Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a Florida corporation that provides software development and consulting services to various commercial entities and state agencies. It has its principal place of business in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to regulate various professions and businesses licensed by the State of Florida. In carrying out its responsibilities it engages the services of outside vendors through competitive bidding. Respondent's principal business office is at 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida. Intervenor is a California corporation that designs, manufactures and services equipment and systems for measurement, computation and communications, together with its consolidated subsidiaries. The RFP In 1993, Respondent was created by legislative action merging the Department of Professional Regulation and Department of Business Regulation. Respondent perceives that the merger was intended to improve the efficiency of the regulatory process and to facilitate accurate and efficient processing of consumer complaints. To further those purposes, on April 12, 1996 Respondent issued RFP 96-006. In the executive summary to the RFP prospective vendors who considered responding to the RFP were informed: This RFP has been developed in support of the merger for the purpose of acquiring contractor consulting service and software development to support the conversion of existing computer application systems for the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, the Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, and the conversion of regulatory, inspection, investigation and complaint processing for all the Business Regulation divisions, including the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Through this Outcome Based RFP, the Department intends to contract with a vendor to not only provide analysis, system design, development, conversion, and selective consulting services, but serve as an integrator and primary contractor on this project. Contractor responding to this RFP will be expected to recommend services based on deliverable specified in this RFP. Since this is an Outcome Based RFP (see definition on Page 2), the Department will not be specifying unique contractor products and/or services or how the contractor is to design the system. In the RFP "Outcome Based RFP" was described as: A Request For Proposal in which the contractor's client will specify concepts, technology directions, size/number of things, and required results (primarily standards and system deliverables). The contractor will respond by recommending the design and proposed solutions -- how to get desired results, by what means (hardware, software, process, and contractor services), and for what cost. The purpose of the RFP was further described as: The purpose of this Outcome Based Request for Proposal (RFP) is to contract with a contractor (serving as integrator as well as contractor) to recommend (RFP bid response) and provide consultant services in conjunction with selected Department staff to: conduct an information management analysis study to identify the business functions performed as well as the data and information flows required to support these functions for the Divisions of Hotels and Restaurants, Land Sales and Condominiums, Pari-Mutual Wagering and regulatory, inspection, investigation and complaint management for all the Business Regulation Divisions, including Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, develop an integrated, data-driven information systems design that addresses the needs of the Business Regulation divisions and their information requirements, convert the business functions and data into the appropriate agency application system, develop detailed design and program specifications, modify existing applications and develop new applications necessary to support the system design, develop an implementation plan which provides a phased approach for migrating from the current environment to the planned environment, including system testing and training of agency personnel, provide post-implementation support for the resolution of problems. The contractor will be expected to contribute (under contract) a predetermined number of calendar months, not to exceed 26, towards systems analysis and design, specification and application development, conversion, testing, training, implementation and post- implementation support. The contractor will be responsible for designing, in detail, the methodology by which data files are to be converted from the multiple applications and various platforms and loaded into predefined relational data bases. The contractor will be responsible, under contract, for all services meeting the requirements of this RFP. All components proposed by the contractor must be at a turn-key level with 100 percent compatibility as far as integrating with installed hardware and software currently utilized by BPR. The scope of the work contemplated by the RFP through services performed by the contractor was to this effect: The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation (BPR) is requesting contractors to propose consulting services for system analysis, design, specification development, application, development, conversion, training, implementation and post- implementation support. The contractor will propose recommendations for products and services required and serve as an integrator/contractor. At minimum, this Business Regulation/Complaint Regulatory Management Conversion solution shall be capable of providing those services outlined within this RFP. The section addresses ten subject areas that must be addressed in contractor's proposal. Section III-A (Contractor Proposal Format) presents the required "Tab" format and refers backs to details in this section for the contractor to use. In the RFP an "Integrator" is defined as: The contractor who has total accountability, under contract, for all products and services being provided to a customer even those supplied by or acquired from other vendors and/or sub-contractors. In the RFP the term "Turn-Key" is defined as: Contractor is solely responsible for delivering a completed system with sign- ificant client involvement. Vendor awarded contract, will be responsible, under bond, for specified deliverables to the department, as well as being the integrator and contractor for the complete system as proposed which will include the roles of the contractor and appropriate involvement of BPR personnel. The RFP provided the vendors with instructions concerning the format for proposals, especially as it related to Tabs 1 through 24 and the need to complete those tabs consistent with the instructions. The vendors were reminded: [A]s required by Tab, the proposal will present specific consulting services that are recommended, and how these services will technically meet requirements as stated, and/or requirements developed and/or uncovered by the vendor that have been determined to be necessary for the project to be successful. Respondent provided a questionnaire to the vendors concerning the prospective vendors' commitment to the project. Those questions were to be answered "yes" or "no" with the opportunity for clarifying sentences to accompany the answers. The RFP instructed the vendors concerning the submission of cost information. It reminded the vendors that they should "submit firm costs to provide the state with the required deliverables, found in Section II of the RFP." The RFP described the manner in which the proposals would be evaluated through two separate committees, a "technical subcommittee" and a "vendor evaluation committee." The vendors were also reminded that the proposals would first be reviewed by the purchasing arm of the Respondent to assure that the vendors provided all mandatory documentation required by the RFP. In the instance where required documentation was missing the response would be determined "non-responsive." The evaluation process contemplated the "technical subcommittee" evaluating technology sections in responses to the RFP and providing those results to the "vendor evaluation committee." The latter committee would then evaluate other subject areas in the proposals and consolidate/finalize results from both evaluation processes into an overall rating. The RFP explained the subject areas that were to be considered by the two committees with particularity. The RFP described in detail the assignment of points and set forth the format for carrying out the evaluation process. The successful vendor would be selected upon the basis of the highest points awarded. The maximum points that could be received were 1950. The maximum points that could be received for the vendors' proposed costs were 250. The RFP sets terms and conditions and identifies mandatory requirements as: The state has established certain require- ments with respect to proposals to be submitted by proposers. The use of "are", "shall", "must" or "will" (except to indicate simple futurity) in the RFP indicates a requirement or condition. A deviation is material if the deficient response is not in substantial accord with this [sic] RFP requirements. Moreover, the RFP reminded the vendors that: Any proposal which fails to meet the mandatory requirements stated in this Request For Proposal shall be rejected. The RFP gives further instructions involving the rejections of proposals where it is stated: The department reserves the right to either make awards or to reject proposals by individual category, groups of categories, all or none, or a combination thereof. Any proposal which fails to meet the mandatory requirements stated in this Request For Proposal shall be rejected. Any proposal that contains material deviations or is conditional or incomplete shall be rejected. The department may waive an immaterial defect, but such waiver shall in no way modify the RFP requirements or excuse the proposer from full compliance with the RFP specifications and other contract requirements if the proposer is awarded the contract. The RFP refers to subcontracts where it states: The contractor is fully responsible for all work performed under the contract resulting from this RFP. The contractor may, with the consent of the department, enter into written subcontract(s) for performance of certain of its functions under the contract. The sub- contractors and the amount of the subcontract shall be identified in the contractor's response to this RFP. Subcontracts shall be approved in writing by the department's Executive sponsor, or designee, prior to the effective date of any subcontract. The Sub- contractor shall provide the Executive sponsor documentation in writing, on company letterhead, indicating known responsibilities and deliverables, with timeframes. No sub- contract which the contractor enters into with respect to performance under the contract resulting from this RFP shall in any way relieve the contractor of any respons- ibility for performance of its duties. All payments to sub-contractors shall be made by the contractor. Tabs 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 require specific information about sub- contractors the vendor might employ in meeting the requirements in the RFP addressed under those tabs. In addition to the specific requirements in the RFP, paragraph 4 to the general conditions reminds the vendor to submit "firm prices." Paragraph 6 to the general conditions states that contract awards are made: As the best interest of the State may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all proposals or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in proposals received. Proposers are cautioned to make no assumptions unless their proposal has been evaluated as being responsive All awards made as a result of this proposal shall conform to applicable Florida Statutes. The RFP explained the manner in which addenda to the RFP would be provided, in which case the addenda would be in writing with the content and number of pages described and sent to each vendor that received the original RFP. The RFP also contemplated the possibility that Respondent might require the vendors to supplement their responses to the RFP with oral presentations to either of the evaluation committees. The RFP explained that there would be a bidders' conference to discuss the contents of the RFP, in view of any written inquiries from the vendors and recommended changes. On April 30, 1996 the bidders' conference was conducted. In this conference information was presented to the vendors and questions from the vendors were presented to Respondent, both oral and written. On May 10, 1996, addendum number 1 resulting from the bid conference was provided to the vendors. Through addendum number 1, Respondent more specifically informed the vendors concerning its expectations in the vendors' responses to the RFP. Additionally the addendum rescheduled certain events in the bid process. It changed the proposal due date and public opening of the technology portion of the proposal to June 7, 1996. The date for opening of proposals in the cost portion was changed to July 12, 1996. The date for posting of the intended award was changed to July 17, 1996. Two vendors responded to the RFP. Those vendors were Petitioner and Intervenor. In addition to the information provided through responses to the RFP, Respondent propounded written questions to the vendors as attachments A and B. Attachment A constituted common inquiry to the vendors. Attachment B was designed to solicit additional information unique to the respective vendors. Both vendors responded to the questionnaires on July 9, 1996. Both vendors' proposals were found responsive. The two committees performed their respective evaluations. Through this process Petitioner was awarded 1206.46 points. Intervenor was awarded 1321.39 points. As a consequence, on July 16, 1996 Respondent posted notice that it intended to award a contract to Intervenor. Respondent also sent a letter on that date notifying the Petitioner that it intended to contract with Intervenor. As described in the preliminary statement, and incorporated here, Petitioner gave notice and formally challenged the decision to award. In its opposition to the decision to award to the Intervenor, Petitioner does not allege that Respondent failed to implement the procedures for evaluation in scoring the competitor's. Rather, Petitioner challenges the results obtained in that implementation. Where Respondent found Intervenor responsive to certain alleged material requirements in the RFP, Petitioner asserts that Intervenor was not responsive to those material requirements. In performing their duties the committee members who evaluated the proposals had a week to prepare themselves to render their input. During that time they were allowed to review the responses to the RFP. Following that opportunity the evaluators were allowed to seek clarification on any items where there might be uncertainty, to include legal advice from the Respondent agency. In carrying out their assignment the evaluators compared the requirements in the RFP to the responses by the vendors. Through this process no evaluator indicated that either proposal was unresponsive. In their review function the evaluators also considered the answers to the questions that had been provided by the vendors on July 9, 1996. The evaluators had been instructed to review the requirements contemplated by Tabs in the RFP, to read the RFP and the addendum to the RFP. Petitioner specifically challenges Respondent's determination that Intervenor was responsive in meeting the following alleged requirements in the RFP: Did the Intervenor Fail to Submit an Outcome Based Proposal in Response to the RFP? The RFP contemplates the necessity that a vendor will submit a proposal that is Outcome Based as defined in the RFP and explained in other provisions within the RFP. The requirement to submit an Outcome Based Proposal is a material requirement. If a vendor does not meet that requirement, the failure to comply is a material deviation from the requirements in the RFP. If a vendor does not meet the requirement for providing an Outcome Based Proposal and the evaluators ignored that irregularity, their actions would be arbitrary. Tab 3 discusses: Business Regulation/Complaint Management Conversion Project Life Cycle Presentation: This section will present the overall scope of the project and the methodology. This section will need to specifically deal with how the vendor addressed the technical design requirements as spelled out in Project Scope. As described, this Tab was designed to have the vendor identify the overall scope of the proposal and the methodology to be employed in reaching the outcome required by the RFP. As Section 3-1 to its response Intervenor replied: Hewlett-Packard's (HP) approach is to provide BPR with both fixed price and 'time-boxing'. Time-boxing is defined as an allocation of consulting hours (3360) which will be delivered by HP technical consultants or sub- contractors. HP is proposing to fix price the Information Management Analysis Study, Integrated System Design, and Project Management. The remaining sections (Detail Design and Program Specification, Data Conversion Phase, Development, System Testing, Implementation, Training, Post-Implementation Support) will be time-boxed with a total of 3360 hours. HP has made suggestions as to the number of hours to be used for these sections. However the final allocation will be mutually agreed upon by HP's project manager and BPR's project manager. HP Professional Services Methodology Moving from a legacy computing model, to a distributed, open client/server computing environment, requires the organization to rethink the process, people, and technology requirements of the enterprise. Organiza- tional integration and effective evaluation of IT solutions tend to get lost in the rush to develop specific applications. If not lost, there is rarely a structured logical process that is followed in defining, designing, developing, implementing, and operating the solution. The remaining provisions within Section 3 to the Intervenor's response to the RFP detail the overall scope of the project and the methodology to be employed. In other respects the Intervenor's response to the RFP explains the manner in which it would reach the outcome contemplated by the RFP in all phases related to its proposed consulting services in this project. Facts were not presented that proved that the evaluators acted arbitrarily in determining that the Intervenor's proposal was based upon the required outcome in the project. Did the Intervenor Submit a Firm Price Proposal? The RFP creates a material requirement that a vendor complete Attachment "E" to the RFP. Attachment "E" provides cost information from the vendor. In every respect Intervenor has complied with that requirement. The evaluators were not arbitrary in determining that the requirement was met. Notwithstanding the use of "time-boxing" for certain phases in the project, the cost information submitted in Attachment "E" assigns a money amount for those phases. By that assignment the consulting hours that are "time-boxed" have an equivalent dollar figure which constitutes firm costs for those deliverables/phases in the project. The evaluators did not act arbitrarily in assigning 234 points to the Intervenor for its cost proposal. Did the Intervenor fail to Submit a List of Sub-contractors Whose Services will be used by the Intervenor? Tab 16, Corporate (vendor) qualifications and commitment; makes it incumbent upon the vendor to indicate the sources committed to the project in terms of personnel and other resources, to include sub-contractors involved with the project. Tab 17, Corporate (vendor) financials; requires the vendor to produce financial information about it and any sub-contractors involved with the project. Tab 19, Individuals proposed to work on contract; requires resumes of individuals who work for the vendor or a sub-contractor and information about key personnel of the vendor and sub-contractors. Tab 20, Contract and support services including post-implementation plan, requires; the vendor to indicate where its services will be provided by the vendor or sub-contractors. Tab 21, Contractor questionnaire; solicits information from the vendor about sub-contractors. As seen, in many provisions the RFP requires a vendor to identify information about sub-contractor whose services would be used by the vendor. These are material requirements. If the evaluators ignored the requirements, their actions would be arbitrary. In addressing intervenor's proposal, the evaluators acted arbitrarily. The problem is that Intervenor in many places in its response has left open the possibility that it would use sub-contractors without naming those sub- contractors and their contribution to the project. Ultimately, the lack of disclosure could provide the Intervenor with an advantage that Petitioner does not enjoy and potentially adversely impact the interests of the Respondent. The following are examples in response to the RFP where Intervenor has maintained its option to use sub-contractors without disclosing information about the sub-contractors: Section 1-3: "The Regulatory Management Conversion solution being proposed is comprised of world-class services from HP and our partners." The reference to partners is seen to include the possibility that sub-contractors might be used. Section 3-1, that has been commented on, referring to time-boxing, describes allocation of the 3360 consulting hours through delivery by the intervenor's technical consultants or sub-contractors. Section 10-2, refers to the implementation of the management plan which follows-up "sub- contractor's work." Section 12-2, refers to Intervenor and its training partners offering "standard and custom instructor led training, computer based training and net work based training." Training partners is taken to mean some persons who reasonably could be considered sub-contractors. Section 13-1, makes reference to third party services involved with the Intervenor's custom solution to the project needs. The reference to third party is equivalent to a sub-contractor. Section 16-9, referring to the flexibility in managing the engagement (project) describes partnering and involvement in sub-contracting. Section 21-2, in responses to the question- naire to Tab 21, Intervenor refers to its time- boxing approach for providing services, in which, according to Section 3-1, Intervenor leaves open the possibility that it would use sub-contractors to deliver the services. It is realized that on occasions in which Intervenor was required to provide contemporaneous and detailed information concerning its intentions to use sub-contractors, answers that it gave in association with Tabs 16, 17, 19 and 20 did not refer to sub-contractors. Consequently, one might assume that Intervenor did not intend to employ sub-contractors in this project notwithstanding references to unnamed sub-contractors found in other places in the response to the RFP. This raises the issue whether the lack of reference and response to the more specific questions about the use of sub-contractors overcomes the implications of the possibility that sub-contractors will be used that is made in response to other requirements in the RFP. That internal inconsistency should not favor an interpretation that creates advantage for Intervenor and potential difficulty for Respondent, which it does. For the evaluators to allow the conflict to remain is an arbitrary act. To seek to resolve the conflict would also constitute an arbitrary act as it would require an amendment to the Intervenor's response. The fact that Respondent must approve subcontracts before their effective dates does not satisfactorily mitigate the need to disclose subcontractor information with the response. Did Intervenor's Proposal Fail to Meet the Requirements in the RFP in the Technical Categories for Tabs 4 through 7, 10, 12, 14, 15 and 21? Petitioner made allegations concerning those issues associated with Intervenor's technical responses in those tabs. However, in the proposed recommended order Petitioner limited its discussion to Tabs 5, 6, 7 and 11. It is assumed that Petitioner abandoned its contentions concerning the remaining tabs described in the interrogatory. Tab 5, Integrated system design, states: In this section the vendor will present the methodology to be used in support of the RFP requirements. The evaluators found that Intervenor had met this requirement. It has not been shown that the evaluators acted arbitrarily in determining that the Intervenor had complied with requirements at Tab 5. Tab 6, Detail design and program specifications, states: In this section the vendor will present the methodology in support of the RFP requirements. Petitioner has failed to prove that the evaluators acted arbitrarily in concluding that the Intervenor met the requirements for Tab 6. Tab 7, Data conversion states: In this section vendor [sic] will provide a description of their approach to the data conversion phase. Petitioner has failed to prove that the evaluators acted arbitrarily in determining that the Intervenor met the requirements for Tab 7. Tab 11, Post-implementation support, states: In this section the vendor [sic] will provide a description of their approach to post-implementation support. Petitioner has failed to show that the evaluators acted arbitrarily in concluding that the Intervenor had met the requirements for Tab 11. Nor has it been shown in any respect that the evaluators acted illegally, fraudulently, or dishonestly. Was the Intervenor a responsible proposer? Petitioner alleged in its petition that the Intervenor was not a responsible proposer. Petitioner did not offer proof to sustain that allegation.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found in the conclusions of law reached it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which declares Intervenor to be unresponsive to the RFP and takes such other action as Respondent deems appropriate in pursuing this project. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Timothy G. Schoenwalder, Esquire Blank, Rigsby and Meenan, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R. Beth Atchison, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Mary C. Piccard, Esquire Cummings, Lawrence and Vezina, P.A. Post Office Box 589 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0589 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Richard T. Farrell, Secretary Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Forida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioners are entitled to an award of reasonable prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs stemming from a prior consolidated action before ALJ F. Scott Boyd, DOAH Case Nos. 16-3298 and 16-3302, pursuant to section 185.05, Florida Statutes. Before the final hearing, the parties stipulated to an amount of reasonable prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs if the undersigned determines that Petitioners are entitled to an award of reasonable prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs stemming from that prior action before ALJ Boyd.
Findings Of Fact The City of Coral Springs is a municipality in Broward County, Florida. It exercises broad power pursuant to article VIII, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, and the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, chapter 166, Florida Statutes. The City Commission of the City of Coral Springs (“Commission”) may create other offices, boards, or commissions to administer the affairs of the city and may grant them powers and duties. The Commission has adopted the Coral Springs Police Officers’ Pension Plan (“the Plan”), which is amended from time to time by ordinance and is set forth in sections 13-5 through 13-17 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Coral Springs. The Plan is administered by the City of Coral Springs Police Officers’ Pension Fund Board of Trustees (“Board”), the powers of which are set forth in sections 13-13 through 13-15 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Coral Springs. The Plan is a local-law defined pension plan created pursuant to chapter 185. In February 2016, the Board adopted a policy to allow for the suspension of pension benefits of members who were charged with crimes specified at section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and whose benefit payments had equaled or exceeded their contributions to the Plan. The Williamses are retired police officers whose pension benefits had fully vested at the time of the enactment of the aforementioned suspension policy. In February 2016, the Board sought to suspend Petitioners’ benefits under the newly-adopted policy because Petitioners had been charged with crimes specified in section 112.3173 and the benefit payments made to them had exceeded their contributions to the plan. Petitioners requested a formal hearing to challenge the authority of the Board to adopt the suspension policy. Petitioners’ benefits were never suspended at any time during the pendency of this suspension matter. The Board contracted with DOAH to conduct the formal hearing under the authority of section 120.65(6), Florida Statutes. DOAH assigned ALJ Boyd to the prior consolidated action, who issued pre-hearing instructions requiring a statement of all issues. The issue of attorney’s fees was not included by the parties. ALJ Boyd conducted the formal hearing on September 30, 2016, and October 10, 2016. On November 18, 2016, ALJ Boyd issued a Recommended Order finding that the Board did not have the authority to adopt the policy nor apply it to Petitioners. The Recommended Order made no mention of awarding attorney’s fees or costs. Nether Petitioners nor the Board filed exceptions to the Recommended Order. Petitioners raised the issue of fees in a letter to the Board dated December 2, 2016. Counsel for Petitioners appeared at a hearing held before the Board in December 2016 and sought fees as set forth in the December 2, 2016, letter. The Board adopted ALJ Boyd’s Recommended Order in toto on January 3, 2017. The Board also denied Petitioners’ request for a hearing regarding an award of attorney’s fees. On January 13, 2017, Petitioners sought an award of attorney’s fees by filing with DOAH a Verified Motion for Prevailing Party Attorney’s Fees and Costs. On March 1, 2017, ALJ Boyd entered an Order dismissing Petitioners’ motion for fees, stating he lacked jurisdiction to hear the issue of fees. That Order was not appealed. Prior to the final hearing in this matter, Petitioners successfully petitioned the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court to compel the Board to grant them a hearing on entitlement to the fees and to quash the Order denying fees for violation of due process. Petitioners then successfully defended an appeal of that Order by the Board to the Fourth District Court of Appeal and a motion for rehearing thereon. Petitioners are not seeking fees for these extraordinary writ actions as these efforts do not fall under chapters 185 or 120. The parties stipulated that “the Williamses prevailed in challenging the Board’s authority to create a policy suspending the benefits.” The Board never applied its proposed suspension policy to Petitioners. Petitioners continue to receive their benefits to this day. Criminal charges against Petitioners remained pending at the time of the hearing in this matter. Petitioners are only seeking entitlement here to an attorney’s fee and costs award for their successful challenge of the suspension policy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order denying Petitioners’ request for prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2021. Brandon J. Hechtman, Esquire Wicker, Smith, O’Hara, McCoy & Ford, P.A. 2800 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 800 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Pedro Herrera, Esquire Sugarman & Susskind, P.A. 100 Miracle Mile, Suite 300 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Bonni Spatara Jensen, Esquire Klausner, Kaufman, Jensen & Levinson 7080 Northwest 4th Street Plantation, Florida 33317 Kenneth R. Harrison, Esquire Sugarman & Susskind, P.A. 100 Miracle Mile, Suite 300 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Gina Orlando, Administrator City of Coral Springs Police Officers’ Pension Fund 9551 West Sample Road Coral Springs, Florida 33065
The Issue Whether Petitioner waived its right to protest the Supplemental Notice of Intent to Award issued by the Department on December 1, 2020.
Findings Of Fact On March 17, 2020, the Department issued Request for Proposals Number 06-80101500-J (the RFP) seeking vendors to provide services through state term contracts in two categories (Service Categories): (1) management consulting services (MCS) and (2) financial and performance audit services (FPA). The awarding of state term contracts resulting from the RFP does not guarantee the awarded vendors business; instead, being selected for award under a state term contract merely allows the awarded vendors to further compete for business from state agencies and certain defined eligible users who require the services offered under the contract. After vendors are selected for a state term contract, a state agency or eligible user who requires the services issues a request for quotes from the state term contract vendors. The vendors decide whether they want to compete for the specific services solicited by submitting a quote, and the procuring agency or user then selects from the contracted vendors the vendor that can best fit its unique needs based on the quotes. Accordingly, the purpose of the RFP is simply to pre-qualify the vendors for the future possibility of obtaining work from state agencies and eligible users. Consequently, the Department’s award to multiple vendors for each Service increases competition and gives the users significant choice in selecting a vendor, with each additional award having the effect of increasing the competition and choice available to state agencies and other eligible users who utilize the state term contract. The Department separately evaluated proposals submitted in the two Service Categories and made separate awards for each Service Category. Integrity Group submitted proposals for both Service Categories. Petitioner’s Protest concerns only the actions of the Department in conducting the procurement for the MCS Service Category and does not implicate the FPA Service Category. As part of the evaluation for the MCS Service Category, each vendor submitted a summary of its experience and a separate proposal for each individual Service (Services a through l) within the MCS Service Category. Integrity Group submitted a response summarizing its experience and an individual proposal for each of the MCS Services (Services a through l). Five evaluators appointed by the Department were tasked with scoring each vendor’s response with respect to experience, as well as separately evaluating and scoring each Service proposal submitted for Services a through l. The vendor with the highest score for each Service was awarded a state term contract for such Service, and the RFP reserved to the Department the right to make additional awards to vendors that scored within 25% of the highest score for each Service. The Department initially posted its Notice of Intent to Award and a list of the vendors that were awarded contracts in each Service on September 29, 2020. While the Department awarded Integrity Group state term contracts for the FPA Service Category, it did not make any awards to Integrity Group for the MCS Service Category. The Notice of Intent to Award for the MCS category posted by the Department on September 29, 2020, stated: State of Florida Notice of Intent to Award Management Consulting Services RFP No: 06-801 01500-J Date: September 29, 2020 As to the Management Consulting Services (MCS) category of the above-mentioned Request for Proposals, pursuant to sections 287.057(1)(b) and 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, the Department of Management Services hereby posts its Notice of Intent to Award a contract to the vendors listed in the MCS Award List attachment. Vendors who submitted proposals but were not awarded a Contract are listed in the MCS No Award attachment. Vendors who have submitted proposals deemed non-responsive are listed in the MCS Non-responsive attachment. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes, or failure to post the bond or other security required by law within the time allowed for filing a bond shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Any protest concerning this agency decision or intended decision must be timely filed with the Agency Clerk. Protests may be filed by courier, hand delivery, or U.S. mail at Department of Management Services, Office of the General Counsel, Attention: Agency Clerk, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950. Protests may also be filed by fax at 850-922-6312 or by email at agencyclerk@dms.fl.gov. It is the filing party’s responsibility to meet all filing deadlines. From October 9 to 12, 2020, the Department received formal protests from four vendors not initially selected for award: Intervenor, MGT; TEK Systems Global Services, LLC; Slalom, LLC; and Tidal Basin Government Consulting, LLC. Integrity Group did not file a notice of protest within 72 hours of the Department’s posting of its September 29, 2020, Notice of Intent to Award, and did not file a formal written protest within ten calendar days from the filing of a notice of protest. On December 1, 2020, and after having engaged in resolution conferences with each of the protesting vendors, the Department issued a Supplemental Notice of Intent to Award, which awarded contracts to the four protesting vendors. Thereafter, on December 4, 2020, Integrity Group filed a notice of intent to protest related to the Department’s Supplemental Notice of Intent to Award, and on December 14, 2020, filed Petitioner’s Protest. Petitioner’s Protest alleges that “the Integrity Group is substantially and adversely affected by the Department’s improper and fundamentally flawed procurement process and erroneous decision to exclude the Integrity Group from receiving any awards.” However, as explained in the Conclusions of Law below, Petitioner’s Protest is untimely, has been waived, and should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner lacks standing and dismissing Petitioner’s Protest with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Rebekah Davis, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Marion Drew Parker, Esquire Radey Law Firm Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mia L. McKown, Esquire Holland & Knight LLP Suite 600 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Benjamin J. Grossman, Esquire Foley & Lardner LLP Suite 900 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Christopher Brian Lunny, Esquire Radey Law Firm Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Karen D. Walker, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Suite 600 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mallory Neumann, Esquire Foley & Lardner LLP Suite 900 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William D. Hall, Esquire Dean Mead & Hall Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James A. McKee, Esquire Foley & Lardner LLP Suite 900 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Jonathan Satter, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 285 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Daniel R. Russell, Esquire Dean Mead & Hall Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this case are twofold: (1) Did the Respondent properly adopt its bid methodology for processing VOCA grants and, if not, (2) did the Respondent demonstrate a suitable factual base for its non-rule policy.
Findings Of Fact The Federal Victim of Crimes Act ("VOCA"), 42 U.S.C., Sections 10601- 10605, authorizes the granting of federal funds to the individual states for the purpose of awarding grants to eligible subgrantees who provide direct assistance to victims of crime. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Victims of Crime, has published guidelines for the implementation of the program. Listed among the factors that a state should take into account when distributing VOCA awards are (1) the range of victim services needed throughout the state, (2) the track record of continuation programs, and (3) the extent to which other sources of funding are available for proposed programs. See, 54 Fed. Reg. 21499, 21503 (May 18, 1989)(Respondent's Exhibit The federal guidelines provide, inter alia, that the states which receive these monies have sole discretion as to which programs within the state shall be awarded subgrants, as long as the subgrantees meet the eligibility criteria of VOCA and the guidelines. The Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Crimes Compensation and Victim Witness Services (the "Bureau") is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for administering the VOCA subgrant program. The Petitioner, Metro-Dade Department of Justice Assistance ("MDJA"), is a nonprofit organization based in Dade County, Florida, which is devoted to providing specialized psychological counseling and related services to victims of child sexual abuse and domestic violence in previously underserved populations; both priority areas under VOCA. Petitioner has been a VOCA grant recipient for the last four years. Petitioner's subject VOCA grant application for FY 1990-91 is the fifth consecutive year in which it has sought VOCA funds through Respondent. Petitioner is currently the only program in Dade County providing free specialized counseling to victims of child sexual abuse and domestic violence. The VOCA award Petitioner is seeking for FY 1990-91 would fund specialized counseling, outreach programs, intervention services, and other related services for between 450-550 victims of child sexual abuse and domestic violence in Dade County. Since the inception of the VOCA program, the Bureau has solicited applications from the State's victim services organizations by means of a request for bid process. The Bureau annually prepares and distributes a VOCA grant manual and application and awards subgrants on the basis of a scoring system set forth in the VOCA grant manual. On March 6, 1990, Respondent sent all prospective applicants, who had indicated by telephone or letter of intent to apply for FY 1990-1991 VOCA funding, a grant manual and application packet, including necessary forms, instructions and filing deadlines, with which to apply for FY 1990-1991 VOCA continuation funding and new and expanded funding. Included with these materials was a grant application timetable notifying respective applicants of deadlines for filing both a Notice of Intent to submit an application and the grant application itself. In addition, this timetable advised prospective applicants that an applicants' conference would be held in Tallahassee, Florida, on March 22, 1990, at 1:00 p.m., "to provide all applicants the opportunity to ask specific questions about the manual or the application process." Although MDJA did not attend the applicants' conference, at the applicants' conference, no one commented or questioned the requirement for filing a Notice of Intent or objected to the deadline for filing the same. The applicants' conference provided a question and answer session through which the Bureau was able to clarify most of the questions posed by the 50 or so potential applicants who attended the conference. No substantive changes to the VOCA grant manual or forms were recommended by the attendees and the Bureau did not make any substantive revisions to the VOCA grant application requirements; specifically, no comment or revisions were made on the Notice of Intent provisions. The manual required for the first time a Notice of Intent. The provisions relating to the Notice of Intent are found in three (3) separate parts of the VOCA grant manual and the application: Page 1 of the VOCA Grant Manual reads: Deadlines for the submission of Notices Intent to Submit a Proposal and Grant Application deadlines must be followed. Any Notices of Intent to Submit a Proposal and Grant Application deadlines must be followed. Any Notices of Intent to Submit a Proposal and Applications received after the deadline will not be considered for funding and will be returned to the applicant. Section II.A.2. of the VOCA Grant Manual provides: 2. Notice of Intent to Submit a Proposal. A Notice of Intent to Submit a Proposal must be submitted by all programs intending to file a proposal or they will not be permitted to submit an application. Applicants must complete the entire form provided in the, Application. The purpose of the Notice of Intent is to estimate the number of proposals and the total amount of money being requested. A Notice of Intent to Submit a Proposal does not constitute an application for VOCA funds. The Notice of Intent to: Submit a Proposal must be signed by the appropriate agency representative designated to sign on behalf of the agency. The original Notice and one copy must be submitted for it to be accepted by the department. The deadline for accepting a Notice of Intent to Submit a Proposal is March 29, 1990, at 2:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. Notices arriving after this time will not be considered for funding and will be returned. (FAXED COPIES ARE NOT ORIGINALS AND THEREFORE WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED.) Notice of Intent to Submit a Proposal for the 1990- 91 Victims of Crime Act Funding ("VOCA"), also provides: Notices are due no later than March 29, `1990 at 2:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. Any Notices received after this time and date will be returned to the applicant and will not be considered for funding. In late February or early March of 1991 Respondent received a telephone call from an employee of Petitioner notifying the Respondent that MDJA would be filing a grant application for FY 1990-91 VOCA funds and specifically requesting Respondent to send to MDJA a VOCA grant manual and related application forms. It is uncontroverted that MDJA, made this telephone call, that it was received by Respondent, and that pursuant thereto, Respondent sent the aforementioned VOCA packet and related forms to MDJA. The Executive Director of MDJA completed and signed the Notice of Intent form provided by Respondent on Friday, March 23, 1990. This form was sent certified mail to Respondent on Monday morning, March 26, 1990, via courier. Although dispatched from MDJA's office on March 26, 1990, for some inexplicable reason, the Notice of Intent was not postmarked and dispatched from the mail room until Wednesday afternoon, March 28, 1990, and was not received by the office of Respondent until 10:05 a.m. on Friday, March 30, 1990, approximately four business hours after the March 29, 1990, 2:00 p.m. deadline. It was postmarked March 28, 1990. On March 30, 1990, fearing that MDJA's Notice of Intent may have been delayed in the mail, the Bureau telephoned MDJA at approximately 9:00 a.m. to inquire if it had mailed the Notice of Intent form. MDJA then informed Respondent that its Notice of Intent had been sent on Monday, March 26 1990, and that such Notice should have been received by the Thursday deadline. Shortly thereafter, at 10:05 a.m., on March 30, 1990, MDJA's Notice of Intent did arrive at Respondent's office, via certified mail. MDJA filed its actual application for VOCA funding for FY 1990-91 prior to the April 12, 1990 for applications. It is not disputed that Respondent received oral notification from MDJA, prior to March 29, 1990, that MDJA would be filing an application for VOCA funding far FY 1990-91. It is not disputed that MDJA was a four-year continuation program. All of the information sought in the Notice of Intent form, including MDJA's name, contact person, address, telephone number, whether the applicant was a continuation program, and the 1990-91 amount sought (which is limited by what the MDJA received the previous year, plus 5%), was already in Respondent's possession prior to the March 29, 1990 filing deadline. It is uncontroverted that MDJA's Notice of Intent being received approximately four business hours after the deadline in no way inconvenienced Respondent or in any way impaired their ability to carry out their duties aid responsibilities. The Respondent, by letter dated April 3, 1990, advised MDJA that it was ineligible for funds in the 1990-91 grant year due to its failure to comply with the March 29, 1990 deadline. Notices of Intent to Submit a Proposal were submitted by 91 applicants. Two (2) of those Notices were received after the deadline (including MDJA's), and the Bureau advised both of them that they were ineligible for funding. One such ineligible applicant, I-Care, also filed a protest. A hearing was held on March 1, 1990, before a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. Said Hearing Officer issued a Recommended Order on May 11, 1990 recommending that the Department enter a Final Order denying I-Care's petition.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Miami-Dade Community College, has adopted a statement of agency policy in violation of Florida law.
Findings Of Fact Prior to August 2, 2002, the Respondent employed the Petitioner, Lonny Ohlfest. At the time of his termination, the Petitioner filed a request for a due process hearing with the Respondent to challenge his termination from employment. The Petitioner challenged the basis for his termination as he wanted to clear his name regarding some unflattering allegations but, equally important, he wanted to keep his job with MDC. The Respondent denied the Petitioner's request for an administrative hearing and found that the Petitioner was not entitled to a hearing. More specifically, the Respondent concluded that since the Petitioner did not have a contract of employment he was not entitled to an administrative hearing. The Petitioner disputed the Respondent's claim and argued that he did have a contract, that he had a reasonable expectation that his employment would continue, and that the Respondent unlawfully refused to afford him regress through the administrative process. When the Petitioner's appeal of his request for an administrative hearing failed, he filed the instant case to challenge the Respondent's policy of not referring administrative cases for formal hearing. The delays in the appeal process explain and support the Petitioner's delay in filing the instant challenge to the agency's alleged rule. To understand the historical perspective of this case, the following findings are made pertinent to the Petitioner's employment with the Respondent: The Petitioner began employment with the MDC on or about April 4, 2001. He was hired as a part-time, hourly worker within the school of allied health technologies. The position he assumed was funded and operated within the "Health Careers Opportunities Program" or HCOP. The HCOP was funded by a federal grant. The monies coming from the grant were renewable each year and ran concurrent with the school's fiscal year (July 1-June 30). All employees paid through the HCOP grant were considered "temporary" as the grant monies were necessary to assure continued employment. In January 2002 the Petitioner was given a full-time position within the HCOP. He was designated "Program Leader/Student Services" for the upcoming summer bridge program. At all times material to this case, all parties knew that absent federal funding the HCOP would not continue to operate. Moreover, the Petitioner knew, or should have known, that his employment with the Respondent would run only until June 30, 2002. Thereafter, it was expected that if and when the federal funding came through, the HCOP employees (including the Petitioner) would continue to work within the scope of the program. At the end of the summer program in 2001, the HCOP employees took leave until the school year started and the funding of the program was assured. Accordingly, after the summer bridge program was completed, the Petitioner expected to be on leave during the summer of 2002 until called back to work. Instead, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner from employment. The 2002 summer bridge program had not finished well for the Petitioner. Amid allegations of sexual harassment (unsubstantiated and not at issue in this proceeding) the Petitioner's working relationship within the HCOP floundered. The Petitioner was aghast that unsubstantiated claims had been reported, he wanted the accusations resolved, he wanted his name cleared, and he was disappointed by the process that failed to timely and fully resolve the issues. When the Petitioner left the campus for what he believed would be the break (similar to the one they had taken the prior year), he was uncertain as to his employment status. In fact, when he left the campus he cleaned out his desk and returned his keys. Nevertheless, on July 26, 2002, Dr. Miller directed the Petitioner to present for work on July 29, 2002. He did not do so. On July 29, 2002, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor directed him to appear for work on July 30, 2002. He did not do so. In fact, the Petitioner did not return to the office until July 31, 2002. The Petitioner did not understand that his attendance was mandatory for the two days that he did not appear for work. When the Petitioner did check in with the HCOP office on the 31st he came to understand the gravity of the situation. As a result of the absences, the Respondent cited the Petitioner with insubordination and terminated his employment with MDC. The Petitioner timely challenged the termination but the Respondent ruled he was not entitled to an administrative review of the decision. The Petitioner filed for, and received, unemployment compensation. The termination was not justified by the standards applicable to that forum. The rules governing unemployment compensation do not, however, govern the administrative process regarding whether or not one's employment constitutes a property interest that is protected by law. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's petition seeking an administrative review, the Respondent declined to afford the Petitioner with a hearing. The Respondent does not forward petitions filed by non- contract employees when such individuals seek to challenge their termination of employment. The Respondent maintains that, as a matter of law, they are not required to forward such petitions for formal review. The Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are not entitled to administrative review when their employment is terminated. Conversely, the Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are entitled to an administrative review when their employment is terminated. The Petitioner was not a full-time, contract employee of the Respondent. The Respondent's policy affords full-time contractual personnel a right to an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact ICF Kaiser Engineers, Inc. is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Florida. KE Realty Services, Inc. is a Florida corporation which has its principal place of business in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On February 26, 1993, the Department issued a RFP to solicit offers on the SR 7 contract. This RFP was identified as RFP-DOT-92-93-4008. Proposals submitted in response to the request were to be opened March 26, 1993, and the bid tabulations were to be posted on April 29, 1993. Four vendors submitted proposals in connection with the subject RFP: the Petitioners; Gulf Coast Property Acquisition, Inc. (Gulf Coast); The Urban Group; and Keith and Schnars, P.A. Each proposal was scored based upon four criteria: technical plan; price; certified DBE; and executive judgment. The points available for each were preset and known to all vendors. The technical plan could receive a maximum of 75 points, price could receive 20 points, and each of the other criteria could receive 5 points. Obviously, the technical plan portion was the more weighted criterion. The technical plan portion of each vendor's proposal was evaluated by a Technical Review Committee (TRC). This committee consisted of Claire Tronel, Kevin Szatmary, Steve Gonot, Lynda Parsons, Van Neilly, and Cheryl Balogh. The membership of the TRC was not kept secret and Petitioners knew, and perhaps other vendors as well, who would be evaluating the proposals. Each member of the TRC scored the proposals independently. The average of all of the independent scores for each proposal was then computed as the technical plan score. The vendors received the following technical plan scores: Petitioners a 67.42; Gulf Coast a 56.79; The Urban Group a 36.42; and Keith & Schnars a 29.71. To determine the price score, the lowest priced proposal received the maximum number of points (20). The other proposals received a fraction of the twenty points available based upon the relation of their price to the lowest price. According to the formula, Keith & Schnars received the highest price score (20), then The Urban Group (17.20), Gulf Coast (15.60), and finally, Petitioners (10.60). Petitioners received the lowest price score because it submitted the highest priced proposal. The ratio of its price with the lowest priced proposal multiplied by 20 resulted in the 10.60 score. The scores for the DBE criterion are not in dispute but were assigned as follows: Petitioners, 5.0; Gulf Coast, 5.0; The Urban Group, 0.0; and Keith & Schnars, 2.0. The TRC did not know the prices submitted with the proposals until it had completed the technical scores for each vendor. The final criterion, executive judgment, was determined by the Selection Committee which consisted of: Rick Chesser, James Wolfe, and Joseph Yesbeck. This committee considered two factors in assigning its five points. First, the vendor's ability to do the work; and second, the cost of the work. The scores for executive judgment were: 0 for The Urban Group and Keith & Schnars because their technical proposals were poor; 1 for Petitioners because, while their technical proposals were good, their price was high; and 5 for Gulf Coast. Following tabulation of all criteria scores, the vendors were ranked as follows: Petitioners with 84.02; Gulf Coast with 82.39; The Urban Group with 53.62; and Keith & Schnars with 51.71. On April 29, 1993, the Department posted the foregoing tabulation and its intent to award the SR 7 contract to Petitioners on May 3, 1993. Thereafter, allegations of impropriety and/or conflict of interest were raised by an unsuccessful vendor. The claims were: that members of the TRC had family members who were either employed by or under contract to Petitioners; that Petitioners had conversations with Department employees prior to the submission of the proposals regarding a revised Department budget for the SR 7 contract; and that an employee of the Department served as the registered agent for Petitioners. Gulf Coast met with the Department and alleged that improprieties had occurred or conflicts of interests existed that had affected the technical evaluation of the bids. Based upon the allegations, the Selection Committee decided to avoid the appearance of any impropriety and to rescind the intent to award to Petitioners and to reject all proposals submitted. The decision reached by the Selection Committee was hurried as the Department believed it was bound, by law, to reach such decision before 8:00 a.m., May 4, 1993. A complete investigation into the truthfulness of the charges was not finished prior to the imposed deadline. On May 5, 1993, the Department posted its formal notice of its intent to reject all proposals. The basis for such decision was "perceived improprieties in the selection process and possible conflict of interest." There were no actual conflicts of interest in the review of the subject proposals. Further, there were no actual improprieties in the proposal review or scoring. With regard to the allegations related to family members employed by Petitioners, no such conflict existed. Claire Tronel's husband has a contract with Petitioners unrelated to any of the issues of this case. Such contract is well-known in the industry and was known to the vendors prior to the assessment of these proposals. Further, the Department knew of such relationship prior to Ms. Tronel being selected for membership on the TRC. Mr. Tronel is not an officer, partner, director, or proprietor of either Petitioner. Nor does he have a direct or indirect ownership interest in more than a five percent of the total assets or capital stock of either company. Ms. Tronel had refrained from serving as a scoring member of earlier technical review committees because of her husband's contractual relationship. Ms. Tronel's supervisor was aware of the relationship Mr. Tronel had to Petitioners and did not consider his limited business relationship to be a conflict. Ms. Tronel was chosen to serve on the TRC because of her experience in right-of-way services, and the relative lack of experience of some of the other committee members. Before serving on the TRC, Ms. Tronel consulted with the district general counsel in order to determine whether her participation would violate Florida Statutes or the Department's ethical standards. After receiving advice and making same known to her supervisors, it was decided Ms. Tronel should serve as a committee member. The contractual relationship between Mr. Tronel and Petitioner did not effect Claire Tronel's evaluation of the proposals. In fact, if the scores assigned by Ms. Tronel to the technical plans of each proposal were subtracted from the average scores, the margin between Petitioners' technical score and the next highest score would widen. Ms. Tronel showed no favoritism or bias in favor of Petitioners. Gulf Coast did not complain about improper conflicts related to their proposal yet Michael Sheridan, the son of TRC member Linda Parsons, is employed by O.R. Colan, an appraisal firm which was listed as a subcontractor in Gulf Coast's proposal. Perhaps Gulf Coast did not complain about Ms. Parsons' membership on the TRC because Ms. Parsons' relationship to Michael Sheridan is also widely known in the vendor community. Petitioners knew of such relationship but did not dispute the accuracy or fairness of Ms. Parsons. If Ms. Parsons' score were deleted from the scoring, Gulf Coast would have received the highest score. Ms. Parsons, who is the chief review appraiser, generally serves on the technical review committee for projects which include appraisal services. Since her son became an employee of O.R. Colan, Ms. Parsons has served on technical review committees which evaluated proposals submitted by O.R. Colan and those submitted by vendors who listed O.R. Colan as a subcontractor. Michael Sheridan is not an officer, partner, director, or proprietor of either Gulf Coast or O.R. Colan and does not own, either directly or indirectly, more than five percent of the total assets or the capital stock of either company. While Ms. Parsons has been instructed not to serve on technical review committees in the future when her son is reflected as a participant in one of the proposals, she has not been instructed to refrain from participating whenever her son's employer participates in a proposal. Ms. Parsons showed no favoritism toward Gulf Coast in her evaluation of the proposals. The facts do not support even an appearance that Ms. Parsons showed any favoritism toward Gulf Coast. Ms. Tronel and Ms. Parsons did not disregard their public duties in favor of a private interest. Therefore, no impropriety by reason of their participation resulted. The Department's decision to rescind the award to Petitioners and to reject all bids was also premised, in part, on concerns regarding contacts between Petitioners and the Department employees before proposals were submitted. Petitioners contacted the Department to ask questions because during the course of preparing its proposal an issue of pricing became apparent. An inconsistency between the amounts that they were developing for the project and the amounts reflected in the Department's work program budget for the project became obvious. Because of the disparity between the Department's budget for the project and the prices that Petitioners developed, Mr. Thomas became concerned that he was misinterpreting the RFP. Mr. Thomas called the Department and spoke, first, to Van Neilly and, subsequently, to Claire Tronel about his concerns. Ms. Tronel confirmed that all services, including appraisal, were to be included in the proposals submitted. Ms. Tronel did not tell Mr. Thomas that the Department intended to revise its budget for the project, nor did Mr. Thomas tell Ms. Tronel or Mr. Neilly what Petitioners' price for the SR 7 proposal would be. Subsequently, the Department did revise its budget for the SR 7 contract by forty to fifty percent. The revised budget exceeds the price bid by Petitioners. The Department's work program budget is a public document which lists all of the projects planned by the Department for a five-year period and includes the Department's price estimate for each project. Petitioners submit bids for Department projects and normally submit proposal prices which exceed the Department's budget. Petitioners normally submit proposals which are highly ranked for their technical quality. It was not improper for Petitioners to ask the question regarding the inclusion of appraisal services and it was not improper for a Department employee to confirm that appraisal services were to be included in the project. It is common practice for vendors to call Department employees before the submittal of proposals. However, vendors are warned not to rely upon information which is not provided to them in writing. In addition, it would be improper for a Department employee to share information with one vendor, which could be advantageous to that vendor, without also providing the information to all other vendors. Petitioners received no information which gave them an advantage over the other vendors. Rick Conner is a Department employee who was, until recently, the resident agent for KE Realty Services, Inc. Mr. Conner served in this position without compensation. He was not involved in any way in the RFP or the evaluation of the subject proposals. His role as resident agent had no effect on the scoring of proposals, and was not a factor in the Department's decision to rescind the award to Petitioners. There was no evidence offered at the hearing to suggest that the relationship between Rick Conner and KE Realty gave the appearance of impropriety. Petitioners expended approximately $40,000 in the preparation of the proposal; and, if there is a rebid, will incur additional amounts to prepare a new proposal. Petitioners hired additional employees for the SR 7 contract, so that it could report in its proposal that it had the staff on hand to begin work immediately. If the SR/7 Contract is not rebid until late 1993 or early 1994, the opportunity to recoup the overhead expenses associated with these additional employees will be lost. In addition, Petitioners' ability to rebid is adversely affected by the Department's decision since Gulf Coast made a copy of the proposal and may now benefit from the technical ideas and suggestions developed by Petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order awarding job no. 86100-3576/2508 for the SR 7 project to Petitioners. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3034 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioners: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31 through 48, 50, 51, and 53 through 61 are accepted. Paragraph 24 is rejected as a statement of law, not fact. Paragraph 27 is rejected as irrelevant. The first sentence of paragraph 30 is accepted; the remainder rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 49 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 52 is rejected as argument or comment. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 17, 21, and 22 are accepted. While paragraphs 18 through 20 accurately state the rationale expressed by the selection committee (one member of which changed his opinion after a thorough review of the facts), the ultimate facts expressed by the paragraphs (for example, that there was an appearance of impropriety) are rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Not one person from the public or from the other vendors testified. The Department took the unfounded allegation of an unsuccessful bidder (not even corroborated at trial) as proof that an appearance of impropriety existed. Paragraph 23 is rejected as argument, conclusion of law, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 24 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 25 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. The first two sentences of paragraph 27 are accepted; the remainder rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraphs 28 and 29 are rejected as argument. Paragraph 30 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 31 is rejected as argument and contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 32 is rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Martha Harrell Chumbler CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD, EMMANUEL, SMITH & CUTLER, P.A. First Florida Bank Building 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, Mail Station 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue In its formal written protest, Petitioner VisionQuest National, Ltd. (VisionQuest), through paragraph 6.d. and e., challenged the manner in which Respondent Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) assigned and weighed points in accordance with specifications set forth in RFP I5J01 (the RFP). The first issue to be resolved concerns the timeliness of that challenge to the specifications. The aspects of the RFP specifications challenged in the formal written protest are related to the assignment of points for past performance in carrying out contracts with DJJ for non-residential programs which can total 250 out of 1000 possible points in the competition. Section 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes. The second issue to be resolved concerns the appropriate disposition in the case where DJJ has conceded that the actions of some of its evaluators in considering responses to the RFP materially deviated from agency policy and the expectations in the RFP, thus compromising the evaluation process. Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact STIPULATED FACTS On or about April 12, 2002, DJJ issued an RFP under Solicitation Number I5J01 for "84 Community-based Conditional Release Slots in Orange and Osceola Counties." DJJ appointed one of its employees, Diana Blue, as the Contract Administrator for this RFP. As a Contract Administrator, she had the duties and obligations of the Source Selection Evaluation Team Chairperson. On or about April 10, 2002, Deborah H. Dickerson, DJJ's Chief Probation Officer for the 9th Circuit, appointed Shelley Maxwell, Nathan Marcou and Marcus Freeman as the evaluation team for RFP I5J01. The evaluation team was to review the responses to the RFP and subjectively evaluate the categories labeled "C.2 - Management Capability" and "C-4 - Program Services." These two criteria combine for a possible 550 points out of a possible 1000. Each category is further broken down into subcategories: C.2 - Management Approach and Organizational Structure and C.4 - Soundness of Approach and Comply with Retirements. The RFP also provides for an objective review of the responses in some respect. The RFP provides for up to 250 points, out of the possible 1000, to be awarded in the area of past performance. One way these points are earned is by a provider having operated a DJJ Program(s) within the last three years and the program(s) having earned a "commendable or higher recognition." Such a program(s) would receive 20 points for each year, thereby allowing a single program to earn multiple scores, or multiple programs to earn multiple scores. A second way these points are earned is by a provider having operated a DJJ Program(s) within the last two years and the program(s) having met or exceeded DJJ's approved Performanced Based Budgeting performance measure for recidivism rates. Such a program(s) would receive 20 points for each year, thereby allowing the single program to earn multiple scores, or multiple programs to earn multiple scores. VisionQuest, Eckerd Youth Alternatives (Eckerd) and Children's Comprehensive Services (CCS) submitted timely responses to the RFP which were due no later than May 14, 2002. On May 14, 2002, the evaluation team was contacted and provided addresses so they could receive the RFP and the responses. This was the first contact the evaluation team had with anyone regarding their role on the evaluation team since the date of their appointment, April 10, 2002. Some of the evaluation team received their packages on Friday, May 17, 2002 and were to have their evaluations back on Tuesday, May 21, 2002. At least one of the evaluation team members did not receive their packages until Monday, May 20, 2002. The date to return the evaluations was extended to Wednesday, May 22, 2002. In this package was the RFP, the responses to the RFP, a score sheet, the Briefing for Source Selection Evaluation (SSET) Team Members and Advisors Form, and Conflict of Interest Questionnaire. Shelley Maxwell, evaluator number 3 for this RFP, is a DJJ probation officer for Osceola County. Part of Ms. Maxwell's responsibilities are to oversee the youth assigned to the current contract provider of community based conditional release slots in Osceola County, VisionQuest. Ms. Maxwell has no experience with RFPs, the evaluation of responses to RFPs nor has she received any training with regards to an RFP. Ms. Maxwell was not told what she would be doing or given any instruction between the time of being appointed to the evaluation team and receiving her materials. Ms. Maxwell reviewed her packet of materials on Friday, May 17, 2002, and was still unclear on what was expected of her. She then contacted a DJJ supervisor who informed her to review the responses and evaluate them. Upon learning that VisionQuest had submitted one of the responses she was to review, Ms. Maxwell thought that she and Nathan Marcou had been appointed to the evaluation team because they worked with VisionQuest on a daily basis. This allowed them to compare VisionQuest's written response with the daily activities of the current program. On Monday, May 20, 2002, Ms. Maxwell met with Nathan Marcou. Ms. Maxwell was told to get together with the other team members and perform the evaluations. Ms. Maxwell and Mr. Marcou discussed the proposal they were reviewing during this meeting, which was Eckerd's. Ms. Maxwell later reviewed the proposals from CCS and VisionQuest at home during the evening of Monday, May 20, 2002. In evaluating the response to the RFP filed by VisionQuest, Ms. Maxwell used her knowledge obtained through her day-to-day contact with VisionQuest. Her knowledge further affected the scores she awarded to VisionQuest. Ms. Maxwell signed her Briefing for Source Selection Evaluation (SSET) Team Members and Advisors Form, Conflict of Interest Questionnaire, and score sheets for CCS and VisionQuest on May 20, 2002. Her score sheet for Eckerd's response is not signed. Ms. Maxwell submitted her paperwork to go to the main office in Orlando, and then on to Tallahassee via courier. Based on the evaluations, DJJ issued a notice of intent to award a contract to Eckerd posted June 4, 2002. VisionQuest timely filed its Notice of Intent to Protest and its Formal Protest Petition and Request for Hearing. During the pendency of this action, DJJ has admitted that the evaluation process of RFP I5J01 was flawed and contrary to DJJ's policies and practices. In an attempt to remedy the flaws, DJJ desires to conduct a new evaluation of the RFP responses with a new evaluation team. VisionQuest desires to have the RFP rebid.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is Barbara Clark and Company, a CPA firm. Barbara Clark owns and operates the company. The Respondent issued a Request for Proposal, RFP Number 7112, for CPA audit services. The Petitioner responded to the RFP along with four other proposers. The award for RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, was to be made to the two (2) companies who received the highest number of points based on individual evaluations by four (4) people selected for the RFP review committee. The evaluation criteria to be used by the review committee members was specified in Section 1.16 of the RFP and involved review of the management and technical aspects of a given proposal. The committee members for the RFP were instructed by the FAMU Purchasing Director to use the criteria as outlined in Section 1.16 in the process of evaluating the management and technical plans of the respective proposals and that each member should evaluate and score each proposal independent from the other committee members. The evaluations by each member were placed in a sealed envelope. The proposals submitted in response to RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, were reviewed by the evaluation committee members. After the members completed their review, they met as a group with the Purchasing Director. The sealed envelopes which contained the individual committee members' evaluation sheets for each proposal were opened and the points for each proposer were determined by adding the points for each respective proposal. The evaluation of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, occurred pursuant to the evaluation criteria in RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services. No committee member testified. There was absolutely no evidence submitted by Petitioner which demonstrated that the committee members did not follow the specifications of the RFP. Likewise, there was a lack of evidence that the evaluation process established in the RFP was arbitrary or capricious. The two (2) proposers that received the highest number of points were recommended for the award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services. Petitioner's proposal was not evaluated as having either of the highest point totals for RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services and therefore did not receive an award of the contract. The FAMU Purchasing Director, Oscar Martinez, sent to each proposer by certified letter, return receipt, notification of the intended award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, to the two proposers with the highest number of points. The FAMU Purchasing Director, Oscar Martinez, discussed the results of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, with Barbara Clark after he mailed the intended award notification to the proposers. A mathematical error in the calculation of points for one of the proposers was discovered and corrected. The error had no effect on the rankings of the proposers and was therefore an immaterial discrepancy in the award of the RFP. Petitioner utterly failed to establish that the intended award pursuant to RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, was not in good faith and not the result of a fair, full and honest exercise of the agency's discretion in making such an award. Likewise Petitioner utterly failed to establish that Respondent acted arbitrarily or capriciously in its intended award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services. After a review of the evidence Petitioner's protest of the intended award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, was clearly without merit and lacked factual or legal support and was therefore frivolous and improper. Indeed the barest attempt was made by Petitioner to prepare or pursue evidence for the hearing in this matter. Although Respondent consulted with Petitioner and provided Petitioner information regarding RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, Petitioner persisted in pursuing its protest of the intended award of the RFP. Petitioner continued its protest of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, long after it was or should have been aware that it had no factual or legal grounds for such a protest causing Respondent's attorney to spend 13 hours in preparation for this case. However, Respondent did not submit an affidavit from another attorney who reviewed the file and number of hours spent by Respondent's attorney and attested to the reasonableness of the hours spent or the fee charged. Therefore, Respondent's motion for attorney's fees is denied.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the protest be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANNE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX CASE NO. 96-1371 1. The facts contained in paragraphs 1-28 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are adopted, in substance, in so far as material. COPIES FURNISHED: George W. Butler, Esquire Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Office of the General Counsel 300 Lee Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32307 Barbara A. Clark Barbara A. Clark and Company 270 First Avenue South, Suite 101 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Bishop Holifield, Esquire Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University 300 Lee Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32307-3100
Findings Of Fact There are no issues of material fact in dispute. Respondent, Department of Children and Families (Department), pursuant to section 394.9151, Florida Statutes (2018),1/ has contracted with a private entity, Wellpath, LLC (Wellpath), to use and operate a facility, Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC), to comply with the requirements of chapter 394, part V (entitled “Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators”). Petitioners are persons subject to chapter 394, part V, and are confined in the FCCC. Petitioners allege that the FCCC Resident Handbook and internal memorandum are unpromulgated rules which are imposed on FCCC residents, and that the same are an improper exercise of delegated legislative authority as de facto agency rules that have not been adopted pursuant to the rulemaking procedures of section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner and his family are entitled to be provided developmental services through Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Wayne McDuffy (“Wayne”), presently age 9, is mentally retarded as a result of Down’s Syndrome. It is undisputed that he is eligible to receive developmental services through Respondent Department of Children and Families (“DCF”). Wayne has been known to DCF since at least 1996 or 1997 and has received services at some time(s) in the past. From February 2000 through the present, however, Wayne has not received services. Nevertheless, at times during this latter period, as will be discussed below, Wayne has been a “client” of DCF. In February 2000, Wayne’s mother, Deborah Moore (“Moore”), made application to DCF, on behalf of her son, for developmental services. She desired, and continues to request, personal care assistance and residential placement to help manage Wayne, who is occasionally violent and aggressive towards others, including Moore’s younger child. Funding for the services that DCF provides to the developmentally disabled is available though the Individual Family Supports Program (“IFS”), which the state pays for out of general revenue, and the Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Program (the “Waiver”), for which the Florida Medicaid Program (“Medicaid”) pays with federal and state monies. When Moore applied for services in February 2000, she did not know about, or appreciate the differences between, these two funding sources. Some time after February 2000, probably in the summer of that year, a DCF caseworker verbally notified Moore that Wayne had been accepted into the Waiver and would soon be receiving services as a client of DCF. Moore kept in telephone contact with DCF and, in September 2000, verbally notified the local office that she was moving to a new address, which she provided, together with a phone number. Services, however, never commenced. Meanwhile, on October 3, 2000, DCF assigned Wayne’s case to an interim support coordinator at Advantage in Support, Inc. (“Advantage”), a third-party provider under contract with DCF. An employee of Advantage placed telephone calls to, and personally visited, Moore’s old residence, i.e. the one from which she and her family had moved in September 2000. That phone number had been disconnected, however, and no one came to the door at the house where Moore and her family no longer lived.1 On November 2, 2000, Advantage returned Wayne’s file to DCF. Back at DCF, Wayne’s file came into the hands of Thelma Bass (“Bass”), then a Medicaid Waiver Specialist. Bass left a telephone message for Moore at her place of employment but did not receive a return call.2 Thereafter, Bass drafted a letter to Moore3 dated November 28, 2000, which read: You had requested that Wayne McDuffy be placed on the Medicaid Waiver program. This we did and an interim support coordinator was assigned to him. The agency tried without success to set up appointments to see Nelson. You never responded to her calls. We would love to assist you in providing the needed services for your son, however, this is impossible as you refuse to cooperate with the independent support coordinator.[4] It is important that you contact us if you desire to receive and/or continue receiving services from the Developmental Disabilities Program. If I do not hear from you by December 7, 2000, we will close this case. We love to hear from you, please call me at 305-808-6236. Bass normally sends letters such as this one by certified mail. In this particular instance, however, she did not use certified mail.5 Nor did Bass personally put this letter into the mailbox. Rather, she directed that it be sent out by others in the ordinary course of her office’s business. For reasons unknown,6 Moore did not receive the November 28, 2000, letter.7 Being thus unaware of the deadline that Bass had imposed, Moore could not and did not meet it; in other words, she failed timely to respond to the letter she had not seen. On December 15, 2000, Bass closed Wayne’s file, without first taking any affirmative steps to confirm the actual delivery of the letter of November 28, 2000, which would have been Moore’s only notice of the critical deadline. No notice of any kind was contemporaneously provided to Moore or Wayne regarding the closure of Wayne’s file. Although Moore was clueless as to what had occurred, the closing of Wayne’s case would have disastrous effects on his (and her) substantial interests. Because, when Wayne stopped being a client, his “slot” in the Waiver was given to someone else——and, as will be seen, would be very difficult to get back. In early 2001 (probably January), Moore contacted DCF to inquire about the services that she had been promised but had yet to receive. She was informed that her son’s case had been closed, and that she would need to re-apply. DCF did not tell Moore, then or ever, that she could request a hearing to challenge the agency’s decision to close Wayne’s file based on her failure to respond to Bass’s November 28, 2000, letter (which Moore had not received and hence remained ignorant of). Moore did as she was told. On April 12, 2001, she again applied for services on Wayne’s behalf, signing an application for participation in the Waiver. She still did not know about the different sources of funds (Medicaid and IFS) for developmental services or appreciate how the issue of funding sources might impact upon her request for services. On April 20, 2001, a district-level Crisis Identification Tool Review Committee (the “Committee”) met to consider Wayne’s new application for services. This meeting was necessary because, by this time, slots in the Waiver were so limited that DCF was able to accept only those applicants who were in “crisis” as determined by an internal, unpromulgated “Crisis Identification Tool.”8 Applicants deemed not to be in crisis were now being placed on a waiting list, to be served in date order, based on the date of becoming a client of DCF. The Committee decided, on April 20, 2001, that Wayne was not in crisis. Thus, he was placed on the waiting list, with an eligibility date——which determines his place in line——of (or around) April 12, 2001. No one at DCF took the trouble, in April 2001, to formally notify Wayne or Moore, in writing, that the Committee had found Wayne not to be in crisis, much less to advise them of the consequences of that decision or of Wayne’s right to request an administrative hearing. Nor did DCF inform either of them of its determination, or of Wayne’s right to challenge such decision, in May, June, July, August, September, October, or November of 2001. It was not until December 17, 2001——eight months after the fact——that DCF finally sent Wayne a letter (by certified mail), in care of his mother, telling him about the agency’s decision and notifying him of the right to request a hearing. The December 17, 2001, notice of agency action, which was signed by Evelyn Alvarez (“Alvarez”), Program Operation Administrator, provided in pertinent part:9 We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted within the limits of the Department’s appropriated general revenue funds unless an individual is in crisis as determined by application of the Department’s Crisis Identification Tool. Using the Crisis Identification Tool to assess your situation, the Department finds that you are not in crisis. Florida law, therefore, prohibits the Department from spending or committing funds in excess of its appropriation. Please see Section 393.13(2)(c) and (d), F.S., and refer to the State Spending Plan as approved by the Florida Legislature. (Emphasis added). In response to the foregoing letter, Moore timely requested a hearing on Wayne’s behalf. At the first session of the final hearing, which took place on May 30, 2002, DCF disclosed the November 28, 2000, letter and represented that Wayne’s file had been closed based on Moore’s failure to respond to that letter. In addition, at the May 30, 2002, hearing, DCF admitted certain facts that revealed the consequences of DCF’s decision to close Wayne’s file: (1) Wayne lost his slot in the Waiver effective December 15, 2000; (2) At the time Wayne was approved for the Waiver, he did not need to be in crisis to receive a slot, but as of April 2001, he did need to be in crisis to avoid being placed on a waiting list; (3) Had Wayne’s file not been closed, he would have remained in the Waiver irrespective of whether he was in crisis, provided he continued to meet the Medicaid eligibility criteria; and (4) Wayne meets the Medicaid eligibility criteria for the Waiver. In sum, therefore, if Moore had received and responded to Bass’s November 28, 2000, letter, then, in all likelihood, Wayne would be receiving developmental services today under the Waiver. The undersigned continued the final hearing to allow Moore an opportunity to amend Wayne’s petition to challenge the obviously significant decision to close Wayne’s case in December 2000 (which was separate and distinct from the agency’s decision, made in April 2001 but not communicated to the substantially affected party until December 2001, that Wayne is not in crisis according to DCF’s criteria). On June 7, 2002, Moore filed an amended petition on behalf of her son, thereby placing DCF’s December 2000 decision in issue. On June 27, 2002, without first seeking or obtaining leave, DCF filed a “corrective letter” from Alvarez to Wayne dated June 27, 2002. This letter (which was sent by certified mail) provided in pertinent part:10 You recently[11] received a letter, dated December 17, 2001, responding to your request for general revenue funded services from the Developmental Disabilities program.[12] Upon our review of the letter sent to you, we discovered that the letter contained language addressing the Department’s Crisis Identification Tool. This language does not apply to request for General Revenue funded services. The first paragraph of your letter should read as follows: We regret to inform you, as a conclusion of law,[13] that your request cannot be granted within the limits of the Department’s appropriated general revenue funds, and Florida law prohibits the Department from spending or committing funds in excess of its appropriation. Please see Section 393.066(4), F.S., and refer to the State Spending Plan as approved by the Florida Legislature. (Italics in original). At the second session of the final hearing on September 3, 2002, DCF’s attorney relied upon the “corrective letter” to argue that the question whether Wayne is in crisis for purposes of the Waiver is not ripe for adjudication because “the process is still going on,” and to contend that Wayne will some day have an opportunity to litigate all Waiver-related issues in a Medicaid “fair hearing” before a DCF hearing officer (assuming, that is, DCF ever gets around to giving Wayne a clear point of entry into such a proceeding, which it still had not done as of September 3, 2002). DCF’s legal contentions will be discussed in the Conclusions of Law below. However, the undersigned rejects here, as factually incorrect, the assertion that DCF somehow has not yet determined whether Wayne is in crisis. Rather, as previously found, the Committee met and decided the “crisis” issue against Wayne on April 20, 2001, and DCF belatedly gave him a clear point of entry to challenge that decision via Alvarez’s letter of December 12, 2001. Wayne then properly exercised his right to challenge DCF’s “crisis” decision. These are matters of historical fact that DCF cannot make disappear through the magic of a revisionist “corrective letter.” Ultimate Factual Determinations DCF’s momentous decision to close Wayne’s file in December 2000 was arbitrary and capricious, in that the action was taken based on Moore’s failure to respond in time to a letter that she had never received——which latter fact DCF would have known had it exercised reasonable efforts to confirm whether Moore had actual notice of the deadline that Bass had unilaterally imposed. A reasonable governmental official would not make a decision of similar detriment to another person’s substantial interests, based solely on the latter’s silence, without first attempting to verify that the adversely affected person was aware of his or her obligation to speak.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DCF enter a final order that, one, rescinds the preliminary agency action taken in December 2000 which resulted in the closure of Wayne’s case and, two, grants all relief necessary to place Wayne in as favorable a position as he would have been in today were it not for DCF’s wrongful closure of his case on or about December 15, 2000. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2003.
