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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS vs COLLIER COUNTY, 07-002317GM (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Naples, Florida May 23, 2007 Number: 07-002317GM Latest Update: Apr. 15, 2011

Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A. Filed April 15, 2011 2:00 PM Division of Administrative Hearings FINAL ORDER NO. DCA 11-GM-067

Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b) (1) (C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER NO. DCA 11-GM-067 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished by the manner indicated to each of the persons listed below on this AV day of April, 2011. Paula Ford Agency Clerk By Inter-Agency Mail The Honorable Bram D. E. Canter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 By Electronic Mail Thomas W. Reese, Esquire 2951 61st Avenue South St. Petersburg, FL 33712 TWReeseEsq@aol.com Steven T. Williams, Esquire Office of the County Attorney Harmon Turner Bldg, 8th Floor 3301 East Tamiami Trail Naples, FL 34112 StevenWilliams@colliergov.net Richard D. Yovanovich, Esquire Goodlette, Coleman & Johnson, P.A. 4001 Tamiami Trail North, Suite 300 Naples FL 34103 ryovanovich@cyklawfirm.com FINAL ORDER NO. DCA 11~GM-067 Michael A. Durant, Esquire Conroy, Conroy & Durant, P.A. 2210 Vanderbuilt Beach Road, Suite 1201 Naples, FL 34109 mdurant@ccdlegal.com Lynette Norr, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Lynette .Norr@dca.state.fl.us

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MIAMI YACHT DIVERS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 96-005850 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 15, 1996 Number: 96-005850 Latest Update: Mar. 05, 1998

The Issue Whether Petitioner, Miami Yacht Divers, Inc., is entitled to reimbursement for cleanup costs.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering claims against the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund. Petitioner is a company located in Dade County, Florida, which performs commercial diving operations. Such operations include oil pollution containment and clean-up. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Dan Delmonico was the principal officer or owner for the Petitioner who supervised the operations of the company. In April of 1993, Mr. Delmonico discovered a fuel discharge next door to the premises of Defender Yacht, Inc., a company located on the Miami River in Dade County, Florida. The source of the discharge was an abandoned sunken vessel. This derelict vessel had no markings from which its ownership could be determined. Upon discovering the vessel, Mr. Delmonico did not contact local, state, or federal authorities to advise them of the discharge. Instead, Mr. Delmonico contacted several colleagues whose help he enlisted to assist him to clean up the discharge. In this regard, Mr. Delmonico procured the services of a diver and a crane company to remove the vessel from the water. Additionally, Mr. Delmonico utilized a boom and oil absorbent clean-up pads to remove the discharged fuel from the water. In total, Mr. Delmonico maintains it took four work days to complete the removal of the discharge and the salvage of the derelict vessel. At no time during this period did Mr. Delmonico contact local, state, or federal authorities to advise them of the foregoing activities. No official from any governmental entity supervised or approved the clean-up operation or salvage activity which is in dispute. After the fact Petitioner filed a reimbursement claim with the United States Coast Guard. Such claim was denied. Upon receipt of such denial, Petitioner filed the claim which is at issue in the instant case. In connection with this claim with Respondent, Petitioner submitted all forms previously tendered to the Coast Guard including the standard claim form, labor receipts, rental receipts, supply receipts, trailer and storage receipts, cash expenses, a job summary, and photographs. On or about September 20, 1996, Respondent issued a letter denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for expenses associated with the above-described salvage and clean-up activities. The grounds for the denial were the Petitioner's failure to obtain prior approval for the activities and the absence of "good cause" for the waiver of prior approval. Additionally, the Respondent maintained that Petitioner had failed to provide evidence that a pollutant discharge existed and that the removal of the vessel was necessary to abate and remove the discharge. It is undisputed by Petitioner that prior approval for the clean-up activities was not obtained. Petitioner timely disputed the denial and was afforded a point of entry to challenge such decision.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathelyn M. Jacques Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 N. Paul San Filippo, Esquire Seidensticker & San Filippo Parkway Financial Center 2150 Goodlette Road, Suite 305 Naples, Florida 34102

Florida Laws (2) 376.09376.11
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WILLIAM HACKETT vs FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, 20-000753 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 12, 2020 Number: 20-000753 Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2024

The Issue Whether the vessel ("Imagine") owned by Petitioner, William Hackett ("Petitioner"), is a "derelict vessel" within the meaning of section 823.11, Florida Statutes (2019); and, therefore, subject to the provisions of sections 376.15(3), 823.11, 705.101(3), and 705.103, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact On January 4, 2020, Officer Glen Way, a sworn FWC law enforcement officer, was on water patrol in an FWC patrol vessel within the public waters of Key West Harbor in Monroe County, Florida, when he observed a vessel (a 32-foot 1967 Hatteras known as "Imagine") sunken and nearly 90% submerged. There were no persons on board and the vessel looked abandoned. The electrical, propulsion, steering systems, and engines were well under sea water and inoperable. Based on his investigation, Officer Way concluded that the vessel suffered a severe marine casualty, had been discarded as sunk with no intrinsic value, and was derelict. His investigation further revealed that the vessel was owned by Petitioner. On January 8, 2020, Officer Way spoke with Petitioner and explained to him the derelict vessel process. That same day, Officer Way emailed Petitioner an Acknowledgement of Receipt of Documentation Related to A Derelict Vessel Determination. Subsequently, Petitioner had the vessel raised from being sunken and tied to a commercial salvage barge with a crane. Although the vessel was no longer sunk, it had been sunk for over two months and Officer Way observed that no corrective action had been taken by Petitioner to correct the systems. Significantly, Officer Way observed that the vessel’s propulsion and steering systems were still inoperable, the onboard engine was substantially corroded, and marine growth was visible along the waterline of the entire vessel. In addition, windows were boarded up with plywood, blocking the ability to safely navigate or operate the vessel upon the water. Officer Way also observed a 25-horsepower outboard motor affixed to the transom of the vessel. However, Officer Way persuasively and credibly testified that a 25-horsepower outboard motor is insufficient to propel the vessel safely upon the public waters of the State of Florida. In sum, the vessel was still wrecked, junked, substantially dismantled, and derelict. Subsequently, on July 28, 2020, and at 8:30 a.m. on August 13, 2020, Officer Way observed that the vessel was again sunk, inoperable, abandoned, left, wrecked, junked upon the public waters of the State, and derelict. The vessel has no intrinsic value. At the hearing on August 13, 2020, Petitioner candidly acknowledged that the vessel was again sunk and not operational.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner’s vessel, "Imagine," derelict under section 823.11, abandoned under chapter 705, and subject to the provisions of sections 376.15(3), 823.11, 705.101(3), and 705.103. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Brandy Elaine Elliott, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) William Hackett 419 Southard Street Key West, Florida 33040 Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57376.15705.101705.103823.11 DOAH Case (1) 20-0753
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GREGORY NELSON vs FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, 20-001715 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Apr. 02, 2020 Number: 20-001715 Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2024

The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a license to possess Class II Wildlife for exhibition or public sale should be approved.

Findings Of Fact FWC is the state agency with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate all wild animal life in Florida. See Art. IV, § 9, Fla. Const.1 1 All references to the Florida Constitution, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code are to current versions that have not substantively changed as applied to the facts in this case. All persons who possess captive wildlife for the purposes of public display or public sale must have a license from FWC. See § 379.3761(1), Fla. Stat. By rule promulgated by FWC, categories of wildlife for which a license is required are broken down into three classes. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A- 6.002. Generally, a person cannot possess Class I animals for personal pets unless they came into their possession prior to 1988. Class I animals include 24 different species generally considered extremely dangerous, and include wildlife such as chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, baboons, leopards, jaguars, tigers, bears, rhinoceros, elephants, hippopotamuses, crocodiles, and Komodo dragons. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A-6.002(1)(a). Class II animals include 38 different species that may, with a proper license, be possessed as personal pets or for commercial purposes. Class II animals have the potential to cause harm but not to the extent of Class I animals and include wildlife such as Howler monkeys, Patas monkeys, Vervet monkeys, Macaques, bobcats, wolves, wolverines, honey badgers, and alligators. See Fla. Admin Code R. 68A-6.002(1)(b). Class III animals include wildlife not listed as Class I or II. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A-6.002(1)(c). The application at issue in this case is Petitioner’s application, ID 75226, to possess, exhibit, or sell Class II wildlife. Petitioner’s application, dated September 9, 2019, identifies Macaques, Patas, Vervet, Grivet, and Green monkeys as species that he does not currently possess, put plans to possess. By letter to Petitioner dated February 5, 2020 (Denial Letter), FWC advised Petitioner that his application was being denied because of prior violations of law and FWC rules regulating wildlife. In particular, the Denial Letter states that on June 19, 2017, FWC investigator Rick Brown found Petitioner in possession of a Vervet monkey without a license. The Denial Letter explains that, on that same date, Petitioner told investigator Brown that Petitioner had sold a lemur, two squirrel monkeys, and an artic fox earlier in that year, but was unable to provide documents for those sales as required by FWC rule. According to the Denial Letter, Petitioner was issued misdemeanor citations for those violations and, on July 21, 2017, Petitioner received adjudication other than acquittal or dismissal for those violations. The Denial Letter also states that, during an investigation of Petitioner at a new location on February 13, 2018, conducted by FWC investigator Steve McDaniel, it was discovered that Petitioner had sold two ring-tail lemurs to an unlicensed individual on December 15, 2017, and that at the time of the sale Petitioner’s license was expired and was not otherwise valid for sales from Petitioner’s new location. The Denial Letter further states that as a result, Petitioner was issued a citation for selling the lemurs without a valid license and a written warning for selling to an unlicensed individual. According to the Denial Letter, on May 22, 2018, Petitioner received adjudication other than acquittal or dismissal for the citation. The Denial Letter concludes: Pursuant to Rule 68-1.010 [Florida Administrative Code], and due to facts stated above, your application has been denied. We are processing your application fee for a refund, and you should receive it within 21 days. During the hearing for this case, the factual basis set forth in the Denial Letter was demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence provided by the testimony of FWC investigators Brown and McDaniel, the documentary evidence, and Petitioner’s own testimony. Indeed, the evidence showed that during an investigation conducted by investigator Brown on June 19, 2017, Petitioner was found to be in possession of a Class II Vervet monkey without a proper license. Petitioner has never had a Class II license. It was also demonstrated that, at the time of that investigation, Petitioner was unable to produce sales records for a lemur, two squirrel monkeys, and an arctic fox that he had sold earlier that year. While Petitioner provided some documents at the hearing purporting to be records related to those sales, they were insufficient to overcome the preponderance of the evidence in this case. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted that he paid the fine from the citation issued against him for possession of the Vervet and lack of sales records. In addition, it was shown by a preponderance of the evidence that on December 15, 2017, Petitioner sold two ringtail lemurs to an unlicensed individual under a Class III license that was expired and that, prior to its expiration, had only been valid at his previous location, instead of the new location where the sale had taken place.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission issue a Final Order denying Petitioner Gregory Nelson’s application for a license to possess Class II wildlife for exhibition or public sale. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory Nelson 23033 Brouwerton Road Howey-in-the-Hills, Florida 34737 Rhonda E. Parnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed)

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57379.3761 Florida Administrative Code (3) 68-1.01068A-6.00268A-6.0023 DOAH Case (1) 20-1715
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JAMES HAMMONDS vs FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, 19-006307 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 25, 2019 Number: 19-006307 Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2024

The Issue Did Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (Commission) correctly deny the application of Petitioner, James Hammonds, to renew his Game Farm License (Case No. 19-6307)? Did the Commission correctly deny Mr. Hammonds' application to renew his License to Possess Class III Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale (Case No. 19-6326)?

Findings Of Fact The Parties Article IV, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution creates the Commission. It charges the Commission to "exercise the regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to wild animal life and fresh water aquatic life, and … exercise regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to marine life, … ." Chapter 379, Florida Statutes (2019), implements the constitutional provision and did so in 2017. Mr. Hammonds owns and operates The Monkey Whisperer in Parrish, Florida. He breeds and sells exotic animals. Mr. Hammonds holds five separate licenses authorizing him to own, breed, sell, and transport wild life. They are a Class III license5 (with a Capuchin Monkey and Spider Monkey endorsement) that authorizes him to exhibit and sell wildlife, a game farm license, a deer herd management license, a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) transport license, and a USDA license to trade in wildlife animals. The renewal of his Game Farm License and License for Exhibition and Public Sale of Wildlife are the subject of this matter. The Commission refused to renew both. Mr. Hammonds has held these two licenses since 2012. Since obtaining his licenses, Mr. Hammonds has passed all Commission inspections. In addition, the Commission has issued him a game farm license. The 2012 Conviction In 2012 Mr. Hammonds pleaded no contest to a charge of unlawfully selling wildlife to an unpermitted entity. The offense was sale of a marmoset at a flea market to an unlicensed purchaser. The record does not provide a citation to the statute violated. Mr. Hammonds was new to the exotic animal trade. He relied upon statements by the purchaser and a Commission representative that the Commission had issued the purchaser a license and that it was en route. The court adjudicated Mr. Hammonds guilty and ordered him to pay a fine and costs totaling $450.00. It also required Mr. Hammonds to pay an additional $50.00 for costs of prosecution. Mr. Hammonds paid the fine and 5 Section 379.3762(2), Florida Statutes (2019), creates three classifications of wildlife types. Class I is wildlife that because of its nature, habit, or status may not be possessed as a pet. Class II is wildlife presenting a real or potential threat to human safety. Class III is all wildlife not included in Classes I and II. costs. Aware of this conviction, the Commission nonetheless routinely approved Mr. Hammonds' license renewal applications and approved his application for a game farm license over the next six years. There is no evidence of or charge of any other violations by Mr. Hammonds until the charges involved in these cases. The Capuchin Monkey In October 2017, Mr. Hammonds sold a Capuchin monkey to Christina Brown. He verified her identity and Nevada residency by looking at her Nevada driver's license. Nevada does not require a license to own exotic animals, including Capuchin monkeys. The Commission did not prove that Ms. Brown did not hold a Florida permit to own wildlife.6 Mr. Hammonds had a few conversations with Ms. Brown and her assistant Manny Ortiz about the sale. On October 12, 2017, Mr. Hammonds completed the required USDA form, "Record of Acquisition, Disposition or Transport of Animals," for the Capuchin sale.7 Mr. Hammonds was advised that Jennifer and Michael Brister would pick up the monkey to transport it to Nevada. The Bristers are located in 6 Lack of proof is the hallmark of this case. The Commission relied solely upon the testimony of one witness. The testimony was almost entirely hearsay or descriptions of document contents. This is despite the Commission, according to its witness, having recordings, sworn statements, telephone records, and financial records to support its allegations. The Commission did not offer these into evidence. Hearsay alone cannot be the basis for a finding of fact unless it would be admissible over objection in a circuit court trial. § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2019). Document descriptions are subject to memory failings, incompleteness, inaccuracies, and other factors that make them less than persuasive. See § 90.952, Fla. Stat.; See Williams v. State, 386 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 1980). 7 The form does not have a field calling for the buyer's telephone number, or any telephone number for that matter. This is noted because the Commission's witness and Notices emphasize, as proof of guilt, an unsupported claim that Mr. Hammonds put his telephone number on the form where the buyer's telephone number went. The unsupported testimony and insistence on its significance is one of the reasons that the witness' testimony is given little credence or weight. Also Mr. O'Horo testified that the form showed a Virginia address for Ms. Brown. It shows a Nevada address. Tennessee. The Bristers held a USDA Class T Carrier permit issued under the federal Animal Welfare Act. Mr. Hammonds obtained proof that the Bristers held this federal permit required for interstate transport of the monkey. He went so far as to obtain a copy of their USDA certification to provide this service. Mr. Hammonds was also aware that the Bristers frequently did business in Florida. Other breeders recommended them highly. The Commission did not prove that the Bristers did not hold a Florida permit to own wildlife. The Bristers picked up the monkey, on behalf of Ms. Brown, from Mr. Hammonds in Florida. Other than to receive a telephone call reporting that the monkey had been delivered, Mr. Hammonds had no further contact with or communications about the monkey or Ms. Brown until the Commission's investigator contacted him. There is no admissible, credible, persuasive evidence about what happened to the monkey from this point forward. The Commission offered only uncorroborated hearsay testimony from Mr. O'Horo on this subject. The Rhesus Macaque Monkey Mr. Hammonds also assists people in rescues of exotic animals whose owners have realized they cannot care for them. In 2017, Mr. Hammonds facilitated the transfer of a Rhesus Macaque monkey from one individual to another. A Macaque monkey is a Class II animal. The monkey owner came to Mr. Hammonds' business seeking assistance because he could not handle the monkey. The monkey was in a pet carrier. Mr. Hammonds recalled a woman in Orlando who had contacted him in the past seeking a Macaque. He put the two individuals in touch with each other. The two individuals agreed to the exchange of the monkey. The woman came the same day, met the Macaque owner, and accepted the monkey from him. The owner kept the monkey with him in the carrier until he gave it to the woman. Mr. Hammonds was paid for his services in facilitating the exchange. There is no competent, persuasive evidence that Mr. Hammonds ever had ownership, physical possession, control, or custody of the Macaque monkey in any form.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, issue a final order renewing the Game Farm License and the License to Possess Class III Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale of Petitioner, James Hammonds. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda E. Parnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) David A. Fernandez, Esquire Florida Trial Counsel 4705 26th Street West, Suite A Bradenton, Florida 34207 (eServed) Sean P. Flynn, Esquire Flynn Law, P.A. 2200 Manatee Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34025 (eServed) Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57379.3761379.3762837.0690.952 Florida Administrative Code (6) 68-1.01068A -6.002368A-1.00468A-6.002268A-6.002368A-6.003 DOAH Case (3) 15-331019-630719-6326
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PHILLIP ROBBINS vs FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, 21-000188 (2021)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lehigh Acres, Florida Jan. 19, 2021 Number: 21-000188 Latest Update: Oct. 01, 2024

The Issue Did Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (Commission), correctly deny the application of Petitioner, Phillip Robbins, for a Public Exhibition of Conditional and/or Prohibited Species Permit (CSP)?

Findings Of Fact Article IV, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution creates the Commission. It charges the Commission to "exercise the regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to wild animal life and fresh water aquatic life, and … exercise regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to marine life, … ." Chapter 379, Florida Statutes (2020),1 implements the constitutional grant of authority. The Commission adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapters 68-1 and 68-5 to fulfill its constitutional and statutory duties. 1 All citations to Florida Statutes are to the 2020 codification, unless noted otherwise. Mr. Robbins operates a business that he calls Pan-Terra Exotics. He owns a Burmese python and has for over 25 years. From 2012 through 2017, Mr. Robbins sought and obtained the license required to possess the python, License to Possess Class II Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale (ESC). He also held and still holds a License to Possess Venomous Reptiles (VRC) that is not involved in this dispute. Mr. Robbins developed a pattern of letting his licenses lapse before applying to renew them. Mr. Robbins' 2015 ESC expired October 3, 2016. Mr. Robbins applied to renew it on October 11, 2016. The Commission issued the license November 2, 2016. Mr. Robbins' 2016 ESC expired October 3, 2017. Mr. Robbins applied to renew it November 8, 2017. The Commission issued the license November 14, 2017. It expired October 3, 2018. The ESCs which Mr. Robbins had held authorized him to possess his Burmese python. Mr. Robbins did not apply for, and consequently did not hold, an ESC after October 3, 2018. On March 11, 2020, Mr. Robbins applied for an ESC and VRC. The Commission issued the VRC on June 12, 2020. It did not issue the ESC. Mr. Robbins followed up on the ESC application with telephone calls and emails. By letter dated July 2, 2020, the Commission denied Mr. Robbins' ESC application. In pertinent part, the Notice of Denial stated: On July 1, 2020, FWC Executive Order 20-19 was signed, effectively altering regulation of species previously listed as Conditional Reptiles. EO 20-19 states in part: The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission … hereby establishes special regulations to take effect July 1, 2020, in order to conform with Laws of Florida that amends Section 379.372, Florida Statutes. This statute regulates certain high-risk nonnative invasive reptiles in Florida, particularly those listed as Conditional, Prohibited, Venomous, and Reptiles of Concern. These regulations are necessary due to ecological, economic and human health and safety concerns related to potential impacts of nonnative reptiles in Florida. The regulations below apply to the following species of reptile: a. Burmese or Indian python (Python molurus) A person, party, firm, association, or corporation may not keep, possess, import into the state, sell, barter, trade, or breed the above species except for educational, research, or eradication or control purposes. Facilities that meet the requirements for the possession of Prohibited species as described in Rule 68-5.007, F.A.C. may apply for an FWC Conditional/Prohibited/Nonnative Species Permit for these uses. The Captive Wildlife Program is no longer issuing authorizations for Conditional reptiles on the ESC license and applicants may no longer apply for an ESC license for the purpose of possessing Conditional, Prohibited, or Reptiles of Concern. For these reasons, your application is denied. The letter went on to give instructions on how to apply online for a CSP "under new regulations, … ." Mr. Robbins did not seek review of that decision. On July 14, 2020, Mr. Robbins applied for a CSP. He followed up on his application. On August 5, 2020, he submitted another application, this one typewritten. He also submitted a completed Critical Incident/Disaster Plan form, a power point file on Burmese pythons, and an image of his Facebook page along with it. As part of the application review process, Commission Investigator Robert O'Horo inspected Mr. Robbins' facility, which was the garage at his residence. There were no exterior signs indicating that the home was a place where a python, other reptiles, or any animals were on display or available for viewing. The python cage was located in Mr. Robbins' garage. There were no signs on the cage or in the garage providing information about the python, such as a description of its natural element or its diet. Mr. Robbins did not provide signs that may have been used but were not displayed at the time because he had paused his operation. Mr. Robbins also did not provide brochures or other printed materials with information about the python or other reptiles. There were no seating areas in the garage. The garage contained many objects one would expect to see in a garage such as weights, a weight bench, and a motorcycle. No area of the garage was cleared out and set up as a presentation area. In short, there was nothing indicating that the garage was being used or had been used as a location for exhibition of a python. Pan-Terra Exotics maintains a scanty Facebook page. That is the only marketing or outreach evidence in the record. On August 10, 2020, the page had two pictures of a snake, presumably the python. The page directed people to contact Pan-Terra on Messenger. It contained only the following description of the business: "We offer personalized tours of multiple facilities covering a wide range of exotic, endangered, beautiful animals. Our education and community outreach is second to none. We also import, export, sell, trade and breed exotic animals." There is no mention of exhibitions at Mr. Robbins' home. The Facebook page also advised that Pan-Terra was temporarily closed. Mr. Robbins explained that the minimal information on his Facebook page, as well as the absence of seating, educational materials, display materials, or signs in his garage were due to his license being lapsed and COVID concerns. Because of this, at the time of the inspection he was not operating his business. But Mr. Robbins, who bears the burden of proof in this matter, did not offer any evidence demonstrating that at any time his home and garage were set up to offer public tours or information. He did not, present earlier images of his Facebook page at a more active time. He did not present examples of brochures or other educational materials used before he ceased operations. He did not offer signs removed because of the pause in operations. He did not offer photographs of the exterior or interior of his home and garage that showed use of the garage to exhibit the python. Mr. Robbins did not offer other evidence that might indicate use of his python in an educational exhibition. Examples of evidence that might have indicated such use include receipts or other records showing individuals or groups paid for an exhibition, the power point presentation referred to in his email and testimony, calendars showing scheduled days and times for tours, photos of the facility, or thank you notes from individuals or groups who had attended exhibitions. Mr. Robbins did not testify persuasively about exhibition of the python in his garage. He spoke generally about ad hoc visits from a few interested people. Mr. Robbins testified more persuasively about taking his reptiles to various locations and meetings. But the testimony was very general, did not clearly indicate that the python was among the reptiles, and did not provide information about when he took the reptiles to various locations and meetings. He also offered no corroborating testimony from other witnesses. The only evidence offered to corroborate his claim of traveling to locations to exhibit the python was hearsay, a single letter generally describing "educational" outreach programs. Furthermore, the visits described do not amount to "scheduled tours or general admission …" in a "permanent, fixed facility."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, issue a final order denying the Conditional/Prohibited/ Nonnative Species Permit application of Petitioner, Phillip Robbins. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda E. Parnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2021. Phillip A. Robbins 1146 Navajo Avenue Lehigh Acres, Florida 33936 Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57379.372 Florida Administrative Code (3) 68-5.00268-5.00468-5.005 DOAH Case (1) 21-0188
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STANLEY W. AND PHYLLIS R. HARTSON vs. BANANA ISLAND RECREATION ASSOCIATION, INC., AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 77-000849 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000849 Latest Update: Apr. 27, 1979

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Banana Island is separated by marshland into areas known as Islands No. 9 and No. 10. The respondent Association presently owns and operates on Island No. 10 a dock and a dive shop which sells snacks and compressed air to divers who use the nearby springs. The purpose of the proposed boardwalk is to connect the existing dock facilities on Island No. 10 to the upland area on Island No. 9, a portion of which will be used as a picnic area for boaters, swimmers and divers. The boardwalk is to be 220 feet long and six feet wide. The immediate area upon which the boardwalk is to be constructed is not utilized by the manatee because of its shallow depth. While the boardwalk would result in the shading of approximately 1,000 feet of marshland, this amount is too insignificant to affect the manatee. There are approximately 1,000 manatee in the United States, and the manatee has been designated as an endangered species under Federal and Florida law. The manatee exists throughout the southeastern portion of the United States. They inhabit areas off Texas, Louisiana, Florida, on up to North Carolina, though it is unusual to see them north of Brunswick, Georgia. The Kings Bay area of Crystal River, primarily around the Springs, and the area of Homosassa Springs provides a winter home for approximately 110 manatee, or about ten percent of the entire manatee population. The manatee come to the Kings Bay area in the winter months from mid-November through March 31st due to the warmer temperatures of the water around the springs. There is only occasional use of the springs area by the manatee between March 31st and November 15th. The numbers of manatee coming into the Kings Bay area has increased since 1971. This increase could be due to better observation techniques or to the reduction of other suitable habitats for the manatee. At least seventy percent of the population return each year. This year, seven new calves were born in the area. During the cooler months, approximately forty- five percent of the manatee can be found within five-eights of a mile of the main spring in Kings Bay. The proposed boardwalk is to be located approximately 150 feet from the main springs. No manatees have been sighted within twenty-five yards of the boardwalk site. The existing dock is located about seventy feet from the main springs. Manatees have been sighted near the end of this dock, which was built in 1971. The general area surrounding the site of the proposed boardwalk, primarily the springs area, is used heavily by boaters, swimmers and divers. Observations during a nonconsecutive seven-day period in late November and early December noted some 603 boats using the general area of Kings Bay, some 250 divers around the springs area and over 430 top-water observers of the manatee. These numbers would lessen during the Spring and pick up again during the Summer and latter part of the Fall months. On January 1, 1979, some fifty-two boats were served within the main springs area. In Citrus County alone, there are over 5,700 registered pleasure and commercial boats. When cruising, the manatee generally travels at a rate of speed of two to three miles per hour. When moving out of the way of a boat, the manatee can move at about eight to nine miles per hour. When confronted by an oncoming boat, the manatee either immediately submerges or turns to the right. Many manatee in the Kings Bay area have propeller scars on their bodies. A few of the manatee, generally the juvenile manatee, appear to enjoy and seek contact and association with the divers. The majority move away and seek to avoid the divers. During periods of heavier boat traffic around the springs, the manatee generally move out into the colder water adjacent to the springs. Continued disruptive activity such as motor sounds, fast moving boats, heavy diver or boat traffic, and harassment from divers and swimmers can prove to be dangerous to the manatee. Such activity can result in a failure to mate and reproduce, body wounds, and a forcing of the manatee out into colder waters, thus disrupting normal feeding patterns and behavior. In 1978, the Florida legislature passed the "Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act," declaring the State of Florida to be a refuge and sanctuary for the manatee. Section 370.12(2), 1978 Supplement to Florida Statutes. This Act directed the Department of Natural Resources to adopt rules regulating the operation and speed of motorboat traffic between the dates of November 15th and March 31st in the Kings Bay area of Crystal River, as well as in other portions of the waters of the State. At the time of the administrative hearing in this cause, the Department of Natural Resources was in the process of adopting Chapter 16N-22 in implementation of the Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act. These proposed rules establish slow speed zones, idle speed zones and prohibited zones for motorboats in Citrus County. The area in dispute herein is designated as an idle speed zone, defined as the minimum speed that will maintain the safe steerageway of a motorboat. The federal government is expected to adopt all state regulations pertaining to the protection of the manatee. It was the opinion of both of the witnesses having knowledge and expertise regarding the activities and behavior patterns of the manatee that any development which attracts and promotes human activity in the springs area could possibly have a deleterious effect upon the manatee. As noted above, the dock and dive shop have been in existence and operation since 1971. Boating and diving activity has increased since that time. The respondent Association has no objection to and is in favor of the proposed new boat speed regulations. While a few boats can now tie up to the existing dock, boats would not be able to tie up to the boardwalk. Trash receptacles are planned for Island No. 9. If Banana Island No. 9 were accessible via the proposed boardwalk for recreational and/or picnic activities, it is entirely possible that there would be less boating activity around the immediate area of the main springs. The majority of the boats around the springs are small boats which the divers and manatee observers rent for those purposes. It is possible that larger boats could be utilized to provide transportation for swimmers and divers to and from the area, thus reducing the number of boats in the immediate area of the springs. During the hearing, the applicant offered and stated its willingness to close down the boardwalk during the winter months should future studies or surveys illustrate that the manatee is being harmed therefrom. The successful and profitable operation of the respondent's boating and diving enterprises depends upon the continued habitation of the area by the manatee.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the respondent's application for a permit to construct and maintain a boardwalk be granted, subject to the stipulations proposed in the permit appraisal relating to the opening and the maintenance of vegetation. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth F. Hoffman Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones and Gay Post Office Box 1872 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Alfred W. Clark Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Baya M. Harrison Mark J. Proctor Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Assistant Department Attorney Carothers and Proctor 202 Blount Street Post Office Box 391 Crown Building Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Tallahassee, Florida 32304

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS vs CITY OF PALM COAST, 10-009050GM (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Palm Coast, Florida Sep. 13, 2010 Number: 10-009050GM Latest Update: Jul. 27, 2011

Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.

Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER NO. DCA 11-GM-145 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished by U.S. Mail to each of the persons listed below on this day of » 2011. By U.S. Mail The Honorable Bram D. E. Canter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 By Electronic Mail Catherine D. Reischmann, Esq. Debra S. Babb-Nutcher, Esq. Gregg A. Johnson, Esq. Brown, Garganese, Weiss & D’agresta, P.A. 111 N. Orange Ave., Ste. 2000 Orlando, Florida 32802 creischmann@orlandolaw.net dbabb@orlandolaw.net gjohnson@orlandolaw.net Reginald L. Bouthillier, Jr., Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301-7742 bouthillierr@gtlaw.com \ Paula Ford tga Agency Clerk Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Blvd Tallahassee Florida 32399-2100 Thomas W. Reese, Esquire 2951 61st Avenue South St. Petersburg, Florida 33712-4539 twreeseesq@aol.com Marcia Parker Tjoflat, Esq. Pappas, Metcalf, Jenks & Miller, P.A. 245 Riverside Ave., Ste. 400 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 mpt@papmet.com M. Lynn Pappas, Esq. Pappas, Metcalf, Jenks & Miller, P.A. 245 Riverside Ave., Ste. 400 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Ipappas@papmet.com Linda Loomis Shelley, Esq. Fowler White Boggs & Banker, PA. P.O. Box 11240 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ishelley@fowlerwhite.com Lynette Nort, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Lynette.Norr@dca.state.fl.us FINAL ORDER NO. DCA 11-GM-145

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CLAYTON L. WOMER vs. CARL W. KIRBY, C/O W. W. CHRISTANSON, AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 77-001408 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001408 Latest Update: Dec. 19, 1977

Findings Of Fact Petitioner proposes to erect a hyacinth fence at the entrance to Canal number 4 in Lake Istokpoga. The fence will consist of 4' x 4' posts six feet apart extending approximately 100 feet from each marsh bank of the canal toward Lake Istokpoga with an opening at the entrance of 12 to 14 feet to allow boat access. The fence will be attached to these 4' x 4' posts and extend about 2 feet below the surface of the water to prevent hyacinths from entering the canal and blocking navigation. Three other canals leading into Lake Istokpoga have been equipped with hyacinth fences and to date no problems have occurred. The fence does not extend to the bottom of the lake, is of a type approved by DER and will not materially effect the movement of water into and out of the canal. There is less water turnover in the canals than in the lake. This results in the canals having less oxygen than the lake and therefore are in a more stressed condition. As a result, from an ecological point of view, it is preferred to keep the hyacinths in the lake as opposed to the canals. Hyacinths which die and sink to the bottom take from the water oxygen that is needed to sustain aquatic life. From a navigational standpoint the 12 to 14 feet opening in the proposed fence is adequate for the boats that use the lake and canal. Erection of the fence will have no adverse effect on the ecology or biological resources of the area, and will result in keeping out many hyacinths that otherwise would enter the canal.

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