Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Michael Gieseke was employed by the City of Safety Harbor as a Laborer 3 in the Sanitation Department. He had been so employed for approximately nine months on February 1, 1991. On January 29, 1991, shortly before clocking out time, Gieseke was in the Sanitation Department breakroom with most of his coworkers. People were talking, laughing and, in general, relaxing following the day's work. The breakroom had six picnic-type tables at which the various employees were sitting. Respondent was sitting at one of these tables facing away from the table. Behind Respondent at the same table, Eric Davis was straddling the bench, and was engaged in conversation with Grover Smith, his and Respondent's supervisor. This conversation was fairly loud and punctuated by loud laughter by Davis. For several minutes this loud laughter had persisted very close to Respondent, and on one or more occasions Respondent had requested Davis stop shrieking in his ear. These protests were not honored by Davis. Several witnesses described Davis' laugh as often irritating. Finally, Respondent got up and picked up a broom near the time clock and returned to his seat with the broom handle resting on his shoulder, held in his right hand with the bristle part between him and Davis. Respondent swung the handle of the broom back and forth likewise moving the bristle end. In so doing, the bristle end of the broom struck Davis on the side of the head. As described by Davis, the blow was sufficient to make one aware he had been hit but not hard enough to make one cry. Davis jerked the broom aside and got up and put his hands around Respondent's neck. Realizing that participating in a fight could lead to dismissal, Davis refrained from tightening his grip on Respondent's neck and merely told Respondent not to do that again. During his rounds that day, Respondent had picked up a discarded razor- knife with which he had been cleaning his fingernails since entering the breakroom. This knife consisted of razor-like blades joined lengthwise which are encased in the sheath of the knife and extend from the sheath in a cutting position by pushing a button on the outside of the sheath and pushing the blade outward. This knife was held in Respondent's left hand with the blade extended approximately 1/2 inch. When Davis was hit by the broom and grabbed Respondent around the neck, one supervisor reminded Respondent that [for drawing a knife] a person would be fired, and another supervisor told both parties to knock it off, which they did. During this slight altercation, Respondent made no effort to use the knife or even threaten to use the knife. The following day, one of the supervisors who was in the breakroom when the altercation occurred reported the incident to the Director, Public Works Department, who had the incident investigated by Kurt Peters, Assistant Public Works Director. Peters is not a Division Director, but was authorized to investigate the incident by Wayne Logan, Jr., the Interim City Manager, Safety Harbor, with the authority to take all disciplinary action taken in this case. Following the investigation, Peters concluded that Respondent had been responsible for the incident and reported this to the City Manager who concurred. On Friday, February 1, 1991, with authorization from Logan, Peters told Gieseke that effective immediately he was being placed on unpaid leave for five days. On Monday, February 4, 1991, Gieseke was on unpaid leave, and the decision was made to terminate Gieseke's employment with the City. Accordingly, the letter to Gieseke dated February 4, 1991 (Exhibit 1) so advising him was sent to Gieseke's home address. This registered letter was not received by Gieseke from the post office, and he learned of the letter when he returned to pick up a pay check.
Recommendation It is recommended that Michael Gieseke be found guilty of violating Rule 24, Section C, Items 7 and 16, of the City of Safety Harbor Civil Service Rules, that the five day suspension be approved, that the subsequent dismissal for the same offense be disapproved and that Gieseke be restored to duty by the City of Safety Harbor with back pay for the period commencing at the conclusion of his period of suspension. ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner are accepted, except for: Paragraph 5, second sentence that Respondent retracted the blade and lowered the knife. No evidence was presented that the blade was ever extended more than 1/2 inch or that Respondent raised the knife as if to use it against another. Paragraph 6, penultimate sentence, insofar as it intimates the decision of the City Manager to terminate Respondent was made on February 1, 1991. On February 1, 1991, the City Manager authorized the suspension of Gieseke for five days. COPIES FURNISHED TO: THOMAS M. GONZALES, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 639 TAMPA, FL 33601 JOHN K. FINCH, ESQUIRE WILLIAM WIGGINS, ESQUIRE 323 MAIN STREET SAFETY HARBOR, FL 34695
The Issue Whether Respondent Eastern Florida State College (EFSC) engaged in discriminatory employment practices and retaliation, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), as alleged in the Petition for Relief; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Garrett is a 53-year-old African American woman. EFSC is a public college in Brevard County, Florida. For the time period relevant to this matter, EFSC is, and has been, her employer. On July 9, 2018, Darla Ferguson informed Ms. Garrett that EFSC eliminated her position as e-Learning Coordinator. EFSC did not fill Ms. Garrett’s position in the e-Learning department; rather, the prior job duties were assigned to other members in the e-Learning department. After eliminating the position of e-Learning Coordinator, EFSC offered Ms. Garrett the position of Coordinator of the Office of Undergraduate Research (OUR). The OUR department supports and promotes research opportunities among undergraduate research students through EFSC’s four campuses. Ms. Garrett accepted EFSC’s offer, and Ms. Garrett became EFSC’s first employee to hold the position as Coordinator of OUR. In lieu of offering Ms. Garrett the position of Coordinator of OUR, EFSC could have laid off Ms. Garrett following the elimination of her position as e-Learning Coordinator. However, rather than laying her off, EFSC found a new position for Ms. Garrett. Following her transfer to the position as Coordinator of OUR, Ms. Garrett’s salary and benefits remained unchanged from her prior position as e-Learning Coordinator. On July 10, 2018, Ms. Garrett met with Dr. Sandra Handfield, Scott Herber, and Dr. Ashley Spring to discuss Ms. Garrett’s new position as Coordinator of OUR. At that meeting, Dr. Handfield—who was Ms. Garrett’s new supervisor—informed Ms. Garrett that Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber were the founders of OUR. Prior to Ms. Garrett’s arrival as Coordinator of OUR, Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber, who were full-time faculty members, oversaw the OUR program. Dr. Handfield also informed Ms. Garrett that should she have any questions regarding her position as Coordinator of OUR, she should consult with Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber. As of the date of the final hearing, Ms. Garrett remained employed by EFSC as the Coordinator of OUR, and continues to receive the same salary and benefits that she received when she was the e-Learning Coordinator. Allegations of Adverse Employment Action EFSC originally intended for the Coordinator of OUR to be a Director, and possess a doctorate degree. However, EFSC later changed this position to Coordinator, which did not require a doctorate degree, and which had a lower salary. Ms. Garrett never applied for the Director of OUR position, and she does not have a doctorate degree. Ms. Garrett testified concerning her belief for the reason that EFSC transferred her to the Coordinator of OUR position, stating: I believe they did that because the intent was to put me in a position that was beyond my reach so that when I had issues and problems, they could use that and tie it with this position in order to say that I could not do the job. On April 12, 2019, Ms. Garrett received a six-month performance evaluation covering her first six months in her position as Coordinator of OUR. Dr. Handfield provided the performance evaluation approximately four months after the performance period ended. The performance evaluation indicated that Ms. Garrett was deficient in the areas of teamwork, valuing differences, and communication. Following the performance evaluation, Ms. Garrett did not lose any pay or benefits, and nothing adverse happened to Ms. Garrett as a result of the performance evaluation. Ms. Garrett testified that she believed Dr. Handfield gave her that evaluation “as a form of retaliation[,]” but not on the basis of her race, age, or gender. She further testified as follows: Q. Okay. But just to be clear, not gender, age, or race. You think it’s retaliation, what she did, correct? A. Correct. Q. Okay. And what was she retaliating against you for in your view or what facts do you have that it was for retaliation? A. I believe it was retaliation based on the input from the faculty members, based on the interactions we had during the actual performance review period, which would have been July 9th, 2018, until January 9th, 2019. Q. So based on the interaction you had with Dr. Handfield, Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber for the six months before that; is that what you’re saying? A. Yes In January 2019, Ms. Garrett requested that she use Canvas shell computer software to enable her to build an orientation outline. EFSC denied this request, because it would not generate money. Allegations of Comparator Ms. Garrett identified Justin Looney, a 38-year-old white male, as a comparator in support of her discrimination claim.1 Ms. Garrett’s testimony was that Mr. Looney was an EFSC employee working as an Academic Services Coordinator at EFSC’s Patrick Air Force Base campus; upon the closing of that campus, EFSC eliminated Mr. Looney’s position and, similarly to Ms. Garrett, transferred him to a newly-created position in which he received the same salary and benefits. 1 At the final hearing, Ms. Garrett also mentioned Marian Sheltman as a possible comparator, stating that she was a white female. However, Ms. Garrett failed to introduce any additional facts or evidence concerning Ms. Sheltman’s status or to explain how the undersigned could consider Ms. Sheltman as a valid comparator. The undersigned finds that Ms. Garrett failed to establish Ms. Sheltman as a comparator in this matter. Ms. Garrett contends that EFSC treated Mr. Looney differently, during his transfer, in that EFSC provided Mr. Looney more notice time between the elimination of his prior position and the transfer to his new position. Ms. Garrett also contends that EFSC treated Mr. Looney differently than her because Mr. Looney was Dr. Handfield’s son-in-law. Allegations of Hostile Work Environment Ms. Garrett testified that at the July 10, 2018, meeting, Dr. Spring commented about the uncleanliness of the OUR office, and recommended that Ms. Garrett obtain a broom and dustpan to keep the office clean. Ms. Garrett also testified that she declined to assist Dr. Spring in hanging posters on the wall of the OUR office. Ms. Garrett also testified that Dr. Spring noticed that the OUR signage was covered up on the outside of the building, and asked Ms. Garrett to correct this. Ms. Garrett testified that in subsequent meetings with Dr. Handfield, she “shared [her] concerns regarding the work environment[,]” and stated that she did not feel comfortable with the things Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber asked of her because these things “were in violation of college policy.” Ms. Garrett testified that Dr. Spring micromanaged her role as the Coordinator of OUR; for example, Dr. Spring continued to process online student research forms, and coordinated the Fall 2018 OUR board meeting. Ms. Garrett also testified that Dr. Spring opened the OUR online student forms too early, which prevented Ms. Garrett from matching faculty mentors with student applicants.2 Ms. Garrett also testified that Dr. Spring made decisions concerning the OUR without consulting with her. Ms. Garrett testified that Dr. Spring would send her e-mails asking if Ms. Garrett had completed the work requested of her. 2 Ms. Garrett also testified that Mr. Herber was not involved in micromanaging her role as the Coordinator of OUR. Ms. Garrett testified that Dr. Spring told Ms. Garrett what she should be doing, and would become vocal with her dissatisfaction of Ms. Garrett’s job performance. Ms. Garrett testified that she did not know why Dr. Spring engaged in any of these actions. After a November 2018 meeting with Dr. Spring, Ms. Garrett testified that her work atmosphere became “more tense … in terms of Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber starting to make comments about allegations about my work.” She further testified that after this meeting, Dr. Handfield “started issuing directives[,]” such as requiring Ms. Garrett to first ask Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber for input prior going to other EFSC campuses to host information tables. Ms. Garrett claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work environment in which “in every meeting that I planned and hosted, Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber would say disparaging comments during the meeting.” For example, “[t]hey would talk across me and I did not reply.” Although Dr. Handfield was Ms. Garrett’s supervisor, Ms. Garrett testified that Dr. Handfield openly discussed supervision of the OUR with Dr. Spring and Mr. Herber. Findings of Ultimate Fact Ms. Garrett presented no persuasive action that EFSC’s decisions concerning, or actions affecting, her, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by race-based, sex-based, or age-based discriminatory animus. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful race, sex, or age discrimination. Ms. Garrett presented no persuasive evidence that EFSC’s actions subjected her to harassment based on race, sex, or age. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful race, sex, or age harassment. Ms. Garrett presented no persuasive evidence that EFSC discriminated against her because she opposed an unlawful employment practice, or because she made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the FCRA. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful retaliation. Ms. Garrett presented no persuasive evidence that EFSC’s actions were sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment to create a hostile work environment. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of hostile work environment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Mary F. Garrett’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Mary F. Garrett Apartment 2508 2741 Caribbean Isle Boulevard Melbourne, Florida 32935 (eServed) Mark E. Levitt, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. Suite 100 1477 West Fairbanks Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for an exemption from disqualification.
Findings Of Fact By letter dated August 28, 1997, Petitioner's employer, Volunteers of America, notified Petitioner that he was ineligible for continued employment in a position as a caretaker of children, disabled adults or elderly persons. However, the letter advised Petitioner that he could request an exemption from disqualification from the licensing agency. In September 1997, Petitioner requested an exemption from disqualification. Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services, denied the exemption based on the fact that on January 9, 1997, Petitioner had been charged with battery. The charge arose from an incident of domestic violence. As a result of the charge, on February 7, 1997, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendre to the offense of battery, and was placed on probation for one year. One condition of Petitioner's probation was that he enroll in a domestic violence intervention program. By September 22, 1997, Petitioner had complied with all conditions of his probation. By Order entered October 8, 1997, Petitioner's probation was terminated. The policy of Respondent is to require a one-year time lapse between termination of probation and granting the exemption from disqualification. Petitioner requested an exemption from disqualification in September 1997, and the request was considered by Respondent's Exemption Review Committee (Committee) on October 2, 1997. At the time Petitioner's request was heard by the Committee, Petitioner was still on probation and less than one year had elapsed since he was charged with battery. Even if, at the time of Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification was heard, more than one-year had elapsed, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate his rehabilitation. Numerous letters of support attesting to Petitioner's good character; exemplary work record; and his successful completion of a domestic violence intervention program were presented at hearing. However, most of the letters are based on those individuals' experiences and relationships with Petitioner prior to Petitioner's completing his probation. Petitioner appears remorseful about his conduct and sincere in his desire to work with youngsters. Nonetheless, Petitioner presented no evidence of rehabilitation during the five months since his probation was terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Children and Family Services, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner, Eric Truitt, an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position designated by law as one of trust or responsibility. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric Truitt, pro se 1771 Harbor Drive Clearwater, Florida 34615 Kathleen Harvey, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road Largo, Florida 33778 Gregory A. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the City of Milton failed to accept an employment application from Sydney McCray on the basis of race or national origin, thereby committing an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact The City is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act. Mr. McCray is a male African-American, and he is a member of a protected class. In his complaint, Mr. McCray claims that on April 4, 1994, the City discriminated against him by failing to hire him for the position of laborer (maintenance worker). Specifically, Mr. McCray alleged that in response to a newspaper advertisement for a laborer's position, he and his sister, Alice Larkins, contacted the City Manager's office for the purpose of submitting their employment applications. Both Mr. McCray and Ms. Larkins asserted that they arrived at the office of Mr. Whitson, the City Manager, at the appointed time, and that they waited over an hour to see Mr. Whitson. After waiting an hour, both Mr. McCray and Ms. Larkins left without ever meeting Mr. Whitson. Mr. McCray asserts that Mr. Whitson failed to meet with him or receive his employment application because of his race. The City disputes Mr. McCray's claims for several reasons. First, the City provided evidence to contradict Mr. McCray's position that he first learned of the laborer position through an advertisement. Several city employees testified that the City only advertises skilled positions and that the unskilled positions, such as maintenance positions, are handled through the Public Works Department without advertisement. With regard to the Public Works Department, testimony was also received that indicated the process for receiving applications for laborer positions. In particular, it was stated that applications for laborer positions are processed by the Public Works Department and that once the applicant has been interviewed, all qualified applicants are placed on a list for future vacancies. The record is clear that Mr. McCray never applied for a laborer position through the established procedure. Second, even if the position was advertised as stated by Mr. McCray, the City disputes that Mr. Whitson's office would have ever made an appointment for Mr. McCray. As indicated above, the prospective laborers are processed by the Public Works Department. Mr. Whitson testified that he plays no role in screening laborer applicants and that he is purposefully insulated from the hiring process. Therefore, it makes no sense that his office would have arranged an interview as asserted by Mr. McCray. Third, in addition to Mr. Whitson's lack of involvement in the employment process for prospective laborers, all the testimony received at the hearing supports a finding that Mr. McCray did not have an appointment with the City manager. Specifically, several City employees, including Mr. Whitson's personal secretary, testified that neither Mr. McCray nor his sister ever had an appointment with Mr. Whitson. They also testified that neither person appeared at Mr. Whitson's office on April 4, 1994. When pressed on the date and time of the alleged appointment with Mr. Whitson, Mr. McCray was unable to articulate consistently when the meeting was to take place. Mr. McCray appeared confused and his answers varied from his earlier deposition testimony and the testimony of his sister. Furthermore, based on the records maintained by the City of Milton, Mr. McCray never submitted an application for the position of "Laborer" with the Public Works Department of the City of Milton. Mr. McCray attempts to supplement his claim of discrimination by establishing that the City of Milton has systematically discriminated against him by failing on more than one occasion to hire him. Specifically, Mr. McCray stated that prior to April 4, 1994, he applied for other positions with the City of Milton, and he was denied such positions. In particular, Mr. McCray stated that he applied for the position of mechanic and technician. In both instances raised by Mr. McCray, however, it appears, based on the record, that he either failed to adequately complete his job application or he failed to possess the minimum qualifications for the positions sought. As further evidence supporting his claim, Mr. McCray offered the testimony of his sister, Alicia Larkin. Ms. Larkin testified that she, like her brother, was the subject of discrimination by the City. The undersigned dismissed her testimony as lacking relevancy and more importantly lacking credibility. First, Ms. Larkin has a claim pending against the City alleging similar discriminatory practices and she appears to have a bias against the City. Second, Ms. Larkin's testimony lacked consistency and lacked credibility. No evidence was presented to indicate that the City of Milton discriminated in its employment practices. Furthermore, the City presented testimony that it has and continues to develop fair employment practices relating to minorities. Specifically, the City of Milton, through Mr. Whitson, has met with the NAACP for the purpose of continuing to improve race relations between the City and the African-American community in Milton. In summary, the City has effectively rebutted the allegations raised by Mr. McCray. The City offered a series of witnesses that had personal knowledge of the employment policies and hiring practices of the City and each corroborated the other. Those witnesses collectively support a finding that the City did not discriminate against Mr. McCray.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing this claim with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Committee, Esquire 8870 Thunderbird Drive Pensacola, Florida 32514-5661 Roy V. Andrews, Esquire Post Office Box 586 Milton, Florida 32572 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case, as stipulated by the parties, is whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2010),1/ by attempting to enter into, or by entering into, pre- dated employment agreements, and/or by attempting to destroy or destroying public records and/or evidence of wrongdoing and/or by attempting to enter into or entering into agreements which exceeded the Respondent's purchasing authority.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Oel Wingo was employed as the city manager for the City of Holly Hill (City) from January 1, 2010, until October 2010. Prior to serving in that capacity, she was the assistant city manager for the City of Palm Coast for ten years, and the assistant city manager for the City of Ocala for five years. Respondent earned a Ph.D. in Education Administration from the University of Florida. At all times material to the allegations herein, the City operated under a commission/city manager form of government. This meant that the commission decided policy, while the city manager was responsible for implementing policy and handling all operational matters, including the hiring and firing of personnel. Respondent's employment as city manager was governed by an employment agreement. The agreement provided for the payment of severance pay to Respondent in the event she was "terminated" by the City. Under section 10 of the agreement, termination could occur under a number of scenarios, including the following: If the Employer reduces the base salary, compensation or any other financial benefit of the Employee, unless it is applied in no greater percentage than the average reduction of all department heads, such action shall constitute a breach of this agreement and will be regarded as a termination. In the event that Respondent was terminated pursuant to the above provision, "[T]he Employer shall provide, initially, a severance payment equal to six months' salary at the current rate of pay " Respondent's employment agreement with the City further provided that she would not be entitled to receive severance benefits in the event she was terminated for cause. At the time she was terminated from her employment as city manager, Respondent’s annual rate of pay was $124,500.00. When Respondent assumed her duties as city manager, the City was experiencing significant budget problems because of declining property values, and the resultant reduction in tax revenues. Faced with a reduced budget, Respondent was nonetheless charged with the duty to maintain the current level of city services. Consequently, Respondent implemented budget cuts, reorganizations, layoffs, and position eliminations within months of her arrival. Understandably, the atmosphere in city commission meetings was, at times, tense and volatile. Similarly, the rapid personnel changes negatively affected employee morale and fostered resistance to many of the changes proposed by Respondent. When Respondent was hired by the City, only one City department head, City Clerk Valerie Manning, had an employment contract. Ms. Manning's contract with the City provided that if the City were to reduce her compensation in a greater percentage than the applicable across-the-board reduction for all City employees, she could elect to resign and “be terminated without cause,” and therefor eligible for full severance benefits. Manning left the employ of the City in April, 2010. In April 2010, Respondent replaced Manning with Joshua Fruecht. Fruecht testified that he requested an employment contract soon after he was hired. Respondent told him she would consider it after he had worked for the City for six months. Early during Respondent's employment with the City she and the City Attorney, Scott Simpson, had conversations about the desirability of the department heads having employment agreements because, as department heads, they had no protection from arbitrary termination. Entering into employment agreements with the department heads would protect them from being terminated by the city commission for personal reasons. By that time Respondent had already been approached by Administrative Services Director Kurt Swarzlander, who was concerned about his position and also wanted an employment agreement. On May 6, 2010, Respondent e-mailed Attorney Simpson with the following inquiry: We recently discussed the need to contract with Department Heads. Previously, the City Clerk had a contract. I am reviewing similar employment contracts from other cities and would like to pursue this for several reasons. My primary question for you is whether these contracts must go before the Commission. My interpretation of the Charter and my hiring and firing capabilities is that they do not, as long as I remain within the adopted job descriptions and pay ranges. Later that day, Simpson responded to Respondent's inquiry as follows: I agree that an employment contract with department heads should be within your authority as the City Manager. However, if severance is going to be provided to the department heads, then I would recommend having the commission approve this change in benefits even if individually the cost would not exceed your spending authority as cumulatively they probably would and it is a new benefit. This should not be an issue as the commission approved this for the City Clerk. Roland Via served on the city commission from November 2005 through November 2010, and was the mayor when Respondent was hired as the city manager. Mr. Via testified that in January 2010, during her first month of employment, Respondent advanced the idea of employment agreements for City department heads. According to Respondent, employment agreements would permit the City to hire the best managerial talent from other cities and provide a benefit to both the City and the employee. In May 2010, Respondent negotiated an employment agreement with Brad Johnson to serve as the public works director. The contract was executed without approval by the City Commission. City Attorney Simpson and Respondent collaborated in the preparation of the contract. Mr. Johnson's agreement provided that if the City were to reduce his financial benefits in a greater percentage than the applicable across-the-board reduction for all City employees, he could resign and be terminated without cause, thus being eligible for full severance benefits. Specifically, section 4(c) of Mr. Johnson’s employment agreement provided as follows: If the City reduces the financial benefits of the Employee in a greater percentage than the applicable across-the-board reduction for all City employees, or if the City refuses, allowing written notice, to comply with any other provision benefitting the Employee as set forth herein, then Employee may, at his/her option, elect to resign and be “terminated without cause” within the meaning of Section 4(a) of the Agreement and shall receive all compensation and benefits in Section (4)(a). Such resignation shall be in writing to the City Manager. In the event there was a termination under the above circumstances, Mr. Johnson’s agreement provided that the City would pay a minimum of four months’ salary and benefits pursuant to the City’s Personnel Policies. Respondent forwarded an e-mail to the members of the City Commission on May 7, 2010, informing them of her decision to enter into an employment agreement with Mr. Johnson based on a similar agreement with the former City Clerk, Ms. Manning. Respondent also informed the commissioners that the “City Attorney has advised that we consider utilizing employment agreements with new Department Heads.” At the time Respondent offered an employment agreement to Mr. Johnson, she elected not to do so for the other department heads. This was because she needed more time to evaluate each department head’s capabilities and determine on a case by case basis whether offering contracts to them would in the best interest of the City. However, the unrebutted testimony established that early in her tenure as city manager Respondent had formulated the intent to enter into employment contracts with qualified department heads at some future time. When Respondent entered into the written agreement with Mr. Johnson she was aware of the potential limitations imposed on her purchasing authority as a result of the severance provisions of the employment agreement. However, at the time that Respondent entered into the agreement with Mr. Johnson, no language was suggested or offered by the city attorney regarding the limitations imposed on the city manager's purchasing authority by virtue of the City’s purchasing code. While Respondent was hired by unanimous vote of the City commission, her relationship with certain commissioners, particularly Commissioner Glass and Commissioner Patton, began to deteriorate within the first months of her employment. This was the result of several actions by Respondent, including challenging Commissioner Glass about directing an employee to expend funds in a manner inconsistent with commission action, and deciding not to authorize the use of City funds to pay for the spouses and children of commissioners to attend the League of Cities convention. As a result of this friction, Respondent testified, she was threatened by Commissioner Glass on more than one occasion. The July 28, 2010, Employment Agreements (Dated May 21, 2010) At a city commission workshop on the evening of July 27, 2010, Commissioner Patton suggested that Respondent take a 20 percent cut in pay, and that salaries of the department heads also be reduced. At the time that Commissioner Patton suggested the pay cuts, the only department head that had an employment agreement was Mr. Johnson. However, no formal motion was made at this meeting to cut Respondent’s or department head pay, and no evidence was introduced that any action was ever taken by the city commission on this suggestion. In the hours immediately following the commission meeting of July 27, 2010, which Respondent and other witnesses characterized as being "vicious, dysfunctional, screaming and yelling," Respondent wrote a resignation letter and prepared a list of things that needed to be done before she left the City. Among the items on Respondent’s “to do” list was to prepare and complete the employment agreements that she and the city attorney had been discussing for department heads. Respondent testified that she had two reasons for implementing employment agreements immediately following the July 27th commission meeting. The first was to protect the department heads from the personal vendettas of the city commission. The second was to ensure that the City had a professional management team in place and continuity of professional management. On the morning of July 28, 2010, Respondent met with all of her department heads at the regularly scheduled weekly executive team meeting. She informed them that she would be working with the human resources director, Diane Cole, to immediately prepare employment agreements for all department heads modeled on the Brad Johnson, May 21, 2010, employment agreement. The reason given by Respondent for the agreements was that the department heads “should all have some protections due to the atmosphere within the city . . . .” During this meeting she also informed her department heads of her intention to resign as city manager. Respondent directed Ms. Cole to use the exact same agreement as had been prepared for Mr. Johnson, and to include the same dates as were included in that agreement. Accordingly, each of the employment agreements was dated as being signed on May 21, 2010, and each contained the same severance pay provision at section 4(c), as did Mr. Johnson’s agreement. Likewise, the effective date of each of the employment agreements was June 7, 2010. On the afternoon of July 28, 2010, each of the department heads, except Police Chief Barker, who was out of town, was presented with and signed their respective employment agreement. Although not present, Chief Barker conferred by telephone with Respondent regarding the employment agreement and advised her that he would not sign a "post-dated" agreement. The July 29, 2010, Agreements Upon further reflection that evening, Respondent became concerned about the “signature date” of May 21, 2010, appearing on contracts actually signed on July 28, 2010. This concern was no doubt fueled by Chief Barker’s comment regarding the “post- dated” nature of the agreements. Accordingly, Respondent decided to have new agreements prepared the following day which would reflect signature dates of July 29, 2010. In addition, both she and Ms. Cole had noted that the some of the agreements signed on July 28, 2010, contained typographical errors that needed to be corrected.2/ On July 29, 2010, Respondent presented a second employment agreement to each of the City department heads for them to sign. Each employment contract was dated as having been executed on July 29, 2010. Each of the employment agreements contained the identical language at section 4(c) as had appeared in the earlier versions signed the previous day. Similarly, the “effective date” of each agreement remained June 7, 2010. Following the execution of the agreements on July 29, 2010, Respondent instructed Ms. Cole to destroy all the agreements dated May 21, 2010. Ms. Cole testified that Respondent directed her to destroy them because they were drafts, they contained typographical errors, and they had been superseded by the July 29, 2010, agreements. Notwithstanding her direction that the hardcopies be destroyed, Respondent testified that she understood that a copy of all of the agreements dated May 21, 2010, remained on the City's computer system, consistent with the City’s record retention procedures. The new agreements tied Respondent's potential severance benefits to base salary reductions of all department heads whose severance benefits were, in turn, tied to reductions in pay and benefits to all City employees.3/ Thus, any potential benefit to Respondent of the new agreements would depend on the type of action taken by the City. At least three scenarios were possible. First, if the City proposed cutting Respondent’s pay and benefits by 20 percent, with no other corresponding reductions to department heads or city personnel, there would be no new benefit to Respondent. She would be entitled to severance as provided in her employment agreement, because her pay and benefits were being cut in a greater percentage than her department heads. Second, if the City reduced salary and benefits paid to department heads or city personnel by 10 percent, but reduced Respondent’s pay and benefits by 20 percent, there would be no new benefit to Respondent. She would be entitled to severance as provided in her employment agreement, because her pay and benefits were being cut in a greater percentage than her department heads. Third, if the City reduced Respondent's salary and benefits by 20 percent and her department heads by 20 percent, and the remaining City employees by five percent, Respondent would receive no new benefit. She would not be entitled to severance as provided in her employment agreement because her pay and benefits were not being cut in a greater percentage than her department heads. Under this scenario, the department heads would be entitled to elect to treat the disproportionate pay and benefit reduction as a “termination without cause,” and while the department heads would benefit, Respondent would not. On or about August 20, 2010, having heard about the employee contracts, City Commissioner Rick Glass telephonically requested a copy of all the employment agreements "from 5/21 to present . . . ." In response, Respondent sent an e-mail to all the City Commissioners, the Executive Team, and to the City Attorney stating, in part: Pursuant to the advice of the City Attorney and based on the fact that the Commissioners previously approved the concept of a Department Head Employment Agreement in 2008, the City Attorney prepared an Employment Agreement in May 2010 for implementation. See Attached. Consistent with the City Manager's approved purchasing authority, all non-union managers were subsequently offered the opportunity to enter into the proposed employment agreement. The Employment Agreement protects the City as well as the professionals. The City is protected by ensuring that we have sufficient lead time, four months, prior to a resignation to ensure we have adequate coverage for a professional position and services can continue uninterrupted. Respondent provided the recipients of the e-mail a copy of "the agreement prepared by the City Attorney." On August 23, 2010, Commissioner Glass sent an e-mail to Respondent requesting a copy of the "first signed copy of the employee agreements predated back to May 2010, that Scott, Brad, Diane, Josh, Oel, Kurt, Ron, and Mark signed! Not the contracts you had them re-sign on July 29th." In response, on August 23, 2010, Respondent wrote: This is a follow-up to Mr. Glass's request for Employment Agreement signed on May 21, 2010. The only Department Head that signed an agreement on that date is Brad Johnson. At that time, I chose not to have the other Department Heads sign Employment Agreements as I felt that I needed more time to determine their capabilities in their jobs and whether an employment agreement which committed the City to those individuals was in the best interest of the City. Subsequently, given the tone of the Commission meetings, the pressure to terminate certain individuals, as well as the pressure to treat those without union contracts differently, I chose to provide those employees with the same agreement that Brad Johnson signed on May 21, 2010. I felt morally and ethically obligated to ensure that those employees had similar protections to those employees with union agreements. These employees signed an agreement on July 28, 2010, which still had the May 21, 2010 date on it. On July 29, 2010, we corrected not only the date to reflect July 29, 2010, but several other errors related to titles and responsibilities within the proposed agreements. It was never my intent to imply that these employees had signed the agreement on May 21, 2010. It was my intent to show that they had the same protective status as Brad Johnson acquired on May 21, 2010, so that all were treated the same. As the date could have reflected a different intent and there were other errors in the intermediate document, I corrected the proposed employment agreement the next day and had the managers sign a new agreement. The documents signed on July 28, 2010, are considered draft or intermediate records which are not in and of themselves considered public records and were disposed of in accordance to state guidelines. In an August 24, 2010, e-mail, Attorney Simpson responded to Ms. Wingo's August 23, 2010, e-mail. He wrote that inasmuch as the documents in question "contained errors that were corrected, including the date, and the revised agreements was [sic] subsequently executed by the City Manager and the employees. Based on these facts the original agreements executed would appear to be drafts or precursors to the final employment agreement." Mr. Simpson concluded, "draft documents are not public records." The August 30, 2010, Agreements On August 30, 2010, yet a third version of the employment agreements was presented to each of the department heads. These agreements were prepared and executed following communications with Attorney Simpson regarding whether the severance pay provisions of the July 30, 2010, agreements potentially exceeded Respondent's purchasing authority of $25,000. At issue was the manner in which Respondent had originally calculated the potential severance benefits available to the department heads under the agreements. In an e-mail dated August 24, 2010, Attorney Simpson expressed his concern that the severance pay provisions in the July 30, 2010, agreements had the potential to exceed $25,000 for all of the department heads, with the exception of Joshua Fruecht. The third and final version of the agreement addressed the limitations in the severance benefits offered as a result of the limits on the city manager’s purchasing authority set forth in the City’s purchasing ordinances. Specifically, section 4(a) of the agreement was amended to provide: In the event the Employee is terminated without cause by the City while the Employee is willing and able to perform the duties of the position as Human Resources Manager, the City agrees, subject to the below conditions, to pay the Employee a minimum of four (4) months of salary and benefits health insurance provided to the Employee pursuant to the City’s Personnel Policies not to exceed the City Manager’s purchasing Authority. Additionally, the City shall be responsible to pay all leave accruals at the Employee’s current rate of pay, consistent with City Personnel Rules and Regulations. (Emphasis in original). Each of the employment agreements signed on August 30, 2010, reflects execution on that date. Other than the signature date and revision to section 4(a), the August 30, 2010, agreements are identical to the July 29, 2010, versions. There is no persuasive evidence in this record that Respondent did not have authority to enter into employment agreements with the City's department heads on behalf of the City. To the contrary, the City's outside labor counsel opined that a strong argument could be made that the city manager possesses the authority to enter into employment contracts, subject to the city manager's purchasing authority. Similarly, Attorney Simpson testified that he believed Respondent had the authority to enter into employment agreements. The only question in his mind was whether the agreements should be presented to the City Commission for review and approval, since in his opinion, offering a severance benefit was a policy issue. There is no question that the City’s department heads received a benefit from having employment agreements with the City. It protected them from arbitrary personnel actions and provided severance benefits under certain circumstances. Specifically, their pay and benefits could not be reduced unless there was a corresponding reduction for all City employees. The evidence adduced at hearing does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent acted corruptly in entering into pre-dated employment agreements with her department heads, or in directing that the July 28, 2010, versions of the agreements be destroyed. Rather, the competent substantial evidence established that Respondent believed that she was acting in a manner consistent with the proper performance of her duties as city manager.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue a Final Order dismissing the Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2012.
The Issue Did Respondent, Universal City Development Partners (Universal), discharge Petitioner, Kevin D. Fischer, because of his age? Did Respondent, Universal City Development Partners (Universal), discharge Petitioner, Kevin D. Fischer, because of a handicap or a perception that he had a handicap?
Findings Of Fact Universal operates a theme park in Orlando, Florida. Universal employed Mr. Fischer as an Industrial Automation Technician (Electrical) for approximately 20 years. From May 27, 2011, until June 15, 2011, Mr. Fischer was on approved medical leave. After that, he returned to work with no activity restrictions. Mr. Fischer's date of birth is July 2, 1960. Universal discharged Mr. Fischer on July 11, 2011. Universal discharged Mr. Fischer for failure to properly clean a bilge pump on June 26, 2011, and for falsely certifying that he had cleaned the pump. Cleaning the pump was a preventative maintenance procedure that Mr. Fischer had performed for most of his career with Universal. The pumps are in the bilge or bottom of the boats used in Universal's Jaws ride. Each boat carries approximately 48 passengers around an artificial island in a man-made lagoon. The ride simulates the experience passengers might have boating in the waters depicted in the movies "Jaws" while the shark swam the waters. The boats ride on rails and are moved about by hydraulic arms. The bilge pumps are important protection for the $8,500.00, engines in the boats. If the pumps fail, water accumulates in the bilge and can cause very costly damage to the engines. On June 26, 2011, Mr. Fischer worked from 6:00 a.m. until 2:30 p.m. His duties that day included cleaning and servicing three bilge pumps. Mr. Fischer completed Universal's standard preventive maintenance form confirming he had cleaned and serviced the pumps. Mr. Christopher Cole, a former supervisor, examined the pumps after Mr. Fischer's shift ended. They had not been properly cleaned. The float switches were caked with sludge. If properly cleaned, they would not have been. The float switch is critical to operation of the pump. It turns the pump on when water reaches an unacceptable level in the bilge. Ricky Stienker, Mr. Fischer's supervisor at the time, terminated Mr. Fischer on July 11, 2011, for failure to properly clean the pumps and falsely representing that he had cleaned them. In 2008 and 2009, Mr. Fischer's annual reviews rated him as less effective. Then in 2010, the review rated Mr. Fischer as highly valued. But during his career, Mr. Fischer had received eight different counselings for poor performance. Mr. Fischer used Universal's appeal process to contest his discharge. David Winslow, senior vice president of the Technical Services Division, denied his appeal. There is no credible evidence of offenses committed by other employees of any age or physical condition that were similar to Mr. Fischer's failure to properly clean the pumps and his misrepresentation that he had cleaned them. Universal's employee handbook includes a clear policy requiring employees to be honest and trustworthy in all of their business activities and relationships. It also, clearly states that acts of dishonesty are grounds for immediate discharge. Mr. Fischer received the employee handbook when he began employment with Universal. Mr. Fischer has diabetes. His previous supervisor, Mr. Cole, knew this because he had observed Mr. Fischer taking medication that Mr. Cole also took. Mr. Cole also has diabetes and has had it for approximately 25 years. Mr. Cole did not perceive having diabetes as a handicap. There is no evidence that Mr. Stienker, who made the decision to discharge Mr. Fischer, knew Mr. Fischer had diabetes. There is no persuasive, credible evidence that Mr. Fischer had a handicap or that his supervisors or any management employee of Universal perceived Mr. Fischer as having a handicap. Consequently, there is no persuasive, credible evidence that a handicap or perception of handicap was a factor in Universal's discharge of Mr. Fischer. There is no evidence establishing who filled Mr. Fischer's position or the age of that person. There is no persuasive, credible evidence that Mr. Fischer's age was a factor in Universal's decision to discharge him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations deny Mr. Fischer's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2012.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for the administration of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, including the licensure of Class "D" Security Officers. Petitioner applied for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer. Pending the processing of that application, Petitioner became employed as a security guard for approximately five months. By letter dated February 21, 1996, Petitioner was notified by Respondent that his application for a Class "D" license was, subject to his due process rights, going to be denied based on his conviction of battery in St. Lucie County in September 1993. Respondent asserted that the conviction was of a crime directly related to the business for which the license is sought within the meaning of Section 493.6118(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Respondent also asserted that the facts relating to that conviction establish that Petitioner had committed an act of violence or used force on another person which was not for the lawful protection of himself or another within the meaning of Section 493.6118(1)(j), Florida Statutes. On September 14, 1993, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of a misdemeanor count of battery. The victim of the battery was Thomas Coburn. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 15 days in the county jail, one year probation, and 50 hours of community service. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Thomas Coburn was employed by the City of Port St. Lucie, Florida, as a city code enforcement officer. The code enforcement division is administered by the City of Port St. Lucie Police Department. Mr. Coburn was not a sworn law enforcement officer. On Sunday, May 16, 1993, Mr. Coburn was acting in his official capacity as a city code enforcement officer. He was wearing a badge, name plate, and collar pins with the initials P.S.L. He was in an official uniform that had patches with the inscription "Port St. Lucie, Fla. Police." He was driving a marked vehicle that reflected he was with the city code enforcement department. Shortly after noon on May 16, 1993, Mr. Coburn went to the personal residence of the Petitioner for the purpose of serving upon Petitioner a notice to appear pertaining to several alleged code violations. Petitioner was home with his wife, his teenage stepson, and his five year old son. When Mr. Coburn arrived, Petitioner was about to begin a barbecue. When the stepson came to the door in response to Mr. Coburn knock on the door, Mr. Coburn asked to speak to Petitioner. The teenage stepson went inside to get the Petitioner. Mr. Coburn did not see the stepson or another member of Petitioner's family after the Petitioner came to the door. When Petitioner came to the door, Mr. Coburn identified himself as a code enforcement officer and told Petitioner he was there to deliver the notice to appear. Mr. Coburn's vehicle was parked on the street so that Petitioner could see the markings on the vehicle. Petitioner became irate and shouted profanities at Mr. Coburn. Petitioner told Mr. Coburn that he could not serve official papers on a Sunday and ordered him off his property. There is a conflict in the evidence as to what next occurred. Petitioner testified that Mr. Coburn bumped him in the chest as the two of them argued. Mr. Coburn testified that he backed away from Petitioner and began to leave the premises. The more credible version of the events is that given by Mr. Coburn. Consequently, it is found that there was no physical contact initiated by Mr. Coburn. As he was backing away and preparing to leave the premises, Mr. Coburn placed the notice to appear on the barbecue grill that was in the area where the two men were standing. After he placed the notice to appear on the barbecue grill, Mr. Coburn turned to walk away. Petitioner then kicked Mr. Coburn in the buttocks. It was Petitioner's act of kicking Mr. Coburn that resulted in his subsequent arrest and conviction. There was no one else in the area around Petitioner's front door at the time of this incident. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Petitioner was acting in defense of himself or of others when he kicked Mr. Coburn. Petitioner has not been convicted of any other crime. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was an approved process server within the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. Petitioner worked as a security guard for the five months preceding the denial of his application. There were no incidents of violence during that five month period.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that the final order deny Petitioner's application for a Class "D" license. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Michele Guy, Esquire Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station No. 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Edward B. Galante, Esquire 789 South Federal Highway, No. 103 Stuart, Florida 34994 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner possesses the requisite good moral character for certification as a correctional officer.
Findings Of Fact Background In June 1988, Respondent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, acting on a tip from local media that intervenor, Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Metro Dade Corrections), had in its employ a number of correctional officers who were not certified, undertook a review of the employment records of Metro Dade Corrections. As a result of this review, Respondent identified 363 individuals, including Petitioner, who were employed by Metro Dade Corrections as correctional officers but who had not been certified by Respondent. On August 10-11, 1988, personnel employed by Respondent visited the Metro Dade Corrections personnel office and audited the personnel file maintained by Metro Dade Corrections of each of the 363 individuals in question, including Petitioner's personnel file. The audit demonstrated that the files were disorganized, lacking documentation required by Rule 11B-27.002, Florida Administrative Code, to apply for certification, and that Metro Dade Corrections had failed to apply for certification on behalf of the 363 officers. Over the course of their two-day visit, employees of Respondent worked with employees of Metro Dade Corrections to complete the documentation on each file. Variously, they prepared registration forms and affidavits of compliance and assembled other missing documentation, such as birth certificate and fingerprint cards. The 363 completed applications for certification were returned to Tallahassee by Respondent for processing. The vast majority of the individuals were certified; however, Respondent declined, for reasons hereinafter discussed, to certify Petitioner. The Pending Application Petitioner has been employed by the Metropolitan Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (hereinafter called Metro Dade Corrections) as a correctional officer since June 24, 1985, without benefit of certification. As part of the pre-employment process, Petitioner submitted to Metro Dade Corrections an affidavit dated June 24, 1985, which provides in pertinent part: I fully understand that, in order to qualify as a law enforcement or correctional officer, I must fully comply with the provisions of Section 943.13, Florida Statutes, as follows: * * * Be of good moral character. I further understand that by executing this document I am attesting that I have met the qualifications as specified. ... Metro Dade Corrections, as the employing agency, is responsible for conducting a thorough background investigation to determine the moral character of an applicant. Consistent with such mandate, Metro Dade Corrections routinely uses previous employment data, law enforcement records, credit agency records, inquiries of the applicant's neighbors and associates, and a pre-employment interview, at which a polygraph examination is administered, to assess an applicant's moral character. At the time Petitioner began employment on June 24, 1985, Metro Dade Corrections had completed its investigation into Petitioner's background and had concluded that Petitioner possessed the good moral character required for certification. Fred Crawford, the Metro Dade Corrections director, executed an affidavit of compliance on June 24, 1985, that contained the following sworn statement: I hereby certify that I have collected, verified, and am maintaining on file evidence that the applicant has met the provisions of Section 943.13(1)-(8) and Section 943.131, Florida Statutes, or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. There is no evidence that a complete application package for Petitioner's certification was prepared before August 11, 1988. Respondent did not receive a complete application for certification on Petitioner's behalf until August 11, 1988, when Metro Dade Corrections, as the employing agency, submitted to Respondent a complete application package for certification of Petitioner as a correctional officer. This was the first application for certification submitted on Petitioners behalf. By letter dated November 1, 1988, Respondent notified Petitioner that his application for certification was denied because Petitioner did not possess the requisite good moral character for certification as a correctional officer. Respondent gave the following as its reasons for concluding that Petitioner lacked good moral character: You have unlawfully and knowingly sold cocaine. You have unlawfully and knowingly possessed and introduced into your body cannabis. Petitioner used marijuana on two occasions that predated his employment with Metro Dade Corrections by five years. Petitioner freely admitted the usage of marijuana on these occasions during his pre-employment processing and made no attempt to conceal the truth. Petitioner has used no controlled substance since those two incidents. Petitioner played on a semi-professional football team in 1981-1982. Following one of the games, the owner of the team offered Petitioner a small quantity of cocaine. Petitioner refused this offer and never became the owner or possessor of the cocaine. This offer was conveyed to Petitioner by one of his teammates. The teammate kept the cocaine and paid Petitioner $7.00. Petitioner freely disclosed this incident during his pre-employment processing. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was 32 years of age and had worked as a correctional officer since June 24, 1985. Petitioner's job performance evaluations as a correctional officer have been satisfactory or above. Petitioner has received several commendations for his service. Petitioner's reputation is that he is a dependable, reliable, and trustworthy individual who possesses high moral character. Following the denial of his request for certification as a correctional officer on November 1, 1988, Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing by the election of rights form he filed with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Division of Criminal Justice standards and Training issue a Final Order which approves Petitioner's application for certification as a correctional officer. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner, individually, are addressed as follows: 1. Rejected as unnecessary to result reached. 2.-4. Addressed in paragraphs 11-12. Addressed in paragraphs 6 and 8. Addressed in paragraph 12. Addressed in paragraph 13. Rejected as unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 13. 10.-14. Rejected as subordinate to conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact submitted for petitioner on the generic record are addressed as follows: 1-14. Rejected as recitation of witness testimony, and not findings of fact. The matters have, however, been addressed in paragraphs 7 so far as deemed necessary to the result reached. 15, 16, 18-20. Addressed in paragraphs 1-4. 17. Rejected as unnecessary to the result reached. 21. Addressed in paragraph 7, otherwise rejected as unnecessary to the result reached in a legal conclusion. 22-27. Rejected as subordinate to the conclusion reached. 28. Rejected as misleading and not supported by competent proof. 29-36. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusion reached or not supported by competent evidence. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: 1-3. Addressed in paragraphs 9-10. 4. Rejected as being unnecessary to result reached. 5.-6. Addressed in paragraphs 11-12. 7. Addressed in paragraphs 5 and 32. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald D. Slesnick, II Attorney at Law Law Offices of Slesnick and Lober 10680 Northwest 25th Street Suite 202 Miami, Florida 33172 Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lee Kraftchick, Esquire Assistant County Attorney in and for Dade County Metro Dade Center 111 N.W. First Street, Suite 2810 Miami, Florida 33128 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, Esquire General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of a handicap, in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed by the City of Kissimmee (the City) from July 17, 1989, to the present as a tele- communicator in the Communications Center of the Police Department. Petitioner and his health care provider advised the City sometime in 1995 that Petitioner is diabetic. Diabetes has impaired Petitioner's work schedule and his willingness to train other employees but has not handicapped Petitioner. The diabetes has not substantially limited Petitioner in a major life activity and has not substantially limited Petitioner from performing a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes. Petitioner is able to care for himself. Petitioner clothes himself, bathes, shaves, brushes his teeth, and combs his hair. Petitioner checks his own blood sugar level regularly during waking hours. Petitioner is able to perform other major life activities. Those activities include walking, driving a vehicle, performing manual tasks, seeing, speaking, hearing, learning, talking, and performing the duties of his occupation. Petitioner has walked for several years approximately 1.25 miles a day. Petitioner drives his own vehicle. Petitioner performs manual tasks. Petitioner operates a computer, though he has some difficulty doing so. Several months ago, Petitioner helped a friend hang an interior door. Petitioner has also helped friends paint walls in recent years. Petitioner has difficulty with his uncorrected vision. With reading glasses, however, Petitioner reads documents most of the time. Petitioner uses a device identified in the record as a CPAP machine to assist him in breathing at night. However, Petitioner does not need to use the machine during the work day to do his job. No health care provider has advised Respondent that Petitioner is disabled. Petitioner’s diabetic specialist is Dr. Jose Mandry. Dr. Mandry did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Mandry informed Respondent that Petitioner has diabetes in a note the City received on or about February 6, 1995, when Respondent attempted to schedule Petitioner for a night shift in the Communications Center. The note from Dr. Mandry did not indicate that Petitioner was handicapped (disabled), or that any accommodations were required in order for Petitioner to continue working. The note requested the City to keep Petitioner on daytime shifts "if possible." The note did not indicate that a daytime schedule was medically necessary. Rather, the note indicated that working day shifts would be “desirable.” On March 23, 1995, Dr. Mandry provided another letter to the City regarding Petitioner's medical condition. The note stated that Petitioner needed to “be accommodated with a normal daytime work schedule.” In July 1995, the City established a regular daytime work schedule for Petitioner. The City never regarded Petitioner as disabled, and the daytime work schedule for Petitioner was not an “ADA Accommodation.” The City employee who granted the request for a daytime schedule was identified in the record as Police Department Commander Johns. Commander Johns did not have authority to provide an ADA accommodation. The authority to provide an ADA accommodation is vested in the city manager and city attorney. They make a final determination of whether the City will provide an ADA accommodation to a particular employee. The city manager and city attorney did not authorize the City to provide any ADA accommodation to Petitioner. The daytime schedule granted to Petitioner is part of Respondent’s general practice and policy of working with impaired employees and employees who have personal needs. The policy attempts to help such employees with their schedules when it is possible to do so without an adverse impact on the City’s ability to provide services. Assuming arguendo that City employees had the authority to provide ADA accommodations to Petitioner in the absence of a formal determination by the city manager and city attorney, Petitioner relies on evidence of interactions between City employees and Petitioner in an attempt to show the City provided Petitioner with ADA accommodations. The relevant evidence involves two time periods. The first is the period from June 4, 1996, until June 5, 2002. The second is the period from June 5, 2002, through March 16, 2006, when Petitioner filed the Charge of Discrimination with the Commission. The record evidence does not support a finding that City employees provided an ADA accommodation to Petitioner. The daytime work schedule authorized in 1995 remained in effect until June 4, 1996, when Dr. Mandry advised the City that Petitioner could work up to 12 hours a day, as long as the 12 hours were daytime hours. Between 1996 and June 5, 2002, the City allowed Petitioner to work overtime when he wanted to, based on Petitioner's self-assessment of his physical condition. Petitioner acknowledged the overtime schedule in a memo that he wrote to Lieutenant Donna Donato on June 5, 2002 (the memo). The memo described Petitioner's plans for his future work schedule. The memo stated that Petitioner was providing notice “that due to self-assessed health issues” Petitioner intended to restrict the amount of his overtime in the future. (emphasis added). In relevant part, the memo advised the City that Petitioner did not intend to “demand the imposition of the restrictions [on his work schedule] as addressed by City Management in June of 1995.” Instead, the memo advised that Petitioner would address his concerns “to the best of [his] abilities by modifying [his] agenda. " Petitioner listed a number of items that may be fairly described as terms or conditions for when and under what circumstances Petitioner would work overtime. Petitioner provided no new medical evidence to support a finding of medical necessity for the terms and conditions that Petitioner prescribed in the memo. Petitioner acknowledged that his concerns were based on “self-assessed health issues” and asserted that “no further documentation should be necessary.” Petitioner did provide a note from Dr. Mandry on June 20, 2002. The note states: The following is a letter as requested by the above-captioned patient [David Dey]. As you know, he suffers from diabetes and also requires insulin for his control. David needs to monitor glucose levels and follow fairly stable meal patterns in order to try to achieve good control of diabetes and avoid complications. It would certainly be to his advantage and much preferable if he could have a stable work shift where he could regulate his meals and his injections properly. (emphasis added) Respondent's Exhibit 18 (Hereinafter R-18, etc.). During the second period of time between June 5, 2002, and the Charge of Discrimination, the City hired a new manager for the Communications Center. In July 2002, the City hired Ms. Jean Moe to manage the Communications Center at the Police Department, and Ms. Moe remains responsible for the supervision and management of Petitioner. Ms. Moe is diabetic. Ms. Moe met with Petitioner on August 6, 2002. The two discussed the issues Petitioner raised in his memo and agreed on a number of items outlined in Ms. Moe’s memo of August 6, 2002 (the Moe memo). The Moe memo provides in relevant part: Beginning today, August 6, 2002 you will only work your twelve (12) hour shift assignment [sic]. You will not volunteer or be assigned any overtime. You are also no longer on the standby schedule. Here you had some concern on the overtime issue, however, as stated by your doctor in writing he is recommending that you do not work any extra hours. Should he feel your health improves and he authorizes your overtime, I will take his note under advisement. That does not mean I will immediately give you overtime but will review his letter and his suggestion. Along with the above issues, your supervisor has been advised under no circumstances will you miss your assigned lunchtime or breaks, these are important to keep you regulated on your medication per your doctor. You also requested you be allowed to lift your feet after working several hours, this will also be under consideration when I receive a note from your doctor stating it R-19. would be another requirement for health reasons. In 2004, the City Police Department considered changes to the normal work schedule for employees in the Communication Center. The City advised employees, including Petitioner, that the City would require employees to rotate work shifts between daytime and night shifts. On July 14, 2004, Petitioner wrote to the City Human Resources Department and requested a “final, permanent accommodation . . .” for daytime work only. Petitioner provided copies of documents from Dr. Mandry, which did not include a medical opinion that Petitioner is disabled. Assistant Human Resources Director Andrea Walton wrote to Dr. Mandry on July 15, 2004, and requested clarification of his letters in order for the City to arrange an appropriate schedule for Petitioner. Ms. Walton specifically inquired about the possibility of Petitioner's working a rotating work schedule and asked Dr. Mandry to clarify Petitioner's ability to work overtime. The City wanted Dr. Mandry to clarify previous statements that Petitioner could work overtime as a parking enforcement specialist but that Petitioner's overtime work as a tele-communicator must be limited. Dr. Mandry responded to Ms. Walton on July 26, 2004. The response explained that Petitioner was able to work in a rotating schedule and for unspecified amounts of overtime if control is optimal and under ideal circumstances. Dr. Mandry was unable at that time to give more specific information to the City. He explained: R-27. With regards to some of the other issues, again, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for me to give you a specific answer, and I would rather you talk to Mr. Dey specifically so that he can let you know what his current limitations are. On August 3, 2004, Ms. Beth Stefek, the director of Human Resources for the City, wrote to Petitioner and explained that the City was willing to work with Petitioner to arrive at an appropriate work schedule. Ms. Stefek did not indicate that the City considered Petitioner to be disabled. Sometime after August 3, 2004, Petitioner experienced further difficulties in controlling his diabetes. On August 10, 2004, Dr. Mandry wrote to the City again. Dr. Mandry told the City: I just saw David today who seems to be having some further difficulties with his health and his control of diabetes. At this time, I have reviewed his records, and I think it would clearly be in his best interest that from now on, he work only on a stable daytime work shift only [sic]. He certainly is not doing well when he tries to do overtime, and traditionally in the past has always become more complicated and his health has deteriorated whenever he tries to do either night shifts or overtime shifts. I have, therefore, at this time, recommended that David should not be allowed to work any overtime and/or nighttime shift. Of course, he needs to have accommodations for meals and monitoring or blood sugar levels as necessary, and he needs to have access to food in case he becomes hypoglycemic. R-29. The difficulties Petitioner experienced in controlling his diabetes were attributable to an increase in stress that Petitioner experienced between June and September 9, 2004. Petitioner's father died in June 2004, and three hurricanes impacted Petitioner’s home from August through September 2004. The hurricanes also increased stress at work due to increased demand on City services. On August 15, 2004, Petitioner advised Ms. Moe that he was intentionally running his blood sugars “higher than desired” at work to “offset and reduce the possibility of a hypoglycemic situation.” Toward the end of August 2004, the City moved Petitioner to the night shift in the Communications Center. Petitioner worked the night shift for a few nights. On September 5, 2004, Petitioner advised Ms. Moe that he was available to be part of a voluntary group of dispatchers to work catastrophic disasters like hurricanes if she decided to form the group. On or about September 9, 2004, while Petitioner was at home, Petitioner fell unconscious and was transported to the hospital for treatment. On September 16, 2004, Dr. Mandry wrote to the City and advised that it was necessary for Petitioner to refrain from working "any overtime shifts and/or nighttime shifts.” On or about September 21, 2004, Petitioner returned to work, and the City placed Petitioner on a daytime work schedule through the remainder of 2004. On January 6, 2005, Ms. Moe advised Petitioner the City needed Petitioner to work the night shift for a few nights. However, the City was able to satisfy its needs without placing Petitioner on the night shift at that time. Petitioner responded to Ms. Moe on January 6, 2005, by stating that he was going to begin a search within the City for another position that would meet his medical needs. On January 20, 2005, Petitioner inquired about an opening within the City for a parking enforcement specialist. On January 25, 2005, Petitioner informed Ms. Moe and others at the City that he would not consider either the parking enforcement position or a community service officer (CSO) position that had become available because both jobs contradicted his "medical requirements.” On April 4, 2005, Ms. Moe sent a memo to Petitioner advising him that the City would place Petitioner on a list identified in the record as the call-back list for emergency back-up in the Communication Center. Ms. Moe specified that the placement of Petitioner on the call-back list was subject to the work conditions previously established in July 1995 by Commander Johns. Ms. Moe advised Petitioner that he would be placed on the call-back list effective April 20, 2005, but only in those weeks when he was scheduled to work 33 hours so that his work week did not exceed 40 hours. She assured Petitioner that absent some extraordinary circumstances, the City would not call Petitioner back to work a night shift and would not schedule Petitioner on a call-back that would result in Petitioner working more than 40 hours in a work week. The memo from Ms. Moe expressly indicated that the City did not consider the Petitioner to be ADA disabled. Ms. Moe told Petitioner to advise her if he thought there was some medical or ADA reason why he could not be on the call-back list. On April 13, 2005, Attorney Edward R. Gay wrote to the City on behalf of Petitioner. Mr. Gay stated that Petitioner believed there was a medical reason that prevented Petitioner from being placed on the call-back list. On April 21, 2005, Attorney Lucille Turner, the City’s special labor counsel, responded to Mr. Gay. Ms. Turner provided Mr. Gay with a copy of the City’s April 4, 2005, memo detailing the call-back restrictions applicable to Petitioner. Ms. Turner repeated that it was not the City's intent to call Petitioner back to work a night shift or to schedule Petitioner to work more than 40 hours a week in the absence of “some extraordinary circumstance." The City, through its counsel, expressly advised Petitioner that the City had never undertaken a formal review of whether Petitioner should be classified as a person protected by the ADA. Instead, the City had informally worked to develop a work schedule for Petitioner that takes into account the information provided by Petitioner's health care providers. The City provided Petitioner with written guidance concerning the procedure for Petitioner to follow to seek a classification from the City as ADA disabled. In relevant part, the letter advises: If [Petitioner] believes that his diabetes (or any other medical condition) requires the City to not include him on the call back list, or to change his work schedule, he should provide the City with further information in support of his request. This should include information about the legal basis for his disability claim . . . [keeping in mind case law cited earlier in the letter indicating diabetes is not a per se disability]. . . . The City will then review the information to determine whether Mr. Dey has a disability as defined by the ADA, and, if so, what accommodations can be reasonably made. R-54, at 3. Petitioner did not ask to be classified as disabled. Rather, Dr. Mandry wrote to the City on June 8, 2005. Dr. Mandry stated that he was writing at the request of Petitioner. In relevant part, Dr. Mandry explained: R-1. Mr. Dey is by no means disabled, and he can clearly work and satisfy the capacities of his job as long as there is some stability involved in it. (emphasis added) In March and August 2005, the City did not select Petitioner to fill respective vacancies for a shift supervisor in the Communication Center and a parking enforcement specialist for the City. Neither action constituted an adverse employment action against Petitioner. The job duties for the vacant shift supervisor in March 2005 required the successful applicant to work night shifts. Petitioner did not apply for the shift supervisor position. When the City posted the notice of vacancy for the shift supervisor, Petitioner requested Ms. Moe to provide Petitioner with information about the job requirements for the position. Ms. Moe responded on March 14, 2005, and advised Petitioner that the position was night shift duty and required the supervisor to train other employees. On March 23, 2005, Petitioner wrote to Ms. Moe indicating he had concluded that multiple aspects of my physical disability are contradictory to the requirements of the supervisory position and that he had elected not to apply for the position. If Petitioner were to have applied for the shift supervisor position, Petitioner was not qualified to perform the essential requirements of the position. Petitioner was unable or unwilling to work the night shift and was unable or unwilling to train subordinate employees. The Communications Center receives 911 calls from the public. Employees receive calls and dispatch them to the police department and fire department 24 hours a day. The work schedule at the Communication Center is divided into two shifts. The day shift begins at 6 a.m. and ends at 6 p.m. The night shift begins at 6 p.m. and ends the following day at 6 a.m. Approximately four to six employees work each 12-hour shift in the Communications Center. However, only one supervisor works each shift. A shift supervisor oversees the duties of all employees at the Communications Center and trains, advises, and assists subordinates. Supervisors are routinely required to work overtime, perform on-call duty, fill in for other shift supervisors, and hold over for indefinite times at the end of a shift to handle ongoing calls. Petitioner claims to suffer from hypoglycemic episodes in which he becomes unresponsive and dysfunctional. Petitioner has previously asked on two separate occasions to be relieved of responsibility to train personnel because it was too stressful for him. In each instance, the City relieved Petitioner of any training responsibilities. In August 2005, Petitioner applied for a job opening as a parking enforcement specialist for the City. The City selected another candidate identified in the record as Ms. Evelyn Thurman. The selection of Ms. Thurman over Petitioner to fill the vacant position of parking enforcement specialist was not an adverse employment action against Petitioner. Ms. Thurman was more qualified by training and experience. When the City selected Ms. Thurman to fill the vacant position of parking enforcement specialist, Ms. Thurman had 24 years of law enforcement and security experience in various agencies. From 1980 until 1996, Ms. Thurman worked as a crime scene investigator for the City of Miami Police Department, where she received numerous commendations, and her performance evaluations rated her as an above average employee. Ms. Thurman also worked at the Sheriff’s Office in Tampa, Florida, and in Security at the Florida Department of the Lottery. Petitioner was unable to meet the essential functions of the job requirements for a parking enforcement specialist. A parking enforcement specialist routinely works alone and is required to work at night. The nature of the job does not permit the type of schedule Petitioner requires. The work schedule of a parking enforcement specialist is not limited to daytime hours that do not exceed 33 to 40 hours a week. A parking enforcement specialist may be required to work evening shifts, long hours, overtime, and holidays. A parking enforcement specialist also must adjust his or her work schedule when needed. A parking enforcement specialist also must be available during emergencies to alleviate calls for service from patrol officers. A parking enforcement specialist works alone. Petitioner suffers from hypoglycemic episodes in which he becomes unresponsive and dysfunctional. The episodes can occur at any time, and Petitioner prefers not be alone on the job if possible. On October 31, 2005, Ms. Moe issued a verbal reprimand to Petitioner for insubordination. The verbal reprimand is not an adverse employment action against Petitioner. The City did not reduce Petitioner's pay and did not change the terms, conditions, or privileges of Petitioner's employment as a result of the reprimand. In preparation for Hurricane Wilma earlier in October 2005, Ms. Moe sent an e-mail to employees in the Communication Center instructing them to come to work the following day with the supplies they would need if events required them to stay at the Communication Center during the hurricane (the Moe email). Petitioner and most of the other employees did not bring their hurricane supplies with them when they reported to work the morning after the Moe email. The City sent Petitioner and the other employees home to fetch their supplies and did not impose a time limit for the task. Petitioner took about 90 minutes to get his supplies and return to work, and the span included the regular lunch hour. The time he took was not an issue of concern and did not provide a basis for the verbal reprimand. Petitioner did not eat lunch during the time he retrieved his supplies. Later in the day, Petitioner requested a meal break, and his supervisor denied the request. Petitioner took a second meal break. On October 23, 2005, Ms. Moe delivered to Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Discipline for insubordination. On October 31, 2005, Ms. Moe issued an Oral Warning to Petitioner. Petitioner grieved the verbal reprimand. During the grievance procedure, the City offered to rescind the warning to resolve the grievance. Petitioner rejected the offer as unsatisfactory unless the City also destroyed the record of the discipline. The City advised Petitioner that it could not destroy the document because the document was a public record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents violated the Florida Civil Rights Act (the Act), as amended, as alleged in Petitioner's Employment Complaint of Discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. She began employment with Staff Builders around October 2012 and continued working with that entity until she voluntarily resigned around May 2014. As the name implies, Staff Builders is a staffing agency in Lakeland, Florida, that provides temporary staffing for various clients in the Lakeland area. One client is Max- Pak, a manufacturing firm also located in Lakeland. A service agreement has been executed by the two companies to formalize this arrangement. Because the evidence shows that Max-Pak was able to exercise control over the manner in which Petitioner and other temporary employees performed their duties, a joint employer relationship is present. See, e.g., Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 344, 349 (D.N.Y. 1984); Washington v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, Case No. 05-2988 (Fla. DOAH Oct. 25, 2005; FCHR Jan. 6, 2006). Before an employee is placed with a client, Staff Builders provides in-house training regarding work rules. Each employee is required to sign a training checklist acknowledging that he/she has received this training. Exhibit 8 reflects that Petitioner received this training on October 15, 2012. As a part of her training, before she was assigned to work at Max-Pak, Petitioner was given a copy of Max-Pak's work rules. See Resp. Ex. 7. Among other things, the rules provide that if an employee is "threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with fellow employees at any time," it would "usually lead to the immediate dismissal at the first offense." Employees are expected to follow the work rules of both Staff Builders and their temporary employer. When the underlying incident occurred, Petitioner was working as a temporary employee for Max-Pak in the assembly line. On March 24, 2014, the men's restroom was out of service. This required that both male and female workers use the women's restroom until the men's restroom was restored to service. That morning, Petitioner went to the restroom, knocked on the closed door, and a male voice responded "wait a minute." The person using the bathroom was Tommy Engram, an African- American male who worked as a temporary staffing employee in the shipping and receiving department. Although the testimony describing the incident is quite limited, the more credible evidence shows that when Engram exited the restroom, Petitioner demanded to know why he was using the women's restroom. "Words" between the two ensued, including a comment by Engram that Petitioner should not disrespect him. Petitioner testified that she was insulted by the tone and demeanor of Engram's words, and had she not been a female, he would not have spoken to her in the manner that he did. However, there is no credible evidence that Engram used profanity or words of a sexual nature, or that his remarks were motivated by gender considerations. When Petitioner spotted Engram in her work area a few minutes later, she demanded to know why he was there. The two had further words, and Petitioner told Engram she would have her boyfriend "beat him up." She then telephoned her boyfriend, Kenneth Graham, and told him about the incident. By threatening Engram in this manner, Petitioner violated a Max-Pak work rule that prohibits an employee from threatening or intimidating a fellow employee and was subject to immediate dismissal. That same evening, Engram went to "the trees," a local area frequented mainly by African-Americans where they socialize and drink. Graham was also at the trees that evening, and after he spotted Engram, Graham says they began arguing about the restroom incident and a "fist fight" between the two took place. Engram suggested that the fight was instigated by Graham, and his version of events was corroborated by a witness to the fight, whose statement indicates that Graham initiated the skirmish. See Resp. Ex. 2. Engram's version is accepted as being more credible. The next morning, Engram reported the incident to Ford. After Ford and Max-Pak conferred, Staff Builders advised Petitioner that Max-Pak no longer wanted her as a staffing employee at their plant. This action was taken solely because Petitioner had violated a Max-Pak work rule by threatening Engram with physical harm. There was no evidence that the decision by either Respondent was based on Petitioner's gender. This was not the first time a temporary employee at Max-Pak was asked not to return for violating work rules. Two other Staff Builder workers, both males, were also reassigned to another client after violating the same anti-violence work rules. Petitioner continued working for Staff Builders and was assigned to staff another client in Tampa, where she worked for four or five weeks. After finding a permanent job, Petitioner voluntarily resigned her position with Staff Builders around May 2014. Petitioner's complaint was filed on June 30, 2014. She says it was filed because no one would tell her why she could not return to Max-Pak. However, at no time before the complaint was filed did Petitioner advise either Max-Pak or Staff Builders that she believed her "termination" was because of her sex. In fact, the only person she reported any alleged discrimination to was "Jade," a co-worker whose last name was not given.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner against both Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 2015.
