The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners on the basis of race, or retaliated against them for exercising a protected right, or both, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Because no evidence was admitted into the record at the final hearing, the undersigned cannot make any findings of fact. § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (“Findings of fact shall be based … exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters officially recognized.”).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Petitioners no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Antonio Carraway Whang Carraway 1406 Southwest Osprey Cove Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 (eServed) Jillian Sidisky, Esquire Stefanie S. Copelow, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 120 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of discriminatory housing practices based on his race or his handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this cause, Petitioner was a tenant of a rental apartment located at 284 South First Street, Apartment 6, Macclenny, Florida (the Apartment). Petitioner?s tenancy was established by a lease agreement with a final effective date of November 24, 2009. Petitioner moved out of the apartment on May 3, 2012. Respondent is a Florida Limited Liability Company. Among its other holdings, Respondent owns four 4-plex units located on First Street, Second Street, and Third Street in Macclenny, one of which includes the Apartment. The racial make-up of the tenants occupying Respondent?s apartments in the vicinity is roughly 50 percent African-American and 50 percent Caucasian. Petitioner is African-American. Petitioner has an unspecified mental condition. He takes medications for management of his symptoms, and receives periodic visits from Ms. Gadsby to ensure that he is complying with his medication regimen. Petitioner does not receive disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. Petitioner holds a bachelor?s degree in criminal justice from Benedict College in South Carolina. As part of the application for rental of the Apartment, Petitioner was asked “[h]ave you been arrested or had criminal charges filed against you? (If yes, please list them).” In response to the application question, Petitioner answered “yes Trepass [sic.].” The trespass charge was related to a misdemeanor incident that occurred at an unspecified time in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Petitioner failed to disclose a felony conviction for an incident that had occurred in South Carolina. Petitioner stated that he thought the requirement to disclose criminal charges applied only to charges arising from incidents having occurred in Florida. However, nothing in the application can be read to support that limitation. As such, Petitioner materially falsified his lease application. Petitioner cut hair for members of his church, neighbors, family, and friends at the Apartment, and had done so for the two-and-one-half years of his tenancy. He equipped the Apartment with a barber chair and a small waiting area. He accepted “donations” of food, clothes, and cash for his services. The cash receipts were used to pay his electric and water bills, among other things. Thus, despite its small scale and limited clientele, Petitioner operated what can only be described as a barbershop from the Apartment. The Lease Agreement between Petitioner and Respondent provides that the Apartment was not to be used “for any other purpose than as a private dwelling unit.” The Lease Agreement also provides that Petitioner was to comply with all applicable building and housing codes. The Macclenny Code of Ordinances, Part III, Section 4-105, provides that home occupations are subordinate and incidental to a residential neighborhood, but that certain occupations, including barbershops, “shall not be considered as home occupations under any circumstance.” Thus, Petitioner?s operation of a barbershop from the Apartment was a violation of the Lease Agreement. There were no apparent landlord/tenant disputes involving Petitioner?s tenancy until late 2011. Mr. Stivender testified that he began to receive periodic complaints from tenants in the area regarding the Apartment, including cars being parked on the grass and in the road, loud music, and people milling about the premises. He testified that at least one tenant advised Respondent that she was afraid to venture out of her apartment due to the number of people in the area. The testimony of Mr. Stivender regarding complaints of other tenants would be hearsay if taken for the truth of the matters asserted. However, the undersigned accepts his testimony as evidence, not of the facts surrounding the alleged complaints, but of a non-discriminatory reason for actions to be described herein, most notably the events of March 6, 2012. At the end of October 2011, Petitioner was cited by Respondent for having more than one car regularly parked at the Apartment. Petitioner?s car was not in running condition. The other cars parked at the Apartment belonged to friends or relatives. Petitioner subsequently sold his vehicle, and would borrow his father?s or his cousin?s car when needed. The incident caused bad feelings between the parties. On November 1, 2011, Respondent sent a notice to each of its tenants in Macclenny. Although the notice was precipitated by the complaints against Petitioner and Respondent?s observations of activities in and around the Apartment, the notice was not limited to Petitioner. The notice cited provisions of the common lease agreement regarding the use of the premises and tenant conduct, and advised that excessive noise, driving on the grass, and “loitering” would be cause for eviction. The notice further advised that the landlord would “be patrolling the area on a regular basis at night to check for violations.” On March 6, 2012, Mr. Ferreria was driving by the Apartment at approximately 10:30 p.m. There were, along with Petitioner and his daughter, three guests at the Apartment, Bianca Gaines-Givens, Jacoby Givens, and Misty Lee. They were playing music on an electronic keyboard. Mr. Ferreria stopped his car on the side of the road. He called his property manager, Mr. Stivender, and advised him that he was going to go speak with Petitioner about the noise coming from the Apartment. Mr. Stivender works for a gas company, and was at work routing gas trucks. Mr. Stivender advised that he was going to come to the Apartment, and asked Mr. Ferreria to wait for him before speaking with Petitioner. Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens left the Apartment after Mr. Ferreria?s arrival in the neighborhood, and noticed Mr. Ferreria sitting in his vehicle. They drove away from the Apartment, but decided to return shortly thereafter. By the time they returned, Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender were leaving. Thus, they did not witness the confrontation described herein. After Ms. Gaines-Givens and Mr. Jacoby Givens drove off, Mr. Ferreria, disregarding Mr. Stivender?s request, went to the Apartment and knocked on the door. It was, by then, approximately 10:45 p.m. When Petitioner answered the door, the two immediately began a heated discussion over the music and the cars. Ms. Lee went to the back of the Apartment when Mr. Ferreria arrived. She heard yelling, but heard nothing of a racial nature. Shortly after Mr. Ferreria arrived at the Apartment, Mr. Stivender arrived on the scene. Mr. Stivender is a solidly built man, and could be an intimidating presence under the right circumstances. These were the right circumstances. Mr. Stivender physically moved Mr. Ferreria out of the way, and came between Mr. Ferreria and Petitioner. He was primed for a confrontation. He had his hand in his pocket, but testified convincingly that he was not armed.1/ He and Petitioner had a loud and angry exchange of words, and Mr. Stivender forcefully suggested to Petitioner that it would probably be best if he moved out of the Apartment. After Mr. Stivender appeared on the scene, Ms. Lee came out from the back of the Apartment. She recognized Mr. Stivender as Respondent?s “office manager.” She noted that Mr. Stivender had his hand in his pocket, and was talking loudly and pointing his finger in Petitioner?s face. Ms. Lee went outside and spoke with Mr. Ferreria. She testified that Mr. Ferreria indicated that some of the neighbors were afraid of Petitioner because of the noise and the number of people who hung around the Apartment. The confrontation ended with Mr. Ferreria and Mr. Stivender leaving the premises. The police were not called. The next morning, Petitioner called Ms. Gadsby. Petitioner frequently called Ms. Gadsby when he was feeling “stressed.” She went to see him that morning, and testified that he was very upset over the events of the previous evening. She returned that afternoon for a “well-check,” and he was doing better. On March 15, 2012, Petitioner called the Baker County Sheriff?s Office to report the March 6, 2012, incident. A deputy went to the Apartment, spoke with Petitioner and Ms. Lee, took their sworn statements, and prepared an offense report. The description of the incident as reflected in the report, including statements made by Petitioner and Ms. Lee, did not contain any account of racial threats or epithets, or any allegation of discriminatory intent based on race or handicap.2/ Other than Mr. Stivender?s statement made in the heat of the March 6 argument, Respondent made no effort to evict or otherwise remove Petitioner from the Apartment. On March 31, 2012, Petitioner noticed water coming from behind a wall of the Apartment. He called Respondent, and Mr. Stivender came to the Apartment to inspect. Mr. Stivender first suspected that the air-conditioning unit was leaking. The air conditioner was turned off and Mr. Stivender left, intending to contact an air-conditioning repair service. By 6:00 p.m. on March 31, 2012, the rate of the leak was such that it was determined that a water pipe had burst under the foundation of the Apartment. Petitioner did not know where the shut-off valve was located, and was unable to stop the flow, which began to cover the floor in several rooms of the Apartment. Mr. Stivender returned to the Apartment, and determined that a car owned by one of Petitioner?s guests was parked on the grass, and was over the meter box with the shut- off valve. The car was moved, and the water turned off. Respondent called a plumber to fix the pipe. Since the pipe was under the foundation, and in order to avoid breaking up the slab, the repair was accomplished by re-routing the pipe in the wall of the Apartment. The repair entailed cutting an access hole in the drywall. That hole was not immediately repaired. Respondent also called Servpro to perform water cleanup services. The standing water was vacuumed up, and large fans and dehumidifiers were placed in the Apartment to dry it out. While the repairs and drying activities were ongoing, Respondent paid for Petitioner and his daughter to stay in a motel in Macclenny. They were there for three to four days. Respondent paid Petitioner?s power bill for the days that Petitioner was unable to use the Apartment. Petitioner returned to the Apartment, and stayed there for some time. He was upset that the access hole for the pipe repair had not been closed up, and that the baseboards had not been replaced in some areas. On April 9, 2012, Petitioner wrote to Respondent about the effects of the water leak. After thanking Respondent for the “compassion” shown to Petitioner and his family during the event, he complained about the damage to his personal property resulting from the water leak, and an odor “suggesting the presence of mold.” He stated his belief that his daughter?s preexisting asthma was aggravated by the smell in the Apartment. In his April 9, 2012, letter, Petitioner also stated that “due to my mental health condition, I am on prescribed medicine that has now been adjusted to assist me through this stressful situation.” Petitioner?s statement, which was not accompanied by any form of medical evidence, was not sufficient to place Respondent on notice that Petitioner had a record of having, or was regarded as having, any form of mental disability. Mr. Stivender testified that no one ever advised Respondent that Petitioner had a mental disability, and that Respondent had no such knowledge. The April 9, 2012, letter being insufficient on its own to convey such information, Mr. Stivender?s testimony is credited. On May 3, 2012, Petitioner moved out of the Apartment. He had been served with no eviction notice or other written request to vacate. Petitioner gave no notice to Respondent, but dropped off his key at Mr. Ferreria?s business on the day he moved out. Mr. Stivender testified that Petitioner left the Apartment in a filthy, deplorable condition. As a result, Respondent withheld Petitioner?s $400.00 security deposit to offset the costs of returning the Apartment to rentable condition. Petitioner testified that the Apartment was not in poor condition when he moved out, and that some of the damage was the result of the pipe leak. However, Petitioner did not testify, or even suggest, that the decision to withhold the deposit was the result of any racial hostility or animus, or of any reaction to his handicap. Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence that he was treated differently under similar circumstances than were tenants of Respondent who were not African-American, or who did not have comparable mental disabilities. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent undertook any act pertaining to Petitioner?s occupancy of the Apartment based on Petitioner?s race. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent knew of Petitioner?s mental disability or handicap, or that Respondent regarded Petitioner as having any such mental disability or handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Petitioner?s race or handicap caused or contributed to the March 6, 2012, confrontation. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the confrontation resulted from noise, issues with cars and parking, and complaints directed to Petitioner by other tenants. Petitioner failed to prove that he was ready, willing, and able to continue to rent the Apartment, but that Respondent refused to allow him to do so. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent took any action to evict him from the Apartment, or to otherwise intentionally interfere with Petitioner?s occupancy of the premises. To the contrary, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent took reasonable and appropriate steps to repair and remediate the Apartment after the water line break, and provided no-cost accommodations to Petitioner while the Apartment was not habitable. The repairs may not have been completed to Petitioner?s satisfaction, but any such deficiency was not the result of discrimination against Petitioner based on his race or his handicap. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent?s decision to withhold his security deposit was based on Petitioner?s race or handicap. In sum, the evidence did not establish that Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with his dwelling based on his race or his handicap.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2013H0034. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference in the exercise of her rights in connection with Respondent?s regulatory actions regarding rental property owned by Petitioner, in violation of section 818 of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2011).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, an African-American woman, owns and manages a residential tri-plex rental unit located at 302 Dubs Drive, Holly Hill, Florida. Dubs Drive is zoned R-2 single-family residential. Petitioner?s tri-plex was constructed in 1955, and is grandfathered as a non-conforming use. The other houses on Dubs Drive are newer, and are all single-family homes. Petitioner purchased the tri-plex in 1998. At the time of her purchase, the tri-plex consisted of a single-story building with 3 apartments and two garages, and was configured, from south to north, as a two-bedroom apartment, a two-bedroom apartment, a one-bedroom apartment, a garage with a washer/dryer connection, and a garage with a toilet. The garages had drywall interiors, except that the ceilings lacked drywall. After she purchased the tri-plex, Petitioner hired Arthur Kowitz, a realtor, to manage the property for her. He performed management services from the time of the purchase until 2001. Mr. Kowitz is white. In 2001, Petitioner retained All-Florida Realtors to manage the property. All-Florida performed management services from 2001 to 2004. All-Florida is a white-owned company. In 2004, Petitioner retained John Benzette to manage the property. Mr. Benzette performed management services from 2004 through November 2007. Mr. Benzette is white. In 2004, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a permit to install an electric meter at the tri-plex. The purpose of the meter was not to serve the apartments -- each of which already had meters by which the tenants individually received and paid for service -- but was a “house meter” or “landlord?s meter” for exterior lighting, garage lighting and outlets, and other uses common to the tri-plex. The permit was issued, and the meter was installed. During one of the 2005 hurricanes that hit the area, the meter was knocked off of the unit by falling debris. It was not reinstalled at that time. The property managers from 1998 through 2007 were responsible for general maintenance and repair activities. Those types of activities did not require building permits. From the time she purchased the tri-plex in 1998, until 2008, the unit was not subject to any formal code-enforcement actions by Respondent. Starting in December, 2007, Petitioner began managing the tri-plex on her own. One of the first activities she performed as owner/manager was the conversion of the garage on the northern end of the building -- separated from the apartments by the other garage -- to a living space. That was accomplished by removing the garage door, constructing a block wall with a window and exterior door, completing interior drywall work, and installing a shower. Petitioner did not apply for or receive a building permit for the work. As part of the construction, Petitioner had the electric meter that was knocked off in 2005 renovated and reinstalled onto the unit. When Petitioner requested service from Florida Power & Light, Florida Power & Light contacted Respondent to confirm a legal connection. Respondent sent employees Mark Ballard and Tim Harbuck to the tri-plex. At that time, it was determined that Petitioner had performed construction without a building permit. Respondent?s employees initially thought the new living space was to be rented as a fourth apartment, an act that would have constituted an unallowable expansion of the non- conforming use of the property. Their belief was not unreasonable, as the configuration of the converted garage was conducive to its being used as a separate apartment, and since Petitioner subsequently placed a “For Rent” sign on the unit, despite the fact that she was living in apartment #3 at the time. However, Petitioner has denied that the rental of the converted garage as a separate unit was her intent, but that the converted garage was intended as an added room for apartment #3. Regardless of whether the conversion of the garage was intended to result in a separate apartment, the construction required a building permit. As a result of the determination that the construction was not permitted, the meter was removed on February 8, 2008. The requirement that the meter be removed, despite the 2004 permit, was not related to Petitioner?s race, but was related to the unauthorized construction and intended use of the converted garage. On April 25, 2008, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice to Appear at a hearing before a special magistrate. The notice provided that the purpose of the hearing was the “violation of City Ordinance Building Permit Required.” The hearing was set for May 14, 2008. Petitioner asserted that she called the telephone number printed on the notice to ascertain the purpose of the May 14, 2008, hearing. She alleged that she was told by an unnamed city employee that the hearing was to be held regarding issues pertaining to her rental license. The evidence of the call was entirely hearsay, and was not corroborated by any non- hearsay evidence. Regardless of the substance of the telephone call, the notice plainly stated that the purpose of the hearing was related to a required building permit. The hearing was held as scheduled on May 14, 2008. At the hearing, Petitioner was advised that the subject of the hearing was the unpermitted construction at the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner, claiming to have had no knowledge of the subject of the hearing, requested a continuance to retain an attorney to represent her. The request was denied. At the hearing, it was determined that, at a minimum, Petitioner removed the garage door, blocked up the front of the garage and installed a door and window in its place to convert it to living space, and installed a shower. On May 22, 2008, the special magistrate entered an Order of Non-Compliance in which he concluded that Petitioner violated the Holly Hill Zoning Ordinance requiring a building permit for the work done on the property, required Petitioner to obtain a building permit, and imposed an administrative fine of $250.00. If the corrective measures were not taken, or the fine was not paid, the Order authorized an additional penalty of $150.00 per day, and authorized Respondent to place a lien on the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner was warned that she was not to use the renovated garage as a separate dwelling unit, but could only use it as an addition to apartment #3. The action by Respondent to enforce its building code was entirely appropriate, and was undertaken with all due process rights having been afforded to Petitioner. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s reaction to Petitioner?s unpermitted construction, or that Respondent failed to enforce its building code, including permit requirements, against similarly-situated property owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Petitioner paid the administrative fine on June 2, 2008, and received the after-the-fact building permit on June 10, 2008. On September 5, 2008, Respondent placed a lien on the Dubs Drive location based on its mistaken belief that Petitioner had failed to pay the $250.00 administrative fine. The notice of lien letter was received by Petitioner on November 18, 2008. Petitioner advised Respondent that she had paid the fine. Ms. Sue Meeks confirmed that the fine was paid, and Respondent promptly recorded a satisfaction of lien. The evidence indicates that the decision to record the lien was a bureaucratic error that was immediately corrected. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race was Respondent?s motive for recording the lien. A business tax receipt is required for each of the three apartments at the Dubs Drive location in order for Petitioner to engage in the business of real estate rental. Authorization for the business tax receipt was adopted by ordinance by Respondent in July, 2000, and is applicable to all rental units in the city of the type owned by Petitioner. Prior to July 2000, Respondent did not require an owner of a small rental location to obtain a business tax receipt. The business tax receipt ordinance required Respondent to perform annual inspections of businesses within its municipal boundaries. The inspections were started in 2000 or 2001. Business tax receipts are issued for a term from October 1 to September 30 of each year. If a business tax receipt is not renewed on time, Respondent is authorized to assess a 25 percent penalty, plus additional filing fees. For 2008-2009, Petitioner timely paid the business tax receipts for apartment Nos. 1 and 2. The tax was $45.00 for each apartment. Petitioner failed to pay the business tax receipt for apartment #3 until March 2009, after the renewal date had passed. Therefore, a penalty and additional filing fees were assessed which raised the business tax receipt fee for that apartment to $70.00. Petitioner alleged that Respondent “overcharged” her for the apartment #3 business tax receipt, which she construed as evidence of a pattern of discrimination. The evidence demonstrates that the $70.00 charge was the result of Petitioner?s failure to timely renew, and was not the result of discrimination based on her race. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s assessment of late penalties and fees, or that Respondent failed to assess such late penalties and fees against similarly-situated rental apartment owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. On or about February 6, 2009, Respondent issued a violation notice alleging that Petitioner failed to renew her business tax receipt for apartment #1 and #2. The notice was posted on the doors of the apartments on February 10, 2009. The notice allowed three days to correct the violation, a period that had already passed when the notice was received. Petitioner had already paid the business tax receipt, and went to city hall to inquire about the violation notice. She was advised that her check, identified by Petitioner as check #486, had not been received. Petitioner went to Bank of America to stop payment on check #486, for which a banking fee of $30.00 was assessed. Upon her return to city hall, Petitioner was advised that a search had resulted in the discovery of check #486 on a city employee?s desk. It had not been cashed. Petitioner wrote a replacement check. Respondent credited Petitioner?s utility bill for $30.00 to reimburse her for the Bank of America stop-payment charge and the matter was resolved without further ado. Petitioner alleged that the incident was “harassment,” which she construed as further evidence of discrimination. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the violation notice was a minor bureaucratic error that was promptly corrected, and for which Petitioner was made financially whole. There is no evidence in the record that the incident was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On February 19, 2009, Petitioner wrote Respondent to express her belief that she was being overcharged for water. She had a single meter to serve the Dubs Drive tri-plex, but was being charged for three connections. In fact, Petitioner had three apartments. In such cases, Respondent bills for each unit served by a single “master meter.” The minimum bill per apartment includes 2000 gallons of water per month, with additional usage added as an additional charge. Respondent billed for three connections at the Dubs Drive location since at least 1997, prior to Petitioner?s purchase of the tri-plex. Petitioner inquired whether she could have separate meters installed for each apartment, rather than having minimum and total bills determined by the “master meter.” Respondent would not allow separate meters since the Dubs Drive tri-plex was a non-conforming use in a single-family zoned area, and the installation of separate meters would “enhance the non- conformity.” Respondent?s approach to billing for water in multi- family locations accounts for the demand created by three families versus one family. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent bills all multi-unit complexes in a manner to account for the demand of multiple family consumption on its water facilities. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s billing practice for water consumption was applied to Petitioner differently from any other multi-family facilities, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 3, 2009, as a result of an annual inspection conducted as part of the business tax receipt process, Respondent cited Petitioner for several deficiencies at the Dubs Drive tri-plex, including a lack of smoke alarms, some windows that would not open, and a lack of GFI (ground-fault interrupter) electrical outlets at one location in apartment #1, and two locations in apartment #2. GFI outlets are commonly known to prevent shocks, and are required at locations where the outlets may be exposed to water, e.g. kitchens and bathrooms. Petitioner installed the GFI outlets. There was no other sanction or penalty. There is no evidence in the record that the requirement that Petitioner install a reasonable and necessary safety feature in apartments being rented to others was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 24, 2009, during the follow-up compliance inspection of the tri-plex, one of Petitioner?s tenants advised the inspector that Petitioner had been living in the converted garage for two months, and was receiving mail in “mailbox #4” during that period. The use of the converted garage as a separate living unit would be a violation of Respondent?s zoning ordinance regarding limitations on the expansion of a non-conforming use, and would have violated the special magistrate?s Order entered at the May 14, 2008, hearing. As a result, Respondent issued violation notices to Petitioner on March 24, 2009, and March 27, 2009, each of which concerned the use of the converted garage as a separate living unit. The March 27, 2009, notice indicated that Petitioner and Respondent were “working to resolve” the issue. On March 31, 2009, Respondent provided Petitioner with a letter resolving the separate living unit issue that stated: This letter is to inform you of the requirements of Compliance in reference to 302 Dubs Ave. Your triplex must not be occupied by more than 3 separate families. The new addition on the north end of the building can be used in conjunction with #3, [b]ut can not be used as a separate unit. Mailbox #4 must be taken down within 45 Days of this date. (March 31, 2009) The letter contained nothing more than a straight-forward recitation of the terms and conditions applicable to the non- conforming residential structure. Respondent imposed no penalties or sanctions. There is no evidence to suggest that Respondent imposed terms or conditions on the use of the tri- plex different from any other similarly-situated non-conforming structure. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s response to the tenant?s statement that Petitioner was using the converted garage as a fourth apartment was either disproportionate under the circumstances, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On April 30, 2009, the tenants of apartment #2 wrote to Petitioner with a long list of complaints regarding the conditions at the apartment that, on their face, were very serious, and which included structural, electrical, plumbing, and safety issues. The couple that lived in the apartment was white. The fact that the tenants were white does not minimize the fact that their concerns were legitimate. Having received no response to their complaints, the tenants called Respondent about the living conditions. In accordance with Respondent?s routine practice regarding complaints, Ms. Meeks was dispatched to inspect the property. Her inspection of apartment #2 confirmed the tenant complaints. Ms. Meeks also inspected apartment #1 at the request of the tenants of that apartment, and noted problems with “the bottom of the walls pealing [sic.] off and has some kind of bugs that are biting the children that live there.” The tenants also provided Ms. Meeks with a list of dates on which they alleged Petitioner had been staying in the converted garage which, if true, would have indicated that Petitioner used the addition as a separate living unit for more than 50 days over a three-month period. Respondent sent Petitioner a letter detailing the problems observed during the inspection, and advising Petitioner that her issues would be taken up at a hearing before the Special Master on July 8, 2009. The letter was received by Petitioner on June 15, 2009. The time between the letter and the scheduled hearing was ample time for Petitioner to correct the problems. On June 24, 2009, Respondent served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear at the July 8, 2009, hearing. On June 25, 2009, and June 29, 2009, Respondent obtained written statements from the tenants of apartment #2 detailing the problems that they had encountered with their leased apartment. Their statements were consistent with their earlier descriptions and the results of the inspection. On July 7, 2009, Petitioner requested a continuance of the July 8, 2009, hearing due to the death of her father. The request was granted by notice dated July 15, 2009, and the hearing was continued to August 12, 2009. Respondent was directed to “bring proof of her father?s passing” to the August hearing. On July 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for the August 12, 2009, hearing. On August 12, 2009, a hearing was convened before the special magistrate. Petitioner was represented by counsel. At the hearing it was determined that the back door of apartment #2 had been replaced to the tenant?s satisfaction, though Petitioner failed to obtain a building permit for the same, and that the electrical issue with the GFI outlet and the water heater breaker had been resolved. It was ultimately determined to be in the best interest of all of the parties to have the tri-plex inspected by Respondent, and to reconvene the hearing in September, 2009. Petitioner asserted that the August 12, 2009, hearing was continued because a white tenant had not appeared at the hearing to testify against her. The record does not support that reason. An Order Continuing Case was entered on August 26, 2009. The Order noted that Petitioner had not produced evidence of her father?s death as instructed. On August 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for September 9, 2009. On August 18, 2009, Respondent conducted an inspection of the tri-plex. It was determined that some of the deficiencies identified in the June notice had been made, but others had not. The hearing was reconvened on September 9, 2009. Petitioner was represented by counsel. After considerable discussion, it was determined that Petitioner had substantially resolved the issues identified in the June notice, some more recently than others. The special magistrate assessed a $250.00 administrative fine for the initial items of non-compliance resulting in the need to have the hearings, and $300.00 for failure to make repairs within a reasonable period after the initial notice in June. Petitioner also produced a copy of her father?s obituary as proof of his death in July. An Order of Non-Compliance reciting the outcome of the hearing was entered on September 25, 2009. The Order was not appealed. Petitioner stated her belief that the requirement that she provide evidence of her father?s death to substantiate the basis for the July 7, 2009, request for continuance was imposed as a result of harassment and discrimination against her due to her race. Although the requirement that she produce an obituary or the like seems insensitive and unnecessary, there was no evidence that Petitioner?s race was the basis for the request, or that such a requirement was not imposed on all persons seeking a continuance of a code enforcement hearing, regardless of race. On November 4, 2009, the special magistrate, after having received evidence of the completion of the repairs from Respondent, entered an Order of Compliance by which he found all of the deficiencies at the Dubs Drive location had been satisfactorily resolved. Petitioner has alleged that the code enforcement actions taken by Respondent were part of a pattern of harassment and intimidation directed at her because of her race. She argued that her white property managers were not cited for violations, thus establishing evidence of racial bias. While it is true that some of the violations for which Petitioner was cited concerned issues that pre-dated Petitioner?s assumption of management duties in December 2007, e.g., the use of interior- grade doors being used as exterior doors and the lack of GFI outlets, there was no evidence that Respondent ever noticed those deficiencies, or that any tenant had ever complained. The evidence demonstrates that the triggering event that drew the attention of Respondent?s code enforcement section was not Petitioner?s race, but was Petitioner?s unpermitted conversion of the garage into living space. The other triggering event was the complaint filed with Respondent by Petitioner?s tenants that alleged crumbling infrastructure, including the very poor condition of the exterior doors. Both incidents properly resulted in thorough inspections. There was no event at the Dubs Drive location prior to December 2007, that would have resulted in increased scrutiny. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Respondent?s actions were reasonable and appropriate responses to conditions at the Dubs Drive location that were brought to its attention by the actions of Petitioner and her tenants, conditions for which Respondent would have been remiss had it failed to act. The evidence in this proceeding does not support a finding that Respondent?s actions were taken due to Petitioner?s race. The evidence produced at the hearing contained not a shred of competent, substantial evidence that would support a finding that Respondent took any action regarding the Dubs Drive tri-plex because of Petitioner?s race. Rather, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent was appropriately exercising its police powers to ensure that rental dwelling units within its jurisdiction are safe and sanitary. If anything, Respondent and the special magistrate treated Petitioner with considerable patience, restraint, and leniency given the nature of the non- compliance resulting from the unpermitted renovations, and from the delays in making necessary repairs to the property. Petitioner?s dated signature on the Housing Discrimination Complaint that forms the basis for this proceeding indicates that Petitioner filed her initial complaint of discrimination no earlier than August 31, 2010. However, the HUD Determination gives two dates on which Petitioner supposedly filed her complaint -- August 13, 2010, and September 2, 2009. Given the findings and conclusions herein that Respondent had no racial animus or bias in its actions regarding Petitioner -- going back to the December 2007 date on which Petitioner assumed her property management duties -- it is not necessary to determine which of the dates is accurate. However, to the extent it were to become an issue with regard to the application of the jurisdictional limits established by section 760.34(2), the most persuasive evidence demonstrates that Petitioner filed her Housing Discrimination Complaint on or after August 31, 2010. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent took any regulatory, utility billing, or code enforcement action regarding Petitioner, or the Dubs Drive location, in an effort to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with Petitioner in the exercise of her rights as an owner of rental housing due to Petitioner?s race. Respondent?s actions were, in each instance, a legitimate response to unpermitted building activities, a correct application of Respondent?s ordinances, or a reasonable response to complaints filed by Petitioner?s tenants. At worst, Respondent committed two minor bureaucratic errors that were quickly resolved, and for which Petitioner suffered no loss. There was no evidence that Respondent applied its code enforcement ordinances or policies in its dealings with Petitioner in a manner that was inconsistent with their application to similarly-situated persons who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Having found no evidence to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2011H0053. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2012.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents committed an act of discrimination based upon disability against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner claimed to be living in his grandfather’s condominium at Respondent, Oceana II North Oceanfront Condominium Association, Inc. (“Oceana II”), 9900 South Ocean Drive, Apartment 4, Jensen Beach, Florida 34957, pursuant to a month-to-month lease under which he paid $1,000.00 monthly. Petitioner neither produced a written lease nor provided testimony from his grandfather, the putative owner of the condominium, of the existence of such lease. Petitioner also offered no competent evidence (e.g., cancelled checks, receipts, etc.) that he had made any payments under the alleged lease, whether written or oral. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was living in Texas and had no immediate plans to return to Florida or his grandfather’s condominium. Oceana II is a condominium homeowners’ association created and authorized under chapter 718, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Tiffany Ferguson, is the community association manager for Oceana II and the corporate representative for Oceana II for purposes of this hearing. Petitioner testified that his claim of discrimination came about because his car was parked in a disabled space with an expired disability placard. He was informed by Respondents or their agents that his vehicle must be moved to a parking lot away from the entrance to the building in which he was staying. He claims to have told Respondents’ agents that he could not park that far away from “his” unit due to a disability. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that any fine or suspension was ever levied by Respondents on him. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that any of Petitioner’s vehicles were ever towed by Respondents. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Respondents treated any other person outside of the protected class any more favorably than Petitioner was treated with respect to the rule requiring a current license plate. Petitioner brought several different vehicles, one of which had an expired Maryland tag, onto Oceana II’s premises. Despite the fact that he worked on many of these disabled vehicles, Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Respondents in any way caused Petitioner to purchase such vehicles, which may have needed repair or had issues obtaining a license plate. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner attempted to purchase or lease a unit in the condominium and was denied by Respondents due to a disability. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner had any lease at any time for his grandfather’s unit which Petitioner testified was a family vacation unit. Petitioner presented no competent evidence that Petitioner provided any information in response to Respondents’ request for information as to an alleged disability, the disability-related need for an accommodation, and how any accommodation was necessary to ameliorate any alleged disability. Petitioner admitted he received Respondents’ email which said no fines would be imposed. Petitioner admitted he received Respondents’ request for additional information to make a meaningful review from Respondents’ counsel. Petitioner admitted he refused to provide the additional information requested by Respondents (through counsel) to make a meaningful review of an accommodation request on October 20, 2020. Petitioner admitted he voluntarily removed the original vehicle (a Pontiac Sunbird) while it had a valid license plate. Petitioner admitted at hearing that he brought in other vehicles at a later time--a green van, a white Saturn, and a gray van--onto the property without plates on purpose to provoke a response and engineer a hearing under section 718.303(3)(b), which pertains to the rights and obligations of condominium associations in levying fines against owners or occupants. He was attempting to set up a claim by intentionally not showing license plates because he wanted a hearing. Petitioner admitted he never tried to register the green van or the gray van with the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). Petitioner admitted the white Saturn has a current plate, not a Florida plate, and it is currently located in Texas. The white Saturn did not display a plate while on the condominium property. Petitioner admitted he refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds whether he ever displayed a plate on any of the vehicles. Petitioner admitted he left Florida in early February and lives in Texas, in San Marco near San Antonio. Petitioner could not renew the Maryland tag on the Sunbird because the VIN (vehicle identification number) on the registration was missing a digit, yet he admitted he has no evidence of any efforts to fix the VIN on the Sunbird with the Maryland DMV.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s claim for relief, finding both that he has failed to make a prima facie case of housing discrimination and that, because he resides in Texas and has no ownership or legal claim to the condominium in Florida, his claim is moot. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 J. Henry Cartwright, Esquire Fox McCluskey Bush Robison, PLLC 3461 Southeast Willoughby Boulevard Post Office Drawer 6 Stuart, Florida 34995 John Sebastian Quick Apartment 4 9900 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Whether Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2011)1/.
Findings Of Fact Background Respondents Hoyt and Nancy Davis (the Davises) own a residential property located at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, Florida (the Property). The Property is utilized exclusively as a rental. Respondent Florida Coastal Jacksonville Realty, Inc. ("Florida Coastal") and its principal John McMenamy ("McMenamy") acted as listing agents for the Property (collectively, the "Broker Respondents"). Mr. McMenamy and his company have managed the rental of the Property for approximately six years. In association with their listing of the Property, the Broker Respondents were responsible for advertising, showing, accepting applications for and assisting in the selection of tenants for the Property. At the time of the events in question, the Property was being offered for lease at a rate of $1,450 per month. Generally, due to its location within a St. Johns County golf community and proximity to good schools, the Property rents easily and quickly. The Rental Applications On May 14, 2010, Petitioner Jaime Terry (Mrs. Terry) contacted McMenamy regarding the Property. McMenamy instructed Mrs. Terry on the rental application process. On the afternoon of Sunday, May 16, 2010, Petitioners submitted via e-mail their rental application, dated May 15, 2010. On their application, the Petitioners disclosed that they had previously declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy was entered in December 2007 and discharged in January 2009. Petitioners also disclosed that they were currently living with Mrs. Terry's parents. The application included a statement of the Terrys' monthly income, and also disclosed that they had three children residing with them -- aged eleven, five and two at the time. A memo attached to the application elaborated on the bankruptcy and other details of their employment and financial situation. Mrs. Terry testified that during the application process the Respondents did not solicit additional information concerning her employment history. On May 18, 2010, McMenamy ran a credit check on the Terrys using the "Online Rental Exchange." The credit report for Jaime Terry reflected a credit score of 664, while Steven Terry's assigned score was 649. However, both reports noted "conditional" approval because of the bankruptcy filing. Although the exact date is unknown, at approximately the same time that the Terrys submitted their application, another couple, Rick and Jessica Egger (the Eggers) contacted McMenamy regarding their interest in possibly renting the Property. On the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010, the Eggers formally submitted an application to rent the Property. The Eggers' application disclosed that, unlike the Terrys', they did not have a bankruptcy in their history. In addition, the Eggers' combined monthly income was higher than the Terrys'2/ and the younger of their two children was nine years old. The credit report obtained for the Eggers reflected a credit score of 672 for Jessica Egger and 696 for Rick Egger, with an unconditional approval rating. Respondents' Tenant Selection Process McMenamy testified that in evaluating applications, potential tenants must meet certain minimum criteria. Factors he considers in assessing applicants include credit checks, criminal background checks, employment status, and rental history. However, he agreed that the evaluation process he uses is subjective. McMenamy acknowledged that bankruptcy would not automatically disqualify a potential tenant, and in fact, confirmed that he has rented to tenants who have a bankruptcy in their history. With regard to credit scores, McMenamy testified that he considered a score below 500 to be unacceptable. Mrs. Davis testified that McMenamy manages the entire process of renting the Property on behalf of herself and her husband. Once McMenamy determines the suitability of a prospective tenant, he discusses that tenant with the Davises. McMenamy does not discuss applicants with the Davises that he does not consider eligible. The Davises do not participate in the background screening process and they do not review applicants' credit ratings. However, Mrs. Davis was aware of McMenamy's process for selecting tenants, and she confirmed her understanding that applicants must meet certain minimum requirements. In selecting a tenant, McMenamy looks not only for a candidate that is financially qualified, but also one who will rent the property for a significant period of time, will take good care of the property, and will make monthly rent payments in a timely manner, according to Mrs. Davis. Denial of Petitioners' Lease Application Mr. Davis testified that he and Mrs. Davis discussed the Petitioners' application with McMenamy. At hearing, Mr. Davis recounted that conversation as follows: Cross-examination by Mr. Organes: Q. Mr. Davis, you stated that you had discussed with Mr. McMenamy the application of Steven and Jaime Terry? A. Yes. Q. And that’s a common practice with Mr. McMenamy as when he receives reasonably qualified applicants, he discusses them with you? A. Yes. Q. And that’s what he did with the Terrys? A. Yes. Q. And you said you did not tell him not to rent to them because of their children? A. That is true, we did not tell him. Q. The issue of children wasn’t discussed at all? A. No. Q. What reason did you give him to tell them why their application was being denied? A. Because of their past rental history and their bankruptcy foreclosure. Q. In general if you don’t approve of an applicant, what reason would you give for denying that applicant? A. I would give that reason, that we didn’t feel that, you know, we probably would get a better applicant and the reason we turned them down is because we didn’t feel that they were suitable for our rental. There is no evidence in this record as to precisely when the above conversation between the Respondents took place, although based upon Mr. Davis's statement that "we probably would get a better applicant" it is reasonable to infer that it was prior to the Eggers submitting their application on the evening of Thursday, May 20, 2010.3/ Early on the morning of Friday, May 21, 2010, McMenamy sent an e-mail to Ms. Terry, which read: Jaime I left a message yesterday but did not hear from you. I spoke to the owner about the application and she was concerned about not really having any rental history and the number of small children. She is a perfectionist and just had the home professionally painted. The one family who lived there had small children and there were handprints all over the walls so that it needed to be repainted. So this was her main concern and therefore does not want to rent to you and the family. If you have any questions please call. Sincerely, John At hearing, Mrs. Davis maintained that the Petitioners' children were not the determining factor in the decision to deny their application. Rather, it was based on their finances and lack of rental history. Consistent with Mr. Davis's testimony, Mrs. Davis also testified that she and her husband did not instruct McMenamy to reject the Petitioners' application because of their children. After being informed that their application was denied, Petitioners immediately began searching for alternate housing. Mrs. Terry testified that their primary concern was to locate a rental in a high quality school district. Within a couple of weeks of receiving the denial e-mail from McMenamy, the Terrys located a home at 983 Lilac Loop, St. Johns, Florida. Petitioners entered into a lease for this property on June 6, 2010; the rent was $ 1,200 per month. Although the Lilac Loop home was acceptable, the Terrys considered it to be inferior to the Property, and Petitioners paid to have the home repainted and wired for cable access. The cable installation fee was $150.00. On September 22, 2010, Petitioners were notified that the Lilac Loop house was in foreclosure. Petitioners appealed to a default-law organization in an attempt to enforce their one-year lease, but were ultimately unsuccessful. As a result of the foreclosure, Petitioners were forced to seek alternative housing within the same school district, and in November 2010, leased a property at 1528 Summerdown Way, Fruit Cove, Florida, 32259. The monthly rent at 1528 Summerdown Way was $1,600 monthly. Petitioners also incurred additional expenses necessitated by hiring a moving service, in the amount of $773.50. At of the hearing, Petitioners continued to reside in the Summerdown Way rental. The Commission Investigation On August 16, 2010, the Terrys filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with HUD alleging they had been unlawfully discriminated against by Respondents based upon their familial status. Thereafter, the Commission opened an investigation of the allegation. As part of that investigation, Respondents were invited to submit written statements setting forth their version of the events at issue, and any defenses to the allegation they wished to raise. On August 19, 2010, the Davises submitted a written statement to the FCHR. In the first paragraph of that submittal the Davises stated: To Whom it May Concern: We enlisted realtor John MaMenamy to find a new tenant for our rental house at 1856 Cross Pointe Way, St. Augustine, FL 32092. Mr. McMenamy was told that we preferred not to rent to someone with more than one, if any, very small children at this particular time. The reason being we just had to have the interior of the house professionally repainted and repairs made to several areas, the walls in particular. Additionally, in light of the fact there were several highly qualified persons interested in and looking at the house concurrently. The submittal continued by identifying four former tenants of the Property, as well as the current tenants (the Eggers), all of whom had children living with them. It is found that McMenamy's e-mail of May 21, 2010, and the Davises' letter of August 19, 2010, constitute direct evidence that Respondents' decision not to rent to Petitioners was based upon their familial status. The testimony of McMenamy and the Davises that familial status was not the reason for refusing to rent to Petitioners is rejected as not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of a discriminatory housing practice against the Terrys in violation of section 760.23(1) and (2), and prohibiting further unlawful housing practices by Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's national origin, Puerto Rican, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rosa M. Cabrera is of Puerto Rican descent and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination based on national origin under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, (2009). On September 17, 2009, she filed a complaint for housing discrimination against the management of Costa del Sol, LLC. Respondent, Monica Londono, is employed by Morgan Whitney, Inc., the company that manages Costa del Sol, a sixteen-unit apartment complex at 7425 Byron Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33141. Ms. Cabrera lived at Costa del Sol for 4 years. In her complaint, she alleged discrimination in the conditions and services provided to her as a tenant based on her national origin. The Housing Authority of Miami Beach inspected Ms. Cabrera's unit annually as required for units subsidized under the Housing Choice Voucher Program, also known as Section 8. On March 23, 2009, a notice was mailed to Ms. Cabrera to inform her that her annual inspection was scheduled for April 10, 2009, between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. Mr. Cabrera was not there, on April 10, 2009, when the inspector arrived, so a door handle notice and a letter mailed the same day notified her that the inspection was rescheduled for April 13, 2009. About the same time, Ms. Cabrera said she had trouble with her hot water heater. On April 13, 2009, the unit failed inspection. The inspector found that a bedroom air conditioner was not cooling properly, that a sink stopper was missing, and that a closet door mirror was cracked. A re-inspection was scheduled for May 11, 2009. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Cabrera was offended and apparently turned away, what she said was, a group of six people who came to make repairs without giving her prior notice. On May 11, 2009, the same defects were noted and, on May 29, 2009, the Housing Authority abated the rent and terminated its contract for the unit with Costa Del Sol effective June 30, 2009. Ms. Cabrera was scheduled to meet her Section 8 case worker, Housing Authority Specialist Felipe Roloff, to "start the moving process" at 4:00 p.m., on June 5, 2009. Ms. Cabrera did not keep the appointment and it was rescheduled for June 16, 2009. On June 9, 2009, however, an "abate-cure" inspection was conducted and the unit passed. On July 21 and 23, 2009, Ms. Cabrera contacted Mr. Roloff to tell him that her refrigerator was not working and the landlord was given 24 hours to repair or replace it. When a handyman came alone to make repairs, Ms. Cabrera was afraid to let him in her apartment fearing sexual battery. So Ms. Londono accompanied the handyman when they attempted to deliver a refrigerator. They were unable to exchange the refrigerators because Ms. Cabrera had changed the locks without giving the manager a new key a violation of the terms of her lease, and she would not unlock the door. Ms. Cabrera's son arrived home at the same time and he also did not have a new key. At his suggestion, the refrigerator was left in the hallway for him to exchange it with the one in Ms. Cabrera's apartment later. Ms. Cabrera claimed, without any supporting evidence, that Ms. Londono publicly embarrassed her by calling her a "fucking Puerto Rican bitch" and a "ridiculous old lady." Ms. Londono, who is also of Puerto Rican descent, denied the allegation. Someone, Ms. Londono believes it was Ms. Cabrera, called the Miami Beach Code Compliance Division, to report that the refrigerator was left in the hallway and it was hauled away as household waste. Ms. Cabrera said the refrigerator left in the hallway was in poor condition. Ms. Londono, according to Ms. Cabrera, called the police and accused her of stealing the refrigerator. There is no supporting evidence of their accusations and suspicions about each other. When she finally got a replacement refrigerator, Ms. Cabrera said it was missing one of the crisper drawers. Ms. Cabrera believed she was being discriminated against in receiving poor services and also when Ms. Londono required her to move a plant from the hallway, but did not make another tenant move his motorcycle from the area where it was parked. Ms. Londono notified Mr. Roloff of Ms. Cabrera's lack of cooperation, and that she intended to collect August rent and to withhold a portion of the security deposit to cover the cost of the missing refrigerator. On August 5, 2009, the Housing Authority issued to Ms. Cabrera a Notice of Termination of Housing Assistance effective September 30, 2009. The Notice cited her failure to allow the landlord to enter to make necessary repairs and her failure to report the income of her son who was living with her. When the rent was not paid on August 5, 2009, Ms. Londono delivered a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate to Ms. Cabrera's unit. Ms. Cabrera did not vacate. Eviction proceedings were begun in September. Ms. Cabrera was evicted on November 22, 2009. After Ms. Cabrera moved the report of the inspection of the unit indicated that, among other damage, it was infested with fleas, supporting Ms. Londono's previous claim that Ms. Cabrera was leaving her window open to allow cats to come and feed in her unit, in violation of Section 8 rules. Ms. Cabrera's claim of discrimination based on national origin is not supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Face and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Rosa M. Cabrera 7851 Northeast 10th Avenue, Apt. 26 Miami, Florida 33138 Monica Londono Morgan Whitney, Inc. Costa del Sol, LLC 1385 Coral Way, Penthouse 403 Miami, Florida 33145
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling; or provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”), section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2019).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female residing in Tallahassee, Florida, who purports to have diagnoses of depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and a learning disability. Petitioner offered no evidence regarding how her diagnoses affect her daily life. Petitioner originally signed a lease with Respondent to rent apartment F201 at Sabal Court Apartments, 2125 Jackson Bluff Road, Tallahassee, Florida, from November 1, 2017, to October 31, 2018. Petitioner moved into the apartment with her two minor children on November 2, 2017. Petitioner testified her two minor children also have ADHD. On October 24, 2018, Petitioner renewed her lease for the apartment for the term of November 1, 2018, through October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that, during the term of both leases, she experienced problems with the apartment; including mold in the bathroom, bed bugs, ants, roaches, spiders, and cracked flooring. Most distressing to Petitioner was the air conditioning unit, which Petitioner alleges was filthy and failed to cool the apartment. Petitioner testified she submitted several requests for the unit to be serviced, but it was never repaired to good working condition. Petitioner complained that the apartment was too hot—frequently reaching temperatures in excess of 80 degrees—for her and her children to sleep at night. On August 7, 2019, Petitioner executed a lease renewal form, requesting to renew her lease for an additional 12 months—through October 31, 2020. On September 23, 2019, Respondent posted a Notice of Non-Renewal of Lease (“Notice”) on Petitioner’s apartment door. The Notice notified Petitioner that her tenancy would not be renewed and that she was expected to vacate the premises on or before October 31, 2019. Petitioner testified that she did not know why her lease was non- renewed, but believed it to be additional mistreatment of her and her family by Respondent. In response to the undersigned’s question why Petitioner believed Respondent’s treatment of her to be related to her handicap, or that of her children, Petitioner replied that she does not believe that the non-renewal of her lease, or other issues with Respondent’s management, was based on either her handicap or that of her children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202021115. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Dastha L. Crews Apartment A 2125 Pecan Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) Joni Henley, Assistant Manager Sabal Court Apartments 2125 Jackson Bluff Road Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Todd A. Ruderman Green Oaks Tampa, LLC Suite 218 3201 West Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether any of the respondents is guilty of unlawful discrimination against Petitioner in the rental of a dwelling, in violation of section 760.23(2), Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been an individual with a disability because he is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). He is required regularly to take medication to control the disease. At all material times, Respondent Scandinavian Properties, LLC (Respondent Scandinavian) has owned a small complex of rental units in Miami Beach consisting of one or more Airbnb units at the back of the property and two duplex units at the front of property in a two-story building. This case involves one of the two-bedroom, one-bath duplexes with the address of 7910 Byron Avenue, Unit 1 (Unit 1), which was the ground-floor duplex. At all material times, Respondent Renes has been a managing principal of Respondent Scandinavian, and Respondent Bourguigne has been an employee of a property management company retained by Respondent Scandinavian to manage the complex. In an effort to find a suitable rental unit, Petitioner employed the services of a real estate broker or associate, who contacted Respondent Renes to discuss the rental of Unit 1, which had just undergone extensive renovations of two years' duration. Petitioner was recovering from recent surgery, so, as a favor to the real estate agent, Respondent Renes agreed to rent Unit 1 to Petitioner with a background check, but not the customary face-to-face meeting that Respondent Renes required with prospective tenants. Thus, Respondent Renes had limited, if any, contact with Petitioner during the lease negotiations. Petitioner and Respondent Scandinavian entered into a 12-month lease commencing November 1, 2018 (Lease). The Lease prohibited keeping any pets, smoking "in the Premises," creating any "environmental hazards on or about the Premises," keeping any flammable items "that might increase the danger of fire or damage" on the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, destroying, defacing, damaging, impairing or removing any part of the premises belonging to Respondent Scandinavian, and making any alterations or improvements to the premises without the consent of Respondent Scandinavian, although Petitioner was allowed to hang pictures and install window treatments. The Lease required Petitioner to ensure that all persons on the premises acted in a manner that did not "unreasonably disturb any neighbors or constitute a breach of the peace" and permitted Respondent Scandinavian to adopt or modify rules for the use of the common areas and conduct on the premises. The Lease assigned to Petitioner the responsibility for maintaining smoke detectors, locks, keys, and any furniture in the unit. The Lease permitted "[o]ccasional overnight guests," who could occupy the premises for no more than seven nights per month, and required written approval for anyone else to occupy the premises. Among the rules of the complex was a prohibition against disabling smoke detectors. However, without reference to the Lease provision applicable to pets, one rule allowed one dog or one cat. Another rule assured that management would help tenants gain access to their units when locked out. Within a few weeks of the commencement of the Lease, Petitioner's visitors violated two provisions of the Lease by smoking outside and allowing a dog to run loose in the common area. Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner of the violations, which do not appear to have resulted in any penalties. Admitting to the presence of the dog, Petitioner testified only that the video of the dog violation, if not also the smoking violation, led him to believe that he was being watched. Petitioner's complaint of individual surveillance became an ongoing issue--in his mind. The minimal staffing and small area occupied by the small complex, as a practical matter, both precluded individual operation of cameras to trace the movements of Petitioner and his visitors in the common area and facilitated the surveillance of all, or nearly all, of the common area with relatively few cameras. The evidence fails to support Petitioner's claim that the respondents at any time conducted video surveillance particularly of Petitioner or his visitors. Subsequently, Respondent Renes or Bourguigne advised Petitioner that someone had been shouting his name outside the gate of the complex during the evening hours. This incident is not prohibited by the Lease because the person, while perhaps acquainted with Petitioner, was not his invitee onto or about the premises. Nonetheless, Petitioner's sole reported reaction to this disturbance was to demand a copy of any video--and complain when the respondents failed to comply with his demand. Another of Petitioner's visitors parked a car outside the gate in a space reserved for occupants of the Airbnbs. When, evidently in the presence of Petitioner, Respondent Bourguigne confronted the visitor, the visitor replied that he had only been parked there for 20 minutes. Respondent Bourguigne stated that she had seen the car parked in the spot for 43 minutes. Again, Petitioner's sole response was not to deal with the violation, but to complain about surveillance, evidently of the parking area. The most serious violations of the Lease were discovered on January 28, 2019, when Respondent Renes conducted an inspection of Unit 1. Respondent Renes inspected all rental units of the complex every two or three months to check for safety issues that could imperil tenants or the complex itself. In her inspection, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had disconnected the smoke alarms and encased them in plastic tape to render them inoperative. She also found that Petitioner had crowded the unit with furniture to the point of impeding egress and constituting a fire hazard. Although not involving safety issues, Respondent Renes found that Petitioner had attached screws to metal doors and kitchen cabinets, damaging these new fixtures. Additionally, Respondent Renes noted the presence of a cat. As noted above, the rules conflicted with the Lease as to the presence of a single dog or cat. In any event, by this time, the respondents were aware that the cat, as well as a human, routinely shared Unit 1 with Petitioner, and the respondents had impliedly consented to these cohabitations. Again, Petitioner's reaction to the Lease violations found by Respondent Renes on January 28 was not to address the problems. Instead, he objected to the inspection as singling him out. By letter delivered to Petitioner on February 14, 2019, Respondent Scandinavian advised that he was in violation of the Lease for allowing an unauthorized person and a cat to occupy the unit, for wrapping the smoke detectors in plastic, for damaging the unit's fixtures by attaching screws into the metal doors and kitchen cabinets, and by cluttering the interior of the unit so as to impede internal movement. The letter demands that Petitioner correct the violations within seven days, or else Respondent Scandinavian would terminate the lease. Respondent Bourguigne's main involvement with this case involves an incident that occurred on the evening of February 15, 2019, when Petitioner locked his keys in his unit and was unable to unlock the door or otherwise enter the unit. Petitioner called the office, but Respondent Bourguigne, who responds to such requests during her normal working hours of Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., did not receive the call until the following morning when she listened to messages. Respondent Bourguigne promptly called Respondent Renes for guidance, and Respondent Renes directed her to summon the complex's handyman, who, as soon as he could, which was 1:00 p.m. on February 16, drove to the complex and opened Unit 1 for Petitioner. Rather than call a locksmith when the respondents failed to respond immediately to his call to the office, Petitioner and a companion attempted to break into Unit 1 with a screwdriver at about 1:30 a.m. Although unaware of the lockout, Respondent Renes learned of the attempted break-in through an automated security system, so she called the police, who reported to the scene and, after briefly interrogating Petitioner, determined that no crime had taken place. Petitioner wrongly concluded that Respondent Renes had been watching him in real time and called the police, knowing that the apparent perpetrator was really Petitioner and no crime was taking place. While locked out of his unit, Petitioner had also sent emails to Respondent Renes. In one of them sent on February 16, Petitioner advised for the first time that he was diagnosed with HIV and dependent on medication that was locked in his unit. Respondent Renes testified that she did not see these emails until days later. At minimum, it is clear that, prior to February 16, no respondent was on notice of Petitioner's disability, so the seven-day notice letter delivered two days earlier could not have been motivated by a discriminatory intent. Despite the seven-day deadline contained in the letter of February 14, by email or text dated February 21, Petitioner advised Respondent Renes that, by 2:00 p.m. on February 22, he "will have remedied each of the … listed [violations]." This was one day past the deadline. Because Petitioner failed timely to meet the conditions of the February 14 seven-day notice letter, Respondent Scandinavian commenced an eviction proceeding on February 22 and, after a hearing, obtained a judgment ordering the eviction of Petitioner. Petitioner failed to prove any discriminatory intent on the part of any of the respondents in their dealings with him, any incidental discriminatory effect in their acts and omissions, or any failure or refusal to accommodate Petitioner's disability. To the contrary, as to discrimination, Respondent Renes chose to forego eviction and instead give Petitioner a chance timely to remedy the Lease violations; when Petitioner failed to do so, Respondent Scandinavian proceeded to evict Petitioner. Nor has any act or omission of any respondent had a discriminatory incidental effect on Petitioner. Lastly, the availability of Respondents Renes and Bourguigne or other employees of Respondent Scandinavian to open units to locked-out tenants and occupants was reasonable and in no way constituted a failure to accommodate Petitioner's disability, for which Petitioner never requested or, on these facts, needed an accommodation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding the respondents not guilty of the charges set forth in the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Philip Kim, Esquire Pensky & Kim, P.A. 12550 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 401 North Miami, Florida 33181 (eServed) Jack Wilson 17560 Atlantic Boulevard, Apartment 515 Sunny Isles Beach, Florida 33160 (eServed) Cheyenne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondents, Housing Authority of Flagler County and Chris Beyrer, Executive Director of the Housing Authority of Flagler County (collectively, the Authority); and Advantage Realty and Management, Inc. and Dymitri Belkin (collectively, Advantage), discriminated against Petitioner Jennifer Nichole King (Petitioner) based on her race by engaging in discriminatory terms and conditions, discriminatory statements, and steering, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who is a participant in the Authority’s Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8 Program). On April 8, 2013, Petitioner moved from the Pinellas County Housing Authority’s Section 8 Program to the Authority’s Section 8 Program. The Authority did not transfer Petitioner into its Section 8 Program, but rather administers Petitioner’s Section 8 voucher for the Pinellas County’s Housing Authority in accordance with the federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations. The essence of Petitioner’s claim against the Authority is that, because of her race, the Authority, and its executive director, Chris Beyer, steered her away from homes in predominately white areas and told her she needed to look for homes in the “projects.” According to Petitioner, when she inquired about certain homes in nicer, predominantly white areas, Chris Beyer told her that people like her did not qualify for that type of housing. She also suggested that, because of discrimination based on her race, the Authority allowed Advantage, and/or the owners of the housing units that she rented under the Section 8 Program, to continue to receive rent and raise rental rates, even though the Authority knew that repairs required for habitability were not being made. The evidence, as outlined in the Findings of Fact below, does not support Petitioner’s claims against the Authority. During her orientation process for Section 8 services in Flagler County, Petitioner completed the Authority’s voucher briefing process, which included both an oral briefing and an information packet. The subjects covered by the briefing information and documentation included family and owner obligations and responsibilities; the housing selection process; a list of the Authority’s resources for locating housing, which included areas outside of poverty or minority concentrated areas; the Authority’s process for determining the amount of housing assistance payment for the family and maximum rent; and a list of participating realtors that manage properties for various owners participating in the Section 8 Program. After Petitioner completed the voucher briefing process, on April 18, 2013, the Authority issued Petitioner a Housing Choice Voucher. In July 2013, Petitioner independently, and voluntarily, located a potential rental unit at 49 Raintree Place, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Raintree Place unit), and submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease for the unit. The Raintree Place unit was a four bedroom, detached single-family home constructed in 2006. The proposed rent for the unit was $1,000.00 per month, with a required security deposit of $1,500.00. The Authority inspected the unit, determined that it passed the housing quality standards, and that the rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract with the owner, or owner’s agent, to pay housing assistance to the owner on behalf of Petitioner. On May 29, 2014, the owner of the Raintree Place unit filed an eviction action against Petitioner for nonpayment of rent. At a subsequent mediation, the parties to the eviction action entered a stipulation agreement on July 2, 2014, which required Petitioner, among other things, to vacate the unit by July 31, 2014. The stipulation agreement also provided that if Petitioner timely performed all of the terms and conditions of the stipulation agreement, then the owner agreed to dismiss the eviction case. On July 31, 2014, Petitioner timely vacated the Raintree Place unit as agreed, thereby avoiding a judgment for possession against her. Thereafter, on August 6, 2014, the Authority issued Petitioner a new Housing Choice Voucher to locate another rental unit. In August 2014, Petitioner independently, and voluntarily, located another potential unit located at 92 Ulysses Trail, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Ulysses Trail unit). Petitioner submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease. This unit was a four bedroom, detached single- family home constructed in 2002. The proposed rent for the unit was $1,200.00 per month, and the security deposit was $1,500.00. The Ulysses Trail unit was owned by Serghei Potorac. Mr. Potorac hired Advantage to manage the unit. Advantage managed the Ulysses Trail unit until September 6, 2017. The Authority inspected the Ulysses Trail unit and determined that it passed the housing quality standards and that the proposed rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a HAP contract with the owner, or the owner’s agent, Advantage, to pay housing assistance to the owner on behalf of Petitioner. Petitioner and her family moved into the Ulysses Trail unit on September 1, 2014. During Petitioner’s tenancy, the owner of the Ulysses Trail unit received various notices for city code violations because of Petitioner’s failure to maintain the property in accordance with local city codes or ordinances. The alleged violations included overgrown lawn, failing to screen outside trash containers, and accumulation of trash on the property. As a result, the city assessed fines against the owner totaling over $800.00. On July 8, 2015, Advantage sent Petitioner a seven-day notice to cure, demanding that she pay the outstanding fines. Petitioner ultimately either corrected, or agreed to correct, the violations. As a result, the city waived the outstanding fines. After conferring with the owner, Petitioner and Advantage advised the Authority that the owner would not proceed against Petitioner. On July 13, 2015, the Authority conducted an annual inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. The unit passed the inspection but there were some issues that the Authority felt needed to be addressed. Therefore, on July 13, 2015, Robert Beyrer, the Petitioner’s housing counselor at the Authority, sent Advantage an email regarding those issues. The next year, on July 12, 2016, the Authority conducted its next annual inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. Because of some noted deficiencies, the unit did not initially pass inspection. The Authority sent correspondence to Advantage detailing the deficiencies that needed correction by August 12, 2016. Thereafter, Advantage provided the Authority with an invoice from VK Services showing that the deficiencies had been timely corrected. During the time period from July 2015 through October 2016, the Authority received copies of at least four three-day notices that Advantage had delivered to Petitioner for failing to timely pay rent. With respect to a three-day notice delivered to Petitioner on October 11, 2016, the owner subsequently filed an eviction action on October 20, 2016. During a court-ordered mediation, the parties entered into a Stipulation Agreement dated November 10, 2016. When Petitioner failed to comply with the November 10, 2016, Stipulation Agreement, Advantage filed an affidavit on February 2, 2017, on behalf of the owner, seeking a judgment for possession. That same day, without advising the Authority of the ongoing eviction action, Petitioner asked the Authority to conduct a special inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. During the Authority’s inspection, the Authority found that the unit failed the inspection as a result of various deficiencies attributed to both the owner and Petitioner. The next day, on February 3, 2017, the court entered a final judgment for possession against Petitioner, and the court clerk issued a writ of possession. In response, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the execution of the writ, claiming, among other things, that Advantage failed to repair items as agreed in the November 10, 2016, Stipulation Agreement. In the meantime, the unit was re-inspected by the Authority on February 27, 2017, and the inspector found that some of the deficiencies had been addressed but there remained some that still needed to be corrected. On March 14, 2017, the Authority did a final inspection of the unit and determined that the remaining deficiencies had been addressed by both Advantage and Petitioner. Following two hearings on Petitioner’s motion in the eviction case, the court granted Petitioner’s motion to stay and vacated the final judgment. The court also reduced Petitioner’s portion of the rent due for the months of January and February 2017 based on its findings regarding the outstanding repairs. Further court orders reflect that Advantage ultimately addressed the disputed repairs and that Petitioner was ordered to pay full rent for the months of March and April 2017. The Authority was not a party and did not appear in the eviction proceedings. Thereafter, the owner gave Petitioner notice and advised the Authority that Petitioner’s lease would not be renewed, and that Petitioner would need to vacate the unit by August 31, 2017. The Authority subsequently sent correspondences to Petitioner explaining what she needed to do in order to be eligible to move to another location with continued housing assistance from the Authority. Petitioner timely vacated the Ulysses Trail unit and was issued a new voucher by the Authority on September 1, 2017, that could be used for a new rental unit. On October 13, 2017, Petitioner sent Robert Beyrer an email stating: Good Morning, Can you email the list of realtors that you have. I misplaced ours with all the moving about. Also I am going to need to request an[] extension of my voucher. Do we need to sign anything? Thank, Jen King In response, Robert Beyrer sent Petitioner another copy of the list of participating realtors in Flagler County previously provided to her by the Authority during her initial voucher briefing. The Authority, through Robert Beyrer, also granted Petitioner’s request for an extension of her voucher until December 1, 2017. On October 30, 2017, Petitioner sent Robert Beyrer another email advising that she was having difficulty finding another unit. By email, Robert Beyrer responded by further extending the expiration date of her voucher until December 31, 2017, and counseling her on various sources where she might find available units, stating: There are rentals out there. I am not sure who you are speaking with. I would continue to contact the landlords on the participating realtors list, check the local newspaper weekly, and check Zillow.com for reputable property management companies. We have been leasing people up with your voucher size in your price range. I will continue to keep my eyes open for you! Petitioner independently and voluntarily located a potential rental unit located at 10 Pier Lane, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Pier Lane unit) and, on December 27, 2017, submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease for the unit. The Authority inspected the Pier Lane unit and determined that it passed the housing quality standards and that the proposed rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a HAP contract with the owner, or owner’s agent, to pay housing assistance to the owner on Petitioner’s behalf. On February 1, 2018, Petitioner moved into the Pier Lane unit. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was residing at the Pier Lane unit and the Authority was paying HAP payments to the owner on behalf of Petitioner under a HAP Contract with the owner. At the hearing, Petitioner maintained that the crux of her housing discrimination complaint was actually based on racially discriminatory statements allegedly made to her by Chris Beyrer. Petitioner alleged that Chris Beyrer said to her, among other things, “You cannot live by the canals; they do not rent to people like you.” Petitioner testified that she took Chris Beyrer’s statements to mean that she could not rent a unit by the canals because they do not rent to black people or people of color. Petitioner admitted, however, that Chris Beyrer never referenced or otherwise indicated that race was the underlying reason or motive when he made the alleged statements. Chris Beyrer denied making the alleged discriminatory statements attributed to her by Petitioner, or any other racially discriminatory statements. Ms. Beyer explained that any housing suggestions to Petitioner would have been on the type of unit Petitioner could afford to rent based on the amount of her reported household income and rental subsidy. Ms. Beyer’s testimony was credible and is accepted. Rather than showing racial discrimination against Petitioner in the Authority’s administration of the Section 8 Program, the evidence showed that, as a Section 8 participant in Flagler County, Petitioner was and is free to locate or choose an eligible rental unit anywhere in the Authority’s jurisdiction and submit the proposed rental unit to the Authority for approval. Further, at the hearing, Petitioner withdrew any claim that Advantage had unlawfully discriminated against her because of her race by failing to make requested repairs or by providing false repair records for the Ulysses Trail unit to the Authority. Specifically, Petitioner stated at the hearing that she did not believe Advantage had engaged in any discriminatory conduct towards her, and was rescinding her housing discrimination complaint against Advantage. Nevertheless, near the close of the hearing, one of Advantage’s witnesses, a repairman from VK Services, provided brief testimony confirming that he had personally made the repairs at the Ulysses Trail unit, as indicated in the various invoices provided by Advantage to the Authority. The testimony is credited. Finally, despite Petitioner’s claims that the Authority also discriminated against her by allowing Advantage to raise rents and continuing to pay HAP to the owner during the years of her tenancy at the Ulysses Trail unit while unaddressed deficiencies existed, Petitioner admitted that she voluntarily chose to accept the owner’s proposed rental increases and repeatedly renewed her lease with the owner. The evidence further showed that Petitioner was always free under the Section 8 Program to reject lease rental increases and relocate to a new unit of her choice with continued housing assistance from the Authority. In sum, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s claim that, because of racial discrimination, the Authority steered her to only certain rental units, that the Authority allowed rent increases despite lack of repairs, that there were discriminatory statements made against her, or that Advantage was complicit in the alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition and Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2018.
