The Issue Whether Respondent as the holder of a Florida Educator's Certificate: (1) violated the law as charged in the Administrative Complaint in this case; and therefore, (2) failed to comply with an order of the Department of Education entered in an earlier case? If so, what is the appropriate discipline?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Frank T. Brogan, is the Commissioner of Education. Upon a finding of probable cause in a case involving a complaint against a teacher which is cause for discipline under Section 231.262(6), Florida Statutes, Petitioner is directed by statute to file a formal complaint and prosecute the complaint under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. If it appears that there are disputed issues of material fact in the case, the statute directs that an Administrative Law Judge be directed to hear the complaint. Section 231.262(5), Florida Statutes. As the Commissioner of Education, the Petitioner is the head of the Department of Education (the "Department"). Section 20.15(2), Florida Statutes. The Department serves as staff to the Education Practices Commission (the "Commission"). Section 231.261(6)(b), Florida Statutes. The Commission, following receipt of recommendations from an administrative law judge in a contested case involving a complaint against a teacher, is responsible for issuing a final order through one of its panels. Section 231.262(5), Florida Statutes. Such final orders are governed by Section 231.262(6), Florida Statutes. Respondent, Robert B. Stewart, is the holder of Educator's Certificate No. 424860. The certificate covers the areas of "Administration and Supervision, English and Speech," in recognition of his undergraduate and Master's degrees. Set at the time the Administrative Complaint was filed in this case to expire on June 30, 1997, the certificate has since been renewed. Now, it will not expire until mid-year 2002. Until his resignation shortly after the occurrence of the incidents that gave rise to the complaint in this case, Mr. Stewart was a teacher in the Hillsborough County School System with eighteen years of experience. At one point in these eighteen years, he was recognized as the Hillsborough County Teacher of English of the Year. He has been married for twenty years. He and his wife are the parents of two daughters. An Earlier Disciplinary Proceeding On April 30, 1996, Commissioner of Education Frank T. Brogan filed against Mr. Stewart an Administrative Complaint (the "first complaint"). Just as in the complaint issued in this case, the first complaint sought to discipline Respondent's Educator's Certificate pursuant to provisions in the Florida Statutes governing complaints against teachers and administrators in public schools, and the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida as found in the Florida Administrative Code. The first complaint alleged that Mr. Stewart, while employed as a teacher at Marshall Middle School in Hillsborough County "[o]n or about May 24, 1995 . . .'mooned' several other staff members by exposing his buttocks to them during a break in a Faculty meeting." Page 2 of 3 of Administrative Complaint issued in Case No. 956-0178-B. The first complaint charged that Mr. Stewart's action was misconduct which, inter alia, seriously reduced his effectiveness as an employee of the school board and violated the Principles of Professional Conduct prescribed by the State Board of Education. In a Settlement Agreement executed June 28, 1996, Respondent did not admit or deny the charge of misconduct. Instead, he elected not to contest the allegations. Respondent also agreed in the Settlement Agreement to accept a letter of reprimand to be placed in both the School Board's personnel file and the Department's certification file. He further agreed to submit to an appropriate evaluation by a treatment provider approved by the Recovery Network Program and thereafter provide verification that he was capable of performing the duties of an educator. Most pertinently to this case, Respondent agreed in the Settlement Agreement to be placed on a period of probation for two years. Among the conditions of probation, imposed by the Settlement Agreement and the Final Order of the Education Practices Commission accepting it, was that Respondent would "violate no law and . . . full comply with all district school board regulations, school rules and State Board of Education Rule 6B-1.006 [the Code of Professional Ethics of the Education Profession as found in the Florida Administrative Code]." Settlement Agreement, page 2 of 4. Treatment for Depression Several weeks after the incident which led to the letter of reprimand, Mr. Stewart visited the office of Michael Caselnova, M.D., a family practitioner. Dr. Caselnova's office notes reflect the following history: He is very concerned with an episode that happened recently. He notes that in the last year he has been pretty irritable and he has had some problems at work with it, but he had an episode recently where somebody called him for something and he was irritated and just had an uncontrollable compulsion to "moon another teacher". He said he knew what was happening, but had no control over it and it was very out of character for him and he was very concerned with it. On further questioning, he has been somewhat depressed at times, very irritable . . . Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. Mr. Stewart was diagnosed as suffering clinical depression for which his family practitioner prescribed Paxil. Two weeks later Dr. Caselnova pronounced him to be feeling "an amazing difference with the Paxil." Id. In the meantime, Mr. Stewart was seen by Charles G. Walker, M.D., a psychiatrist, for purposes of the evaluation called for by the settlement agreement. On March 25, 1996, Dr. Walker reported his evaluation of Mr. Stewart. In a letter to Ms. Marilyn T. Wittner, General Director of Human Resources for the Hillsborough County Schools, Dr. Walker offered his opinion that Mr. Stewart "was suffering from a very severe Major Depression at the time of the . . . [May 24, 1996] incident." Dr. Walker continued to report that Mr. Stewart had shown a good response to the Paxil and that "he is able to return to teaching and will have no difficulty conducting himself appropriately and professionally." Id. Return to Teaching Sometime following Dr. Walker's report, Mr. Stewart was hired as a Technical Education teacher at Pierce Middle School in the Hillsborough County School District. He remained employed there until his resignation on September 17, 1996. Pierce Middle School is in Tampa. Mr. Stewart lives in Zephyrhills, 32 or 33 miles away, where he also works at a Scotty's Home Center as a part-time employee. In between the school and Scotty's is the scene of the incidents alleged in the Administrative Complaint to have led to this disciplinary proceeding: a public park. Lettuce Lake Park Lettuce Lake Park is open to the public daily from the morning until about 10:00 p.m. It has areas for picnics with public facilities including rest rooms. Throughout the park are both paved trails for bicycles and roller blading as well as nature trails for members of the public to walk and enjoy the park's wooded areas. The park is well-used, in fact "crowded quite often" (Tr. 19) with men, women, and children. In the late summer of 1996, park personnel lodged complaints with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office in reference to sexual activity in the park, particularly in the rest rooms and on the nature trails. The complaints were reported to make reference to "explicit sexual activity among men, genital exposure and a man-made trail lined with condoms." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Deputy Sheriff L. D. Hyder, a ten-year member of the force and participant in the Sheriff's Vice and Morals Unit in 1996, was assigned to investigate. Together with four or five other officers, all undercover and split into teams for the purpose of observation "to see if any activity occurs or somebody comes in and tries to, you know, make any advances or things of that nature," (Tr. 19) Deputy Hyder went to Lettuce Lake Park on September 9, 1996. September 9, 1996 After grading papers following the departure of his students from Pierce Middle School on September 9, 1996, Mr. Stewart was "running a little bit late." (Tr. 77). He needed to be at Scotty's in Zephyrhills for his part-time job by 5:00 p.m. On the way to Scotty's, he stopped at a fast-food restaurant "to grab a burger and a drink." Id. By the time he had reached the area of the park in his car, he needed to urinate and wanted to dispose of the remains of the fast-food meal. He didn't want his two daughters to see that he had had a burger "because if the girls see it [the paper wrappers and bag with fast food restaurant logo] in the car then they want to know why they didn't get burgers too." Id. Mr. Stewart pulled into Lettuce Lake Park. He headed toward the rest room in one of the picnic areas with the refuse in hand. As he approached the rest room, he observed Deputy Hyder entering before him. Deputy Hyder "paused at the opening, glanced over his shoulder, looked [in Respondent's] direction." Tr. 78. Mr. Stewart entered the restroom shortly after the deputy sheriff. Once inside, he threw away the trash and stepped into the area of the urinal. In the meantime, Deputy Hyder, with his partner stationed outside the rest room, had become seated on a toilet. The toilet was next to the urinal but separated from it by a partition fastened to the wall. The toilet area had no door and could not be considered a stall. In other words, the area, between the wall opposite the partition and the partition, was open. The partition extended out at least several feet and was raised a foot or so above the floor, allowing a person seated on the toilet to see the feet of a person near the urinal. While seated, Deputy Hyder did not make any noise except to cough or clear his throat. "I'm constantly clearing my throat." Tr. 29. The law enforcement officer remained fully clothed. He had on a large shirt that was not tucked in because under his shirt at his waist, he had a camera. Deputy Hyder's first sight of Mr. Stewart in the rest room was of his feet and the lower part of his legs through the space below the partition. It was approximately 4:50 p.m. Soon after Mr. Stewart's entry, Deputy Hyder had become suspicious. Although standing in the vicinity of the urinal, Mr. Stewart's feet were not positioned as if he were standing at the urinal and, therefore, using it. Mr. Stewart's feet shifted back and forth next to the partition. Remaining in a seated position, Deputy Hyder continued to watch Mr. Stewart's feet. He describes what happened this way: I saw those feet turn, walk towards the end of the partition. I saw the defendant put his head around and peek and look at me. At that point in time, I'm sitting on the urinal, and I smiled at him. At that point he stepped on into the front portion [of the toilet area] unzipped his pants and pulled out his penis and started to rub his penis. Tr. 23. * * * I pulled [the] camera out, took a snapshot and immediately identified myself as Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office and yelled for my partner, and we then arrested him for lewd and lascivious behavior. Mr. Stewart's testimony about these moments differed dramatically. He testified that to use the urinal, he had to stand on a concrete block. His testimony at this point follows: [I]t was difficult for me to stand at that urinal and use it properly. So I had not yet zipped my pants up when I stepped back from the urinal. Off the block puts you pretty much at the doorway or the opening to the stall, and at that time I heard noises coming from the stall. It could have been moaning, it could have been groaning; it was hard to say. And then I heard the man in the other stall say, "Come here." I stepped back a little bit, looked around the corner, a gentleman on the stall was wearing, you know, a rather large shirt and was rising. I'm not stupid. I pretty much guessed that he was masturbating; and for a moment, I have to admit, I looked in his direction. He gave me a wink, jerked his head, and at that time, I thought, "Geez, I've got to get to work." So I reached down to zip my pants up. He flashed out a camera, announced that he was a deputy and that I was under arrest. (Tr. 78-79, emphasis supplied). Newspaper Reports and Resignation Eight days later, the arrest was reported in both the Tampa Tribune and the St. Petersburg Times. Mr. Stewart was not the only person nor the only teacher arrested as part of the undercover operation of which Deputy Hyder was a part. Twenty- four other persons were reported to have been arrested on September 9 as well, three of them teachers. Of the teachers reported arrested, one was reported to be at the college level; the other two were reported to be public school teachers: an elementary teacher and Mr. Stewart. It was reported at what school the elementary teacher worked and for how long he had been a school district employee. The charge against him was briefly discussed. As to the remainder of those arrested, with the exception of Mr. Stewart, the newspaper reported little. But in Mr. Stewart's case, both newspapers reported that the arrest would not lead to Mr. Stewart's first encounter with teacher discipline; it was reported Mr. Stewart had been disciplined before and the reason for the discipline, mooning school personnel the year before, was also spelled out. On the same day as the newspaper reports, Mr. Stewart submitted his resignation as a teacher with the Hillsborough County School District. The resignation was accepted by the district effective the day it was made, September 17, 1996. Criminal Proceeding and the Destruction of Evidence As the result of his encounter with Deputy Hyder, Mr. Stewart was charged with a second-degree misdemeanor: entering in a place for lewdness or assignation. The criminal proceeding was resolved without an adjudication or admission of guilt when Mr. Stewart was placed in a pre-trial misdemeanor intervention program. Mr. Stewart resisted such a resolution at first. His attorney had advised him that, although odds were in his favor for a dismissal of the case, the chance of a conviction remained since it was possible that, of the only two eye-witnesses to the events, Deputy Hyder's testimony would be believed rather than his. At his wife's urging in light of the attorney's advice, Mr. Stewart agreed to enter the program. On November 20, 1997, Mr. Stewart successfully completed the intervention program. The result of the successful termination was that all pending charges in the criminal proceeding were dismissed. In the meantime, Deputy Hyder had received routine periodic inquiries from the evidence room in the Sheriff's Office with regard to whether the evidence in the case, including the photograph taken of Mr. Stewart in the Lettuce Lake Park rest room, should continue to be stored. Deputy Hyder was informed on November 11, 1997, (although the notice of successful termination of the intervention program was not issued until nine days later on November 20, 1997) that the criminal proceeding had ended. Not knowing the licensing proceeding was ongoing and the use to which the evidence might still be put, Deputy Hyder ordered the Evidence Room to destroy the photograph. His order was carried out. What could have been a determinative piece of evidence then in weighing the testimony of Deputy Hyder and Mr. Stewart, the photograph was not in existence at the time this case was heard. The Importance of Judgment Mr. Stewart's lack of judgment in the earlier disciplinary case and, if Deputy Hyder's version of the events in the Lettuce Lake Park rest room is true, were matters of serious concern to Janice W. Velez, Director of Professional Standards for the Hillsborough County School District. Ms. Velez' expert opinion outlined the importance of good judgment on the part of teachers. It is important, for example, for employees of a school district to have the ability to trust in each other's judgment. It is also important that a teacher display good judgment so that parents of students will have confidence in the teacher's ability to supervise and make decision concerning their children. Finally and critically, it is not just important but essential that a teacher exercise and display good judgment because of direct contact with students for whom the teacher is responsible. This responsibility rises to the level of a fiduciary so that the teacher is a trustee of the student's future. The teacher, moreover, serves as a role model for his students. This role is central to the educator's profession and lies at the heart of the purpose of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact, it is recommended to the Education Practices Commission, that Respondent, Robert B. Stewart, holder of Educator's Certificate No. 424860, be found to have committed the statutory and rule violations charged in the Administrative Complaint; that his certificate be suspended for at least a period of three years and that he not be allowed to return to teaching until a competent mental health professional pronounces him fit to teach even if such pronouncement is not made until more than three years from the commencement of the certificate suspension. It is further recommended that he be placed on probation for two years after his return to teaching if and whenever that occurs. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce P. Taylor, Esquire Post Office Box 131 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-0131 Kathleen Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission 224B Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Robert Stewart 3801 Allen Road Zephyrhills, Florida 33541 Carl Zahner, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jerry W. Whitmore, Program Director Professional Practices Commission Department of Education 224E Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional payment for a shipment of watermelons that he delivered to Respondent in May, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Growers Marketing Services, Inc. (Respondent) is a broker of watermelons and other agricultural produce. Preferred National Insurance Company, Inc. is the surety for Respondent. Petitioner has grown watermelons for about six years. In 1993, as in past years, Petitioner sold watermelons to Respondent and other brokers. Late on the afternoon of May 5, 1993, and continuing past darkness, Petitioner loaded a trailer full of watermelons for C & C, which is another agricultural broker to which Petitioner sells watermelons. Because Petitioner lacks sufficient lighting at the place of loading, the crew could not sufficiently determine the quality of the watermelons that they were loading. Many misshapen and substandard watermelons were loaded, but the trailer was not quite full. The conformance of the shipment, which was supposed to be all large watermelons, suffered further when a C&C representative told Petitioner to complete the load with smaller melons. Petitioner did so. The C & C shipment was taken to the scales, weighed, and trucked that night to Miami, where the recipient rejected the shipment due to poor quality and small size. On the morning of May 6, Petitioner learned that C & C was returning the shipment to him and would not pay for it. A field representative of Respondent learned of the rejected shipment and offered to try to sell it for whatever he could. Petitioner agreed. When the melons returned to the area on May 6, they were immediately taken to Respondent's packing house in Plant City. The packer immediately recognized that the melons were quite distressed. Misshapen, flat, and leaking, the melons needed to be sold fast. The packer so informed representatives of Respondent, who directed the packer to place the melons in large bins, rather than boxes, so they could be more easily marketed. A representative of Respondent immediately informed Petitioner of this development, and he said that they should get whatever they could for the melons. Respondent called a customer in Jacksonville, explained the situation, and agreed to sell them on consignment to the customer. The customer successfully remarketed a large number of the melons and, on May 25, 1993, remitted to Respondent a check in the amount of $5000, representing full payment for the melons. Respondent deducted from the $5000 its normal binning charge of $1260 and its normal sales charge of $420, leaving $3320. After a small mandatory deduction for National Watermelon Promotion Board, Respondent remitted to Petitioner, by draft dated June 10, 1993, the net of $3311.60. With the above-described payment, Petitioner has been paid in full for the watermelons.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the Complaint. ENTERED on January 10, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 10, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Kye Bishop, pro se 145 N. Osceola Arcadia, FL 33821 Arthur C. Fulmer P.O. Box 2958 Lakeland, FL 33806 Preferred National Insurance P.O. Box 40-7003 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33340-7003
The Issue The issues presented here concern the attempt by Petitioner to recover $2,367.30 as payment for watermelons sold to Sunshine Fruit Company, Inc. See Sections 604.15 - 604.30, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact In July, 1993, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in Florida. That product was watermelons. At that time Sunshine Fruit Company was a dealer in agricultural products grown in Florida. Bill Hamilton also produced watermelons in Florida in July, 1993. His field had a common boundary with Petitioner's field. The watermelons taken from Petitioner's field in July, 1993 adjacent to the Hamilton field are at issue here. Bill Hamilton had done business with Sunshine Fruit Company in 1993 but was unable to meet the July demand which Sunshine Fruit Company had for watermelons. Hamilton had conducted his business with Allen Reiter as representative for Sunshine Fruit Company. To assist Reiter in obtaining additional watermelons in July that Hamilton could not supply, Hamilton referred Reiter to the Petitioner. An agreement was made to sell Petitioner's watermelons. The agreement was one in which Phillip Allen, Petitioner's son, served as her representative in the negotiations. In this arrangement the son was entitled to fifty percent of any profits and Petitioner the remaining 50 percent. The deal Petitioner made was to provide one load of medium melons and one load of large melons to Sunshine Fruit Company. Allen Reiter sent trucks to pick up the melons from Petitioner's field. After referring the Petitioner's business to Sunshine Fruit Company, Bill Hamilton observed Allen Reiter cut watermelons that were being delivered to Sunshine Fruit Company to examine the condition of the watermelons. Those watermelons that were being examined were located on a field truck. The field truck was a truck different from the truck that was to be used in transporting the watermelons to market. Hamilton also observed Reiter examining watermelons that were being loaded onto the transport truck. Hamilton had not experienced significant problems with hollow heart or bruising in the watermelons that he had harvested in the field adjacent to that belonging to the Petitioner in the year 1993. An approach which Hamilton and Petitioner had employed to avoid crop damage to the watermelons was to avoid loading watermelons that had become wet when it rained. Both producers, that is to say Hamilton and the Petitioner, had experienced an occasional slow down in harvesting in July, 1993, because of rain. Rain delayed the harvesting and loading of the Petitioner's watermelons provided to Sunshine Fruit Company. When the rain shut down the harvesting operation, some of the watermelons had already been picked. Harvested watermelons were put on the field truck before the rain commenced and were covered up with plastic to keep the rain from damaging the watermelons. The watermelons that had been picked that morning and placed on the field truck were left on the field truck while it rained hard that afternoon. The load that is being described was finished with watermelons picked the following day. Charles Gardner who worked for Petitioner in the harvesting operation also saw Allen Reiter cut watermelons that were on the field truck on the first day, the day it rained in the afternoon. Gardner also saw Reiter examine melons on the field truck on the second day. Phillip Allen and others loaded the two trucks provided by Sunshine Fruit Company and he supervised that operation. The second load of watermelons was placed on a truck that Phillip Allen and Charles Gardner understood to be Allen Reiter's "personal truck." An individual whose name was not identified at the hearing, whom Gardner and Phillip Allen understood to be "Reiter's personal driver", based upon an introduction made by Allen Reiter, interfered with the attempts by Phillip Allen to discard watermelons of questionable quality that were being loaded onto the transport truck. Phillip Allen told the driver that the questionable watermelons were bad, and the driver said "they are all right". When Phillip Allen would attempt to discard watermelons, this unidentified individual would return the questionable watermelons into the group of watermelons being transported, accompanied by a remark to the effect, "don't worry about it." This arrangement was contrary to the more typical arrangement in which the producer would discard what it referred to as the "culls." This caused a considerable number of watermelons to be kept for transport that should have been discarded. In the past the "culls" had been broken in the field or sold as pig feed. Phillip Allen tried to contact Allen Reiter by telephone after experiencing problems in which the driver insisted that substandard watermelons be packed. Phillip Allen was unable to reach Allen Reiter. Being unsuccessful in this attempt at contact, Phillip Allen deferred to the driver's choice to leave bad watermelons in the load for transport to market. However, Phillip Allen, not the driver, was in charge of the loading of the truck upon which substandard watermelons were being placed. Therefore, to the extent that the substandard watermelons diminished the value of the load, Petitioner must suffer the consequences. Nothing in the record leads to the conclusion that the driver had the authority to act as agent for Sunshine Fruit Company in determining what watermelons were of sufficient quality to be shipped. The driver mentioned in the previous paragraph stated in the presence of Charles Gardner that he was going home for the weekend and would deliver the watermelons on Monday. This comment was made on the prior Friday. The driver stated in the presence of Phillip Allen that he was going home because of brake problems and was going to wait to deliver the melons until Monday. Larry Thompson was the buyer and field supervisor for Sunshine Fruit Company in the transaction with Petitioner. Because it had been raining for several days, the decision to purchase the watermelons was through an arrangement in which the price would be determined at the time of receipt at the ultimate destination for the produce. There was no written agreement between the parties. Larry Thompson went to the field on the day after it had rained. While at the field on the second day Thompson observed the load of large watermelons. Charles Gardner told Larry Thompson that the large watermelons were popping. Larry Thompson told Allen Reiter that Reiter needed to check the large watermelons. Larry Thompson observed watermelons that were split. The watermelons were further observed by cutting the melons to examine them. During these events Thompson told Reiter that Thompson was glad that Sunshine Fruit Company was "riding" the watermelons, meaning waiting to determine the price until delivery at the ultimate destination. Otherwise Sunshine Fruit Company would not have bought the watermelons that were in the questionable condition as Thompson observed them on the second day. Some of these substandard watermelons were observed by Phillip Allen when loading the trailer and in conversation with the unnamed driver. As expected, this load of watermelons was in poor condition at the place and time that it was delivered. This was confirmed by an inspection that was performed at the place of ultimate delivery. Phillip Allen was made aware of the problem with that load. Phillip Allen told Larry Thompson that he, Phillip Allen, was going to have to contact the Inspector and asked that Thompson provide Allen with a copy of the inspection report. Thompson mailed Allen a copy of the inspection report. Thompson told Allen that some arrangement would have to be made to gain the best financial outcome with the questionable load of watermelons that could be achieved or that the watermelons would have to be dumped. It was resolved between Thompson and Allen that an individual in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, would be responsible for making some disposition with the questionable load of watermelons and this was accomplished by that individual in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. It is unclear who would pay for freight. Concerning the freight costs, Petitioner made no claim at hearing that the freight costs should be borne by Sunshine Fruit Company, and Petitioner and Sunshine Fruit Company failed to prove the amount of freight costs that had been incurred. However, based upon testimony by Dale Swain, a dealer in agricultural products in the region, it is inferred that the custom and practice employed in selling watermelons in 1993, to include watermelons sold by Petitioner to Sunshine Fruit Company, called for the deduction of freight expenses from the price paid for the watermelons. Watermelons Swain purchased from Petitioner in July 1993 were of acceptable quality. It was established that the cost of harvesting the subject watermelons would be borne by the producer, Pauline Allen. Phillip Allen established that the price per pound for both medium and large watermelons was 3.5 . It is undisputed that the load amounting to 41,180 pounds at 3.5 per pound was worth $1,441.30. Nor is there any contention concerning the fact that Sunshine Fruit Company has paid $740 to the Petitioner for the watermelons in question. At hearing, Petitioner asserted that the second load, the load with problems, weighed at the scales in Florida before the transport in the amount 47,600 pounds. At 3.5 per pound the claimed value was $1,666.00. The at-scale value was not the agreed upon arrangement. The actual amount which was paid for the problem second load as delivered was not established at the hearing, but it can be inferred that the amount is less than $1,666.00 based upon facts that were presented at hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Final Order be entered which dismisses the complaint calling for the payment of additional monies in the amount of $2,367.30. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX CASE NO. 93-6173A The following discussion is given concerning the Respondent Sunshine Fruit Company's findings of fact: Unnumbered Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found with the exception that it is not clear in the record whether both loads are to be paid for within two weeks of passing inspection. Unnumbered Paragraphs 2 and 3 are not supported by the record. Unnumbered Paragraph 4 constitutes legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Allen 695 North Maylen Lacanto, FL 34461 Allen Reiter 3535 Recker Highway Winter Haven, FL 33880 Richard E. Straughn, Esquire Post Office Box 2295 Winter Haven, FL 33883-2295 Meritor Savings, F.A. Post Office Box 193 Winter Haven, FL 33882 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Bureau of Licensure and Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983) . At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Swaiff was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1); Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 1630 by the Department, and bonded by Hartford Insurance Company of the Southeast (Hartford) in the sum of $25,000.00 Bond No. RN 4528454. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Hartford was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). The record is clear that Respondent Swain agreed to purchase a load of watermelons from Petitioner at an agreed upon price of $0.03 per pound, with payment "due on date of sale", to be loaded on a truck furnished by Respondent Swain through Elton Stone, Inc., a truck broker. Petitioner agreed to harvest and load the truck with a "good quality" or U.S. No. 1 grade watermelons subject to rejection on arrival at their destination if the watermelons were nonconforming for reasons attributable to the Petitioner. No evidence was presented with regard as to what Respondent Swain or Petitioner understood watermelons of "good quality" to mean and, likewise, no evidence was presented to show what standards a load of watermelons had to meet in order to be graded U.S. No. 1. Although Respondent Swain contends that he acted only as a sales agent, that is, he arranged the sale of the watermelons and made arrangements for a truck to deliver the watermelons; the evidence shows that the agreement between Petitioner and Respondent Swain was that title and risk of loss passed to Respondent Swain on shipment, with all remedies and rights for Petitioner's breach reserved to Respondent Swain. Petitioner sold other loads of watermelons to Respondent Swain during the 1985 watermelon season but only one (1) load is in dispute which is a load of watermelons weighing 4,8760 pounds at $0.03 per pound for a total amount of $1;462.80 which Respondent Swain has refused to pay. From June 19, 1985 through June 30, 1985, Petitioner harvested and sold nine t9) other loads of watermelons from the same field as the watermelons in dispute were harvested without any loss due to anthractnose rot or otherwise on arrival at their destination. The watermelons in dispute were loaded June 26, 1985 on a trailer with license number KY-T37-131 and billed to Charley Brothers Company; New Stanton; Pennsylvania by Respondent Swain's on his Invoice Number 061843 and delivered on June 28, 1985. Charley Brothers Company rejected the load and Respondent Swain called for an inspection which showed some anthractnose rot in the early stages in the front ten (10) feet of trailer with the remaining load showing no decay. The percentage of rot or decay is not-evident from the report since it is somewhat illegible and the inspector who prepared the report did not testify. 10 The evidence was insufficient to prove whether the trailer was vented or not vented. The testimony of those persons present during the loading of the watermelons in dispute was credible and shows that the watermelons were in good condition on June 26; 1985 when they were loaded and that if anthractnose rot was present on the watermelons it was not visible at the time of loading. Neither Respondent Swain nor his representative were present during the harvesting and loading of the watermelons. The evidence shows that Respondent Swain made numerous telephone calls in regard to this load of watermelons, some of those calls to Petitioner, but the evidence is insufficient to prove the content of those telephone conversations with Petitioner. The load was put on consignment to Felix and Sons Wholesale by Respondent Swain and he received a check in the sum of $500.00 as payment for the load of watermelons. Respondent Swain paid Elton Stone, Inc. $1,820.94 for freight resulting in a loss of $1,320.94 on the load of watermelons.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein; it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Swain be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $t,494.30. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Swain fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Hartford be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21; Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 28th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee; Leon County; Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, F1orida 32301 L. J. Crawford Route 3, Box 269 Lake Butler, Florida 32059 Ron Weaver, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe W. Kight; Chief License and Bond Room 418, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hartford Insurance Company of the Southeast 200 East Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Dale M. Swain d/b/a Palm Fruit Shop 313 West Seminole Avenue Bushnell, Florida 33513
The Issue The issue to be determined in this bid protest matter is whether Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s, intended award of funding under Request for Applications 2017- 108, entitled “SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments To Be Used In Conjunction With Tax-Exempt Bond Financing And Non-Competitive Housing Credits” was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Its purpose is to provide and promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. As such, Florida Housing is authorized to establish procedures to distribute low income housing tax credits and to exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of these credits. § 420.5099, Fla. Stat. For purposes of this administrative proceeding, Florida Housing is considered an agency of the State of Florida. To promote affordable housing in Florida, Florida Housing offers a variety of programs to distribute housing credits. (Housing credits, also known as tax credits, are a dollar-for-dollar offset of federal income tax liability.) One of these programs is the State Apartment Incentive Loan program (“SAIL”), which provides low-interest loans on a competitive basis to affordable housing developers. SAIL funds are available each year to support the construction or substantial rehabilitation of multifamily units affordable to very low- income individuals and families. See § 420.5087, Fla. Stat. Additional sources of financial assistance include the Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bond program (“MMRB”) and non- competitive housing credits. Florida Housing administers the competitive solicitation process to award low-income housing tax credits, SAIL funds, nontaxable revenue bonds, and other funding by means of request for proposals or other competitive solicitation. Florida Housing initiates the competitive application process by issuing a Request for Applications. §§ 420.507(48) and 420.5087(1), Fla. Stat.; and Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.009(4). The Request for Application at issue in this matter is RFA 2017-108, entitled “SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments to Be Used in Conjunction with Tax-Exempt Bond Financing and Non-Competitive Housing Credits.” Florida Housing issued RFA 2017-108 on August 31, 2017. Applications were due by October 12, 2017.6/ The purpose of RFA 2017-108 is to distribute funding to create affordable housing in the State of Florida. Through RFA 2017-108, Florida Housing intends to award approximately $87,000,000 for proposed developments serving elderly and family demographic groups in small, medium, and large counties. RFA 2017-108 allocates $46,279,600 to large counties, $32,308,400 to medium counties, and $8,732,000 to small counties. RFA 2017-108 established goals to fund: Two Elderly, new construction Applications located in Large Counties; Three Family, new construction Applications located in Large Counties; One Elderly, new construction Application located in a Medium County; and Two Family, new construction Applications located in Medium Counties. Thirty-eight developers submitted applications in response to RFA 2017-108. Of these applicants, Florida Housing found 28 eligible for funding, including all Petitioners and Intervenors in this matter. Florida Housing received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked applications pursuant to the terms of RFA 2017-108, Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67- 48 and 67-60, and applicable federal regulations. RFA 2017-108 provided that applicants were scored based on certain demographic and geographic funding tests. Florida Housing sorted applications from the highest scoring to the lowest. Only applications that met all the eligibility requirements were eligible for funding and considered for selection. Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to review and score each application. On November 15, 2017, the Review Committee announced its scores at a public meeting and recommended which projects should be awarded funding. On December 8, 2017, the Review Committee presented its recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors for final agency action. The Board of Directors subsequently approved the Review Committee’s recommendations and announced its intention to award funding to 16 applicants. As a preliminary matter, prior to the final hearing, Florida Housing agreed to the following reassessments in the scoring and selection of the applications for funding under RFA 2017-108: SP Lake and Osprey Pointe: In the selection process, Florida Housing erroneously determined that SP Lake was eligible to meet the funding goal for the “Family” demographic for the Family, Medium County, New Construction Goal. (SP Lake specifically applied for funding for the “Elderly” demographic.) Consequently, Florida Housing should have selected Osprey Pointe to meet the Family, Medium County, New Construction Goal. Osprey Pointe proposed to construct affordable housing in Pasco County, Florida. Florida Housing represents that Osprey Pointe is fully eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. (While Osprey Pointe replaces SP Lake in the funding selection for the “Family” demographic, SP Lake remains eligible for funding for the “Elderly” demographic.) Sierra Bay and Northside II: In the scoring process, Florida Housing erroneously awarded Sierra Bay proximity points for Transit Services. Upon further review, Sierra Bay should have received zero proximity points. Consequently, Sierra Bay’s application is ineligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. By operation of the provisions of RFA 2017-108, Florida Housing should have selected Northside II (the next highest ranked, eligible applicant) for funding to meet the Elderly, Large County, New Construction Goal. Florida Housing represents that Northside II is fully eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. Harbour Springs: Florida Housing initially deemed Harbour Springs eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108 and selected it to meet the Family, Large County, New Construction Goal. However, because Harbour Springs and Woodland Grove are owned by the same entity and applied using the same development site, under rule 67-48.004(1), Harbour Springs is ineligible for funding. (Florida Housing’s selection of Woodland Grove for funding for the Family, Large County, New Construction Goal, is not affected by this determination.) The sole disputed issue of material fact concerns Liberty Square’s challenge to Florida Housing’s selection of Woodland Grove to meet the Family, Large County Goal. Liberty Square and Woodland Grove applied to serve the same demographic population under RFA 2017-108. If Liberty Square successfully challenges Woodland Grove’s application, Liberty Square, as the next eligible applicant, will be selected for funding to meet the Family, Large County Goal instead of Woodland Grove. (At the hearing on December 8, 2017, Florida Housing’s Board of Directors awarded Woodland Grove $7,600,000 in funding.) The focus of Liberty Square’s challenge is the information Woodland Grove provided in response to RFA 2017-108, Section Four, A.5.d., entitled “Latitude/Longitude Coordinates.” Liberty Square argues that Woodland Grove’s application is ineligible because its Development Location Point, as well as the locations of its Community Services and Transit Services, are inaccurate. Therefore, Woodland Grove should have received zero “Proximity” points which would have disqualified its application for funding. RFA 2017-108, Section Four, A.5.d(1), states, in pertinent part: All Applicants must provide a Development Location Point stated in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place. RFA 2017-108 set forth scoring considerations based on latitude/longitude coordinates in Section Four, A.5.e, entitled “Proximity.” Section Four, A.5.e, states, in pertinent part: The Application may earn proximity points based on the distance between the Development Location Point and the Bus or Rail Transit Service . . . and the Community Services stated in Exhibit A. Proximity points will not be applied to the total score. Proximity points will only be used to determine whether the Applicant meets the required minimum proximity eligibility requirements and the Proximity Funding Preference ” In other words, the Development Location Point identified the specific location of an applicant’s proposed housing site.7/ Applicants earned “proximity points” based on the distance between its Development Location Point and selected Transit and Community Services. Florida Housing also used the Development Location Point to determine whether an application satisfied the Mandatory Distance Requirement under RFA 2017-108, Section Four A.5.f. To be eligible for funding, all applications had to qualify for the Mandatory Distance Requirement. The response section to Section Four, A.5.d., is found in Exhibit A, section 5, which required each applicant to submit information regarding the “Location of proposed Development.” Section 5 specifically requested: County; Address of Development Site; Does the proposed Development consist of Scattered Sites?; Latitude and Longitude Coordinate; Proximity; Mandatory Distance Requirement; and Limited Development Area. Section 5.d. (Latitude and Longitude Coordinates) was subdivided into: (1) Development Location Point Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place In its application, Woodland Grove responded in section 5.a-d as follows: County: Miami-Dade Address of Development Site: NE corner of SW 268 Street and 142 Ave, Miami-Dade, FL 33032. Does the proposed Development consist of Scattered Sites? No. Latitude and Longitude Coordinate; Development Location Point Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place: 25.518647 Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place: 80.418583 In plotting geographic coordinates, a “-” (negative) sign in front of the longitude indicates a location in the western hemisphere (i.e., west of the Prime Meridian, which is aligned with the Royal Observatory, Greenwich, England). A longitude without a “-” sign places the coordinate in the eastern hemisphere. (Similarly, a latitude with a negative value is south of the equator. A latitude without a “-” sign refers to a coordinate in the northern hemisphere.) As shown above, the longitude coordinate Woodland Grove listed in section 5.d(1) did not include a “-” sign. Consequently, instead of providing a coordinate for a site in Miami-Dade County, Florida, Woodland Grove entered a Development Location Point located on the direct opposite side of the planet (apparently, in India). At the final hearing, Florida Housing (and Woodland Grove) explained that, except for the lack of the “-” sign, the longitude Woodland Grove recorded would have fallen directly on the address it listed as its development site in section 5.b., i.e., the “NE corner of SW 268 Street and 142 Ave, Miami-Dade, FL 33032.” In addition to the longitude in section 5.d., Woodland Grove did not include a “-” sign before the longitude coordinates for its Transit Services in section 5.e(2)(b) or for any of the three Community Services provided in section 5.e(3). Again, without a “-” sign, the longitude for each of these services placed them in the eastern hemisphere (India) instead of the western hemisphere (Miami-Dade County). In its protest, Liberty Square contends that, because Woodland Grove’s application listed a Development Location Point in India, Florida Housing should have awarded Woodland Grove zero proximity points under Section Four, A.5.e. Consequently, Woodland Grove’s application failed to meet minimum proximity eligibility requirements and is ineligible for funding. Therefore, Liberty Square, as the next eligible applicant, should be awarded funding for the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017-108.8/ Liberty Square asserts that a correct Development Location Point is critical because it serves as the beginning point for assigning proximity scores. Waiving an errant Development Location Point makes the proximity scoring meaningless. Consequently, any such waiver by Florida Housing is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to competition. At the final hearing, Woodland Grove claimed that it inadvertently failed to include the “-” sign before the longitude points. To support its position, Woodland Grove expressed that, on the face of its application, it was obviously applying for funding for a project located in Miami-Dade County, Florida, not India. In at least five places in its application, Woodland Grove specified that its proposed development would be located in Miami-Dade County. Moreover, several attachments to Woodland Grove’s application specifically reference a development site in Florida. Woodland Grove attached a purchase agreement for property located in Miami-Dade County (Attachment 8). To satisfy the Ability to Proceed requirements in RFA 2017-108, Woodland Grove included several attachments which all list a Miami-Dade address (Attachments 9-14). Further, Woodland Grove submitted a Local Government Verification of Contribution – Loan Form executed on behalf of the Mayor of Miami-Dade County, which committed Miami-Dade County to contribute $1,000,000.00 to Woodland Grove’s proposed Development (Attachment 15). Finally, to qualify for a basis boost under RFA 2017-108, Woodland Grove presented a letter from Miami-Dade County’s Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources, which also referenced the address of the proposed development in Miami-Dade County (Attachment 16). In light of this information, Woodland Grove argues that its application, taken as a whole, clearly communicated that Woodland Grove intended to build affordable housing in Miami-Dade County. Nowhere in its application, did Woodland Grove reference a project in India other than the longitude coordinates which failed to include “-” signs. Accordingly, Florida Housing was legally authorized to waive Woodland Grove’s mistake as a “harmless error.” Thus, Florida Housing properly selected the Woodland Grove’s development for funding to meet the Family, Large County Goal. Florida Housing advocates for Woodland Grove’s selection to meet the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017- 108. Florida Housing considers the omission of the “-” signs before the longitude coordinates a “Minor Irregularity” under rule 67-60.002(6). Therefore, Florida Housing properly acted within its legal authority to waive, and then correct, Woodland Grove’s faulty longitude coordinates when scoring its application. In support of its position, Florida Housing presented the testimony of Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s current Director of Multifamily Allocations. In her job, Ms. Button oversees the Request for Applications process; although, she did not personally participate in the review, scoring, or selection decisions for RFA 2017-108. Ms. Button initially explained the process by which Florida Housing selected the 16 developments for funding under RFA 2017-108. Ms. Button conveyed that Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to score the applications. Florida Housing selected Review Committee participants based on the staff member’s experience, preferences, and workload. Florida Housing also assigned a backup reviewer to separately score each application. The Review Committee members independently evaluated and scored their assigned portions of the applications based on various mandatory and scored items. Thereafter, the scorer and backup reviewer met to reconcile their scores. If any concerns or questions arose regarding an applicant’s responses, the scorer and backup reviewer discussed them with Florida Housing’s supervisory and legal staff. The scorer then made the final determination as to each application. Ms. Button further explained that applicants occasionally make errors in their applications. However, not all errors render an application ineligible. Florida Housing is authorized to waive “Minor Irregularities.” As delineated in RFA 2017-108, Section Three, A.2.C., Florida Housing may waive “Minor Irregularities” when the errors do not provide a competitive advantage or adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67- 60.002(6) and 67-60.008. Such was the case regarding Woodland Grove’s application. Heather Green, the Florida Housing staff member who scored the “Proximity” portion of RFA 2017-108, waived the inaccurate longitude coordinates as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Green then reviewed Woodland Grove’s application as if the proposed development was located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Florida Housing assigned Ms. Green, a Multifamily Loans Manager, as the lead scorer for the “Proximity” portion of RFA 2017-108, which included the Development Location Point listed in Exhibit A, section 5.d. Ms. Green has worked for Florida Housing since 2003 and has scored proximity points for Request for Applications for over ten years. At the final hearing, Florida Housing offered the deposition testimony of Ms. Green. In her deposition, Ms. Green testified that she is fully aware that, to be located in the western hemisphere (i.e., Miami-Dade County), a longitude coordinate should be marked with a negative sign or a “W.” Despite this, Ms. Green felt that the longitude coordinates Woodland Grove used without negative signs, particularly its Development Location Point, were clearly typos or unintentional mistakes. Therefore, Ms. Green waived the lack of a negative sign in front of the longitude coordinates in section 5.d. and section 5.e. as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Green understood that she was authorized to waive “Minor Irregularities” by rule under the Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Green felt comfortable waiving the inaccurate longitude coordinates because everywhere else in Woodland Grove’s application specifically showed that its proposed housing development was located in Miami-Dade County, not India. Accordingly, when scoring Woodland Grove’s application, Ms. Green corrected the longitude entries by including a negative sign when she plotted the coordinates with her mapping software. Ms. Green then determined that, when a “-” was inserted before the longitude, the coordinate lined up with the address Woodland Grove listed for the Development Location Point. Therefore, Woodland Grove received proximity points and was eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. (See RFA 2017-108, Section Five.A.1.) However, Ms. Green acknowledged that if she had scored the application just as it was presented, Woodland Grove would not have met the required qualifications for eligibility. Ms. Button relayed that Florida Housing fully accepted Ms. Green’s decision to waive the missing negative signs in Woodland Grove’s response to section 5.d. and 5.e. as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Button opined that Woodland Grove’s failure to place a “-” mark before the longitude was clearly an unintentional mistake. Ms. Button further commented that Florida Housing did not believe that scoring Woodland Grove’s development as if located in the western hemisphere (instead of India), provided Woodland Grove a competitive advantage. Because it was evident on the face of the application that Woodland Grove desired to develop a housing site in Miami-Dade County, Ms. Green’s decision to overlook the missing “-” sign did not award Woodland Grove additional points or grant Woodland Grove an advantage over other applicants. Neither did it adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. However, Ms. Button also conceded that if Ms. Green had scored the application without adding the “-” sign, Woodland Grove would have received zero proximity points. This result would have rendered Woodland Grove’s application ineligible for funding. Ms. Button also pointed out that Ms. Green waived the omission of “-” signs in two other applications as “Minor Irregularities.” Both Springhill Apartments, LLC, and Harbour Springs failed to include negative signs in front of their longitude coordinates. As with Woodland Grove, Ms. Green considered the development sites in those applications as if they were located in Miami-Dade County (i.e., in the western hemisphere). Ms. Green also waived a mistake in the Avery Commons application as a “Minor Irregularity.” The longitude coordinate for the Avery Commons Development Location Point (section 5.d(1)) was blank. However, Ms. Green determined that Avery Commons had placed the longitude in the blank reserved for Scattered Sites coordinates (section 5.d(2)). When scoring Avery Commons’ application, Ms. Green considered the coordinate in the appropriate section. According to Ms. Button, Florida Housing felt that this variation did not provide Avery Commons a competitive advantage. Nor did it adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. Finally, Ms. Button explained that the application Florida Housing used for RFA 2017-108 was a relatively new format. In previous Request For Applications, Florida Housing required applicants to submit a Surveyor Certification Form. On the (now obsolete) Surveyor Certification Form, Florida Housing prefilled in an “N” in front of all the latitude coordinates and a “W” in front of all the longitude coordinates. However, the application used in RFA 2017-108 did not place an “N” or “W” before the Development Location Point coordinates. Based on the evidence presented at the final hearing, Liberty Square did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Florida Housing’s decision to award funding to Woodland Grove for the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017-108 was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Florida Housing was within its legal authority to waive, then correct, the missing “-” sign in Woodland Grove’s application as “Minor Irregularity.” Therefore, the undersigned concludes, as a matter of law, that Petitioner did not meet its burden of proving that Florida Housing’s proposed action to select Woodland Grove for funding was contrary to its governing statutes, rules or policies, or the provisions of RFA 2017-108.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order dismissing the protest by Liberty Square. It is further recommended that Florida Housing Finance Corporation rescind the intended awards to Sierra Bay, SP Lake, and Harbour Springs, and instead designate Northside II, Osprey Pointe, and Pembroke Tower Apartments as the recipients of funding under RFA 2017-108.10/ DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceedings Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceedings Respondent BB & W was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 245 by the Department, and bonded by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (Fireman) in the sum of $15,000 - Bond No. SLR - 4152 897. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Fireman was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Although Respondent BB & W contends that the watermelons in dispute were purchased through Scotty Luther Produce as were all watermelons purchased by the Respondent BB & W in Florida, the evidence shows that on the load in dispute, Respondent BB & W, through its president Cecil Bagwell was dealing directly with Petitioner when Cecil Bagwell contacted him by telephone to discuss the purchase of the watermelons and in making the necessary arrangements for a truck to pick up and deliver the watermelons to their destination. The evidence also shows that Scotty Luther of Scotty Luther Produce was not present in the area when the watermelons in dispute were purchased or loaded and was not involved in this transaction. The agreement between Petitioner and Respondent BB & W was that title and risk of loss passed to Respondent BB & W on shipment, with all remedies and rights for Petitioner's breach reserved to Respondent BB & W. Petitioner loaded three (3) loads of Charleston Grey Watermelons (grey) to Respondent BB & W on June 3 and 4, 1985 but only one (1) load is in dispute which is a load of grey watermelons loaded on June 4, 1985 on a truck furnished by Respondent BB & W. The net weight of the watermelons was 46,810 pounds and the agreed upon price was $0.03 per pound for a total price of $1,404.30 which Respondent BB & W has refused to pay. Petitioner also sold Respondent BB & W two (2) loads of grey watermelons on June 3, 1985 that were harvested from the same field as the watermelons in dispute and shipped: one load to Orlando, Florida; and one (1) load to Atlanta, Georgia without any incident of loss as a result of overmaturity or otherwise. The watermelons in dispute were not federally or state inspected before or during loading. Although Respondent BB & W contended that the watermelons had been inspected by a federal inspector at their destinations the evidence was insufficient to show that the watermelons in dispute had been inspected or that they were over mature upon arrival at their destination. Likewise the evidence was insufficient to prove that the watermelons in dispute were over mature upon loading. The record reflects that the watermelons in dispute were loaded in a closed trailer with no apparent ventilation and the refrigeration unit not operating when the trailer departed from Petitioner's farm after loading. Petitioner received a call from Respondent BB & W's office two (2) days after shipping the watermelons advising him that the watermelons had been "kicked" but it was two (2) more days before he reached Cecil Bagwell to find out that they were "kicked" for being over mature.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent BB & W be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $1,404.30. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent BB & W fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Fireman be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ron Weaver, Esquire, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe W. Kight, Chief License and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Freddie Woods Jr. Post Office Box 52 Evinston, FL Cecil Bagwell, President BB & W Farms, Inc. Route 2, Box 855 Cordell, GA 31015
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to an award of $11,952 for payment of a shipment of tomatoes made to Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, including the proposed ore tenus requests by Petitioner's counsel, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Petitioner, Corky Foods Corporation, is a diversified agri-business company engaged in, among other things, the sale of produce from one of its warehouses in Boynton Beach, Florida. On January 21, 1985, Pat Adams, a broker for Adams brokerage company in Bonita Springs, Florida, placed an order with Petitioner's salesman, Daniel Garcia, for a load of tomatoes from Georgia Tomato Company. The tomatoes were sold to Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, on January 21, 1985. The invoice of these products (No. 18917) was dated January 23, 1985 and contained a total of 1,440 boxes. Respondent was allowed a $1 credit under the market price which amount reflects the amount of the initial claim by Petitioner against Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company; i.e., $25,560 less the credit of $1,440 for a total claim of $24,120. During this period of time, there was a freeze in South Florida which occurred on January 20, 1985 and the price of produce dropped substantially for products picked after January 20, 1985. The market value for tomatoes picked on January 19, 1985 was as follows: 5 x 6 #1 @ $18.00 6 x 6 #1 @ $16.00 6 x 7 #1 @ $14.00 This amount, less the $1 credit given to Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, by Petitioner represents the amount initially claimed by Petitioner; i.e., $24,120. Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, failed to pay Petitioner's invoiced amount which resulted in a complaint being filed by Petitioner against Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, on March 4, 1985. Once that complaint was filed, Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, tendered to Petitioner an amount of $12,168 which reduced the complaint by that amount leaving a balance now due and owing Petitioner of $11,952 based on its amended claim filed herein dated April 24, 1985. Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, contends that it was overcharged on the amount of this shipment of tomatoes and attempted to substantiate its position by showing several invoices for tomatoes that it purchased subsequent to January 21, 1985. Daniel Garcia, Petitioner's vice-president in charge of marketing, determined the market price for the tomatoes shipped to Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, on January 21, 1985. In doing so, he called brokerage houses in Homestead, Bonita Springs, and other brokers, including Pat Adams, the broker who purchased the tomatoes here in question on behalf of Adams Brokerage House, and established the market price as per the invoice sent to Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company. In addition, Mr. Garcia referred to the Southeastern Fruit and Vegetable Report, Volume 30, No. 17, which is a guide to the pricing information for fruit and vegetables in the southeast and which is relied upon to ascertain fruit and vegetable prices in this area. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) This data supports Petitioner's claim for the amount invoiced to Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company. Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, did not dispute the quality of the tomatoes shipped by the Petitioner. Respondent offered no other defenses against the amount claimed by Petitioner. Based thereon, it is herein concluded that the Petitioner is entitled to an award of the amount in its amended claim of $11,952.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Georgia Tomato Company, Inc., be ordered to pay Petitioner, Corky Foods Corporation, the amount of $11,952 as set forth in its amended complaint filed herein dated April 24, 1985, within fifteen (15) days of the date of entry of the Final Order by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Bureau of License and Bond. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger C. Lambert, Esquire 250 South County Road, Suite 201 West Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Glenn Vaughn, General Manager Georgia Tomato Company, Inc. Building F State Farmers Market Forest Park, Georgia 30050 Joe Kight, Chief Bureau of License & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 418 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Continental Insurance Company Legal Section (License & Bond) 80 Maiden Lane New York, New York Robert Chastain, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Doyle Conner Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues presented are whether Respondent, George Mason Citrus, Inc. (Mason), owes Petitioner $10,000 for citrus fruit that Mason purchased from Petitioner and, if so, whether the surety is liable for any deficiency in payment from Mason.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as a “citrus fruit dealer,” within the meaning of Subsection 601.03(8), Florida Statutes (2005) (dealer).1 The business address for Petitioner is 1103 Southeast Lakeview Drive, Sebring, Florida 33870. Mason is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as a citrus fruit dealer. The business address for Mason is 140 Holmes Avenue, Lake Placid, Florida 33852. Western is the surety for Mason pursuant to bond number 42292005 issued in the amount of $100,000 (the bond). The term of the bond is August 1, 2004, through July 31, 2005. Petitioner conducts business in Highlands County, Florida, as a dealer and as a “broker” defined in Subsection 601.03(3). In relevant part, Petitioner purchases white grapefruit (grapefruit) for resale to others, including Mason. Mason conducts business in Highlands County as either an “agent,” “broker,” or “handler” defined in Subsections 601.03(2), (3), and (23). On January 31, 2003, Mason contracted with Petitioner to purchase grapefruit from Petitioner pursuant to Fruit Contract number 03-307 (the contract). Mason drafted the contract. The terms of the contract require Petitioner to sell grapefruit to Mason for the 2003, 2004, and 2005 “crop years.” The 2003 crop year began in the fall of 2002 and ended at the conclusion of the spring harvest in 2003. The 2004 and 2005 crop years began in the fall of 2003 and 2004 and ended in the spring of 2004 and 2005, respectively. Only the 2005 crop year is at issue in this proceeding. The contract required Petitioner to deliver grapefruit to a person designated by Mason. Mason designated Peace River Citrus Products, Inc. (Peace River), in Arcadia, Florida, for delivery of the grapefruit at issue. Mason was required by the terms of a Participation Agreement with Peace River to deliver 30,000 boxes of grapefruit to Peace River during the 2005 crop year. In an effort to satisfy its obligation to Peace River, Mason entered into the contract with Petitioner for an amount of grapefruit described in the contract as an “Approximate Number of Boxes” that ranged between 12,000 and 14,000. Petitioner delivered only 2,128 boxes of grapefruit to Peace River. The production of grapefruit was significantly decreased by three hurricanes that impacted the area during the 2005 crop year. The parties agree that Mason owed Petitioner $19,070.03 for the delivered boxes of grapefruit. The amount due included a portion of the rise in value over the base purchase price in the contract caused by increases due to market conditions and participation pay out after the parties executed the contract (the rise).2 On or about October 26, 2005, Mason mailed Petitioner a check for $9,070.03. The transmittal letter for the check explained the difference between the payment of $9,070.03 and the amount due of $19,070.03. Mason deducted $10,000 from the $19,070.03 due Petitioner, in part, to cover the cost of grapefruit Mason purchased from other dealers or growers to make up the deficiency in grapefruit delivered by Petitioner (cover). The $10,000 sum also includes interest Mason claims for the cost of cover and Mason's claim for lost profits. Petitioner claims that Mason is not entitled to deduct lost profits and interest from the amount due Petitioner. If Mason were entitled to deduct interest, Petitioner alleges that Mason calculated the interest incorrectly. The larger issue between the parties is whether Mason is entitled to deduct cover charges from the amount due Petitioner. If Mason were not entitled to cover the deficiency in delivered boxes of grapefruit, Mason would not be entitled to interest on the cost of cover and lost profits attributable to the deficiency. The parties agree that resolution of the issue of whether Mason is entitled to cover the deficiency in delivered boxes of grapefruit turns on a determination of whether the contract was a box contract or a production contract. A box contract generally requires a selling dealer such as Petitioner to deliver a specific number of boxes, regardless of the source of grapefruit, and industry practice permits the purchasing dealer to cover any deficiency. A production contract generally requires the selling dealer to deliver an amount of grapefruit produced by a specific source, and industry practice does not permit the purchasing dealer to cover any deficiency. The contract is an ambiguous written agreement. The contract expressly provides that it is a "Fruit Purchase Contract" and a "delivered in" contract but contains no provision that it is either a box or production contract. The contract is silent with respect to the right to cover. Relevant terms in the contract evidence both a box contract and a production contract. Like the typical box contract, the contract between Mason and Petitioner prescribes a number of boxes, specifically no less than 12,000, that are to be delivered pursuant to the contract. However, the typical box contract does not identify the number of boxes to be delivered as "Approximate No. of Boxes" that ranges between 12,000 and 14,000 boxes. Unlike a production contract, the contract does not identify a specific grove as the source of the required grapefruit. Best practice in the industry calls for a production contract to designate the grove by name as well as the number of acres and blocks. However, industry practice does not require a production contract to identify a specific grove as the source of grapefruit. In practice, Mason treated another contract that Mason drafted with a party other than Petitioner as a production contract even though the contract did not identify a specific grove as the source of grapefruit. The absence of a force majure clause in the contract may evidence either type of contract.3 A box contract typically requires the selling dealer to deliver the agreed boxes of grapefruit regardless of weather events, unless stated otherwise in the contract. However, the absence of such a clause may also be consistent with a production contract because "acts of God" are inherent in a production contract. Such acts, including hurricanes, necessarily limit grapefruit production, and a production contract obligates the selling dealer to deliver only the amount of grapefruit produced. The contract between Petitioner and Mason did not contain a penalty provision for failure to deliver the prescribed boxes of grapefruit (box penalty). The absence of a box penalty in the contract evidences a production contract. The contract identifies Petitioner as the "Grower." A grower typically enters into a production contract. A box contract does not limit the source of grapefruit to be delivered, and the selling dealer in a box contract may obtain grapefruit from anywhere in the state. The contract between Petitioner and Mason limits the source of grapefruit to grapefruit grown in Highlands County, Florida. Mason knew that Petitioner sold only grapefruit from groves in Highlands County, Florida, identified in the record as the Clagget Taylor groves. During the 2003 and 2004 crop years, Petitioner sold only grapefruit from the Clagget Taylor groves. Mason received trip tickets and other documentation related to the delivery of no less than 24,000 boxes of grapefruit, all from the Clagget Taylor groves. The boxes of grapefruit delivered during the 2005 crop year came only from the Clagget Taylor groves. Mason received documentation showing the grapefruit came from the Clagget Taylor groves. Ambiguous written agreements are required by judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law to be construed against the person who drafted the agreement. Mason drafted an ambiguous agreement with Petitioner. The agreement must be construed against Mason as a production contract. Mason owes Petitioner $10,000 for the delivered grapefruit during the 2005 crop year. The terms of the bond make Western liable for any deficiency in payment from Mason.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Mason to pay $10,000 to Petitioner, and, in accordance with Subsections 601.61 and 601.65, requiring Western to pay over to the Department any deficiency in payment by Mason. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2007.
The Issue The dispute here involves the alleged non-payment for watermelons that the Petitioner claims to have sold to the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The case is being considered in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, which establishes the apparatus for settling disputes between Florida produce farmers and dealers who are involved with the farmers' products. Lyman Walker, a Florida farmer, contends by his complaint that five loads of watermelons grown and harvested in Florida, were sold directly to Mr. Pagano & Sons, Inc., in the person of Maurice Pagano, on the following dates, by the following types; in the following weight amounts; at the following price per pound, and for the following total price per load: June 2, 1977, small Charleston Gray Watermelons, 51,550 lbs. at .03-1/2, totaling $1,804.00 June 2, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, 47,440 lbs. at .03-1/2, totaling $1,660 June 7, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, 47,850 lbs. at .02, totaling $957 June 7, 1977, Charleston Gray Watermelons, 49,190 lbs. at .02, totaling $983 June 8, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, approximately 46,000 lbs. at .02, totaling $920 Total for all loads $6,325. An examination of the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, supports the Petitioner's contention. The facts in this case also show that Maurice Pagan, acting in behalf of the Respondent gave money to the Petitioner for having the watermelons loaded for shipment. That amount was $2,500, and when deducted from the $6,325 total price leaves a balance owing to the Petitioner of $3,825. The Respondent has not paid the $3,825 which it agreed to pay to the Petitioner and under the facts of the agreement it is obligated to pay the Petitioner. One final matter should be dealt with and that pertains to the approximation of the weight of the June 8, 1977, load. The figure used is an approximation, because the Respondent's representative at the loading in Florida, Phil Pepper, took that load away and failed to return the weight ticket. This caused the Petitioner to have to approximate the weight and the approximation is accepted in determining the amount which the Respondent owes the Petitioner.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent be required to pay the Petitioner $3,825 for watermelons it purchased from the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jon D. Caminez, Esquire 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Maurice Pagano 59 Brooklyn Terminal Market Brooklyn, New York 11236 L. Earl Peterson, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Division of Marketing Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
