June 86 9.11 WISC-R Leon Cty. School, Barnes FSIQ 72 March 91 14.8 WISC-R Leon Cty. School, Popp FSIQ 69 April 92 15.9 Vineland Adapt. Psych. Assoc. Dr. Clark 62 July 93 17.0 WAIS-R, Psych. Assoc. Dr. Deitchman 70 Dr. Thomas Clark, who holds a doctorate in clinical psychology and is a board certified clinical psychologist, testified regarding intelligence testing and his examination of the Petitioner and the records of Petitioner's intelligence testing. The numbers in the far right column in Paragraph 5, above, all reflect the IQ of the Petitioner. IQ scores of 70 or lower placed a person two or more standard deviations below the mean on standardized intelligence tests. Individuals with mental retardation, who may exhibit higher IQ test scores when they are younger, may have their scores decrease as they get older. This is a recognized phenomenon in the mildly retarded. Scores on IQ tests may be inflated by a practice factor which occurs when the test is administered more than once within a six-month period. The record reflects that the Petitioner was tested two times in 1986, and his second score of 72 was higher because of the practice factor. The increase of Petitioner's score was within 2 to 3 points above his general performance on the first test in 1986 and his subsequent tests in 1991, 1992, and 1993, which is the predicted increase due to the practice factor. Since age 9.9, with the exception of the 72 due to the practice factor, the Petitioner has not scored above 70 on an IQ test. Based upon his examination and testing of the Petitioner and his review of the Petitioner's records, Dr. Clark's professional opinion was that the Petitioner was more than two standard deviations below the average in intellectual performance. Although the Petitioner suffers from Attention Deficit Disorder and has some emotional problems, Dr. Clark stated this did not alter his opinion regarding the Petitioner's IQ or his intellectual performance. Dr. Clark found that Petitioner's adaptive behavior was low for Petitioner's IQ. The parties stipulated that the measurement of Petitioner's general intellectual functioning existed concurrently with deficits in his adaptive behavior as manifested during the period from conception to age 18. Based upon its assessment, the Leon County Schools recommended that the Petitioner be placed in the community-based educational program which is designed for students who are mentally retarded within the educable range. The Petitioner has been awarded Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act upon a determination that he is mentally retarded. Since his completion of school, the Petitioner has been attending workshops conducted by Goodwill Industries to develop job skills and job coping skills. He has been unable to maintain employment, and has been discharged from all of the positions to which he has been referred. Petitioner was referred to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Developmental Services by officials of Vocational Rehabilitation (Composite Exhibit 1-C). Petitioner's grandparents take him shopping, assist the Petitioner in maintaining his daily life, live with Petitioner on a daily basis, and give him support and try to assist him in controlling his "excessive loud talking". Without the care of his grandparents, the Petitioner would not be able to maintain the activities of daily living. Petitioner's friends include neighborhood children whose ages range from 3 years to 12 years. Their parents have requested Petitioner no longer play with them due to his size, age and conduct. Petitioner's testimony and demeanor while testifying reveal a young adult who is mentally retarded and whose adaptive skills are consistent with his IQ. Petitioner's grandmother testified that even though he is 18 1/2 years old, the Petitioner acts like a boy between 9 and 10 years old. The Respondent's position was that Petitioner's earlier test scores indicated that he was not two deviations below average intellectual performance, and the Petitioner's later test scores were adversely impacted by his emotional and attention deficit problems; therefore, Petitioner was ineligible for developmental services. The testimony of Dr. Clark clearly refuted the assertion that the Petitioner's earlier high test scores indicated a higher IQ, and refuted the alleged negative impact upon IQ testing of Petitioner's attention deficit and emotional disorder. Petitioner presented competent evidence and expert testimony concerning Petitioner's intellectual function to establish that Petitioner's performance was two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test. Petitioner's showing was unrebutted by the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is; RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's eligibility for developmental services. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Subsumed in Paragraph 14 Paragraph 3 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 4 Subsumed in Paragraph 14 Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraph 16 Paragraph 6 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 7 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 3 Paragraph 9 Paragraph 4 Paragraph 10 Paragraph 5 Paragraph 11 Subsumed in Paragraph 9 Paragraph 12 Irrelevant Paragraphs 13,14 Subsumed in Paragraphs 16-19 Paragraphs 15-17 True, but made part of Statement of Case Paragraphs 18-21 Subsumed in Paragraph 20 Paragraphs 22-25 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-10,21 Paragraph 26 Paragraph 11 Paragraph 27 Paragraph 22 Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Rejected as contrary to the more credible evidence summarized in Paragraph 20. Paragraph 3 Paragraph 5 in which the typographical error regarding the test of October 1980 is corrected. The facts set forth in the footnotes are rejected, particularly the assertion that Dr. Cook's reference to a "recent" administration of an IQ test did not fix the date of the test sufficiently to say whether the practice effect would impact its administration. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 7 and 21 Paragraph 6 See comments for Paragraph 3. As stated in the findings, this premise was specifically rejected. Paragraph 8 Paragraph 1 Paragraph 9 Irrelevant Paragraph 10 Subsumed in various other findings. Paragraph 11 True; however, the Petitioner's application is based solely upon his allegation that he is mentally retarded. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel W. Dobbins, Esquire 433 North Magnolia Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, FL 32399-2949 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners AIA is a trade association made up of 40 groups of insurance companies. AIA member companies annually write $6 billion in property, casualty, and automobile insurance in Florida. AIA's primary purpose is to represent the interests of its member insurance groups in regulatory and legislative matters throughout the United States, including Florida. NAMIC is a trade association consisting of 1,430 members, mostly mutual insurance companies. NAMIC member companies annually write $10 billion in property, casualty, and automobile insurance in Florida. NAMIC represents the interests of its member insurance companies in regulatory and legislative matters throughout the United States, including Florida. PCI is a national trade association of property and casualty insurance companies consisting of 1,055 members. PCI members include mutual insurance companies, stock insurance companies, and reciprocal insurers that write property and casualty insurance in Florida. PCI members annually write approximately $15 billion in premiums in Florida. PCI participated in the OIR's workshops on the Proposed Rule. PCI's assistant vice president and regional manager, William Stander, testified that if the Proposed Rule is adopted, PCI's member companies would be required either to withdraw from the Florida market or drastically reorganize their business model. FIC is an insurance trade association made up of 39 insurance groups that represent approximately 250 insurance companies writing all lines of insurance. All of FIC's members are licensed in Florida and write approximately $27 billion in premiums in Florida. FIC has participated in rule challenges in the past, and participated in the workshop and public hearing process conducted by OIR for this Proposed Rule. FIC President Guy Marvin testified that FIC's property and casualty members use credit scoring and would be affected by the Proposed Rule. A substantial number of Petitioners' members are insurers writing property and casualty insurance and/or motor vehicle insurance coverage in Florida. These members use credit-based insurance scoring in their underwriting and rating processes. They would be directly regulated by the Proposed Rule in their underwriting and rating methods and in the rate filing processes set forth in Sections 627.062 and 627.0651, Florida Statutes. Fair Isaac originated credit-based insurance scoring and is a leading provider of credit-based insurance scoring information in the United States and Canada. Fair Isaac has invested millions of dollars in the development and maintenance of its credit-based insurance models. Fair Isaac concedes that it is not an insurer and, thus, would not be directly regulated by the Proposed Rule. However, Fair Isaac would be directly affected by any negative impact that the Proposed Rule would have in setting limits on the use of credit-based insurance score models in Florida. Lamont Boyd, a manager in Fair Isaac's global scoring division, testified that if the Proposed Rule goes into effect Fair Isaac would, at a minimum, lose all of the revenue it currently generates from insurance companies that use its scores in the State of Florida, because Fair Isaac's credit-based insurance scoring model cannot meet the requirements of the Proposed Rule regarding racial, ethnic, and religious categorization. Mr. Boyd also testified that enactment of the Proposed Rule could cause a "ripple effect" of similar regulations in other states, further impairing Fair Isaac's business. The Statute and Proposed Rule During the 1990s, insurance companies' use of consumer credit information for underwriting and rating automobile and residential property insurance policies greatly increased. Insurance regulators expressed concern that the use of consumer credit reports, credit histories and credit-based insurance scoring models could have a negative effect on consumers' ability to obtain and keep insurance at appropriate rates. Of particular concern was the possibility that the use of credit scoring would particularly hurt minorities, people with low incomes, and young people, because those persons would be more likely to have poor credit scores. On September 19, 2001, Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher appointed a task force to examine the use of credit reports and develop recommendations for the Legislature or for the promulgation of rules regarding the use of credit scoring by the insurance industry. The task force met on four separate occasions throughout the state in 2001, and issued its report on January 23, 2002. The task force report conceded that the evidence supporting the negative impact of the use of credit reports on specific groups is "primarily anecdotal," and that the insurance industry had submitted anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Among its nine recommendations, the task force recommended the following: A comprehensive and independent investigation of the relationship between insurers' use of consumer credit information and risk of loss including the impact by race, income, geographic location and age. A prohibition against the use of credit reports as the sole basis for making underwriting or rating decisions. That insurers using credit as an underwriting or rating factor be required to provide regulators with sufficient information to independently verify that use. That insurers be required to send a copy of the credit report to those consumers whose adverse insurance decision is a result of their consumer credit information and a simple explanation of the specific credit characteristics that caused the adverse decision. That insurers not be permitted to draw a negative inference from a bad credit score that is due to medical bills, little or no credit information, or other special circumstances that are clearly not related to an applicant's or policyholder's insurability. That the impact of credit reports be mitigated by imposing limits on the weight that insurers can give to them in the decision to write a policy and limits on the amount the premium can be increased due to credit information. No evidence was presented that the "comprehensive and independent investigation" of insurers' use of credit information was undertaken by the Legislature. However, the other recommendations of the task force were addressed in Senate Bills 40A and 42A, enacted by the Legislature and signed by the governor on June 26, 2003. These companion bills, each with an effective date of January 1, 2004, were codified as Sections 626.9741 and 626.97411, Florida Statutes, respectively. Chapters 2003-407 and 2003-408, Laws of Florida. Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, provides: The purpose of this section is to regulate and limit the use of credit reports and credit scores by insurers for underwriting and rating purposes. This section applies only to personal lines motor vehicle insurance and personal lines residential insurance, which includes homeowners, mobile home owners' dwelling, tenants, condominium unit owners, cooperative unit owners, and similar types of insurance. As used in this section, the term: "Adverse decision" means a decision to refuse to issue or renew a policy of insurance; to issue a policy with exclusions or restrictions; to increase the rates or premium charged for a policy of insurance; to place an insured or applicant in a rating tier that does not have the lowest available rates for which that insured or applicant is otherwise eligible; or to place an applicant or insured with a company operating under common management, control, or ownership which does not offer the lowest rates available, within the affiliate group of insurance companies, for which that insured or applicant is otherwise eligible. "Credit report" means any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency, as defined in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 1681 et seq., bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, which is used or expected to be used or collected as a factor to establish a person's eligibility for credit or insurance, or any other purpose authorized pursuant to the applicable provision of such federal act. A credit score alone, as calculated by a credit reporting agency or by or for the insurer, may not be considered a credit report. "Credit score" means a score, grade, or value that is derived by using any or all data from a credit report in any type of model, method, or program, whether electronically, in an algorithm, computer software or program, or any other process, for the purpose of grading or ranking credit report data. "Tier" means a category within a single insurer into which insureds with substantially similar risk, exposure, or expense factors are placed for purposes of determining rate or premium. An insurer must inform an applicant or insured, in the same medium as the application is taken, that a credit report or score is being requested for underwriting or rating purposes. An insurer that makes an adverse decision based, in whole or in part, upon a credit report must provide at no charge, a copy of the credit report to the applicant or insured or provide the applicant or insured with the name, address, and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency from which the insured or applicant may obtain the credit report. The insurer must provide notification to the consumer explaining the reasons for the adverse decision. The reasons must be provided in sufficiently clear and specific language so that a person can identify the basis for the insurer's adverse decision. Such notification shall include a description of the four primary reasons, or such fewer number as existed, which were the primary influences of the adverse decision. The use of generalized terms such as "poor credit history," "poor credit rating," or "poor insurance score" does not meet the explanation requirements of this subsection. A credit score may not be used in underwriting or rating insurance unless the scoring process produces information in sufficient detail to permit compliance with the requirements of this subsection. It shall not be deemed an adverse decision if, due to the insured's credit report or credit score, the insured continues to receive a less favorable rate or placement in a less favorable tier or company at the time of renewal except for renewals or reunderwriting required by this section. (4)(a) An insurer may not request a credit report or score based upon the race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence of the applicant or insured. An insurer may not make an adverse decision solely because of information contained in a credit report or score without consideration of any other underwriting or rating factor. An insurer may not make an adverse decision or use a credit score that could lead to such a decision if based, in whole or in part, on: The absence of, or an insufficient, credit history, in which instance the insurer shall: Treat the consumer as otherwise approved by the Office of Insurance Regulation if the insurer presents information that such an absence or inability is related to the risk for the insurer; Treat the consumer as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit information, as defined by the insurer; Exclude the use of credit information as a factor and use only other underwriting criteria; Collection accounts with a medical industry code, if so identified on the consumer's credit report; Place of residence; or Any other circumstance that the Financial Services Commission determines, by rule, lacks sufficient statistical correlation and actuarial justification as a predictor of insurance risk. An insurer may use the number of credit inquiries requested or made regarding the applicant or insured except for: Credit inquiries not initiated by the consumer or inquiries requested by the consumer for his or her own credit information. Inquiries relating to insurance coverage, if so identified on a consumer's credit report. Collection accounts with a medical industry code, if so identified on the consumer's credit report Multiple lender inquiries, if coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the home mortgage industry and made within 30 days of one another, unless only one inquiry is considered. Multiple lender inquiries, if coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the automobile lending industry and made within 30 days of one another, unless only one inquiry is considered. An insurer must, upon the request of an applicant or insured, provide a means of appeal for an applicant or insured whose credit report or credit score is unduly influenced by a dissolution of marriage, the death of a spouse, or temporary loss of employment. The insurer must complete its review within 10 business days after the request by the applicant or insured and receipt of reasonable documentation requested by the insurer, and, if the insurer determines that the credit report or credit score was unduly influenced by any of such factors, the insurer shall treat the applicant or insured as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit information or shall exclude the credit information, as defined by the insurer, whichever is more favorable to the applicant or insured. An insurer shall not be considered out of compliance with its underwriting rules or rates or forms filed with the Office of Insurance Regulation or out of compliance with any other state law or rule as a result of granting any exceptions pursuant to this subsection. A rate filing that uses credit reports or credit scores must comply with the requirements of s. 627.062 or s. 627.0651 to ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. An insurer that requests or uses credit reports and credit scoring in its underwriting and rating methods shall maintain and adhere to established written procedures that reflect the restrictions set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, this section, and all rules related thereto. (7)(a) An insurer shall establish procedures to review the credit history of an insured who was adversely affected by the use of the insured's credit history at the initial rating of the policy, or at a subsequent renewal thereof. This review must be performed at a minimum of once every 2 years or at the request of the insured, whichever is sooner, and the insurer shall adjust the premium of the insured to reflect any improvement in the credit history. The procedures must provide that, with respect to existing policyholders, the review of a credit report will not be used by the insurer to cancel, refuse to renew, or require a change in the method of payment or payment plan. (b) However, as an alternative to the requirements of paragraph (a), an insurer that used a credit report or credit score for an insured upon inception of a policy, who will not use a credit report or score for reunderwriting, shall reevaluate the insured within the first 3 years after inception, based on other allowable underwriting or rating factors, excluding credit information if the insurer does not increase the rates or premium charged to the insured based on the exclusion of credit reports or credit scores. The commission may adopt rules to administer this section. The rules may include, but need not be limited to: Information that must be included in filings to demonstrate compliance with subsection (3). Statistical detail that insurers using credit reports or scores under subsection (5) must retain and report annually to the Office of Insurance Regulation. Standards that ensure that rates or premiums associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Standards for review of models, methods, programs, or any other process by which to grade or rank credit report data and which may produce credit scores in order to ensure that the insurer demonstrates that such grading, ranking, or scoring is valid in predicting insurance risk of an applicant or insured. Section 626.97411, Florida Statutes, provides: Credit scoring methodologies and related data and information that are trade secrets as defined in s. 688.002 and that are filed with the Office of Insurance Regulation pursuant to a rate filing or other filing required by law are confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.3 Following extensive rule development workshops and industry comment, proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005 was initially published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, on February 11, 2005.4 The Proposed Rule states, as follows: 69O-125.005 Use of Credit Reports and Credit Scores by Insurers. For the purpose of this rule, the following definitions apply: "Applicant", for purposes of Section 626.9741, F.S., means an individual whose credit report or score is requested for underwriting or rating purposes relating to personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential insurance and shall not include individuals who have merely requested a quote. "Credit scoring methodology" means any methodology that uses credit reports or credit scores, in whole or in part, for underwriting or rating purposes. "Data cleansing" means the correction or enhancement of presumed incomplete, incorrect, missing, or improperly formatted information. "Personal lines motor vehicle" insurance means insurance against loss or damage to any motorized land vehicle or any loss, liability, or expense resulting from or incidental to ownership, maintenance or use of such vehicle if the contract of insurance shows one or more natural persons as named insureds. The following are not included in this definition: Vehicles used as public livery or conveyance; Vehicles rented to others; Vehicles with more than four wheels; Vehicles used primarily for commercial purposes; and Vehicles with a net vehicle weight of more than 5,000 pounds designed or used for the carriage of goods (other than the personal effects of passengers) or drawing a trailer designed or used for the carriage of such goods. The following are specifically included, inter alia, in this definition: Motorcycles; Motor homes; Antique or classic automobiles; and Recreational vehicles. "Unfairly discriminatory" means that adverse decisions resulting from the use of a credit scoring methodology disproportionately affects persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. Insurers may not use any credit scoring methodology that is unfairly discriminatory. The burden of demonstrating that the credit scoring methodology is not unfairly discriminatory is upon the insurer. An insurer may not request or use a credit report or credit score in its underwriting or rating method unless it maintains and adheres to established written procedures that reflect the restrictions set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, Section 626.9741, F.S., and these rules. Upon initial use or any change in that use, insurers using credit reports or credit scores for underwriting or rating personal lines residential or personal lines motor vehicle insurance shall include the following information in filings submitted pursuant to Section 627.062 or 627.0651, F.S. A listing of the types of individuals whose credit reports or scores the company will use or attempt to use to underwrite or rate a given policy. For example: Person signing application; Named insured or spouse; and All listed operators. How those individual reports or scores will be combined if more than one is used. For example: Average score used; Highest score used. The name(s) of the consumer reporting agencies or any other third party vendors from which the company will obtain or attempt to obtain credit reports or scores. Precise identifying information specifying or describing the credit scoring methodology, if any, the company will use including: Common or trade name; Version, subtype, or intended segment of business the system was designed for; and Any other information needed to distinguish a particular credit scoring methodology from other similar ones, whether developed by the company or by a third party vendor. The effect of particular scores or ranges of scores (or, for companies not using scores, the effect of particular items appearing on a credit report) on any of the following as applicable: Rate or premium charged for a policy of insurance; Placement of an insured or applicant in a rating tier; Placement of an applicant or insured in a company within an affiliated group of insurance companies; Decision to refuse to issue or renew a policy of insurance or to issue a policy with exclusions or restrictions or limitations in payment plans. The effect of the absence or insufficiency of credit history (as referenced in Section 626.9741(4)(c)1., F.S.) on any items listed in paragraph (e) above. The manner in which collection accounts identified with a medical industry code (as referenced in Section 626.9741(4)(c)2., F.S.) on a consumer's credit report will be treated in the underwriting or rating process or within any credit scoring methodology used. The manner in which collection accounts that are not identified with a medical industry code, but which an applicant or insured demonstrates are the direct result of significant and extraordinary medical expenses, will be treated in the underwriting or rating process or within any credit scoring methodology used. The manner in which the following will be treated in the underwriting or rating process, or within any credit scoring methodology used: Credit inquiries not initiated by the consumer; Requests by the consumer for the consumer's own credit information; Multiple lender inquiries, if coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the automobile lending industry or the home mortgage industry and made within 30 days of one another; Multiple lender inquiries that are not coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the automobile lending industry or the home mortgage industry and made within 30 days of one another, but that an applicant or insured demonstrates are the direct result of such inquiries; Inquiries relating to insurance coverage, if so identified on a consumer's credit report; and Inquiries relating to insurance coverage that are not so identified on a consumer's credit report, but which an applicant or insured demonstrates are the direct result of such inquiries. The list of all clear and specific primary reasons that may be cited to the consumer as the basis or explanation for an adverse decision under Section 626.9741(3), F.S. and the criteria determining when each of those reasons will be so cited. A description of the process that the insurer will use to correct any error in premium charged the insured, or in underwriting decision made concerning the insured, if the basis of the premium charged or the decision made is a disputed item that is later removed from the credit report or corrected, provided that the insured first notifies the insurer that the item has been removed or corrected. A certification that no use of credit reports or scores in rating insurance will apply to any component of a rate or premium attributed to hurricane coverage for residential properties as separately identified in accordance with Section 627.0629, F.S. Insurers desiring to make adverse decisions for personal lines motor vehicle policies or personal lines residential policies based on the absence or insufficiency of credit history shall either: Treat such consumers or applicants as otherwise approved by the Office of Insurance Regulation if the insurer presents information that such an absence or inability is related to the risk for the insurer and does not result in a disparate impact on persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), This information will be held as confidential if properly so identified by the insurer and eligible under Section 626.9711, F.S. The information shall include: Data comparing experience for each category of those with absent or insufficient credit history to each category of insureds separately treated with respect to credit and having sufficient credit history; A statistically credible method of analysis that concludes that the relationship between absence or insufficiency and the risk assumed is not due to chance; A statistically credible method of analysis that concludes that absence or insufficiency of credit history does not disparately impact persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S.; A statistically credible method of analysis that confirms that the treatment proposed by the insurer is quantitatively appropriate; and Statistical tests establishing that the treatment proposed by the insurer is warranted for the total of all consumers with absence or insufficiency of credit history and for at least two subsets of such consumers. Treat such consumers as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit information, as defined by the insurer. Should an insurer fail to specify a definition, neutral is defined as the average score that a stratified random sample of consumers or applicants having sufficient credit history would attain using the insurer's credit scoring methodology; or Exclude credit as a factor and use other criteria. These other criteria must be specified by the insurer and must not result in average treatment for the totality of consumers with an absence of or insufficiency of credit history any less favorable than the treatment of average consumers or applicants having sufficient credit history. Insurers desiring to make adverse decisions for personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential insurance based on information contained in a credit report or score shall file with the Office information establishing that the results of such decisions do not correlate so closely with the zip code of residence of the insured as to constitute a decision based on place of residence of the insured in violation of Section 626.9741(4)(c)(3), F.S. (7)(a) Insurers using credit reports or credit scores for underwriting or rating personal lines residential or personal lines motor vehicle insurance shall develop, maintain, and adhere to written procedures consistent with Section 626.9741(4)(e), F.S. providing appeals for applicants or insureds whose credit reports or scores are unduly influenced by dissolution of marriage, death of a spouse, or temporary loss of employment. (b) These procedures shall be subject to examination by the Office at any time. (8)(a)1. Insurers using credit reports or credit scoring in rating personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential insurance shall develop, maintain, and adhere to written procedures to review the credit history of an insured who was adversely affected by such use at initial rating of the policy or subsequent renewal thereof. These procedures shall be subject to examination by the Office at any time. The procedures shall comply with the following: A review shall be conducted: No later than 2 years following the date of any adverse decision, or Any time, at the request of the insured, but no more than once per policy period without insurer assent. The insurer shall notify the named insureds annually of their right to request the review in (II) above. Renewal notices issued 120 days or less after the effective date of this rule are not included in this requirement. The insurer shall adjust the premium to reflect any improvement in credit history no later than the first renewal date that follows a review of credit history. The renewal premium shall be subject to other rating factors lawfully used by the insurer. The review shall not be used by the insurer to cancel, refuse to renew, or require a change in the method of payment or payment plan based on credit history. (b)1. As an alternative to the requirements in paragraph (8)(a), insurers using credit reports or scores at the inception of a policy but not for re-underwriting shall develop, maintain, and adhere to written procedures. These procedures shall be subject to examination by the Office at any time. The procedures shall comply with the following: Insureds shall be reevaluated no later than 3 years following policy inception based on allowable underwriting or rating factors, excluding credit information. The rate or premium charged to an insured shall not be greater, solely as a result of the reevaluation, than the rate or premium charged for the immediately preceding policy term. This shall not be construed to prohibit an insurer from applying regular underwriting criteria (which may result in a greater premium) or general rate increases to the premium charged. For insureds that received an adverse decision notification at policy inception, no residual effects of that adverse decision shall survive the reevaluation. This means that the reevaluation must be complete enough to make it possible for insureds adversely impacted at inception to attain the lowest available rate for which comparable insureds are eligible, considering only allowable underwriting or rating factors (excluding credit information) at the time of the reevaluation. No credit scoring methodology shall be used for personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential property insurance unless that methodology has been demonstrated to be a valid predictor of the insurance risk to be assumed by an insurer for the applicable type of insurance. The demonstration of validity detailed below need only be provided with the first rate, rule, or underwriting guidelines filing following the effective date of this rule and at any time a change is made in the credit scoring methodology. Other such filings may instead refer to the most recent prior filing containing a demonstration. Information supplied in the context of a demonstration of validity will be held as confidential if properly so identified by the insurer and eligible under Section 626.9711, F.S. A demonstration of validity shall include: A listing of the persons that contributed substantially to the development of the most current version of the method, including resumes of the persons, if obtainable, indicating their qualifications and experience in similar endeavors. An enumeration of all data cleansing techniques that have been used in the development of the method, which shall include: The nature of each technique; Any biases the technique might introduce; and The prevalence of each type of invalid information prior to correction or enhancement. All data that was used by the model developers in the derivation and calibration of the model parameters. Data shall be in sufficient detail to permit the Office to conduct multiple regression testing for validation of the credit scoring methodology. Data, including field definitions, shall be supplied in electronic format compatible with the software used by the Office. Statistical results showing that the model and parameters are predictive and not overlapping or duplicative of any other variables used to rate an applicant to such a degree as to render their combined use actuarially unsound. Such results shall include the period of time for which each element from a credit report is used. A precise listing of all elements from a credit report that are used in scoring, and the formula used to compute the score, including the time period during which each element is used. Such listing is confidential if properly so identified by the insurer. An assessment by a qualified actuary, economist, or statistician (whether or not employed by the insurer) other than persons who contributed substantially to the development of the credit scoring methodology, concluding that there is a significant statistical correlation between the scores and frequency or severity of claims. The assessment shall: Identify the person performing the assessment and show his or her educational and professional experience qualifications; and Include a test of robustness of the model, showing that it performs well on a credible validation data set. The validation data set may not be the one from which the model was developed. Documentation consisting of statistical testing of the application of the credit scoring model to determine whether it results in a disproportionate impact on the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), A model that disproportionately affects any such class of persons is presumed to have a disparate impact and is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory. Statistical analysis shall be performed on the current insureds of the insurer using the proposed credit scoring model, and shall include the raw data and detailed results on each classification set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. In lieu of such analysis insurers may use the alternative in 2. below. Alternatively, insurers may submit statistical studies and analyses that have been performed by educational institutions, independent professional associations, or other reputable entities recognized in the field, that indicate that there is no disproportionate impact on any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. attributable to the use of credit reports or scores. Any such studies or analyses shall have been done concerning the specific credit scoring model proposed by the insurer. The Office will utilize generally accepted statistical analysis principles in reviewing studies submitted which support the insurer's analysis that the credit scoring model does not disproportionately impact any class based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. The Office will permit reliance on such studies only to the extent that they permit independent verification of the results. The testing or validation results obtained in the course of the assessment in paragraphs (d) and (f) above. Internal Insurer data that validates the premium differentials proposed based on the scores or ranges of scores. Industry or countrywide data may be used to the extent that the Florida insurer data lacks credibility based upon generally accepted actuarial standards. Insurers using industry or countrywide data for validation shall supply Florida insurer data and demonstrate that generally accepted actuarial standards would allow reliance on each set of data to the extent the insurer has done so. Validation data including claims on personal lines residential insurance policies that are the result of acts of God shall not be used unless such acts occurred prior to January 1, 2004. The mere copying of another company's system will not fulfill the requirement to validate proposed premium differentials unless the filer has used a method or system for less than 3 years and demonstrates that it is not cost effective to retrospectively analyze its own data. Companies under common ownership, management, and control may copy to fulfill the requirement to validate proposed premium differentials if they demonstrate that the characteristics of the business to be written by the affiliate doing the copying are sufficiently similar to the affiliate being copied to presume common differentials will be accurate. The credibility standards and any judgmental adjustments, including limitations on effects, that have been used in the process of deriving premium differentials proposed and validated in paragraph (i) above. An explanation of how the credit scoring methodology treats discrepancies in the information that could have been obtained from different consumer reporting agencies: Equifax, Experian, or TransUnion. This shall not be construed to require insurers to obtain multiple reports for each insured or applicant. 1. The date that each of the analyses, tests, and validations required in paragraphs (d) through (j) above was most recently performed, and a certification that the results continue to be applicable. 2. Any item not reviewed in the previous 5 years is unacceptable. Specific Authority 624.308(1), 626.9741(8) FS. Law Implemented 624.307(1), 626.9741 FS. History-- New . The Petition 1. Statutory Definitions of "Unfairly Discriminatory" The main issue raised by Petitioners is that the Proposed Rule's definition of "unfairly discriminatory," and those portions of the Proposed Rule that rely on this definition, are invalid because they are vague, and enlarge, modify, and contravene the provisions of the law implemented and other provisions of the insurance code. Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, does not define "unfairly discriminatory." Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, provides that a rate filing using credit reports or scores "must comply with the requirements of s. 627.062 or s. 627.0651 to ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that the FSC may adopt rules, including standards to ensure that rates or premiums "associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence." Chapter 627, Part I, Florida Statutes, is referred to as the "Rating Law." § 627.011, Fla. Stat. The purpose of the Rating Law is to "promote the public welfare by regulating insurance rates . . . to the end that they shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." § 627.031(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The Rating Law provisions referenced by Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, in relation to ensuring that rates are not "unfairly discriminatory" are Sections 627.062 and 627.0651, Florida Statutes. Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, titled "Rate standards," provides that "[t]he rates for all classes of insurance to which the provisions of this part are applicable shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." § 627.062(1), Fla. Stat. Subsection 627.062(2)(e)6., Florida Statutes, provides: A rate shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory as to a risk or group of risks if the application of premium discounts, credits, or surcharges among such risks does not bear a reasonable relationship to the expected loss and expense experience among the various risks. Section 627.0651, Florida Statutes, titled "Making and use of rates for motor vehicle insurance," provides, in relevant part: One rate shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory in relation to another in the same class if it clearly fails to reflect equitably the difference in expected losses and expenses. Rates are not unfairly discriminatory because different premiums result for policyholders with like loss exposures but different expense factors, or like expense factors but different loss exposures, so long as rates reflect the differences with reasonable accuracy. Rates are not unfairly discriminatory if averaged broadly among members of a group; nor are rates unfairly discriminatory even though they are lower than rates for nonmembers of the group. However, such rates are unfairly discriminatory if they are not actuarially measurable and credible and sufficiently related to actual or expected loss and expense experience of the group so as to assure that nonmembers of the group are not unfairly discriminated against. Use of a single United States Postal Service zip code as a rating territory shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory. Petitioners point out that each of these statutory examples describing "unfairly discriminatory" rates has an actuarial basis, i.e., rates must be related to the actual or expected loss and expense factors for a given group or class, rather than any extraneous factors. If two risks have the same expected losses and expenses, the insurer must charge them the same rate. If the risks have different expected losses and expenses, the insurer must charge them different rates. Michael Miller, Petitioners' expert actuary, testified that the term "unfairly discriminatory" has been used in the insurance industry for well over 100 years and has always had this cost-based definition. Mr. Miller is a fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society ("CAS"), a professional organization whose purpose is the advancement of the body of knowledge of actuarial science, including the promulgation of industry standards and a code of professional conduct. Mr. Miller was chair of the CAS ratemaking committee when it developed the CAS "Statement of Principles Regarding Property and Casualty Insurance Ratemaking," a guide for actuaries to follow when establishing rates.5 Principle 4 of the Statement of Principles provides: "A rate is reasonable and not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially sound estimate of the expected value of all future costs associated with an individual risk." In layman's terms, Mr. Miller explained that different types of risks are reflected in a rate calculation. To calculate the expected cost of a given risk, and thus the rate to be charged, the insurer must determine the expected losses for that risk during the policy period. The loss portion reflects the risk associated with an occurrence and the severity of a claim. While the loss portion does not account for the entirety of the rate charged, it is the most important in terms of magnitude. Mr. Miller cautioned that the calculation of risk is a quantification of expected loss, but not an attempt to predict who is going to have an accident or make a claim. There is some likelihood that every insured will make a claim, though most never do, and this uncertainty is built into the incurred loss portion of the rate. No single risk factor is a complete measure of a person's likelihood of having an accident or of the severity of the ensuing claim. The prediction of losses is determined through a risk classification plan that take into consideration many risk factors (also called rating factors) to determine the likelihood of an accident and the extent of the claim. As to automobile insurance, Mr. Miller listed such risk factors as the age, gender, and marital status of the driver, the type, model and age of the car, the liability limits of the coverage, and the geographical location where the car is garaged. As to homeowners insurance, Mr. Miller listed such risk factors as the location of the home, its value and type of construction, the age of the utilities and electrical wiring, and the amount of insurance to be carried. 2. Credit Scoring as a Rating Factor In the current market, the credit score of the applicant or insured is a rating factor common to automobile and homeowners insurance. Subsection 626.9741(2)(c), Florida Statutes, defines "credit score" as follows: a score, grade, or value that is derived by using any or all data from a credit report in any type of model, method, or program, whether electronically, in an algorithm, computer software or program, or any other process, for the purpose of grading or ranking credit report data. "Credit scores" (more accurately termed "credit-based insurance scores") are derived from credit data that have been found to be predictive of a loss. Lamont Boyd, Fair Isaac's insurance market manager, explained the manner in which Fair Isaac produced its credit scoring model. The company obtained information from various insurance companies on millions of customers. This information included the customers' names, addresses, and the premiums earned by the companies on those policies as well as the losses incurred. Fair Isaac next requested the credit reporting agencies to review their archived files for the credit information on those insurance company customers. The credit agencies matched the credit files with the insurance customers, then "depersonalized" the files so that there was no way for Fair Isaac to know the identity of any particular customer. According to Mr. Lamont, the data were "color blind" and "income blind." Fair Isaac's analysts took these files from the credit reporting agencies and studied the data in an effort to find the most predictive characteristics of future loss propensity. The model was developed to account for all the predictive characteristics identified by Fair Isaac's analysts, and to give weight to those characteristics in accordance to their relative accuracy as predictors of loss. Fair Isaac does not directly sell its credit scores to insurance companies. Rather, Fair Isaac's models are implemented by the credit reporting agencies. When an insurance company wants Fair Isaac's credit score, it purchases access to the model's results from the credit reporting agency. Other vendors offer similar credit scoring models to insurance companies, and in recent years, some insurance companies have developed their own scoring models. Several academic studies of credit scoring were admitted and discussed at the final hearing in these cases. There appears to be no serious debate that credit scoring is a valid and important predictor of losses. The controversy over the use of credit scoring arises over its possible "unfairly discriminatory" impact "based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence." § 626.9741(8)(c), Fla. Stat. Mr. Miller was one of two principal authors of a June 2003 study titled, "The Relationship of Credit-Based Insurance Scores to Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Loss Propensity." This study was commissioned by several insurance industry trade organizations, including AIA and NAMIC. The study addressed three questions: whether credit-based insurance scores are related to the propensity for loss; whether credit- based insurance scores measure risk that is already measured by other risk factors; and what is the relative importance to accurate risk assessment of the use of credit-based insurance scores. The study was based on a nationwide random sample of private passenger automobile policy and claim records. Records from all 50 states were included in roughly the same proportion as each state's registered motor vehicles bear to total registered vehicles in the United States. The data samples were provided by seven insurers, and represented approximately 2.7 million automobiles, each insured for 12 months.6 The study examined all major automobile coverages: bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments coverage, personal injury protection coverage, comprehensive coverage, and collision coverage. The study concluded that credit-based insurance scores were correlated with loss propensity. The study found that insurance scores overlap to some degree with other risk factors, but that after fully accounting for the overlaps, insurance scores significantly increase the accuracy of the risk assessment process. The study found that, for each of the six automobile coverages examined, insurance scores are among the three most important risk factors.7 Mr. Miller's study did not examine the question of causality, i.e., why credit-based insurance scores are predictive of loss propensity. Dr. Patrick Brockett testified for Petitioners as an expert in actuarial science, risk management and insurance, and statistics. Dr. Brockett is a professor in the departments of management science and information systems, finance, and mathematics at the University of Texas at Austin. He occupies the Gus S. Wortham Memorial Chair in Risk Management and Insurance, and is the director of the university's risk management and insurance program. Dr. Brockett is the former director of the University of Texas' actuarial science program and continues to direct the study of students seeking their doctoral degrees in actuarial science. His areas of academic research are actuarial science, risk management and insurance, statistics, and general quantitative methods in business. Dr. Brockett has written more than 130 publications, most of which relate to actuarial science and insurance. He has spent his entire career in academia, and has never been employed by an insurance company. In 2002, Lieutenant Governor Bill Ratliff of Texas asked the Bureau of Business Research ("BBR") of the University of Texas' McCombs School of Business to provide an independent, nonpartisan study to examine the relationship between credit history and insurance losses in automobile insurance. Dr. Brockett was one of four named authors of this BBR study, issued in March 2003 and titled, "A Statistical Analysis of the Relationship between Credit History and Insurance Losses." The BBR research team solicited data from insurance companies representing the top 70 percent of the automobile insurers in Texas, and compiled a database of more than 173,000 automobile insurance policies from the first quarter of 1998 that included the following 12 months' premium and loss history. ChoicePoint was then retained to match the named insureds with their credit histories and to supply a credit score for each insured person. The BBR research team then examined the credit score and its relationship with prospective losses for the insurance policy. The results were summarized in the study as follows: Using logistic and multiple regression analyses, the research team tested whether the credit score for the named insured on a policy was significantly related to incurred losses for that policy. It was determined that there was a significant relationship. In general, lower credit scores were associated with larger incurred losses. Next, logistic and multiple regression analyses examined whether the revealed relationship between credit score and incurred losses was explainable by existing underwriting variables, or whether the credit score added new information about losses not contained in the existing underwriting variables. It was determined that credit score did yield new information not contained in the existing underwriting variables. What the study does not attempt to explain is why credit scoring adds significantly to the insurer's ability to predict insurance losses. In other words, causality was not investigated. In addition, the research team did not examine such variables as race, ethnicity, and income in the study, and therefore this report does not speculate about the possible effects that credit scoring may have in raising or lowering premiums for specific groups of people. Such an assessment would require a different study and different data. At the hearing, Dr. Brockett testified that the BBR study demonstrated a "strong and significant relationship between credit scoring and incurred losses," and that credit scoring retained its predictive power even after the other risk variables were accounted for. Dr. Brockett further testified that credit scoring has a disproportionate effect on the classifications of age and marital status, because the very young tend to have credit scores that are lower than those of older people. If the question is simply whether the use of credit scores will have a greater impact on the young and the single, the answer would be in the affirmative. However, Dr. Brockett also noted that young, single people will also have higher losses than older, married people, and, thus, the use of credit scores is not "unfairly discriminatory" in the sense that term is employed in the insurance industry.8 Mr. Miller testified that nothing in the actuarial standards of practice requires that a risk factor be causally related to a loss. The Actuarial Standards Board's Standard of Practice 12,9 dealing with risk classification, states that a risk factor is appropriate for use if there is a demonstrated relationship between the risk factor and the insurance losses, and that this relationship may be established by statistical or other mathematical analysis of data. If the risk characteristic is shown to be related to an expected outcome, the actuary need not establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the risk characteristic and the expected outcome. As an example, Mr. Miller offered the fact that past automobile accidents do not cause future accidents, although past accidents are predictive of future risk. Past traffic violations, the age of the driver, the gender of the driver, and the geographical location are all risk factors in automobile insurance, though none of these factors can be said to cause future accidents. They help insurers predict the probability of a loss, but do not predict who will have an accident or why the accident will occur. Mr. Miller opined that credit scoring is a similar risk factor. It is demonstrably significant as a predictor of risk, though there is no causal relationship between credit scores and losses and only an incomplete understanding of why credit scoring works as a predictor of loss. At the hearing, Dr. Brockett discussed a study that he has co-authored with Linda Golden, a business professor at the University of Texas at Austin. Titled "Biological and Psychobehavioral Correlates of Risk Taking, Credit Scores, and Automobile Insurance Losses: Toward an Explication of Why Credit Scoring Works," the study has been peer-reviewed and at the time of the hearing had been accepted for publication in the Journal of Risk and Insurance. In this study, the authors conducted a detailed review of existing scientific literature concerning the biological, psychological, and behavioral attributes of risky automobile drivers and insured losses, and a similar review of literature concerning the biological, psychological, and behavioral attributes of financial risk takers. The study found that basic chemical and psychobehavioral characteristics, such as a sensation-seeking personality type, are common to individuals exhibiting both higher insured automobile losses and poorer credit scores. Dr. Brockett testified that this study provides a direction for future research into the reasons why credit scoring works as an insurance risk characteristic. 3. The Proposed Rule's Definition of "Unfairly Discriminatory" Petitioners contend that the Proposed Rule's definition of the term "unfairly discriminatory" expands upon and is contrary to the statutory definition of the term discussed in section C.1. supra, and that this expanded definition operates to impose a ban on the use of credit scoring by insurance companies. As noted above, Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, does not define the term "unfairly discriminatory." The provisions of the Rating Law10 define the term as it is generally understood by the insurance industry: a rate is deemed "unfairly discriminatory" if the premium charged does not equitably reflect the differences in expected losses and expenses between policyholders. Two provisions of Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, employ the term "unfairly discriminatory": (5) A rate filing that uses credit reports or credit scores must comply with the requirements of s. 627.062 or s. 627.0651 to ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. * * * (8) The commission may adopt rules to administer this section. The rules may include, but need not be limited to: * * * (c) Standards that ensure that rates or premiums associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Petitioners contend that the statute's use of the term "unfairly discriminatory" is unexceptionable, that the Legislature simply intended the term to be used and understood in the traditional sense of actuarial soundness alone. Respondents agree that Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, calls for the agency to apply the traditional definition of "unfairly discriminatory" as that term is employed in the statutes directly referenced, Sections 627.062 and 627.0651, Florida Statutes, the relevant texts of which are set forth in Findings of Fact 18 and 19 above. However, Respondents contend that Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, calls for more than the application of the Rating Law's definition of the term. Respondents assert that in the context of this provision, "unfairly discriminatory" contemplates not only the predictive function, but also "discrimination" in its more common sense, as the term is employed in state and federal civil rights law regarding race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. At the hearing, OIR General Counsel Steven Parton testified as to the reasons why the agency chose the federal body of law using the term "disparate impact" as the test for unfair discrimination in the Proposed Rule: Well, first of all, what we were looking for is a workable definition that people would have some understanding as to what it meant when we talked about unfair discrimination. We were also looking for a test that did not require any willfulness, because it was not our concern that, in fact, insurance companies were engaging willfully in unfair discrimination. What we believed is going on, and we think all of the studies that are out there suggest, is that credit scoring is having a disparate impact upon various people, whether it be income, whether it be race. . . . Respondents' position is that Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, requires that a proposed rate or premium be rejected if it has a "disproportionately" negative effect on one of the named classes of persons, even though the rate or premium equitably reflects the differences in expected losses and expenses between policyholders. In the words of Mr. Parton, "This is not an actuarial rule." Mr. Parton explained the agency's rationale for employing a definition of "unfairly discriminatory" that is different from the actuarial usage employed in the Rating Law. Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, already provides that an insurer's rate filings may not be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory" in the actuarial sense. To read Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, as simply a reiteration of the actuarial "unfair discrimination" rule would render the provision, "a nullity. There would be no force and effect with regards to that." Thus, the Proposed Rule defines "unfairly discriminatory" to mean "that adverse decisions resulting from the use of a credit scoring methodology disproportionately affects persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S." Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(1)(e). OIR's actuary, Howard Eagelfeld, explained that "disproportionate effect" means "having a different effect on one group . . . causing it to pay more or less premium than its proportionate share in the general population or than it would have to pay based upon all other known considerations." Mr. Eagelfeld's explanation is not incorporated into the language of the Proposed Rule. Consistent with the actuarial definition of "unfairly discriminatory," the Proposed Rule requires that any credit scoring methodology must be "demonstrated to be a valid predictor of the insurance risk to be assumed by an insurer for the applicable type of insurance," and sets forth detailed criteria through which the insurer can make the required demonstration. Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(9)(a)-(f) and (h)-(l). Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(9)(g) sets forth Respondents' "civil rights" usage of the term "unfairly discriminatory." The insurer's demonstration of the validity of its credit scoring methodology must include: [d]ocumentation consisting of statistical testing of the application of the credit scoring model to determine whether it results in a disproportionate impact on the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. A model that disproportionately affects any such class of persons is presumed to have a disparate impact and is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory.11 Mr. Parton, who testified in defense of the Proposed Rule as one of its chief draftsmen, stated that the agency was concerned that the use of credit scoring may be having a disproportionate effect on minorities. Respondents believe that credit scoring may simply be a surrogate measure for income, and that using income as a basis for setting rates would have an obviously disparate impact on lower-income persons, including the young and the elderly. Mr. Parton testified that "neither the insurance industry nor anyone else" has researched the theory that credit scoring may be a surrogate for income. Mr. Miller referenced a 1998 analysis performed by AIA indicating that the average credit scores do not vary significantly according to the income group. In fact, the lowest income group (persons making less than $15,000 per year) had the highest average credit score, and the average credit scores actually dropped as income levels rose until the income range reached $50,000 to $74,000 per year, when the credit scores began to rise. Mr. Miller testified that a credit score is no more predictive of income level than a coin flip. However, Respondents introduced a January 2003 report to the Washington State Legislature prepared by the Social & Economic Sciences Research Center of Washington State University, titled "Effect of Credit Scoring on Auto Insurance Underwriting and Pricing." The purpose of the study was to determine whether credit scoring has unequal impacts on specific demographic groups. For this study, the researchers received data from three insurance companies on several thousand randomly chosen customers, including the customers' age, gender, residential zip code, and their credit scores and/or rate classifications. The researchers contacted about 1,000 of each insurance company's customers and obtained information about their ethnicity, marital status, and income levels. The study's findings were summarized as follows: The demographic patterns discerned by the study are: Age is the most significant factor. In almost every analysis, older drivers have, on average, higher credit scores, lower credit-based rate assignments, and less likelihood of lacking a valid credit score. Income is also a significant factor. Credit scores and premium costs improve as income rises. People in the lowest income categories-- less than $20,000 per year and between $20,000 and $35,000 per year-- often experienced higher premiums and lower credit scores. More people in lower income categories also lacked sufficient credit history to have a credit score. Ethnicity was found to be significant in some cases, but because of differences among the three firms studied and the small number of ethnic minorities in the samples, the data are not broadly conclusive. In general, Asian/Pacific Islanders had credit scores more similar to whites than to other minorities. When other minority groups had significant differences from whites, the differences were in the direction of higher premiums. In the sample of cases where insurance was cancelled based on credit score, minorities who were not Asian/Pacific Islanders had greater difficulty finding replacement insurance, and were more likely to experience a lapse in insurance while they searched for a new policy. The analysis also considered gender, marital status and location, but for these factors, significant unequal effects were far less frequent. (emphasis added) The evidence appears equivocal on the question of whether credit scoring is a surrogate for income. The Washington study seems to indicate that ethnicity may be a significant factor in credit scoring, but that significant unequal effects are infrequent regarding gender and marital status. The evidence demonstrates that the use of credit scores by insurers would tend to have a negative impact on young people. Mr. Miller testified that persons between ages 25 and 30 have lower credit scores than older people. Petitioners argue that by defining "unfairly discriminatory" to mean "disproportionate effect," the Proposed Rule effectively prohibits insurers from using credit scores, if only because all the parties recognize that credit scores have a "disproportionate effect" on young people. Petitioners contend that this prohibition is in contravention of Section 626.9741(1), Florida Statutes, which states that the purpose of the statute is to "regulate and limit" the use of credit scores, not to ban them outright. Respondents counter that if the use of credit scores is "unfairly discriminatory" toward one of the listed classes of persons in contravention of Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, then the "limitation" allowed by the statute must include prohibition. This point is obviously true but sidesteps the real issues: whether the statute's undefined prohibition on "unfair discrimination" authorizes the agency to employ a "disparate impact" or "disproportionate effect" definition in the Proposed Rule, and, if so, whether the Proposed Rule sufficiently defines any of those terms to permit an insurer to comply with the rule's requirements. Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(2) provides that the insurer bears the burden of demonstrating that its credit scoring methodology does not disproportionately affect persons based upon their race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Petitioners state that no insurer can demonstrate, consistent with the Proposed Rule, that its credit scoring methodology does not have a disproportionate effect on persons based upon their age. Therefore, no insurer will ever be permitted to use credit scores under the terms of the Proposed Rule. As discussed more fully in Findings of Fact 73 through 76 below, Petitioners also contend that the Proposed Rule provides no guidance as to what "disproportionate effect" and "disparate impact" mean, and that this lack of definitional guidance will permit the agency to reject any rate filing that uses credit scoring, based upon an arbitrary determination that it has a "disproportionate effect" on one of the classes named in Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes. Petitioners also presented evidence that no insurer collects data on race, color, religion, or national origin from applicants or insureds. Mr. Miller testified that there is no reliable independent source for race, color, religious affiliation, or national origin data. Mr. Eagelfeld agreed that there is no independent source from which insurers can obtain credible data on race or religious affiliation. Mr. Parton testified that this lack of data can be remedied by the insurance companies commencing to request race, color, religion, and national origin information from their customers, because there is no legal impediment to their doing so. Mr. Miller testified that he would question the reliability of the method suggested by Mr. Parton because many persons will refuse to answer such sensitive questions or may not answer them correctly. Mr. Miller stated that, as an actuary, he would not certify the results of a study based on demographic data obtained in this manner and would qualify any resulting actuarial opinion due to the unreliability of the database. Petitioners also object to the vagueness of the broad categories of "race, color, religion and national origin." Mr. Miller testified that the Proposed Rule lacks "operational definitions" for those terms that would enable insurers to perform the required calculations. The Proposed Rule places the burden on the insurer to demonstrate no disproportionate effect on persons based on these categories, but offers no guidance as to how these demographic classes should be categorized by an insurer seeking to make such a demonstration. Petitioners point out that even if the insurer is able to ascertain the categories sought by the regulators, the Proposed Rule gives no guidance as to whether the "disproportionate effect" criterion mandates perfect proportionality among all races, colors, religions, and national origins, or whether some degree of difference is tolerable. Petitioners contend that this lack of guidance provides unbridled discretion to the regulator to reject any disproportionate effect study submitted by an insurer. At his deposition, Mr. Parton was asked how an insurer should break down racial classifications in order to show that there is no disproportionate effect on race. His answer was as follows: There is African-American, Cuban-American, Spanish-American, African-American, Haitian- American. Are you-- you know, whatever the make-up of your book of business is-- you're the one in control of it. You can ask these folks what their ethnic background is. At his deposition, Mr. Parton frankly admitted that he had no idea what "color" classifications an insurer should use, yet he also stated that an insurer must demonstrate no disproportionate effect on each and every listed category, including "color." At the final hearing, when asked to list the categories of "color," Mr. Parton responded, "I suppose Indian, African-American, Chinese, Japanese, all of those."12 At the final hearing, Mr. Parton was asked whether the Proposed Rule contemplates requiring insurers to demonstrate distinctions between such groups as "Latvian-Americans" and "Czech-Americans." Mr. Parton's reply was as follows: No. And I don't think it was contemplated by the Legislature. . . . The question is race by any other name, whether it be national origin, ethnicity, color, is something that they're concerned about in terms of an impact. What we would anticipate, and what we have always anticipated, is the industry would demonstrate whether or not there is an adverse effect against those folks who have traditionally in Florida been discriminated against, and that would be African-Americans and certain Hispanic groups. In our opinion, at least, if you could demonstrate that the credit scoring was not adversely impacting it, it may very well answer the questions to any other subgroup that you may want to name. At the hearing, Mr. Parton was also questioned as to distinctions between religions and testified as follows: The impact of credit scoring on religion is going to be in the area of what we call thin files, or no files. That is to say people who do not have enough credit history from which credit scores can be done, or they're going to be treated somehow differently because of that lack of history. A simple question that needs to be asked by the insurance company is: "Do you, as a result of your religious belief or whatever [sect] you are in, are you forbidden as a precept of your religious belief from engaging in the use of credit?" When cross-examined on the subject, Mr. Parton could not confidently identify any religious group that forbids the use of credit. He thought that Muslims and Quakers may be such groups. Mr. Parton concluded by stating, "I don't think it is necessary to identify those groups. The question is whether or not you have a religious group that you prescribe to that forbids it." Petitioners contend that, in addition to failing to define the statutory terms of race, color, religion, and national origin in a manner that permits insurer compliance, the Proposed Rule fails to provide an operational definition of "disproportionate effect." The following is a hypothetical question put to Mr. Parton at his deposition, and Mr. Parton's answer: Q: Let's assume that African-Americans make up 10 percent of the population. Let's just use two groups for the sake of clarity. Caucasians make up 90 percent. If the application of credit scoring in underwriting results in African-Americans paying 11 percent of the premium and Caucasians paying 89 percent of the premium, is that, in your mind, a disproportionate affect [sic]? A: It may be. I think it would give rise under this rule that perhaps there is a presumption that it is, but that presumption is not [an irrebuttable] one.[13] For instance, if you then had testimony that a 1 percent difference between the two was statistically insignificant, then I would suggest that that presumption would be overridden. This answer led to a lengthy discussion regarding a second hypothetical in which African-Americans made up 29 percent of the population, and also made up 35 percent of the lowest, or most unfavorable, tier of an insurance company's risk classifications. Mr. Parton ultimately opined that if the difference in the two numbers was found to be "statistically significant" and attributable only to the credit score, then he would conclude that the use of credit scoring unfairly discriminated against African-Americans. As to whether his answer would be the same if the hypothetical were adjusted to state that African-Americans made up 33 percent of the lowest tier, Mr. Parton responded: "That would be up to expert testimony to be provided on it. That's what trials are all about."14 Aside from expert testimony to demonstrate that the difference was "statistically insignificant," Mr. Parton could think of no way that an insurer could rebut the presumption that the difference was unfairly discriminatory under the "disproportionate effect" definition set forth in the proposed rule. He stated that, "I can't anticipate, nor does the rule propose to anticipate, doing the job of the insurer of demonstrating that its rates are not unfairly discriminatory." Mr. Parton testified that an insurer's showing that the credit score was a valid and important predictor of risk would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption of disproportionate effect. Summary Findings Credit-based insurance scoring is a valid and important predictor of risk, significantly increasing the accuracy of the risk assessment process. The evidence is still inconclusive as to why credit scoring is an effective predictor of risk, though a study co-authored by Dr. Brockett has found that basic chemical and psychobehavioral characteristics, such as a sensation-seeking personality type, are common to individuals exhibiting both higher insured automobile losses and poorer credit scores. Though the evidence was equivocal on the question of whether credit scoring is simply a surrogate for income, the evidence clearly demonstrated that the use of credit scores by insurance companies has a greater negative overall effect on young people, who tend to have lower credit scores than older people. Petitioners and Fair Isaac emphasized their contention that compliance with the Proposed Rule would be impossible, and thus the Proposed Rule in fact would operate as a prohibition on the use of credit scoring by insurance companies. At best, Petitioners demonstrated that compliance with the Proposed Rule would be impracticable at first, given the current business practices in the industry regarding the collection of customer data regarding race and religion. The evidence indicated no legal barriers to the collection of such data by the insurance companies. Questions as to the reliability of the data are speculative until a methodology for the collection of the data is devised. Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, authorizes the FSC to adopt rules that may include: Standards that ensure that rates or premiums associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Petitioners' contention that the statute's use of "unfairly discriminatory" contemplates nothing more than the actuarial definition of the term as employed by the Rating Law is rejected. As Respondents pointed out, Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, provides that a rate filing using credit scores must comply with the Rating Law's requirements that the rates not be "unfairly discriminatory" in the actuarial sense. If Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, merely reiterates the actuarial requirement, then it is, in Mr. Parton's words, "a nullity."15 Thus, it is found that the Legislature contemplated some level of scrutiny beyond actuarial soundness to determine whether the use of credit scores "unfairly discriminates" in the case of the classes listed in Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes. It is found that the Legislature empowered FSC to adopt rules establishing standards to ensure that an insurer's rates or premiums associated with the use of credit scores meet this added level of scrutiny. However, it must be found that the term "unfairly discriminatory" as employed in the Proposed Rule is essentially undefined. FSC has not adopted a "standard" by which insurers can measure their rates and premiums, and the statutory term "unfairly discriminatory" is thus subject to arbitrary enforcement by the regulating agency. Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(1)(e) defines "unfairly discriminatory" in terms of adverse decisions that "disproportionately affect" persons in the classes set forth in Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, but does not define what is a "disproportionate effect." At Subsection (9)(g), the Proposed Rule requires "statistical testing" of the credit scoring model to determine whether it results in a "disproportionate impact" on the listed classes. This subsection attempts to define its terms as follows: A model that disproportionately affects any such class of persons is presumed to have a disparate impact and is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory. Thus, the Proposed Rule provides that a "disproportionate effect" equals a "disparate impact" equals "unfairly discriminatory," without defining any of these terms in such a way that an insurer could have any clear notion, prior to the regulator's pronouncement on its rate filing, whether its credit scoring methodology was in compliance with the rule. Indeed, Mr. Parton's testimony evinced a disinclination on the part of the agency to offer guidance to insurers who attempt to understand this circular definition. The tenor of his testimony indicated that the agency itself is unsure of exactly what an insurer could submit to satisfy the "disproportionate effect" test, aside from perfect proportionality, which all parties concede is not possible at least as to young people, or a showing that any lack of perfect proportionality is "statistically insignificant," whatever that means. Mr. Parton seemed to say that OIR will know a valid use of credit scoring when it sees one, though it cannot describe such a use beforehand. Mr. Eagelfeld offered what might be a workable definition of "disproportionate effect," but his definition is not incorporated into the Proposed Rule. Mr. Parton attempted to assure the Petitioners that OIR would take a reasonable view of the endless racial and ethnic categories that could be subsumed under the literal language of the Proposed Rule, but again, Mr. Parton's assurances are not part of the Proposed Rule. Mr. Parton's testimony referenced federal and state civil rights laws as the source for the term "disparate impact." Federal case law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, has defined a "disparate impact" claim as "one that 'involves employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.'" Adams v. Florida Power Corporation, 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001), quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1705, 123 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1993). The Proposed Rule does not reference this definition, nor did Mr. Parton detail how OIR proposes to apply or modify this definition in enforcing the Proposed Rule. Without further definition, all three of the terms employed in this circular definition are conclusions, not "standards" that the insurer and the regulator can agree upon at the outset of the statistical and analytical process leading to approval or rejection of the insurer's rates. Absent some definitional guidance, a conclusory term such as "disparate impact" can mean anything the regulator wishes it to mean in a specific case. The confusion is compounded by the Proposed Rule's failure to refine the broad terms "race," "color," and "religion" in a manner that would allow an insurer to prepare a meaningful rate submission utilizing credit scoring. In his testimony, Mr. Parton attempted to limit the Proposed Rule's impact to those groups "who have traditionally in Florida been discriminated against," but the actual language of the Proposed Rule makes no such distinction. Mr. Parton also attempted to limit the reach of "religion" to groups whose beliefs forbid them from engaging in the use of credit, but the language of the Proposed Rule does not support Mr. Parton's distinction.
