The Issue The issue in this matter is whether section 330.30(3)(f), Florida Statutes, exempts Petitioner from obtaining the approval of the Department of Transportation prior to using a private heliport site adjacent to his property.
Findings Of Fact The Department is authorized to administer and enforce the rules and requirements for airport sites, including initial airport site approval, registration of private airports, and licensing of public use airports. See § 330.29, Fla. Stat. Petitioner owns a home next to Honeymoon Lake in Brevard County, Florida. Petitioner, an aviation enthusiast, also owns several helicopters. Petitioner currently parks his helicopters at a nearby airport. Petitioner desires to takeoff and land his helicopters at his home. Petitioner built a dock on Honeymoon Lake next to his property. Over the dock, Petitioner constructed a wooden platform to use as his heliport. Petitioner built the platform directly into the submerged lands beneath Honeymoon Lake. The platform is approximately 36 feet long by 32 feet wide. The platform rests on wooden pilings and is raised to about 15 feet above Honeymoon Lake. The platform is connected to the shore by a wooden foot bridge. Petitioner harbors two boats at the dock beneath the platform. Petitioner constructed the heliport for his private, recreational use only. Petitioner wants to use his heliport without applying for approval from the Department. Honeymoon Lake is a private (not State) body of water whose history goes back to a deed issued in the late 18th century. In 1878, President Rutherford B. Hayes, on behalf of the United States government, deeded Honeymoon Lake to the original developer of the area. Honeymoon Lake is approximately 300 feet wide at Petitioner’s property line. The area of the lake where Petitioner’s heliport is located is owned by the Stillwaters Homeowners Association and used as a recreation area. On September 5, 2017, after Petitioner constructed the platform, the Stillwaters Homeowners Association Board of Directors approved Petitioner’s heliport by resolution. Prior to this administrative action, Petitioner applied to the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) for airspace approval to operate his heliport on Honeymoon Lake. On April 13, 2017, the FAA provided Petitioner a favorable Heliport Airspace Analysis Determination in which the FAA did not object to Petitioner’s use of his helicopters in the airspace over Honeymoon Lake. The FAA’s determination included an approved Approach/Departure Path Layout and Agreement with the 45th Space Wing, which operates out of nearby Patrick Air Force Base. Petitioner also represents that the heliport platform does not violate the Brevard County Building Code. In support of this assertion, Petitioner introduced the testimony of Brevard County Code Enforcement Officer Denny Long. In August 2017, after receiving a complaint that Petitioner’s heliport might have been built in violation of Brevard County ordinances, Mr. Long inspected Petitioner’s dock structure. Upon finding that Petitioner had already constructed his platform, Mr. Long could not identify a code provision that he needed to enforce. Therefore, he closed his investigation. Petitioner contends that the Honeymoon Lake area is not taxed by Brevard County. Neither is Brevard County responsible for any improvements thereon.3/ Because his heliport is situated over water and not land, as well as the fact that he will only use the heliport for occasional, private use, Petitioner believes that he is entitled to the exemption under section 330.30(3)(f) from obtaining the Department’s approval prior to landing his helicopters at his heliport. Section 330.30 states, in pertinent part: SITE APPROVALS; REQUIREMENTS, EFFECTIVE PERIOD, REVOCATION.— (a) Except as provided in subsection (3), the owner or lessee of any proposed airport shall, prior to . . . construction or establishment of the proposed airport, obtain approval of the airport site from the department. * * * (3) EXEMPTIONS.—The provisions of this section do not apply to: * * * (f) Any body of water used for the takeoff and landing of aircraft, including any land, building, structure, or any other contrivance that facilitates private use or intended private use. Petitioner asserts that the exemption described in section 330.30(3)(f) extends to a “building, structure or any other contrivance” that is constructed on, or over, a body of water. Therefore, since his landing site is situated over water, Petitioner argues that his heliport should be considered a “structure . . . that facilitates private use” of a “body of water for the takeoff and landing of aircraft” which qualifies him for an exemption from Department approval. Although Petitioner does not believe that he needed to apply to the Department for approval of his proposed landing site, he did so at the FAA’s suggestion. Around April 2017, Petitioner contacted the Department inquiring about the process to obtain an airport license or registration for his heliport. On September 25, 2017, however, the Department denied Petitioner’s application as incomplete. Pursuant to section 330.30(1)(a), the Department instructed Petitioner to produce written assurances from the local government zoning authority (Brevard County) that the proposed heliport was a compatible land use for the location and complied with local zoning requirements. In response, instead of supplementing his application, Petitioner asserted to the Department that his heliport was exempt from registration under section 330.30(3)(f) because it was located in a private body of water. On April 6, 2018, the Department issued Petitioner a formal “Letter of Prohibition.” The Letter of Prohibition notified Petitioner that he was not authorized to operate his helicopter from his dock/heliport without first registering his heliport with the Department and obtaining an Airport Site Approval Order. The Letter of Prohibition further stated that Petitioner’s heliport did not meet the exception from site approval and registration requirements in section 330.30(3)(f). The Department expressed that the exception only applied to “a body of water used for the takeoff and landing of aircraft.” The exception did not apply to the platform Petitioner desired to use as his landing site. Petitioner challenges the Letter of Prohibition in this administrative hearing. The Department, through Alice Lammert and Dave Roberts, asserts that Petitioner must register his private-use heliport before he may use it to takeoff or land his helicopters. Ms. Lammert and Mr. Roberts testified that the Department has consistently interpreted section 330.30(3)(f) to pertain to actual bodies of water, e.g., waters used by seaplanes or other floatable aircraft. Both Ms. Lammert and Mr. Roberts commented that Petitioner is not seeking to takeoff or land his helicopters on Honeymoon Lake. Petitioner intends to use a platform, situated 15 feet above Honeymoon Lake, on which to land his helicopters. Ms. Lammert and Mr. Roberts expressed that Petitioner’s construction of his heliport over water does not change the fact that his heliport is a fixed wooden structure and not a “body of water.” Consequently, Petitioner must obtain Department approval prior to using the platform for his helicopters. Ms. Lammert and Mr. Roberts added that if Petitioner’s helicopters were equipped with pontoons and landed directly on the surface of Honeymoon Lake, his “landing site” would qualify for the exemption set forth in section 330.30(3)(f). Ms. Lammert and Mr. Roberts further explained that the Department is responsible for ensuring that aircraft operating in Florida takeoff and land in safe, controlled areas. Through section 330.30, the Department is tasked to inspect all potential airport sites to make sure that the landing zones do not pose a danger to any aircraft (or helicopter) that might use them. Safety is the Department’s primary focus when approving private airport/heliport registrations. For example, as Ms. Lammert explained, the Department would inspect Petitioner’s heliport to ensure that the platform is sturdy enough and wide enough to bear the weight of Petitioner’s helicopters. The Department might also determine whether the platform should be equipped with a safety net. Regarding Petitioner’s argument that the Department should consider his heliport a “structure . . . that facilitates private use” of a body of water, Mr. Roberts understands the exemption under section 330.30(3)(f) to include docks that are used for persons disembarking from a seaplane or other floatable aircraft. The exemption, however, does not apply if the dock, itself, serves as the landing site. Regarding Petitioner’s reference to the FAA analysis determination, Mr. Roberts explained that while the FAA has authority to approve the use of the airspace over Honeymoon Lake, the authority to approve the landing site remains with the Department. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his heliport qualifies for an exemption under section 330.30(3)(f). Accordingly, prior to his use of his heliport to takeoff or land his helicopters, he must apply for site approval from the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from Department approval under section 330.30(3)(f) prior to the use of his wooden platform as a heliport. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2018.
The Issue As described in the parties' Prehearing Stipulation Petitioners are challenging the Respondent's (SJRWMD) solicitation process with regard to the "Invitation to submit an Offer to Purchase property known as the Zellwin Airstrip." Petitioners seek to set aside the award of purchase to Intervenors and to have the solicitation process re-advertised. The issue for resolution is whether Petitioners are entitled to that relief.
Findings Of Fact In 1996 the Florida Legislature mandated that the St. Johns River Water Management District (SJRWMD) attempt to purchase farms on the north shore of Lake Apopka as part of a long-term restoration and reclamation project. Petitioners, Rex Shepherd and Dale Harper, are pilots and owners of an aerial advertising business, American Outdoor Aerial Advertising. In early 1998 the business was operating out of Crakes field, a small airstrip owned by Kent Crakes as part of Crakes' North Lake Apopka farm. Petitioners' business owned airplanes and banners which it flew for its advertising clients such as Sears and GEICO. Sometime in early 1998 it became obvious that Petitioners would need to move their operation to another field. There were break-ins at the hanger, and the airstrip was beginning to flood as a result of the reclamation project. Kent Crakes referred Rex Shepherd to Leonard Freeman, the individual with SJRWMD who was involved with land acquisition in the area. Around March or early April 1998 Petitioners commenced discussions with Mr. Freeman regarding their use of the farm airstrip at Zellwin Farms, also part of the SJRWMD Lake Apopka farms acquisition program. Mr. Freeman was the SJRWMD point of contact for the Zellwin Farms acquisition. By early 1998, the property was already under contract and was scheduled to close some time around June 1998. Mr. Freeman and the Petitioners met at the Zellwin Farms airstrip in June 1998, and Petitioners determined the property would be suitable for their operation. Eager to accommodate Petitioners because of their predicament and also in anticipation of the SJRWMD's eventual sale of the Zellwin parcel, Mr. Freeman gave permission for Petitioners to store their equipment on the site and gave them a key. Because Zellwin Farms was beyond what SJRWMD considered to be the lake's historic shoreline, the SJRWMD knew that it would need to dispose of its 1400 acres as surplus, in whole or part. Mr. Freeman's desire was to find a way to dispose of the property as the best thing for the SJRWMD. Thus, because of the Petitioners' immediate interest in relocating their business, Mr. Freeman began negotiating with them for their purchase of the airstrip and related buildings. In September 1998, Mr. Freeman met again with Petitioners at the airstrip and discussed a specific proposal. Petitioners talked about offering $250,000 under a lease-purchase arrangement, and sent a letter dated September 10, 1998, to Mr. Freeman with that offer. Mr. Freeman later suggested that since the appraised value was $275,000, an offer in that amount would be easier to get approved. Mr. Freeman did not have the authority to obligate the SJRWMD to sell the property and Petitioners understood that. Still, Petitioners felt they were negotiating in good faith with staff who could make a strong recommendation to the board. Petitioners believed in early October that they had a hand-shake deal subject to further discussions regarding specific terms. They knew that a competitive solicitation might be an option for the SJRWMD but they also believed that they would be given an opportunity to meet another third party's offer. This belief was based not on some specific agreement for a "right of first refusal," but rather on Mr. Freeman's good-natured assurances that they would work it all out. Mr. Freeman requested that the SJRWMD special counsel develop a draft contract based on Petitioners' offer. The offer would then need to be signed by Petitioners and approved by Mr. Freeman's supervisor before going to the SJRWMD governing board. The counsel never finished the draft and it was never given to Mr. Freeman or the Petitioners. By the end of October 1998, Robert Christianson, Mr. Freeman's supervisor and director of the SJRWMD Department of Operations and Land Resources, learned that Petitioners were flying in and out of the Zellwin airstrip and using it for their business base of operations. This activity was beyond the storage permission that Mr. Freeman had granted. (Even that permission was beyond his individual authority.) Mr. Freeman and Mr. Christianson met with Petitioners on October 27, 1998, to work out a license agreement for their use of the airstrip. Such an agreement was necessary to protect the parties' respective interests and to cover the SJRWMD for any liability in the landlord/tenant relationship. The result of that meeting was a written license agreement for Petitioners to use, maintain, and provide protection for the property for a period from October 30, 1998, to April 30, 1999, subject to revocation with advance notice. Petitioners used the airstrip property under that agreement and made improvements, mostly cleaning up the facility so it could be used. At the October meeting it became obvious to Petitioners that the informal negotiations for their purchase were terminated and that the SJRWMD was going to solicit competitive offers for the purchase. This concerned the Petitioners and they felt let- down by Mr. Freeman. Still, they concentrated on getting the license agreement worked out. Rex Shepherd's account of the October meeting was that Mr. Christianson was very clear about the fact that the SJRWMD had to go for competitive bid, that they were bound by a board and rules and regulations even though both he and Mr. Freeman would like for Petitioners to have the airport, and that they should be able to work it out. At the end of the meeting, and as they were leaving the trailer, Mr. Shepherd commented to Mr. Freeman that he really did not want to lose the airport and wanted to be apprised of what was going on so that if there were a higher bid, he could have the opportunity to match it, or if it were too high, that they would have 30 or 60 days to vacate the property. According to Mr. Shepherd, Mr. Freeman simply responded, "We'll work all that out, don't worry about it." On November 11, 1998, the SJRWMD governing board voted to surplus the Zellwin Farms property with direction to the staff that the sale be widely advertised in the aviation community and not be a sole source deal. Consistent with the board's direction and pursuant to Section 373.089(3), Florida Statutes, the SJRWMD advertised a "Notice of Intention to Sell" the airstrip property in the Orlando Sentinel for three consecutive weeks, November 9, 16, and 23, 1998. The notice identifies the airstrip property as an "Approximately 47-acre agricultural airport facility, 2,200'? square feet asphalt runway, 5,250 ? square feet metal hanger, 2,048 ? storage square feet building, well and septic tank at a location of northwest Orange County, Florida, Sections 20 and 29, T-20-S, R-27-E, on Jones Avenue, 1 ? mile west of U.S. Highway 441, Zellwood." The Notice of Intention to Sell states that "[a]ll interested persons are invited to submit an offer to the District for purchase of said lands. Contact the District . . . and request an Airport Sales Package." Both the Airport Sales Package and the Notice of Intention to Sell state that the airport property will be sold for the highest price obtainable. The sales package states that full cash offers to be paid at closing will be given first consideration and that 10 percent of the purchase price must be paid when the offeror was notified that it was successful. The sales package also states that any person adversely affected by an offer solicitation shall file a Notice of Protest, in writing, prior to the date on which the offers are to be received, and shall file a formal written protest within ten (10) days after filing the Notice of protest pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 40C-1.801. * * * Failure to timely file a notice of protest or failure to timely file a formal written protest shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. (SJRWMD Ex. 3). Both the Notice of Intention to Sell and the sales package require that sealed "offers for purchase" be submitted to the SJRWMD prior to 2:00 p.m. on December 4, 1998, the advertised time for opening of the offers. Nothing in the Notice or sales package reserves a right of first refusal for any person. Instead, both plainly state "no offer will be accepted after the date and hour specified for submittal of offers." (SJRWMD Exhibits 1 and 3) Although Petitioners did not see the newspaper notice, they had knowledge that the SJRWMD advertised the sale of the airstrip property through a competitive solicitation process in the newspaper. They had been clearly informed of need for the competitive process by Mr. Christianson at the October meeting and they were present when a pre-solicitation meeting/inspection took place at the airstrip in November prior to the offers being accepted by the SJRWMD. Intervenors requested a sales package from the SJRWMD on November 30, 1998, and December 2, 1998. Petitioners requested and received a sales package prior to the opening of the offers to purchase. The sales packages were not available to the public until December 2, 1998, the same day Petitioners received their package. Mr. Freeman told Petitioners they needed to submit their bid. Although the sales package stated that facsimile offers would not be accepted by the SJRWMD, Leonard Freeman informed Petitioners that they could fax their Offer to Purchase. The SJRWMD did accept a facsimile offer to purchase from Petitioners on December 4, 1998, at 1:07 p.m. Offers to purchase were opened by the SJRWMD at 2:10 p.m. on December 4, 1998. Petitioners submitted an offer to purchase the airstrip property for $275,000, where Petitioners would pay $1,500.00 per month for 60 months ($90,000 with $72,000 applied toward principal) with a balance of $203,000 cash to be paid at the end of the 60-month term. Intervenors submitted an offer to purchase the airstrip property for $310,000, where Intervenors would put 10 percent down ($31,000 earnest money deposit) at award of Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the balance of $279,000 cash would be paid at closing on or before May 1, 1999. Petitioners' offer to purchase was not the highest offer; it did not provide for cash at closing; and it did not meet the requirement of 10 percent to be paid upon notification. Staff recommended to the SJRWMD board that it award the purchase of the airstrip property to the highest offeror, Intervenors. The governing board approved staff's recommendation at its regularly scheduled meeting on December 9, 1998. On December 9, 1998, Petitioners filed a Notice of Protest. On December 18, 1998, Petitioners filed a copy of their Formal Bid Protest with the SJRWMD. Petitioners never grasped the implications of the competitive solicitation process until after the offers were opened and the award was made to Intervenors. Even if Petitioners had seen the newspaper notice and had received the sales package sooner, they still would not have protested because they understood that their "agreement" was outside of the process. That is, they mistakenly perceived that after the offers were in they could negotiate further to exceed the high offer. Chagrined, and genuinely regretful of the misunderstanding, Mr. Freeman had to tell Petitioners that further negotiations were foreclosed after the offers were opened. Mr. Freeman's earlier assurances to Petitioners were the result of an excess of bonhomie rather than any deception. He wanted them to have the airport and he wanted to work out the sale of surplus property. Petitioners were aware that he did not have the authority to bind his agency to an agreement. Mr. Freeman never specifically told Petitioners they had a right of first refusal; they wanted that advantage and surmised agreement from Mr. Freeman's and Mr. Christianson's vague counsel to not worry and that it would all be worked out. The SJRWMD devised a competitive process for disposition of the Zellwin airstrip that was consistent with its statute and with the direction of its governing board. Intervenors responded with an offer that met all the published requirements. Petitioners did not, and any culpability of SJRWMD's staff for Petitioners' misunderstanding is not so egregious as to require that the process begin again. Petitioners occupied the property, used it, and made improvements to enhance their use. This, however, was in reliance on their license to use the property and not on some certainty that they would ultimately be able to own the property. As Petitioners testified at hearing, they were disappointed that the SJRWMD decided to solicit competitive proposals; they knew that it was possible someone would offer more than they could match. (Harper, Transcript pages 117-120).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: that the SJRWMD enter its final order denying Petitioners' request to reject all bids and re-advertise the sale. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry Dean, Executive Director St. Johns River Water Management District Post office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 John W. Williams, Esquire St. Johns River Water Management District Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429 Clayton D. Simmons, Esquire Stenstrom, McIntosh, Colbert, Whigham And Simmons, P.A. Post Office Box 4848 Sanford, Florida 32772-4848 Stanley Dollen 1230 Kelso Boulevard Windermere, Florida 34786 Herbert Clark 5416 Trimble Park Road Mt. Dora, Florida 32757
The Issue The issue is whether AHG Hotels, LLC's application for a Type B site plan and deviation should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Background On September 11, 2002, the Development Review Committee (DRC) of Respondent, City of Tallahassee (City), approved a Type B site review application authorizing the construction of a Hampton Inn & Suites by Respondent, AHG Hotels, LLC (AHG). The DRC also granted AHG's request for a deviation from development standards contained in Section 10.6RR of the City's Zoning Code by allowing AHG to exceed the four-story height limitation and to add a fifth floor to the structure. Two other deviation requests by AHG were determined to be either inapplicable or exempt from Zoning Code requirements because of vesting, and thus they are not at issue here. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner, Capital City Hotels, Inc. (Petitioner), which owns and operates a Hilton Garden Inn near the proposed construction, timely filed a Petition for Formal Proceedings to contest the approval of the deviation request. On October 15, 2002, a determination of standing as to Petitioner was issued by the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission (Commission), which will issue a final order in this matter. As stipulated by the parties at hearing, the only issue is whether AHG failed to satisfy three of the seven criteria that must be met in order for the DRC to grant a deviation. Those disputed criteria are found in paragraphs (iii)-(v) of Section 23.3 of the City's Code of Ordinances (Code) and provide as follows: The deviation requested is the minimum deviation that will make possible the reasonable use of the land, building, or structure; and The strict application of the requirements of this chapter will constitute a substantial hardship to the applicant, which hardship is not self- created or imposed; and There are exceptional topographic, soil, or other environmental conditions unique to the property; The parties agree that all other criteria for the site plan and deviation have been satisfied by AHG. In addition, a related request by AHG for a technical amendment to the boundaries of the parcel will be granted by the DRC, assuming that AHG obtains a favorable ruling in this case. History of the Property The property which is the subject of this case is identified as lot of record 454 and fronts on the west side of Lonnbladh Road, lies south of Raymond Diehl Road and several hundred feet east of Thomasville Road, and is just southeast of the major intersection of Interstate 10 and Thomasville Road in Tallahassee. The zoning for the property is Commercial Parkway (CP), a mixed-use zoning district which applies to areas exhibiting an existing development pattern of office, general commercial, community facilities, and intensive automotive commercial development abutting urban area arterial roadways with high traffic volumes. Among the numerous permitted uses in that land use category are hotels and motels. The property is part of a 7.1-acre site originally owned by Kingswood Land Partners, Ltd. (Kingswood). In January 1990, Kingswood obtained from the City a minor subdivision approval, dividing the 7.1 acres into three lots of record, including lot of record 454. The three lots consisted of a 2.44-acre lot running along most of the western portion of the property with the exception of a small area on the southern end, a 1.68-acre lot on the northeast portion of the property, and a 2.98-acre lot on the southeast portion of the property (lot of record 454). In November 1990, Kingswood received from the City a verification of vested status (vested rights certificate) for the 7.1-acre site. The vested rights certificate provided that the 7.1-acre site was exempt from the consistency and concurrency provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County Comprehensive Plan (Plan) and was vested for an 89,887 gross square foot commercial non-medical office building and a 135- unit hotel/motel. In 1991, Kingswood utilized the vesting for a 135- unit, five-story hotel and constructed what is now known as the Cabot Lodge on the 2.44-acre lot. It also constructed on part of the southeastern 2.98-acre lot a paved area with parking places. In 1992, Kingswood conveyed to Twin Action Hotels, Inc. (Twin Action) the 2.44-acre lot which included the Cabot Lodge Hotel, but not the paved parking area on the 2.98-acre lot. The same year, Kingswood also conveyed to New Horizons Unlimited, Ltd. (New Horizons) the remaining two lots, which two lots were vested for a commercial non-medical office six- story building of 89,887 gross square feet. At the time of the conveyances of the New Horizons property and the Cabot Lodge property to New Horizons and Twin Action, respectively, these parties entered into a Grants of Reciprocal Easements dated June 23, 1992, recorded in Official Records Book 1570, at page 1072 of the Public Records of Leon County, Florida. Around 1994, the Florida Department of Transportation acquired .333 acres of the northernmost lot owned by New Horizons for a project which included realigning and four-laning Raymond Diehl Road and relocating the eastbound entrance ramp to Interstate 10, immediately in front of the Cabot Lodge lot. This acquisition reduced the New Horizons 1.68-acre lot to 1.347 acres. On October 14, 1998, the City approved a vested rights transfer request submitted by New Horizons, which provided that the New Horizons property could be used for a 107-room, four-story business hotel and 59,162 gross square feet of commercial non-medical offices, instead of the vested 89,887 gross square feet of commercial non-medical offices. Since the acquisition by New Horizons of the two remaining lots, that property has remained vacant and unimproved with the exception of the westernmost portion immediately south of the Cabot Lodge building, on which is located pavement and parking spaces. The parking spaces are not legally available to Cabot Lodge for use. The property located immediately west of the Cabot Lodge 2.44-acre lot is property which is referred to as the Thomasville Road Executive Park (Executive Park) property. On an undisclosed date, this property was divided into three separate lots by a minor subdivision approval consisting of Parcel A on which was constructed the Unisys Building and parking spaces, Parcel B which is now improved with a Hilton Garden Inn owed by Petitioner, and Parcel C which remains undeveloped. In 1996, Petitioner filed its site plan application to develop Parcel B. Included in the site plan application was a request for a technical amendment to adjust the boundary lines between Parcels A and B of the Executive Park property. Like AHG has done here, Petitioner also requested a deviation to the then height limitation of 45 feet, requesting that the City allow it to build the building 50 feet high, rather than the required 45 feet. Although the property on which the Hilton Garden Inn is now located was vested for a three-story commercial office building, subject to CP zoning, the City agreed that the vesting could also be used for a hotel use consisting of four stories rather than three stories. The City granted Petitioner's request to allow it to build a four-story hotel on Parcel B. It also granted Petitioner a height deviation so that the midpoint or peak of the roof would be not higher than 50 feet. However, the top of the roof is 59 feet, 6 inches. The facility has 99 rooms. No objection was made by Cabot Lodge, Unisys, or New Horizons to Petitioner's application for approval of its site plan, the technical amendment adjustment to boundary parcels, the use of the property for a four-story hotel instead of a three-story office building, or the granting of a height deviation. In April 2002, AHG entered into a contract with New Horizons for the purchase of 2.23 acres of the southeastern property owned by New Horizons for approximately $1.5 million. The 2.23 acres is part of the 2.98-acre lot of record known as lot 454. The application On July 5, 2002, AHG filed with the DRC its site plan application to construct a 122-room, five-story hotel on the 2.98-acre lot. On the same day, it filed a Deviation from Development Standard Request asking that it be allowed to construct a five-story hotel on the parcel rather than being limited to a four-story hotel, as required by the development standards for the CP zoning district in which the property is located. New Horizons has also requested a technical amendment to the boundaries of the 1.68-acre lot and the 2.98- acre lot that would result in the 2.98-acre lot on which the hotel will be built being reduced to 2.23 acres. The DRC intends to approve that request, assuming that AHG prevails in this proceeding. AHG's site plan uses the largest footprint for construction of the hotel building that is allowed under current applicable Code restrictions relating to the amount of impervious surface allowed to be constructed on a 2.23-acre lot, as well as the required amount of green space which must be maintained. If current zoning rules and regulations are strictly applied, AHG would be unable to have more than approximately 107 rooms in the hotel, utilizing the maximum footprint and only four stories on the 2.23 acres. The only way to accommodate the construction of 122 rooms is to obtain a deviation from the current restriction of four floors and allow a fifth floor to be built. The proposed height of construction of the five- story hotel will be 53 feet, 10 inches, except for several small areas of parapet walls which will be no higher than 58 feet, 4 inches. The subject site is relatively flat, with no excessive slopes, and it has no remarkable features from an environmental standpoint. It is unique in the sense that it is flat, barren land. It does not have wetlands, pristine water bodies, or other protected conditions. Also, it has no endangered plant species requiring special protection, no patriarch trees, no protected trees, and no native forests. Should the Deviation be Approved? A deviation under Section 23.3 is an amendment to a "set requirement" in the Code, such as a setback or height restriction. Between 60 and 75 percent of all applications filed with the DRC for a site plan approval are accompanied by a request for a deviation from a development standard, which are standards prescribed for each zoning district in the Code. One such development standard for the CP District is a four- story height limitation on structures found in Section 10.6RR of the Zoning Code. The DRC is a four-person committee comprised of representatives from the City's Utility Department, Public Works Department, Growth Management Department, and Planning Department; it is charged with the responsibility of deciding whether to grant or deny a deviation request. For at least the last six years, and probably much longer, the DRC has consistently applied and interpreted the deviation standards in Section 23.3 in the same manner. Although Section 23.3 provides that "the granting of deviations from the development standards in this chapter is not favored," they are not discouraged since more than half of all applicants cannot meet development standards due to site characteristics or other factors. Rather, the intent of the provision is to prevent wholesale deviations being submitted, project after project. Requests for a deviation are always approved, when justified, in order to give both the City and the applicant more flexibility in the development process. Here, AHG's application was treated the same as any other applicant. This case represents the first occasion that an approval of a deviation has been appealed. After an application for a deviation is filed, it is forwarded to all appropriate City departments as well as members of the DRC. Each reviewing agency is requested to provide information to the DRC members on whether or not the request should be recommended for approval. In this case, no adverse comments or recommendations were made by any City Department. After reviewing the Department comments, and the justification submitted by AHG, the DRC approved the deviation. Under Section 5.1 of the Code, the City's land use administrator, Mr. Pitts, has the specific responsibility to interpret all zoning and development approval regulations, including Section 23.3, which provides the criteria for granting a deviation. That provision has an apparent inconsistency between the first two sentences: the first sentence includes a phrase that all criteria set forth thereafter must be met to approve a deviation while the second sentence appears to provide that only the conditions necessary to granting a particular deviation must be met. In resolving this apparent inconsistency, Mr. Pitts does not construe the Section as requiring that all seven criteria must be met in every case. Instead, even though all criteria are reviewed by the DRC, only those that are applicable must be satisfied. If this were not true, the DRC "would grant very few deviations as part of [its] site plan or subdivision regulation [process]," and the intent of the Section would be undermined. For example, in order to justify a deviation, the DRC does not require that an applicant show that there are exceptional topographical soil features if, as here, there are no exceptional environmental features on the property. This interpretation has been consistently followed over the years, is a reasonable and logical construction of the language, and is hereby accepted. As a part of its application, AHG submitted a narrative justifying the granting of a deviation under each of the seven criteria. To satisfy the first disputed criterion, AHG indicated in its application that "[t]his deviation is the minimum allowed to make reasonable use of the property and to compete with adjacent hotels who enjoy the same height opportunity." AHG's use of the property is consistent with adjoining developments, including the neighboring Cabot Lodge, which is five stories high and has 135 rooms, and the Hilton Garden Inn, which was originally vested for an office building, but was allowed by the DRC to construct a four-story hotel. There is no other property available to AHG at this site on which to construct a hotel. The evidence shows that New Horizons initially offered to sell AHG only 2.05 acres; when AHG advised that anything less than 2.23 acres would render the project financially unfeasible, New Horizons "very reluctantly" agreed to sell an additional .18 acres. Because New Horizons intends to build a restaurant on its remaining 2.097 acres, any further reduction in the acreage would reduce its highest and best use of the property. Thus, AHG does not have the option of purchasing more property to expand its hotel laterally, as Petitioner suggests, rather than by adding a fifth floor. In addition, AHG does not have the ability to reduce the size of its hotel rooms in order to squeeze more rooms out of a four-story structure. This is because Hampton Inn (the franchisor) will not grant a franchise for a new hotel unless the franchisee agrees to build a hotel with prototypical room sizes. The present design of the hotel meets the minimum size required. There is no evidence that there is any other minimum deviation that could be granted which would make possible the use of the property for construction of 122 rooms under the standards set forth by Hampton Inn, the franchisor. Thus, the only practical adjustment that can be made is to obtain a height deviation. Accordingly, the criterion has been satisfied. To satisfy the second disputed criterion, AHG stated in its narrative that "[t]he strict application of this requirement would place this property and proposed hotel at a competitive disadvantage by a lower number of available rooms." Through testimony of an AHG principal, it was established that in order for AHG to make reasonable use of its property, the addition of a fifth floor is necessary. The evidence shows that as a general rule, a developer can only afford to pay approximately $10,000.00 per room for land cost. In this case, based on the 2.23 acres, at a purchase price of $1,500,000.00 and a hotel with 122 rooms, the projected land cost is $12,000.00 per room. This is the maximum that can be paid for land and still make AHG's project economically feasible. The strict application of the Zoning Code will make the project financially unfeasible, which will create a substantial hardship to AHG. The hardship is not self-created or imposed. At hearing, Petitioner's representative contended that "there are some companies who would find it financially feasible" to construct a four-story hotel with fewer rooms on the same site. However, the more persuasive evidence on this issue was presented by the AHG principal and shows the contrary to be true. The evidence further shows that the granting of the deviation will result in an almost equal efficiency factor of the total square footage of building versus the total square footage of the site when comparing AHG's proposed project to the neighboring Cabot Lodge. On the other hand, strict application of the Zoning Code could result in a substantially less and disproportionate efficiency factor of AHG's property as compared to the adjoining Cabot Lodge. This is because the highest point of the proposed Hampton Inn and Suites is 58 feet, 6 inches, with the majority of the hotel being 51 feet high. The adjoining five-story, 135-room Cabot Lodge has its highest point at 55 feet, 6 inches, with the majority of the building at 46 feet high. The Hilton Garden Inn has the highest roof with its maximum height at 59 feet, 6 inches, which runs across the entire peak of the roofline. 40. To satisfy the final disputed criterion, AHG indicated in its application that "[t]he absence of any environmental features on this property, or any adjacent environmental features that might be impacted[,] help support the deviation." As noted above, the property in question is unique in the sense that it is flat, treeless, and has no remarkable environmental features. If a site is devoid of environmental features, as it is here, the DRC has consistently interpreted this provision as having no application in the deviation process. This is the same interpretation used by the DRC when it approved Petitioner's application for a height deviation in 1996 to construct the Hilton Garden Inn. Like AHG's property, Petitioner's property was also devoid of environmental features. Therefore, this criterion does not apply. Even assuming arguendo that this provision applies, the addition of a fifth story to a four-story building has no impact whatsoever on the environmental characteristics of the site. Finally, there is no evidence that the deviation request is inconsistent with the Plan, or that the deviation will have any adverse impact to the general health, safety, and welfare of the public. Indeed, as to any Plan implications that might arise through the construction of a hotel, the evidence shows that the project is wholly consistent with the purpose and intent of the CP land use category, which is to promote higher intensity and density in CP-zoned land and to discourage urban sprawl.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission enter a final order granting AHG's Type B site plan review application and its application for a deviation from the height restriction for the CP land use category. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles R. Gardner, Esquire Gardner, Wadsworth, Shelfer, Duggar & Bist, P.A. 1300 Thomaswood Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-7914 Linda R. Hurst, Esquire City Hall, Second Floor 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731 John Marshall Conrad, Esquire Ausley & McMullen Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0391 Jean Gregory, Clerk Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission City Hall 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731
Findings Of Fact Selwin Coleman is the record holder of land located near Maytown Road three miles west of Oak Hill, Florida, at latitude 28o51'25" North, longitude 80o54'26" West in Sections F and G, Township 19 South, Range 34 East in Volusia County (the proposed site). He has authorized his son-in-law, Ron Biritz, to seek DOT site approval and a license for a private airport as the proposed site. Petitioners and intervenors own land in the general vicinity, and Robert L. Hart owns extensive mineral rights, including rights to any minerals underlying the proposed site. Other land owners, including Warren J. Brull, who owns part of the land over which the existing air strip runs, C.R. "Dick" Powell, and Vaughn L. Grasso, who owns a crop duster he stores in a building he characterizes as agricultural, also made Mr. Biritz their agent for purposes of the pending application. Known as "Blue Ridge Flightpark," a 4,000-foot grass air strip at the proposed site had been used by light planes for some time, until recently. The air strip has been significantly improved within the last two years; at one time watermelons were grown on the property. Originally, scrub hickory and gopher tortoise holes made its use as an air field impractical. When John Bronson Monteith, the aviation specialist for DOT's District Five, learned the grass strip at the proposed site was "operational," he contacted the owners and instructed them to close down operations until site approval was granted; and told them how to apply for site approval. As one result, they caused a large "X" to be placed on the strip, indicating the field was closed to operation. When Mr. Monteith visited the proposed site on November 21, 1991, he saw rust on a brake disc on Mr. Biritz's airplane, suggesting disuse. After DOT received the application, Mr. Monteith determined that it was complete and seemed to meet all rule and statutory criteria, so he prepared a notice to grant the application for Nancy Houston's signature. He caused copies of the notice of intent to be sent by certified mail to all airports and municipalities within 15 miles and to all landowners within 1,000 feet of the proposed site. The notice of intent was published in the News Journal, and a public hearing was held on July 18, 1991. There is some question regarding the true nature of several largish buildings along the air strip. Treated as "agricultural" for purposes of construction without building permits, the buildings look to some more like hangars than barns. But, as to the air strip itself, Volusia County zoning officials have recognized a nonconforming use antedating adoption of County zoning ordinances, a use which the ordinances allow to continue, as long as it does not entail construction of any new structures. Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 4 and 7. As experience has demonstrated, the proposed site is "feasible" and "adequate." Despite military air traffic in the general vicinity, the Federal Aviation Authority concluded that, if limited to private use, the "airport will not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft." Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Only a windsock and markings, including threshold markings, are needed to meet licensing requirements.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DOT grant site approval on the conditions stated in Order No. 91-34; and, after the requirements of Section 330.30(2), Florida Statutes (1991) have been satisfied, issue a private airport license to Ron Biritz. DONE and ENTERED this 28 day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. own. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of May, 1992. APPENDIX Both intervenors adopted petitioner's proposed findings of fact as their Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2 and 4 have been adopted in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the legal status was not clear. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 5, a preponderance of the evidence established that flights had stopped recently. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 6 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 7 is properly a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Dan R. Warren, Esquire 315 Silver Beach Avenue Daytona Beach, FL 32118 Bruce Best Post Office Box 2793 New Smyrna Beach, FL 32170 Cheryl M. Sanders Post Office Box 2793 New Smyrna Beach, FL 32170 James S. Morris, Esquire Storch, Hansen & Morris, P.A. 1620 South Clyde Morris Blvd., #300 Daytona Beach, FL 32219 Vernon L. Whittier, Esquire 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Documentary evidence was received that Hangar Two, Inc. was chartered on April 4, 1980, and had "Hangar Two, Inc." and its unique logo registered as a service mark on June 18, 1980. See Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 6. Documentary evidence was received that Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was incorporated on November 25, 1980. See Exhibits 4 and 5. Wallace I. Garrick testified on behalf of Hangar Two, Inc. Garrick has been the attorney for Carl Knight for a number of years and handled the incorporation of Hangar Two, Inc. for Knight. For several years, Knight has been engaged in the business of repairing, rebuilding and maintaining aircraft. Garrick has been to Knight's place of business many times. The business was located at North Perry Airport for a number of years and did business as Hangar Knight was forced to move his business and incorporated his business as Hangar Two, Inc. The business of the corporation is the repair and maintenance of aircraft. Knight moved his business to a building on the southeast corner of the same airport, which he caused to be identified and marked with his service mark "Hangar 2." See Exhibit 6. Located in this building when Knight moved there was an aircraft repair and maintenance business operated by George Ritch. Thereafter, Ritch retained a one-room office and leased a small portion of the floor space for his business use. Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was incorporated by Milton Margulies, a local attorney. Its primary Director and agent for service of process is Jean S. Morse, an employee of Margulies. Garrick was advised by Margulies that he had incorporated Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. for George Ritch, and that he had no further relationship with the corporation or with Ritch. Incorporation of Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was sought after the date that Knight's business moved into the same building occupied by Ritch and after the date Knight's business was incorporated in the name Hangar Two, Inc. Incorporation of Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was not in good faith. Both corporations are engaged in the same business, aircraft repair and maintenance, and their principal places of business are located in the same building at the same airport. Garrick has seen bills and other mail intended for Ritch's business delivered to Knight's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of State revoke the reservation for the corporate name Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Wallace I. Garrick, Esquire Concord Building, Suite 1000 66 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Jean S. Morse, Registered Agent Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. 2020 NE 163rd Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Stephen Nall, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact By application dated May 10, 1987, and subscribed to on December 18, 1987, the Petitioner applied to the Department for approval and licensing of a seaplane airport site for his own private usage (P-2) . The Petitioner is appropriately licensed as a seaplane pilot. The location of the proposed airport is Pate Lake, located near Caryville, in Washington County, Florida. Pate Lake is approximately one mile by three-quarters of one mile in size, large enough to accommodate the Petitioner's proposed airport. The Petitioner's seaplane is currently and would remain based on the west side of the lake, where the Petitioner owns a parcel of land. The Petitioner has utilized Pate Lake as a base of operation for the seaplane on an irregular basis for several years. The seaplane is a single-engine Balanca Citaba, similar in size to a Piper Cub. The plane carries a maximum of two persons, including the pilot. The engine produces 150 horsepower and has a muffled exhaust. There was no reliable evidence which would indicate the decibel level or amount of noise that is generated by the seaplane on takeoff, however the noise at landing is minimal because landings are accomplished with the engine thrust significantly reduced. Pate Lake is relatively remote with limited population, however the population residing near the water is generally concentrated on the western side of the lake. The lake is used primarily for fishing and other recreational activities. A public boat ramp is also located on the west side of Pate Lake, approximately 400 to 500 feet from the Petitioner's property, according to a map prepared by the Department and introduced by the Petitioner (P-12). The number and type of recreational users of the lake depend on the weather and time of year, with an estimated 15 to 20 fishing boats on the lake simultaneously when conditions warrant. In December, 1987, an on-site inspection of the proposed airport area was performed by Larry Parker, an aviation specialist with the Department. Parker determined that the site was feasible for use as proposed by the Petitioner and "can meet the requirements set forth in Airport Licensing and Zoning Rule Chapter 14-60" (P-4). By letter dated December 30, 1987, the administrator for the Washington County Commission advised the Department that there were no restrictions which would prohibit the establishment of the seaplane base (P-5). There is no relevant zoning ordinance applicable to Washington County. By letter dated March 2, 1988, the Petitioner was advised by the Federal Aviation Administration that the proposed airport would "not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft" provided that operations were limited to VFR (visual flight rules) weather conditions, and that the airport were limited to private use. The F.A.A. specifically "did not consider the interaction of sea plane operations with surface craft traffic..." (P-6). On May 2, 1988, the department issued a "Notice of Intent" to approve the airport and issue the license (P-3). A public meeting was subsequently held on June 8, 1988, at which time an unknown number of persons apparently objected to the Department's intended approval of the license application. On June 16, 1988, a resolution was adopted by the Washington County Board of County Commissioners at which time the Board expressed opposition "to the permitting of a Seaplane operation on Pate Pond" (P-8). The resolution clearly indicates that the Board acted, at least in part, in the belief that "a commercial Seaplane operation is contemplated on the lake..." and that property owners in the area objected to the proposal. By memo dated July 11, 1988, Larry Parker, the district aviation specialist for the Department forwarded materials from the public meeting to his supervisor, Bobby Grice (P-9). At that time, Parker reiterated his opinion that the proposed airport site met "the safety standards as outlined in Rule 14-60", and that the Petitioner could operate in a safe manner from Pate Lake. By letter dated July, 27, 1988, the Petitioner received notice from the Department that it intended to deny his application for approval of his Pate Lake seaplane base (P-10). The Department stated that the denial was based on the County Commission resolution of June 16th, which "the department accepts...as equivalent to zoning refusal by the Washington County Commission." Further the Department cited comments "submitted by many of the nearby landowners and they are opposed to a seaplane base on Pate Lake on the basis of noise and safety." The Department's action followed the recommendation of Mr. Grice to deny the application. Mr. Grice based his recommendation on safety concerns related to utilization of the recreational lake as a seaplane base. Mr. Grice has visited the Pate Lake area, but has not viewed the Petitioner's seaplane in operation. At the administrative hearing the Department presented the testimony of several persons who reside on or near Pate Lake. The property owners had on infrequent occasions heard or seen a seaplane, allegedly the Petitioner's, flying over their homes at an altitude they believed to be unreasonably low or in a manner which caused what they felt was excessive noise. 1/ No one recalled more than two such incidents over the several years that the Petitioner has utilized the lake as a seaplane base. Other complaints were directed towards the maintenance of the Petitioner's property, which was identified by one witness as an "eyesore". Concerns were voiced related to the witnesses fear of property value depreciation, but there were no facts to support the theoretical depreciation. One witness, a helicopter instruction pilot who visits the area on occasion, observed the seaplane, approximately seven or eight months prior to the hearing, take off and land twice on the same day. The witness testified that the pilot on both occasions flew at an excessively low altitude over the houses on the west side of the lake. The witness estimated the altitude over the houses to be less than 500 feet, an altitude which he believed was a "major judgement error" of the pilot, because an emergency maneuver at that altitude, if necessary, would have been difficult to accomplish. However, the witness, who has no experience with seaplane operations, did not register the incident with any regulatory agency, although he believed it to be a violation of minimum safe altitude regulations. He has not otherwise viewed the seaplane in operation. One witness, a seasonal resident of the lake area who utilizes the lake for fishing, recalled an incident in January or February, 1988, where the Petitioner's plane landed on the lake while the witness was fishing from a small boat in the same vicinity as where the Petitioner was attempting to land. The witness had not heard the plane's approach due to the lack of engine noise until the plane began landing. Although uninjured, he was fearful for his safety during the incident. The witness explained that he was concerned about the personal safety of boaters in the water during the times the seaplane was landing, because the noise level is minimal, and boaters may not be aware of the aircraft's approach. There was no explanation or response offered by the Petitioner to the allegations of the Department's witnesses other than assertions that a seaplane could be operated in such a manner as to prevent low flight over residences and minimize risk to users of the lake. Although there was testimony related to lakes, similar or smaller than Pate Lake, which are allegedly licensed as private seaplane airports, the testimony did not provide evidence sufficient to provide for an accurate comparison between other lakes and Pate Lake.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's application for licensure of Pate Lake as a seaplane base be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1988.
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted a license for a private airport some four miles east of Dundee, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Frank J. Drewniany, Petitioner, is the owner of 153 acres of undeveloped land some 4 miles east of Dundee, Florida, which he proposes to develop and on which he proposes to operate a private airport. On October 28, 1988, Petitioner applied for a site permit and license for a private airport (Exhibit 1). The application provided the information required by statute and the rules of the Department of Transportation (DOT), Respondent. This information included evidence of Applicant's right to so use the property, a list of airports within 15 miles of the proposed facility, mailing addresses of all landowners within 1000 feet of the proposed facility, FAA airspace approval and the prescribed fees. The proposed site was inspected by John Roeller, the Florida DOT airport program administrator in the district office having jurisdiction over the area. This inspection revealed the site to be adequate for the proposed airport; the airport, if constructed, would conform to minimum standards of safety; the local zoning was appropriate for the airport; the Applicant had provided a list of all airports and municipalities within 15 miles of the proposed airport and all property owners within 1000 feet of the proposed airport; and that safe air traffic patterns can be worked out for the proposed airport. Following this inspection Roeller, on October 31, 1988, executed the prescribed certification that the site is feasible for the proposed use and can meet the requirements set forth in Chapter 14-60, Florida Administrative Code (Exhibit 5). By letter dated August 22, 1988, the Federal Aviation Administration (Exhibit 6) determined the proposed airport would not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft if operations are conducted in VFR weather conditions and the landing area is limited to private use. By Notice of Intent to issue site approval dated March 22, 1989 (Exhibit 7), the DOT published the intent to issue the requested permit and advised protestors would be allowed to air their views at a public meeting on May 10, 1989. Following this public meeting, Site Approval Order 89-13 (Exhibit 8) was issued, a hearing was requested to contest the issuance of the requested license and these proceedings followed. Intervenors presented evidence of a general concern for the safety of residents living in the vicinity of the airport and hearsay evidence regarding crashes of private planes in various areas of the United States. No evidence was presented by Intervenors to rebut the evidence that the Applicant had complied with the requirements for site approval and licensure contained in Chapter 14-60, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered granting Frank J. Drewniany a license to operate a private airport at Latitude 28 -00'-40" North and Longitude 81 -31'40" West, subject to restrictions established by the FAA and DOT to insure safe air patterns are established for the proposed private airport. ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger W. Sims, Esquire Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas J. Patka, Esquire Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33601 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas J. Hirt 1 Cypress Run Sun Air Country Club Haines City, Florida 33844 Ben G. Watts Interim Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, David E. Rabren was licensed as a Tampa Bay state pilot and was president of the Tricounty Pilot's Association (TRICO). At the time the movement of the OCEAN LORD occurred, there was only one state licensed pilot who was a member of TRICO. That was David E. Rabren. Other members held only federally issued pilot's licenses. Prior to the movement of the VOMAR, a second state licensed pilot joined TRICO. At present, there are four licensed state pilots and one deputy pilot associated with TRICO. The vessel OCEAN LORD arrived in Tampa Bay February 18, 1986, and was piloted by Captain Rabren to its berth at C. F. Industries (CFI). After taking on cargo, the OCEAN LORD was moved the same date to Gadsden Anchorage. During this move, Captain Murphy, a federally licensed, but not state licensed, pilot was on board. Captain Murphy is associated with TRICO. On February 21, 1986, the OCEAN LORD was moved from Gadsden Anchorage to the CSX Transportation dock at Rockport. Again, Captain Murphy was the pilot. On September 21, 1986, the vessel VOMAR was moved from Rockport to a dock at Big Bend with Captain Murphy as the pilot. Anita Rabren determined that the movement could be accomplished with a federally licensed pilot on board. On October 5, 1986, the vessel ASPEN, an American flag vessel, arrived at Tampa Bay, and the ship's agent requested TRICO provide a pilot. Due to a misunderstanding of the agent's statement that the ASPEN was coming from the west coast, Anita Rabren assumed this was from the west coast of the United States. Actually, the ASPEN's last port of call was in Korea. Had the vessel come from a west coast of the United States port, the voyage would have been a coastwise trip, and a federally licensed pilot would be required. A federally licensed pilot was assigned to pilot the ASPEN. The last port of call of the ASPEN was ascertained after the pilotages up Tampa Bay commenced, and the fact that an improperly licensed pilot was used was reported forthwith. TRICO paid a double pilot fee to the Tampa Bay Pilot's Association. Tampa Port Authority has jurisdiction over all of Hillsborough County and establishes rules and regulations for that area. They do not regulate pilotage of vessels. Many of the terminals in Hillsborough County are owned by the Port Authority, but some are privately owned such as Big Bend and Rockport, both of which are in the port of Tampa. The Port Authority controls the allocation of berths at all terminals owned by the Port Authority, but does not control the berths at privately owned terminals. The CFI terminal is owned by the Port Authority who establishes wharfage rates and docking rates at this terminal. The berths at Rockport and Big Bend are privately owned, and tariff rates are not set by the Port Authority. CSX Transportation owns a dock at Rockport where phosphate is loaded onto vessels. No wharfage or dockage charge is levied, but such charges are included in charges for the commodity loaded. Ships can clear customs at any of the terminals above noted. The Big Bend facility is under the jurisdiction of Gulf Coast Transit Company. Vessels bring coal to Big Bend for use by Tampa Electric Company. The AGRICO terminal at Big Bend is used for loading phosphate rock. All of these privately owned terminals are licensed by the Tampa Port Authority to whom they pay a fee and submit reports of their activities. The Tampa Port Authority charges a fee to vessels who load or unload cargo at the Gadsden Anchorage which is also in the port of Tampa. Section 310.002(4), Florida Statutes, defines "port" to mean, any place in the state in which vessels enter and depart. For Tampa Bay, this section lists Tampa, Port Tampa, Port Manatee, St. Petersburg and Clearwater as ports. Of those listed ports, Tampa and Port Tampa are in Hillsborough County and come under the jurisdiction of the Tampa Port Authority. No evidence was submitted showing the areas encompassed by the Port of Tampa and Port Tampa. The Port of Tampa's Terminal and Facilities Map (Exhibit 5) showing the port facilities at Tampa, Florida, does not show the facilities at Port Tampa; it shows only those facilities on the east side of the Tampa peninsula, and does not reach as far south as Big Bend. Presumably, if there are only two ports in Hillsborough County that portion of Hillsborough County west of the Tampa peninsula would comprise Port Tampa, and that portion of Hillsborough County east and south of the Tampa peninsula would comprise the Port of Tampa. If so, all of the movements here complained of occurred in the Port of Tampa. Exhibit 5 supports this conclusion. Finally, no credible evidence was presented that Respondent assigned a federally licensed, but not a state licensed, pilot to the OCEAN LORD, VOMAR and ASPEN as alleged, except Exhibit 3 which states the assignment of a federally licensed pilot to the Aspen was due to an error on the part of Captain Rabren. The direct testimony presented in this regard is that Anita Rabren assigned federally licensed pilots to those ships. Further, this determination that use of a federally licensed pilot for those movements of foreign flag vessels within the Port of Tampa was proper was made by Anita Rabren after receiving legal advice regarding the in-port movements of foreign flag vessels that can be piloted by a federally licensed pilot.
The Issue The issue is whether the application meets the standards found in Section 330.30, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-60, Florida Administrative Code. The specific factual issues presented for resolution are: Whether the site is adequate for the proposed helistop. Whether the proposed helistop will conform to minimum standards of safety. Whether safe air-traffic patterns could be worked out for the proposed helistop and for all existing airports and approved sites in the vicinity.
Findings Of Fact Memorial Hospital is operated by the South Broward Hospital District, an independent taxing authority created by Chapter 24415, Laws of Florida (1947), to operate public health care facilities in south Broward County and to serve the health care needs of residents of the district without regard to their ability to pay. The site of the proposed facility (known as "Memorial Hospital Helistop") is a rectangular-shaped area on the top level of a six-floor parking garage located on the west side of the hospital's property, near the emergency room. The helistop is a landing site for air ambulances. The site will not be used for regularly scheduled helicopter flights. The only landings will be those associated with emergency transportation of patients or supplies to Memorial Hospital. No basing facilities such as fueling facilities will be provided. The parking garage is owned by the hospital. Jay A. Burke, Jr., the Director of Safety and Security, and Helistop Manager for Memorial Hospital, filed an application for helistop site approval with the Department of Transportation, on September 1, 1987. Zoning approval was granted by the City of Hollywood, Florida, on July 1, 1987. An airspace determination for the proposed site was obtained by letter from the FAA dated March 1, 1988. A feasibility inspection of the site was made by Steve Kozman, District IV Aviation Engineer, on September 16, 1987. He determined the site was feasible for use as a helistop. Mr. Kozman conducted the public meeting on November 24, 1987, and submitted a report dated December 18, 1987, to the Chief of the Department of Transportation Aviation Bureau. The Kozman report contained the following conclusions: Many of the issues at the public hearing were unrelated to the requirements of the licensing law and cannot be affected by either issuance or denial of site approval. The elevated site as presented in drawings and as viewed from the existing garage is adequate for the proposed helistop. The helistop, if constructed, can meet the minimum standards of safety. Elevated helistops at Naples Hospital and Good Samaritan Hospital in West Palm Beach have been in operation without incident. Safe air traffic patterns can be decided after receipt of FAA airspace determination. No objections were received from nearby airports or approved sites. Mr. Kozman recommended, subject to FAA determination, that the helistop site application be approved. An evaluation report on the proposed emergency helistop prepared by an aviation engineer was admitted in evidence. The 151' x 125' site on the 6th level of the parking structure is adequate and will conform to the minimum standards of safety. The area of the landing pad limits the size of helicopters using it to 63' in length. The total live load factor of the proposed site is 94,000 pounds, which would be distributed on three wheels. The structure will accommodate use by most single rotor helicopters, which are the type of rotocraft used in life-flight operations. The site will not accommodate heavy dual rotor military rotocraft, usually referred to as "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters. The site also would meet the flight path requirements of Chapter 14-60, Florida Administrative Code. The proposal conforms with all published minimum safety standards. A Coast Guard flight surgeon testified that he would have no reservation about flying into the proposed site on emergency missions. A Coast Guard Officer, who has seventeen years experience flying helicopters, testified he frequently flies rescue missions transporting victims to area hospitals. He had inspected the proposed site and had viewed aerial photographs of the proposed site and had no reservations about utilizing the helistop. The proposed site is safe and has an adequate approach for landing in case of rotocraft emergencies. The air traffic patterns at the site would not interfere with adjacent airports utilizing the Fort Lauderdale control tower. The Petitioners expressed concern about noise, diminished property values and threats to safety of residents in the area resulting from the helistop. Memorial Hospital is located near a residential neighborhood. Mrs. Briglio agreed that emergency helicopter service was needed, but believed it should be located some place else. Mr. Worth doubts that air ambulances are safe. The evidence shows that the helistop will meet duly adopted safety standards. Lay doubts about whether the standards are adequate, or will be observed, cannot be reached in this hearing. Mr. Worth expressed concern about the site approval permitting providing transportation of medical supplies. An agreement between the City of Hollywood and the hospital as to helicopter operations from the proposed site provides as follows: That Memorial Hospital agrees that helicopter transports into or from Memorial Hospital between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., will occur only when, in the opinion of the helicopter transport personnel, the flight is necessary to save the life or limb of a patient or if medical intervention available at Memorial is essential to prevent permanent disability. Routine helicopter transports into Memorial during all other hours will not be restricted. That Memorial Hospital will cooperate with Hollywood Fire Department's EMS Division in its monitoring of the provisions of this Agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that a final order be entered by the Secretary of Transportation finding that Site Approval Order No. 88-06 is valid and should remain in full force and effect, having been issued in accordance with applicable statutes and rules. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of September 1988. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9765 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert C. Worth, Chairman Hollywood Hills Citizens Committee 3423 Garfield Street Tallahassee, Florida 33021 Mrs. Erna L. Dahmen 515 North Rainbow Drive Hollywood, Florida 33021 Mr. Jay Burke, Jr. Director Safety and Security Memorial Hospital 3501 Johnson Street Hollywood, Florida 33021 Phyllis and Eugene Briglio 507 North Rainbow Drive Hollywood, Florida 33021 Mrs. Roy Thompson 429 North Highland Drive Hollywood, Florida 33021 Rivers Buford, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Clarke Walden, General Counsel Memorial Hospital Suite 533 Hollywood, Florida 33021 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
