The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice as envisioned in Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2005), on the basis of the Petitioner's disability or handicap, and his age. It must also be determined whether the Respondent committed retaliation against the Petitioner for the Petitioner's alleged exercise of statutorily protected rights in complaining about health, or safety concerns, regarding his operation of a machine or device while an employee of the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Jimmy D. Forehand was hired by the Department of Management Services or its predecessor on January 21, 1977. He was employed at that Agency for approximately 27 and one-half years through June 30, 2004. For the last 19 years of his tenure he was classed as an electrician. This is the entry level electrician trade position and has fewer complex duties and skills required for its performance, as opposed to the more complex position of master electrician, in terms of working with complex wiring, wiring problems, electrical devices, and so forth associated with that latter position. It has been stipulated that through his termination date of June 30, 2004, Mr. Forehand, was qualified to perform the duties and functions of his job. The Respondent is an Agency of the State of Florida charged with managing all state government agency resources, services, properties, benefits, and procurement. It manages state-owned facilities, handles state human resources or personnel matters, employee benefit matters, as well as procurement of such things as office space and office supplies. It maintains the physical integrity of all state-owned properties. The Petitioner was employed for the Respondent by the Division of Facilities Management and Building Construction (Division of Facilities) which is responsible for managing and maintaining office complexes and other properties owned by the state. The Petitioner specifically worked for the electrician unit of that Division. The Disability Claim The Petitioner experienced several purported medical conditions which resulted in workers' compensation claims during his tenure as an employee. The ones relevant to this case commenced in approximately 1992. In 1992 the Petitioner was engaged in a repair work assignment at a DMS-administered office building in downtown Tallahassee. He allegedly became exposed to asbestos during that job. The Petitioner and the employer, DMS, initiated a First Report of Injury and a workers' compensation claim ensued regarding the asbestos incident. The progress of that workers' compensation claim and its disposition are not relevant to this case, aside from the diagnosis concerning that claim as a part of the predicate for showing a disability for purposes of the case at bar. In any event, in 1992, the Petitioner was diagnosed by a physician with asbestosis. Because of that diagnosis, through the workers' compensation process, the employer and carrier have authorized the Petitioner, in all the years since, to have an annual medical examination and chest X-ray under the auspices of the Division of Workers' Compensation, Department of Financial Services. This is for the purpose of monitoring the status of the asbestosis. The Respondent has stipulated that it was aware of the diagnosis of asbestosis. It does not agree that the asbestosis constitutes a disability for purposes of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (i.e. handicap). The Petitioner was released from the physician with regard to the asbestosis situation without work limitations or restrictions due to that diagnosis. Sometime in 1999 the Petitioner injured his left knee on the job, apparently a severe sprain. A workers' compensation notice of injury was filed and a workers' compensation claim process ensued whereby he received treatment for his knee problem. When he reached maximum medical improvement he returned to work with a light duty recommendation from his treating physician, on a temporary basis. In fact, the Respondent accorded him a temporary light duty assignment after he returned to work from the knee injury. The Respondent, through the Petitioner's supervisors, particularly Joe Jacobson, generally made an effort to try to find the Petitioner a light duty assignment when he returned from illness or injury, based upon a doctor's recommendation and/or the Petitioner's own request for light duty. His supervisor, Mr. Jacobson, would customarily call other building managers, the "OP/CON Center" and other agencies in an effort to find a light duty post Mr. Forehand could perform in until he was ready for the full duties of his regular position. Thus, on several occasions Mr. Forehand was placed in light duty as a janitor or answering phones. It was not always possible to find temporary light duty for Mr. Forehand when he requested it or when a doctor recommended it. Apparently Mr. Forehand was on leave without pay for a number of months on at least one occasion when no light duty was available for him. In this connection, however, the Respondent, throughout Mr. Forehand's tenure as an employee or at least since his 1992 asbestosis diagnosis, has shown a penchant for allowing Mr. Forehand to occupy and perform his duties in his regular position of electrician by working at his own pace, without regard to any time limit for performing his duties, without prohibition on his taking frequent rest breaks, and with tolerance for his late arrival at work, if tardiness was related to his physical condition. Thus, in a defacto fashion, the Respondent accommodated what it knew of Mr. Forehand's impairments, as he related them to the Respondent, or as they learned of them from reports from his physicians and from the workers' compensation process (i.e., breathing difficulties and to some extent left knee impairment after 1999). In any event, the preponderant evidence establishes that when the Petitioner requested light duty and/or his physician recommended it, the Respondent would provide him with light duty if it was available, although it was not always available. It accommodated what it knew of his impairments when he worked in his regular position, performing his regular duties, by the means described above; even though the Petitioner did not for the most part request rest periods, frequent breaks from his duties, additional time to complete his assignments, or for permission to trade assignments with another worker who might have a less physically taxing job. In fact, when the matter of his physical difficulties came up, or was raised by the Petitioner in a conversation with his supervisor on at least one occasion, his supervisor told him in effect to "do the best you can." The implication thus clearly was that if the Petitioner needed rest breaks, needed additional time to do assignments, that the Respondent would accommodate him by not holding him to a strict standard as to when his job duties got performed. Since approximately the year 2000 or the fiscal year 2000-2001 the Respondent, like other state agencies, have been under a mandate from the Legislature and the Office of the Governor to save on costs and to become more efficient in its operations. One of the primary means of accomplishing this has been to require a reduction in the Agency's workforce. The Respondent has thus experienced a loss of employment positions since that fiscal year in each budget year and session of the Legislature. It has thus lost approximately 635 full-time positions over a four-year period ending with the 2005 Legislature and Appropriations Act. In fiscal year 2000-2001, the Petitioner's position was identified by the year 2000 Florida Legislature to be eliminated, by making it "non-recurring," such that his position would be cut or eliminated effective July 1, 2001. The Respondent's supervisors did not want him to be laid off. Therefore, they avoided his lay-off in that fiscal year by re- classifying him or his position into a vacant position within the Division of Facilities. They made the decision to retain him even with knowledge of his past workers' compensation claims, his asbestosis diagnosis and his knee injury of 1999 with related occasional light duty and time off from work. When the 2000 Legislature identified his position as being one which would be non-recurring or deleted after July 1, 2001, the Respondent held a meeting with the Petitioner and all other employees whose positions had been deemed non-critical and subject to deletion in the job force reduction. What had occurred was explained and their options and procedures to remain employed or become re-employed were explained. Because his supervisors wanted to save him from lay-off, and re- classified a different position to place him in, he was protected when the 2001 Legislature carried through with its previous year alteration of his position to non-recurring funding by withdrawing all funding and rate supporting his original position. In continuation of its mandate to reduce the work force, the 2003 Legislature made 20 positions non-recurring, including the Petitioner's. This meant that the funding was determined to be non-recurring, meaning that the positions would be funded one more year, but at the end of the fiscal year, on June 30, 2004, these positions would no longer be funded and would be abolished. In the Governor's and agency's budget preparation process thereafter, in 2003 and early 2004, the Legislatively- mandated reduction of 20 positions was incorporated. The Agency, however, in late 2003 or early 2004, arrived at the conclusion that it needed 15 of those 20 positions to be re- classified as critical positions necessary to its mission. Therefore, in the Legislative budget-making process, beginning in February and early March 2004, it sought to convince the Legislature's Appropriations staff and members that 15 of the positions were critical. It was successful in doing that during the Legislative session. The Petitioner's position was not re-established as a recurring, critical position. This was because his position had previously been determined to be non-critical in the 2000-2001 fiscal year, and, since his job duties and responsibilities had not changed since that time, his position was again deemed to be no longer critical to continued division operation. It was determined by the Respondent that the functions of his position could be performed by including them in the duties of other positions, to be performed by persons who qualified for and occupied those positions (such as master electricians). Although Mr. Jacobson, his supervisor, wanted to find a vacant position to place the Petitioner in as he had done in the 2000-2001 fiscal year job force reduction, there were no vacant positions available in which to place the Petitioner. Mr. Jacobson's testimony establishes this, as does that of Clint Sibille and Cherri Linn (Mr. Jacobson's supervisors). The fact that Mr. Jacobson had a desire to try to find a way to retain the Petitioner is somewhat corroborated by the statement or message from Ms. Linn to Mr. Jacobson to the effect that "you can't save him this time." This meant that, unlike the situation in 2000-2001, there were no vacant positions which could be converted to a position in which to place the Petitioner. Moreover, the testimony of the supervisory lead worker, Bill Kerr, corroborated that of Joe Jacobson and Clint Sibille that there were no vacant positions to place the Petitioner in or to convert to a position suitable for his qualifications. Their testimony shows that the Petitioner's position was not a critical one in the division, especially because it did not involve duties concerned with intricate electrical wiring, wiring repairs, working on complex electrical devices and other complex electrical work. This testimony established that it made no sense to convert a master electrician position into one which met Mr. Forehand's lesser qualifications because a qualified person in a master electrician position, can perform the Petitioner's duties and many more duties in terms of complexity and critical importance than can a person with the Petitioner's lesser qualifications in an entry-level electrician position. Mr. Forehand is not a licensed electrician. The Respondent thus determined that there were no positions which were vacant and sufficiently less critical to its operation as to justify it in converting such to one which met the Petitioner's qualifications (in a managerial context). The Petitioner was not told of his lay-off until June 14, 2004. In fact, Mr. Jacobson, his supervisor, did not know that it was certain to occur until immediately before Mr. Forehand was told, several days before at the most. Clint Sibille had told Mr. Jacobson before the Legislative session convened that Mr. Forehand's position might be eliminated but he was not certain at that time (approximately in December 2003 or January 2004). It is not clear which supervisor or manager made the initial decision that the Petitioner's position was not critical. It apparently was the recommendation of Clint Sibille, in concert with Cherri Linn, and with the final approval of the Division Director, then LeeAnn Korst. Mr. Jacobson, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor, did not request that his position be deleted. During most of 2003, the Petitioner's job duties included operation of a florescent bulb or lamp crushing system. This was a device known as a VRS Bulb Crusher also known as the "bulb eater." It had apparently been purchased by the Agency sometime in 2002. The device consists of a large drum with a vertical tube through which burned-out florescent light bulbs are inserted so that they fall into the large drum where a mechanical device is operated which crushes the bulbs for disposal. The Petitioner performed a large portion of the bulb crusher's operation. This was particularly true during early 2004, when the Petitioner used the machine at a more intense level. Sometime in February 2004, the exhaust or filtration system of the machine sustained damage, or a break, so that dust and particulate matter and any gaseous or chemical contents of the broken bulbs had the opportunity to leak out of the area of the break into the ambient air. A temporary repair was made and a permanent replacement part was ordered from the manufacturer. The machine continued to malfunction, however, and the repair did not hold. The Petitioner complained to Bill Kerr, his lead worker, concerning the dust and particulate matter the machine apparently sprayed into the air. He also complained to his supervisor, Joe Jacobson. The Petitioner stated that he believed that the dust and particulate matter and other unknown contents of the broken florescent bulbs might aggravate the breathing problems he professed to have, which he related to his original asbestosis diagnosis. These complaints began in early March 2004. The Petitioner also complained to Dave Wiggins, the Respondent's Environmental Supervisor in March of 2004. When the complaints were made and the temporary repair was not successful, the Respondent stopped all use of the bulb machine in early March 2004. This was contemporaneous with the time or occasion when the Petitioner refused to use the machine any longer. The complaints about the bulb crushing machine were reported up the "chain of command" so that on March 16, 2004, Glen Abbott, the Employee Relations Specialist of the Bureau of Personnel Management Services, made a written "medical report" (according to the Petitioner's testimony) concerning the Petitioner's reported exposure to "poisonous chemicals" in the fluorescent bulbs being crushed through operation of the machine. This report was apparently required for workers' compensation purposes. The Petitioner also told Clint Sibille, Mr. Jacobson's supervisor, of the machine's purported malfunction. Mr. Sibille asked Dave Wiggins, the Environmental Specialist, to investigate the machine to determine if the machine was malfunctioning or if the problem reported by the Petitioner was caused by operator error. Mr. Wiggins and Joe Jacobson, after investigating the matter, believed it to be caused by operator error in the manner in which the bulbs were inserted into the vertical tube of the machine. The Petitioner maintains that he asked Clint Sibille to send him to a doctor concerning his fears of heath problems related to the machine and states that Clint Sibille told him to "see his own doctor." Mr. Sibille did confer with Cherri Linn about the Petitioner's request and Cherri Linn informed him that the Petitioner would have to engage in the workers' compensation report and claim process in order to see a doctor concerning his health-related fears about the bulb crushing machine. Mr. Sibille then told the Petitioner's supervisor Joe Jacobson to tell the Petitioner of this. Thereafter, at some point during the period of March through June 2004, after the Petitioner reported his complaints concerning the use of the bulb crusher, Glenn Abbott told all the electricians and carpenters who had worked with the machine to obtain medical examinations under the normal workers' compensation procedure, to try to ascertain if there are any deleterious effects caused by these persons' operation of the machine. Sometime in early May of 2004, the Petitioner called the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and spoke to someone there and made a verbal report of his belief concerning unsafe conditions regarding operation of the bulb crushing machine. After the Petitioner left employment with the Respondent Agency in July of 2004, the machine and the warehouse space where it was located was examined by a representative of the DEP and samples were taken, in an effort to ascertain if any hazardous materials had been produced by the machine or were present in that working area. On May 18, 2004, the Petitioner re-injured the same knee which he had injured in 1999. A Notice of Injury concerning this knee injury was filed to trigger the workers' compensation process and the Petitioner saw a doctor through the workers' compensation procedure who examined and treated his knee problem (severe sprain). He was off work for a few days and then was sent back to work by the physician with a prescription of "light duty." He thus became available for work with light duty, at the doctor's recommendation, on or about June 1, 2004. At about this time he told his lead worker Bill Kerr, of his blood clot and showed him the doctor's report concerning leg swelling. He also informed Joe Jacobson of this. He sought light duty and indeed Joe Jacobson made substantial efforts to find light duty available for him by calling the various building managers and the "opcon" center to see if any light duty was available. Mr. Jacobson went so far as to try to ascertain if there were any office filing duties that the Petitioner could perform. He was unable to locate any light duty work for the Petitioner at this time. Joe Jacobson took annual leave in early June and while he was on annual leave, he received a call from his employer, (apparently Cherri Linn) around June 10th or 11, 2004, requiring him to come back to work because the job force reduction lay-off was going to be imposed on the Petitioner and his presence as his supervisor was apparently needed. On June 11, 2004, the Petitioner was called and told to report to work on Monday morning, June 14, 2004. On Monday the Petitioner was called in to a meeting with Joe Jacobson and Tim Carlisle and told of his lay-off. He was immediately required by the Department's Inspector General, Tim Carlisle, to take boxes and pack up his belongings and to leave the premises. Carlisle helped him pack his belongings and ushered him off the Respondent's premises. The Petitioner maintains that he did not know of his lay-off until that same day, which happened to be his fifty-fifth birthday. He was placed on leave with pay until June 30, 2004, his actual termination date. In July of 2004, apparently on or about July 2, 2004, he filed a formal written complaint to the Chief Inspector General regarding his concerns and feared health consequences of the operation of the bulb crushing machine. On or about July 20, 2004, Mr. Forehand visited a walk-in medical facility because he contends he was experiencing shortness of breath, chest pains, and tightness in his chest. He attributed these symptoms to use of the bulb crusher back in March and earlier. He testified that he was diagnosed with silicosis and that he physician determined that he could not tolerate walking 30 to 60 minutes at a time or lifting more than 15 or 20 pounds. Neither this physician nor any other testified, nor was non-hearing medical information admitted into evidence in this regard. Interestingly, Mr. Forehand's testimony indicates he was diagnosed with a heart condition, apparently based on these symptoms, and in late 2004 underwent insertion of an arterial stint. The Petitioner thus complained to his supervisors beginning in about early March 2004, concerning the fears he had about the results of the machine operations. He complained verbally to DEP in early May of 2004, but made no written formal complaint, to any agency or person, until after his termination in July 2004. The Petitioner was not asked to participate in an investigation, hearing or inquiry concerning the operation of the bulb crushing machine and made no written complaint to any supervisory officials of the Respondent, who could then themselves submit a complaint to the Inspector General or to the Human Relations Commission. In fact, in his own testimony the Petitioner admits that he made a written complaint in July of 2004. In an apparent effort to show that the Respondent's proffered non-discriminatory reason for his termination was pretextual, the Petitioner advanced testimony from a number of witnesses, including himself, which he maintains shows a pattern and practice by the Respondent of retaliating against, and, if necessary, effectively firing older, disabled employees or employees who complain of safety hazards. In this regard, of the five positions selected to be eliminated in the job force reduction of 2004, four had incumbents when the decision was made. All four of those incumbents were over 40 years of age. Two of those four positions, however, became vacant before they were eliminated by the job force reduction. Ms. Ashraf Achtchi was fired by the Respondent before her position became officially eliminated in the job force reduction and Preston Booth voluntarily resigned from his position for unknown reasons. Ms. Achtchi testified to the general effect that she felt she had been discriminated against because of being ill and under medical treatment, yet she was still singled out (in her view) for being absent or tardy. Although the record may establish that she is over 40 years of age, there is no persuasive evidence that she suffered from a legally cognizable disability as that condition or term is defined below, even if she was under a doctor's care, was ill, and had frequent tardiness or absentness due to illness or a doctor's visit during her employment tenure. In any event, other than her own subjective opinion and Mr. Forehand's speculations based upon hearsay, there is no persuasive, competent evidence to show that she was terminated for any reasons based upon an unproven disability, her age or due to any retaliation regarding any protected status within the purview of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner maintains that both he and Mr. Feizi were over 40 and disabled. Whether or not the Petitioner established proof of disability will be dealt with in the conclusions of law below. Mr. Feizi apparently suffered from a disease of the nervous system (AMS) and was confined to a wheel chair much of the time. It may thus be inferred that, for purposes of the legal elements of disability referenced below, that Mr. Feizi was disabled. Other than his subjective opinion and Mr. Forehand's subjective testimonial speculation, based upon hearsay, however, there is no competent, persuasive evidence concerning the reasons Mr. Feizi was terminated, other than that his position was simply eliminated through a job force reduction in the manner described in the above findings of fact. There is no persuasive, credible evidence to show that he was dismissed from employment based upon his age or due to his disability or as retaliation, nor was that proven with regard to Ms Achtchi. Other employees testified concerning alleged retaliatory conduct on the part of the Respondent. Sid Palladino and John Corbin opined that they had been retaliated against for making safety complaints of various kinds, as well as for testifying on behalf of the Petitioner in this proceeding. Ralph Cleaver testified that he left the Department to work for the Department of Agriculture because he had filed a "whistle blower" claim and that the Respondent, in his view, would use retaliation for his taking such an action. Barry McDaniel was 60 years old when hired and, abruptly soon thereafter, was asked to resign, according to his testimony, without any given reason. He testified that Mr. Sibille had him read a book purportedly advocating hard work and the hiring of young workers. The book was entitled "The Go Getter." According to Mr. McDaniel's testimony, the book was required to be read by all employees under Mr. Sibille's supervision. There was no evidence, however, that although Mr. McDaniel was asked to resign, that any other employee was so treated. The book was not in evidence and the undersigned has only Mr. McDaniel's subjective testimony concerning his thoughts regarding the theme and content of the book, in relation to his subjective belief that his age was the reason he was asked to resign. He testified that his immediate superior, who was also 60 years of age, was "gone" shortly thereafter. There is no evidence of any circumstances or facts concerning why Mr. McDaniel or his supervisor were actually asked to resign or in the case of his supervisor, may have voluntarily resigned. There are insufficient facts and circumstances established by the evidence to show any discriminatory motive related to age or otherwise with regard to the terminations of either of these men. Sid Palladino testified that he was reprimanded for not wearing his uniform and that other employees were not reprimanded when they had not worn uniforms either. He also testified that he felt he was retaliated against for making safety complaints as well as for testifying in support of the Petitioner in this proceeding. In fact, his reprimand was rescinded shortly after it was given him when it was learned that he had not worn his uniform or worn it properly because the uniform supplied him did not fit. Additionally, other than their anecdotal comments in their testimony, there is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Palladino or Mr. Corbin were retaliated against for complaining of safety issues and the same is true of Ralph Cleaver opining that he was about to be retaliated against for being a whistle blower, and Barry McDaniel as well. There is simply no definitive, credible proof, other than these employees' own subjective opinions, upon which to base a finding that there was any pattern and practice of retaliation against employees for complaining about safety hazards, for supporting other employees' discrimination claims, for making whistle blower claims, for being disabled or on account of their age, which could be persuasively probative of the discrimination and retaliation claims of the Petitioner.1/ In this connection, it is also found that there are a number of remaining employees in the Petitioner's division, who were his age or older. Indeed, Mr. Robert Smith had retired and then was later re-hired by the Department and the Division after suffering at least one episode of injury and medically prescribed light duty. Likewise, there are an unknown number of disabled or physically impaired persons remaining employed by the Department, after the dates and circumstances occurred with regard to the Petitioner's discriminatory claims. At least two of them testified in this proceeding. These facts belie the existence of a systematic policy or practice of eliminating employees over age 40 or of Mr. Forehand's age or older, or those who might be disabled or suffering from physical or medical impairments.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2006.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, A-1 Block Corp., discriminated against Petitioner, Harold E. Ford, Jr., on the basis of his race and/or color and in retaliation, and, if so, what remedy should be ordered.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a family-owned business that manufactures concrete products, ready-mix concrete, concrete block, and precast concrete. Mr. Freeman has been the president of Respondent for approximately 10 years. Petitioner is an African-American male who was employed by Respondent at two different times. Petitioner was hired to work in several different capacities which included: ready-mix driver; block driver; dump truck driver; and/or loader operator. Mr. Caviglia serves Respondent in a supervisory position, and Mr. Caviglia made the decision to hire Petitioner as a truck driver in December 2009 (first employment). Respondent hired Petitioner at $12.00 an hour. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment in July 2011 (first employment termination). Mr. Freeman described the circumstances under which Petitioner was terminated as: Petitioner failed to unhook some type of ladder or other apparatus at a self-loading dock, and drove off causing approximately $4,000 to $5,000 of damage to Respondent’s truck and/or the dock. Respondent was responsible for making the repairs. At the time of his first employment termination, Petitioner was making $13.00 an hour. Approximately five months later, in December 2011, Mr. Caviglia re-hired Petitioner to be a truck driver for Respondent. The other drivers employed by Respondent wanted Petitioner to return. Petitioner was hired at $13.00 an hour (second employment). At various times during Petitioner’s employment with Respondent, Petitioner inquired about becoming a “dispatcher” for Respondent. Mr. Freeman indicated to Petitioner that he (Mr. Freeman) would think about Petitioner’s dispatcher request. However, one of the requirements for Respondent’s dispatcher position was the availability to work on Saturdays. Mr. Freeman knew that Petitioner had a second job which required Petitioner to work on Saturdays. Since 2004, Petitioner worked part-time as an attendant at a local funeral home, which required Petitioner to work some Saturdays. Petitioner was paid $75 per funeral; however, he did not know how much he had been paid since his second employment termination. Petitioner did not have any pay-stubs to reflect how much he had been paid by the funeral home. Petitioner continues to work for the funeral home. In October 2013, Petitioner caused damage to tires on a truck belonging to Respondent. Respondent incurred a financial loss as a result of the damaged tires. Petitioner was terminated from his second employment with Respondent on November 20, 2013. Petitioner alleged and testified that Mr. Caviglia threatened Petitioner at various times during Respondent’s operational meetings.3/ Two other witnesses, Mr. Timmons and Mr. Sandy, testified that they did not observe Petitioner being threatened at these meetings. Petitioner alleged that he was retaliated against based on his race. Petitioner claimed that he was directed to wash a white man’s truck. Petitioner refused to wash the truck. Respondent requires its drivers to wash the trucks that they drive each day. However, there was no evidence of any retaliation against Petitioner when he did not wash the other man’s truck. Petitioner alleged he asked for raises when he thought it appropriate, and was refused. Mr. Freeman paid his employees the going rate, and it was established that Petitioner was being paid $14 an hour when he was terminated. Mr. Timmons, a former employee of Respondent, received the same rate of pay for working as a driver or as a dispatcher for Respondent. Petitioner’s resumé was admitted into evidence as Exhibit C. Petitioner created this resumé in 2011, and revised it one time to assist in the preparation for the hearing. The resumé does not accurately reflect Petitioner’s separate employment periods at Respondent, nor does it contain a two-week period of employment at another construction company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations DISMISSING the Petition for Relief filed by Mr. Ford. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether Parallon Enterprises LLC-HSC Orange Park (“Parallon”) committed an unlawful employment practice against Tina Gainey by subjecting her to disparate treatment based on her national origin.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties Parallon is a business based in Orange Park, Florida, that contracts with 22 hospitals to provide health information management (“HIM”) services. HIM is a term used to describe the process by which a health care facility secures and maintains a patient’s medical record from admittance to discharge. Parallon’s main purpose is to ensure that a patient’s medical record is complete and accurate upon discharge. Rather than employing nurses, physicians, or other providers of direct patient care, Parallon employs the hospital staff members involved with HIM operations. Ms. Gainey is Hispanic and began working for Parallon in April of 2011 as a health information technician at the Twin Cities Hospital in Niceville, Florida. Ms. Gainey has held the position of health information technician during her entire tenure at Parallon. Ms. Gainey works the night shift and is usually the only HIM employee present at that time. HIM work during the night shift is less complex than HIM work during the day. The nighttime work involves gathering the records of discharged patients, ensuring that all of those records can be traced to a particular patient, and preparing those records for delivery to a document imaging center. Upon beginning her employment with Parallon, Ms. Gainey had high hopes of enjoying a long tenure there. Because she was told that a degree in the HIM field would enable her to advance within Parallon, Ms. Gainey geared her education toward a specialization in HIM. The HIM Director Position at Twin Cities Hospital Opens Ms. Gainey’s previous supervisor, the HIM Director at Twin Cities Hospital, relocated to a different position in approximately March of 2016. A HIM Director with Parallon has a great deal of responsibility. In addition to being a supervisor and responsible for every medical record in a hospital, a HIM Director investigates every unauthorized release of protected health information. Ms. Gainey was interested in the HIM Director position and communicated her interest to Lisa Terrell. Ms. Terrell is one of Parallon’s HIM Regional Directors and oversees Parallon’s operations at eight health care facilities in Florida, including Twin Cities Hospital. Ms. Terrell interviews qualified candidates for vacant HIM Director positions and recommends which candidates will be interviewed by Parallon’s upper management. Ms. Terrell told Mr. Gainey to send her the necessary documentation and Ms. Terrell would then forward that documentation to the appropriate person. Ms. Gainey followed Ms. Terrell’s instructions and provided her with the necessary documentation, an internal transfer form and a resume, via an e-mail transmitted on May 4, 2016. On May 4, 2016, Ms. Terrell forwarded Ms. Gainey’s e-mail to Kimberly Baker, a human resource generalist at Parallon’s headquarters in Orange Park during the time in question. Ms. Baker did not account for that e-mail by adding Ms. Gainey to the list of applicants for the HIM Director position at Twin Cities Hospital. Ms. Baker should have recognized this e-mail as an application for the open HIM Director position because the subject line read “FW: Application for HIM Director position.” Moreover, the line below the subject line indicates two files were attached to the e-mail. Those files were named “Internal Transfer Form rev 9.3.14.doc” and “Tina Gainey Management Resume 2016.docx.” Ms. Baker can only speculate as to why she failed to account for Ms. Gainey’s application. Ms. Baker was on vacation in May of 2016, and she left Parallon at the end of that month. Thus, it is possible that Ms. Terrell’s e-mail was overlooked in a mass of e-mails that accumulated in Ms. Baker’s in-box while she was gone. Also, Ms. Gainey did not follow the formal process established by Parallon for existing Parallon employees to apply for transfers to open positions. Parallon requires existing employees to apply for open positions by transmitting an e-mail to a particular human resource employee such as Ms. Baker. An internal transfer form and the employee’s resume should be attached to the e-mail. That requirement serves multiple purposes. First, Parallon’s human resources department is able to verify that an application is complete. Then, the human resources department screens a particular applicant to ensure that he or she is eligible to apply for the position in question. Parallon also requires that applications be sent to a particular human resources employee because the employee responsible for managing the process for filling a particular opening must track which applicants are interviewed and which receive offers. If the human resources department finds that a particular applicant is eligible, then the human resources department notifies the hiring director that an internal candidate has applied for the position in question. A list of open positions within Parallon on March 29, 2016, indicates that existing employees should have transmitted an e-mail and the required attachments to Ms. Baker. Ms. Baker believes that she would have been more likely to have added Ms. Gainey to the list of applicants for the HIM Director position if Ms. Gainey had followed the established procedure. Nevertheless, Ms. Baker should have recognized Ms. Terrell’s e-mail as an application for the open HIM Director position. Parallon Offers the HIM Director Position to Karen Truelove Karen Truelove was employed by Parallon and working at the Fort Walton Beach Medical Center (“FWB Medical Center”) in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, in May of 2016. Ms. Truelove was also interested in the HIM Director position at Twin Cities Hospital. She transmitted an e-mail to Ms. Baker on March 30, 2016, with an internal transfer form and her resume attached thereto. Ms. Truelove has over 20 years of experience in the HIM field. From March of 1996 through December of 2000, Ms. Truelove worked for Contra Costa County Health Services in Martinez, California, where she: (a) developed and implemented policies and procedures for medical record maintenance; (b) worked with outlying county medical clinics to ensure proper medical record procedures; and (c) completed and processed workers’ compensation, state disability, social security, and private insurance forms. From January of 2001 to October of 2001, Ms. Truelove worked at the Oasis Sports Medical Group in San Diego, California, where she: (a) prepared charts for daily outpatient visits; (b) requested MRIs, EMGs, and medical records; and (c) proofread medical record dictation. Ms. Truelove was next employed from April of 2002 through July of 2003 at the Rehabilitation Hospital of the Pacific in Hawaii, where she conducted insurance verifications, processed referrals, and scheduled patients. Ms. Truelove’s next position was based at the Queens Medical Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, from July of 2003 through December of 2004, where she reviewed discharged patient medical records for completeness and accuracy. Ms. Truelove has worked for Parallon at the FWB Medical Center since February of 2005. She began her employment with Parallon as an HIM Operations Supervisor for the evening shift. In that position, Ms. Truelove was responsible for: (a) staffing the evening shift; (b) ensuring that the evening shift met productivity and quality goals; (c) preparing charts; and (d) reviewing charts for completeness and accuracy. Ms. Truelove held the HIM Operations Supervisor position until February 21, 2006. She then became the Lead HIM Technician at the FWB Medical Center for issues pertaining to incomplete medical records and patient charts. At some point in 2007, Ms. Truelove became a tumor registrar at FWB Medical Center. A tumor registrar analyzes patient charts for cancer diagnoses. The information is then reported to the American College of Surgeons so that national treatment guidelines for cancer can be developed. In order to hold this position, Ms. Truelove earned a certification from the National Cancer Registrar’s Association. In addition to working full-time, Ms. Truelove is currently pursuing a two-year degree in HIM and hopes to eventually take an examination in order to become a registered health information technician. Because she had visited the FWB Medical Center for department meetings, Ms. Terrell already knew Ms. Truelove prior to her application for the HIM Director position and had a very high opinion of her work. Ms. Truelove’s direct supervisor at the FWB Medical Center gave Ms. Truelove a strong recommendation. As a result, Ms. Terrell considered a face-to-face interview with Ms. Truelove to be unnecessary and interviewed her over the phone on April 17 or 18, 2016. Afterwards, Ms. Terrell recommended that Ms. Truelove be interviewed by Parallon’s upper management. Even if Ms. Gainey’s application had been processed by Ms. Baker, Ms. Terrell would have considered Ms. Truelove to be a better candidate for the HIM Director position. Parallon’s Chief Executive and Chief Operating Officers then interviewed Ms. Truelove. Ultimately, Parallon offered the HIM Director position to Ms. Truelove on or about May 17, 2016, and she has held that position since June of 2016. Because she is much further along in her career and has more than twice as much experience with medical records, Ms. Truelove would have almost certainly been offered the job even if Ms. Gainey’s application had been processed by Ms. Baker. With regard to hiring and/or promotional practices, there is no persuasive evidence to support a finding that Parallon treats similarly situated, non-Hispanic employees more favorably than Hispanic employees, such as Ms. Gainey. Ms. Gainey Requests Training On Friday, May 20, 2016, Ms. Gainey sent an e-mail to Ms. Baker inquiring about the HIM Director position: Hi Kimberly, I have not heard back from Lisa Terrell regarding the HIM Director position at Twin Cities in Niceville. I sent her my transfer form and resume information back on May 2, and wanted to make sure that you had received this as well. Please contact me as soon as possible. Thank you. Tina M. Gainey Ms. Baker responded on May 23, 2016, with the following e-mail: Tina, These always need to be sent to HR for consideration and processing. I can see if Lisa receive[d] it, but unfortunately, they have already selected a candidate for an offer. Ms. Gainey then spoke to Ms. Terrell about receiving training so that she could advance beyond her nighttime technician position. Parallon has offered training to Ms. Gainey so that she could advance into a daytime position. However, given that her nighttime shift ends at 1:30 a.m., it is unclear whether the training has been offered at a time during which it would be reasonable to expect that Ms. Gainey would be able to take advantage of that training opportunity. There was no persuasive evidence indicating that any other Parallon employees were treated more favorably than Ms. Gainey with regard to training opportunities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Tina Gainey’s Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner was employed by the respondent $` percent General Telephone Company in October of 1971. From November of 1980 to February 3, 1982, he was classified as a cable splicer. This position requires strenuous physical duties including climbing telephone poles, lifting and moving heavy equipment, handling compressed gas cylinders that weigh 150 pounds and digging splice pits. Performance of the duties of a cable splicer requires strong hands, arms, back and leg muscles. In November of 1980, petitioner suffered a back injury and was unable to perform the activities of a cable splicer. He was placed on Absent Injury status, thus receiving 80 percent of his salary, and returned to work on or about January 6, 1981. He then took left-over vacation time until January 19, 1981, and about one week later, a light duty assignment was located for him at the Seminole DART Center. Although this assignment required no driving, petitioner complained that the drive to and from the Seminole location aggravated his back condition and was difficult for him due to the medications he was taking for his physical problems. On or about February 17, 1981, petitioner was reassigned to duty as a clerk at the St. Petersburg main building. Due to several absences, complaints by petitioner that he could not sit, stand or bend for long periods of time and that alternating from sitting to standing was painful, petitioner was relieved of all duties on March 30, 1981. He was informed that he would again be placed on Absent Injury status until such time as respondent could verify with the treating physician exactly what petitioner was capable of doing. There is some indication that petitioner may have returned to work in a light duty position in May and June of 1981, though petitioner had no recollection of these dates. In any event, petitioner returned to Absent Injury status on or about June 23, 1981, and was paid Absent Injury benefits until approximately December 15, 1981. He was then advised that his Absent Injury benefits were exhausted, that he would be placed on vacation as of December 16, 1981, and that his benefits with respondent would expire as of December 31, 1981. Petitioner was further advised that he could request a 30-day leave of absence, provide a doctor's statement regarding his present condition and that, during that 30-day leave of absence period he could request an additional 5 month leave of absence. Upon the advice of his Union representative, petitioner did request and was granted a 30-day leave of absence, which expired on January 31, 1982. On January 19, 1982, a meeting was held with petitioner to discuss his medical condition. He was advised that there were no light duty positions available at that time and that his 30-day leave of absence would terminate at the end of January. Petitioner's supervisor suggested that he request further leave of absence without pay in order to protect his employment and continue his benefits. Petitioner became angry at this suggestion, refused to request additional leave without pay, and uttered some statement about a "personal tragedy." His supervisor felt that he had been threatened by Mr. Wiggins and notified the police. Petitioner was terminated on February 3, 1982. The reasons cited for the termination were failure to apply for an additional leave of absence before his last 30-day leave had expired and insubordination at the January 19, 1982, meeting. Petitioner presented no evidence that other light duty assignments were available in January of 1982. He made reference to two other light duty assignments held by other employees. He acknowledged that one such position held by a white employee required extensive driving, and admitted that he was unable to drive for long distances or long periods of time. The other light duty position that petitioner believed he could have filled was awarded to a black employee. Other than these two positions, petitioner was not aware of any light duty assignments which were available between May and December of 1981 and were not afforded to him. Petitioner also admits that he was unable to perform the duties of a cable splicer in 1981 and in January of 1982.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's charge that the respondent committed an unlawful employment practice be DISMISSED. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0606 The undersigned has carefully considered the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the petitioner and the respondent. The proposed findings of fact have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below. Petitioner: The document filed by the petitioner entitled "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" contains neither factual findings nor legal conclusions. Instead, petitioner complains of the procedural rulings at the final hearing. The undersigned would only note that the final hearing occurred on a Friday and that the parties were advised that if the hearing were not completed on that day, it would be continued to a later date. It was only after the petitioner announced that he had no further witnesses that respondent moved for a directed recommended order and elected not to present any evidence after that motion was granted. Respondent: (NOTE: Any reference to the hearing transcript and Mr. Wiggins' deposition transcript are rejected inasmuch as neither transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings.) 23 and 24. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in dispute. COPIES FURNISHED: E. D. Wiggins 4843 Campenella Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Kathryn M. Lancaster, Esquire 501 First Avenue North Suite 626 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Leslie Reicin Stein, Esquires Post Office Box 110, M.C. 7 Tampa, Florida 33601 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Regina McGriff, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background This case involves a claim by petitioner, Robert Jones (Jones or petitioner), that he was denied employment by respondent, Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES), on account of his handicap. It is undisputed that Jones has diabetes, he is insulin-dependent, and he has had at least one toe amputated because of the disability. As such, he does not enjoy, in some measure, the full and normal use of his physical facilities, and he is accordingly deemed to be a handicapped person within the meaning of the law. The parties also agree that DLES is an employer subject to the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, which governs this dispute. DLES denies it acted in a discriminatory manner and contends generally that (a) the handicap played no role in its employment decision since it was unaware that Jones was a disabled person when the employment decision was made, and (b) a more qualified person was hired for both positions sought by Jones. A preliminary investigation by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. Since October 3, 1982, petitioner has been employed as an investigator specialist II at the Commission. He also worked for DLES from May 1980 until October 1981, and at the Florida State Employment Service from October 1981 until April 1982. Prior to working with the state, Jones served in the U. S. Marine Corps from which he was honorably discharged with a medical disability in 1977. He is a graduate of Florida State University having received a degree in political science in December 1985. Between 1982 and 1991, respondent made application for employment at DLES on at least four or five occasions but was never hired. On July 16, 1991, he wrote a letter to the agency head, then Frank Scruggs, complaining about his inability to get a job, advising that he was a disabled veteran, and asking for a "fair shake" on his applications. Later that year, he applied for the positions of management review specialist and senior management analyst II. Although he was interviewed for one of the two positions, he was not selected for either job. In his application filed with DLES, Jones described his health as "excellent." Attached to his application papers was a certification from the Veterans Administration indicating he had a service-related disability rated at 30 percent or more. Also, he included a handwritten statement that he was a "veteran with a compensable service-connected disability." There was no indication, however, as to the nature of the disability. After receiving two rejection letters from DLES on February 10, 1992, regarding his job application, Jones filed a complaint of discrimination with the Commission on July 23, 1992, alleging he had "been discriminated against because of (his) Handicap, Diabetes." He later filed a petition for relief in which he charged that DLES' employment decision was based not only on his handicap, but also on account of his "gender, race, veteran status or any other unlawful reason." As to the grounds raised after the Commission had concluded its initial investigation, they have been disregarded as being untimely. Senior Management Analyst II Position On January 9, 1992, respondent published a job opportunity announcement for the position of senior management analyst II in the office of civil rights and minority affairs. The position had been created to assist the director of that office, Deidre Kyle, in her day-to-day responsibilities. Kyle was also the individual responsible for the hiring decision. The advertised position required as minimum qualifications that the applicant have "a bachelor's degree and four years of professional experience in systems administrative work, employment and training, employment security, grants management, education, vocational counseling, vocational placement, occupational analysis, employment selection and referral activities, program planning, program evaluation or program monitoring." Petitioner met the minimum qualifications. Besides Jones, approximately fifty persons applied for the position of senior management analyst II, including Carolyn W. Franklin, a non-handicapped African-American female then working under Kyle's supervision and filling an Other Personal Services (OPS) slot as a civil rights specialist III in Kyle's office since September 1991. Franklin had previously worked for over twelve years in the Governor's Office, principally as a governmental analyst in the Citizens Assistance Office, and mostly under the direct supervision of Shirley Gooding, who later served as inspector general, and then assistant secretary, and finally as secretary of DLES in July 1992. She had also served as the affirmative action officer for the Governor's Office for four years. Except for these latter duties, Franklin had no experience in equal employment or civil rights. Out of the fifty applicants, only four were selected for an interview with Kyle, and none was handicapped. Jones was not selected for an interview. In choosing the top candidates for an interview, Kyle relied upon the duties and responsibilities contained in the career service system position description as well as certain review criteria which she had prepared. The review criteria were: (a) extensive knowledge of equal employment and affirmative action rules and regulations, (b) thorough knowledge of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, (c) knowledge of the Americans with Disabilities Act, (d) experience in conducting federal program compliance reviews, (e) familiarity with American Standards Institute standards, (f) effective oral and written communication skills, and (g) personal computer experience (Word Perfect and/or Lotus Preferred). The qualifications of the three individuals other than Franklin selected for the final interview are not of record. Also, the record does not show how Jones' qualifications compared with those of the final candidates (other than Franklin). Thus, there is no way to determine if Jones was more or less qualified than the others on the final list, or whether he ranked fifth or even fiftieth out of all of the candidates filing applications. Kyle made no effort to determine whether any of the applicants, including petitioner, had a handicap. Therefore, when she made the decision to reject Jones and the other forty-five candidates through the initial screening process, she was unaware of the fact that he had diabetes. Indeed, she did not learn of this fact until Jones filed his complaint. The position sought by Jones was ultimately filled by Franklin. In selecting Franklin, Kyle noted that Franklin had served in an OPS position with "similar" job responsibilities, she had worked under Kyle's direct supervision for the preceding four months, and she had working knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of the position "that would allow her to begin work immediately." Contrary to petitioner's assertion, Kyle was not told by her superiors to hire Franklin. She concedes, however, that there were "suggestions" by then inspector general Gooding to hire Franklin, a former colleague of Gooding at the Governor's Office. In considering DLES' assertion that the reason for hiring Franklin was that she was the most qualified person, it is noted that earlier that year Franklin had applied for a lower-graded career service position in Kyle's office but was rejected because Kyle was unimpressed with Franklin's "communicative skills." After her rejection, Gooding "suggested" that Kyle hire Franklin for the OPS slot, a suggestion which Kyle followed. Based on these facts, it may be reasonably inferred that Kyle's true motive in hiring Franklin was to satisfy, albeit reluctantly, the wishes of her superior, Gooding, who wanted to place her friend in the agency, rather than hiring the best qualified person for the job. While friendship or even cronyism was the decisive factor in Franklin getting the job, there is insufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that would support an inference that petitioner's handicap was the reason why he was not selected. Indeed, there is no evidence to support a finding that Jones would even have made the short list had Franklin not applied for the job, or would have been considered if Kyle had rejected the suggestions of her superior. Therefore, while the final employment decision may not have been fair, it is found that there was no discriminatory animus in DLES' employment decision to reject Jones. Management Review Specialist Positions On October 17, 1991, respondent published a job opportunity announcement for two management review specialists (position numbers 1158 and 5420) in its office of inspector general, then run by inspector general Gooding. At that time, the office had two sections: management review and investigations. When the announcement was published, the office was unsure whether both positions would be used for management reviews or whether one would be management review and the other for investigations. The minimum qualifications for the positions were a bachelor's degree and 4 years of professional experience in systems analysis, management analysis, program planning, program research, program evaluation, engineering or administrative work. Petitioner met the minimum qualification requirements. The management review slot required the successful applicant to be experienced in management reviews, which are very comprehensive and involve an evaluation of the following management functions: planning, organization, staffing, directing and controlling. The specialist is also required to prepare rather comprehensive reports. On the other hand, the specialist in the investigative section performs more traditional investigative duties with a much more narrow focus than management review. The record shows that Jones was not fully qualified to fill a slot in the management section since his main experience had been investigating discrimination complaints for the Commission for the preceding ten years. Jones and some ninety other persons filed applications for these positions. A preliminary screening process of all applications was conducted by Kitty J. Convertino, who headed the management review section, and Gary Sanford, who headed the investigation section. Because of his investigative experience with the Commission, Jones was placed on the list of some fifteen to seventeen persons to be initially interviewed. It was contemplated that after these initial interviews were conducted, a short list of five candidates would be picked from those interviewed, and they would be invited back for a second interview. Although Convertino ostensibly had authority to make a hiring decision, the final say-so rested with her superior, inspector general Gooding. During the initial interview, each candidate was asked "interview questions" from a list prepared by Convertino. Among other subjects, the applicants were asked about their computer skills since specialists were required to prepare much of their own work. Although Jones says he uses a microcomputer in his present work, his computer skills did not meet Convertino's expectations. At the conclusion of the interview, Jones was asked to provide a writing sample, and he later funished a copy of an investigative report he had written for the Commission in 1986. This writing sample reinforced Convertino's opinion that Jones was more qualified for the investigation section than the management review section. During the selection process, a member of Convertino's management review team was transferred from her team to Sanford's investigation team. When this occurred, the management review specialist vacancy on Sanford's investigation team was eliminated leaving both vacancies in the management review section. The decision to transfer the position was made by inspector general Gooding. Because no position was open in the investigation section, and the qualifications of the chosen candidates for the management section exceeded those of petitioner, Jones was not invited back for a second interview. There is no evidence to support a finding that the transfer was made to prevent petitioner from being considered for the vacant position in the investigative section. Among the candidates for the two management review positions was Jane Steele, a former collegue of Gooding at the Governor's Office, who had performed administrative work for the City of Altamonte Springs for some eighteen months prior to seeking employment with DLES, and who had prior stints with the Department of Insurance, Department of Transportation, and Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting. When Steele's qualifications did not initially comply with the job description for position 5920, the job description was rewritten midway through the evaluation process so that Steele could satisfy the qualifications. Whether this change was made at the behest of Gooding is not of record. In any event, there is no evidence to show that this manipulation in the qualification process was for an unlawful discriminatory purpose. Steele was ultimately selected to fill one of the two management review specialist positions. According to Convertino, Steele was selected because of her prior experience in performing compliance audits for a state agency and writing audit reports. In addition, she was computer literate, was a "good" writer, having published several articles, and had a masters degree in public administration. Although Steele once worked with Gooding at the Governor's Office, there is no evidence that Convertino consulted with Gooding prior to making her employment decision. Indeed, Convertino flatly denied that any conversations took place. Ronald J. Rigby, an African-American who also has diabetes and is hearing impaired, was selected for position 1158. He had previously performed compliance reviews for DLES in the Job Training Partnership Act program, which experience Convertino believed would be compatible with the work required of position 1158. Although Rigby was placed under investigation by the State Controller in mid-January 1992 for "wage claim discrepancies," and this prevented him from assuming the job for several months, the matter was resolved sometime after April 10, 1992, and he was then allowed to report to work. When the decision to hire Rigby was made, Convertino did not know that Rigby had diabetes, although she knew that he was hearing impaired. Jones says his medical condition was discussed during the interview process, and he advised the interviewers that the disability was controlled by medication. Neither Convertino nor Sanford recalled any such discussion, and Convertino says she was unware of Jones' condition until the complaint was filed. In any event, there is no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that would support a finding that Jones' handicap played any part in the employment decision. While the investigative slot may have been filled through a transfer on account of friendship or cronyism, that decision was not predicated on a desire to keep a handicapped person from being considered for the job. Moreover, the evidence shows that both Steele and Rigby had more experience in performing compliance audits than did Jones, and thus they were the more qualified individuals to fill those positions. Miscellaneous Employment records received in evidence show that petitioner's annual pay was $22,000 at the time his application was filed in October 1991. His salary since that time is not of record. The position of management review specialist paid in the range of $2,407.49 to $4,056.63 per month while the position of senior management analyst II paid in the range of $2,740.51 to $4,653.39 per month. Respondent apparently did not document, nor could it produce, the written basis for its hiring decisions, as required by its own personnel manual. Even so, this lack of documentation is insufficient to raise an inference that an unlawful discriminatory animus motivated DLES in its employment decisions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2754 Petitioner: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 4. Rejected as being unnecessary. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 10. Rejected as being unnecessary. 11. Rejected as being cumulative. 12. Rejected as being unnecessary. 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 14-16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 17-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 20-21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 25. Rejected as being unnecessary. 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 27-28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. 29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 30-34. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 35-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 40. Rejected as being unnecessary. 41-44. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. 45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. 46. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. 47. Rejected as being unnecessary. 48-55. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. 56. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 57-59. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 60-61. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 62-63. Rejected as being unnecessary. 64-67. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 68. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 69. Rejected as being unnecessary. 70. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 71. Rejected as being unnecessary. 72-73. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 74-77. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 78. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 79-81. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 82. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 83-84. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 85-87. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 88. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 89-90. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 91-92. Covered in preliminary statement. Rejected as being unnecessary. Covered in preliminary statement. Rejected as being unnecessary. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence. 97-98. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 3-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5-7. Partially accepted in findings of fact 18 and 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the unused part has been rejected as being unnecessary to reach a resolution of the issues, irrelevant, cumulative, subordinate, not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. Minnick, Esquire Pamela H. Page, Esquire Post Office Box 11127 Tallahassee, FL 32302-3127 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Andrea Bateman, is a female. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Bateman was 41 or 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman is an attorney. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was a member of The Florida Bar during the period of time at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. Ms. Bateman's Employment by the Department. In October of 1990, the Department employed Ms. Bateman as an attorney in the Department's Office of Child Support Enforcement. Ms. Bateman was required to be a member of The Florida Bar. Ms. Bateman's position with the Department was classified as a "Select Exempt Service" position. Pursuant to Chapter 22SE-1.002(5), Florida Administrative Code, and Part V, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, persons employed in select exempt service positions may be terminated from employment without cause. Ms. Bateman's immediate supervisor was Chriss Walker. Mr. Walker is a Senior Attorney with the Department and, at the time Ms. Bateman was hired, also served as the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement. As of December 4, 1991, the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement, and Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor was Anne F. Donovan. At all times relevant to this proceeding, William H. Bentley was an Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Department with supervisory authority over the Department's Assistant Secretary's, including Mr. Walker and Ms. Donovan. "Productivity Enhancement" at the Department. During 1991, the Department was required to evaluate all employment positions at the Department and to reduce those positions in an effort to improve the productivity of the Department. Generally, all positions at the Department and the work performed by the persons filling those positions were considered and decisions were made as to which positions could be eliminated. The Department referred to the elimination of positions as "red-lining". The Department also made efforts to insure that any person affected by the elimination of their position would be placed in another position. Ms. Bateman's attorney position with Child Support Enforcement was identified for elimination. Another attorney position in Child Support Enforcement and Mr. Walker's Senior Attorney position were not identified for elimination. The decision to eliminate one of the attorney positions was based upon conclusion that the administrative duties of the two attorney positions could be handled by a paralegal position and the legal duties could then be handled by one attorney. Efforts to assist Ms. Bateman to find another position were not successful. Ultimately, the Department decided to find a position in which to continue to employ Ms. Bateman rather than to terminate her position and release her. The Department reclassified another vacant position so that Ms. Bateman could continue to be employed as an attorney for Child Support Enforcement. Mr. Walker was directed to create an attorney position for Ms. Bateman by the Assistant Secretary for Human Services. This decision was made during the early Fall of 1991. The Department's decision to continue to employ Ms. Bateman was based in part on the Department's concern about terminating an employee of the Department. The evidence failed to prove that the Department acted unreasonably with regard to the red-lining of Ms. Bateman's position. Ms. Bateman's Performance. During the year after Ms. Bateman began her employment with the Department, Mr. Walker, Ms. Bateman's supervisor, began to develop concerns about the adequacy of her work product. Ms. Bateman also began to evidence behavior which was not acceptable for an attorney of the Department. As a result of Ms. Bateman's odd behavior, Mr. Walker became concerned about Ms. Bateman's mental well-being. Mr. Walker memorialized his concerns about Ms. Bateman in a memorandum to Mr. Bentley dated December 2, 1991. The memorandum was revised December 19, 1991 to eliminate references to a counselor that Ms. Bateman had informed Mr. Walker she was seeing. Ms. Bateman's work deteriorated to an extent which necessitated other employees carrying out some of her duties. Among the difficulties experienced with Ms. Bateman which formed a reasonable basis for terminating her employment were the following: Ms. Bateman had difficulty communicating with other employees and her supervisor. As an attorney, Ms. Bateman was required to communicate orally and in writing. She was unable to do so in an adequate manner. Ms. Bateman failed to demonstrate good judgment and trustworthiness and, therefore, her supervisors were unable to rely upon her judgment as an attorney of the Department. Ms. Bateman's appearance was unacceptable for an employee of the Department who was required to meet and communicate with the public. Ms. Bateman's hair was unkempt and dirty, her clothes were often soiled and wrinkled, she failed to brush her teeth and she appeared not to be bathing based upon her appearance and her strong body odor. Although required to do so by Department policy, Ms. Bateman refused to give her supervisor a permanent home address or phone number. On one occasion Ms. Bateman was found asleep in the offices of the Department at night and on one occasion she was found asleep during working hours. Based upon the inadequacy of Ms. Bateman's performance, the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment. Mr. Walker's Evaluation of Ms. Bateman. On December 18, 1991, Mr. Walker presented Ms. Bateman with a Professional Employee Performance Appraisal form he had completed on her performance. The Appraisal was reviewed by Ms. Bateman and signed by her on December 18, 1991. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance a rating of "effective" on the Appraisal. Of the factors evaluated on the Appraisal, Mr. Walker judged Ms. Bateman's performance as "excellent" on one factor, "effective" on eleven factors and "needs improvement" on nine factors. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance an "effective" rating despite his conclusion that her work product was not acceptable and despite his concerns about her inappropriate behavior. He did so because he had recently been directed to create a position to keep Ms. Bateman as an employee of the Department and in an effort to avoid litigation over Ms. Bateman's termination. Mr. Walker did not believe that his supervisors wanted to avoid any difficulties concerning Ms. Bateman employment. Mr. Walker failed to follow Department procedure in presenting the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman. The Appraisal was required to be reviewed and approved by Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor, Ms. Donovan, before it was given to Ms. Bateman. Mr. Walker, contrary to Department policy, presented the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman before Ms. Donovan had seen and approved it. Ms. Donovan was aware of the problems with Ms. Bateman's performance and would not have approved an "effective" rating. Upon receiving the Appraisal, Ms. Donovan discussed the Appraisal with Mr. Walker and rejected it, as it was her right to do. Ms. Donovan, consistent with Department policy, specified that Ms. Bateman would be evaluated again in sixty days. The Department's Request that Ms. Bateman Undergo a Psychological Evaluation. Although the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment by the end of 1991 and in early 1992, the Department decided to attempt to discover the cause of Ms. Bateman's decline in performance and the onset of her odd behavior rather than terminate her employment. The Department made this decision in an effort to determine what assistance Ms. Bateman might need. Ultimately, the Department was attempting to determine what work, if any, Ms. Bateman was capable of performing. The Department's decision was based upon a number of incidents involving Ms. Bateman. Those incidents are included in Mr. Walker's Chronology of December 2, 1991 and his Revised Chronology of December 19, 1991 and are hereby incorporated herein. Although not all the incidents described in the chronologies were proved during the final hearing to have occurred, the Department's consideration of the incidents reported by Mr. Walker was reasonable. Due to the Department's concerns about Ms. Bateman, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman voluntarily participate in the Department's employee assistance program. Ms. Bateman refused. In order to determine what could be done to help Ms. Bateman, and to determine what duties and responsibilities she was capable of performing, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological, or other, evaluation. Ms. Bateman refused. After discussing the matter with Ms. Bateman and legal counsel she had retained, the Department notified Ms. Bateman that her continued employment was conditioned upon her undergoing a psychological evaluation or some other evaluation which would allow the Department to determine what work she was capable of performing. In a letter of February 12, 1992, Ms. Bateman, through her representative, was informed of the following: As you also know, we are attempting to help Andrea address a problem which we believe exists and has been well documented over the past 16 months. In return, we need Andrea's help and cooperation. If Andrea chooses to agree to our request that she undergo a psychiatric evaluation and authorize the release to us of the psychiatrist's prognosis, diagnosis and recommendation for treatment, we will be glad to schedule an appointment for her with a psychiatrist, and will pay for such an evaluation. We will use the evaluation to determine an appropriate course of action. Ms. Bateman's Termination from Employment. Ms. Bateman continued to refuse to undergo any evaluation or to suggest any alternative course of action. Consequently, based upon Ms. Bateman's inadequate and unacceptable work performance, the Department terminated Ms. Bateman's employment with the Department on or about February 13, 1992. Ms. Bateman's termination from employment was effective February 28, 1992. Ms. Bateman was terminated from employment due to the fact that she was not adequately performing her job and she refused to cooperate with the Department to find out what could be done to help her become an effective employee. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department's reason for terminating her employment was a pretext. Ms. Bateman's Charge of Discrimination. On or about September 15, 1992, Ms. Bateman filed a Charge of Discrimination against the Department with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Bateman alleged that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and a perceived handicap. On February 10, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Ms. Bateman filed a Request for Redetermination on March 4, 1992. On April 12, 1993, the Commission issued a "Redetermination: No Cause" affirming its decision. On May 12, 1993, Ms. Bateman filed a Petition for Relief seeking a formal administrative hearing. In the petition Ms. Bateman alleged that the Department had discriminated against her on the basis of sex, a perceived handicap and, for the first time, age. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Ms. Bateman. Alleged Sex Discrimination. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any action of the Department was based upon Ms. Bateman's sex: she was not held to any standard or requirement based upon her sex, she was not terminated because of her sex and the Department's efforts to determine the cause of Ms. Bateman's problems was not based upon her sex. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any Department policy or standard had a disparate impact on female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a male attorney. Ms. Bateman's grooming habits were discussed with her. Some of those discussions concerned the wearing of panty hose and her makeup. It must be inferred that such discussions were not carried on with male employees. The evidence, however, failed to prove that Ms. Bateman's termination was based upon these matters. Although grooming played a part in the decision to terminate Ms. Bateman's employment, it was grooming related to basic cleanliness and neat appearance required of all employees and not just female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, female. Alleged Age Discrimination. At the time that Ms. Bateman was hired she was 41 years of age, and at the time she was terminated she was 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that age played any part in her treatment by the Department. This finding is supported, in part, by the fact that the difference between Ms. Bateman's age when she was hired and when she was terminated was only one year. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a younger person. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the persons who made the decision to terminate her employment were aware of her age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her age. Alleged Perceived Handicap. The Department did believe that Ms. Bateman was suffering from some mental problem. This belief was based upon Ms. Bateman's odd behavior and a concern that Ms. Bateman was "homeless". It was for this reason that the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological evaluation. Ms. Bateman failed to prove, however, that the Department treated her differently from the manner other employees of the Department were treated under similar circumstances. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department's request that she undergo a psychological or other evaluation to determine how to assist her to meet the requirements of her employment was made for a discriminatory reason. Under the circumstances, the Department's request of Ms. Bateman was reasonable. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that she was terminated from employment because of any perceived handicap. The evidence proved that she was in fact terminated from employment due to her inability to satisfactorily carry out her job responsibilities. Ms. Bateman also failed to allege or prove that she has a handicap based upon her mental condition. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of a handicap or a perceived handicap.
The Issue Whether or not Respondent, Seminole County Public Schools, discriminated against Petitioner, Juanita O. Jones, in employment by reason of race, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, and documentary evidence, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a black female, who has been employed by Respondent since 1991. She has served Respondent as an Executive Secretary, Elementary Education; Executive Secretary to the Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent; and a Technical Assistant, Media Center, Sanford Middle School. Prior to her employment by Respondent, Petitioner was employed as a word processing systems operator by the Florida Department of Corrections. In late 1999 or early 2000, Petitioner applied for the advertised position of Specialist, Applications Software. Respondent had advertised three separate Specialist, Applications Software, position vacancies during a two-month period. Although interviewed for the vacancies for the first two positions, Petitioner was not selected for the first two advertised vacancies. Petitioner does not contend that her non- selection for the first two positions was a result of unlawful discrimination. Applicants for the three Specialist, Applications Software, positions were interviewed by a two-person panel: Regina Klaers and John Davis. Ms. Klaers is Supervisor, Student Support; Mr. Davis is Manager, Student Support and Information Services. These individuals supervised the Specialist, Applications Software, position and were intimately familiar with the job requirements. Thirteen individuals applied for the third Specialist, Applications Software, position. Of the thirteen, ten met the minimum qualifications. Three applicants were interviewed. Applicants who had been previously interviewed, Petitioner among them, were not interviewed an additional time as the interviewers felt they had sufficient knowledge from the previous interviews. Petitioner had been interviewed twice previously. The interviews focused on three areas: (1) school- based experience with student data; (2) customer service experience; and (3) "people skills." These were critical areas for the position. The interviews were particularly important in assessing an applicant's "people skills." It was the opinion of the interviewers that one applicant's qualifications in these critical areas exceeded the other applicants', including Petitioner's. Based on the interviews, Elizabeth Jean Smith, a white female, was selected for the position. Ms. Smith had significantly greater school-based "data-entry" experience with the student data systems, WANG and SASI, than did Petitioner. Immediately prior to being selected for the position in question, Ms. Smith's position was Clerk/Receptionist-Customer Service. Both interviewers agreed that Ms. Smith demonstrated better "people skills." Credible evidence supported the selection of Ms. Smith based on her extensive school-based experience with student data systems and her customer service experience. While "people skills" are less empirically quantifiable than the other critical areas of the interviewers' focus, nothing revealed during the final hearing led the undersigned to believe that Petitioner had better "people skills" than did the individual selected for the position. Respondent selected Elizabeth Jean Smith for the Specialist, Applications Software, position because she was more qualified for the position than other applicants, including Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ned N. Julian, Jr., Esquire Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Alberto E. Lugo-Janer, Esquire 3501 West Vine Street, Suite 281 Kissimmee, Florida 34741-4673 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of race or handicap in discharging him from employment on February 25, 1992; and whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner and other black employees in pay for similar jobs.
Findings Of Fact During the summer of 1988, Larry Jelks, a black male, approached Jerry Sikes, the Director of Public Works of Suwannee Country, seeking employment. Petitioner, Jelks, explained and Sikes was aware that Petitioner had significant experience as a welder. Several weeks later, Sikes contacted Jelks and offered him a job as a laborer. The Petitioner began work of August 16, 1988 with a starting pay of $5.00/hour in the position of laborer, an entry level, unskilled job classification. The Petitioner received a copy of the employer's regulations. On August 24, 1988, the Petitioner was promoted to Serviceman, and his pay increased to $6.00/hour. On October 12, 1988, Sikes hired Mr. Praley, a white male, as a welder, although his expertise was as a mechanic and Praley was subsequently assigned duties as a mechanic by Sikes. Praley was paid a starting salary of $6.50/hour. The welder/mechanic position was open when Jelks was hired. On November 24, 1988, Petitioner completed his 100 day probation and given his annual 5 percent raise, increasing his pay to $6.30/hour. Other black employees also had their pay raises delayed until after their probation was completed. White employees, including Praley, received their annual raises in the year of their initial employment, notwithstanding their probationary status. This discrepancy in treatment of employees was not explained by the County. On September 30, 1989, the Petitioner laterally transferred to the position of truck driver for the refuse collection service because he did not enjoy the work of a serviceman. One October 1, 1989, Petitioner received an annual raise of 4 percent, to $6.56/hour. Subsequently, the axle in Petitioner's truck broke, and when he was questioned about it, he asked for a transfer. On March 3, 1990, the Petitioner was transferred to a shop position in which he repaired rusted or damaged garbage bins (dumpsters), by welding new sides and bottoms on them. The sheets of steel which Petitioner welded on the bins were 6 feet by 12 feet in size and 1/16" thick, and weighed approximately 180 pounds. These sheets were generally cut into smaller pieces prior to being moved from the stack in which they were stored. These pieces of material had to be moved into position to be cut and welded. The bins were moved using backhoes and forklifts. The Petitioner was responsible for moving the pieces of sheet steel and using the equipment to move the bins. On March 17, 1990, the Petitioner received a 5 percent pay increase to $6.89/hour. On April 28, 1990, the Petitioner received a 5 percent raise to $7.24/hour. On October 1, 1990, the Petitioner was given a 5 percent raise to $7.61/hour. In early 1991, the Petitioner's child became critically ill, and the Petitioner obtained leave to be with the child. In addition, Jerry Sikes approved flexibility in the Petitioner's scheduling to permit him be with the child conditioned upon Petitioner letting his supervisors know what he was doing and when he was going to be away from his job. Problems were encountered with Petitioner's attendance, and he was counseled about this and given a copy of the Country's leave policy. Generally, however, the Petitioner's performance was satisfactory, and he was considered a good and valued employee. On September 23, 1991, the Petitioner suffered a job- related injury, and was placed upon workers' compensation leave. The Petitioner received workers' compensation and disability benefits during his leave. During his absence the other employees performed his welding duties. While on leave, the Petitioner received a 3 percent pay increase to $7.84/hour. On November 25, 1991, Sikes wrote Petitioner a letter advising that he was required to submit doctor's notes concerning his absences while on workers compensation leave. On December 20, 1991, John B. Roberts, the County's workers' compensation (rehabilitation) consultant contacted Sikes and asked Sikes to identify an alternative position the duties of which the Petitioner could perform. Sikes advised Roberts that the County had no light duty jobs, but that driving a truck was one of the least physically demanding jobs in the County's maintenance department. He advised Roberts that he would assign the Petitioner to drive one of the light dump trucks if he returned to work. These trucks have an especially rough ride when operated off road, as these were. Roberts looked at the duties of the job, and determined that the Petitioner ought to be able to perform these duties. Roberts discussed returning to work and performing the duties of a truck driver with the Petitioner; however, the Petitioner advised Roberts that he wanted to talk with his attorney prior to returning to work. The Petitioner did not return and assume the duties of driving a truck in December as Roberts had arranged. On January 2, 1992, the Petitioner was sent a copy of a letter which was to Mr. Larry Sikes from Dr. Cason who had been treating Petitioner. The letter stated that the Petitioner was released from treatment to return to regular work activities as of January 2, 1992. On January 3, 1992, the Petitioner returned to work. He had a 4 percent permanent impairment, but his employer was not advised of this. His doctor advised the rehabilitation counselor that the Petitioner be placed on light duty because he would have to toughen up after returning to work. Sikes did not afford the Petitioner the opportunity to work back into the job. The Petitioner's work area was outside, behind the regular shop, exposed to the elements. It was very cold at the time the Petitioner returned to work. The Petitioner's production was low because he could not physically manhandle the large sheets of steel as he could prior to his injury. He asked that an inmate be assigned to work with him all the time, but assistance was denied to the Petitioner. The Petitioner asked for a backhoe, which he had previously modified, to move the bins and sheets around; however, this piece of equipment had been sent to the landfill. He was told to use a front end loader to do this work; however, he went to the landfill and retrieved the backhoe because he had difficulties climbing into the cab of the front end loader. His demands and getting the backhoe without permission created additional conflicts between the Petitioner and his supervisors. On January 8, 1992, Sikes issued the Petitioner a memo concerning his poor productivity and failure to follow the instructions of his supervisor. Prior to his injury, the Petitioner repaired approximately one bin per day. During the period after his return to work, he did approximately one bin every two to three days. When presented with the memorandum, the Petitioner advised that he was unable to do that which he had formerly done. The Petitioner was told that he was expected to do all his regular work. This motivated the Petitioner to return to the doctor and seek a clarification of what he could and could not do. In addition, Petitioner was also seeing a chiropractor regularly for treatment. Petitioner left work almost daily to see the doctor, and frequently did not return. He did not provide his employer with documentation of these visits. The Petitioner asked that an overhead chain hoist, similar to the one which was inside the shop area, be installed in his work area to move the sheets of steel to assist him. His direct supervisor, Mr. Horton, denied the request because it was expensive and required additional construction to support the mechanism. On January 13, 1992, the Petitioner received a second warning for being absent from work without notifying his supervisor. Sikes advised the Petitioner that he would have to comply with the County's personnel regulations which required prior notification and a note from the doctor. Although the Petitioner testified he was absent attending doctor's visits, he presented no other substantiation of these visits at the hearing. On January 22, 1992, the Petitioner submitted, as requested earlier, a report from Dr. James B. Slatery of Gainesville Orthopedic Group, advising that the Petitioner could return to work, but should avoid climbing and limit his lifting over 50 pounds to an occasional basis. A similar report was submitted by Dr. A. C. Bass. The metal sheets the Petitioner was lifting weighed over fifty pounds. The County failed to make accommodations for the Petitioner's physical problems upon his return to work in a manner it had for white employees. The county had placed recovering white employees in positions where they were flagmen, directed traffic, and in similar positions. The county placed the Petitioner back at his regular duties, stated it had no "light duty" positions, and demanded Petitioner perform all his duties to pre-injury standards of productivity. When the Petitioner asked for assistance in lifting the sheets of steel which were in excess of the weight allowance set by his doctor, the County told him to seek assistance from his coworkers, who were instructed to assist him. He had to wait until they finished with their immediate task, and they were less than happy about these interruptions, and going outside where the Petitioner worked. This slowed his production for which he received criticism from his supervisors. The conditions imposed by the employer were not so bad as to constitute a constructive discharge. However, had Petitioner filed an action at that time, he would have proven that he was treated differently than white employees who were accommodated for their physical problems when returning from workman's compensation leave. There was a verbal exchange between the Petitioner and one of his coworkers, Earnest Johns, arising out of their interactions in the shop. The Petitioner told Johns that he "would pass up a bus load of white girls, to make him (Johns) his bitch." Johns complained to Sikes about the Petitioner, and told Sikes, "he needed to do something about that Nigger." Sikes told Johns that he would take care of it and to calm down. Johns, who was very upset, subsequently apologized to Sikes for his confrontational manner in raising the matter with him. On January 25, 1992, Sikes sent the Petitioner another memo confirming a verbal warning about his poor work habits, wasting time, and absenteeism. On January 30, 1992, Sikes sent the Petitioner another memo regarding his poor work habits. In February, the Petitioner's wife, from whom he was separated, died, and he was granted three days bereavement leave for February 11-13, 1992. On February 18, 1992, the Petitioner called the shop and left word with a secretary that he would not be at work for the rest of that week. He did not submit a leave request for this period of time. Subsequently, the Petitioner was absent without permission from February 14 until February 24, 1992. The Petitioner did not obtain permission from his supervisors prior to taking this leave, did not request leave without pay, and did to explain his absence. Neither did his doctor, the rehabilitation counselor, his chiropractor, his attorney, or a member of his family or a friend report his absence and give any explanation. During this period, he appeared once at work to pick up his pay check on February 21, 1992. On this occasion the Petitioner did not address the matter of his absence with Sikes or Horton, although Horton advised he Petitioner that Sikes wanted to speak with him. The Petitioner had exhausted all of his sick and vacation leave prior to February 14, 1992. Under the County's rules, an employee had to request leave without pay after exhausting sick and annual leave, and the request had to be approved by the County Commission. The Petitioner did not make a request for leave without pay. Although the Petitioner asserts that he had not exhausted his sick leave because he was visiting the doctor during his absences which was covered by workers' compensation leave, he did not provide medical substantiation for the alleged treatments and doctors' visits as required by the employer's rules in order to obtain workers' compensation leave. On February 25, 1992, the Petitioner returned to work at starting time wearing work clothes. Horton stopped him on his way to his work area, and advised him that Sikes wanted to talk with him. Horton accompanied the Petitioner to Sikes office. Sikes asked the Petitioner were he had been, and the Petitioner answered that he had been attending to personal business. Sikes asked him for a more detailed explanation of his absence, and the Petitioner again told him that he had been tending to business and that Sikes should either fire him or get off his back. Sikes warned the Petitioner that unless he provided some explanation for his unauthorized absence, he would have to terminate him. The Petitioner refused to provide any additional explanation, but asked that his firing be put in writing. The Petitioner left the work place after the meeting, and did not return to work or attempt to explain his absences. Sikes viewed the Petitioner's absences and refusal to obey the personnel regulations as undermining his credibility as a supervisor. Several days after the confrontation on February 25, 1992, Sikes wrote a letter terminating the Petitioner for (1) continued or gross neglect of duty; (2) absence without leave; incompetence or unwillingness to render satisfactory service; insubordination; and (5) habitual absences, as provided in Parts X and XI of the County personnel regulations. Sikes extended special consideration to all employees of the department, who were permitted to take leave or be absent without applying for leave. The Petitioner was permitted to take leave without applying for it, and that considerable latitude was extended to the Petitioner regarding his absences prior to his being discharged. A white male, who was not handicapped, was hired on May 28, 1992 to file the position from which the Petitioner was discharged. The Petitioner appealed his discharge under the County's rules, and after an evidentiary hearing in which the Petitioner was represented by counsel, the county's hearing officer found that the dismissal was for cause in a Final Order dated September 24, 1992. Discrimination in Promotion and Pay among Blacks. The population and labor market statistics offered by the Petitioner in support of his contention that Blacks were discriminated against in promotion fail to support the proposition for which they were offered. For example, the Petitioner limits the labor pool to those persons who are over 16 and worked in 1989. However, there are those persons who are over 16 and would like to work, but who have not been hired. If the Petitioner's contention is correct, one would expect that for every white employee hired, there was a black applicant who was not hired. Therefore, comparisons based upon persons actually hired understate the percentage of Blacks in the labor pool. The relevant labor market for this dispute is Suwannee County, Florida, and the relevant labor pool are those people over 16 years of age who are now seeking, or who have in the past sought employment. According to the 1990 census, 14.7 percent of the population of the County is black. Blacks constitute 13.8 percent of the County's employees. The work environment was not overtly racist, and while, as stated above, racially charged verbal barbs were occasionally exchanged, there is no evidence that this was common or tolerated by the employer. The best evidence of discrimination by the employer were the actual practices engaged in by the County. During the 12 years prior to the termination of the Petitioner, the County had never had a Black supervisor. From 1989 to September 23, 1992, the County hired one black employee of 30 employees who it hired. Its top 10 highest paid employees were all white. The highest paid black was the forty-first highest paid employee of the County. Kevin Praley was placed in a welder's position despite the fact he was a mechanic at $6.50/hour; and Petitioner, who was a professional welder, was hired as a laborer at $5.00/hour in 1988. At the time Praley was hired, the Petitioner was making $6.00/hour, so that the differential between their pay was $.50/hour in 1988. After four years, Praley, who was hired after the Petitioner, was paid $2.01/hour more than the Petitioner for work which Sikes and others said was similar. This reflects continuing discrimination in hiring and paying Blacks. Blacks were hired in the lowest paying, menial jobs within the county, and this was not on the basis of education. All of the county's custodial employees are black. Only one of the county's secretaries is black. Until very recently, there were no black supervisors in the county's maintenance department. Most of the County's increases in Black employment and promotions occurred after institution of this case. The Clerk of the Circuit Court/Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners has not published a salary discrimination review required by Section 28.34, Florida Statutes. Further, the County's Equal Opportunity Program of 1992 provided for annual assessment of its progress in equal opportunity. As of May 9,1994, the County and not compile an annual report pursuant to its plan. The County did not train Black employees to assume greater responsibility, and did not utilize them as heavy equipment operators until after the institution of this action. The county did not pay Jelks and other Black employees annual pay raises while they were on probation; however, it did pay white employees Praley, Hardin, Simmons, Mobley, Luanne Mixon, Tervola, and Brother annual pay raises while they were on probation. These white employees were all hired prior to or during the year the Petitioner was hired. Jelks received the raise at the end of his probation period on November 24, 1988. Helen Stoudermire, Mattie L. Weatherspoon, Tyrone Tillman, and Marvette Gwinn, all black employees of the Respondent, did not receive annual raises while in probationary status, contrary to the treatment afforded white employees. The amounts of their collective salary losses were not presented as a finding of fact. The county did discriminate against the Petitioner and other black employees in pay and promotion during the period 1989 until February 25, 1992.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission of Human Relations enter a Final Order directing that: The Petitioner's Petition for Relief relating to his discharge be dismissed; Black employees of the County be certified as a class for the period beginning August 1988 until the present; The County be ordered to cease and desist its discriminatory practices in pay and promotion against the class of black employees; The County's Clerk be ordered to file reports on salary differentials are required by statute; and Reasonable attorney's fees and costs be awarded to Petitioner's counsel. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1994. APPENDIX CASE NO. 93-5330 Both of the parties submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 2 Rejected as contrary to more credible facts. See Paragraph 41. Paragraph 3 True, but part of statement of case. Paragraph 4 Paragraph 11. Paragraph 5 Paragraph 1. Paragraph 6 Subsumed in Paragraph 11. Paragraph 7 Subsumed in Paragraphs 11 and 17. Paragraphs 8,9,10 Paragraph 44. Paragraph 11 Conclusion of Law Paragraph 12 Paragraph 57. Paragraph 13 Contrary to facts. The Petitioner returned to duty. Paragraph 14 Irrelevant. Paragraph 15 Paragraph 48 Paragraphs 16,17,18 Paragraph 51 Paragraph 19,20 Contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 21 Subsumed in paragraph 54. Paragraph 22 Paragraph 56. Paragraphs 23,24,25 Paragraphs 2,3,4,58,60 Paragraph 26 Paragraph 26. Paragraphs 27,28 Paragraph 42. Paragraphs 29,30 Subsumed in 2,3,52,53. Paragraph 31 Rejected because Jelks received the raise at the end of his probation period on November 24, 1988. His reduction in pay was $.30/hour for October and November, or 8 weeks X 40 hours X .30 = $96.00. Paragraph 32 County's claims were rejected on this point. Paragraph 33 Paragraph 18 Paragraph 34 The statistical record is rejected for lack of credibility because it considers averages of both groups compared when there are findings which show whites held higher paying jobs. Paragraph 35 Subsumed in paragraph 32. Paragraph 36 Subsumed in paragraph 54. Paragraph 37 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 38 Subsumed in Paragraphs 26,27. Paragraph 39 Paragraphs 29,30. Paragraph 40 Is not addressed specifically because it violated the HO's directions that findings be kept short, and address specific factual matters, and is mostly argument. Paragraph 41 Subsumed in Paragraph 17. Paragraph 42 Paragraph 20. Paragraph 43 The County did accommodate some whites. Paragraph 44 Rejected as contrary to best evidence. Paragraph 45 Paragraph 50. Paragraph 46 Subsumed in Paragraph 55. Paragraph 47 Rejected. Welder and mechanic were the same job description. Paragraph 48 Irrelevant. Paragraph 49 Rejected because "handicap" relates to permanent conditions, and his permanent handicap was only 4 percent. It was his temporary condition which impacted his ability to perform the work. Paragraph 50 Irrelevant. Paragraph 51,52 The name calling by employees, to include Johns, occurred in the context of an angry exchange with Sikes, who cautioned Johns to calm down. Johns subsequently apologized to Sikes, and neither were aware that his comments had been overheard by Jelks. Paragraph 53 Paragraph 51. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-5 Paragraphs 1-6 Paragraph 6 Subsumed in part in 1-6, and rejected in part as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraphs 7,8 Paragraph 6 & rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 9 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 10,11 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 12,13,14 Paragraph 9,10 Paragraph 15 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 16 Paragraph 49 Paragraphs 17-23 Paragraphs 11-17 Paragraph 24 Paragraph 21 Paragraph 25 Paragraph 19. Paragraphs 26,27 Irrelevant. Paragraph 28 Paragraph 25 Paragraph 29 Paragraph 17 Paragraph 30 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 31 Paragraph 28. Paragraph 32 Irrelevant. Paragraph 33 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 34 Paragraph 20. Paragraphs 35,36 Paragraph 19 & rejected as contrary to best evidence. Paragraph 37 Paragraph 23. Paragraph 38 Paragraph 24. Paragraph 39 Paragraph 25. Paragraph 40 Paragraph 31. Paragraph 41 Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 42 Paragraph 33. Paragraphs 43,44 Paragraph 32. Paragraph 45 Paragraph 35. Paragraph 46 Paragraph 36. Paragraph 47 Irrelevant. Paragraph 48 Subsumed in paragraphs above. Paragraph 49 Subsumed in Paragraph 33. Paragraph 50 Paragraph 35, best evidence. Paragraph 51 Paragraph 32. Paragraph 52 True, but part of law. Paragraph 53 Paragraph 34. Paragraphs 54-58 Paragraphs 37,38,40,41 Paragraph 59 Irrelevant. Paragraph 60 Duplicative. Paragraphs 61,62 Irrelevant. Paragraph 63 Rejected as contrary to most credible evidence. Paragraph 64 Paragraph 48. Paragraph 65 Subsumed in Paragraph 41. Paragraph 66 Subsumed in Paragraph 48. Paragraph 67 Irrelevant. Paragraph 68 The wage disparity was the result of hiring Blacks in the lowest paying jobs. Paragraph 69 Subsumed in Paragraph 54. Paragraph 70 Paragraph 50. Paragraph 71 See comments to Paragraph 68. Paragraphs 72-83 Subsumed in Paragraphs 54, 55. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Mattimore, Esquire Kimberly L. King, Esquire Suite 305 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Toby Buel, Esquire Three Rivers Legal Services 817 West Duval Street Lake City, FL 32055 C. Dean Lewis, Esquire Post Office Box 8 Live Oak, FL 32060 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice, to wit: constructively discharging Petitioner on the basis of handicap discrimination without reasonable accommodation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Lake County Sheriff's Office (LCSO), constitutes an "employer" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Chris Daniels took office as the elected Sheriff of Lake County, Florida, in January 2005. He had been with Respondent LCSO for 18 years. The sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer for Lake County; operates the Lake County Jail for the Board of County Commissioners; and manages security and bailiffs for the Lake County Courthouse. His responsibilities also include providing final approval for staffing levels at the Lake County Jail. In 2005, Petitioner had been employed as a detention officer at the Lake County Jail for 16 years. He is a certified corrections officer. Corrections/detention officers assigned to the inmate housing/security areas at the jail work 12-hour shifts from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. They are assigned to either "A," "B," "C," or "D" Squads. The squads rotate from day to night, and from night to day, shifts every four months. Officers assigned to inmate security are not normally assigned permanent shifts. Petitioner was such an officer. Working on rotating shifts is an essential function of working in the inmate housing area of the jail, as detailed in the job description for corrections officers as follows: . . . ensures a timely transmission of pertinent information and materials to other correctional personnel assigned to the same and/or the next shift. Petitioner understood at the beginning of his employment with LCSO that he was expected to work rotating shifts, and he did, in fact, work rotating shifts until 1996. Other corrections officers assigned to laundry, the jail kitchen, inmate transportation and other administrative functions permanently work days from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, without shift changes. Such positions with permanent day shifts have become available over the years. However, Petitioner last sought such a position in 1997 or 1998. Petitioner was working as a detention/corrections officer for Respondent when he was diagnosed with diabetes in 1996. Petitioner's diabetes causes tingling in his hands and feet, impotence, floaters in his eyes, dizziness, profuse sweating, frequent urination, a weakening immune system and occasional outbreaks of boils. Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 reveals that he takes multiple oral medications and that each kind of medication ideally should be taken at the same time of day, each day, but there are instructions on how to compensate if a dose is missed. With the exception of working rotating shifts, Petitioner was able at all times to perform the essential functions of a corrections officer for Respondent. The Veterans’ Administration pays Petitioner $218.00 per month because it believes his diabetes was induced by Agent Orange he encountered while in Viet Nam. At Petitioner's request, Respondent allowed Petitioner to work a permanent day shift from 1996 to June 30, 2005, when he retired. Petitioner testified he has worked in the past as a military medic and as a physician's assistant in correction facilities, so he is knowledgeable about the horrific, and sometimes fatal, effects of uncontrolled diabetes. Petitioner expected to live a normal life so long as he controlled his diabetes. Petitioner claims to have explained over the years to all his superiors that he needed to consistently take his medications at the same time of day. However, he did not offer any evidence in the present proceeding to explain why he could not take his medications consistently on a 24-hour clock, e.g. during nights, as opposed to during days. There have been periods when he experienced problems with his diabetes while working a permanent day shift. His medications have been adjusted several times since 1996. All witnesses agreed that Petitioner spent 18 months alone in a permanent day position in the third-floor control room. Petitioner claimed that he was assigned this long period of duty on the third-floor as “punishment” for being allowed to permanently work a day shift. He maintained, without any supporting evidence, that being assigned to a single position for more than a few months this way was unusual. However, although Respondent assigned Petitioner to the third-floor control room alone for a duration of 18 months, Respondent also assigned a non-diabetic employee alone there for about one year. Petitioner speculated, again without any supporting evidence, that the non-diabetic employee was also being punished for something. Both Petitioner and the non-diabetic employee experienced being confined to the control room without a restroom. Having to urinate when no other officer could stand- in for them created a hardship on both men. On one occasion, the non-diabetic employee urinated in a garbage can. At the date of hearing, Gary Borders had been with LCSO for 17 years and served as its Chief Deputy.1/ On the date of hearing, and at all times material, Chief Borders’ duties included responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the Lake County Jail and the Lake County Courthouse and for training. Petitioner claims to have frequently protested to many superiors about not having a restroom on the third-floor and not being allowed to bring food in for his diabetes. He also claimed to have specifically asked Chief Borders to be transferred from service on the third-floor, but Chief Borders did not recall more than one vague conversation concerning Petitioner’s complaint about how long Petitioner had been posted there and that he had told Petitioner he, Borders, had no problem with Petitioner’s being transferred elsewhere in the jail. It is not clear when, precisely, this 18 month-period occurred. Because Petitioner was on a permanent day shift from 1996-1997 to 2005 (eight years), and Petitioner testified his 18-month posting on the third-floor was "over" and was from 2003-2005, his time on the third-floor was not affirmatively shown to have occurred within the 365 days immediately preceding the filing of his Charge of Discrimination with FCHR on December 8, 2005. When Sheriff Daniels took office in January 2005, Chief Borders advised him that because the date for the squads to rotate shifts (see Finding of Fact 4) was due to occur on May 1, 2005, the number of persons assigned to permanent shifts was affecting Chief Borders' ability to make assignments. When corrections officers working in inmate housing of the jail are assigned permanent shifts, staff shortages can occur on other shifts. Chief Borders further advised the new sheriff that he, Borders, was receiving additional requests for permanent shifts. While discussing why there were so many employees assigned permanent shifts, and not subject to the standard four months' rollover of the squads from day-to-night and night-to- day shifts, Sheriff Daniels and Chief Borders concluded that LCSO needed a formal method of differentiating between those employees who genuinely needed a permanent day or night shift and those employees who merely wanted a permanent shift assignment. To determine which employees needed a permanent shift as an accommodation for their specific condition or situation, Sheriff Daniels instructed Chief Borders to send a memorandum to the 12-14 employees assigned to permanent shifts, requiring those employees to provide medical evidence of their need for a permanent shift assignment. On March 25, 2005, Chief Borders sent all employees assigned to permanent shifts the following memorandum: There is a requirement for rotating shift work for Detention Deputies, Auxiliary Detention Deputies and Deputy Sheriffs at the Lake County Sheriff's Office. Please ask your physician to review the Job Description for Detention Deputy (or Auxiliary) and ask if you can perform all the job requirements. If you are cross- sworn, also have your physician review the Deputy Sheriff job description and ask if you can perform all of the job requirements for that position. When your job description(s) have been reviewed, bring your physician's letter and all related supporting material (diagnosis, prognosis, treatment notes, test results and any other documents that would assist the agency in evaluating your request) to me so that our agency physician can review them for possible accommodation. Because shift changes will take place on May 1, 2005, you must have your documents to me no later than 5:00 P.M. on Friday, April 15, 2005. If I do not hear back from you by Friday, April 15, 2005 at 5:00 P.M., I will take it that you are available for rotating shift work assignment. The process envisioned by the Sheriff and Chief was that when an employee, who wanted an accommodation, provided the requested information from his own treating physician, that employee's supervisor would pass the information along to LCSO's physician, and an interactive process would begin. As of the date of hearing, LCSO had employees working in modified jobs, including job sharing, and an accommodation had been made for a person in a wheelchair. In 2005, LCSO also fully intended to accommodate those employees who provided proof from their physicians of their need for other accommodations. Petitioner testified that he did not want to repeatedly roll over from day-to-night shifts every four months because past experience had taught him that each time his shift changed, it took him at least two weeks to properly regulate and space his intake of food, liquids, and medications, in such a way that his diabetes was controlled and he felt alert and capable. In response to receiving the March 25, 2005, memorandum, Petitioner presented Chief Borders with a note from Petitioner's primary physician, Dr. Gelin, written on a prescription pad, stating: brittle diabetic pt needs to work day shift only. Petitioner did not present any other written information in response to Respondent LCSO’s detailed request. Petitioner testified that he discussed Dr. Gelin’s note with Chief Borders to the extent that he told Borders that if anyone on behalf of LCSO phoned Dr. Gelin, Dr. Gelin would discuss or fax further information to that person; Chief Borders does not recall this conversation. Chief Borders is a diabetic himself, but he had never heard the term, "brittle diabetic." It is Petitioner's position that because, in Dr. Gelin's private conversations with Petitioner, Dr. Gelin had told Petitioner that “any doctor” should know the sequelae and effects of "brittle diabetes," all Petitioner’s LCSO superiors needed to do was pass on Dr. Gelin’s prescription note to LCSO’s consulting physician in order for Petitioner to be accommodated. Petitioner believed it was his superiors' duty to make Dr. Gelin submit the written materials they wanted. Sheriff Daniels generally distrusted the information that physicians submitted on prescription pads, because, in his experience, when the employee or physician was pressed for details, there was often no supporting information forthcoming. Therefore, he did not believe the information on Petitioner's prescription slip, as described to him by Chief Borders, was sufficient to begin the interactive process with LCSO’s Human Resources Department or its consulting physician. Neither Sheriff Daniels nor Chief Borders presented Petitioner's prescription slip to them. It was decided between the Sheriff and the Chief, that Chief Borders would try to get more detailed information from Petitioner. Petitioner testified that he tried to get more information from his primary physician, Dr. Gelin, but Dr. Gelin would not provide in writing the detailed information requested by LCSO’s March 25, 2005, memorandum. On April 22, 2005, Chief Borders wrote Petitioner that Dr. Gelin's prescription pad note was insufficient and that Petitioner would not be reassigned to a permanent day shift position, stating: I have reviewed the information provided by your physician and find there is insufficient evidence presented to justify a permanent shift assignment. As such, your request is denied. You will rotate day/nights with your assigned shift during the normal rotation. None of the 12-14 employees assigned to permanent shifts, had submitted the requested information, so all of them, including Petitioner, were assigned to a rotating shift. The Sheriff and Chief received no report of complaints from any employee. However, on April 26, 2005, Petitioner received a memo stating that effective May 4, 2005, he would be assigned to "C" squad. "A" Squad, where Petitioner was then assigned, was scheduled to rotate from day shift to night shift on May 1, 2005, and "C" Squad was due to rotate from the night shift to the day shift on the same date. Accordingly, LCSO’s purpose in transferring Petitioner to “C” Squad was to provide him with four more months (until September 1, 2005) to obtain the required medical opinion and detailed supporting documentation from his treating physician. The "A" to "C" Squad change also would have allowed Petitioner to remain on a day shift, without interruption, and allow him an additional four months in which to gather medical information from any appropriate source to support his request to indefinitely remain on a permanent day shift. In fact, Petitioner was regularly seeing Dr. Flores, at the Veterans’ Administration, as well as Dr. Gelin. Dr. Flores coordinated oversight of Petitioner's medical condition with Dr. Gelin, who is Petitioner's private physician. However, Petitioner did not approach Dr. Flores, and he did not go back to Dr. Gelin, until after Petitioner retired. Petitioner had hoped to work another six years before retiring, but on May 13, 2005, while still assigned to the day shift, Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation, hoping that someone in his chain of command would try to talk him out of leaving. He expected his supervisors to "workout" a permanent day shift for him, instead of permitting him to retire.2/ Petitioner's resignation letter stated: Regrettable [sic] I am submitting my letter of resignation effective June 30, 2005. Your recent decision denying me permission to remain on the day shift in spite of my doctor's recommendation to remain on the day shift because of my medical condition (brittle diabetic) has forced me to retire earlier than I had planned to. There is no other way that I can regulate my medication switching from days to nights . . . Respondent never required Petitioner to work the night shift, and he never did work the night shift after 1996-1997. Petitioner gave notice of his retirement in May 2005, rather than work in "C" Squad on the day shift until September 1, 2005, or continue to try to obtain additional medical information that would allow him to indefinitely remain on a permanent day shift. Petitioner elected to retire effective June 30, 2005, because, upon advice of “Retirement” he believed it was more financially beneficial for him to retire in June 2005, rather than wait until January 2006.3/ Since January 1, 2006, Petitioner has been employed managing real property in Florida and Costa Rica. Petitioner testified that when he retired, he could perform all the duties required by his detention/corrections officer job description, and perhaps other duties as well, except for the rotating shifts. He believes, but offered no supporting documentation, that rotating shifts are counter- productive and are on their way out in most jails. He further testified that he could probably even work the rotating shifts required by this employer but he believed that to do so would have put him in a health crisis due to his diabetes and multiple medications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner filed his complaint against Respondent for race discrimination more than 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10(10), Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact The parties' Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Material Facts constitute the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Floyd Peacock, Jr., a black male, was hired by the Respondent, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., on August 22, 1980. The Petitioner was initially hired and employed by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic at the hire (entry) level. On August 22, 1980, James Coleman, a white male, was hired by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic. On August 25, 1980, Elvin Higgins, a white male, was hired by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic at the second year step level. The Respondent has had two means of filling the vacancies that arose in the plant. First, whenever someone left the Respondent's employ due to retirement, a voluntary discharge, or involuntary termination, that vacancy would be posted on a job board on the Respondent's premises. Employees wishing to transfer to the department where the vacancy arose were then allowed to apply, or bid, for the posted vacancy. Bids are awarded based upon job skills and seniority. For positions within the operations department, seniority is determined by the amount of time the employee had with the company. For maintenance positions, seniority is determined by the amount of time the employee had with the maintenance department. The second method used by the Respondent to fill vacancies was a "back- fill" procedure. When an employee's bid was awarded and that employee then transferred to another department, the vacancy created in the transferring employee's department was "back-filled" with a new hire from outside of the company. Additionally, a position that was opened for bids but not bid upon was also back-filled with new hires from outside of the company. In 1982, the Petitioner, whose pay level as a mechanic with the Respondent was at the "second step/year level," became interested in a three- year position in the ammonia methanol area and inquired about bidding for the job. He was told by the personnel manager, Laura Finn, that since he was at the two-year level, he did not qualify for the three-year position. The Petitioner did not bid for the job. Two white males, Roy Mony and Clayton Perry, who were previously employed as mechanics with Carroll Construction, as had the Petitioner, were hired at the "third step/year level" and placed in the two "third step/year level" mechanics jobs. The Petitioner filed no charge or complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission concerning his not bidding for the "three step/year level" mechanics position or the hiring and assigning of the two white males "three-step" mechanics to those positions in 1982. At the time of his "fifth-year step" mechanic's interview in 1985 for obtaining his "five year/step" pay increase, the Petitioner confirmed with his supervisor that James Coleman had been made senior mechanic and had been advanced to the "senior mechanic" pay level. The Petitioner was given a "fifth year/step" mechanic's pay increase. Soon after the 1985 pay increase interview, the Petitioner went to the Respondent's Personnel Department with his supervisor to inquire about why James Coleman had been made a senior mechanic before the Petitioner. When the personnel manager was unable to provide the reason, the Petitioner talked with a staff member of the Escambia-Santa Rosa Human Relations Commission about his being given a "fifth year/step" mechanic's pay increase while James Coleman received a senior mechanic's title and pay increase. However, the Petitioner did not file any complaint with that agency or with the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. In June, 1986, the Respondent had a reduction in force (RIF) that resulted in some employees' employment being terminated and other employees being reassigned to other lower level and lower paying jobs. The following actions were taken as part of the RIF process in June, 1986: Maintenance mechanics hired prior to June 10, 1977, continued in their positions. Maintenance mechanics hired after June 20, 1977, but before the Petitioner's date of hire of August 22, 1980, were assigned permanent operator positions. Fifteen or sixteen maintenance mechanics who had been hired on or after the Petitioner's date of hire were placed in a temporary job position designated as "utility operators." Among the mechanics retained in the employ of the Respondent but assigned as utility operators was Elvin Higgins, a white male senior mechanic, and the Petitioner. The remaining mechanics were discharged as a result of the RIF in June, 1986. Among the mechanics who were discharged at that time were Roy Mony and Clayton Perry, whose hiring dates were after the Petitioner's date of hire. The utility operator position was a new, temporary position created in response to the RIF. In lieu of being discharged, fifteen employees, including Petitioner, were placed in the utility operator position. Utility operators worked at reduced pay, performing work previously accomplished by independent contractors. As vacancies arose in other departments of the company, one by one, each of the utility operators were to fill these vacancies until no one remained in the utility operator position. The respondent provided the utility operators with two means of transferring out of the utility operator position into a regular, higher paying position. First, utility operators were allowed to bid on any position that was subject to the Respondent's customary bid procedure. The second means that the utility operators had for leaving the utility operator position was through the assignment of a "back-fill" position. Instead of back-filling positions with new hires from outside of the company, as was the procedure before the RIF, utility operators were to be assigned to the back-fill positions. A utility operator would be back-filled into any vacancy that had been opened up for bids under the customary bid procedure, but on which no one had bid. Second, utility operators could be back-filled into a secondary vacancy created when another employee transferred from one position to another. The utility operators were to back-fill these non-bidded [sic] positions and secondary vacancies in order of seniority with the company (i.e., by date of hire). In June, 1986, when Elvin Higgins was reduced from senior mechanic to a utility operator because of the reduction in force (RIF), the Petitioner first became aware that Elvin Higgins had previously received senior mechanic status. On July 28, 1987, Aubry Garrett, one of the utility operators, used the normal bid procedure and successfully "bid-out" of the utility operator's position and took an operator's position. The Petitioner did not bid for this position. Between the time of the RIF in June, 1986, and the time the first back-fill position arose in September, 1987, the Respondent had not provided its employees with a finalized written or oral statement about how the back-fill positions would be administered after the RIF; however, during this period before the Petitioner refused the first back-fill position, when asked about this procedure by employees, Ernest Labadie, the personnel manager, told them that utility operators would be assigned back-fill positions in the order of the employees' length of service with the company. In September, 1987, two operator positions became available for utility operators to "back-fill" as secondary vacancies. The Petitioner, as the most senior utility operator based on date of hire, was offered one of the positions, but he refused the job because it was rotating shift work and he desired to work only "day hours" like he was working as a utility operator and had worked as a maintenance mechanic. Elvin Higgins and Gene Moore, the next senior utility operators based on date of hire, accepted the "back-fill" positions and were assigned those positions in early October, 1987. At the time of the Petitioner's refusal to "back-fill" and accept the available advancement to operator, the Petitioner was informed by Ernest Labadie, the personnel manager, that the Petitioner would be placed at the bottom of the list of the utility operators for future "back-filling" of jobs by utility operators. The Petitioner made no complaint to anyone or any agency about his being placed at the bottom of the list of utility operators for "back-filling" purposes in September, 1987, and believed at that time that his placement at the bottom of the list was fair and not discriminatory. Gary Kent is a white male who is senior the Petitioner both by date of hire and by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department. Before the reduction in force (RIF) in June, 1986, Mr. Kent was a mechanic, but as a result of the RIF, he was transferred to an operator's position in the amines area of the company. The amines job was not shift work. On November 24, 1987, Mr. Kent bid for an operator's position in the PVC area and received the job on December 8, 1987. His move to the PVC area from the amines area resulted in an operator vacancy (secondary vacancy) in the amines area that would be "back- filled" from the utility operators' list (i.e., without the need for bidding for the vacant position). On December 8, 1987, the vacant operator position in the amines area was "back-filled" by David Hart, who was the next utility operator on the "back- fill" list since the Petitioner was at the bottom of the list. The Petitioner became aware of this assignment, or surmised that the assignment of Mr. Hart to the amines area would occur, before the announcement of the assignment was posted and when he heard that Mr. Kent had bid for the PVC area operator position. In November or December, 1987, the Petitioner spoke with the personnel manager, Mr. Labadie, about the Petitioner's chances of getting the vacant amines area operator position that was to be "back-filled" since Gary Kent had bid for the PVC operator's position. The Petitioner was interested in this operator position because it was not a rotating shift job. The Petitioner was told that consistent with the personnel manger's discussions with the Petitioner in October, 1987, the Petitioner was not eligible to "back-fill" the position because he was at the bottom of the "back-fill" list. The Petitioner accepted the explanation and understood the policy and procedure for "back-filling." The Petitioner made no complaint to anyone about assigning the amines area operator's job to Mr. Hart instead of to the Petitioner. In January, 1988, Bruce Holiday, a white male who is senior to the Petitioner by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department and who has been working as an operator after the reduction in force, bid for and received on February 1, 1988, the assignment back into the maintenance mechanic. The Petitioner had bid for this position but has no complaint of racial discrimination about his not being awarded the position because Mr. Holiday was a senior to the Petitioner for the maintenance mechanic position by the amount of time in the maintenance department. In February, 1988, the Petitioner and the other two last remaining utility operators, Randy Mock and Lawrence Pearce, were assigned and "back- filled" to operator positions. The Petitioner made no complaint and has no complaint about this assignment. In November, 1988, Gary Kent, who was also senior to the Petitioner both by date of hire and by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department, bid for and received on November 20, 1988, an assignment back into the maintenance department as a maintenance mechanic, a position subject to the customary bidding procedures. The Petitioner had also bid for this position. The announcement of Mr. Kent's assignment was posted on the bulletin board for employees to see. The Petitioner became aware of the assignment of Mr. Kent to maintenance on or before the posting of the announcement on November 16, 1988. On or about November 16, 1988, the Petitioner discussed with Mr. Labadie, the personnel manager, Mr. Kent's bidding and being assigned into the maintenance department as a mechanic. The Petitioner complained that since Mr. Kent had previously bid and received the PVC position in December, 1987, Mr. Kent, in the Petitioner's view, had decided at that time that Mr. Kent did not want to go back into the maintenance department. Therefore, the Petitioner surmised that, even though Mr. Kent would later be the senior person eligible to be awarded a maintenance mechanic job if he had bid it, Mr. Kent should have been "placed at the bottom of the list" for purposes of bidding on any maintenance mechanic positions. The Petitioner asserted that this would be consistent with his being placed at the bottom of the "back-fill" list when he refused to accept the "back-fill" assignment in September or October, 1987. Mr. Labadie asserted in response to the Petitioner that there was nothing inconsistent since Mr. Kent's assignment was pursuant to and consistent with the Respondent's bidding procedures and policies for maintenance department positions which were in effect and used both before and after the RIF (and under which the Petitioner was allowed to bid and did bid for mechanic's positions); while the Petitioner's assignments from utility operator to the operator positions were governed by the "back-fill" procedure. The Petitioner personally did not agree with and did not accept this explanation, although he understood the two different procedures, and told Mr. Labadie that it was Petitioner's opinion that the bidding and "back-filling" should operate the same way. In January, 1989, the Petitioner again had a similar conversation with Mr. Labadie about Mr. Kent's bidding and being assigned a maintenance mechanic's job and the Petitioner's being put at the bottom of the "back-fill" list for assignment to operator positions. In late February, 1989, Ricky Cook and John Rink, both white males who are senior to the Petitioner by the amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department and who had been working as operators after the June, 1986 reduction in force, bid for and received assignments back into the maintenance department as mechanics. The Petitioner has no complaint, based on racial discrimination or otherwise, as to these assignments. The Petitioner's employment discrimination charge was filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on March 27, 1989, and filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 31, 1989. On or about March 29, 1989, the Petitioner bid for and received assignment to maintenance mechanic in the Respondent's maintenance department, along with Larry Perritt, who is a white male and who was a senior to the Petitioner by the amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department. The Petitioner was assigned the job on April 16, 1989, at the senior mechanic pay level. The Petitioner has no complaints about any of these assignments. The Petitioner received a pay increase at the "top level" of senior mechanic in October, 1989, after serving six (6) months in that position. In October, 1989, Elvin Higgins, after bidding for the position, was assigned to maintenance mechanic at the senior mechanic pay level.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's charges. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of June, 1995. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Johnson, Esq. Spriggs & Johnson W. College Ave. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ralph B. Peterson, Esq. Beggs & Lane P. O. Box 12950 Pensacola, FL 32576-2950 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esq. Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
