Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Arthritis Medical Center, Inc. (AMC), operated a facility at 901 Southeast 17th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. According to its business card, AMC provides a "Hormone Balance Treatment" to patients suffering from arthritis and uses a "medication" that "combines three separate hormones - glucocorticoid and the male and female sex hormones." The card represents that AMC collaborates with a "medical staff" and that its registered nurse administrator was one Donna Pinorsky. 2/ The card reflects also that AMC has a facility at 2025 Broadway, #19D, New York City. The parties have stipulated that respondent holds no licenses or permits from any state regulatory agency. Further, it has no pending application for any permit. Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), is charged with the responsibility of protecting the public health regarding commerce of drugs, devices and cosmetics. Through its pharmacy services program, HRS issues permits to those persons or establishments, other than pharmacies, who provide or sell legend drugs, devices or cosmetics to the public. Also, the agency inspects both permitted and unpermitted facilities that hold drugs, devices or cosmetics to ensure that adulterated, misbranded or unsanitary drugs are not dispensed to the public. To this end, HRS employs licensed pharmacists who make random, unannounced inspections of such facilities. This case arises out of two unsuccessful efforts by HRS inspectors to inspect respondent's facility. The inspections were prompted by HRS' receipt of a letter from the Department of Professional Regulation. The contents of the letter were not disclosed. On the afternoon of January 16, 1987, HRS inspectors Jones, Loudis and White, all licensed pharmacists, visited AMC's facility in Fort Lauderdale for the purpose of inspecting any legend drugs, devices or cosmetics that might be on the premises. They were met by Pinorsky, the facility's administrator. After identifying themselves, Pinorsky picked up a hand-held tape recorder and began taping the conversation. Pinorsky first acknowledged that a "Doctor Kline," whose sign was on the outside of the building, had offices at the facility but was not present. She also gave the inspectors an AMC business card which contained the information set forth in finding of fact 1. When the inspectors asked if any hormones were kept on the premises, Pinorsky responded by asking if the inspectors had a subpoena. After being told there was none, she read the inspectors the following statement: On advice of counsel, under the United States Supreme (Court) decision See's vs City of Seattle, Washington, I must decline to allow a search without a search warrant signed by a Judicial officer. And, if such warrant has been issued on advice of counsel I decline to consent to a search until a Court has ruled on a motion to quash under the Fourth & Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. My local attorney is Larry Altman Post Office Box 402404 Miami Beach, FL 33140 My general counsel is John Burgess 2000 Powell Street Suite 1680 Emoryville, CA 94608 The inspection ended at that point. Around 4:15 p.m. on March 13, 1987 Jones and Loudis returned to AMC's place of business for the purpose of conducting an inspection. They were met by one Kathy Bentley, a secretary, who was told the purpose of the visit. Bentley would not allow the inspection to be made because the "nurse" was not present. Pinorsky then entered the room carrying a "toddler." After putting the child down, Pinorsky immediately set up a tape recorder and began recording the conversation. After identifying themselves, the inspectors requested they be permitted to inspect the facility to ensure compliance with Chapter 499, Florida Statutes. Pinorsky denied their request saying there was ongoing "litigation" over their right to inspect the facility. The inspection ended at that point. Based upon the two unsuccessful efforts to inspect AMC's facility, an administrative complaint was issued by HRS in January, 1988. The complaint is the second administrative action taken against respondent. The first culminated in a Final Order issued on October 22, 1986 imposing a $500 fine on respondent for refusing to allow inspectors to inspect its facility on April 30, 1986. The inspectors had no search warrants to inspect AMC's facility nor had there been any finding of probable cause by a judge or magistrate that a statutory violation may have taken place on AMC's premises. Also, the inspectors did not know the precise nature of respondent's business or whether any drugs were actually kept on the premises. Indeed, Pinorsky never admitted that any were kept at the facility. The inspectors estimated that approximately forty percent of all inspections are on nonpermitted facilities. The inspections are made on a random basis or after the receipt of information from other agencies suggesting that one be made. In 1986-87, HRS inspected more than 350 health maintenance organizations, doctor's offices and medical centers as well as other establishments that hold drugs, devices and cosmetics. The basis for and criteria used in such inspections are set forth in a written HRS "operational guide." This document is not of record. Based upon (a) the representations in AMC's business card that it "treats" arthritis patients and that a "medication" is given to them, (b) the use of the term "medical center" in respondent's business name, and (c) the fact that a physician has offices at AMC's facility, it may be logically inferred that AMC is an establishment that holds or maintains drugs on its premises.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 499.005(6), Florida Statutes (1987), and Rule 10D-45.0545, Florida Administrative Code (1987), on two occasions and that it pay $5,000 for each violation, or a total of $10,000, said fine to be paid within 30 days from date of the Final Order rendered in this matter. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 1988.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent knowingly obtained or used, or endeavored to obtain or use, the property of another valued at $300 or more with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of the right to the property, or a benefit therefrom, or to appropriate the property to his own use, or to the use of any person not entitled thereto, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and other substantive and material evidence of record, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to this cause, Respondent was a certified Correctional Officer, having been certified on or about April 2, 1991, and issued Correctional Officer Certification No. 92406. On October 8, 2000, Respondent, in the company of two other persons, Steven Smith and Henry Fox, went to a business named "Four Star Refinish" located at 898 County Road 621, Lake Placid, Florida. David Trobaugh is the owner of Four Star Refinish and the compressor at issue in this proceeding. The building housing Four Star Refinish had been largely destroyed by fire before October 8, 2000, and the compressor, valued at more than $300, was located outside the building, undamaged. On October 8, 2000, at the business site of Four Star Refinish, Respondent, Steven Smith, and Henry Fox, agreed to take the compressor and together removed the compressor from the premises and transported it to the residence of Steven Smith. On October 12, 2000, Respondent gave a statement to Robert Neale, Highlands County Sheriff's Department, admitting that he, Steven Smith, and Henry Fox loaded the compressor onto a trailer and together transported it to Steven Smith's residence. Respondent, after his admission, assisted Deputy Neale in recovering the compressor by contacting Steven Smith by telephone, who then provided the location of the compressor. At the location provided by Steven Smith, the compressor was located and recovered by Deputy Neale, identified by the owner, David Trobaugh, and returned to him. Respondent, with knowledge of the unlawful taking of the compressor, with knowledge of the parties who unlawfully removed the compressor, and with knowledge of the compressor's whereabouts, concealed his participation in the aiding and abetting in the commission of a felony by Steven Smith and Henry Fox, when initially approached by law enforcement. As a direct result of the foregone and on April 1, 2001, in the case of State v. Jerry E. Lambert, the State Attorney entered a nolle prosequi, in Highlands County Circuit Court Case No. CF00-00685A-XX, under which Respondent was charged with one count of Grand Theft in Excess of $300, with the stated ground for the nolle prosequi listed as "Case Referred to CDS (Citizen Dispute Settlement). An Agreement was reached and restitution and fees paid." Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent, without permission of the owner and without legal right to obtain, did in fact obtain and remove an air compressor valued at more than $300 from the site location of the lawful owner. Respondent's admitted participation in the commission of a felony offense evidenced his intentional failure to maintain good moral character and proves his failure to maintain qualifications required of a certified correctional officer. Respondent offered no mitigating evidence.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order revoking Respondent's Correctional Officer Certification No. 92406. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry E. Lambert 126 East Royal Palm Avenue Lake Placid, Florida 33852 Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice, to wit: failure to accommodate Petitioner's handicap and termination of Petitioner, on the basis of handicap discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an adult African-American male. After retiring from the United States Army with an excellent reputation, Petitioner was hired by Respondent Department of Corrections. When Respondent hired Petitioner it was aware he had a 10 percent physical impairment, as assigned by the Veterans' Administration (VA). Petitioner completed 512 hours of training and was certified as a Correctional Officer, pursuant to the Florida Statutes. At all times material, he was a "vested" State career service employee. Petitioner sustained an on-the-job injury on February 11, 2003, while employed by Respondent. Apparently, Petitioner was adequately performing his job duties up through the date of his injury. Respondent Employer provided workers' compensation and medical benefits as required by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. These benefits were monitored by the State Risk Management Office within the Department of Insurance. The Employer instructed Petitioner not to return to work until he was medically released to return to work. Petitioner's injury was a torn medial meniscus (knee joint injury). He underwent collagen injections and lengthy physical therapy, but no surgery. His treating physician was Dr. Aguero. On July 21, 2003, Petitioner underwent a Functional Capacity Evaluation by a physical therapist. The report of this evaluation was typed up two days later and showed, in pertinent part, that: Mr. Brown demonstrated the capacity to sustain work tasks in the light strength category of physical demands. His . . . previous job was corrections officer. That job is estimated to be in the medium strength category. Known job duties of concern or particular relevance include: ability to move rapidly and to perform take- down and restraint procedures. Risk Management employees urged the treating physician to release Petitioner to return to work. On July 30, 2003, Dr. Aguero released Petitioner to return to work on light duty, with restrictions on standing, walking, and lifting. Presumably, Dr. Aguero believed Petitioner would be reassigned by the employer to appropriate light duty work until he reached maximum medical improvement from his knee injury. The Employer Department of Corrections, in fact, did assign Petitioner to "alternate duty" work when he returned to the correctional institution on or about July 30, 2003. Petitioner worked in the mail room for approximately three weeks thereafter. As of July 30, 2003, in addition to his 10 percent rating of permanent partial disability from the VA, Petitioner had gained a great deal of weight due to inactivity during the post-knee injury period. He also suffered from arthritis. On or about August 18, 2003, Dr. Aguero filled out a Workers' Compensation Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI) Form, designating that Petitioner had improved from his on-the-job injury as much as could be reasonably medically expected. As of that date, Dr. Aguero assigned him an additional two percent permanent partial disability rating, due to his on-the-job accident. The two percent rating carried continued work restrictions. Dr. Aguero provided the results of Petitioner's July 21, 2003, Functional Capacity Test score to the Employer (see Finding of Fact 6) attached to his MMI rating. Dr. Aguero's employment restrictions for Petitioner, post-MMI, as stated on the official MMI Form, say "See FCE," meaning that Dr. Aguero had adopted, as his restrictions on Petitioner, the functional abilities described in the July 21, 2003, Functional Capacity Evaluation Report. This meant that Petitioner was found by the physical therapist testing him to be unable to do these tasks on July 21, 2003, and the medical physician was saying for July 30, 2003, that Petitioner had achieved all the improvement he was going to achieve from the knee injury and he should not be required to do these activities on the job because he could not do them and trying to do them could be harmful to him. These restrictions included no extended periods of standing/walking, no balancing, and no significant lifting. Also, Petitioner was listed as being unable to lift 50 pounds, routinely. Essential Function A-4 of the Essential Functions of a Correctional Officer, which the Department of Corrections has adopted as its minimum standards for employment as a Correctional Officer, requires that a Correctional Officer be able to: Sit, walk, and stand for prolonged periods of time; stoop, squat, kneel, bend, run, and lift approximately 50 pounds on a routine basis. Within a day of receiving the MMI package, Petitioner's highest superior, the Warden, sent Petitioner home. Petitioner was subsequently provided a Predetermination Conference and a dismissal letter. Petitioner claimed to have begged to stay on in alternate duty positions, but neither he nor any of his local supervisors reported these requests for light duty or other accommodation of his permanent condition to the Employer's Americans With Disabilities Act Coordinator, Martie Taylor. It was not necessary under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, for Petitioner to do more than ask his supervisors for an accommodation, but Ms. Taylor testified that even if Petitioner's supervisors had properly relayed his requests for accommodation to her, she knew of no way the Employer could have accommodated Petitioner's lifting restrictions. Petitioner related that supervisors made comments to him that they needed a fully functional "soldier in the field" and that his obesity and inability to run and subdue prisoners rendered him not fully functional as a correctional officer. Petitioner believes that his large size is an asset in commanding and subduing inmates but that Respondent is prejudiced against his size. Petitioner testified that he knew of insulin-dependent diabetics and of other obese correctional officers who did very well at regular employment with the Employer and that he knew of other correctional officers whom the Employer had permitted to stay employed at light duty longer than he had been allowed to stay on light duty. However, Petitioner had no knowledge of whether these employees had reached MMI or of which essential requirements of the job of Correctional Officer they were able, or unable, to perform while they were on light duty. In fact, the Department of Correction's Procedure 208.10, covering "Career service employee's right to alternate duty assignments," reads, in pertinent part: SPECIFIC PROCEDURES COORDINATION OF ALTERNATE DUTY: . . . * * * (c) The department does not have specific alternate duty positions. The employee will remain in her/his current position while performing alternate duties. * * * Certified Officers: Individuals employed in a certified officer's position must be prepared and able at all times to perform the essential functions of his/her position. If approved for alternate duty, an employee in a certified officer's position will be temporarily assigned to non-certified officer duties for the period of time during which the employee is determined by the Division of Risk Management to have a temporary partial disability. * * * (8) MAXIMUM MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT (c) When maximum medical improvement has been determined by the treating physical and information has been provided to the Division of Risk Management, the employee will be reassigned the duties and responsibilities of her/his regular position unless the employee cannot perform the essential functions of the position. In no way will the employee be allowed to continue to perform alternate duties once the maximum medical improvement has been determined by the Division of Risk Management. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner pursued his employment rights before the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC). PERC's Final Order (January 8, 2004) on this matter determined as a factual finding that Petitioner could not perform the essential duties of a correctional officer and accepted the hearing officer's findings of fact. Brown v. Dept. of Corrections, 19 FCSR 9 (2004). More specifically, the PERC hearing officer found that "Brown received maximum medical improvement on July 30, 2003, with a two percent impairment," and that "the doctor indicated on the evaluation that Brown has work restrictions and he cannot perform the standing and walking requirements of a correctional officer." At hearing, Brown indicated that he cannot perform the duties of a correctional officer . . . . He also stated that he cannot run . . . . In sum, the Agency demonstrated that it is undisputed that Brown cannot perform the essential duties of a correctional officer." Since there were no appeals, the findings of fact of the PERC hearing officer between the same two parties are res judicata; are presumed correct, and are binding herein as a matter of law. Some findings also constituted admissions of Petitioner. Loss of employment has been very hard on Petitioner and his family. On September 11, 2003, Petitioner applied for a disabled person license plate, reciting that he was so ambulatory disabled that he could not walk 200 feet without stopping to rest, and that he is severely limited in his walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition. His treating physician signed this application, attesting to Petitioner's listed conditions. Petitioner's Answers to Respondent's Requests for Admission in the instant case concedes that he can perform jobs other than those of a correctional officer. Petitioner's testimony at hearing was to the effect that he still cannot perform all the duties of a correctional officer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and the Charge of Discrimination herein, and awarding no attorney's fees or costs to Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Horace Brown, Jr. 2012 Bradley Avenue Valdosta, Georgia 31602 Mark Simpson, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Anderson is a certified correctional officer, certified by Petitioner. Her certificate number is 190482. At the time of the incident at issue, Anderson was working for the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. On May 27, 2003, Patricia Johns (Johns) was in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Clewiston, Florida. Johns was taking groceries she had purchased from a shopping cart and placing them in her vehicle. She placed her sweater and her purse in a shopping cart while she was loading the groceries. Johns retrieved her sweater from the cart, but left her purse in the cart. She pushed the cart with the purse in it between her vehicle and another vehicle, got into her vehicle, and left the parking lot. A few seconds later Anderson pulled into Johns' parking space. Anderson's vehicle bumped the shopping cart, pushing it forward a couple of feet. She got out of her vehicle, went over to the cart, and removed the purse. Anderson, while wearing her correctional officer uniform, placed the purse in the backseat of her vehicle, took her son out of the vehicle, and went into Wal-Mart. She did not take the purse into Wal-Mart and attempt to locate the owner. The purse was a Tommy Hilfiger brand valued at $50. Inside the purse was a wallet with $18 in cash, a credit card, and blank checks. A cellular telephone valued at $350 was also in the purse. Anderson picked up some prescriptions at Wal-Mart, returned to her vehicle, and eventually returned home. She knew that the purse did not belong to her, but claimed that she was planning to turn the purse in at the police department the next day. Her claim that she was going to turn the purse into the police is not credible based on later actions. Sometime after she had returned home, she remembered she had put the purse in the back of her vehicle and asked her fiancé to get the purse. When he went to retrieve the purse, only the wallet remained minus the cash. During the time that Anderson left Wal-Mart and the time that her fiancé discovered that the purse, cash, and cellular telephone were missing, both Anderson and her fiancé had driven the vehicle while carrying other passengers. Anderson did not remove the purse, cash, and cellular telephone from the vehicle. She believes that one of the other passengers who had been riding in her vehicle on May 27, 2003, took the purse, cash, and cellular telephone. The next day, Anderson placed the wallet in a zip-lock plastic bag and dropped it in a drop box at the post office. She did not notify the owner of the purse that she had taken the purse from the Wal-Mart parking lot, and did not notify the police until later that she had taken the purse. Johns reported to the police that her purse had been stolen. An investigation ensued, and it was learned based on a video tape of the Wal-Mart parking lot on May 27, 2003, that Anderson had taken the purse. A police officer attempted to contact Anderson by telephone concerning the incident. On June 9, 2003, Anderson gave a taped interview to police officers, in which she admitted taking the purse out of the shopping cart and placing it in the backseat of her car. She was arrested for grand theft and released on the same day after posting a bond. An information for grand theft, a third degree felony, was entered against Anderson on August 13, 2003. She agreed to make restitution in the amount of $419, and a Notice of Nolle Prosequi was entered on December 5, 2003. As a result of the incident at issue, Anderson was dismissed from her position as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. She is sincerely sorry for her actions and has made restitution for the property taken.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lenora R. Anderson is not guilty of a violation of Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that she failed to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011; and imposing the following penalties as set forth in Subsection 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2003): issuance of a written reprimand and placement of Respondent on probation for two years under conditions as specified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based on retaliation for participation in a protected activity in violation of Chapter 760.10(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner (Holden) is an African-American female. At all times relevant to this petition, Holden was employed in a probationary status by the Florida Department of Corrections at Apalachee Correctional Institution (ACI) as a Correctional Officer. Probationary officers are not entitled to progressive discipline, but can be terminated for any reason. At the hearing, Holden withdrew her claims that the Department had discriminated against her based on her race and sex. On or about July 22, 2001, Captain Tullis Scipper responded to a call from the Medical Unit at ACI. Upon his arrival, he observed Officer Holden in front of the Suicide Watch Isolation Cell. She was cussing at the inmate with whom she had a previous confrontation. Scipper explained to her that she was not to argue or verbally abuse the inmate and that she should stay away from the cell. On at least one other occasion that night, Captain Scipper responded to the Medical Unit and observed similar actions by Holden. The next day, Captain Scipper received a call from Warden Adro Johnson, who inquired as to what had happened in the Medical Unit the night before. Warden Johnson had received a complaint from Nurse Carla Weeks that Officer Holden had been cussing the inmates and he was checking into the complaint. Warden Johnson asked Captain Scipper to bring Officer Holden to his office. The purpose of the meeting was not to ascertain whether Officer Holden had been cussing at inmates. The Warden had two eye-witness, staff accounts of her behavior. When confronted, she advised Warden Johnson that she had become angry and had cussed the inmate. Warden Johnson counseled Holden about her behavior. Warden Johnson testified that he felt that Holden was unreceptive to his counseling and that she was argumentative. He believed that she was not displaying the attitude that a good officer displays when he/she is being counseled by a warden. Holden also was upset and crying, and, as a result, Warden Johnson informed her that she needed to adjust her attitude and come back to see him the next day. Warden Johnson testified that he had not made up his mind as to what action he would take against Holden for her actions with the inmate. After the meeting with Warden Johnson, Captain Scipper observed Officers Holden and Shiver arguing with each other. Holden testified that she had asked Shiver about why her tour was changed, and this led to the incident observed by Scipper. In Scipper’s opinion, Holden was the “aggressor” because she continued to advance on Shiver, even though Shiver had his hands in the air and was stating words to the effect that he did not have anything to do with whatever they were arguing about. Knowing that Holden had just had a counseling session with the Warden, Scipper was surprised that Holden would almost immediately be involved in an altercation with a staff member. He relieved Holden of her duties for the rest of her scheduled shift. The next day Holden met as scheduled with Warden Johnson. Captain Scipper did not attend this meeting. Johnson had been informed of the previous day’s incident between Officers Holden and Shiver. He asked Holden if she was willing to change her attitude. He had not determined prior to the meeting if he would take any action at all against Holden. Johnson felt that Holden's response to him was disrespectful, and that she did not have the right attitude. Johnson terminated Holden based on what he perceived to be her poor attitude. He knew that Holden was approaching the end of her probationary status and that if he wanted to terminate her before she attained career service status with its attendant protections, he needed to do so at that time. Petitioner complained in an incident report filed before the Warden the first time that Captain Scipper refused to listen to her when he counseled her about a prior staff altercation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Holden 2103 Vista Road Marianna, Florida 32448 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Petitioner on the basis of an alleged violation of Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, by sleeping while on duty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent currently holds a Class "D" Security Officer License, Number D92-08606, issued pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, effective June 2, 1994. During September and October of 1994, Motivated Security provided security services to Shurgard Storage, located at 1650 West Oakland Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On September 30, 1994, the Respondent was employed as a security officer by Motivated Security. On that date the Respondent's assigned post with Motivated Security was at the Shurgard Storage premises described above. On that date, the Respondent was assigned to the 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. shift. At approximately 11:15 p.m. on September 30, 1994, while the Respondent was on duty at the post described above, the Respondent was sound asleep in a golf cart for a period of at least one-half hour.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case finding that the Respondent committed the violation charged in the Administrative Complaint and imposing a penalty consisting of a six-month suspension of the Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August 1995. APPENDIX The following are the specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner. Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted. Paragraphs 7 through 11: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. (All of these proposed details are essentially correct; it is simply not necessary to repeat them.) Findings submitted by Respondent. (None.) COPIES FURNISHED: Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Gerald Brown 3551 N.W. 41st Street Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33309 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a perceived disability and retaliated against her in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioner was employed by Respondent at the Liberty Correctional Institution (LCI). She was hired as a Correctional Officer in LCI's Security Department effective December 21, 1990. In February 1991, Petitioner was counseled regarding her failure to report for duty or to notify the institution of an intended absence. On April 1, 1996, Petitioner's supervisor counseled her regarding her failure to report to work in a timely manner. Petitioner had been tardy to work three times in March 1996. On May 30, 2001, Respondent counseled Petitioner regarding her excessive absenteeism. Petitioner had five unscheduled absences. Respondent promoted Petitioner to Correctional Officer Sergeant effective November 1, 2001. In October 24, 2003, Respondent gave Petitioner an oral reprimand for abuse of sick leave. Petitioner had developed a pattern of absenteeism in conjunction with her regular days off. In December 2004, Respondent gave Petitioner a written reprimand. The reprimand was based on Petitioner's failure to follow oral and/or written instruction, continued absenteeism, and abuse of sick leave. On July 7, 2007, Petitioner sustained an on-the-job injury. The injury was diagnosed as carpel tunnel syndrome. Petitioner underwent surgery for this condition in December 2007. On or about April 8, 2008, Petitioner reached statutory Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI). Petitioner had a Permanent Impairment Rating (PIR) of six percent. On April 15, 2008, a functional capacity evaluation revealed that Petitioner was able to perform light work with lifting restrictions. The restrictions prevented Petitioner from performing the essential functions of a Correctional Officer. Pursuant to policy, Respondent immediately conducted a job search. At that time, a Clerk Typist Specialist position was available at LCI. Petitioner was qualified to perform that job. She submitted an application for the position on or about June 5, 2008. In a letter dated June 10, 2008, Respondent offered Petitioner the Clerk Typist Specialist position in LCI's Classification Department. On June 26, 2008, Petitioner signed an Acknowledgement, accepting a voluntary demotion from Correctional Officer Sergeant to Clerk Typist Specialist and stating that she agreed to perform the duties of the new position to the best of her ability. Petitioner returned the Acknowledgement to Respondent. At the same time, Petitioner questioned whether she would be able to perform the duties of a Clerk Typist Specialist due to her carpel tunnel condition. In a letter dated June 27, 2008, Respondent requested that Petitioner take an essential functions form to a July 8, 2008, doctor's appointment. Respondent wanted the physician to complete the essential functions form and return it to Respondent by July 18, 2008. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine whether Petitioner was able to perform as a Clerk Typist Specialist. On or about July 24, 2008, Petitioner advised Respondent that she was going to have a nerve conduction test on July 30, 2008. She advised Respondent that she would provide the results to Respondent as soon as possible. In a letter dated August 20, 2008, Respondent advised Petitioner that, pending the results of a pre-determination conference, Petitioner could be dismissed from her employment as a Correctional Officer effective September 11, 2008. Respondent proposed this action because Petitioner had not provided Respondent with a doctor's report regarding Petitioner's ability to perform the essential functions of a Clerk Typist Specialist. A pre-determination conference was held on August 27, 2008. In a letter dated September 12, 2008, Warden Douglas advised Petitioner that she would not be dismissed because she had provided medical documentation of her ability to perform the position of a Clerk Typist Specialist. Petitioner began working in that capacity on September 19, 2008. In December 2008, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Respondent's Secretary, Walt McNeil. In the e-mail, Petitioner complained that Respondent had not returned her to work as a Correctional Officer Sergeant after being medically cleared to work in that capacity. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner had been medically released to work as a Correctional Officer in December 2008. Additionally, there is no evidence that Petitioner had made a request or filed an application to return to work as a Correctional Officer at that time. Respondent subsequently requested Petitioner's doctor to provide an updated opinion regarding Petitioner's ability to work as a Correctional Officer. On or about January 15, 2009, Petitioner's doctor approved Petitioner's return to work as a Correctional Officer with no restrictions. In a memorandum dated February 9, 2009, Respondent advised Petitioner that she was medically cleared to work as a Correctional Officer but that she would need to apply for openings. The memorandum stated that Petitioner had to be reprocessed as a Correctional Officer, including having a drug test and physical examination. The February 9, 2009, memorandum also reminded Petitioner that she would be required to serve another probationary period if she received an appointment as a Correctional Officer. There is no promotion track between the Security Department and the Classification Department. Petitioner applied for four Correctional Officer positions between February and May 2009. Two of the applications were for positions located at LCI. The third application was for a position at Calhoun Correctional Institution (CCI). The fourth application was for a position at Franklin Correctional Institution (FCI). On February 10, 2009, Warden Chris Douglas at LCI declined to interview or rehire Petitioner as a Correctional Officer for position number 7002037. Warden Douglas made this decision based on Petitioner's previous and current employment history showing attendance problems. Petitioner's testimony that she never applied for this position is not persuasive. Petitioner's application for a Correctional Officer position at FCI was never completely processed. In a letter dated April 9, 2009, Respondent advised Petitioner that she needed to provide additional information to support her application for employment in position number 70039564 at FCI. Petitioner did not respond to the request because she decided that she did not want to commute to work so far from her home. On April 23, 2009, Petitioner received her Performance Planning and Evaluation. Her direct supervisor, Kim Davis, Respondent's Classification Sentence Specialist, rated Petitioner as performing "Above Expectation" in all applicable categories. On April 30, 2009, Petitioner requested Warden Douglas to let her complete her mandatory firearm training because her weapons qualification was about to expire. Warden Douglas promptly responded that she could be scheduled to take the next firearms class. Petitioner re-qualified with specified weapons on May 11, 2009. On May 28, 2009, Petitioner was interviewed for a position as a Correctional Officer at LCI. She gave correct and appropriate answers to all questions during the interview. Even so, Warden Douglas decided not to hire Petitioner due to her past and current attendance problems. Warden Adro Johnson did not give Petitioner an interview for Correctional Officer position number 70041507 at CCI. He made his decision in July 2009 based on information indicating that Petitioner was already employed at LCI. In July 2009, Respondent's supervisor counseled Petitioner regarding her attendance. She had been absent for four unscheduled absences in the past 90 days. She had missed approximately 40 work days or eight weeks of work during the 11 months she was in the position of Clerk Typist specialist. On August 3, 2009, Petitioner filed her initial complaint with FCHR. Ms. Davis was the person who trained Petitioner as a Clerk Typist Specialist. Petitioner's job included filing documents related to approval or disapproval of inmate visitation. The original documents were sent to the inmates. Respondent was supposed to file copies of the documents in the inmates' classification files. During the time that Petitioner worked as a Clerk Typist Specialist, Ms. Davis had to counsel Petitioner approximately ten times regarding the filing of the inmate visitation documents. Ms. Davis stressed the importance of Petitioner completing her work and filing the documents in a timely manner. Additionally, Ms. Davis noted that Petitioner occasionally failed to properly file the documents. Petitioner was trained to remove duplicate copies of documents from inmate files. Duplicate copies of documents could be shredded. Petitioner was not instructed to shred the inmate visitation documents. If the documents were not legible, another copy was supposed to be made, using the copy machine to darken the print. Willie Brown is one of the Assistant Wardens at LCI. His office was close to Petitioner's work area. Assistant Warden Brown occasionally counseled Petitioner regarding the need to file the papers on her desk. On August 18, 2009, Assistant Warden Brown observed a large amount of paperwork that Petitioner had not filed. Once again, Assistant Warden Brown told Petitioner that she needed to file on a timely basis. He explained that Petitioner could file on the schedule she developed, but that it might be necessary to file everyday. Later on August 18, 2009, Heather Barfield, a Correctional Sentence Specialist, observed Petitioner feeding a large amount of paper into a shredder, causing the shredder to jam. Ms. Barfield subsequently attempted to clear the shredder jam and noticed that the papers belonged in the inmates' files. Ms. Barfield reported her observations to Assistant Warden Brown and Cynthia Swier, the Classification Supervisor. Assistant Warden Brown confirmed that the partially shredded documents were legible and should have been filed. Ms. Davis was informed about the shredding incident when she returned to work the following day. Ms. Davis verified that the shredded documents had been legible and were not duplicates of documents in the inmates' files. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner intentionally shredded the documents in order to clear her desk. Petitioner's testimony that she was shredding them because they were not legible is not credible and contrary to more persuasive evidence. On August 26, 2009, Respondent terminated Petitioner employment as a Clerk Typist Specialist. Because she was on probationary status, she had no appeal rights.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Gertrude Berrieum 5032 Martin Luther King Road Bristol, Florida 32321 Todd Evan Studley, Esquire 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Walter A. McNeil, Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kathleen Von Hoene, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, LP Ormond Beach, LLC d/b/a Signature Healthcare ("Signature") committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race by subjecting her to disciplinary procedures that were not applied to non-minority employees.
Findings Of Fact Signature is an employer as that term is defined in subsection 760.02(7). Signature is a provider of long-term nursing care in many markets in the United States. Signature operates the skilled-nursing facility in Ormond Beach that is the locus of this proceeding. Petitioner is a black female. On February 29, 2012, Petitioner was hired by Signature as a Certified Nursing Assistant (“CNA”). Petitioner’s job consisted of providing personal care to the residents of Signature’s Ormond Beach facility, including assisting the residents with their activities of daily living (“ADLs”). Signature terminated Petitioner’s employment in August 2013, when she failed to show up for work or call to notify her superiors that she would not be there. Petitioner did not contest the grounds of her dismissal in this proceeding. Petitioner’s complaint is limited to her allegations of disparate treatment on the job at Signature. At the time of her hiring, Petitioner was provided a copy of Signature’s “Stakeholder Handbook,” a document setting forth the company’s employment policies, including its anti- discrimination and anti-retaliation policies. The handbook sets forth Signature’s policies and procedures that prohibit, among other things, discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, national origin, or any other categories of persons protected by state or federal anti-discrimination laws. Prior to filing her Employment Complaint of Discrimination with FCHR, Petitioner never made a complaint of employment discrimination while working at Signature. Signature also has a written “Abuse, Neglect and Misappropriation Policy” (abbreviated herein as the “Abuse and Neglect Policy”). Petitioner received a copy of this policy during her orientation and raised no objection to any of its contents. The policy states that the facility will “immediately report and thoroughly investigate allegations of mistreatment, neglect, abuse, misappropriation of resident’s property or any injury of unknown origin.” The policy further states, “Employees accused of participating in alleged abuse will be immediately suspended until the findings of the investigation have been reviewed by the Administrator, Director of Nursing Services, and Human Resources Director.” Signature’s uniform practice is to suspend the accused employee without pay during the investigation. If the investigation discloses that the employee did not commit the alleged abuse, then the employee receives back pay for the period of the suspension. On September 27, 2012, Petitioner’s supervisor, Director of Nursing Judy Wade, issued a “Stakeholder Performance Improvement Plan” to Petitioner because of resident complaints. Ms. Wade wrote: You’ve had three residents complain of your care in the past five months. Complaints summarized as “less than gentle” care, that you told resident you couldn’t provide care because we didn’t have enough staff, sitting in resident room without resident’s permission, rudeness, and lack of assistance to residents in need.[2/] These complaints resulted in you being removed from providing care for these residents. Staff complaints summarized as: Not open to direction, makes excuses, confrontational, not a team player, and off the floor without informing nurse. Ms. Wade went on to outline Petitioner’s future expectations, which included providing care “in a timely, gentle and caring manner,” assisting co-workers and taking direction from superiors “in a positive, friendly manner,” and not leaving the floor without permission of the supervising nurse. The Performance Improvement Plan concluded with the statement, “If any expectation is not fully met your employment will be terminated.” Petitioner was not suspended pursuant to the Performance Improvement Plan because it addressed work performance issues, not “abuse” or “neglect” as defined by the Abuse and Neglect Policy. In late October 2012, Signature suspended Petitioner without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation into an incident in which a resident whom Petitioner had placed upright in a wheelchair, fell out of the wheelchair and was injured. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that she placed the resident in the wheelchair and saw the resident fall. Petitioner’s only contention is that a white co-worker, Claudia Dominique, was also present and witnessed the fall but was not suspended. Luz Petrone, then the human relations director for Signature’s Ormond Beach facility, and Tiffani Petersen, the facility’s abuse prevention coordinator, testified that at the time of the incident they were not aware of any involvement by or allegation of abuse and neglect against Ms. Dominique. Therefore, they were in no position to suspend Ms. Dominique for the resident’s fall. Both women testified that Ms. Dominique would have been suspended if there had been an allegation of her involvement in the incident. The investigation concluded that Petitioner needed additional training on wheelchair usage but that she had not engaged in any abuse or neglect. Signature reinstated Petitioner to her position and paid her for the time she had missed while on suspension. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. On November 19, 2012, Petitioner was suspended without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation into an allegation of abuse and neglect. Petitioner did not allege that any white employees were involved in this incident. The record does not disclose the specifics of this incident, but does indicate that the investigation concluded with a finding that Petitioner had not engaged in any abuse or neglect. Petitioner was reinstated to her position on November 26, 2012, and reimbursed for the work she missed while on suspension. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. On January 15, 2013, Petitioner was suspended without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation into an allegation that she was being “rough” with a resident while providing care. One of Petitioner’s co- workers, Tina Williams, was involved in the incident and was also suspended pending the investigation. The investigation concluded that Petitioner needed additional training but had not engaged in any abuse or neglect.3/ Petitioner was reinstated to her position and paid for the time she missed while on suspension, as was Ms. Williams. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. On March 5, 2013, Signature suspended Petitioner without pay pursuant to the Abuse and Neglect Policy pending an investigation regarding rough handling of a resident and failure to toilet a resident when the resident asked to use the bathroom on March 2. A white co-worker, Patricia Capoferri, was also involved in the incident and was also suspended without pay pending investigation. Ms. Capoferri asserted that the resident in question was assigned to Petitioner but that Ms. Capoferri had to answer the resident’s call light because Petitioner would not do so.4/ Ms. Capoferri claimed that she had to answer Petitioner’s “lights all the time, because she don’t answer them.” Upon completion of the investigation, Signature determined that the allegations of abuse or neglect against Petitioner were not substantiated. Petitioner was reinstated to her position and paid for the time she had missed while on suspension. Petitioner was not otherwise disciplined for this incident. Petitioner credibly testified as to the hardship caused by the suspensions imposed on her during the investigations. It is reasonable to assume that a person attempting to survive on a CNA’s wages can scarcely afford to go a week without being paid, even when she ultimately receives full compensation for the suspension. Petitioner suffers from high blood pressure, and the tension generated by the frequent suspensions required several visits to her physician. On March 11, 2013, Signature terminated Ms. Capoferri’s employment as a result of the investigation. Petitioner claimed that Ms. Capoferri never went into the resident’s room on March 2, and that Signature suspended and fired Ms. Capoferri in order to cover its tracks regarding its pattern of discriminatory actions against Petitioner. Petitioner claimed that Signature acted against Ms. Capoferri only after Petitioner filed her Employment Complaint of Discrimination with FCHR. However, Ms. Capoferri was suspended on March 5, three days before Petitioner filed her complaint. Ms. Capoferri was fired on March 11, three days after Petitioner filed her complaint, but Ms. Petrone and Ms. Petersen credibly testified that they were unaware of the complaint at the time Ms. Capoferri’s employment was terminated. Petitioner offered no credible evidence to support her somewhat fanciful claim that Signature would fire a white employee solely to shield itself from a charge of discrimination by a black employee. Signature offered persuasive evidence that it applies its Abuse and Neglect Policy consistently and without regard to race or any other protected category. In April 2013, an allegation of abuse and neglect was made against Nancy Harnonge, a white CNA working at the Ormond Beach facility. Consistent with its policy, Signature suspended Ms. Harnonge without pay pending investigation and then reinstated her to her position with back pay after the investigation concluded that the allegations could not be substantiated. In May 2010, an allegation of abuse and neglect was made against Ms. Capoferri, who was suspended without pay pending investigation and then reinstated with back pay after the investigation did not substantiate the allegations. Petitioner never complained of discriminatory treatment or harassment to any supervisor at Signature prior to filing her Employment Complaint of Discrimination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Signature for her several suspensions pending investigation of abuse and neglect allegations. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Signature's stated reasons for her suspensions were a pretext for race discrimination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Signature discriminated against her because of her race in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Petitioner made no claim that her dismissal from employment was in retaliation for any complaint of discriminatory employment practices that she made while an employee of Signature.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that LP Ormond Beach, LLC d/b/a Signature Healthcare did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a lumber mill in a community known as Cypress near Marianna, Florida. In 2007, Respondent hired Petitioner, an African-American male, to operate a 966 Caterpillar loader (the loader) at the mill. Melvin Lewis is an African-American male. Mr. Lewis is a second-shift supervisor. At all times relevant here, Mr. Lewis was Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Mr. Lewis reports directly to Ross Jackson, a white male. Mr. Jackson has been Respondent's general manager since January 2008. In May 2008, Mr. Lewis told Petitioner that the loader was slowly leaking brake fluid. Mr. Lewis instructed Petitioner to always check the loader to ensure that it had brake fluid. On or about Thursday, May 28, 2009, between 2:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., Petitioner was involved in an accident while operating the loader. Petitioner told Mr. Lewis that a log fell onto the loader, the brakes failed, and the loader went over a retaining wall. After the accident, Mr. Lewis immediately checked the brake fluid reservoir. He found the reservoir empty. Petitioner knew or should have known the standard procedure to follow when, and if, a log rolled onto a loader. In that event, the loader operator was supposed to immediately call his supervisor on the two-way radio and request help. At the time of the accident, Petitioner and Mr. Lewis had working two-way radios. Petitioner used the radio to call Mr. Lewis right after the accident. He did not call for help when the log first rolled onto the loader. On May 28, 2009, Petitioner was operating the 966 loader on a ramp that is 75-feet long and 40-feet wide with a retaining wall on each side of the ramp. At the high end of the ramp is a flat area where Petitioner was picking up logs from a pile. To get off of the flat part of the ramp, Petitioner had to accelerate backwards to then go down the ramp. When the accident occurred, Petitioner had traveled almost all of the way down the 75-foot ramp and then turned the loader 90 degrees toward the retaining wall. To go over the one and one-half foot retaining wall, the loader must have been traveling at a fairly high rate of speed. The accident tore the transmission off of the loader. The loader was inoperable and had to be repaired. The cost of the repairs was over $14,000. After the accident, Mr. Lewis told Petitioner that "this is really bad." Mr. Lewis first directed Petitioner to clock-out and go home. Mr. Lewis then told Petitioner to stay until Mr. Jackson arrived at work at 5:00 a.m. When Mr. Jackson came in to work, he told Petitioner that he would be suspended until Mr. Jackson and Mr. Lewis had a chance to review the situation. Mr. Jackson told Petitioner to report back on Monday, June 1, 2009. Mr. Lewis decided that Petitioner should not be allowed to operate equipment for the following reasons: (a) Petitioner failed to keep brake fluid in the loader as instructed; (b) Petitioner failed to call for help on his radio when the log rolled onto the loader; and (c) with the log on the loader, Petitioner accelerated backward down the ramp, turned the loader 90 degrees, and drove the loader fast enough to hit the retaining wall and bounce over it. Mr. Lewis recommended termination of Petitioner's employment. Mr. Jackson concurred. Petitioner was terminated on June 1, 2009. No evidence indicates that the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment was based on his race. There was no persuasive evidence that Respondent gave any white employee more favorable treatment under similar circumstances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric J. Holshouser, Esquire Fowler, White and Boggs, P.A. 50 North Laura Street, Suite 2800 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Gary Powell 6782 Bumpy Lane Grand Ridge, Florida 32442 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent James F. Watson holds a certificate as a correctional officer, No.05-86-502-04 issued by petitioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission; and has held it at all pertinent times. In the spring of 1988, he worked for the Florida Department of Corrections at Holmes Correctional Institution, where he held the rank of Sergeant or Correctional Officer II. On May 25, 1988, Sergeant Watson came to Sergeant Pumphrey's assistance as he escorted an inmate, Samuel Collier, across a prison yard into the security complex. The inmate took a swing at Sergeant Watson, who grasped the inmate's right arm while Sergeant Pumphrey gripped his left. Seeing their difficulty, Inspector William T. Nobles brought a pair of handcuffs which Sergeant Pumphrey used to secure the inmate's hands behind his back. Inside the security complex, before they reached the hall onto which Major Faircloth's office opened, they encountered Major Faircloth and Ms. Parmer, a correctional officer who worked as an administrative lieutenant. Major Faircloth, both sergeants and the inmate started down the hall, and Lieutenant Parmer "stepped out of the way so they could go down the hallway." T.220. Although she came within three or four feet of the inmate, Lieutenant Parmer did not observe any injuries. T.220. The mail room officer, who was also within three or four feet of the inmate about this time, saw no injuries on the inmate's face either. T.233-4. Neither did Sergeant Pumphrey, at this point. T.541. Testimony that Samuel Collier's T-shirt had "a little spot of blood," id., on it when he entered the security complex has not been credited. As he walked by them, Major Faircloth turned to Sergeants Michael Sheppard and William Paul and Inspector Nobles, who were in a group talking, and told them "to wait right there, [and not to] let any inmates come down" (T.66) the hall toward Major Faircloth's office. After he had given this order, Major Faircloth followed Messrs. Collier, Watson and Pumphrey into the office and closed the door. T.43. From the hall, the inmate was heard interrupting Major Faircloth, cursing loudly "and raising sand." Id. During the three or four minutes that elapsed before Major Faircloth came back out of his office, four to six noises that "sounded like licks being passed," (T.44) were audible through the closed door at intervals of 30 seconds to a minute. "It sounded like flesh meeting flesh." T.150; T.178. The inmate yelled, "[D]on't hit me anymore." T.235. Major Faircloth emerged from his office without the inmate or Sergeants Pumphrey and Watson, reentering the hall where Sergeants Sheppard and Paul and Inspector Nobles still stood. Sergeant Sheppard noticed spatters of blood on Major Faircloth's shirt, although Major Faircloth was not bleeding, as far as he could see. T.46. Ms. Hutching, the mail room officer, told Major Faircloth he needed to change shirts, "[b]ecause he had blood spattered all over his shirt." T.238. Sergeant Paul was asked "to go get three shirts . . . two white shirts and one brown shirt . . . [o]fficers' uniform shirts." T.151. Major Faircloth walked toward the control room, then stopped in front of the mail room and flexed his swollen right hand. When the mail room officer inquired, Major Faircloth responded, "I knocked that son of a bitch's tooth out." T.238. Frederick Terrell Kirkland, a classification supervisor who is not related to the assistant superintendent, saw Major Faircloth that day and noticed his hand and his blood-spattered shirt. Deposition of Kirkland. When assistant superintendent Kirkland arrived, he spoke to Major Faircloth, then accompanied him as he went back into the office where the inmate, respondent and Sergeant Pumphrey remained. At some point Lieutenant Chesnut entered Major Faircloth's office. After a few minutes, Mr. Kirkland, opening then closing the office door behind him, left to go down the hall to the bathroom. When he returned, Sergeant Sheppard opened Major Faircloth's office door to let the assistant superintendent back in. As he opened the door for Mr. Kirkland, Sergeant Sheppard "saw Major Faircloth slap the inmate in the face." T.482. Samuel Collier was seated in a chair at the time, his hands still behind him in handcuffs. Standing behind Mr. Collier, Sergeant Pumphrey rested his hands on the inmate's shoulders, facing Major Faircloth, who stood in front of inmate Collier. Sergeant Watson stood by the office door. Nothing obstructed respondent's view of Major Faircloth's striking Samuel Collier, although he turned his head and looked at Sergeant Sheppard when the door opened. T.51. "[D]id you see the son of a bitch kick me?" Major Faircloth asked the assistant superintendent. T.83. He later apologized to Mr. Kirkland for hitting the inmate in front of him. T.330, 343. After Samuel Collier had been taken away, Major Faircloth asked William Paul "to get an inmate to go clean the blood up out of his office. But then he said, no not to get the inmate, that the inmate didn't need to see that mess, for [Paul] to clean it up [him]self." T.153. In order to place Samuel Collier in solitary confinement, which was the course decided upon, he had to be sent elsewhere, because appropriate facilities were not then available at Holmes Correctional Institution. Karen Roberts, a nurse who worked at Holmes Correctional Institution, was summoned. After she drew blood, took the inmate's temperature and pulse, and made notes recording his vital signs, Mr. Collier was driven in a van to Okaloosa Correctional Institution. When Michael G. Foley, M.D., chief health officer at Okaloosa Correctional Institution, saw him shortly after lunch on May 25, 1988, Samuel Collier still had "alcohol on his breath." The parties stipulated that laboratory tests on the blood Ms. Roberts took from the inmate "revealed a .17 blood alcohol content." T.10. He had reportedly been drinking "buck," a home brew concocted from prison foodstuffs. Ms. Roberts had noticed a laceration of the upper lip which she felt "did not need suturing" (T.111) and swelling around the eyes, which she testified she attributed to the fact that Mr. Collier was crying. She "[w]anted to put ice on his eyes . . . [but] it was impossible to keep ice," (T.113) or so she testified, so she did not try it. Samuel Collier's injuries, including loose teeth Ms. Roberts overlooked, are consistent with blows received in a fight and could not have been caused by a fall against a fence post coupled with a fall out of a chair onto the floor. T.188. Samuel Collier's injuries resulted at least in part from blows Major Faircloth administered in respondent's presence. T.188, 196. When Dr. Foley examined Mr. Collier, both of the inmate's upper eyelids were swollen. An area of his scalp was swollen. There was "a massive hematoma to the upper lip, which is a massive swelling" (T.186) that made it protrude. He "had tenderness, abrasions and contusions to both cheeks. . . [and] some loose upper incisors." T.187. Dr. Foley ordered x-rays "to make sure there w[ere] no fractures." T. 184. The radiologist concluded that no bones were broken, according to Dr. Foley. Meanwhile, Major Faircloth told some correctional officers that they "were supposed to say that he had hurt his hand doing yard work." T.294. When Sergeant Sheppard asked about filing a report, Major Faircloth told him not to "worry about it, you didn't use force," (T.58) "you're not on the duty roster, they don't even know you were here" (T.94) or words to that effect. Major Faircloth's directive contravened Department of Corrections policy, which requires any correctional officer observing force being used against an inmate to prepare a "use of force report . . . and forward it to the Inspector General's office." T.59. That day, respondent Watson filed a written report, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8, reciting that he and Sergeant Watson had used force against Samuel Collier to restrain him on the way to the security complex. Concerning events in Major Faircloth's office, the report stated: When the inmate would not sit down and after Major Faircloth had ordered him to be placed in the chair, I got him by the right arm with both my hands and we placed him in the chair, holding to him. Inmate Collier['s] resistance caused him to twist out of the chair, falling to the floor. I then grabbed for his arm once again and Sgt. Pumphrey got the other arm and we pulled him from the floor, placing him back in the chair. I used only a minimum amount of force to control the situation and prevent injuries. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8. Respondent's report mentioned force Sergeant Pumphrey used in helping him get Samuel Collier into the chair in the major's office and recited that "Lt. Chesnut placed the rag across the inmate's mouth, to prevent him from spitting on any one else." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8. But respondent's report omitted any mention of the force Major Faircloth had used against Samuel Collier. On June 28, 1988, while he was interrogated by Inspector G. L. McLain, respondent falsely denied under oath that he had seen Major Faircloth hit Samuel Collier and injure his hand. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, p.14. Inspector McLain had authority to administer the oath in the course of his official duties, and did administer an oath to respondent before interrogating him on June 28, 1988.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's certificate as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-1395 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 3-15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24-31 and 32-47 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 and 2 are immaterial as to respondent Pumphrey. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 16, it was not clear that a fence and gate were in place at the time. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 19, Major Faircloth first joined the group before they reached his office. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 23, the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish the exact number of times Major Faircloth hit Collier. Sergeant Sheppard saw him slap Collier only once. But the evidence clearly and convincingly showed that Major Faircloth landed additional blow(s), causing his knuckles to swell, and that respondent saw this. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-7, 11, 13-17, 20-21, 28-29, 32, 40 and 43 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 8, 9 and 10, it was not clear that there was a need to pass between those two posts. That Collier hit or fell into a post was not established by the weight of the credible evidence. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact Nos. 45-46 and 7, the weight of the credible evidence did not establish that Collier was bleeding when he reached the security complex. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 18 and 19, credible evidence did not establish that Collier leapt from the chair and fell, striking a desk and the floor. Respondent's proposed findings of fact No. 22, 24, 30, 31, 33, 38, 39, 42, 44, 47 and 48 pertain to subordination matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 were not escorted by credible evidence. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact Nos. 34, 35, 36 and 37, the nurse's testimony that she thought Collier's eyes were swollen because he had been crying has not been credited. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 41, the weight of the evidence did not establish that nobody saw Collier's injuries before he left HCI. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Joseph S. White, Esquire Gina Cassidy, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen W. Foxwell Florida Police Benevolent Association 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
