Findings Of Fact At the time of final hearing the Respondent, Myron Lewis, was the holder of State Certified General Contractor's Licenses as follows: Myron Lewis d/b/a Interior Concepts of Palm Beach, Number CG C005282; Myron Lewis d/b/a Whitten Corporation South, Number CG CA05282; and Myron Lewis d/b/a Custom Pools of the Palm Beaches, Inc. Number CG CB05282. Respondent was engaged in the business of building swimming pools in the Palm Beach area. In connection with that business the Respondent entered into contracts for the construction of pools with several individuals, including the following: James Riley; Michael Belmonti; Walter Beasley; Jose Dorribo; Gerald Gottner; James Overton; and Ronald Malcolm. With regard to the first six names listed above, Respondent had failed to complete the pool and perform according to the contract and, apparently, abandoned the project after accepting a major portion of the contract price agreed upon. With regard to the seventh name listed above, Respondent accepted an initial deposit of $680.00 for construction of a swimming pool but never performed any work and did not return the deposit. Some efforts were made by the Respondent to settle each of the claims against him and to that end there was submitted into evidence general releases from Malcolm, Riley and Belmonti each reciting that the general release was a settlement and compromise of disputed claims and that the payments are not to be construed as admission of liability on the part of Custom Pools of the Palm Beaches, Inc. and/or Myron Lewis. (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3) With regard to the projects set forth in Paragraph 2 above, Respondent apparently terminated because of financial difficulties he and his company were in, none of which was the fault or responsibility of the persons for whom Respondent had contracted to build pools. More than ninety days had elapsed from the time of termination of the project by Respondent and this final hearing. All of these projects occurred prior to 1978. The Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board, by action taken on January 23, 1978, suspended Respondent's license until further notice. That suspension was the result of the termination of the projects set forth above. The evidence presented indicates that an unspecified amount of money paid Respondent for the construction of specific pools was actually used for other obligations of Respondent and such funds were not used for the prosecution or completion of the project for which they were paid.
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030 (b) (1) (C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. FINAL ORDER NO. DCA10-GM-115 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished as indicated to each of the persons listed below on this DW say of , 2010. aula Ford Agency Clerk By U.S. Mail Amy Taylor Petrick, Assistant County Attorney Palm Beach County 300 North Dixie Highway, Suite 359 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 Tel.: (561) 355-2529 Fax.: (561) 255-4324 Email: apetrick@co.palm-beach.fl.us William L. Hyde, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. 215 S. Monroe Street, Suite 618 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Phone: (850) 521-1980 Facsimile: (850) 576-0902 Email: whyde@gunster.com James M. Crowley, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. 450 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1400 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Phone: (954) 713-6416 Facsimile: (954) 523-1722 Email: jcrowley@gunster.com FINAL ORDER NO. DCA10-GM-115 Claudia McKenna, City Attorney City of West Palm Beach 401 Clematis Street West Palm Beach, FL 33401 Phone: (561) 882-1350 Facsimile: (561) 822-1373 Email: cmckenna@wpb.org Keith W. Davis, Esquire Trela White, Esquire Attorney for Village of Royal Palm Beach Corbett & White, P.A. 1111 Hypoluxo Road, Suite 207 Lantana, FL 33462 Phone: (561) 586-7116 Facsimile: (561) 586-9611 Email: keith@corbettandwhite.com; trela@corbettandwhite.com By Hand Delivery Richard E. Shine Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs By Interoffice Mail The Honorable Donald R. Alexander Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Philip Lee Sullivan (Sullivan), has served as Chief of Police for the City of Panama City Beach, Florida since August 10, 1977. Sullivan's salary as Police Chief was $62,326.12 in 1994, and will total $63,211.20 in 1995. As Police Chief, Sullivan's duties include planning, organizing, and directing all activities of the Panama City Beach Police Department. He is also charged with supervision of all members of the police force, with particular attention to personnel at the administrative and supervisory level, and with the investigation and disposition of complaints against police officers. In his official capacity, Sullivan is also required to cooperate with state and federal officers in the apprehension and detention of wanted persons and with other agencies where activities of the police department are involved. Sullivan has the authority to take disciplinary action against an employee of the police department up to and including suspension without pay for 30 days, and can recommend termination to the City Manager. He also completes written performance evaluations on members of his command staff, which is comprised of the Patrol Division Commander, the Investigative Division Commander, the Assistant to the Chief, and the Reserve Division Commander. In 1987, Sullivan began a business as a loss prevention and security consultant, operating as a sole proprietorship. Sullivan's first client was Hilton, Inc. Charles Hilton is the Chief Executive Officer of Hilton, Inc. It was Mr. Hilton who made the initial decision to hire Sullivan. He considered one other person for the work, but rejected that individual based on the fee sought. Sullivan verbally sought approval from the City Manager to contract with Hilton, Inc. The City Manager verbally approved the arrangement. Hilton, Inc. owns and operates five hotels in Panama City Beach: The Holiday Inn Sun Spree, Ramada Inn, Days Inn, Best Western Del Coronado, and Best Western Casa Loma. All except Sun Spree, which was added in 1990, were owned by Hilton, Inc., when Sullivan began contracting with the corporation. Hilton, Inc. pays Sullivan $2,000 a month with an additional fee for background checks. Sullivan's next client was the Bay Point Improvement Association (Bay Point). Bay Point is outside the city limits of Panama City Beach. By letter dated February 2, 1989, Sullivan formally requested approval from the City Manager to accept the position of Director of Security for Bay Point. Approval was granted by letter dated February 15, 1989. Sullivan was initially hired in February, 1989, as Director of Security, but his employment status was subsequently changed to that of an independent contractor, similar to his position with his other private employers. Bay Point pays Sullivan $18,000 per year for his services. Sullivan's next client was the La Vela Beach Club ("La Vela") in March, 1993. He was hired by the club's owner, Alois Pfeffer. Sullivan no longer works for the La Vela Beach Club, but while he was working for the club he was paid $6,000 per year. Sullivan's next client was Boardwalk Beach Resorts, which hired him in September, 1993. Boardwalk Beach Resort is the fictitious name for a limited partnership, Resort Hospitality Enterprises, Ltd. ("Resort Hospitality"). The majority of the stock of Resort Hospitality is owned by People's First Properties, Inc. ("People's First"). Resort Hospitality owns and operates four hotel properties, totaling approximately 625 rooms, on Panama City Beach. Robert Henry, the chief financial officer for People's First, was the person who decided to contract with Sullivan after independently determining to the satisfaction of People's First that Sullivan did not have a conflict of interest. People's First pays Sullivan $18,000 per year with additional fees for background checks. In 1994 Sullivan was paid $6,450 for background checks and as of September 11, 1995, he was paid $4,720 for the background checks performed in 1995. Sullivan incorporated his business as Beach Security, Inc. on December 12, 1993. Sullivan's next client was the Miracle Strip Park/Shipwreck Island (Miracle Strip). He was hired in May, 1994 by the Miracle Strip's General Manager, Shelton Wilkes. Miracle Strip is located on Panama City Beach. Sullivan receives $7,200 per year from Miracle Strip. Sullivan's next client was Spinnakers, where he was hired in July, 1994, by W. B. Sparkman, III. Spinnakers paid Sullivan $6,000 per year. As of the date of the final hearing it was not known whether Spinnakers would continue its contract with Sullivan for the next season. Except for Bay Point, there are no written contracts between Sullivan and any of the businesses with which he contracts. Sullivan has no job description, no set work hours, and no regular meetings with his employers. As part of the services offered by Beach Security, Sullivan makes recommendations to his clients in developing their safety and security policies and procedures, particularly with respect to policies, procedures and training for the security staff. The ultimate decision whether to implement any of Sullivan's recommendations rests with Sullivan's clients. Sullivan is also expected to defend those policies and procedures in court as an expert witness in the event his employer adopts his recommendations and is sued. Sullivan neither sets nor manages security for his clients. He makes recommendations. Sullivan does not hire, fire, or make other employment decisions for the security personnel of his clients. He does not supervise or evaluate the performance of his clients' security staff on a daily basis, and does not evaluate the individual performance of any of his clients' employees. As part of Sullivan's services to Hilton, Inc., Boardwalk Beach Resort and La Vela, Sullivan did background checks for potential employees. Sullivan hired an employee of the police department to do the background checks for him. The background checks were performed at the Bay County Courthouse for local applicants. If the information needed was located in another county or state, Sullivan would contact the clerk of the court at the appropriate location for the information. Getting information from another county or state can be a slow process. The information which Sullivan uses in doing the background checks is information which is available to the general public. The Police Department of Panama City Beach (Police Department) has an agreement with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to allow the Police Department access to criminal history record information. Access to the information is limited to police department business. If a police department employee desires to access the information, the employee must log in on the computer, which creates a computer-generated log at FDLE. Sullivan personally does not know how to access the information. Sullivan could request a police department employee to access the information for him. Panama City Beach is a popular resort area, which experiences a large influx of teenagers and young adults during spring break. Problems associated with alcohol consumption, including traffic violations and accidents, assaults, and disorderly conduct, are commonplace police concerns, particularly during spring break. Spinnakers and La Vela are clubs located on Panama City Beach which cater to the spring break crowd and serve alcohol. The La Vela has a capacity for about 6,000 people and Spinnakers about 4,000. The Hilton, Inc. hotels, the Boardwalk Beach Resort, and the Miracle Strip also do heavy spring break business. The Miracle Strip deals with more than 600,000 visitors over the course of its season. The police department investigates crimes and responds to calls and complaints made by citizens. The department also investigates accidents and is routinely called any time an ambulance is called. In the past two years the police department has received more than five thousand calls for service at businesses which are located in Panama City Beach and which contract with Sullivan. No evidence was presented that Sullivan has ever disregarded public duty in favor of private interests, or misused confidential police information for the benefit of his private employers. In February 1993, Spinnakers was sued for the wrongful death of one of its patrons. The Complaint alleged that the deceased, Robert Gaither, was involved in an altercation with one or more of the club's other patrons. Spinnaker security became involved, and the other patrons were ejected. When Mr. Gaither left, security allegedly saw these individuals in Spinnakers' parking lot, but took no action. After leaving the club, Mr. Gaither was beaten to unconsciousness by these same people, and was either left or passed out in the street, where he was run over by a drunk driver. The Complaint alleges that Spinnakers' security staff was negligent in its handling of the incident. Although the incident took place before Spinnakers hired Sullivan, Sullivan has given a deposition in the case as a potential expert witness. The Panama City Beach Police Department investigated the death of Mr. Gaither. Part of Sullivan's services to Le Vela has been to instruct its staff on how to handle fights. The owner of the club has complained to Sullivan about reaction from Panama City Beach police officers when fights have occurred at the club. It is the club owner's observation that the police, in protection of their own physical safety, often leave the burden of breaking up a fight to the security officers, or wait until the participants wear themselves out. Since the club's insurance will not pay for damages if the club's security officers get involved in the fight, the owner wants the police officers to intervene at an earlier stage in the fight and has so complained to the police department. At the June 23, 1994 meeting of the Panama City Beach City Council, Sullivan's outside employment as a consultant was thoroughly discussed. Sullivan gave a detailed account of his operation. At that meeting the City Council voted to continue the City's policy of encouraging outside employment of its police officers and allowing police officers to use the police vehicles during off-duty hours as long as the police officer is on call. On October 12, 1995, the City Council of the City of Panama City Beach enacted Ordinance No. 455, which codified the rules governing secondary or off- duty employment by employees of the City of Panama City Beach. Section 2-46 of the ordinance deals specifically with law enforcement officers, including the Chief of Police. Section 2-46(d)(1) of Ordinance 455 provides: The following types of off-duty employment do not, on their face, constitute a conflict of interest for law enforcement officers: Security guard duty protecting premises or property. Security consultant within or without the City. Providing dignitary or official's protection. Conducting pre-employment checks into the applicant's previous criminal history provided that only public records are accessed. Performing accident investigations or providing technical services as otherwise per- mitted by the Department. Ordinance 455 requires that police officers who desire to have outside employment must submit an "Off-Duty Employment Request" form. The forms were made available to the police officers sometime during the early part of December, 1995. Shortly after Sullivan received the forms, he submitted authorization requests for off-duty employment with Bay Point Resort, Miracle Strip Amusement Park, Boardwalk Beach Resort, and Hilton, Inc.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Philip Lee Sullivan's employment with businesses within the jurisdiction of the Panama City Beach Police Department and his employment in doing pre-employment application background checks is in violation of Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and recommending that Philip Lee Sullivan be dismissed from his employment as Police Chief of the Panama City Beach Police Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4141EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted to the extent that the computer database can be accessed from the Police Department but rejected to the extent that it implies that Sullivan, himself, can physically access the information based on his testimony that he does not know how to operate the computer to get the information. Paragraph 6: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found Paragraph 7: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 8-12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: The first two sentences are accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 14-21: Accepted. Paragraph 22: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 23: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is accepted. Paragraphs 24-28: Accepted. Paragraphs 29-32: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 33-34: Accepted. Paragraph 35: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 36: The first sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that the information is available at the Police Department and can be accessed by Police Department staff pursuant to an agreement with FDLE. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance except for the employment outside the police department jurisdiction. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance that Sullivan requested approval for employment as Director of Security for Bay Point. Rejected to the extent that the request could be construed as a request for blanket approval for Sullivan to do security consulting services. It appears from Sullivan's letter that his employment at that time dealt with more than consulting services given that he had the authority to hire, fire, and direct the security force at Bay Point. Paragraph 3: Accepted to the extent that Beach Security Inc. was incorporated in December, 1993. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted to the extent that Sullivan has submitted the off-duty employment authorization requests. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 8: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found Paragraph 9: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 11-15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 17: The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence that such an arrangement could not tempt dishonor. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The first part of the second sentence is accepted in substance. The last part of the second sentence is rejected to the extent that although the businesses were anticipating that Sullivan would gather his information from public records, human nature being what it is, if Sullivan knew that an applicant was a suspect in a criminal investigation the employers would not want Sullivan to recommend that the applicant be hired. Paragraphs 19-22: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mary Ellen Davis, Esquire Hilton, Hilton, Kolk, Penson & Roesch Post Office Box 1327 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Does a statement by an agency that its regulatory authority is limited by Section 161.58, Florida Statute, constitute a non- rule policy? Does a statement by an agency that fees levied under authority of Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, by county governments for beach driving do not constitute revenue for purposes of invoking its regulatory jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005 (Rule 18-21.005) constitute a non-rule policy?
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Petitioner Shirley Reynolds (Reynolds) resides and owns beachfront property overlooking the Atlantic Ocean in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Florida. Reynolds does not own to the mean high water line, and her property is not adjacent to the sovereign submerged lands held by the Trustees. Reynolds “shares riparian rights with the public.” Reynolds has owned her oceanfront home since 1981. She has observed beach driving by the general public on the beach and in the shallow water in the vicinity of her home. She enjoys the beachfront for “regular recreational, traditional recreational purposes.” Petitioner Diann Bowman (Bowman) resides and owns property that extends to and adjoins the mean high water line of the Atlantic Ocean in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Florida. Bowman has observed the general public driving on the beach and in shallow waters of the Atlantic Ocean in the vicinity of her property. Bowman goes swimming in the ocean, builds sand castles by the edge of the water with her grandchildren, and walks on the beach with friends. Petitioners did not have any requests for leases or applications for action pending before the BOT, and Volusia County had not made an application to the Trustees for any activity permit or lease. Petitioner Bowman was not even aware of Reecy's e- mail, and could not articulate how she was affected by it. Although Reynolds testified at length about the impacts of beach driving and beach concessions between her home and the ocean, she failed to show how she was affected by Reecy's statements that the BOT does not regulate beach driving. In response to counsel’s question of what personal interest she has in whether or not the Trustees require authorization to use state land for motor vehicle traffic in front of her home, she responded, “[I]f and when they ever deal with it, it will certainly raise the consciousness of the human safety element.” Petitioners testified regarding the adverse impacts of beach driving on their property and their enjoyment of their property. Beach driving has an adverse impact upon the property values and upon their enjoyment of their property. Respondents The BOT is an agency of the State of Florida, consisting of the Governor and Cabinet. (Art. IV, s. 4 (f), Fla. Const.) The BOT holds the title to the State’s sovereign submerged lands acquired at statehood “for the use and benefit of the people of the state,” pursuant to Chapter 253, Florida Statutes. (§§ 253.001, 253.03, and 253.12, Fla. Stat.) Private use of such lands generally requires consent of the BOT and must not be contrary to the public interest. The BOT is required to manage and conserve state-owned lands, including sovereignty lands, by law and is granted rulemaking authority to that end. The Department functions as the staff for the BOT, and issues leases and other authorizations for private parties to use sovereign submerged lands under Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 18-21, Florida Administrative Code. In carrying out its duties with relationship to the BOT, the Department implements policy as determined by the BOT, to include taking some final agency actions. The Department would be the agency through which the BOT would initiate rulemaking. The Department does not have delegated authority to adopt rules for the BOT. Ken Reecy (Reecy) is a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor in the Department’s Division of State Lands. One of Reecy’s job duties is to provide responses to requests for BOT’s public records housed in the Division of State Lands of the Department. On August 5, 2003, Ross Burnaman e-mailed Eva Armstrong of the Department the following public records request: Hi Eva-I am hoping that you can assist me with this inquiry for public records. I'm looking for any Trustees authorization for the use of state lands (including uplands and submerged lands) for beach driving by the general public or commercial vendors. While I'm aware of Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, I'm of the opinion that Trustees' authorization is still required for beach driving on state lands. Most local governments that allow beach driving (e.g. Gulf County, Volusia County) charge a fee for that activity. That would appear to trigger, Rule 18-21.005(b)(2), FAC, and the requirement for a lease. As I understand it, public beach driving is allowed in parts of the following counties: Nassau, Duval, Flagler, St. Johns, Volusia, Gulf and Walton counties. Thanks in advance for you assistance. Best regards, Ross Burnaman (phone number deleted) Ms. Armstrong passed this request to Ken Reecy of the Department who replied to Mr. Burnaman with the following e-mail message: Mr. Burnaman Concerning your request as to any authorization by the Board of Trustees for beach driving and fees triggering Rule 18- 21.005(b)(2)[sic]: We are unaware of any instance in which the issue of beach driving has been brought before the Board of Trustees for authorization. Further, in discussions with staff from our legal department, it is felt that s. 161.58 sufficiently covers the issue and that authorization from the Board is not necessary. We are also of the opinion that fees counties charge for beach driving would not trigger Rule 18-21.005(b)(2)[sic]. If you have any further questions on this issue, please contact Suzanne Brantley in EIP's Office of General Counsel (phone number deleted) The e-mail above contains two potential policy statements; one concerning a statute and the other concerning a rule. The analysis of each differs slightly. The BOT was authorized at one time to regulate all the uses of state sovereignty lands, to include regulation of driving on the state's beaches, i.e., that portion of land seaward of the mean high water line (hereafter: beach.) The BOT restricted the operation of private vehicles on the beaches via rule. The Legislature of the State of Florida enacted Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, which authorized those counties which had traditionally permitted driving on the beach to regulate the operation of privately owned vehicles on the beaches in their counties. Several of the counties which had traditionally permitted driving on the beach permitted privately owned vehicles to be operated on the beach in their counties and charged a small fee to defray the costs of providing parking, life guards, and traffic direction on the beaches. The BOT attempted to intervene in those counties which charged fees for beach driving on the basis that the fees being charged were "revenue" producing. The Legislature of the State of Florida amended Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, to specifically authorize the counties to collect reasonable fees to defray their costs of regulating beach driving. The statements that are challenged have not been adopted as a rule. Reecy testified at the hearing. Reecy only intended to give Burnaman information related to his public records request. The portion of Reecy's e-mail that is being challenged was intended to explain why no records were found. Reecy responded because Burnaman had sent follow-up e-mails to Reecy’s supervisor, Armstrong, the Director of the Division of State Lands. Reecy knew that Armstrong had a practice of providing information to the public when it was requested. Reecy is not charged with implementing or interpreting Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21 and does not process applications for leases or other authorizations from the BOT. Reecy's statement that no records were found is not a policy statement and has not been alleged to be one by Petitioners. Reecy conferred with Department legal staff before issuing his statement about Section 161.58, Florida Statutes. Reecy did not state that Section 161.58 exempted counties from getting BOT authorization for beach driving, as Petitioners state in their Petition, for several reasons: first, Reecy is not the person on the BOT’s staff who makes such determinations; second, there was no factual determination pending, i.e., no request for declaratory statement or request for an exemption or authorization; and third, the statute cited and its history indicate that the Legislature has vested the exclusive authority to regulate beach driving in those counties in which it traditionally occurred to county government in those counties. James W. Stoutamire (Stoutamire) is the principal Department employee who is charged with interpreting and applying the BOT’s rules. Stoutamire was the person to whom authority had been delegated to make such policy determinations. Burnaman's request was not presented to Stoutamire, and Reecy did not consult with Stoutamire. Although it is a statement concerning general law, Reecy's first statement regarding Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, does not assert agency jurisdiction or exempt a specific factual predicate from agency jurisdiction. Reecy also discussed Burnaman’s reference to Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005(1)(b)2. with the Department's legal staff. Reecy's references to the section mistakenly cites it as Rule 18-21.005(b)2. Regardless of Reecy's intent, his answer constitutes an interpretation of the rule as applied to the fees charged by counties for beach driving. The BOT's rules provide what types of private activities must have consent prior to their being undertaken on sovereign submerged lands. They do not contain a list of all of the many public activities that occur on Florida’s beaches, shores, and waters that do not require consent. The BOT's rules in Chapter 18-21 are not intended to prevent air or noise pollution, promote public safety, protect property values, provide peace and quiet, or protect quality of life. These are the concerns about which Petitioners testified as diminishing their peaceful enjoyment of their property rights. Beach concessions above the mean high water line do not fall within the Trustees jurisdiction or control.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made. At all times material to this case the Respondent, Willie Whittington, was licensed as a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, holding license number CG C006966. At all times material to this case the Respondent was the sole qualifying agent for Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. On May 15, 1987, Edwin W. Brown and Sandra J. Brown, husband and wife, contacted Respondent, in response to Respondent's advertising, to discuss the construction of a log house and an outbuilding on a lot owned by the Browns in Palm Beach County, Florida. The outbuilding was to be used as a combination garage and barn. During this initial meeting, the Browns described the project to Respondent. At the conclusion of the meeting on May 15, 1987, the Browns gave Respondent a $2,000.00 deposit to get started on the project. Respondent was to use that deposit to have plans drawn for the two buildings and to secure the necessary building permits. On June 23, 1987, Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. entered into two contracts with the Browns, one for the house and the other for the outbuilding. Respondent signed both contracts on behalf of Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. Both contracts were clear and unambiguous as to the work that was to be performed, as to the price that was to be paid for the work, and as to the schedules by which the construction draws would be made. The price for the house was set at $73,506.00. The price of the outbuilding was set at $11,665.00. Both contracts provided that construction would be completed within 130 days. On June 23, 1987, the Browns paid to Respondent the sum of $6,871.60 as required by the two contracts. Sandra Brown began keeping a log of her contacts with Respondent as of August 4, 1987, because she had experienced difficulty reaching Respondent by telephone and because no progress was being made on the project. Around August 4, 1987, Respondent told the Browns that he needed an additional $175.00 to pay to the architect to complete the plans. Because this was not provided for by their contracts, the Browns refused Respondent's request for this additional sum of money. On August 7, 1987, the Browns paid to Respondent the sum of $3,822.90 that Respondent was to use to order the logs. The building permits were not obtained until October 9, 1987. The permits were not obtained earlier than that date because Respondent did not diligently pursue his obligation to get the permits. As of early November 1987, the only work that had been done was the preparation of the lot for the foundation. On November 7, 1987, Respondent requested that the Browns advance him $5,000.00 so he could proceed with the construction. Respondent was financially unable to proceed because the Internal Revenue Service had garnished the account in which Respondent had placed the Browns' deposits. The Browns refused to advance Respondent this additional sum of money, but they remained willing to pay Respondent according to the draw schedules of the contracts. In December 1987 the Browns received a notice to owner form from Rinker Materials. In response to this notice, the Browns paid to Rinker Materials the sum of $2,664.77 and asked that no further materials be delivered on a credit basis to the job site. The Browns received a release of lien from Rinker Materials on December 28, 1987, for the materials Respondent had previously ordered on credit. In the middle of December 1987, the Browns learned that Respondent had neither ordered the logs for the construction nor determined the quantity of logs that would be required. On or about December 18, 1987, the foundation for the house was poured. Little work was done on the project between that date and January 4, 1988, the date Respondent told the Browns that his back was hurt and he could not work. The Browns filed a written complaint with the Palm Beach County Contractors Certification Board on January 8, 1988. As of January 13, 1988, Respondent was unable to account for the funds the Browns had deposited with him. At a meeting on January 19, 1988, among Respondent, the Browns, and a representative of Palm Beach County Contractors Certification Board, Respondent agreed to furnish receipts and an accounting of the construction funds by the next meeting on January 27, 1988. Respondent also agreed, during the meeting of January 19, 1988, to perform certain work on the project before the next meeting. At the next meeting, Respondent did not provide the Browns with receipts or with an accounting of the construction funds. Instead Respondent submitted a non-itemized bill in the amount of $18,131.20 for labor and materials supposedly expended by Respondent through January 27, 1988. The Browns refused to pay this bill. Respondent had worked only approximately 16 hours on the project between January 19 and January 27 and had not completed the additional work he had promised to have done January 27, 1988. The Browns fired Respondent and his company on January 27, 1988. At that time, Respondent had completed approximately 10% of the project `whereas it should have been approximately 60-70% completed. The delays by Respondent throughout his association with this project were not justified. After the Browns fired Respondent, they were forced to pay a materialman, MacMichael Lumber Company, to prevent the foreclosure of a lien against the property. This lien resulted because Respondent did not pay for certain materials he had ordered on credit before the Browns fired him. On February 4, 1988, Respondent agreed to repay the Browns the sum of $4,200.00. As of the date of the final hearing, Respondent owed the Browns $1,400.00. A subsequent contractor completed the project without undue delay in June 1988 for an additional $74,000. This price reflects changes the Browns made after the subsequent contractor began his work. Petitioner is the state agency charged with the regulation of contractors in the State of Florida. The Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner against Respondent alleges, in pertinent part, the following: Respondent failed to perform in a reasonably timely manner, and or abandoned said job(s), in violation of 489.129(1)(m),(k). There was financial mismanagement and/or misconduct in connection with this matter, attributable either to Respondent directly, or to Respondent's failure to properly supervise, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(h) & (m), as generally exhibited by, but not limited to, the following: Subject double billed Customer on several occasions; failure to pay subcontractors and suppliers; and failure to buy materials. There was no allegation in the Administrative Complaint or evidence presented at hearing that Respondent has been the subject of prior disciplinary action. Respondent has been licensed as a certified general contractor by the State of Florida since 1973. Following receipt of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent denied the violations and timely requested a formal administrative hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which finds Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(h), Florida Statutes and which imposes a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,500 for such violation and which further finds Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes and which imposes a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,500 for such violation so that the total fine to be imposed against Respondent is $3,000. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-0743 The proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner are addressed as follows. Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 27. Addressed in paragraph 3. 4-5. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in paragraph 6. Rejected as being unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 8. Addressed in paragraph 9. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 10. 14-15. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 12. Addressed in paragraph 17. Rejected as being unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 14. Addressed in paragraph 15. Addressed in paragraph 15. Addressed in paragraph 16. 22-26. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 17. Addressed in paragraph 19. Addressed in paragraph 23. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 24. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 22. 34-35. Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Willie Whittington 342 Walker Street Greenacres City, Florida 34974 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 =================================================================
The Issue Whether a vessel is owned by Petitioner, Jonathan Selby, and is a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2020), and City of Riviera Beach Derelict Vessel Policy, No. 4.2., and therefore, subject to the provisions of section 705.103, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of the 1987 Wellcraft marine vessel, Florida Boat Registration Number FL5632FV (HIN: WELC24661687)(the “vessel”), that sunk on the north side of the Riviera Beach Marina. Riviera Beach Marina is in the City of Riviera Beach. The vessel broke free from a mooring in a storm and is now in a wrecked, junked, or substantially dismantled condition. Therefore, the vessel is a “derelict vessel” as defined in section 823.11(1)(b)1., and the City of Riviera Beach Derelict Vessel Policy, No. 4.2. There was no evidence presented that the vessel became derelict because of the negligence of Petitioner.
