The Issue Whether grounds exist to deny Petitioner's Class III Personal Use Application, which would allow him to personally possess a capuchin monkey. 1 All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2020), unless otherwise noted.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is the state agency that exercises regulatory and executive powers with respect to wild animal life, fresh water aquatic life, and marine life within Florida. Art. IV, § 9, Fla. Const. The Commission is also responsible for promulgating rules regarding wild animal life in the state. § 379.1025, Fla. Stat. Petitioner desires to "personally possess" a capuchin monkey named "Roxy." To do so, Petitioner must first obtain a Class III captive wildlife pet permit from the State of Florida. As a brief background, Roxy currently belongs to identical twin sisters, Yvonne Robertson, née Hicks, and Yvette Hicks. The Hicks sisters obtained Roxy as a baby in 2006, when they lived in West Virginia. The twins quickly grew enamored with Roxy, and adopted five more capuchin monkeys over the next few years. In 2013, the sisters moved to Florida. They bought a house in Sebring with enough property to construct a large habitat, which would enable their growing "troop" of monkeys to enjoy a healthy lifestyle in a more natural environment. Upon arriving in Florida, both sisters sought the required licenses to possess their animals. Yvonne Robertson applied for, and received, a Class III permit from the Commission. Yvette Hicks applied for, and received, the corresponding permit from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The sisters now own and house 14 capuchin monkeys on their property. 2 By requesting a deadline for filing post-hearing submissions beyond ten days after the final hearing, the 30-day time period for filing the Recommended Order was waived. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.216(2). After establishing their residence, the Hicks sisters formed the business "Twins & Jungle Friends." Soon thereafter, they began showing their capuchin monkeys at a variety of events across the state. The "Twins & Jungle Friends" dynamic changed slightly in 2015, when Yvette Hicks met Petitioner. Yvette and Petitioner swiftly developed, and are currently enjoying, a serious personal relationship. At first, Petitioner moved into the sisters' house to help the twins care for their monkeys. The monkeys quickly took to Petitioner, and he became involved in every aspect of nurturing and raising the animals. Petitioner formed an especially close bond with the twins' oldest capuchin monkey, Roxy. As more fully discussed below, in early 2018, Petitioner and Yvette Hicks decided to move to Petitioner's home. Petitioner also desired for Roxy to come live in a habitat he built in his backyard. For authorization to keep Roxy at his house, Petitioner was required to apply for a Class III wildlife pet permit from the Commission.3 See §§ 379.3761 and 379.3762, Fla. Stat., and Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A-6.003(5) and 68A-6.004(3). Accordingly, on July 16, 2018, Petitioner submitted to the Commission a Class III Personal Use Application and Questionnaire (the "Application") for "One Black Capped Capuchin Monkey (Sapajus Apella)." Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 68A-6.004(3)(c), to receive a Class III permit for a capuchin monkey, Petitioner is specifically required to meet the age, experience, and examination requirements for authorization to possess Class II wildlife as set forth in rule 68A-6.004(2)(d). Rule 68A-6.004(2)(d) requires applicants to document one year of experience, to consist of no less than 1,000 hours, "in the care, feeding, handling, and 3 The Commission, by rule, has established three categories, or "Classes," of captive wildlife in Florida. Class I includes animals that pose a significant, potentially lethal, risk to public safety, including lions, tigers, and bears. Class II includes animals that are capable of inflicting serious bodily harm, such as alligators, coyotes, and ostriches. Class III encompasses all other wildlife (including capuchin monkeys) not listed in Class I or II. See Fla. Admin. Code Rule 68A-6.002. husbandry of the species for which the permit is sought." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A-6.004((2)(c)1. Further, the documentation must include references of at least two individuals who have personal knowledge of the applicant's experience. Fla. Admin. Code R. 68A-6.004(2)(c)2.c. Petitioner, to demonstrate that he met the experience requirement, included two documents with his Application, which became the focus of the Commission's decision to deny Petitioner a permit to possess Roxy. The first document is an 11-page Documentation of Experience form (downloaded from the Commission's website), which records all the hours Petitioner worked in the "care, feeding, handling and husbandry" of capuchin monkeys from October 22, 2016, through February 11, 2018. The form reported that Petitioner worked eight hours a day with capuchin monkeys for approximately 8 to 10 days each month during that time period. Supporting this form is a typed letter describing the different entries written in the Documentation of Experience form, and bears the signature "Yvonne Hicks." (Yvonne Robertson's maiden name.) The letter represents that Petitioner has conducted all of his hours of experience under the supervision of Yvonne Hicks (Robertson), who holds an active Class III license from the Commission to possess capuchin monkeys. The second document is a separate letter of reference, also signed "Yvonne Hicks," which states: I Yvonne Hicks have witnessed [Petitioner take] care of many of our primates. He is very knowledgeable on the feeding caring and medical maintenance of the monkeys. He has also been part of our traveling entertainment business since October 2016. He will provide a very safe and loving home for primates. The Commission denied Petitioner's Application in a Notice of Denial letter, dated January 8, 2019. In its letter, the Commission stated that its decision was due to the following: Within your application … you submitted documented hours … under the supervision of license holder, Yvonne Hicks, along with a letter of reference from Ms. Hicks. … [However,] Ms. Hicks informed Investigator Zimmerman both the hours and the letter submitted to the Captive Wildlife Office had been falsified. For legal support, the Commission based its denial decision on rule 68- 1.010(1), which directs that the Commission "shall" deny an application based on the following grounds: Submission by the applicant of false, misleading, or inaccurate information in the application or in any supporting documentation provided by the applicant or on behalf of the applicant relating to the license ..." In short, the Commission alleges that Petitioner falsified his Application by intentionally misrepresenting, if not forging, information submitted with his Application regarding his experience working with capuchin monkeys. To expound on the basis for its decision, at the final hearing, the Commission offered the testimony of Erika Zimmerman, an investigator in the Commission's Captive Wildlife Office. Investigator Zimmerman's primary responsibilities are to ensure that individuals who apply for captive wildlife permits will offer humane and sanitary treatment to the animals they wish to possess, as well as maintain public safety. Investigator Zimmerman explained that, in early 2018, she was assigned to investigate the efficacy of granting Petitioner a Class III permit to possess a capuchin monkey. To begin her investigation, Investigator Zimmerman met Petitioner at his house on February 1, 2018, in order to inspect the cage in which he intended to keep his monkey (Roxy). Upon arriving at Petitioner's home, however, Investigator Zimmerman found that Petitioner was already boarding several capuchin monkeys in a backyard enclosure. Because Petitioner did not already possess a Class III permit, she directed Petitioner to remove the monkeys from his property and return them to the proper license holder, Yvonne Robertson. The next event in Investigator Zimmerman's involvement occurred in April 2018. That month, she received a phone call from Yvonne Robertson. Ms. Robertson proclaimed to Investigator Zimmerman that if Petitioner presented the Commission with any correspondence, letter, or paperwork bearing her signature, it was a forgery. Ms. Robertson disclosed to Investigator Zimmerman that the Commission had previously denied Yvette Hicks (her sister) a permit to keep capuchin monkeys. Therefore, Ms. Hicks was conspiring with Petitioner to fraudulently obtain a Class III permit for himself. Ms. Robertson relayed that, to support his Application, Petitioner (and Ms. Hicks) had requested that Ms. Robertson substantiate his experience by verifying the hours recorded on his Documentation of Experience form. However, Ms. Robertson declared that she did not intend to sign off on any document included with Petitioner's Application. Petitioner submitted his Application to the Commission in July 2018. With the Application, Petitioner included the two letters bearing the signature "Yvonne Hicks." Upon receiving Petitioner's Application, Investigator Zimmerman promptly met with Ms. Robertson to inquire about a possible forgery. When shown the two signatures, Ms. Robertson initially affirmed that she signed the letters. But, she quickly broke down in tears and informed Investigator Zimmerman that the two signatures were forged. At that point, Investigator Zimmerman walked through with Ms. Robertson all the activities recorded on Petitioner's Documentation of Experience form. Ms. Robertson advised Investigator Zimmerman that: 1) she did not authorize the hours Petitioner allegedly worked per entry (8 hours), 2) much of the work described for each entry did not take 8 hours, and 3) (as a specific example) Petitioner did not give any of the monkeys an insulin shot. Thereafter, Investigator Zimmerman asked Ms. Robertson if she would provide a written statement memorializing their conversation. Ms. Robertson agreed, and completed a Commission Sworn Written Statement form. As Investigator Zimmerman watched. Ms. Robertson wrote: I didn't write this letter of recommendation and this is not my signature on this letter. On the App. of Documentation of hours for [Petitioner] I did not write those experience hours from 10-22-16 to 2-11- 18 and it is not my hand writing on the application. Ms. Robertson further set down that, regarding the letter describing the specific entries on the Documentation of Experience, Petitioner worked "no hours" with the monkeys related to construction, diapers, training, show, playtime, movement, meals, deworming, or administering Insulin. Ms. Robertson then signed the Sworn Written Statement with the name "Yvonne Hicks."4 Investigator Zimmerman then visited with Petitioner in August 2018. When they met, Investigator Zimmerman and Petitioner reviewed the Application. Petitioner expressed to Investigator Zimmerman that he personally completed his Application, and all representations in the Application, especially the hours worked with capuchin monkeys, were accurate. Investigator Zimmerman next confronted Yvette Hicks. Ms. Hicks became visibly upset upon learning that Ms. Robertson (her sister) would not support Petitioner's Application. Ms. Hicks maintained that all the information and signatures within the Application were accurate and true. At that point, Investigator Zimmerman concluded that Petitioner's Application contained falsehoods and forgeries. Therefore, later in August 2018, she presented her findings to the Highland County State Attorney's 4 To the naked eye, the "Yvonne Hicks" signatures on all three documents appear remarkably similar. The undersigned, however, is not a handwriting expert, and, therefore, makes no finding whether Ms. Robertson actually signed the two letters submitted with Petitioner's Application. Office to consider pressing criminal charges against both Petitioner and Yvette Hicks.5 Several months later, on January 16, 2019, Ms. Robertson met with Investigator Zimmerman and the State Attorney handling the criminal case. During that meeting, she repeated her attestation that the information in Petitioner's Application was "completely false" and her signatures were forged. Based on Ms. Robertson's declarations, criminal charges were brought against both Petitioner and Yvette Hicks for forgery. However, for reasons discussed in more detail below, in August 2019, Ms. Robertson recanted her entire testimony. Thereafter, the State Attorney's Office dismissed all charges against both Petitioner and Yvette Hicks. The Notice of Nolle Prosequi stated that: The State of Florida is unable to determine when Yvonne [Robertson] is lying and when she is not. Due to a total lack of credibility of this witness the State can not proceed further. Finally, during the final hearing, Investigator Zimmerman reviewed a handful of entries recorded in Petitioner's Documentation of Experience. She pointed out several specific areas of concern including: 1) the accuracy of the entries, 2) whether the tasks described actually consumed 8 hours of time, and 3) whether Petitioner had 8 hours of time available on several dates considering his busy work schedule with his employer, Highlands Regional Medical Center. 5 Rule 68A-6.004(2)(c)4. states: Providing false information to document the applicant's experience, by the applicant or any reference, is prohibited as provided in Sections 837.012 and 837.06, F.S. Section 837.012, Florida Statutes, directs that "a false statement, under oath, not in an official proceeding" is a first-degree misdemeanor. Similarly, section 837.06 states that "a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant" is a second-degree misdemeanor. Despite the possible discrepancies in Petitioner's Application, Investigator Zimmerman acknowledged that the Commission's application and questionnaire form does not contain any instructions or suggested format or language that applicants should use to complete the Documentation of Experience form. She also agreed that the activities Petitioner recorded, such as "interaction," "playtime," and "preparing meals" were legitimate examples of "care, feeding, handling, and husbandry" and could be performed in a variety of ways and lengths of time. John Conlin, a Lieutenant with the Captive Wildlife Office, also testified for the Commission. In his job, Lieutenant Conlin oversees the permitting process for captive wildlife in Florida. Lieutenant Conlin first became aware of Petitioner's Application when Investigator Zimmerman contacted his office to report a "red flag" due to an alleged falsified signature. Thereafter, based on Investigator Zimmerman's determination that the allegations of forgery and fraud were verified, the Captive Wildlife Office concluded that the hours of experience recorded on Petitioner's Application were false. Lieutenant Conlin commented that Yvonne Robertson was the only person with whom Petitioner worked who was licensed by the Commission to possess capuchin monkeys. Consequently, she was the only individual authorized to validate the time Petitioner spent with the monkeys. Therefore, when Ms. Robertson denied that she actually supervised the hours Petitioner claimed, the Commission designated his Application for denial. At the final hearing, Lieutenant Conlin expanded on his office's decision to deny the Application explaining that the fact that every entry on the Documentation of Experience form recorded exactly eight hours of time was a concern. The representation that Petitioner performed precisely eight hours of work with capuchin monkeys each day was not realistic. In addition, Lieutenant Conlin testified that many of the work descriptions themselves lacked sufficient details to establish the "care, feeding, handling, and husbandry" necessary to receive a permit. Despite the Commission's decision to deny Petitioner's Application, Lieutenant Conlin admitted that, if Petitioner's Documentation of Experience form was accurate, then Petitioner's Application reflects competency in the "care, feeding, handling, and husbandry" of capuchin monkeys. At the final hearing, Petitioner maintained that his Application is accurate, true, and valid, and he meets all requirements under rule 68A- 6.004 to receive a Class III wildlife pet permit to personally possess Roxy. Initially, Petitioner represented that he is a upstanding citizen and well respected professionally. He is a registered nurse and currently works as the night supervisor at Highlands Regional Medical Center in Sebring. Petitioner conveyed that he has a strong ethical track record as a hospital administrator, with no disciplinary issues. Addressing why he desires a permit, Petitioner expressed that, after meeting Yvette Hicks in October 2015, he quickly became involved with the sisters' capuchin monkeys. Although he owns his own home, he soon moved into the sister's house. From that point onward, his life has revolved around the monkeys. Petitioner testified that raising exotic animals takes time and energy. After moving in with Ms. Hicks, the monkeys dominated his life. To explain his experience in the "caring, feeding, handling, and husbandry" of capuchin monkeys recorded on his Documentation of Experience form, Petitioner recounted a typical day at the sisters' house. In the evenings, the sisters brought their monkeys inside the house to sleep with them in their beds. Then, first thing in the morning, the monkeys were taken out to their cages and fed. Meals were prepared and served twice a day. The monkeys were placed in diapers during day and showered/bathed at night. The cages themselves were cleaned once a day. Other activities, including "deworming," "interaction," "playtime," and "training" filled the gaps. Petitioner commented that every daily entry on his Documentation of Experience form was noted as "8" hours long because he understood that he could only record up to eight hours of experience per day. However, Petitioner testified that he generally spent far more than eight hours a day with the monkeys. Petitioner further relayed that Roxy, in particular, needs special attention as she has Type 1 diabetes. Her condition requires two shots of insulin a day, and her blood sugar levels must be routinely checked. Petitioner explained that, because of his nursing background, he quickly assumed responsibility for administering the shots to Roxy. Petitioner also remarked that the sisters book approximately 75 "Twins & Jungle Friends" shows a year (prior to the COVID-19 pandemic). The sisters, together with their capuchin monkeys, travel all across Florida to perform at a variety of venues, including birthday parties, corporate events, county fairs, music videos, and school functions. Petitioner expressed that he accompanied the sisters whenever he could to help handle the monkeys or set up the shows. Petitioner testified that his work with the sisters' capuchin monkeys remained consistent and steady until April 2018, when Ms. Hicks and Ms. Robertson experienced an abrupt and harsh falling out. Consequently, he suggested to Ms. Hicks that they move into his house, which they gradually did. Even so, Petitioner and Ms. Hicks continued to care for the monkeys on a daily basis. Thereafter, because of how attached he had grown to the monkeys, he wanted the ability to bring one or more of them back to his house. Therefore, he constructed a large cage in his backyard in which to house the monkeys. Regarding the Commission's stated reasons for denying his Application, Petitioner expressed that the experience recorded in his Documentation of Experience form is accurate, genuine, and true. Petitioner further testified that he did not forge or falsify the signature(s) of "Yvonne Hicks." Petitioner explained that Ms. Robertson and Ms. Hicks mended their relationship in July 2018. At that time (July 3, 2018, to be exact), Ms. Robertson signed his Application. Thereafter, he submitted it to the Commission. Petitioner declared that, since October 2016, he has easily spent over 1,000 hours a year working with capuchin monkeys. He continues to spend time every day with the monkeys. He has come to "love them like a child."6 Petitioner acknowledged that he and Ms. Hicks were arrested and charged with forgery in September 2018. However, Petitioner explained that the State of Florida dismissed the case prior to trial. Consequently, neither he nor Ms. Hicks were ever convicted of any crime for forgery or fraud related to his Application, nor are any charges currently pending. Petitioner asserted that the criminal case was based on an outright lie by Ms. Robertson, which she made because she was mad at her sister. Accordingly, Petitioner contends that his Application, on its face, easily shows that he meets the required regulatory conditions and criteria to possess a capuchin monkey. His Application amply demonstrates that he has acquired sufficient knowledge of the capuchin monkey species, as well as its nutritional and social needs, caging requirements, and safety and medical demands to qualify for a permit. Petitioner urges that his Application clearly documents over 1,000 hours of legitimate and valid experience working with capuchin monkeys, as required by rule 68A-6.004(2) and (3). Consequently, when considering the merits of his Application, Petitioner argues that he proved that the Commission should grant him a Class III permit. Petitioner's testimony regarding the work he has performed with capuchin monkeys beginning in October 2015 is credible and credited. 6 One of the benefits of video teleconferencing is that it allows a party to participate in the final hearing from any location. In this matter, Petitioner (and Ms. Robertson and Ms. Hicks) joined the final hearing from the sisters' house, which is home to Roxy and the troop of 13 other capuchin monkeys. Periodically during the hearing, Roxy traipsed across the video screen and crawled into Petitioner's arms. Both Petitioner and Roxy appeared quite at ease in each other's company, and Roxy's attachment to Petitioner was quite evident. Yvonne Robertson testified at the final hearing in support of Petitioner's Application. Ms. Robertson declared that she did, in fact, sign off on Petitioner's work hours. She asserted that the "Yvonne Hicks" signatures, on both the Documentation of Experience form, as well as the letter of reference, are hers. Before explaining why she now recants her (sworn) statements to Investigator Zimmerman and the State Attorney's Office, Ms. Robertson buttressed Petitioner's description of the activities he performed in the "care, feeding, handling, and husbandry" of capuchin monkeys. Ms. Robertson echoed Petitioner's statement that owning capuchin monkeys is "life changing," in that they have no life outside of caring for their monkeys. Her animals require constant attention to feed, nurture, and safeguard. As to why she contacted the Commission to report a forgery, Ms. Robertson expressed that in April 2018, she and her sister suffered a severe personality clash. Ms. Robertson explained that "like all sisters do … we fought our whole life." That same month, she was asked to approve Petitioner's Documentation of Experience form, as well as provide a reference letter. Ms. Robertson testified that, due to her roiling resentment of her sister, this request came at a most inopportune time. To spite her sister, Ms. Robertson reached out to Investigator Zimmerman and issued her proclamation that she did not, and would not, sign off on Petitioner's Application. Ms. Robertson admitted that she specifically told Investigator Zimmerman that any signature on the Application bearing her name was a "forgery." Later, when confronted by the State Attorney, she perpetuated her story because she believed that the Commission might take her monkeys away if she retracted her allegations. At the final hearing, however, Ms. Robertson adamantly asserted that the "Yvonne Hicks" signature on Petitioner's paperwork "is mine." Ms. Robertson professed that, she willingly supported, and supports, Petitioner's effort to obtain a wildlife pet permit to keep Roxy. Towards that end, Ms. Robertson testified that she personally observed Petitioner care for her capuchin monkeys from October 2016 through February 2018. Ms. Robertson further professed that she reviewed, approved, and signed off on Petitioner's Documentation of Experience form on July 3, 2018. Ms. Robertson explained that, by that date, she had reconciled with her sister, and was ready and willing to substantiate Petitioner's Application. Ms. Robertson further elaborated that it was her sister who actually completed the entries on the Documentation of Experience form. Ms. Robertson stated that Ms. Hicks maintains a daily planner/calendar. Ms. Robertson relayed that the descriptions of the work that Petitioner performed with the capuchin monkeys came directly from Ms. Hick's written records. Ms. Robertson further insisted that she personally observed Petitioner's interaction with the monkeys, and that Ms. Hick's entries are accurate and true. Ms. Robertson expressed that Petitioner, Ms. Hicks, and she worked together with the monkeys every day during the time period covered by Petitioner's Application. At the file hearing, Ms. Robertson expressed her extreme regret at accusing her sister and Petitioner of fraud. She wishes that she had never made the "stupid mistake" of reporting a forgery. Ms. Robertson asserted that she now fully endorses Petitioner's Application "because it is the right thing to do. He did the hours, he deserves the license." Yvette Hicks testified on Petitioner's behalf. Ms. Hicks asserted that Petitioner is perfectly capable of tending to Roxy and the rest of her capuchin monkeys. Not only was Petitioner receptive, ready, and willing to look after her monkeys, but the monkeys took to him as well. Ms. Hicks confirmed that she was the person who actually logged Petitioner's experience onto the Documentation of Experience form. Ms. Hicks testified that she diligently and meticulously writes into a planner "everything that happens on every day." She also maintains the calendar for "Twins & Jungle Friends" shows. To record Petitioner's work hours, she referred to her daily notes, then transferred the activities and events to Petitioner's Application. In chronicling Petitioner's experience on the Documentation of Experience form, Ms. Hicks explained that she recorded that Petitioner worked "8" hours a day with the monkeys because she understood that eight was the maximum number of hours that the Commission would allow per entry.7 In reality, however, Ms. Hicks insisted that Petitioner spent "way more" than eight hours a day with the monkeys. She maintained that, because he lived with the sisters, Petitioner worked with the monkeys all day, every day. Ms. Hicks also commented on several of her specific entries on the Documentation of Experience form. She explained that the term "Served Meals" documented when Petitioner prepared one or both of the monkeys' meals for the day. The entry for "Insulin" referred to the times Petitioner provided the insulin shots to Roxy. (Ms. Hicks added that Petitioner is an extremely capable nurse and administered the shots on most days.) Finally, Ms. Hicks voiced that "Show" entries represented days when Petitioner assisted with the "Twins & Jungle Friends" performances. (Ms. Hicks expressed that Petitioner became an integral part in the sisters' production.) Regarding Ms. Robertson's allegation to the Commission in April 2018 that she did not sign off on Petitioner's Application, Ms. Hicks declared that Ms. Robertson's statements were "all a lie." Ms. Hicks affirmed Ms. Robertson's testimony that their relationship was "rocky." Ms. Hicks, however, firmly, maintained that the hours and descriptions she wrote on 7 The one exception to the "8" hours worked for each entry on the Documentation of Experience form was for October 27, 28, and, 29, 2017. For these dates, Ms. Hicks recorded that Petitioner "spent 3 days performing at the Ocala Pumpkin Festival with show monkeys," and that he worked "all day." Petitioner's Documentation of Experience form were true and accurate.8 Ms. Hicks also fervently declared that Ms. Robertson signed off on Petitioner's experience, and the two signatures of "Yvonne Hicks" in the Application are Ms. Robertson's. Ms. Hicks convincingly testified that Petitioner is "wonderful" with the capuchin monkeys. Further, she credibly represented that, based on her observations, Petitioner protected the monkeys' safety, enhanced their lives, and made them happy. Based on the competent substantial evidence presented at the final hearing, the greater weight of the facts establishes that Petitioner possesses significant experience in the "care, feeding, handling, and husbandry" of capuchin monkeys. The evidence further shows that Petitioner will provide humane and sanitary treatment to any monkeys (especially Roxy) entrusted to his care. In addition, the testimony does not support, by a preponderance of the evidence in the record, the allegations that either the "Yvonne Hicks" signatures or the descriptions of work performed in Petitioner's Application are false, forged, fraudulent, or misleading. However, the implication that Petitioner's Documentation of Experience form contains "inaccurate information" has merit. The Commission's witnesses persuasively expressed the Commission's concerns with the accuracy of the representation that Petitioner earned exactly "8" hours of experience on each and every day he worked, as well as the reliability of the work descriptions written on the form, and whether the work described actually took "8" hours to perform. Further, although Ms. Robertson testified with conviction that Petitioner achieved the required 1,000 hours of experience under her supervision, her credibility is materially 8 At the final hearing, during questioning by the Commission, Ms. Hicks did concede one "inadvertent error" in the 11-page Documentation of Experience form. The "Show" entry she recorded on November 23, 2017, had been rescheduled and actually occurred on November 25, 2017. damaged by the prior untruths she told to Investigator Zimmerman and the Highlands County State Attorney's Office.9 Consequently, Petitioner did not establish that his Application meets the requirements necessary under rule 68A-6.004 to qualify for a wildlife pet permit for a capuchin monkey. Therefore, Petitioner did not meet his ultimate burden of proving that the Commission should grant his Class III Personal Use Application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission deny Petitioner's Application for a Class III personal use permit to possess capuchin monkeys. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda E. Parnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Peri E. Sedigh, Esquire Sedigh Law 2443 Grandview Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on October 29, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Hispanic woman who was employed by Respondent from December 1997 until her termination on October 2, 2002. She worked in Alachua County Animal Services (Animal Services) as an animal control officer. Animal Services control officers are supervised by the Animal Services field supervisor who reports to the director of Animal Services. Petitioner received a bachelor's degree in 1983 in agriculture with a concentration in animal production and agricultural management courses, has experience in animal nutritional research, and has one published paper in that field.2/ Prior to working for the Alachua County, Petitioner managed a small pest control business. By the time she applied for the supervisory position, she had obtained Florida Animal Control Association (FACA) Level I, euthanasia, and chemical immobilization certifications. An animal control officer is responsible for enforcing state laws and county ordinances regarding small animals. Animal control officers impound animals at-large, issue warnings and citations, handle citizen complaints, and investigate animal bites and cruelty to animals. Petitioner served as interim Animal Services supervisor for a little over one month in June 2000. When the position of Animal Services field supervisor became vacant in December 2001, Petitioner applied for the job. Penny Lefkowitz, a newly hired Animal Services officer, also applied for the job. At that time, Ms. Lefkowitz had seven years of animal control experience in Arizona as lead officer. In that capacity, she was a sworn officer with firearm authority, a field training officer, and handled over 1,000 calls per year in that position. She held National Animal Control Association (NACA) Level I and II certifications. She was euthanasia- certified and had 25 years' experience breeding dogs and horses. Ms. Lefkowitz has a high school diploma. Ms. Lefkowitz was placed in the interim field supervisor position for a period of approximately three months, during which time she received supervisory pay. The record is not clear whether there was a separate application process for the permanent position following the appointment of the interim supervisor position. In any event, Respondent hired Bill Burris as Animal Services supervisor in March 2002. At the time he applied, Mr. Burris had nine years of animal control experience in Arkansas, where he was the animal control officer and shelter assistant. He held a high school G.E.D. Additionally, he held NACA Level I, II, and III certifications. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination regarding failure to promote only references Ms. Lefkowitz's appointment to the interim director position, "[i]n December 2001, a newly hired officer, white female with less experience was hired as interim supervisor." It does not reference Mr. Burris as being hired in the director position. Her Petition for Relief alleges, "[t]hose less qualified individuals were hired and promoted in violation of county/company policy." Thus, it is not clear that Respondent hiring Mr. Burris for the permanent position is properly within the scope of this case. Nonetheless, the evidence presented at the hearing regarding Mr. Burris' qualifications is addressed herein. Mr. Burris held the position of field operation supervisor from March 2002 until his resignation in September 2003. Based upon the evidence in the record, at the time the decision was made to place Ms. Lefkowitz in the temporary supervisory position, she and Petitioner met the qualifications for the job. Ms. Lefkowitz had significantly more supervisory and field experience than Petitioner. At the time he was placed in the job, Mr. Burris met the qualifications for the job and had significantly more supervisory experience than Petitioner. Petitioner held a college degree, which neither Ms. Lefkowitz or Mr. Burris had. However, according to Mr. Burris, a college degree was not a minimum requirement of the job, but two years' animal control or animal shelter experience were required. There is nothing in the record to contradict his testimony in this regard. When Mr. Burris became field supervisor, he held a staff meeting and told the animal control officers he supervised that he would start fresh as far as performance and discipline issues. He handed them an empty folder and informed them that he would only consider their past performance if he saw a pattern that caused him to look at past personnel records. Mr. Burris called staff meetings to discuss policies that were not up-to-date or in need of updating. Prior to the staff meeting, Mr. Burris sent a memorandum to the animal control officers informing them that there would be a staff meeting. Officers were expected to attend and were excused only if they were on an emergency call. If an officer was absent from a meeting, Mr. Burris would promptly notify them in memorandum format as to what happened at the meeting. When changes were made in policies or procedures, Mr. Burris would put a copy of the policy changes in every officer's box. Each officer had his or her box where they would receive their mail. Each officer was expected to check that box daily. The boxes were accessible to everyone so that when there was a confidential document, such as payroll information, that document was placed in an envelope and then put in the officer's box. Petitioner's mid-year performance review was due in April 2002, approximately six weeks after Mr. Burris became the supervisor. Petitioner received an overall rating of "exceeded expectation." There are five categories of performance ratings, and "exceeded expectation" is the second highest category. That rating was consistent with ratings Petitioner received from previous supervisors. On April 24, 2002, Mr. Burris held a staff meeting to discuss a new policy regarding issuance of warnings and citations. The new policy required officers to give animal owners in violation of vaccination or licensing requirements 15 days to come into compliance. Previous to this, some officers had given animal owners 30 days to come into compliance. Under extenuating circumstances and upon seeing reasonable attempts to achieve compliance, the officer could extend an owner's deadline by 15 more days. Testimony is conflicting as to whether Petitioner attended this meeting. Petitioner insists she was not at this meeting. Mr. Burris insists that she was and that this issue was discussed in great detail. In any event, Mr. Burris put the new policy in writing a few days after the April 24, 2002, meeting, and the new written policy was given to all the officers. The weight of the evidence establishes that even if Petitioner did not attend the April 24, 2002, meeting, she would have been notified of the policy change shortly thereafter. On April 29, 2002, Petitioner issued a warning to a dog owner, which allowed the dog owner 30 days to achieve compliance with licensing and vaccinations for 24 dogs. According to Petitioner, she considered 30 days to be ample time for the owner to come into compliance. Petitioner maintains that at the time she issued this warning, she was not aware of the change in policy from 30 to 15 days. She acknowledges that Mr. Burris later explained the change in policy to her. It is clear that Mr. Burris informed Petitioner of this policy change and directed her to follow these procedures. In June or July 2002, Mr. Burris designed a policy and procedure manual incorporating all policies and procedures. A manual was issued for each truck used by the animal control officers. On July 31, 2002, Mr. Burris issued a memorandum entitled, "Bite Priority," to the animal control officers. Following a staff meeting where this memorandum was given to the officers, an informal discussion took place around the dispatch area. During this informal discussion, Petitioner questioned Mr. Burris as to whether he had ever read a document called the rabies compendium. Mr. Burris described Petitioner as speaking in a disrespectful, challenging tone. Ms. Lefkowitz witnessed the exchange and described it as disrespectful and condescending.3/ This statement made in front of other officers was inappropriate. The "Bite Priority" memorandum reads, in pertinent part, as follows: All Bites will be priority. Stand-by officers will be required to respond if the bite is after hours during their on-call shift. Bites will not be passed on to the next day. Shifts are 10 hour shifts, not 9 1/2 hours, if you end up working over you are compensated. Officers will not pass calls off to the stand-by person. Priority calls will be taken by Officers during their regular shift. The remainder of the memorandum dealt with off-premise bites. In early August 2002, Mr. Burris decided to "work the roads on a Saturday to take up some of the slack" because the animal control officers were overworked. Late one afternoon, Mr. Burris attempted to reach Petitioner on the radio, but was unable to do so. He asked the dispatcher to contact Petitioner. Petitioner acknowledges that she was contacted by the dispatcher and received Mr. Burris' request to fill up the truck she was driving and to leave the keys and the fuel card on Mr. Burris' desk. Petitioner had already filled up the truck that day in the late morning. She did not fill up the truck again at the end of the day, but described the truck as being seven-eighths full at the end of her shift, after making ten to 12 calls after stopping for fuel. Petitioner believed her actions complied with Mr. Burris' instructions. Mr. Burris described finding the truck the next morning as half-full of gas. Mr. Burris concluded that Petitioner did not follow his instructions. Mr. Burris' conclusion in this regard was not unreasonable. The truck incident gave rise to Mr. Burris' first written warning about her conduct. On August 5, 2002, Mr. Burris issued a memorandum to Petitioner for "failure to follow verbal instruction." The memorandum noted a safety concern in that he was not able to reach Petitioner by radio and his concern that she did not follow his directive. On August 6, 2002, Mr. Burris called Petitioner into his office to discuss the written memorandum. Mr. Burris described Petitioner's behavior when he handed her the memorandum to be disrespectful. As a result, Mr. Burris went to the director's office to explain the circumstances surrounding this incident. This resulted in a meeting in the director's office at which the director, Mr. Burris, and Petitioner were present. Petitioner acknowledges that she made the statement, "I guess one out of a hundred is unacceptable" during this meeting, and that she said it using a sarcastic tone. Later on August 6, 2002, Mr. Burris issued Petitioner another in-house written warning, the subject of which was "improper conduct" about her conduct in the director's office, which read in part: I informed Dr. Caligiuri of Blanca's discourtesy and or improper conduct. I had Blanca meet with me in Dr. Caligiuri's office to discuss her comment and the way in which it was stated. During our conversation in Dr. Caligiuri's office Blanca used mild sarcasm, expressing, "I guess one time out of a hundred is unacceptable" as we discussed the importance of responding to her radio. At this time, I do not want to write this up as a group I #19 Discourtesy to another employee or a Group II #7 Improper conduct which would effect the employees relationship with co-workers. However, if this behavior continues I will be left with no alternative. I know Blanca is capable of doing her job in a professional manner. I only want this as a written documentation of what occurred on this day, to prevent future occurrences of this same behavior. Petitioner refused to sign the August 6, 2002, memorandum. On August 13, 2002, Animal Services received a call about a dog bite at a residence. Animal control officer Jay Butts was dispatched on the call. When he arrived, he saw two or three dogs inside the home, and he could not determine which dog was involved in the reported bite. The owner of the dog was not at home. He left without leaving a written warning because, "I did not have the correct owner or dog, so I didn't know which dog or which owner to leave a written warning to. . . So I wanted to come back and find out which dog actually was involved in the bite." The following morning, Mr. Butts received information from the Health Department regarding the dog's owner and learned that the dog was not currently vaccinated or licensed. Mr. Butts returned to the residence where the bite occurred. He posted a notice to the dog's owner. Apparently the owner was still not home because he posted a warning which included the following necessary corrective action: "Your dog must be placed into quarantine by 5:00 pm on 8-14-02 at our shelter or a licensed vet. If you do not have this done today your animal will be impounded and you will receive a citation of $200.00 per day." The warning required the owner to correct the violation by 5:00 p.m. that day. Officer Butts proceeded to handle other calls until his shift was over. He did not make contact with the dog's owner before his shift ended. His shift ended before 5:00 p.m. The dog's owner called Animal Services after 5:00 p.m. on August 14, 2002. Petitioner took the call. After speaking to the dog's owner, she called a veterinarian and learned that the dog's vaccination had expired by a few months. She did not pick up the dog. She gave the following reason: Yeah, it happened on property. The dog was confined to his property. We had contacted the owner. And basically even though the vaccination had expired, even a one-year vaccination is good for three years. This is a known fact of any vaccine, any rabies vaccine manufactured in the United States, a one-year vaccine has an efficacy of three years. So I take all that matter into consideration when I have to make a decision as to what to do with a bite dog. Petitioner told the dog's owner that he had to comply with the written warning given by Mr. Butts. According to Petitioner, she told the dog's owner that he had to quarantine the dog off the property either at the shelter or at a veterinarian clinic. She also informed him that the only person who could reverse that decision was her supervisor. The next morning, August 15, 2002, the dog's owner called Mr. Burris. Mr. Burris spoke to the dog's owner and then questioned Petitioner to get her side of the story. He then instructed Petitioner to pick up the dog. She did not pick up the dog as instructed; another officer picked up the dog later that day. Mr. Burris gave a verbal warning to Officer Butts regarding his handling of the dog-bite incident. Mr. Butts had received previous disciplinary actions, including suspensions, prior to Mr. Burris becoming the field supervisor. However, on August 20, 2002, Mr. Burris initiated a Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action (Notice) to Petitioner in which he recommended a three-day suspension without pay. The reasons referenced in the Notice were willful negligence in the performance of assigned duties or negligence which would endanger the employee, other employees, or the public; and refusal to perform assigned duties or to comply with written or verbal instructions of a higher level supervisor. The narrative of the Notice referenced the dog-bite incident and the August 6, 2002, improper conduct memorandum. Mr. Burris explained his decision to give different disciplinary actions to Officer Butts and Petitioner: Q What should she have done with the dog? A She should have impounded it immediately. If the owner refused her, she should have issued him a citation for failure to comply. Q Jay Butts participated in this. We had some testimony about that. Jay Butts participated in this event two days prior and one day prior to Ms. Carbia getting involved. Why wasn't Butts given any suspension on the same matter? A Jay Butts was given the same verbal consultation that Officer Carbia had received. The only thing Jay Butts could have done differently would have perhaps left a posted notice the day of or given a notice to the roommate with generic information. Jay Butts received consultation pertaining to that. He did not receive disciplinary action because he never made any contact with the owner. The officer that made contact with the owner and had the first opportunity to take the dog was Officer Carbia. Q So there is a difference in the seriousness of her offense and Jay Butts' offense? A Absolutely. Q Hers was more serious? A Yes. As a result of the Notice, a grievance hearing took place on August 26, 2002, in the director's office. Wayne Mangum, who at that time was the union steward, Mr. Burris, and Petitioner were there, as well as the director, Dr. Caligiuri. During the meeting, Petitioner explained her position. At some point in the meeting, Dr. Caligiuri made a comment to the effect that 80 years ago women could not vote.4/ Petitioner found that comment to be discriminatory toward women. When asked whether Dr. Caligiuri's demeanor in that meeting was aggressive or not cordial, Mr. Mangum replied that his demeanor was "uncordial." In any event, Dr. Caligiuri's comment was offensive and inappropriate. During the August 26, 2002, meeting, Mr. Burris instructed Petitioner to discontinue striking the word "within" from the form used when giving an animal owner a time frame within which to bring in an animal to be impounded. She had not been instructed regarding that previously. Mr. Burris received a copy of a warning form dated August 28, 2002, on which Petitioner had crossed out the word "within" contrary to his instructions. He took no action at the time since he thought it might have been a "slip of the pen." He then received another warning form dated September 9, 2002, regarding a dog bite which Petitioner had again altered by crossing out the word "within." Petitioner had written on the form that the warning had been posted. Posting is a procedure officers follow when the animal owner cannot be found. The notice is posted on the door of the residence for the owner to find upon returning home. Based upon his telephone call to the dog's owner and the information on the form, Mr. Burris was of the belief that the form had not been posted, and that Petitioner's indication on the form that it had been posted was inaccurate. Mr. Burris met with Petitioner regarding this incident. Petitioner acknowledged at hearing that she spoke to the dog's owner, but was intimidated and confused when questioned by Mr. Burris about whether or not she had spoken to the owner. Petitioner contends that she did not lie to Mr. Burris, that initially the owner did not come to the door but later did come to the door. According to Petitioner, she simply neglected to cross out the word "posted" or ask the owner to sign the form. On September 18, 2002, Mr. Burris signed and provided a Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action to Petitioner which proposed her termination from employment. The stated reasons for the proposed action were willful negligence in the performance of assigned duties or negligence which would endanger the employee, other employee, or the public; deliberate falsification and or destruction of county records; and refusal to perform assigned duties or to comply with written or verbal instruction of a higher level supervisor. The Notice referenced the August 28, 2002, warning notice with the word "within" crossed out; the September 10, 2002, warning notice with the word "within" crossed out; the written word "posted" on a warning when she had personally spoken to the dog's owner; and the meeting on August 26, 2002, which resulted in her three-day suspension. The Notice concluded: This is the same type of circumstance concerning the same written instruction after meeting with Blanca and her union rep. This time Blanca was untruthful in her statements, even after I gave her three opportunities to tell me that she had personally spoken to the dog owner. By writing "posted" on the notice which indicates the owner was not home, she falsified a county document. Blanca hand delivered the notice to the dog owner and did not impound the dog when she had the opportunity. Petitioner was terminated from her employment with Respondent effective October 2, 2002. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner complained to anyone that she felt she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender or national origin. The only evidence presented regarding her national origin was Petitioner's brief testimony: Q Were there any other Hispanics employed at animal services during the time frame that Mr. Burris was there? A No. Do you feel that your national origin had something to do with the way Mr. Burris treated you? A Certainly just—basically I felt that I was treated differently, yeah.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2004.
The Issue Whether the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (“the Commission”) correctly determined that a sailboat owned by Jeffrey Sundwall was a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2017),1 and thus subject to sections 376.15(3)(a) and 705.103, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Commission is empowered to remove, or cause to be removed, derelict vessels from Florida’s public waters. §§ 376.15(3)(a) and 823.11(3), Fla. Stat. A vessel is considered to be “derelict” if it is left, stored, or abandoned “[i]n a wrecked, junked, or substantially dismantled condition upon any public waters of this state.” § 823.11(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. Mr. Sundwall was the registered owner of a 28-foot sailboat named the Sea Joy. Facts Specific to the Instant Case Lieutenant Andy Cox of the Commission found the Sea Joy anchored off Wisteria Island in the Florida Keys on March 27, 2017. The Sea Joy had an expired registration decal, and a large amount of seaweed on the outboard motor, which probably rendered the motor inoperative. The Sea Joy had been left open and exposed to the elements, and Lieutenant Cox observed one-inch deep, green water inside the vessel. Lieutenant Cox also determined that the Sea Joy had no working bilge pumps or battery power. Lieutenant Cox initiated a derelict vessel investigation. While the Commission did not take custody of the Sea Joy at that time, Lieutenant Cox affixed a large, red sticker to the Sea Joy announcing that the vessel’s owner had 5 days before the Commission disposed of it pursuant to its authority under chapter 705. Lieutenant Cox met with Mr. Sundwall on approximately March 28, 2017, in a Florida Keys jail and served him with three infraction citations. Lieutenant Cox also provided Mr. Sundwall with a written notice indicating the Commission considered the Sea Joy to be a derelict vessel. On July 24, 2017, the County Court for Monroe County issued an Order requiring the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office and the Commission to preserve the Sea Joy as essential evidence in a criminal case against Mr. Sundwall. Thus, the Sea Joy could not be “destroyed, removed, altered, moved, or otherwise disposed of.” After Hurricane Irma struck Florida in September of 2017 and wrecked several hundred vessels, the Commission partnered with the Coast Guard in an effort to identify and remove derelict vessels. If an owner of a derelict vessel waived his or her ownership interest, then the State of Florida would not charge for a vessel’s removal and disposal.2 Wisteria Island is owned by the FEB Corporation. In November of 2017, the Commission found the Sea Joy hard aground on the shore of Wisteria Island, and the Sea Joy could not be moved without mechanical assistance. The Sea Joy had no mast or sail, and the vessel was still left open and exposed to the elements. In sum, the Sea Joy was nothing more than a hull at that point. Contemporaneous photographs and video of the Sea Joy indicate that it was resting on “wrack lines” left by the tide. Those wrack lines demonstrated that the Sea Joy was on public waters at high tide.3 In response to a request for reconsideration from the State of Florida, the Monroe County Court issued an Order on December 12, 2017, allowing the State to remove the Sea Joy from Wisteria Island. On December 17, 2017, the Commission transported the Sea Joy to a marina in Marathon, Florida. 2 The Commission’s attorney announced during the final hearing that the Commission would not seek to recover the costs of removing and disposing of the Sea Joy from Mr. Sundwall. Ordinarily, the owner of a derelict vessel is responsible for all costs associated with its removal and destruction. See §§ 376.15(3)(a), 705.103(4), and 823.11(3)(b), Fla. Stat. However, in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, the State of Florida assumed all of those costs. 3 This finding is based on the testimony of Major Robert Rowe of the Commission, and the undersigned found him to be a credible and persuasive witness. Officer David Bellville of the Commission met with Mr. Sundwall on January 4, 2018, at the Stock Island Detention Center in Key West. Officer Bellville served Mr. Sundwall with a notice stating that he had 30 days to take possession of the Sea Joy or it would be destroyed pursuant to the Commission’s authority under chapter 705. Officer Bellville also served Mr. Sundwall with an election of rights form stating he had 21 days to protest the Commission’s proposed action. Mr. Sundwall declined to waive his property interest in the Sea Joy and ultimately executed the election of rights form and a request for an administrative hearing on January 20, 2018. Mr. Sundwall’s hearing request was postmarked on January 23, 2018, and received by the Commission on January 29, 2018. Because Mr. Sundwall’s documents were received after the 21-day deadline, the Commission had the Sea Joy destroyed on February 21, 2018, and issued an Order on March 6, 2018, dismissing Mr. Sundwall’s hearing request with prejudice. Mr. Sundwall appealed the Commission’s Order to the First District Court of Appeal, and the appellate court issued an opinion in Sundwall v. Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission, 271 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), on May 16, 2019, reversing and remanding the Commission’s dismissal: After Hurricane Irma struck Florida in 2017, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) identified Mr. Sundwall as the owner of a boat declared derelict upon the waters of Florida. See § 823.11, Fla. Stat. (2017) (defining derelict vessels and empowering FWC to deal with them). Mr. Sundwall was incarcerated at the time. FWC sent Mr. Sundwall notice of the declaration, an explanation of his rights, an Election of Rights form, and a form for a Petition for Administrative Proceeding. The notice stated that a failure to make any election within twenty-one days from receipt of the notice would constitute a waiver of the right to a hearing. Mr. Sundwall signed a receipt for these documents on January 4, 2018. The twenty-first day after that fell on January 25, 2018. He signed the Election of Rights form, requesting a hearing; and also completed the Petition for Administrative Proceeding, dating both of his signatures January 20, 2018. There was no certificate of service or institutional date stamp on any of the papers, nor any institutional mail log indicating when he gave the papers to prison officials. The envelope was postmarked January 23, 2018. FWC stamped it as received on January 29, 2018. FWC dismissed the petition with prejudice because FWC did not receive it within twenty-one days and Mr. Sundwall did not request an extension within that period. FWC's order of dismissal acknowledged that the envelope from Mr. Sundwall was postmarked January 23, 2018. However, FWC relied on Florida Administrative Code Rule 28- 106.104(1), which defines filing as receipt by the agency clerk during normal business hours. In his pro-se brief, Mr. Sundwall relies on the January 20 date of his signatures and the January 23 postmark date, arguing that he is entitled to the benefit of the prison mailbox rule under Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992). FWC does not dispute that argument, but argues that Mr. Sundwall provided no proof that he placed his papers in the hands of prison officials before expiration of the deadline; i.e., no institutional mail stamp or log and no certificate of service. The record does not reflect whether Mr. Sundwall’s institution utilizes dated mail stamps or logs, but one reason there were no certificates of service is because none of the forms that FWC supplied to him contained a certificate of service. In a literal sense, however, Mr. Sundwall "provided" FWC a postmarked envelope that evidences timeliness. He argues on appeal that FWC calculated the time erroneously, and he points out that the envelope was postmarked on January 23. The postmark date was before expiration of the twenty-one-day period for requesting a hearing, and therefore the petition necessarily was submitted to prison officials before the deadline. FWC acknowledged the postmark date in its order of dismissal, and the postmarked envelope is in the record. We therefore reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings on Mr. Sundwall's petition.[4] Ultimate Findings There is no dispute that the Sea Joy was a “vessel” within the meaning of section 327.02(46), Florida Statutes. When it was beached on Wisteria Island, the Sea Joy was a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1. It was left or abandoned in a wrecked, junked, or substantially dismantled condition upon the public waters of this state. While the Sea Joy no longer exists, the photographic evidence and the witness testimony conclusively demonstrate that it was wrecked or substantially dismantled by the time it ran aground on Wisteria Island. The photographic evidence also demonstrated that the Sea Joy was upon the State of Florida’s public waters at high tide. Mr. Sundwall made several factual arguments during the final hearing. For instance, section 823.11(1)(b)3. defines a “derelict vessel” as one that is “[d]ocked, grounded, or beached upon the property of another without the consent of the owner of the property.” Mr. Sundwall testified that he had permission for the Sea Joy to be on Wisteria Island. Mr. Sundwall’s argument is not persuasive because the Commission determined the Sea Joy to be a 4 To whatever extent that Mr. Sundwall is seeking damages from the Commission for the Sea Joy’s destruction, he must pursue that claim before a different tribunal. DOAH’s role in this matter is limited to making findings as to whether the Sea Joy was a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1. and thus subject to sections 376.15(3)(a) and 705.103. derelict vessel pursuant to section 823.11(1)(b)1., not section 823.11(1)(b)3. However, even if the Commission had deemed the Sea Joy to be derelict pursuant to section 823.11(1)(b)3., Mr. Sundwall’s testimony that he had permission to keep the Sea Joy on the shore of Wisteria Island was uncorroborated and unpersuasive. In preparation to take control of the Sea Joy, Mr. Sundwall asserted that a friend of his had attempted to inspect the Sea Joy while it was beached on Wisteria Island. He claimed that the Commission forced Mr. Sundwall’s friend away from the wrecked vessel. Because the Commission was dealing with several hundred displaced vessels in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, it is very unlikely that the Commission would have been in a position (or to have been inclined) to prevent any willing person from removing the derelict Sea Joy from Wisteria Island or inspecting it. Moreover, the undersigned generally found Mr. Sundwall’s testimony on this point to be unpersuasive and self-serving. Mr. Sundwall’s witnesses did not present any persuasive testimony to corroborate his assertions. Mr. Sundwall also argued that the instant case is part of the Commission’s ongoing effort to retaliate against him for undermining a criminal investigation. Even if that were the case, there is no evidence that the Commission left the Sea Joy anchored off Wisteria Island or caused it to become a derelict vessel. Mr. Sundwall asserts that he has been denied due process. However, the facts refute that assertion because: (a) he was given notice of the Commission’s proposed action to dispose of the Sea Joy; (b) he had an opportunity to request a hearing; (c) his case was referred to DOAH; and (d) a formal administrative hearing was conducted on February 7, 2020, at which he fully participated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission issue a Final Order deeming the Sea Joy to have been a “derelict vessel” within the meaning of section 823.11(1)(b)1. and that the Commission was authorized under section 376.15(3)(a) to relocate or remove the Sea Joy. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Brandy Elaine Elliott, Esquire Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Jeffrey Ray Sundwall, 829113 Jackson Correctional Institution 5563 10th Street Malone, Florida 32445 Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed) Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 (eServed)
The Issue Did Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (Commission), correctly deny the application of Petitioner, Phillip Robbins, for a Public Exhibition of Conditional and/or Prohibited Species Permit (CSP)?
Findings Of Fact Article IV, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution creates the Commission. It charges the Commission to "exercise the regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to wild animal life and fresh water aquatic life, and … exercise regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to marine life, … ." Chapter 379, Florida Statutes (2020),1 implements the constitutional grant of authority. The Commission adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapters 68-1 and 68-5 to fulfill its constitutional and statutory duties. 1 All citations to Florida Statutes are to the 2020 codification, unless noted otherwise. Mr. Robbins operates a business that he calls Pan-Terra Exotics. He owns a Burmese python and has for over 25 years. From 2012 through 2017, Mr. Robbins sought and obtained the license required to possess the python, License to Possess Class II Wildlife for Exhibition or Public Sale (ESC). He also held and still holds a License to Possess Venomous Reptiles (VRC) that is not involved in this dispute. Mr. Robbins developed a pattern of letting his licenses lapse before applying to renew them. Mr. Robbins' 2015 ESC expired October 3, 2016. Mr. Robbins applied to renew it on October 11, 2016. The Commission issued the license November 2, 2016. Mr. Robbins' 2016 ESC expired October 3, 2017. Mr. Robbins applied to renew it November 8, 2017. The Commission issued the license November 14, 2017. It expired October 3, 2018. The ESCs which Mr. Robbins had held authorized him to possess his Burmese python. Mr. Robbins did not apply for, and consequently did not hold, an ESC after October 3, 2018. On March 11, 2020, Mr. Robbins applied for an ESC and VRC. The Commission issued the VRC on June 12, 2020. It did not issue the ESC. Mr. Robbins followed up on the ESC application with telephone calls and emails. By letter dated July 2, 2020, the Commission denied Mr. Robbins' ESC application. In pertinent part, the Notice of Denial stated: On July 1, 2020, FWC Executive Order 20-19 was signed, effectively altering regulation of species previously listed as Conditional Reptiles. EO 20-19 states in part: The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission … hereby establishes special regulations to take effect July 1, 2020, in order to conform with Laws of Florida that amends Section 379.372, Florida Statutes. This statute regulates certain high-risk nonnative invasive reptiles in Florida, particularly those listed as Conditional, Prohibited, Venomous, and Reptiles of Concern. These regulations are necessary due to ecological, economic and human health and safety concerns related to potential impacts of nonnative reptiles in Florida. The regulations below apply to the following species of reptile: a. Burmese or Indian python (Python molurus) A person, party, firm, association, or corporation may not keep, possess, import into the state, sell, barter, trade, or breed the above species except for educational, research, or eradication or control purposes. Facilities that meet the requirements for the possession of Prohibited species as described in Rule 68-5.007, F.A.C. may apply for an FWC Conditional/Prohibited/Nonnative Species Permit for these uses. The Captive Wildlife Program is no longer issuing authorizations for Conditional reptiles on the ESC license and applicants may no longer apply for an ESC license for the purpose of possessing Conditional, Prohibited, or Reptiles of Concern. For these reasons, your application is denied. The letter went on to give instructions on how to apply online for a CSP "under new regulations, … ." Mr. Robbins did not seek review of that decision. On July 14, 2020, Mr. Robbins applied for a CSP. He followed up on his application. On August 5, 2020, he submitted another application, this one typewritten. He also submitted a completed Critical Incident/Disaster Plan form, a power point file on Burmese pythons, and an image of his Facebook page along with it. As part of the application review process, Commission Investigator Robert O'Horo inspected Mr. Robbins' facility, which was the garage at his residence. There were no exterior signs indicating that the home was a place where a python, other reptiles, or any animals were on display or available for viewing. The python cage was located in Mr. Robbins' garage. There were no signs on the cage or in the garage providing information about the python, such as a description of its natural element or its diet. Mr. Robbins did not provide signs that may have been used but were not displayed at the time because he had paused his operation. Mr. Robbins also did not provide brochures or other printed materials with information about the python or other reptiles. There were no seating areas in the garage. The garage contained many objects one would expect to see in a garage such as weights, a weight bench, and a motorcycle. No area of the garage was cleared out and set up as a presentation area. In short, there was nothing indicating that the garage was being used or had been used as a location for exhibition of a python. Pan-Terra Exotics maintains a scanty Facebook page. That is the only marketing or outreach evidence in the record. On August 10, 2020, the page had two pictures of a snake, presumably the python. The page directed people to contact Pan-Terra on Messenger. It contained only the following description of the business: "We offer personalized tours of multiple facilities covering a wide range of exotic, endangered, beautiful animals. Our education and community outreach is second to none. We also import, export, sell, trade and breed exotic animals." There is no mention of exhibitions at Mr. Robbins' home. The Facebook page also advised that Pan-Terra was temporarily closed. Mr. Robbins explained that the minimal information on his Facebook page, as well as the absence of seating, educational materials, display materials, or signs in his garage were due to his license being lapsed and COVID concerns. Because of this, at the time of the inspection he was not operating his business. But Mr. Robbins, who bears the burden of proof in this matter, did not offer any evidence demonstrating that at any time his home and garage were set up to offer public tours or information. He did not, present earlier images of his Facebook page at a more active time. He did not present examples of brochures or other educational materials used before he ceased operations. He did not offer signs removed because of the pause in operations. He did not offer photographs of the exterior or interior of his home and garage that showed use of the garage to exhibit the python. Mr. Robbins did not offer other evidence that might indicate use of his python in an educational exhibition. Examples of evidence that might have indicated such use include receipts or other records showing individuals or groups paid for an exhibition, the power point presentation referred to in his email and testimony, calendars showing scheduled days and times for tours, photos of the facility, or thank you notes from individuals or groups who had attended exhibitions. Mr. Robbins did not testify persuasively about exhibition of the python in his garage. He spoke generally about ad hoc visits from a few interested people. Mr. Robbins testified more persuasively about taking his reptiles to various locations and meetings. But the testimony was very general, did not clearly indicate that the python was among the reptiles, and did not provide information about when he took the reptiles to various locations and meetings. He also offered no corroborating testimony from other witnesses. The only evidence offered to corroborate his claim of traveling to locations to exhibit the python was hearsay, a single letter generally describing "educational" outreach programs. Furthermore, the visits described do not amount to "scheduled tours or general admission …" in a "permanent, fixed facility."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, issue a final order denying the Conditional/Prohibited/ Nonnative Species Permit application of Petitioner, Phillip Robbins. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda E. Parnell, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Eric Sutton, Executive Director Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2021. Phillip A. Robbins 1146 Navajo Avenue Lehigh Acres, Florida 33936 Emily Norton, General Counsel Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Farris Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding initiated by a state agency as provided under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, A.S., is the primary custodial parent of the child, A.S., who is now ten years old. At the time of the original incident, A.S. was a full time state wildlife law enforcement officer. On May 18, 1991, Respondent initiated a child protective services investigation in which resulted in the creation of FPSS Report 91-052785, wherein the Respondent proposed to confirm Petitioner as the perpetrator of abuse or neglect of his child. Petitioner requested and obtained a formal hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. This resulted in the issuance of a Recommended Order, dated February 28, 1992, wherein this Hearing Officer recommended that Petitioner's name be expunged from the Abuse Registry. The Respondent rejected the recommendation and issued a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for expungement. The Final Order was appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal and subsequently to the Supreme Court of Florida which reversed the Final Order of the Department. On remand from the Court, the Department issued a Final Order on Remand, dated January 20, 1995, which expunged Petitioner's name from the Abuse Registry. Petitioner is clearly the prevailing party in this matter.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Respondent operated the House of India (Restaurant), an eating establishment located in Coral Gables, Florida. Respondent is now, and was at times material to the instant case, the holder of a license issued by Petitioner (license number 2313769) authorizing it to operate the Restaurant as a public food service establishment. On the morning of September 28, 2006, Douglas Morgadanes, a Sanitation and Safety Specialist with Petitioner, conducted an inspection of the premises of the Restaurant. His inspection revealed, among other things, that there were, what he believed to be, "rodent droppings" present in the Restaurant, creating "an unsanitary condition [that] could lead to food borne illnesses" if the food served to patrons became contaminated with these droppings. Before leaving the establishment, Mr. Morgadanes advised Respondent that this "unsanitary condition" had to be corrected within 24 hours. The Restaurant closed immediately following the inspection and an extensive cleanup operation was undertaken. In addition, Respondent had "[its] pest control company," Rentokil Pest Control (Rentokil), come to the Restaurant during or around the early morning hours of September 29, 2006, to perform "follow-up" rodent control services. (Rentokil had just made a "routine service" call to the Restaurant on September 27, 2006.) Mr. Morgadanes conducted a "callback" inspection of the Restaurant on September 29, 2006. His inspection revealed that, notwithstanding Respondent's cleanup and rodent control efforts, there were, what appeared to him to be, rodent droppings4 in an unused attic area above, and "a little bit to the side" of, the Restaurant's kitchen. Respondent was unable to produce for Mr. Morgadanes during the "callback" inspection documentation reflecting that Rentokil had been to the Restaurant to provide rodent control services. Respondent subsequently sent such documentation to Mr. Morgadanes' office by facsimile transmission. The documentation for the September 29, 2006, service call (9/29 Documentation) contained the following entries under "Service Performed by Rentokil" and "Cooperation Requested from Customer": Service Performed by Rentokil: Inspected and service[d] facility for pest[s]. Found no activity. Put out glue in kitchen underneath kitchen sink around hole near the back door. Cooperation Requested from Customer: Proofing Adequate? ? Yes ? No Please fix hole underneath sink to prevent rodent harborage. Sanitation Needed? ? Yes ? No Please clean dishwashing station. These entries on the 9/29 Documentation clearly and convincingly establish that, although Respondent had done cleanup work and retained the services of Rentokil in an effort to minimize the presence of rodents in the Restaurant, it had not eliminated harborage conditions on the premises.5 After receiving the documentation from Respondent, Petitioner issued the Administrative Complaint that is the subject of the instant controversy. This was the second time in less than a year that Petitioner had charged Respondent with violating Section 6-301.14 of the Food Code. A prior charge (filed in DBPR Case No. 2005064978) had been disposed of by stipulation, the terms of which were "adopted and incorporated" in a Final Order issued by Petitioner on January 12, 2006. There was no admission or finding of guilt. The "stipulated disposition" of the charge was Respondent's payment of a fine of $500.00 and attending a hospitality education program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order finding that Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and disciplining Respondent therefor by imposing a fine of $1,000.00 and directing that Respondent attend, at its own expense, a hospitality education program. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2007.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Zion's Hope, Inc., d/b/a Holy Land Experience (hereinafter "HLE"), discriminated against Petitioners, James Gantz and Bette Gantz, by refusing Petitioners entry into HLE due to the Gantzes's disability, i.e., being hard of hearing and requiring the service of hearing ear dogs.
Findings Of Fact Zion's Hope, Inc., is a Florida not-for-profit corporation formed in 1989. It is a religious entity with a Section 501(c)3 designation under the U.S. Tax Code as a bona fide charitable organization. HLE is a privately-owned religious theme park operated by Zion's Hope. Religious services are conducted at HLE seven days a week. HLE is located at 4655 Vineland Road, Orlando, Florida. The public, upon payment of an admission fee, is invited into HLE on a daily basis. James and Bette Gantz are an elderly married couple who reside for part of each year in North Port, Florida. Both James and Bette are hard of hearing and have suffered from this affliction for many years. James and Bette each have a certified hearing ear dog which accompanies them almost everywhere they go. The dogs were present at the final hearing. On March 19, 2010, James and Bette accompanied by their service dogs and Bette's sister, Lois Wilcox, decided to visit HLE. Upon arrival, they were told that the HLE parking lot was full, but that additional parking was available across the street. James dropped off Bette, the dogs, and Lois in front of the HLE entrance, then went to park the car across the street. When Bette, Lois, and the dogs approached the ticket window to purchase admission into HLE, they talked to one of the employees about the service dogs to make sure the dogs could accompany them inside. The employee opted to call her superior, Jane Wilcox (no relation to Lois), to make a determination about the dogs. Jane Wilcox testified that she approached Bette and Lois in the lobby area, i.e., an enclosed area akin to a hotel lobby, which housed the ticket windows. Bette and Lois said they were never inside a building at HLE; rather, the discussions that occurred happened outside on the sidewalk area. It seems most likely from the evidence that the conversation commenced inside the lobby and then continued outside. Jane Wilcox did a cursory examination of the dogs and decided they did not appear to be service dogs. She also determined that the dogs appeared to be "frisky" in nature and were not like other service dogs she had seen. It was her practice to make a determination as to whether an animal was a service animal or not by asking reasonable questions. This is the way she handles each of the 100 or so cases a year in which guests show up with animals. Jane Wilcox has not had any formal training from the Commission or other regulatory entity regarding service dogs. She was given on-the-job training by her predecessor and has studied written materials on the subject. Her experience in this area is somewhat extensive during her three and a-half year tenure at HLE. After Jane Wilcox made an initial visual determination that the dogs appeared to be pets, Bette attempted to advise her that the dogs were certified and had certification documents on the capes they were wearing. Bette and James had taken the dogs into numerous other businesses and had been asked many times for proof of the dogs' certification. Thus, they kept the certification documents on the dogs at all times. Jane Wilcox refused to look at the certification documents because she has been provided bogus certification documents on occasion. That being the case, she did not put any stock in documents that were presented to her by guests. Rather, it was her normal practice to ask questions of the owners and to visually examine the animals. Based on the answers and her observation, Jane Wilcox would come to a conclusion about the animal in question. The discussion between Jane Wilcox and Bette became somewhat heated once Jane Wilcox made her initial determination about the dogs. Bette was talking loudly, but she is prone to do that because of her hearing impairment. Jane Wilcox viewed Bette as being very excited and possibly offended by the refusal to admit the dogs into HLE. After a few moments, Jane Wilcox determined that communication with Bette had broken down to the point that further conversation was useless. At that point, she called for security assistance.1/ It appears that the matter could have been resolved to everyone's satisfaction had the conversation not degenerated into a contentious debate between the parties. However, it is impossible to ascertain from the facts submitted whether one party or the other was more responsible for the verbal melee. Therefore, no finding can be made as to that point. The security officer who arrived took Bette and Lois to his small security building, where they were joined by James. The security officer said that Jane Wilcox was within her rights to refuse their admission into HLE with the service dogs. He advised them that there was a facility nearby that would care for the dogs while the guests were at HLE. The security officer allegedly told the Gantzes that HLE was a private facility and not subject to federal or state law regarding disabled persons. He also supposedly said that HLE considers dogs like those belonging to the Gantzes as pets, rather than service animals. According to Bette, this "colored" security officer would not listen to her or allow her to talk. A Caucasian guard, however, allegedly told Bette that maybe the dogs should be allowed into HLE, but he was overruled by the first guard. The Gantzes then asked the security officer to call the local (Orlando) police, which he did. When the police officer arrived, he advised the Gantzes that he could not force HLE to admit the dogs, but that he would write up a report. The report written by the police officer indicates that "security officer Santis" called in the request for assistance. It is not clear from the evidence at final hearing which of the two aforementioned security officers was Santis. The incident narrative in the police report simply states: Contact was made with all parties. 'Gantz' were acc[ompanied] by certified service dogs for hearing along with proper documentation. Upon Mngt request to leave, did so without incident. The Gantzes and Lois Wilcox opted not to board the dogs at the nearby facility. Rather, they left HLE and, ultimately, filed a complaint against Zion's Hope with the Commission. HLE does have a policy of admitting service animals inside the attraction. However, as a private religious facility, it does not believe that it has to do so, i.e., it does not believe it is governed by the Americans with Disabilities Act. Of the 100 or so service animals appearing for admission each year, about 70 percent of them are admitted. The others are boarded or the owners opt not to enter HLE. HLE does have a strict policy disallowing pets from admission to the park. Inasmuch as Jane Wilcox found the animals with the Gantzes to be pets, they were denied admission on that basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petitions for Relief filed by James Gantz and Bette Gantz in their entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2011.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of employment discrimination, based on age or marital status, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and, if so, what relief is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was born in 1940 or 1941. He has a high school education, and he has obtained some credits toward an associate’s degree in computer science/business management. Petitioner is married, but his children are grown and no longer living at home. Petitioner worked for 30 years with a large manufacturer, which reduced its workforce and terminated him. Shortly prior to moving to Florida in 1993, Petitioner worked for two and one-half years with the fish and game division of the Enfield, Connecticut, police department, enforcing fishing and hunting laws and dealing with animals. In April 1994, Petitioner applied with Respondent for the position of animal control officer. In May 1994, Keith Larson, Director of Animal Control, telephoned Petitioner and scheduled an interview for the following week. During this telephone call, Mr. Larson and Petitioner briefly discussed his animal control experience with the Enfield police department. Mr. Larson said that Petitioner sounded like a good candidate, and Petitioner felt that he had a good chance to get the job. During the interview, which took place on May 27, 1994, Mr. Larson asked Petitioner, “Do you really think you can get through the animal control course at this time of your life?” Petitioner replied in the affirmative. Mr. Larson also asked Respondent if he were married and if his wife would mind him working the “crazy hours” required of an animal control officer because wives sometimes caused problems. Petitioner assured him that his wife would present no problems. At the time, Petitioner has been working as a Wells Fargo security officer at the courthouse. A few days after his interview, he learned from a deputy that Mr. Larson had hired someone else for the animal control position. Shortly after learning that Mr. Larson had not chosen him for the job, Petitioner complained to Ms. Linda Skelton, presently Respondent’s Human Resources Manager and then one of Respondent’s Employee Relations Supervisors. Petitioner complained about the questions that Mr. Larson had asked during the interview. Ms. Skelton conducted an investigation, which consisted entirely of talking to Mr. Larson, who denied making any of the statements. Ms. Skelton then informed Petitioner that she had found no evidence of discrimination, but referred him to the Florida Commission on Human Relations and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, if he wished to pursue the matter further. She encouraged Petitioner to reapply for an animal control position and promised a fair interview if he did. Choosing not to pursue legal relief, Petitioner reapplied for an animal control position four more times in the year following the unsuccessful initial application. On the first three reapplications, Mr. Larson declined to offer Petitioner an interview. On the fourth reapplication, Mr. Larson granted Petitioner another interview. On Petitioner’s fourth reapplication, Mr. Larson, in consultation with Ms. Skelton, arranged for a panel of County employees to interview candidates. The panel consisted of two firefighters, who were not familiar with the duties of animal control officers, and an animal control officer. Mr. Larson did not speak to any of the three panelists about their deliberations, so as to isolate himself from the selection process. However, the panelists knew Mr. Larson had formed the panel due to Petitioner’s earlier complaint about age and marital discrimination. The panel conducted its interviews in May 1995. The panelists were not particularly well-prepared to conduct interviews. The most prominent shortcoming emerged when one of the firefighters asked Petitioner’s brother, who was also interviewing for the animal control position, who was older-- Petitioner or his brother. The panelists did not take notes during the interviews. They administered a short written test to each applicant; during Petitioner’s test, one panelist continued to talk to him. Petitioner took offense at this distraction, as well as the waste of time spent on a discussion of Petitioner’s martial arts background. Given the simplicity of the test, the distraction was harmless, as was the discussion of martial arts. The deficiencies of the panel are attributable to the unsuitability of the panelists for their task; this was the first time that the panelists had interviewed applicants for an animal control position. After considering all of the applicants, the panelists recommended that Mr. Larson not hire any of the applicants, but instead try to obtain new applicants for the opening. Mr. Larson accepted this recommendation and readvertised the position. Petitioner did not apply for this or any subsequent animal control opening. After conducting another round of interviews, the panelists recommended that Mr. Larson hire Catherine Katzman. Mr. Larson did so. This was the last time that Mr. Larson used the panel to interview applicants for an animal control position. Petitioner’s career and education have had almost nothing to do with animal control. Although the record is not particularly well-developed on these points, it does not appear that much of the animal control officer’s duties in Charlotte County involve undomesticated animals, and it does not appear that much of Petitioner’s duties in the fish and game division of the Enfield police department involved domesticated animals. The job description for the animal control position calls for someone to apprehend animals and enforce the County’s animal control ordinances. The educational and physical demands are modest: graduation from a high school or vocational school with “some animal contact work experience” and “moderate physical activity.” The job description notes that the position requires knowledge of animal control procedures, relevant local law, and the geography of Charlotte County, as well as an ability to work with the public. Petitioner is qualified for each animal control position that Mr. Larson sought to fill. However, Petitioner’s qualifications are minimal and easily bettered by other applicants. Following the May 1994 interview, Mr. Larson hired William Pahl, who was in his 20s, married, and the father of at least two young children. Mr. Pahl had already earned his animal control certificate and had worked for two years as an animal control officer in Lee County. Mr. Pahl was considerably more qualified than Petitioner. The next person whom Mr. Larson hired, instead of Petitioner, was Charles Owensby, who had a high school degree and was in his 40s. Mr. Owensby had already earned his animal control certificate and had worked for three years as an animal control officer in Lee County, ten months as a veterinary technician, and 15 years as a dog trainer. Mr. Owensby was considerably more qualified than Petitioner. The next person whom Mr. Larson hired, instead of Petitioner, was James Wilcox. Mr. Wilcox had no prior experience in animal control. He was in his mid 20s. Mr. Larson based his decision to hire Mr. Wilcox on his ability to mold him into an ideal animal control officer. The record does not reveal if a factor other than youth contributed to Mr. Larson’s determination that Mr. Wilcox could be molded into the ideal animal control officer. Mr. Wilcox had only a high school education and his work experience was unimpressive, consisting of grocery store clerk (five months), outdoor furniture assembler (11 months), short-order cook and handyman at restaurant (five months), lawn maintenance (seven months), and--most recently--handyman at a resort (10 months). Again, the record is not particularly well- developed, but Mr. Larson promoted Mr. Wilcox to Animal Control Supervisor at some point, presumably due to Mr. Wilcox’s good work. Mr. Wilcox left the Animal Control Department after two or three years to join the Charlotte County Fire Department. Mr. Wilcox was not as qualified as Petitioner for the animal control position. Petitioner had some tangentially relevant experience; Mr. Wilcox had none. Petitioner had an impressive employment history; Mr. Wilcox did not. The next person whom Mr. Larson hired, rather than Petitioner, was Cheryl Vanande. She had earned a college degree, but had no relevant experience. Ms. Vanande had worked as an energy conservation specialist for a power company (four and one- half years), yellow pages salesperson (nearly two years), and automobile sales and leasing representative (one and one-half years). While serving in the naval reserves, Ms. Vanande had supervised up to 68 persons. Also, her annual earnings had consistently been about $24,000. Ms. Vanande was married and in her 30s. Despite the lack of direct animal control experience, Ms. Vanande was probably more qualified than Petitioner. The last person whom Mr. Larson hired, instead of Petitioner, was Catherine Katzman, whom he hired after the second round of interviews in June 1995. Ms. Katzman had worked for two years at an animal shelter in Charlotte County, where her responsibilities included care for fractious animals. She had also worked for a couple of months as a veterinary technician. Ms. Katzman had earned an associate arts degree and credits in a veterinary medicine major. Ms. Katzman was in her mid 20s and married. She was considerably more qualified than Petitioner. Except for the hiring of Mr. Wilcox, the decisions to employ persons other than Petitioner were entirely justified, based upon qualifications. Ms. Vanande is a closer case, but her college degree and supervisory experience probably rendered her a superior applicant over Petitioner. In each of these cases, then, Mr. Larson’s testimony that his employment decisions were not motivated by unlawful discriminatory intent is supported by the fact that he hired persons more qualified than Petitioner. The decision to employ Mr. Wilcox, rather than Petitioner, cannot be justified based on superior qualifications. On paper, Petitioner was more qualified than Mr. Wilcox for the animal control position. If Mr. Larson had reasons, besides relative youth, to hire Mr. Wilcox, he did not articulate them at the hearing. Mr. Larson’s initial interview with Petitioner is crucial in this case. Displaying an interest in Petitioner’s age and marital status, Mr. Larson revealed the role of these criteria in his hiring decisions. This does not mean that his preferences concerning age and marital status necessarily influenced subsequent decisions. In fact, the record does not establish that any of Mr. Larson’s employment decisions in this case were influenced by marital status. As for age, the superior qualifications of all the other applicants, besides Mr. Wilcox, signifies that it was unnecessary for Mr. Larson, in hiring these four applicants, to reach the issue of age. Each of these four applicants was better qualified than Petitioner to fill the animal control position, so Mr. Larson presumably ended his considerations at this point. But Mr. Wilcox was not as qualified as Petitioner to fill the animal control position. The reasonable inference is that, in hiring Mr. Wilcox over Petitioner, Mr. Larson gave effect to the discriminatory concerns, earlier expressed during the initial interview, concerning Petitioner’s age. Specifically, solely on the basis of age, Mr. Larson doubted that Petitioner was sufficiently adaptable to acquire the skills needed for the animal control position; solely on the basis of age, Mr. Larson expected that Mr. Wilcox was sufficiently adaptable--moldable--to acquire the skills for the animal control position. Mr. Wilcox’s application bears a date of receipt of February 16, 1995. It is safe to assume that Respondent received Mr. Wilcox’s application prior to the date on which Mr. Larson hired Mr. Wilcox. Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination on November 21, 1995. Clearly, then, Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination within one year of the sole act of discrimination proved in this case. Although Petitioner relies upon evidence dating from earlier than November 21, 1994, to establish an act of age discrimination, the act of age discrimination did not take place until early 1995. Petitioner’s proof of emotional suffering is too vague and uncertain to permit an award. This claim is rejected. Petitioner’s proof of lost earnings and associated benefits is more definite, but somewhat unclear. Petitioner would have initially earned $8.12 hourly as an animal control officer, which required 40 hours weekly. Six years have elapsed since the approximate date of hire of Mr. Wilcox. The record suggests that Petitioner would have retired in 2002. It is not entirely clear when Petitioner has held various jobs since March 1, 1995. At one point, Petitioner worked for Wells Fargo at $5.15 hourly. Then, he worked at the Charlotte County courthouse at $5.75 hourly and later earned $7.00 hourly. At some point, Petitioner worked at the clerk’s office at the courthouse and earned $6.50 hourly, but was employed only 30 hours weekly. The parties should try to settle upon a specific amount representing the value of lost earnings and associated benefits, when comparing the animal control job to Petitioner’s actual employment, from March 1, 1995 (or, if available, the date of hire of Mr. Wilcox) through his age of retirement, as noted in Petitioner’s proposed recommended order, in 2002. Likewise, the parties should try to settle upon attorneys’ fees and costs. If unable to reach a settlement, the parties should request the Florida Commission on Human Relations to remand the case again to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the precise relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations: Enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief on the ground that it is time-barred. If the Commission elects not to dismiss the Petition for Relief, enter a final order determining that Petitioner has proved that Respondent committed a single act of age discrimination in the decision to hire Mr. Wilcox on or about March 1, 1995, as an animal control officer. If the Commission enters a final order determining that Respondent has committed the act of discrimination described in the preceding paragraph, enter a final order giving the parties a reasonable period of time to settle Petitioner’s claims, other than emotional suffering, and, if they fail to do so, enter an order remanding the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct an evidentiary hearing solely on the issue of the relief to which Petitioner is entitled. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Azizi M. Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Amy L. Sergent Lancaster & Eure, P.A. 711 North Washington Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34236 Brendan Bradley Deputy County Attorney Charlotte County Administration Center 18500 Murdock Circle Port Charlotte, Florida 33948-1094
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, by committing unlawful employment practices against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male who was born on April 25, 1943. He received a Bachelor of Science degree in biology in 1965 from Florida A&M University, a Master of Science degree in wildlife and fisheries science in 1978 from Texas A&M University, and a Doctorate in wildlife and fisheries science in 1991 from Texas A&M University. According to his job applications, Petitioner worked for the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service, from June 1965 until April 1994. He worked in various positions, including "survey statistician," "operations research analyst," "fishery research biologist as chief of turtle headstart," "fishery technician/biologist," and "Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor." From July 28, 1995, until July 6, 1998, Petitioner was employed as a child support enforcement case analyst with the Florida Department of Revenue. Petitioner is currently employed at Daytona Beach Community College in an unknown position. Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination with FCHR on September 2, 1997, indicating that the most recent or continuing act of alleged race, age, or sex discrimination occurred on August 11, 1997. Alleged acts of discrimination that occurred more than 365 days prior to the filing of the Charge of Discrimination cannot be considered here. See Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner received letters from Respondent prior to September 2, 1996, informing him that he would not be hired for the following positions: (a) position No. 543 (Job Opportunity Announcement (JOA) #005-6) position filled by Laura Richards with hire date effective March 1, 1996, Petitioner's rejection letter dated April 5, 1996; (b) position Nos. 213 and 956, positions filled by Robert Guerra and Jacklyn Gilmore, respectively, both with effective hire dates of March 29, 1996, Petitioner's rejection letter dated April 3, 1996; and (c) position No. 1099, position filled by Lorraine Heisler with hire date effective May 10, 1996, Petitioner's rejection letter dated April 8, 1996. Therefore, employment decisions regarding these positions are not at issue here. Petitioner applied for and was rejected for the following position numbers after he filed his Charge of Discrimination with FCHR: (a) position Nos. 1161 and 1162, positions filled, Petitioner's rejection letter dated February 16, 1999; (b) position No. 1160, position filled, Petitioner's rejection letter dated March 15, 1999; (c) position No. 918, position filled, Petitioner's rejection letter dated June 4, 1998; (d) position No. 966, position filled, Petitioner's rejection letter dated August 27, 1998; and (e) position No. 859, Petitioner's application faxed to Respondent on June 29, 1998, Petitioner's rejection letter not in record. There is no evidence that FCHR's investigation of Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and the resulting Determination of No Cause included the employment decisions associated with these positions. Therefore, they are not at issue here. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever applied for position No. 671. Accordingly, that position number is not at issue here. The employment positions at issue here are as follows: (a) position No. 543 (JOA #047-7, Issue Date July 16, 1997), no evidence regarding employment decision, no rejection letter in record; (b) position No. 1071, position filled by Dwight Myers with effective hire date of July 11, 1997, Petitioner's rejection letter dated June 30, 1997; (c) position No. 869, position filled by Forrest Marchinton with effective hire date of March 3, 1997, Petitioner's rejection letter dated February 13, 1997; (d) position No. 2503, position filled by Gil McRae with hire date of March 24, 1997, Petitioner's rejection letter not dated; and (e) position No. 878, Petitioner submitted a resume but no application for this position; Petitioner's alleged rejection letter dated August 11, 1997, is not in record. When Respondent desires to fill a vacant position, it requests the Department of Management Services (DMS) to publish a Vacancy Announcement, which provides a short summary of information regarding that position. The Vacancy Announcement contains the "bare essentials" about a job and includes a brief description of the job duties, the minimum qualifications necessary for the position, and Respondent's contact person. When Respondent desires to fill a vacant position, it publishes a JOA, listing, among other things, the minimum qualifications and a description of job duties for the position. The JOA instructs applicants to submit a separate application for each position sought and to include the appropriate class title and position number. The JOA directs applicants to submit a completed State of Florida Application form to a named contact person. The State of Florida Employment Application directs applicants to "[l]ist the knowledge, skills, and abilities that [the applicant] will bring to the job." The application advises applicants to refer to the JOA or listed contact person to determine those specific requirements. For each established career service position, DMS and the applicable state agency create a Career Service Position Description (CSPD), which lists in great detail the job's duties and responsibilities. DMS and the agency maintain copies of the CSPD. When Respondent intends to fill a vacant position, it develops a Selection Criteria Form. This form sets forth the essential and preferred selection criteria based on the required knowledge, abilities, and skills for the position. Respondent uses the Selection Criteria Form to screen job applications, rank the applicants, and determine which applicants Respondent will interview. At hearing, Respondent's staff testified that it is required to interview the selected applicant. This testimony does not mean that Respondent may select an applicant before interviewing him or her. Likewise, this testimony does not mean that Respondent must select an interviewed applicant. Respondent may interview one or more applicants. After Respondent completes the interview process, it may select one of the interviewed applicants to fill the vacant position. Pursuant to DMS rules, Respondent cannot select an applicant that has not been interviewed. After Respondent selects the applicant most qualified for the vacant position, it prepares a Recruitment Report. This report identifies demographic information regarding all persons who filed an application, the name of the successful candidate, and the Respondent's reasons for determining that non-selected candidates are less qualified in comparison to the selection criteria. Position No. 543 Respondent initially advertised position No. 543, Biological Administrator I, in JOA #005-6. Petitioner applied for the position, but Laura Richards, a former FMRI employee, was better qualified for the job. Ms. Richards' effective hire date was March 1, 1996. Petitioner subsequently received Respondent's April 5, 1996, letter advising him that he was not selected for the position. All of this occurred more than 365 days prior to the date that Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination and is not at issue here. Ms. Richards vacated position No. 543 sometime after Respondent offered her the position. In the meantime, Petitioner had a conversation with Toby Harris, Respondent's Chief of Personnel in 1997. The conversation focused on the selection process for Respondent's established positions. In the conversation, Petitioner expressed his concern regarding his failure to be interviewed for positions when he had a Doctorate in a biological science area and selected candidates only had a Master of Science (M.S.) degree. Mr. Harris did not tell Petitioner that Respondent was targeting candidates with M.S. degrees. Instead, Mr. Harris indicated that he would ask Respondent's Division of Wildlife to interview Petitioner to determine whether he had relevant background qualifications not reflected on an application. Mr. Harris also agreed to add Petitioner's name to the mailing list for JOAs. In a letter dated August 8, 1997, James R. Schuette, one of Respondent's regional wildlife biologists, sent Petitioner two JOAs. One of the JOAs was for position No. 671, for which Petitioner never applied. The other JOA (#047-7, issued July 16, 1997) was for position No. 543. Petitioner applied for position No. 543 (JOA #047-7). Respondent offered to interview Petitioner and set up a date and time for the interview. However, Petitioner was unable to attend the interview because of transportation problems. Petitioner eventually advised Respondent that he was withdrawing his application for position No. 543. Consequently, there is no letter advising Petitioner that he was not selected for position No. 543. Moreover, the record contains no evidence as to whether Respondent ever filled position No. 543 or continued to seek applicants for that position. There is insufficient evidence on which to base a finding that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in making an employment decision relative to position No. 543. Position No. 1071 Petitioner applied for position No. 1071, Biological Scientist III. The JOA for this position states that the minimum qualifications include the following: A bachelor's degree with a major in one of the biological sciences and two years of professional biological experience in a field or laboratory program; or a master's degree in one of the biological sciences and one year of professional biological experience as described above; or a doctorate in one of the biological sciences. Degree(s) in wildlife management or ecology are preferred. The duties for position No. 1071 are set forth as follows in the JOA: Develops and implements management plans for Lake Placid Wildlife Environmental Area. Prepares annual work plans, budget proposals and performance reports. Monitors and documents population levels (trend) of various wildlife species. Coordinates hunting and other recreational activities. Applies various wildlife habitat practices. Petitioner possessed the minimum qualifications for position No. 1071. However, he did not possess the preferred degrees in wildlife management or ecology. He did not possess experience in wildlife management that was required for this position. Wildlife is defined as land-based mammals and birds. Petitioner's education and experience is almost entirely with marine species such as marine turtles, shrimp, or fishes. When hiring for the position of Biological Scientist III, Respondent focuses on an applicant's knowledge, skills, and abilities in performing wildlife population surveys and inventories, working hunter check stations, collecting biological samples from wildlife and upland mammals and game birds, and interacting with the public in exchanging information pertinent to wildlife. Respondent looks for an applicant with wildlife management experience and at least a bachelor's degree or higher in wildlife management and science. The CSPD for position No. 1071, states as follows in relevant part: Area Responsibilities: Duties and responsibilities include the direct involvement in the development and implementation of management programs for the KICCO Wildlife Management Area. . . . Management Planning: Duties and responsibilities include coordination of the development and periodic revision of long-range, comprehensive management plans for the KICCO Wildlife Management Area. . . . Program Development: Duties include supervision, coordination and direct involvement in projects to accomplish management of wildlife, timber, range and water resources. The job includes the following responsibilities: Collection of biological data to evaluate wildlife population numbers and fluctuation and land responses to habitat management. Accomplishment of work in Commission-planned activities such as controlled burning, roller chopping, wildlife food-plot planting, public hunt management, etc. . . . Providing wildlife related recreational opportunities including consumptive and nonconsumptive [sic] uses where appropriate. . . . Supervision of one Biological Scientist II and occasional assistance with program development on the Arbuckle and IMC Wildlife Management Areas. * * * Technical Assistance: Duties and responsibilities include providing technical guidance to private citizens or other governmental agencies in wildlife or associated land management programs. Information - Education: Duties and responsibilities include developing programs to disseminate information on wildlife management, environmental awareness, and related subjects. . . . Endanger [sic] and Exotic Species: Duties and responsibilities include identification and protection of endangered species and habitats. Documents and recommends eradication programs for exotic plant species that endanger native habitat. Petitioner was not interviewed for position No. 1071. His application did not indicate that he had the required training and experience in wildlife management. There were 41 applicants for position No. 1071, including 26 males and 15 females. Seven of the applicants were known to be minorities, including two black males. Respondent interviewed four males and one female. One of the interviewed males was known to be of Asian or Pacific Island descent. The individual that Respondent selected for position No. 1071 was Dwight Myers, a white male, age unknown. Mr. Myers' effective hire date was July 11, 1997. Mr. Myers' education and experience exceeded the minimum qualifications for the job. Mr. Myers was more qualified for the position than Petitioner because of his training and experience in wildlife management. Petitioner received a non-selection letter dated June 30, 1997, for position No. 1071. Petitioner was not hired because he lacked the preferred experience and education in wildlife management. Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner based on his race, sex, or age in making an employment decision relative to position No. 1071. Position No. 869 Petitioner applied for position No. 869, Biological Scientist III. The JOA for this position states that the minimum qualifications include the following: A bachelor's degree with a major in one of the biological sciences and two years of professional biological experience in a field or laboratory program; or a master's degree in one of the biological sciences and one year of professional biological experience as described above; or a doctorate in one of the biological sciences. Degree(s) in wildlife management or ecology are preferred. The duties for position No. 869 are set forth as follows in the JOA: Develops and implements management plans for the Osceola Wildlife Environmental Area. Prepares annual work plans, budget proposals and performance reports. Monitors and documents population levels (trend) of various wildlife species. Coordinates hunting and other recreational activities. Applies various wildlife habitat practices. Petitioner possessed the minimum qualifications for position No. 869. However, he did not possess the preferred degrees in wildlife management or ecology. He did not possess experience in wildlife management that was required for this position. As stated above, Petitioner's education and experience is almost entirely with marine species such as marine turtles, shrimp, or fishes, and not with land-based mammals and birds. When hiring for position No. 869, Petitioner focused on the same knowledge, skills, and abilities as when hiring for position No. 1071. Respondent was looking for an applicant with wildlife management experience and at least a bachelor's degree or higher in wildlife management and science. The CSPD for position No. 869 states as follows in relevant part: WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA RESPONSIBILITIES PUBLIC HUNTING AND RECREATION Plan, implements and directs activities required for managing all public hunts on the Osceola, Bienville-PC Phosphate, Lake Butler an Cypress Creek WMAs. Hires, trains and supervises eight to ten seasonal employees; moves check stations to operational locations; collects biological data at check stations; disseminates information about wildlife to the public . . POPULATION MONITORING, MANAGEMENT AND BIOLOGICAL SAMPLING Database Management - Maintains detailed databases and up-to-date summary tables of all species monitored and all wildlife management activities on areas. Conducts sophisticated data analyses and develops Annual Management Reports. Wildlife Population Monitoring - Develops, administers and conducts surveys for monitoring and documenting population levels and status of selected game, migratory, threatened and endangered, and selected nongame [sic] species. Conducts annual population surveys for white-tailed deer, bobwhite quail and bobcats. Wildlife Population Management - Uses results of the population monitoring and analyses to develop options and recommendations to manage the population of species monitored. Actions could take the form of either regulatory or habitat management. Biological Sampling - Plans, directs and participates in the collection of biological samples for both live and hunter-harvested animals. Analyses those samples and provides reports summarizing the findings and conclusions. Specialized knowledge of collection procedures is required. Research - Coordinates wildlife research projects that may be conducted on the areas. This includes the live capture of wild animals and collection and maintenance of accurate records. . . . Analyzes large data bases to determine correlations and relationships with environmental factors and management actions. FACILITIES Maintenance and Habitat Management * * * Technical Assistance - Provides technical assistance to the US Forest Service regarding wildlife management including written comments on actions that will affect the quality of the habitat. Habitat Manipulation and Enhancement - Assists the US Forest Service with their habitat manipulation projects on Osceola WMA when time permits. Petitioner was not interviewed for position No. 869. His application did not indicate that he had any wildlife training or experience. There were 99 applicants for position No. 869, including 77 males and 22 females. Fourteen of the applicants were known to be minorities, including three black males and one black female. Respondent interviewed one white male and one male of Indian descent. The individual that Respondent selected for position No. 869 was Forrest Marchinton, a white male, age unknown. Mr. Marchinton's effective hire date was March 3, 1997. There is no specific evidence regarding Mr. Marchinton's education and experience for the job. However, there is evidence that all persons selected for wildlife biologist positions had education and experience in wildlife/environmental science. Petitioner received a non-selection letter dated February 13, 1997, for position No. 869. Petitioner lacked the preferred experience and education in wildlife management or ecology for the job. Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner based on his race, sex, or age in making an employment decision relative to position No. 869. Position No. 878 Petitioner did not file a completed application for position No. 878, Biological Scientist IV. He only filed a resume. The application deadline for JOA #029-7 was July 7, 1997. Petitioner testified that he received a non-selection letter from Respondent on August 11, 1997. That letter is not in evidence. The JOA for position No. 878 states that the minimum qualifications include the following: A bachelor's degree with a major in one of the biological sciences and three years of professional biological experience in a field or laboratory program; or a master's degree in one of the biological sciences and two year's of professional biological experience as described above; or a doctorate in one of the biological sciences. Prefer: Experience in geographic information systems, especially ARC/INFO, ARC VIEW, ERDAS IMAGE, and UNIX. The duties for position No. 878 are set forth as follows in the JOA: Obtains information, such as known occurrences of rare species of fish and wildlife, and ancillary data such as political boundaries, public land boundaries, soils, land cover, roads, hydrology, land use, etc., from outside sources and import/convert the data for use in the GFC geographic information system (GIS). Reviews scientific literature to obtain information on species requirements. Serves as the systems administrator for the GIS networked computer system. Provides technical assistance to Commission biologists, other agencies, and the public in the form of digital data and/or hard copy maps of GIS data layers. The CSPD for position No. 878 states as follows: This is a professional position responsible for investigating and analyzing fish and wildlife population dynamics and ecology as they relate to existing and proposed restoration and management activities in the Lake Okeechobee-Everglades-Florida Bay system. Serves on interagency committees, as assigned, to ensure that fish and wildlife issues are adequately addressed during restoration and management efforts. Independently seeks out background information and makes contacts with experts in various related fields in order to address these issues competently. Conducts field inspections, as necessary, to document habitat condition and existing fish and wildlife resources. Drafts agency comments and policy for supervisory review. Keeps supervisor up to date on progress of projects and committees. Analyzes effects of past, current, and proposed restoration and management programs on the population dynamics and ecology of freshwater fish and wildlife species. Conducts field inspections to document habitat conditions and existing fish and wildlife resources of affected communities. Designs and conducts limited scientific monitoring and research projects on aspects of Everglades habitat restoration and management alternatives, and the response of fish and wildlife communities to habitat management actions. Prepares project reports and manuscripts for scientific publication and public presentation. Reviews development proposals that would affect the restoration of the Everglades system. This includes conducting field inspections to document habitat conditions and existing fish and wildlife resources of affected communities, and drafting agency comments and policy for supervisory review. Petitioner possessed the minimum qualifications for position No. 878, as set forth in the JOA. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner had the required experience in geographic information systems to perform the job. Likewise, Petitioner clearly did not have the training and experience to fulfill the specific responsibilities and duties of the job as set forth in the CSPD as they relate to freshwater fish and wildlife. Petitioner presented no evidence as whether Respondent ever filled position No. 878 or continued to seek applications for the job after sending Petitioner a rejection letter. Even if Respondent made such a selection, Petitioner presented no evidence as the race, age, or gender of the selected individual. There is no evidence that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in making an employment decision in regards to position No. 878. Position No. 2503 Position No. 2503, Research Scientist, was advertised by DEP for FMRI in JOA #97-102 on January 6, 1997 with an application deadline of January 30, 1997. The JOA states as follows in relevant part: MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS: A bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university with major course of study in one of the physical or natural sciences or mathematics and five years of professional experience in one of the physical or natural sciences or mathematics; or a master's degree from an accredited college or university with major course of study in one of the physical or natural sciences or mathematics and four years of professional experience as described above; or a doctorate from an accredited college or university with a major course of study in one of the physical or natural sciences or natural sciences or mathematics and two years of professional experience as described above. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: Prefer working knowledge of age-structured fisheries models, familiarity with SAS, dexterity with PCs, and knowledge of life history and ecology of marine fish species. * * * BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF JOB DUTIES: Develop single and multi-species assessments of Florida's East Coast fisheries integrating research on life history, fishery monitoring, ecological and habit surveys and human behavior. Develop mathematical techniques to accomplish the above duties. Prepares reports and manuscripts for resource managers. Participates in preparation of management plans. REQUIRED ENTRY-LEVEL KNOWLEDGE, SKILL(S), & ABILITIES: Knowledge of: population assessment techniques; simulation modeling; and statistics. Ability to: process and analyze data; produce technical reports and manuscripts; develop presentations from scientific data; plan and coordinate research; design and test sampling methods; and to communicate effectively verbally and in writing. Skill in the use of a programming language, modeling software, word processing and spreadsheet software. The CSPD for position No. 2503 states as follows: Independently integrate data from directed research studies on the life history or population dynamics of marine fishes, fishery monitoring programs, ecological and habitat surveys and human behavior into single and multi-species assessments of Florida's East Coast fisheries issues. Monitor the status of selected marine fisheries and analyze how well Florida's management goals are being met. Independently design and test new mathematical techniques to accomplish the above duties. Keep current on relevant literature. Attend courses and workshops pertaining to mathematical analyses of fisheries data. Assist with the coordination and implementation of all fisheries research and monitoring programs. Assist with the design and testing of sampling techniques for fisheries programs. Prepare reports and peer-reviewed manuscripts on findings from the above analyses. Prepare stock assessments and special reports for Florida's marine resource managers. Review and evaluate reports, in the preparation of management plans for federal fisheries contiguous to Florida. Advise and assist other departmental, governmental, institutional, or private agencies in matters related to the above research. Participate in the public outreach efforts as appropriate. Assist in other Institute activities as requested. Knowledge, Skill(s), and Ability(ies): List any entry level knowledge, skill(s) or ability(ies) relating to this position including utilization of equipment. KSAs identified in this section are considered essential function(s). Knowledge of: population assessment techniques; simulation modeling; and statistics. Ability to process and analyze data; produce technical reports and manuscripts; and develop presentations from scientific data; plan and coordinate research; design and test sampling methods; and to communicate effectively verbally and in writing. Skill in the use of a programming language, modeling software, word processing and spreadsheet software. DEP's Selection Criteria Form for position No. 2503 lists the following as essential knowledge, abilities, and skills: Knowledge of: population assessment techniques; simulation modeling; and statistics: Ability to: communicate effectively in writing and verbally; process, analyze, produce technical reports and manuscripts; develop presentation from scientific data; plan and coordinate research; and design and test sampling methods. Skill in the use of: a programming language; modeling software; and word processing and spreadsheet software. DEP's Selection Criteria Form for position No. 2503 lists the following as preferred essential knowledge and skills: Knowledge of: age-structured fisheries models Skill in the use of: personal computers DEP had 51 applicants for this position. The agency interviewed six of the applicants. Five of the interviewed candidates were white. One candidate was of Asian descent. Five of the interviewed candidates were male. One was female. Two of the interviewed candidates were over the age of 40. Four of the candidates were DEP employees. Petitioner applied for this position but did not receive an invitation for an interview. DEP sent him an undated non-selection letter, which states that the position had been offered to an applicant whose overall background most closely fit the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for the position. Petitioner met the minimum qualifications set forth in the JOA for position No. 2503. Persuasive evidence indicates that he did not have the necessary training and experience to perform the specific assessment modeling techniques in order to perform the job. A white male and a white female, who were already employed by FMRI, were not interviewed for the same reason. DEP selected Gil McRae, an FMRI employee, for position No. 2503 with an effective hire date of March 24, 1997. Mr. McRae was a white male under the age of 40. He had a M.S. in Fisheries Statistics and more than enough professional experience to meet the minimum qualifications for the job. He had been an Associate Research Scientist with DEP for fifteen months. Of all the applicants, Mr. McRae had the most knowledge and the best skills and abilities to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position. There is no persuasive evidence that DEP discriminated against Petitioner in making an employment decision relative to position No. 2503. Finally, there is no persuasive evidence that Respondent's staff ever told Petitioner that he would not be considered for a job because he had a doctorate. He was never advised that an interview with Respondent equated to a job offer. Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence that Respondent or DEP changed job classifications or varied conditions of employment to discriminate against Petitioner based on his race, gender, or age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ausbon Brown, Jr. Post Office Box 10946 Daytona Beach, Florida 32120-0946 Preston T. Robertson, Esquire Sharman H. Green, Esquire Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Bryant Building 620 South Meridian Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent's License to practice veterinary medicine should be revoked or suspended for alleged violations of Sections 474.31(6) & 474.31(12), Florida Statutes. An Order was issued on December 5, 1975, consolidating this case for hearing with the case of Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine vs. Cristobal M. Gonzalez Mayo, D.V.M., Docket No. 751925, because the cases involve similar issues of law and fact. At the hearing, Respondent was advised of his right to employ legal counsel to represent him at his own expense and he elected to represent himself. He also was advised of other rights under the Administrative Procedure Act, including the right to testify as a witness, if he so desired. Respondent indicated his understanding of these rights as explained to him by the Hearing Officer.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds license no. 231 issued by the State of Florida, Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Board of Veterinary Medicine, which he received on March 30, 1944. The license is currently in effect (Petitioner's Exhibit l). Respondent has been a veterinarian for some 29 years and practices his profession at 3520 N.W. 36th Street, Miami, Florida (Testimony of McGee). Respondent employed Sergio Gutierrez, D.V.M., a veterinarian with approximately 25 years of experience, but who was not then licensed by the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine, on December 6, 1974, for a period of approximately 3 months. At the time he was hired, Dr. Gutierrez exhibited various licenses from other jurisdictions to the Respondent and the latter gained the impression that Dr. Gutierrez held a temporary Florida license, even though he did not ask that it be shown to him. At that time, Dr. Gutierrez had submitted his license application to the Board of Veterinary Medicine, but it had not been acted upon by the Board (Testimony of Gutierrez, McGee). On December 6, 1974, James Gillece, an investigator with the Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, took a cat to the Respondent's place of business in order to investigate a complaint that an unlicensed veterinarian was employed there. Upon arrival, he informed the receptionist that the cat was sick and asked her assistance. He was referred to Dr. Gutierrez who gave the cat inoculations for rabies and distemper. Gillece thereupon paid $19.00 for the services and received a receipt. He returned on December 13, presented his identification to Dr. Gutierrez and asked him if he was licensed to practice veterinary medicine. Dr. Gutierrez informed him that, although he was licensed in 40 states, he was not so licensed in Florida. Although Respondent was not present when the cat was treated, Dr. Gutierrez testified that Respondent exercised general supervision over his activities during his employment (Testimony of Gillece, Gutierrez, McGee) On March,4, 1975, Chery Lynn Correa, along with Dr. Calvin Dugas, D.V.M., both employees of the Knowles Animal Hospital in Miami took a Doberman Pinscher to Respondent's Clinic. Their visit was prompted by a request of their employer, Dr. Knowles, who had asked them to check a complaint that there were unlicensed veterinarians working for the Respondent. Without disclosing their purpose, Correa informed the Respondent's receptionist that she had brought the dog to get rabies and distemper shots and to have some bumps on its neck checked. She and Dr. Dugas were referred to Dr. Cristobal Gonzalez Mayo, in the treatment room. Mayo checked the dog and told them that the bumps were due to an improper diet. He then administered inoculations for rabies and distemper and checked the animal for worms. He also looked at the dog's throat and diagnosed tonsilitis for which he prescribed tetracycline pills. He also procured liquid shampoo called Tergex for a skin problem and gave instructions to bathe the dog once a week. He gave two more injections of antibiotics and cortisone. The receptionist signed Respondent's name to the certificate of rabies vaccination and to a form for issuance of a Dade County dog tag. Dr. Mayo signed Respondent's name to a Canine Interstate Health Certificate reflecting the administration of the inoculations. Correa paid the bill of $43.00 and then she and Dr. Dugas departed. During the time they were at Respondent's clinic, they did not see the Respondent on the premises (Testimony of Correa, Dugas, Petitioner's Exhibit 3). However, Respondent was in the back office at the time in question suffering from a headache and had asked his receptionist, to have Dr. Mayo give routine shots to animals during the day and only call him if a diagnosis was necessary. In view of Dr. Mayo's lack of a Florida license, Respondent did not permit him to diagnose, treat, or incise skin of an animal without supervision. In accordance with these directions, Respondent Mayo always checked with Respondent on a diagnosis and the latter would then prescribe the proper treatment. Dr. Mayo followed this procedure with respect to the dog brought to the clinic by Correa and received instructions from Respondent as to the treatment that was thereafter performed. Dr. Mayo was not licensed by the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine until, July 27, 1975. Respondent professed the belief at the hearing that since secretaries could sign distemper and rabies certificates, he felt Dr. Mayo could sign an interstate health certificate although he normally signed such documents himself. Dr. Mayo testified that he had worked for the local humane society for over nine years and, during that period, had signed his own name to interstate health certificates by authorization of the board of directors of the society. The receptionist took the interstate health certificate in question to Dr. Mayo to sign because he had administered the shots to the animal. She was unaware of the fact that he was unlicensed (Testimony of McGee, Mayo, Uriquize, Petitioner's Exhibit 2).
Recommendation That the charges against Harold M. McGee, D.V.M., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald C. LaFace, Esquire 101, E. College Avenue P.O. Box 1752 Tallahassee, Florida Harold M. McGee, D.V.Mp. Miami Veterinary Clinic 3520 Northwest 36th Street Miami, Florida 33142
