The Issue This proceeding concerns a Consent Order entered into by the Department of Environmental regulation (DER), and James and Patricia Gratzer (Gratzers) regarding an allegedly unpermitted fill in Winter Springs, Florida. The ultimate issue for determination is whether DER abused its discretion in resolving the alleged violations by entering into the subject Consent Order.
Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1990, the Gratzers purchased a 4.35 acre lot located at 216 Stoner Road in Winter Springs, Florida. At the time of purchase, the Gratzers planned to divide the lot and build a residence on the two acre parcel. In preparation for construction of their new home, the Gratzers approached the Winter Springs City Council to subdivide the property and to approve of use of the fill road as ingress and egress for both lots. In February of 1991, the Gratzers and their builder obtained the proper building permits from the County and septic tank permits from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Construction began on the residence on April 9, 1992 when the Gratzers' builder brought in several trucks of dirt to the end of the existing fill road to begin the house pad. At the time the Gratzers began construction on the subject lot, they had no idea or reason to believe that they were about to build in jurisdictional wetlands of the State of Florida. On approximately April 14, 1992, the Gratzers were first made aware that they may have problems with potential wetlands on the property when an officer of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission visiting the site instructed the builders to halt construction, pending a review by DER. As a result of the site visit, the Gratzers investigated further with DER employees the potential wetlands on their property. They also sought the advice of an attorney and his environmental consultant regarding possible ways to solve DER's concerns. On approximately April 26, 1991, an employee of DER visited the site and made an initial determination that the property was a jurisdictional wetland subject to permitting by DER. Under present rules the Gratzer property, with exception of the filled access road, would all be in DER jurisdictional wetlands if only the natural vegetation were considered. Upon being informed of DER's initial determination, the Gratzers hired an engineer from Boyer-Singleton & Associates to make an engineering determination as to the extent of jurisdictional wetlands based upon a ten-year backstop. A ten-year backstop is a method provided by statute to determine the ultimate landward extent of DER's vegetational jurisdictional line. It is a hydrological calculation to determine water elevation levels in a certain area, subject to the ten-year recurrent storm event. By rule and statute, DER's jurisdiction over wetlands effectively stops at the upper end or limit of the ten-year flood elevation line. Claude Cassagnol, of Boyer-Singleton and Associates, an expert in hydrology, reviewed available materials, visited the site and made an initial determination of the ten-year backstop on the Gratzers' property, and ultimately mapped out his conclusions on a plat. Mr. Cassagnol's hydrological study, and his review of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) materials, led him to conclude that the ten-year backstop would leave the Gratzer's house pad out of any DER jurisdictional wetlands. As a result of his study, Cassagnol forwarded several letters to George Baragona of DER requesting that Mr. Baragona, an expert hydrologist, review his determination and ratify his conclusions. The Gratzers, on advice of counsel, allowed their building contractor to complete compaction of the house pad and begin preparations to pour the house floor. The septic tank contractor for the Gratzers completed installation of the tank and drain field prior to July 1st. After the Gratzers had recommenced construction, on approximately July 10, 1992, DER, issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) which ultimately formed the basis for the Consent Order in this case. The Gratzers immediately ceased further construction on the property and sought further negotiations with DER. Shortly after the NOV was issued, George Baragona reviewed the information, studies and plats submitted by Mr. Cassagnol regarding the ten-year backstop. Baragona made a determination of the ten-year backstop at a point more landward than Cassagnol's. It appears from the plat submitted at hearing, that Baragona's ten- year backstop line runs along the base of the fill roadway; his testimony, however, indicated that his backstop line dipped in and out near the roadway, and he simply chose the baseline of the fill road as his "worst case scenario". Baragona, because of the house pad, was required to extrapolate a line through the house pad, resulting in approximately half of the house pad area being in jurisdictional wetlands. The result of further negotiations between the parties was the Consent Order which is the subject matter of this proceeding. As settlement, the Gratzers agreed to Baragona's "worst case scenario" ten-year backstop, placing approximately half of the house pad was in DER jurisdictional wetlands. As part of the settlement, the Gratzers agreed to, and have paid, a fine of $1,400.00 to DER and have granted a conservation easement over a large portion of the remainder of their property, resulting in an 11.6 to 1 ratio of conservation easement to impacted wetlands, slightly above DER's guideline 10 to 1 ratio. In investigating the alleged violations at the subject property, DER reviewed the cumulative impacts of the project and determined that they were not great, in light of the surrounding area and its already high level of development. In making this determination, DER reviewed property lists, maps and other facts to determine the level of current development. In reviewing the alleged violations, DER also considered whether or not this project would have been able to get a permit had the Gratzers sought a permit prior to any construction. It was DER's determination that the project would have been permittable under the criteria in Chapter 403, in conjunction with the mitigation offered at the site. Finally, in its review and study of the alleged violations, DER determined there was no evidence that this project would have any adverse impact on water quality. DER made a determination that this was a "low to medium" violation, and that the impacts were properly addressed through the Consent Order which imposed the $1,400.00 fine and secured the conservation easement. Fill Road Issue A small road or driveway existed on the site at the time the Gratzers purchased the property, extending from Stoner Road from the south, to the center of their property. Although Baragona indicated the DER modelled backstop line did not always extend to the driveway, he said it sometimes appeared to "bump up" to the eastern edge of the driveway. Baragona could not say with absolute certainty where the 10 year backstop would be on the east side of the site if the driveway were not present. The type of wetland vegetation on the Gratzer property would be considered jurisdictional wetland vegetation under rules adopted pursuant to the 1984 Warren F. Henderson Wetlands Act (Section 403.91, et seq.), but would not be considered jurisdictional wetland vegetation under rules applicable prior to October 1, 1984. If the driveway on the Gratzer property was installed prior to October 1, 1984, it is legal, but if it was installed after that date it is illegal because there is no evidence it ever was properly permitted. DER does not allow illegally filled areas to cut off the extent of its wetland jurisdiction. Therefore, if the driveway on the Gratzer property were placed in DER jurisdictional wetlands without a permit, the road itself could not act as a 10 year backstop cutting off DER wetland jurisdiction to the west. There was conflicting evidence as to when the driveway was placed on the property. James Hartman, who sold the property to the Gratzers, testified he built the driveway in 1978 and 1979. William Kuyper, an expert in aerial photography interpretation, testified that based on his review of aerial photos, the road had been placed on site sometime between January 6, 1986, and March, 1989. The weight of the evidence indicates the driveway was probably placed on site before October 1, 1984, and therefore did not require a DER permit. First, the former landowner's testimony that he built the road in 1978 and 1979, must be considered more reliable than an interpretation of aerial photos taken from 12,000 feet in the air, in spite of the expertise of the photographic interpreter. A possible explanation for why the driveway "appeared" in the 1989 aerial photo but not in the 1986 aerial photo is that the road may have been disturbed, or new fill put on the road sometime between 1986 and 1989, causing the road to be more visible in 1989. Even if the 10 year backstop were to be determined without the driveway present, it would not be significantly different. While DER's 10 year backstop line "bumps up" against the road in places, it does not "bump up" in other places along the driveway, but in order to be conservative the line was placed along with driveway in all areas. The modelled location of the line north of the housepad where there is no driveway is consistent with where the line is modelled south of the housepad where the driveway is located. The Society and its Concerns The Society's corporate status was not controverted. CFWS members have been patrolling the Lake Jessup/Gee Creek area and other wetland areas and have found what they believe are violations of the law and rules intended to protect wetland resources. Although neither Michael Mingea nor his expert witness have been on the Gratzer property, they have been in the immediate area and are concerned about the cumulative impact of small dredging projects, like the Gratzers, which projects are routinely reported to DER by the Society. Beginning in May 1991, the Society corresponded regularly with Secretary Browner at DER and Secretary Williams at the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) and their respective staffs, regarding what the Society perceived were violations occurring through lax enforcement. The Society believed, though review of HRS and DER files, that the Gratzers' project included a septic tank placed in jurisdictional wetlands. This was not established; rather, the septic tank was erroneously placed inside a setback line, but outside the jurisdictional line, and a variance was readily obtained from HRS. DER does not have direct jurisdiction over septic tank permits and HRS' authority is derived from the statutes, not from DER. The Society's position regarding the Gratzer project is based in substantial part on its assertion that the fill road was illegally placed and that DER's jurisdiction extended through the entire property. The Society, however, did not rebut the sound evidence by George Baragona of the 10-year backstop. Nor did it present competent evidence of any alleged water quality violations. Only one other actual violation of permit requirements was established, and DER has required the developer to move the project from jurisdictional wetlands.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that the Consent Order that is the subject of this proceeding be adopted as Final Agency Action. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0104 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Petitioners: 1.-3. Adopted in preliminary statement and paragraph 19. 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. 5.-6. Rejected as unnecessary. 7.-8. Adopted in substance in paragraph 14. 9.-12. Rejected as unnecessary. 13. Adopted in part in paragraph 20, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 14.-16. Rejected as unnecessary. 17.-18. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 19. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. 20.-22. Rejected as unnecessary. 23.-25. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 26. Rejected as unnecessary. 27.-30. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 31.-32. Rejected as summary of testimony or argument, rather than findings of fact. 33.-34. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 35.-36. Rejected as unnecessary. 37. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. [Section VI, pp 19-22 includes unnumbered paragraphs summarizing testimony, rather than findings of fact]. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael W. Mingea, President Central Florida Wetlands Society P.O. Box 2826 Orlando, FL 32802 Rex D. Ware, Esquire P.O. Box 1794 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire DER-Twin Towers Office Bldg. 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary DER-Twin Towers Office Bldg. 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esq. DER-Twin Towers Ofc. Bldg. 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399
The Issue The issue is whether Vista of Fort Walton Beach, LLC (Vista), should be issued Surface Water Management Permit No. 04-2012-0013G authorizing the construction of an earthen embankment dam and impoundment to impound stormwater runoff from a proposed commercial development in the City of DeFuniak Springs (City), Walton County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The District has regulatory jurisdiction over the construction of certain types of impoundments within its boundaries. If an impoundment is at least ten feet high but less than 25 feet in height and has an impounding capacity of at least 50 acre-feet, a general permit is required. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 40A-4.041(1). Vista, a limited liability corporation, owns an odd- shaped parcel in the City on which it intends to build a small commercial development consisting of a 17,000-square foot building, a parking lot, and related amenities. The vacant parcel abuts the north side of U.S. Highway 90 just east of 18th Street and is approximately 1.66 acres in size. The property is partially wooded and has a small wetland area on its northeastern corner. In conjunction with the proposed commercial development, Vista intends to construct an impoundment to control stormwater runoff from the project. Because the impoundment will be ten feet high and have an impounding capacity of at least 50 acre-feet, Vista is required to obtain a general permit. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 40A-4.041(1). Vista filed a permit application with the District on June 8, 2012. On August 8, 2012, the District gave notice that it intended to issue a surface water management permit to Vista. The permit allows the construction of a stormwater retention basin. A mitigation plan for impacts to 0.23 acres of wetlands was also approved but is not at issue in this proceeding. As described in the District staff report, the project will encompass one earthen embankment dam and impoundment to impound the storm runoff. It will operate as a dry stormwater retention basin designed to impound water only during rainfall events. The facility will utilize a pipe and riser spillway system, and the basin outfall will be protected by a rip-rap lined plunge pool. Due to space restrictions, an engineered retaining wall will be incorporated into the embankment's north side slope. The stormwater will discharge through controlled overflow structures into a nearby wetland area that lies northeast of Vista's property and will then be integrated into an existing channel that eventually forms the headwaters of Sandy Creek to the north. Petitioner has resided on her property since around 1932. Her odd-shaped parcel, described as being between five and seven acres in size, lies immediately to the north of Vista's property. A small wetland is located on the southeastern corner of her property. The two parcels share a common boundary line, appearing to be no more than a hundred feet or so. Because the boundary line is lower than the highest part of each owner's property, a "trench" has formed along the line. Wabash Avenue, a platted but un-built roadway that begins on U.S. Highway 90, runs to the northwest through the wetland area and along the eastern boundaries of both properties. As alleged in the Second Amended Petition, Petitioner is concerned that the project will cause flooding on her property. In a broader sense, she appears to be opposed to any commercial development on Vista's property. The back side of the Vista parcel slopes downhill to a recessed area that is adjacent to both properties. Although some fill has already been placed on the property in preparation for the development, the applicant intends to add "a lot" more fill to the entire parcel to create a gradual slope down to the edge of Wabash Avenue. A basin or pond around 0.20 acres in size will be formed within the fill area and a retaining wall consisting of multiple segments will be constructed around the basin. The wall will be separated from Petitioner's property by a 20-foot buffer, while at its closest point the basin will be "35 feet or so" from her property line. The plans submitted by the applicant demonstrate that the system will be built in accordance with all District standards and should operate in a safe manner. Before construction can begin, the District must approve the retaining wall design specifications. During rain events, the first inch of water will be retained on site for treatment. Additional water will be stored in the basin and then slowly allowed to discharge from the basin into the wetlands. The point of discharge from the basin is at a location a minimum of 20 feet south and east of Petitioner's property line. To ensure that the retention system will not discharge runoff at a higher rate than was discharged before development, Vista performed hydrologic calculations demonstrating pre- and post-development runoff. According to accepted models developed by the United States Department of Agriculture and its predecessor, the Soil Conservation Service, the current peak runoff from the Vista property is 2.46 cubic feet per second (CFS) during a two-year, 24-hour storm event. After development, the volume of water will be reduced to 0.74 CFS. During a 25-year, 24-hour storm event, the volume of runoff post-development is anticipated to drop from 12.59 CFS to 6.51 CFS. Finally, during a 100-year, 24-hour storm event, post- development runoff will be slightly reduced from 19.64 CFS to 18.99 CFS. Therefore, as sited, sized, and designed, the project will reduce runoff during all anticipated storm events. The foregoing calculations were not credibly contradicted and satisfy the requirement that an applicant give reasonable assurance that the project will not cause an increased flow such that it will endanger downstream property in times of flood with respect to state or frequency. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 40A-4.301(2)(f). They also confirm that water in the impoundment will not be raised to a level that could be harmful to the property of others. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 40A- 4.301(2)(c). Thus, the potential for flooding on Petitioner's property will be reduced if the project is constructed as permitted. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is currently repairing the drainage system on U.S. Highway 90 in front of the Vista property. Stormwater from that project drains into the wetlands through an easement deeded to the City at the rear of the Vista property. Petitioner pointed out that after the DOT project began, and fill was added to the Vista property, she has experienced an increase in water on her property. Whether the DOT project is responsible in any way for this hydrologic change is not known. However, accepted testimony by two professional engineers supports a finding that Vista is not responsible for any hydrologic changes on Petitioner's property. Vista was not required to take into account any runoff from the DOT project in making its hydrologic calculations because the amount of runoff from its own property will actually be reduced by the retention system. At hearing, Petitioner contended that a fence she built on the common boundary line with Vista sometime after 1990 was illegally removed by Vista in order to construct the basin. According to Mr. George, who first surveyed the property line in 1990 and then surveyed it a second time a few years ago, the fence was built a few feet beyond Petitioner's property line and lies within the buffer zone between the basin and her property. Petitioner argues that even if this is true, the doctrine of adverse possession applies and she is now the owner of the property on which the fence was built. This type of dispute, however, can only be resolved in circuit court, and not in an administrative forum. See § 26.012(2)(g), Fla. Stat. The District has examined the property records and is satisfied that Vista has ownership of the property on which the impoundment will be built. Notably, the basin will not be located within the 20-foot buffer where the fence once stood and which is dedicated to the City as an easement. Finally, through cross-examination at hearing, Petitioner suggested that any project designed by humans carries with it the remote possibility that it will fail and create a catastrophic situation on her property. In the unlikely event that the design and operation of the retention basin threaten the safety of adjoining property owners, section 373.429 and rule 40A-1.205 enable the District to revoke, suspend, or modify a permit to protect the safety of others.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Northwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order approving the issuance of Surface Water Management System Permit No. 04-2012-0013G to Vista. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathon Steverson, Executive Director Northwest Florida Water Management District 152 Water Management Drive Havana, Florida 32333-4712 Helen J. Crenshaw 61 North 18th Street DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433-9547 Kevin X. Crowley, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 James Busby Vista of Fort Walton Beach, LLC Post Office Box 760 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549-0760
The Issue The issues are: whether proposed amendments to Florida Administrative Code1 Rules 9K-9.003(6) and 9K-9.006(2) are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority under Section 120.52(8)(b), (c), and (e), Florida Statutes2; and, if so, whether costs and attorney's fees should be assessed against Respondent and paid to Petitioner under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The FCT has the power "to undertake, coordinate, or fund activities and projects which will . . . serve to conserve natural resources and resolve land use conflicts, including . . . [w]orking waterfronts." § 380.507(2)(g), Fla. Stat. The FCT also is specifically authorized to "award grants and make loans to local governments and nonprofit organizations for" that purpose. Id. at ¶ (6). In 2008, the Florida Legislature enacted the Stan Mayfield Working Waterfront grant program. Codified as Section 380.5105, Florida Statutes, paragraph (2) of the statute authorizes the FCT to promulgate "rules specifically establishing an application process and a process for the evaluation, scoring and ranking of working waterfront acquisition projects. . . . Such rules shall establish a system of weighted criteria to give increased priority to projects: Within a municipality with a population less than 30,000; Within a municipality or area under intense growth and development pressures, as evidenced by a number of factors, including a determination that the municipality's growth rate exceeds the average growth rate for the state; Within the boundary of a community redevelopment agency established pursuant to s. 163.356; Adjacent to state-owned submerged lands designated as an aquatic preserve identified in s. 258.39; or That provide a demonstrable benefit to the local economy." The purpose of the grant program is to preserve working waterfronts, which have been under pressure to convert to other uses. Some driving forces behind the conversion of working waterfront to other uses include: high coastal property values; high and unpredictable property taxes; increased regulation of commercial fishing to protect reduced fishery stocks; confusing and time-consuming regulatory processes for expanding or creating new working waterfronts; increased cheaper imported seafood; and rising fuel costs. The Stan Mayfield Working Waterfront grant program is administered by the FCT. In 2008, the FCT adopted rules governing the program, including Rule Chapter 9K-9 on Grant Application Procedures. In the first cycle of grant applications, evaluations, and awards, Monroe County applied for a grant to purchase and preserve Intervenor's property on Stock Island in Key West. Monroe County's Stock Island application was not granted. The FCT announced its intention to amend the rules based on the experience of the first grant cycle under the existing rules and input from "stakeholders" (mostly local governments and private not-for-profit entities interested in applying for grants) throughout the State. Workshops were conducted, and stakeholders (including Monroe County) participated. Proposed amendments were drafted, and stakeholders were invited to comment on the draft proposed amendments. The draft proposed amendments and comments were considered by the governing board of the FCT at its meeting in May 2009. The Board made some revisions to the draft proposed amendments and initiated rulemaking. Petitioner and Intervenor challenge proposed amendments to Rules 9K-9.003(6) and 9K-9.006(2). The proposed amendment to Rule 9K-9.003(6) caps awards at five million dollars or the amount appropriated by the Legislature, if less than five million dollars (sometimes referred to as "the cap"). The proposed amendment to Rule 9K-9.006(2) adds paragraph (d) and awards evaluation points based on the amount of grant money requested in an application, as follows: 8 points for a request not exceeding $1.5 million; 4 points for a request not exceeding $2.5 million; and 2 points for a request not exceeding $3.5 million.3 This proposed rule amendment is sometimes referred to as "the sliding scale." It is common for grant programs to adopt a "cap" on awards. The FCT's proposed "cap" took into account recent and expected future legislative appropriations, as well as the grant amounts requested in the first grant application cycle and expected in the immediate future, with the understanding that the "cap" could be adjusted by rule amendment in the future if that became necessary. The purpose of the proposed "cap" was to ensure that at least two applicants would receive grant money in each grant cycle. The proposed "sliding scale" was suggested by a representative of Dixie County at a noticed public FCT meeting. It was designed promote the use of non-State matching funds and to help local governments with less resources to compete in the grant application process. The proposed "sliding scale" was thoroughly discussed in-house by FCT staff and was discussed by the FCT governing board before it was approved unanimously. The challenged proposed rules cite Sections 380.507 and 380.5105(2), Florida Statutes, as their statutory authority. They cite Sections 259.105 and 380.501-380.515, Florida Statutes, as the specific laws they implement. Section 259.105, Florida Statutes, is the Florida Forever Act. Some of the funds in the Florida Forever Trust Fund are designated for distribution "to the Department of Community Affairs for the acquisition of land and capital project expenditures necessary to implement the Stan Mayfield Working Waterfronts Program within the Florida communities trust pursuant to s. 380.5105." § 259.105(3)(j), Fla. Stat. Sections 380.501-380.515, Florida Statutes, are the Florida Communities Trust Act, which includes the Stan Mayfield Working Waterfronts grant program. Petitioner and Intervenor contend that the proposed rule amendments are not authorized by statute and enlarge, modify, or contravene the law implemented because they add to the evaluation criteria in Section 380.5105(2), Florida Statutes. But it is clear that, besides the two proposed rule amendments under challenge in this case, the "system of weighted criteria" adopted in Rule Chapter 9K-9 includes several unchallenged criteria, in addition to the ones required by the statute to be given "increased priority." In addition, the evidence was that evaluation criteria in addition to those to be given "increased priority" are essential for the "system of weighted criteria" to function properly to differentiate and rank the most worthy grant applications. Without additional criteria, it is likely that many if not all grant applications would get the same score in the evaluation process. Petitioner and Intervenor also contend that the proposed "cap" and "sliding scale" result in "increased priority" not being given to the criteria specified in Section 380.5105(2), Florida Statutes. Actually, "increased priority" still is given to the criteria listed in Section 380.5105(2), Florida Statutes. Rule 9K-9.006(1)(c) gives "increased priority" (ten points) for the criterion listed in Section 380.5105(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Rule 9K-9.006(2)(b) gives "increased priority" (ten points) for the criterion listed in Section 380.5105(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Rule 9K-9.006(1)(a) gives "increased priority" (ten points) for the criterion listed in Section 380.5105(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Rule 9K-9.006(1)(b) gives "increased priority" (ten points) for the criterion listed in Section 380.5105(2)(d), Florida Statutes. Rule 9K-9.006(2)(a) gives "increased priority" (ten points) for the criterion listed in Section 380.5105(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Petitioner and Intervenor also contend that the challenged proposed amendments discriminate against grants to higher-priced properties. They contend that higher prices indicate higher pressure to convert, larger size, and greater benefit to the local economy from preservation. They contend that all of these indicators exist in the case of Intervenor's Stock Island property--indeed, the Stock Island property is under relatively high pressure to convert, is relatively large in size, and would stand to continue to greatly benefit the local economy if preserved. They contend that discriminating against higher- priced properties like Intervenor's Stock Island property is not authorized by statute, contravenes the statutes, and is arbitrary and capricious. Actually, the challenged proposed rules do not necessarily discriminate against higher-priced properties. An applicant can use non-State matching funds to bring a more costly proposal under the "cap" of the proposed amendment to Rule 9K- 9.003(6), and unchallenged existing Rule 9K-9.006(4)(a) provides that grant proposals with non-State matching funds score significant points--far more than would be lost under the "sliding scale" of paragraph (d) of the proposed amendment to Rule 9K-9.006(2). In addition, higher-priced projects are favored by other criteria in parts of the rule and proposed rule amendments that are not under challenge. For example, points are awarded for docking facilities, seafood houses, storage areas for traps, nets, and other gear, and boat ramps. These are more likely to be attributes of a larger, more expensive property. A proposed amendment to Rule 6K-9.006(3) significantly increased the amount of points available for docking facilities, especially existing usable docking facilities, which are more likely to exist on larger properties. A grant proposal with these kinds of amenities and attributes will "blow away in point-scoring" an application for a smaller grant for a proposal without these features. In support of their contentions, Petitioner and Intervenor hypothesize two grant proposals for projects (whether in the same locale or in different parts of the state) with identical attributes except for property cost. However, the evidence was that such a scenario is unlikely. If that unlikely scenario were to occur, it is possible that the higher-cost proposal would exceed the "cap" of the proposed amendment to Rule 9K-9.003(6), and the lower-cost proposal would score more points as a result of the proposed addition of paragraph (d) to Rule 9K- 9.006(2). However, the former scenario would create the desired incentive to secure enough non-State matching funds to get under the "cap"; and under the latter scenario, it would make sense to favor the grant proposal requesting less State money. Petitioner and Intervenor also contend that the proposed amendments fail to include a provision suggested by Monroe County to adopt a "sliding scale" for the "benefit to the local economy" and add other quantifiable criteria on a "sliding scale" (e.g., a "sliding scale" to give credit for the capacity of docking facilities and storage areas) that would give a greater competitive advantage to a large project like Monroe County's Stock Island proposal. The evidence was that these kinds of criteria would be difficult to devise and implement to achieve the desire result. For example, a large project might appear to benefit the local economy greatly but actually just consolidate several different areas of economic activity into one location. As a result, it was logical for the FCT not to adopt rules attempting to quantify and score these criteria on a "sliding scale." The challenged proposed amendments are supported by logic and the necessary facts, and were adopted with thought and reason and are rational. The contention that the FCT thoughtlessly adopted a suggestion by a representative of Dixie County and ignored suggestions by Monroe County is rejected.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent owns real property located in Township 2 North, Range 7 East, Section 32, in Madison County, Florida, that has surface water flowing through it and is encompassed within what is defined as "wetlands." Respondent is in control and possession of the property in question and all work on the property that is material to this proceeding is under the control or direction of the Respondent. There were access roads on the property as early as 1973 as reflected by Respondent's exhibit 2, a 1973 aerial photograph, but the width of the roads or the existence of ditches or culverts cannot be determined from the photograph. Petitioner's exhibit 2, a 1981 aerial photograph, shows the roads still in existence in 1981 but the width of the roads or existence of ditches or culverts cannot be determined from the photograph. Sometime before the Respondent purchased the property and began construction to expand the roads, ditches and culverts were in place; however, there was no evidence as to when the ditches and culverts came to be in place. A 1976 survey of the property reflects 60 foot roads which were to provide access to platted but unrecorded lots. These roads had not been constructed when Respondent purchased the property or began construction to expand the roads. The newly constructed portions of the road indicates an attempt to build the roads in accordance with the 1976 survey. The previously existing roads attempted to follow the natural contour of the land and as a result were not always straight, and only had a negligible effect on the flow or storage of surface water in regard to the property. Sometime around October 1987, Respondent began to rebuild and construct roads on the property by straightening existing curves, removing fill material from adjacent wetlands to widen and heighten the existing roadbed or construct a new roadbed, and to increase the depth and width of existing ditches or dig new ditches. The initial portion of the existing road providing access to the property from the county graded road has been substantially rebuilt with portion of the roadbed being 40 to 43 feet wide. Ditches along this portion of the roadbed have had their width increased up to 14 feet and their depth increased up to 6 and 8 feet. Other portions of the road has been expanded beyond the previously existing roadbed by increasing the width and height of the roadbed. The increased size of the ditches and the expanded roadbed has increased the interception of surface water above that already being intercepted by the previous roadbed and ditches and, as a result, there is an increased amount of surface water impounded or obstructed. The effect is that surface water is removed from Respondent's property at a faster rate than before road construction began and, as a result, sheet flow of surface water is decreased which diminishes the storage of surface water on the property. Although new culverts were installed during road construction, there was insufficient evidence to show that these new culverts were in addition to the culverts already in place or if they replaced old culverts. There was insufficient evidence to show that the new culverts allowed water to flow in a different direction or be removed from the property at a faster rate than before or if they impounded or obstructed surface water more so than before. The previously existing roads had sufficiently served an earlier timber harvest on the property and, by Respondent's own testimony, were sufficient for his ongoing hog and goat operation. The extensive rebuilding and constructing of roads in this case was neither necessary nor a customary practice for construction of farm access roads in this area. Respondent is engaged in the occupation of agriculture in that he has a bona fide hog and goat operation. However, Respondent's silviculture occupation is somewhat limited in that he is presently harvesting the timber but shows no indication of replanting or continuing the forestry operation upon completing the present harvesting operation. The extensive rebuilding and constructing of roads in this case goes beyond what is necessary or is the customary practice in the area for a hog or goat operation or forestry operation such as Respondent's and is inconsistent with this type of agriculture or silviculture occupation. Respondent has never applied for nor received a surface water management permit from the Petitioner even though the Petitioner has informed Respondent that a permit was required for the work being done on his property. The present alteration of the topography of the land by Respondent has obstructed and impounded surface water in such a fashion that the interruption of the sheet flow of surface water has been increased, causing the storage of surface water on the property to be diminished. At the present time, Respondent has been enjoined by the Circuit Court of Madison County, Florida, from any further activity on this project. However, should Respondent be allowed to complete this project, it is evident that the sole and predominant purpose would be to impound and obstruct the sheet flow of surface water and diminish the storage of surface water on the property in question.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Suwannee River Management District, enter a Final Order requiring Respondent, Norman Leonard, to: (a) remove all unauthorized fill material placed within jurisdictional wetlands and return those areas to predevelopment grades and revegetate with naturally occurring local wetlands species to prevent erosion; (b) back fill excavated swale ditches, return road beds and excavated ditches to predevelopment condition and grades and seed disturbed non-wetland areas with a 50:50 mix of bahia and rye grass and; (c) refrain from any other development until and unless a required permit is obtained for such development. Respectfully submitted and entered this 13th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-1445 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2.-3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 4.-7. Are unnecessary findings for this Recommended Order. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as conclusions of law. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 17. 26.-29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 31.-32. Subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 35.-38. Subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 39.-42. Rejected as not being relevant or material. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent 1. The first paragraph adopted in Finding of Fact 16. The balance is rejected as a conclusion of law. 2.-3. Rejected as not being relevant or material. Not a finding of fact but a statement of testimony. However, it is subordinate to facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. The more credible evidence is contrary to this finding. COPIES FURNISHED: Janice F. Baker, Esquire Post Office Box 1029 Lake City, Florida 32056-1029 Norman Leonard, Pro Se Route 2, Box 172-D Live Oak, Florida 32060 Donald O. Morgan Executive Director Suwannee River Water Management District Route 3, Box 64 Live Oak, Florida Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to an environmental resource permit for a surface water management system and the alteration of a wetland in connection with the construction of two warehouses, paved parking and loading areas, a detention pond, and enhancement of the remainder of the existing wetland. If not otherwise entitled to the permit, an additional issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to the permit through an exemption, waiver, or variance from the standard requirements for mitigation.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner Carlos M. Beruff, as Trustee under Florida Land Trust No. 22 dated March 30, 1989 (Petitioner), purchased 85 acres of land in Manatee County for $1.2 million in May 1989. (All acreages are approximate.) The east boundary of the 85-acre parcel consists of about 1700 feet of frontage along U.S. Route 301. One month after the purchase, Petitioner sold 70 of the 85 acres for $1.6 million. In the intervening month, Petitioner incurred no significant expenses for development or marketing, although the development and marketing expertise of Carlos Beruff facilitated the $1.6 million sale. The 70 acres that were sold included the frontage on U.S. Route 301. The 15 acres remaining after the sale comprise two tracts of 9 and 5.88 acres. In these cases, Petitioner seeks an environmental resource permit (ERP) for activities involving the 5.88-acre parcel (Site). The 9-acre parcel occupies the northwest corner of the 85-acre parcel. The Site, which was platted in 1911, is the only noncontiguous land constituting the 85-acre parcel; it is 450 feet south of the remainder of the 85-acre parcel. The sole parcel between the Site and the remainder of the 85- acre parcel was originally owned by Lowe's and is now owned by Cheetah Technologies (Cheetah Parcel). The 5.88-acre Site is subject to a road right-of-way of 0.32 acres in favor of the Cheetah Parcel. Of the remaining 5.56 acres, 4.66 acres are wetland and 0.9 acres are upland. The 0.9 acres of upland are subject to an access easement of 0.42 acres, also in favor of the Cheetah Parcel, so the net available upland acreage is only 0.48 acres. The Cheetah Parcel occupies the northwest corner of U.S. Route 301 and Saunders Road (also known as 63rd Avenue East). The Site is immediately west and south of the Cheetah Parcel and occupies the northeast corner of Saunders Road and 24th Street East (also known as Arlin Road). The Site is about 530 feet west of the intersection of U.S. Route 301 and Saunders Road. U.S. Route 301 is a major arterial, and Saunders Road is at least a major collector road. The Site contains about 600 feet of frontage along Saunders Road and 465 feet of frontage along 24th Street East. The Site is in unincorporated Manatee County roughly midway between downtown Bradenton and downtown Sarasota. Saunders Road crosses a north-south railroad line approximately one-half mile west of the Site and Bowlees Creek about 650 feet west of the railroad track. The 9-acre parcel still owned by Petitioner is about 350 feet north-south by 1250 feet east-west. The western boundary of the 9-acre parcel runs along the east side of the railroad line. Like the other parcels involved in this case, the 9-acre parcel drains into Bowlees Creek. The Site is in an area characterized by industrial land uses, including warehouses, a junkyard, an industrial center, and a bakery. A halfway house for persons recently released from prison is located one-quarter mile to the west of the Site. The Site is zoned HM (heavy manufacturing), which is a limited, and thus valuable, zoning category in Manatee County. Respondent has issued three relatively recent surface water management permits that are relevant to these cases: a 1986 permit for the development of the Cheetah Parcel (Cheetah Permit), a 1988 permit for the widening of Saunders Road from two to four lanes (Saunders Road Permit), and a 1989 permit for the construction of a commercial park north of the Site known as 301 Park of Commerce (301 Permit). Bowlees Creek runs from north to south, emptying into Sarasota Bay across from Longboat Key. Sarasota Bay is an Outstanding Florida Water. Bowlees Creek drains a nine square-mile basin, which is about 21-25 percent developed. The Bowlees Creek basin is an open drainage basin. Due to flooding problems, Manatee County has imposed special limitations upon development within the Bowlees Creek basin. Among these limitations is that the rate of post- development runoff must be less than the rate of pre- development runoff--up to 50 percent less, according to expert witnesses for both sides (Lawrence Weber, Tr. Vol. III, pp. 118-19; and Daryl Flatt, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 230). By stipulation, the Site is at the extreme eastern end of the Bowlees Creek basin. In fact, the Site may have historically drained into Bowlees Creek and will drain into Bowlees Creek after, as described below, the northwest window is added to the surface water management system. In 1993 or 1994, Petitioner began the process of developing the Site following the sale five years earlier of the larger 70-acre parcel. Mr. Beruff has been in the development business for 20 years. His career began in 1980 when Mr. Beruff became an employee for U.S. Homes and Modern Builders; he became self-employed in 1984. Mr. Beruff has developed seven commercial and ten residential developments. Application Process Deciding to pursue warehouse development for the Site, Petitioner initiated the development process by hiring an engineer and environmental consultant. With the assistance of these consultants, Petitioner prepared its application for an ERP. By application dated October 9, 1998, and filed November 13, 1998, Petitioner requested that Respondent issue an individual ERP for the construction on the Site of a surface water management system in connection with the construction of two warehouse buildings, paved parking and loading areas, and a detention pond, as well as the enhancement of the remainder of the existing wetland (Application). The Application states that the total building, parking, and loading areas would be 58,026 square feet and that wetlands constitute 3.37 acres of the 5.88-acre Site. The site plan attached to the Application shows a "wetland preservation & enhancement" area of 1.592 acres at the north end of the Site. To the south, toward Saunders Road, are two buildings with paved parking and loading areas. On the southwest corner is a "stormwater treatment & attenuation" area. After several discussions with Respondent's staff, Petitioner modified the proposed development. In its latest revision, the footprint of the proposed development would occupy 2.834 acres of wetland, leaving 1.826 acres of wetland. On November 13, 1998, Petitioner filed a Petition for Exemption, Waiver or Variance as to Mitigation Requirements, seeking an exemption, waiver, or variance from all laws requiring offsite mitigation or additional onsite mitigation for the portion of the wetland that would be destroyed by the proposed development. Drainage At present, the Site receives runoff from a total of 27 acres. The offsite contributors of runoff are the Cheetah Parcel and a segment of Saunders Road east of 21st Street East. These locations have drained into the Site for hundreds of years. In general, drainage raises two distinct issues: water quality and water quantity. For an open drainage basin, the issue of water quantity expresses itself primarily in runoff discharge rate, although historic basin storage is also an issue. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the Respondent's Basis of Review identifies different storm events to which applicants must design different components of surface water management systems. For water quantity, the system may release no more than the permitted discharge rate in the design storm, which is the 25-year, 24-hour storm event. At present, the design storm would produce about eight inches of rain, although the same design storm, due to a different model or modeling assumptions, produced 9.5 inches of rain at the time of the issuance of the permit for the Cheetah Parcel. (The practical effect of this change in the calculation of the design storm is that the quantitative capacity of the surface water management system of the Cheetah Parcel is nearly 20 percent greater than would be required today.) For water quality, the system must capture the first inch of runoff (sometimes only the first half-inch of runoff, depending on the type of system and receiving waterbody). In contrast to the relatively infrequent 25-year storm, approximately 90 percent of the storms in Respondent's jurisdiction produce no more than one inch of runoff. The underlying premise is that the first inch of runoff contains nearly all of the contaminants that will be flushed from impervious surfaces. The Cheetah surface water management system features a wetland and a retention pond along the north property line of the Site. The Cheetah pond and wetland attenuate runoff before allowing it to drain south onto the Site. The Cheetah surface water management system also includes a swale running north along 24th Street East to take runoff eventually to Bowlees Creek. The Saunders Road surface water management system discharging onto the Site consists largely of an underground, offline storage and attenuation system that stores excess runoff, as compared to pre-development rates, in lateral pipes off a weir. Nothing in the record suggests that the surface water management systems authorized by the Cheetah Permit or the Saunders Road Permit fail to provide reasonable assurance that the discharged runoff is of satisfactory water quality. Following their respective permits in 1986 and 1988, respectively, the rates of discharge of runoff from the Cheetah Parcel and Saunders Road were no greater post- development than they had been pre-development. The Cheetah Parcel post-development and pre-development discharge rates were both 10.6 cubic feet per second (cfs). The Saunders Road post-development and pre-development discharge rates were both 32.4 cfs. In issuing the 301 Permit, Respondent authorized the construction of a drainage system that would take runoff north along 24th Street East and then west, eventually emptying into Bowlees Creek. Conforming to the previous drainage system, the new system replaced an open ditch with underground stormwater pipes. Of particular relevance to the Site, two prominent features of the system authorized by the 301 Permit were windows in the vicinity of the southwest and northwest corners of the Site (Southwest Window and Northwest Window). A window is an opening in the wall of a hardened structure whose purpose includes drainage. The opening is constructed at a certain elevation and a certain size to allow specified volumes or rates of water to pass into the structure and then offsite. The 301 Permit authorized the construction of a swale along the southwest corner of the Site to direct runoff discharging from the Saunders Road system into the Southwest Window. This swale has been construed. However, several problems have precluded the construction of the Southwest Window, probably permanently. The most serious problem, from an engineering perspective, is the failure to lay the stormwater pipe along 24th Street East at the proper depth. The stormwater pipe was erroneously installed at an elevation of 15.32 feet National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD), and the Southwest Window was to have been cut at a control elevation of 14.75 feet NGVD. The discharge elevation of the Saunders Road outlet precludes raising the control elevation of the Southwest Window sufficiently to allow gravity drainage into the stormwater pipe. Exacerbating the discrepancy among the as-built elevations of the three structures is what appears to be a design problem belatedly recognized by Respondent. Respondent is justifiably concerned that the Southwest Window, at a control elevation of 14.75 feet NGVD, would draw down the water elevation of the Site's wetland, which is at a wet season elevation of 16.5 feet NGVD (now actually 17 feet NGVD, possibly due to the absence of the Southwest Window). A third problem with the Southwest Window is that the southwest corner of the Site was not historically a point of discharge, so the Southwest Window would deprive the Site's wetland of runoff. Fortunately, neither the Southwest nor the Northwest Window is essential for the proper operation of the surface water management system of 301 Park of Commerce, which largely depends on a series of lakes for treatment and attenuation. The Northwest Window was to be at elevation 16.5 feet NGVD, and its construction would provide needed drainage for the Site. In general, the Northwest Window does not raise the same concerns as does the Southwest Window. The Northwest Window is in the vicinity of the historic point of discharge for the Site and replaces a ditch permitted for the Cheetah Parcel to take runoff north along 24th Street East. The Northwest Window would also alleviate a standing-water problem at the northwest corner of the Site. However, Manatee County, which controls the right- of-way on which the Northwest Window is located and is responsible for its construction and maintenance, has discovered that it lacks a sufficient property interest to access the Northwest Window. The County has since initiated the process by which it can obtain the necessary interest, and, once completed, the County will cut the Northwest Window into the existing structure. Due to the role of the Northwest Window in draining the runoff in the area, including the Site, the Application reincorporates the Northwest Window, as it should have been constructed pursuant to the 301 Permit. Although the Cheetah and Saunders Road permits resulted in greater runoff volume entering the Site, more importantly to area drainage, these permits did not result in greater runoff rates and or in a deterioration in runoff water quality. Likewise, the failure to construct the Southwest Window and Northwest Window is not especially relevant to area drainage, nor is the likely inability ever to construct the Southwest Window. Far more important to area drainage is the fact that Petitioner proposes that the Site, post-development, would produce a runoff rate of 10.6 cfs, as compared to a pre-development runoff rate of 7 cfs. A serious adverse impact to area drainage, the proposed activity increases the runoff rate by 50 percent in a floodprone, 80-percent builtout basin--a basin of such sensitivity that Manatee County is imposing a post-development requirement of substantially reduced runoff rates. The cumulative impacts of the proposed development, together with existing developments, would be to cause substantial flooding of the Bowlees Creek basin. Petitioner's expert attempted to show that the runoff from the Site, which is at the extreme eastern end of the Bowlees Creek basin, would be delayed sufficiently so as not to exacerbate flooding. Respondent's expert thoroughly discredited this testimony due, among other things, to its reliance upon obsolete data and an unrealistic limitation upon the assumption of the direction of travel of storms. Similarly, Petitioner failed to prove that the authorized discharge rate for the 301 Permit is 42 cfs. This assertion is most succinctly, though not exclusively, rebutted by the fact that the 42-inch pipe can only accommodate 18 cfs. Even if the 42-inch pipe could accommodate a substantially greater runoff rate, Petitioner's expert would have erroneously inferred a permitted discharge rate from this increased capacity without negating the possibility that other structures in the 301 surface water management system effectively reduced the rate or that oversized structures existed to accommodate higher runoff rates in storms greater than the design storm. In addition to increasing the runoff rate by 50 percent, Petitioner's proposal would also reduce the historic basin storage by over 40 percent. Displaced basin storage moves downstream, increasing flood levels from fixed storm events. At present, the Site provides 8.68 acre-feet of historic basin storage. The Application proposes to replace this storage with storage in the wetland and retention pond totaling only 4.9 acre-feet. The loss of 3.8 acre-feet of basin storage means that this additional volume of water would, post-development, travel down Bowlees Creek. A final drainage deficiency in Petitioner's proposal arises out of a berm's proposed outside of the Northwest Window. A one-foot bust in the survey of Petitioner's expert would have resulted in this berm preventing runoff from entering the Site from the Cheetah Parcel, as runoff presently does. Respondent's expert suggested several possible alternatives that might result in a permittable project with respect to post-development runoff rates (the record is silent as to the effect of these alternatives upon historic basin storage, although it would seem that they would add storage). Reducing the area of destroyed wetlands to one acre would probably reduce the excess of post-development runoff rate to 1-2 cfs. Petitioner could then obtain offsetting attenuation through a variety of means, such as by obtaining an easement to use the wetland on the Cheetah Parcel, constructing an attenuation pond on the 9-acre parcel, or constructing underground vaults in the filled area of the wetland on the Site. Wetlands Except for the road right-of-way, the Site is undeveloped and forested. The presence of 25-year-old red maples militates against attributing the transition from an herbaceous to a forested wetland to the failure to install the Northwest and Southwest windows. More likely, this transition to the sub-climax species of red maple and willow (in the absence of a cypress source) is due to the repression of fire on the Site. Experts for the opposing sides differed sharply in their biological assessments of the wetland. Petitioner's expert described a stressed wetland whose impenetrable thicket provided habitat only to a lone rat and swarm of mosquitoes. Respondent's expert described a robust wetland featuring a luxuriant overstory of red maple and Carolina willow; an rich understory of ferns, and diverse wildlife ranging from birds in the air (direct evidence); fish, snails, and tadpoles in a small pond (direct evidence); and squirrel and opossum (indirect evidence) scampering (indirect evidence) among the buttonbush, elderberry, and wax myrtle (direct evidence). Undoubtedly, the wetland has been stressed; approximately 30 percent of the wetland vegetation is Brazilian pepper, which is a nuisance exotic. However, the wetland is well hydrated. Issuance of the Cheetah Permit was predicated, in part, upon the rehydration of the wetland on the Site. With the issuance of the Cheetah Permit and especially the Saunders Road Permit, the quality of water entering the wetland has improved by a considerable amount. As already noted, added volumes of runoff are entering the wetland since the issuance of these two permits, although post-development runoff rates are the same as pre-development runoff rates. On balance, the wetland is functioning well in providing habitat and natural drainage functions. Giving due weight to the current condition of the wetland, the enhancement offered by Petitioner does not approach offsetting the loss of wetland area. In return for destroying 2.83 acres of the wetland, Petitioner proposed the enhancement of the remaining 1.83 acres by removing exotic species to no more than 10 percent of the total vegetation. The mitigation is plainly insufficient because of the level of functioning of the entire wetland at present. Additionally, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Brazilian pepper, which is the major nuisance exotic occupying the Site, is evenly distributed; to the contrary, it is present mostly outside the wetland, along a berm just outside of the wetland. The lack of seedlings and old specimens suggests that the Brazilian pepper population may not be stable and may itself be stressed. Petitioner's failure to show that the remaining wetland area has more than 10 percent infestation or is likely to suffer additional infestation further undermines the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation. Respondent has never issued an ERP for a proposed activity involving the alteration of wetlands when the enhancement mitigation ratio is as low as .65:1, as Petitioner proposes. In general, Respondent requires higher mitigation ratios when proposals involve wetlands enhancement, rather than wetlands creation, because the wetlands to be enhanced are already functioning--in these cases, at a relatively high level. Although Petitioner has been unwilling to consider such alternatives, numerous alternatives exist for offsite mitigation or mitigation banking, if insufficient area exists for adequate onsite mitigation. Lastly, Petitioner devoted considerable effort at hearing to portraying Respondent's handling of the Application as flawed and unfair. However, the evidence does not support these assertions. Most strikingly, Respondent's staff treated the drainage windows inconsistently, to the benefit of Petitioner. They treated the Northwest Window as installed for the purpose of calculating the pre-development runoff discharge rate to Bowlees Creek. Until the Northwest Window is installed, the actual rate is even lower. This approach is justifiable because the Northwest Window will be installed at some point. On the other hand, Respondent's staff ignored the higher wetland elevation on the Site, presumably resulting from the absence of the Southwest Window. However, this approach, which benefits Petitioner in calculating wetland drawdown effects, is unjustifiable because the Southwest Window probably will never be installed. Petitioner's specific complaints of unfair treatment are unfounded. For example, Petitioner suggested that Respondent credited Lowe's with wetland acreage for the littoral shelf of its wetland, but did not do so with the wetland on the Site. However, Petitioner produced no evidence of similar slopes between the two shelves, without which comparability of biological function is impossible. Additionally, Petitioner ignored the possibility that, in the intervening 14 years, Respondent may have refined its approach to wetland mitigation. Although occurring at hearing, rather than in the application-review process, Respondent's willingness to enter into the stipulation that the Site presently drains into Bowlees Creek, despite recent data stating otherwise, was eminently fair to Petitioner. Absent this stipulation, Respondent would have been left with the formidable prospect of providing reasonable assurance concerning drainage into the floodprone Bowlees Creek when the post-development rate was 10.6 cfs and the pre-development rate was 0 cfs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent deny Petitioner's application for an environmental resource permit and for an exemption, variance, or waiver. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of February, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: S. W. Moore Tracey B. Starrett Brigham. Moore, Gaylord, Schuster, Merlin & Tobin, LLP 100 Wallace Avenue, Suite 310 Sarasota, Florida 34237-6043 Mark F. Lapp Jack R. Pepper Assistant General Counsel Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609 E. D. "Sonny" Vergara Executive Director Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899
Findings Of Fact On September 13, 1977, SFWMD advised Coquina by letter that "[a]t its September 8, 1977 meeting the Governing Board of this District gave Conceptual Approval of [Coquina's] surface water management plan . . . subject to the four special conditions found on page 15 of the District's staff report. . . [and an] additional special condition Joint exhibit No. 5. The first special condition found on page 15 of the District's staff report requires that complete construction plans be submitted, including "supporting calculations for all design elements not already submitted and any other plans necessary to assure adherence to the concept plan." Joint exhibit No. 2, page 15. The plan approved by SFWMD is designed to lower the water table in a 22 square mile area northwest of Lake Okeechobee in Okeechobee County. In its natural state, the land lies under water for part of the year. The corporate owner of the land has plans to subdivide it and sell residential lots, beginning with the four contiguous sections as to which the present application for a construction permit has been made. These four sections (phase I) lie north and south of each other in the western portion of the larger tract. The proposed construction would consist of digging ditches or swales paralleling existing and planned roads; building intersecting collector swales running north and south; installing ditch checks where swales intersect; dredging a retention pond into which the collector swales could empty at the south end of the phase I tract; digging an outfill ditch to channel water leaving the retention area for Ash Slough; and erecting a weir, between the retention area and the slough. Culverts through the weir would be equipped "with standard flash board risers in which the water level is regulated by stop logs which can be added or removed," Coquina's exhibit No. 1, p. 10, and the culverts would ordinarily serve as the route by which water from the retention area would reach Ash Slough. Under extremely wet conditions, however, water from the retention area could overflow the weir. The intervening petitioners own land on Ash Slough downstream from the retention area and adjacent to the southern boundary of the phase I tract. No formal studies of the likely effects of the proposed construction downstream were undertaken by Coquina or by SFWMD in evaluating Coquina's application. The surface water management plan given conceptual approval by SFWMD provides: The quantity of runoff flowing to the south through existing sloughs will be controlled to protect the downstream areas against flooding whereas at the present there is no control. The amount flowing to the existing sloughs to the south during the 25 yr. design storm will be limited to the amount flowing to those sloughs before any development takes place. Lesser storms will be more completely retained on the property. Controlled discharge will be provided from retention areas to the existing sloughs for the purpose of nourishing these streams. Coquina's exhibit No. 1, p. 1. (Emphasis supplied) Since no records of the amount of discharge to Ash Slough "before any development" are in existence, certain assumptions and estimates were made. One such assumption on which the application for construction permit proceeds is that the phase I tract all drains to the south, in its present state. In fact, some of the water now leaving the phase I tract travels in a westerly direction and never enters Ash Slough, at least under some weather conditions. If the proposed construction is accomplished, the phase I tract would all drain to the south through Ash Slough. As things now stand, a significant amount of water leaves the phase I tract by evapotranspiration. If the water table were lowered two and a half feet, which is what Coquina proposes, less water would leave the phase I tract by evapotranspiration, leaving more water to flow over the ground. In estimating the quantity of the anticipated discharge to Ash Slough, if the proposed construction takes place, it is necessary to take into account drainage onto the phase I tract from adjoining lands. Coquina has failed to furnish plans and supporting calculations sufficient to insure that the proposed construction will not increase the amount of flow to Ash Slough during the 25 year design storm. Increased flow to Ash Slough would aggravate downstream landowners' drainage problems, unless the slough could handle the additional flow, a question which the application does not address. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 34O So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That SFWMD deny Coquina's application for construction permit. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of November, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX Paragraph one of intervening Bass petitioners' proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant, except that the evidence did not demonstrate that downstream landowners would in fact be harmed. Paragraphs two, three, four, five, six and seven of intervening Bass petitioners' proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. Paragraph one of respondent Coquina's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant, except for the date of the application. Paragraphs two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine and thirteen of respondent Coquina's proposed findings of fact have been adopted in substance, insofar as relevant. Paragraph ten of respondent Coquina's proposed findings of fact stated a conclusion of law, in part. While "testimony was presented that the construction of Phase I would have no substantial adverse affect [sic] on surrounding properties," the evidence as a whole did not establish this fact. Paragraphs eleven and twelve of respondent Coquina's proposed findings of fact have not been adopted because they were not established by the evidence, except for subparagraph eleven (f), which was proven. COPIES FURNISHED: John Henry Wheeler, Esquire South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box V West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Robert Birenbaum, President Viking Communities Corporation (Coquina Water Management District) 123 Northeast 70 Street Miami, Florida 33138 Kyle S. Van Landingham, Esquire County Attorney Okeechobee County Courthouse Okeechobee, Florida 33472 Andrew B. Jackson, Esquire J.C. Bass & Bass Ranch, Inc. Post Office Box 488 Lake Placid, Florida 33852 Emerson Allsworth, Esquire 1177 Southeast Third Avenue Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Mr. Bob Wittenberg Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dr. Patrick M. McCaffrey Kissimmee Coordinating Council 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. George Stansbury Central Florida Regional Planning Council Post Office Box 2089 Bartow, Florida 33830
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue The issues in this case are: Whether Petitioner, Warren M. Briggs ("Briggs"), should be issued a Wetland Resource Permit (WRP) for the construction of a single-family dwelling on a lot with jurisdictional wetlands in Santa Rosa County, Florida, as proposed in his application submission of 1998; and Whether the Department would permit the construction of a single-family dwelling on the subject lot under conditions and circumstances other than those set forth in Briggs' application.
Findings Of Fact Briggs is the owner of Lot 67, Block H, Paradise Bay Subdivision, located in southern Santa Rosa County ("Briggs lot"). Paradise Bay Subdivision was developed in approximately 1980, prior to the passage in 1984 of the Warren Henderson Wetland Protection Act. (Official Recognition of Section 403.918, Florida Statutes). The subdivision consists of modestly priced single- family homes that are attractive to young families because of the quality of nearby schools. The typical non-waterfront home in the subdivision is single story, approximately 2,000 square feet in area, and built on a concrete slab. The typical setback from the road to the front edge of a home is 75 feet. This fairly consistent setback from the road prevents the view from one home into the adjacent property owner’s back yard and, thereby, adversely affecting the neighbor’s property value. The undeveloped Briggs lot was purchased in 1981 for approximately $15,000 and remains undeveloped. Briggs bought the lot, along with three other lots in the subdivision, as investment property. The other three lots have been sold. One of the lots sold earlier by Briggs was a waterfront lot on East Bay located in jurisdictional wetlands. The entire lot was filled pursuant to a permit issued by the Department. The Briggs lot is 90 feet wide by 200 feet deep. It is located on the south side of Paradise Bay Drive. The lots on the north side of Paradise Bay Drive are waterfront lots on East Bay. To the rear (south) of the Briggs lot and other lots on the south side of Paradise Bay Drive, is a large swamp that eventually discharges into East Bay. The major connection between the Briggs lot and East Bay is through a culvert under Paradise Bay Drive. The Briggs’ lot consists of 2,914 square feet of uplands and 15,086 square feet of state jurisdictional wetland, with all of the uplands located in the northern half of the lot. Converted to acres, the Briggs lot consists of 0.067 acres of uplands and 0.347 acres of state jurisdictional wetland. Lot 66, immediately east of the Briggs lot, has been cleared and is about half tietie swamp with the remainder consisting of uplands and disturbed wetlands. Some fill has been placed on the lot. Lot 68, immediately west of the Briggs lot, is undeveloped and consists of all tietie wetlands. Lots 69, 70 and 71 of Block H of the subdivision are undeveloped and consist primarily of wetlands. The Department issued a permit on October 31, 1996, that allowed the owners of Lot 71 to fill 0.22 acres (9,570 square feet) of wetlands. The fill is allowed to a lot depth of 145 feet on the west side, and to a width of 73 feet of the total lot width of 90 feet. The fill area is bordered on the east and west by wetland areas not to be filled. The Department issued a permit on November 13, 1997, that allowed the owner of Lot 61 to fill 0.26 acres (11,310 square feet) of wetlands. Fill is allowed over the entire northern 125 feet of the 185 foot-deep lot. On April 28, 1998, Briggs applied to the Department for a permit to fill Lot 67. The Department, in its letter of August 7, 1998, and its permit denial of September 2, 1998, erroneously described the project as consisting of 0.47 acres of fill. The entire lot consists of only 0.41 acres, of which 0.067 acres is uplands, leaving a maximum area of fill of 0.343 acres. If Briggs’ residential lot is to be used, some impact to the wetlands on the lot is unavoidable. Alternatives discussed by Briggs and the Department, three of which are still available for Briggs to accept, included the following: One hundred feet of fill with a bulkhead separating the fill from the wetland area, with no off-site mitigation; Fill pad could be placed on property with the remainder of the wetlands on the site to remain in their natural state with no backyard, with no off-site mitigation required; One hundred feet of fill with a bulkhead separating the fill material from the wetland, with a small back yard, with no off-site mitigation required. Briggs did not accept any of the foregoing alternatives or proposed acceptable mitigation measures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the permit application, provided that the parties may reach subsequent agreement regarding proper mitigation in order to make the construction of a single-family dwelling possible on the Petitioner’s property in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles T. Collette, Esquire Lucinda R. Roberts, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Jesse W. Rigby, Esquire Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry Bond and Stackhouse 125 West Romana Street, Suite 800 Post Office Box 13010 Pensacola, Florida 32591-3010 Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue This proceeding concerns an Intent to Issue a dredge and fill permit given by the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") to Respondent, Edmund Burke ("Burke"), for construction of a retaining wall and wooden pile-supported bridge crossing a portion of the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The ultimate issues for determination are whether Petitioner has standing to challenge the proposed DER action, and if so, whether the proposed agency action complies with the requirements of Sections 403.91 through 403.938, Florida Statutes, and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edmund Burke, on January 15, 1988, filed with the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") application number 431441608 for a permit to construct a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge approximately 80 feet long and 10 feet wide connecting the mainland with an island in the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The bridge was to span a 50 foot canal or creek ("channel") in the River. One of two retaining walls was to be located on the mainland peninsula. The other retaining wall was to be located on the island (the "initial project"). Between January 15, 1988, and April 28, 1989, the initial project was modified by Respondent, Burke, to satisfy DER concerns over potential impacts, including secondary impacts, relevant to the application. The width of the bridge was reduced from 10 feet to 6 feet. The retaining wall initially planned at the point where the bridge intersects the island was eliminated. The retaining wall on the mainland side of the bridge was relocated above mean high water. Sixty feet of the proposed bridge runs from mean high water to mean high water. An additional 10 feet on each end of the bridge is located above mean high water. The project remained a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge (the "modified project"). The Intent to Issue, dated April 28, 1989, indicated that the modifications required by DER had been made, that the modifications satisfied DER concerns relevant to the initial project, and that DER intended to issue a permit for construction of the modified project. The elimination of the retaining wall obviated any necessity for backfill on the island. The reduction in the width of the bridge virtually eliminated the secondary impacts on the surrounding habitat, resulted in less shading of the water, and precluded vehicular traffic over the bridge. The final modification that was "necessary in order for [DER] to approve this application" was the reduction in the width of the bridge from 10 feet to 6 feet. Petitioner's Exhibit 17. DER's requirement for this final modification was communicated to Mr. Cangianelli in a telephone conversation on April 6, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 18), and memorialized in a letter to Respondent, Burke, on April 14, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 17). The final modification was made, and the Intent to Issue was written on April 28, 1989. Petitioner's Case. Property commonly known as Harbor Estates is adjacent to the site of the modified project. A constructed harbor and contiguous park are located within the boundaries of Harbor Estates. Both are used by residents of Harbor Estates and both are proximate to the site of the modified project. The harbor entrance and site of the modified project are located on opposite sides of a peninsula approximately 40 feet wide and approximately 125 feet long. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that can navigate under the modified project need only travel the length of the peninsula, a distance of approximately 125 feet through the channel, in order to reach the harbor entrance. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that cannot navigate under the proposed bridge must travel around the island, a distance of approximately 1800 feet in the main body of the St. Lucie River, in order to reach the harbor entrance. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that prior to the construction of the bridge the channel was navigable by boats not capable of passing under the bridge after the bridge was completed. Petitioner, Harbor Estates Associates, Inc., submitted no evidence to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of modifications required by DER. Of Petitioner's 26 exhibits, Exhibits 1-19, 24 and 25 were relevant to the initial project but were not material to claims in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of the modifications required by DER. Petitioner's Exhibit 20 was cumulative of DER's Exhibit 6B. Petitioner's Exhibits 22 and 26, respectively, concern a 1980 bridge permit and a Proposed Comprehensive Growth Management Plan for Martin County, Florida. Petitioner offered no expert testimony in support of the pleadings in the Petition including assertions that: the modified project will have a direct adverse impact upon water quality and the welfare or property of others; the channel is navigable by deep-draft motor vessels; the modified project will result in shoaling that will have to be corrected at the expense of Harbor Estates; the modified project will result in prohibited destruction of mangroves; or that the modified project will cause any of the other specific adverse effects described in the Petition. The testimony of fact witnesses called by Petitioner was not material to Petitioner's claims that modifications required by DER were inadequate. The testimony of Bob Nicholas was relevant to allegations of prior violations but was not dispositive of any issue concerning the adequacy of modifications required by DER. The testimony of William Burr was admitted as rebuttal testimony relevant to precedents in the general area of the modified project but failed to address the adequacy of modifications required by DER. Petitioner consistently demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the applicable law, the proper scope of the formal hearing, and the distinction between argument and evidence. Petitioner repeatedly attempted to establish violations of laws not relevant to the proceeding including local laws and other environmental laws. Petitioner attempted to establish issues by arguing with witnesses during direct and cross examination, and by repeatedly making unsworn ore tenus representations of fact. There was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact in this proceeding because Petitioner failed to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings. Petitioner presented no evidence refuting Respondent, Burke's, showing that the modifications required by DER were adequate to assure water quality and the public health, safety, or welfare, or the property of others. Evidence presented by Petitioner was not material to the issue of whether the modifications required by DER were adequate for the purposes of the law applicable to this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose, primarily to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or approval of the proposed activity. Respondents' Case. The island to be accessed by the modified project is approximately 2.5 acres in area and contains mostly wetland. The island is approximately 900 feet long. The portion of the island that is beyond DER permit jurisdiction is less than 200 feet long and less than 50 feet wide. The site of the modified project is located in Class III waters. Respondent, Burke, provided adequate assurances that portions of the modified project not extending over open water will be constructed upon property owned by him. The single retaining wall to be constructed at the southeastern terminus of the modified project will be constructed landward of DER jurisdiction. The modified project permits neither the installation of water or electrical conduits to the island nor any excavation, filling, or construction on the island. Respondent, Burke, must provide notification to DER before any such activity is begun. The bridge will accommodate no vehicular traffic larger or heavier than a golf cart. Golf cart access is necessary in order to accommodate a physical disability of Respondent, Burke. The modified project employs adequate methods to control turbidity, limit mangrove alteration on the island, and limit potential collisions with manatees. Vegetation, including mangroves, will not be removed. Incidental, selective trimming of vegetation will be allowed to create access to the island. The single retaining wall to be constructed on the mainland will be located landward of mangroves. Turbidity curtains will be used during construction to minimize short term water quality impacts. The modified project requires turbidity screens to be installed if there is any indication of sedimentation. No mechanical equipment will be located on the island during construction. No boats will be moored at the site of the modified project. The modified project will cause no significant downstream shoaling or silting. The site of the modified project is located approximately 15 feet from an existing fishing platform. No significant shoaling has been associated with that platform. The impacts associated with the modified project are similar to the impacts associated with single family docks in the area. No significant shoaling has been associated with such docks. The modified project is not a navigational hazard. The elevation is sufficient to accommodate small boats, canoes, and row boats. Reflective devices are required to alert night boat traffic of its presence. There is adequate clearance under the bridge to prevent obstruction. DER reviewed all applicable rules and criteria in considering the modified project. The modified project will have no adverse effect upon public health, safety or welfare, or the property of others. The modified project will not adversely impact the conservation of fish, wildlife, or their habitats. The modified project will not adversely affect navigation, the flow of water, or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The modified project will not adversely impact fishing value or marine productivity in the area. The modified project will have no adverse impact upon recreational values in the vicinity. The modified project was reviewed in a manner that is customary for similar projects reviewed by DER. It is common practice for DER employees, as they did in this case, to rely upon opinions of other DER professionals in formulating an intent to issue. Other projects within DER jurisdiction in the general geographic area of the modified project and within the same region were considered in DER's review process. Other docks and marinas have been constructed and are proposed for construction within the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. Bridges including pedestrian bridges have been and are proposed to be constructed in Martin County. DER did not require a hydrographic study because the modified project was considered a minor project. DER review took into account the intended future use of the island property and DER's past experience with Respondent, Burke. As part of its review, DER reviewed a conceptual bridge to a single family residence on the island which would not require any fill or construction of retaining walls. In addition, DER considered previous violations on the island under Florida Administrative Code Rules 17-4.070, 17-4.160, and 17-4.530 in connection with an earlier permit that expired before the initial project was begun. Respondent, Burke, provided reasonable assurances that he is the owner of the site of the proposed project. Respondent, Burke, signed DER's property ownership affidavit and submitted a survey. DER's Intent to Issue does not authorize any construction in any area within the jurisdiction of DER other than the modified project. The Intent to Issue constitutes compliance with state water quality standards. DER has not received any requests for a jurisdictional determination in the general geographic area of the modified project. No enforcement action has been initiated by DER or at the request of a third party against Respondent, Burke, for alleged violations of DER rules.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order on the merits issuing the requested permit and awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs in accordance with this Recommended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of April, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Although most of Petitioner's proposed findings were cast in the form of "fact", they were in substance argument and rejected accordingly. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in part in Finding 1 Findings as to ownership are rejected as beyond the jurisdiction of the undersigned. Finding as to the late filed exhibit is rejected as irrelevant. 2-4, 10-12, Rejected as either irrelevant 16, or not supported by the record. 5 and 6, 37, 40 Rejected as unsupported by 42 the record. 7, 8, 15 Rejected as irrelevant 17, 21-29 and immaterial 9, 13, 14, 18-20 Rejected as immaterial 30-33, 35 and 36 37(a), 38, 39, 41, 48 20(A) Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial except the last sentence is included in Finding 13 34 Included in Finding 12 Rejected as not supported by the record, hypothetical and immaterial. Rejected as not established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent, Burke, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Respondent. Burke's, Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 15 and 16 Included in Finding 1 17, 26, 27 Included in Finding 2 18, 48 Included in Findings 15 and 16 19, 30, 31, 42 Included in Finding 13 20, 21, 44 Included in Findings 4 and 14 22, 23, 25, 32 Included in Finding 17 24 Included in Finding 16 25, 36-38 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 18 Included in Finding 3 Included in Finding 10 Included in Finding 19 35, 39, 43 Included in Finding 20 40, 41 Included in Finding 11 45-47 and 49 Included in Finding 16 51 and 52 Included in Findings 6-8 54 Included in Finding 5 and 8 50 and 53 Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial Respondent, DER, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 and 2 Included in Findings 1 and 2 3 Included in Finding 10 4 and 5 Included in Finding 16 6, 9 Included in Finding 2 7 and 8 Included in Findings 9 and 11 10 Included in Finding 13 11 Included in Finding 15 Included in Finding 17 and 14 Included in Finding 16 COPIES FURNISHED: Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia E. Comer Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia V. Bartell Qualified Representative 615 S.W. St. Lucie Street Stuart, FL 34997 J. A. Jurgens Jones, Foster, Johnson & Stubbs, P.A. 505 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, FL 33402
