The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline on Respondent's correctional certificate for alleged violations set forth in the Administrative Complaint, Case No. 17450?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the election of rights and proof identifying Respondent's employment with the Florida Department of Corrections, it is inferred that Respondent is certified as a corrections officer by Petitioner. It is perceived that Respondent, in his contest of material facts, disagrees with the allegations in paragraph two to the Administrative Complaint, as those facts might reveal a violation of statutes and rules referred to in the Administrative Complaint in its latter provisions. Respondent rented an acoustic guitar and an item referred to as a "gig-bag" from Guitar Renters in its Gainesville, Florida store. The amount of rental was $30.74 for the period November 16, 1999, through December 11, 1999. The overdue rate for the rental was $2.97 per day. The retail value of the instrument and bag was identified in the rental agreement as $345.00. The rental contract was executed by Respondent agreeing to those terms. The contract made clear that the arrangement was for rental only and not for sale. There was a specific reminder that any rental over 10 days past due would be reported to the police department as a stolen item. Respondent did not timely return the guitar and bag consistent with the contract terms. As a consequence, the proprietors at Guitar Renters sent letters in the ordinary mail to remind Respondent that he was late in returning the items. No response was made to those letters. A certified letter was sent to Respondent reminding him of his obligation to return the equipment. Again Respondent failed to respond. Scott Tennyson, who managed the Gainesville store, telephoned Respondent about the overdue items. Respondent replied that he could not return the instrument. When asked why, Respondent indicated that he had pawned the instrument. Mr. Tennyson told Respondent that if the matter were not resolved in some fashion, namely for Respondent to go back and get the guitar from the pawnshop and bring it to the owner, then criminal charges would be filed. Consistent with that statement, a complaint was made and criminal charges were filed in the Circuit Court in and for Alachua County, Florida, Court No. 01-2000-01573-CFA, C.R. No. 007601, Division One. This case was pursuant to a sworn complaint from the Gainesville Police Department charging Respondent with grand theft. The case was subsequently nolle prosequi/no information, based upon what is referred to in that dismissal, as an appropriate administrative action deemed sufficient in lieu of prosecution. On June 25, 2001, the matter was resolved to the satisfaction of Guitar Renters when Respondent made payment in full on the items that he had rented. In effect, the items were sold by way of restitution at their stated value when the rental contract was made.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and Conclusions of Law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered revoking Respondent's correctional certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kevin Dannunzio 1718 Spring Street Lake City, Florida 32025 Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and/or Class "G" Statewide Firearm License should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, set forth in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence introduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about June 7, 1989, Respondent filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License with the Department. The application form asked the applicant whether he had ever been arrested and to list any and all arrests. The application specifically provided that "falsification of this question may be grounds for denial of your license." Respondent answered affirmatively that he had been arrested. The only specific incident listed on the application was an arrest in 1979 for a charge of "asault [sic] with a deadly weapon intemp [sic] to kill Fay N.C. [sic]." The Application also required the applicant to set forth the outcome of all arrests. Respondent replied that the "charges was [sic] drop [sic]." On or about July 17, 1990, Respondent submitted an application with the Department for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. The application form for this license included an identical request regarding prior arrests. In response, Respondent checked the box indicating he had never been arrested and wrote "N/A" where he was supposed to indicate the date, charge and outcome of the arrests. Respondent has not provided any explanation for why his Class "D" Application disclosed an arrest in 1979, but his Class "G" Application did not reference this arrest. This discrepancy is not alleged in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner has submitted a certificate from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court which indicates that a criminal summons was issued for "Angelo Louis Lugo" on or about May 5, 1987, for a charge of "M Assault By Pointing A Gun." It is not clear whether this summons is directed at Respondent nor is it clear whether the Summons was ever served and/or the subject was arrested. The ultimate disposition of this criminal case is not clear. Respondent denies ever being served with the summons referenced in this court record. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Respondent was ever arrested in connection with this matter. Petitioner has submitted a second certified record from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court, which indicates that Respondent was issued a "Citation" on March 10, 1986, for the charge of "M Shoplifting Concealment Goods." No other evidence or explanation of this record has been provided. Respondent admits that he was issued a Notice to Appear in court after he was caught by store security personnel taking aspirin from a bottle. He testified that he did not list this matter on his applications because he was not "arrested." Instead, he claims that he was merely issued a citation to appear in court. The evidence presented in this case did not refute Respondent's version of the events surrounding this court record. In sum, the evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever formally "arrested" for this incident. The ultimate disposition of this criminal charge is not clear from the record in this proceeding. Counts III and IV of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint are based upon an incident that occurred on February 9, 1993 between Respondent and Jorge Ruiz. There is a good deal of conflicting evidence regarding this incident. Both Respondent and Ruiz have testified and/or given statements on several occasions about the incident including statements to the police, testimony in a related criminal proceeding against Respondent and depositions taken in connection with a civil lawsuit filed by Ruiz against Respondent, Respondent's employer and the Bank where Respondent worked. It is impossible and unnecessary to resolve all of the conflicts in the differing accounts of the incident as described by Respondent and Ruiz at various times. After considering all of the evidence presented, including the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, the findings in this Recommended Order are based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented. On February 9, 1993, Respondent was working as an armed security guard at a Barnett Bank in Plantation, Florida. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Respondent was working outside the bank in the vicinity of the drive-thru lanes. He was there to direct traffic and monitor the area. Around this time, Jorge Ruiz pulled into the paved area in front of the drive-thru booths. Ruiz had been to the Bank on numerous occasions in the past and he had often used the drive-thru windows. Ruiz has a very powerful radio in his pick-up truck and he admits that he tends to play music at a loud volume. On at least one prior occasion, Ruiz had proceeded to the drive-thru station with his radio blasting. The tellers had complained about the noise coming through the intercom system. During the week or so prior to February 9, 1993, Ruiz and Respondent had at least one minor confrontation. During this prior instance, Respondent advised Ruiz that he had to turn his radio down before he reached the drive-thru booth because the intercom system picked up the background noise and it interfered with the tellers' ability to communicate with the customers. Ruiz replied that he would turn down the radio when he got to the window. When Ruiz entered the Bank's parking lot on February 9, 1993, his radio was playing loudly. Respondent approached the driver's side window of Ruiz' vehicle and asked Ruiz to turn his radio down. Ruiz responded with a number of obscenities. Respondent told Ruiz that unless he turned his radio down, he could not use the drive-thru facility. Ruiz refused to comply. Respondent stood in front of Ruiz' vehicle and directed him away from the drive-thru lane. Ruiz' vehicle moved forward and bumped into Respondent. Respondent drew his gun and shouted at Ruiz to stop the car and get out. Respondent claims that he intended to hold Ruiz while he called the police. The parties exchanged words and Ruiz' truck again moved forward striking Respondent. Respondent was not knocked down or otherwise injured, however, his gun discharged. The bullet penetrated the windshield of Ruiz' truck and hit the steering wheel. A fragment from the steering wheel struck Ruiz in the neck or chest area, causing a minor wound. Respondent contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon and/or using deadly force "to prevent the escape from custody of a person who committed a felony in his presence." This contention is rejected because there is no evidence that Ruiz was attempting to escape. Furthermore, it is not clear that Ruiz in fact committed a felony, nor does it appear that the use of force was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case. Respondent also contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon in self-defense because he was being threatened by a deadly weapon, i.e. Ruiz' truck, and he had no reasonable means of escape. Respondent claims that he was boxed in by a vehicle in front of the truck and had no reasonable way to retreat from the "deadly force" that confronted him. Respondent's contention that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected as not credible. Contrary to Respondent's claim, the evidence was clear that Respondent had reasonable means of escape. Moreover, there were alternate ways to handle the situation which would have diffused rather than exacerbated the tension and danger. Respondent claims that the gun discharged accidently when the truck hit him. No persuasive evidence was presented to refute this contention. Indeed, in some of his statements, Ruiz admitted that the gun may have gone off by accident when his truck struck Respondent. In sum, it is clear that Ruiz was belligerent and abusive and that his car bumped into Respondent twice. Nonetheless, Respondent's contention that he was justified in drawing his weapon and that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected. While it can not be concluded from the evidence presented that Respondent deliberately shot at Ruiz, the evidence did establish that Respondent was guilty of negligence, misconduct and/or incompetency when he drew and pointed his loaded weapon at Ruiz. The circumstances did not justify Respondent pointing a loaded weapon at Ruiz. Without question, Respondent failed to demonstrate that level of discretion and caution that is expected of a person licensed to carry a firearm in the course of his employment. After the gun went off, Respondent immediately jumped into the truck and took Ruiz to a nearby hospital where Ruiz' minor injury was treated and he was released.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I, II, and III of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent and finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Count IV of that Third Amended Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violation, Respondent should be fined $1,500.00, his Class "G" Firearms License should be revoked and his Class "D" Security Guard License should be placed on probation for three years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2566 Petitioner has not submitted any proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's proposed recommended order included a section entitled Findings of Fact. However, that section does not include any individually numbered proposed findings of fact and the paragraphs contained in this section of Respondent's proposal include a mixture factual assertions, argument and legal conclusions. The proposal has been fully reviewed and considered. However, because proposed findings of fact have not been separately identified, no rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposal. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 James S. Benjamin, Esquire Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A. 100 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue An Administrative Complaint dated February 8, 1999, alleges that Respondent committed violations of Section 493.6118, Florida Statutes, when he performed armed security officer services without a proper license and when he failed to cooperate with an official investigation and gave false information regarding his identity and address. The issues in this proceeding are whether the alleged violations occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Vance H. Britto, was licensed by the Florida Department of State as a security officer some time prior to 1993. His license expired and he was deemed ineligible for re- licensure because of an unpaid disciplinary fine. On August 27, 1998, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Richard Yates, an investigator with the Florida Department of State, conducted a pro-active investigation at Windhover Apartments in Orlando, Orange County, Florida. Investigator Yates was accompanied by his colleague, Ed Sundberg. The investigators approached an individual wearing a security officer's uniform and badge and carrying a 38-caliber revolver. They identified themselves and asked the individual for his name and security officer's license. The individual gave his name as David Wilson but said that his license was at his employer's office being laminated. Although he was in a white Ford sedan with security markings, the individual denied having his driver's license or social security card with him. He gave his address as 2203 Page Street in Orlando. He gave his supervisor's name as Ricky Heath and his employer as Security Enforcement Services, Inc. After a brief exchange with the investigators, the individual sped away in his vehicle. Investigator Yates made a note of the license plate and made further notes on an inspection checklist. When he returned to his office and described the individual and the encounter to his supervisor, and with the aid of a file photograph, Investigator Yates was able to identify the individual as Vance Britto, a former licensee. In 1998 and to the present time, Mr. Britto has not been licensed with either a "Class G" or "Class D" license. No one knew Mr. Britto at the Page Street address he gave the investigators and when they checked his address in the computer file they learned that he had not lived there in over two years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: that the agency enter its formal order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 493.6118(1)(g) and (o), Florida Statutes, and assessing an administrative fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Vance H. Britto 6525 Pompeii Drive Orlando, Florida 32822 Honorable Katherine Harris Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether Respondent Employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner Employee.
Findings Of Fact On or about November 17, 2006, Petitioner filed an Employment Complaint of Discrimination (formerly known as a "Charge of Discrimination") on the basis of disability/handicap and national origin with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. On June 15, 2007, the Commission entered a Determination: No Cause. On or about July 2, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission. On or about July 5, 2007, this case was referred by the Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings. On July 18, 2007, a telephonic conference was held to schedule a final disputed-fact hearing date. The hearing date agreed upon was October 1, 2007, and a Notice of Hearing and Order of Pre-hearing Instructions issued on July 18, 2007. Neither party complied with the Order of Pre-hearing Instructions. At the time noticed for October 1, 2007, Respondent appeared for hearing. In the Joint Response to Initial Order, filed July 16, 2007, and in a subsequent Motion filed September 26, 2007, Respondent referred to itself as "Wal-Mart Stores, East L.P. (incorrectly referred-to in the caption as Wal-Mart Stores)," but made no motion to correct the style of this cause. Respondent acknowledged in its pleadings, and its counsel acknowledged orally at hearing, that it was the appropriate Respondent in this cause, regardless of the case's style. After waiting 30 minutes, Petitioner still had not appeared for hearing. The undersigned made diligent inquiry to ensure that Respondent had done nothing to discourage Petitioner from appearing, and closed the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Complaint of Discrimination and a Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___ ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Amy Harrison, Esquire Lindsay A. Connor, Esquire Ford & Harrison 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Catrina Soriano 1826 Nekoma Court Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: This discrimination case involves an allegation by petitioner, David Coleman, that he was denied employment by respondent, City of Jacksonville (City), because of his handicap. The City denies this allegation. A preliminary investigation by the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no probable cause that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. By way of background, petitioner has been employed by the City on four separate occasions, the last time as an employee in the mosquito control department in 1984. He was "released" the same year for "unacceptable leave." Since 1990, he has applied for at least twenty separate positions with the City. In conjunction with those and earlier efforts to obtain a job with the City, he has filed several job applications, including one in December 1987 and another in June 1992. Such applications are valid for a period of two years after they are signed and filed with the City. Therefore, if petitioner applied for a position with the City in March 1991, he did not have a valid job application on file. The petition for relief filed by Coleman describes the unlawful employment practice allegedly committed by the City as follows: unlawful hired or employment practice: with veteran preference that I have, and a handicap, which is alleged. The petition for relief does not describe the handicap. At hearing, however, petitioner contended he suffers from paranoia schizophrenia. Petitioner says that he applied for a job as a "traffic checker" with the City's engineering department in March 1991. City records reveal, however, that it has no such position called "traffic checker," and thus it hired no one for that job in 1991. It does have a position called "parking enforcement specialist," but since no description of the functions of that job is of record, it is unknown if the two positions are the same. Even so, City records do not show that petitioner made application for that position in March 1991. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, petitioner says that he interviewed for the position with an unidentified "supervisor," and he was told to prepare a resume, which he later gave to the interviewer's secretary. Thereafter, he made inquiry with the City's affirmative action office and learned that a veteran, not disabled, had been hired to fill the slot. Petitioner then brought this action charging the City with an unlawful employment practice. It is noted he has subsequently filed a second discrimination claim pertaining to another job application with the City. At hearing, petitioner contended that he suffers from paranoia schizophrenia. Other than his own assertion, however, no evidence was produced to confirm this disability, and as to this issue it is found that insufficient credible evidence exists to support a finding in petitioner's favor. The City admits that in one of petitioner's job applications filed with the City, petitioner attached a copy of a DD214 form reflecting that he was honorably discharged from the military. Also, the City acknowledges that in one of the applications is found a statement that petitioner had a 30 percent service related disability but the type of disability is not described. Whether the service related disability was still valid in March 1991 is not of record. Finally, petitioner's exhibit 1 is a copy of what purports to be a "statement of patient's treatment" from a VA outpatient clinic prepared in February 1985, but this document is hearsay, and in any event, is so dated as to have no probative value in this case. The more credible evidence shows that petitioner did not apply for the position of "traffic checker" or parking enforcement specialist in 1991. Moreover, petitioner had no valid application on file at that time, and there is no credible evidence as to who, if anyone, was hired to fill the position or what were the qualifications of the person hired. Even if one assumes an application was filed, the record is silent as to why petitioner's application may have been denied or, assuming he had a handicap, whether he could adequately perform the essential functions of the job. Given these considerations, and the lack of evidence to establish that petitioner is disabled with a handicap, it is found that the City did not commit an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5926 Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commissioin Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Mr. David Coleman 1071 Ontario Street Jacksonville, FL 32205 Brian M. Flaherty, Esquire 600 City Hall 220 East Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202
The Issue The issues in this case are: a) whether White Construction Company, Inc. timely filed its requests for hearing with the Department of Transportation in response to notices of intent to suspend White's certificate of qualification because of alleged delinquencies on State Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306 and; (b) if not, whether the doctrine of equitable tolling, waiver, estoppel or other legal or equitable principles apply under the facts of this case such that White is entitled to a formal hearing on the merits of the department's determination of delinquency.
Findings Of Fact White Construction Company, Inc. (White) is a contractor prequalified to bid on Department of Transportation (Department) construction projects in excess of $250,000. It was incorporated in 1951 and maintains a home office in Chiefland, Florida. White was the successful bidder on three projects that are included within the Department's Seminole Expressway Project in Seminole County which is being funded and supervised by the Department's Turnpike Office. The projects are three contiguous segments and are identified as State Project Nos. 97770-3304, 97770-3305 and 97770-3306. The Seminole Expressway Project consists of twelve separate projects. HNTB Corporation is the Department's Resident Engineer for Project Nos. 97770-3304 and 97770-3306 and maintains an office at 2927 US 17-92 in Sanford. ICF Kaiser Engineers is the Resident Engineer for Project No. 97770-3305 and maintains an office in a trailer at the job site. The Resident Engineers are the main liaison between White and the Department on the Project. The Department's Turnpike Office maintains a local office at 112 Beider Avenue in Casselberry. The Resident Engineers are supervised from that location by Mr. Gary Geddes, the Department's Program Manager, in conjunction with Mr. Ray Daniel, an Area Engineer who is employed by Post, Buckley, Schuh and Jernigan, which is under contract with the Department. The Resident Engineers, though employed by private consultants, serve as the Department's representatives and are delegated the title of Engineer of the Project for the Department. On July 30, 1993, the Department issued notices of intent to suspend White's certificate of qualification because of alleged delinquencies in White's performance on State Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306. The Department's notices of intent to suspend were received by White at its Chiefland offices on August 3, 1993. Each notice contained the following language: Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-23 and in accordance with this determination, we intend to suspend your Certificate of Qualification and those of your affiliates. This suspension will become conclusive final agency action unless you request an Administrative Hearing within ten (10) days of receipt of this notice. Your request for a hearing shall be in writing and shall be filed with the Clerk of Agency Proceedings, Mail Station 58, Haydon Burns Building, 605 Suwanee Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 within ten days of receipt of this notice. A copy of the request for hearing shall also be provided to the State Construction Engineer, Mail Station 31, Haydon Burns Building, 605 Suwanee Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450. The request for hearing shall include: The name and address of the party making the request; A statement that the party is requesting a formal or informal proceeding; and All specific facts and circumstances which the Contractor believes legally excuses the unsatisfactory progress on the project. A request for hearing is filed when it is delivered to and received by the Clerk of Agency Proceedings. If a hearing is timely requested after the receipt of the notice of the intent, the hearing shall be held within 30 days after receipt by the Hearing Officer of the request for hearing in accordance with 337.16 of the Florida Statutes. In addition to a request for an Administrative Hearing and in accordance with Article 8-8.2 of the Special Provisions of this project, you are hereby given opportunity to request an extension of allowable contract time in an amount of cause progress on this contract to be acceptable or to submit other information to show that progress of work is not delinquent. (Petitioner's Exhibit #7, emphasis added) White forwarded the two Notices of Intent to its attorneys, Cummings, Lawrence and Vezina, P.A. On August 11, White's attorneys sent to Mr. Burney Keen of White Construction, via Federal Express Priority Morning Delivery, a package containing originals and copies of requests for formal hearing and for contract time extensions for both projects, with written instructions to have the requests executed and delivered to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings and James Lairscey, via Federal Express, and to hand deliver copies to the Project Engineers no later than August 13. The package from White's attorneys did not arrive at White's offices until late in the afternoon on August 12, when Mr. Keen was no longer in the office. Mr. Keen did not receive the package from White's counsel until the morning of August 13. Notwithstanding the Priority Delivery designation, Federal Express delivery to White's Chiefland office occurred between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. Mr. Keen instructed his secretary, Patti Cook, to have the documents executed by an officer of White, and to have them hand-delivered to the Department's Resident Engineers and delivered to the Department's Tallahassee offices by Federal Express, in accordance with counsel's instructions. On Friday afternoon, August 13, 1993, White hand-delivered its request for hearing, along with its requests for contract time extension, to the Department's two Resident Engineers. On that same day, White sent out a package containing copies of these documents by Federal Express addressed to Mr. J. Lairscey, 605 Suwanee Street, MS 58, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. Mr. Keen and Ms. Cook both believed that J. Lairscey was the Clerk of Agency Proceedings. This is not surprising since at his deposition, J. Lairscey, who is the State Construction Engineer for the Department, did not know who the Clerk of Agency Proceedings was either. Standard operating procedure for the Project established by the Department at the preconstruction conference required that all correspondence from White be sent to the Department's Resident Engineers. Mr. Keen believed it to be of utmost importance to timely hand-deliver the requests for formal hearing to the Department's Resident Engineers. Although White had filed notices or requests with the Department Clerk in the past, this was Mr. Keen's first experience with the delinquency filing procedures. The package arrived at the Department's offices in Tallahassee on Saturday, August 14, 1993, and was delivered to Mr. Lairscey's office, MS 31, and not MS 58 (which is the Clerk of Agency Proceedings' Mail Station and office) on the morning of August 16, 1994. The package delivered to ICF Kaiser contained an original letter from White addressed to Michael Landry, which requested an extension of time on Project No. 97770-3305 and referred to an enclosed request for hearing. The package also contained an original letter addressed to: Clerk of Agency Proceedings, 605 Suwanee Street, MS 58, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. The letter to the Clerk requested a formal hearing in response to the Department's July 30th Notice of Intent and referred to three large appendices which were enclosed. Upon its receipt on August 13, 1993, a secretary and the office engineer at ICF Kaiser's office recognized that they received misdirected originals of important legal documents. The office engineer and secretary telephoned Ray Daniel, the Department's Area Engineer, at the Department's office in Casselberry and told him that they had received from White what looked like an original legal document, which they did not think they were supposed to have. They questioned whether the documents should be redirected to the Department. Mr. Daniel instructed them not to send the documents to him. Mr. Daniel knew that requests for hearing should be sent to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings in Tallahassee, but was not sure that a mistake was made and took no action regarding the request for hearing. The documents were filed away at ICF Kaiser until August 27, 1993, when Michael Landry followed up an inquiry from Ray Daniel and had the originals forwarded to the Turnpike's Casselberry office. The package delivered to HNTB Corporation also on August 13 contained an original letter from White addressed to Ralph Burrington which requested an extension of time on Project No. 97770-3306 and referred to an enclosed request for hearing. Like its counterpart, this package also contained an original letter addressed to: Clerk of Agency Proceedings, 605 Suwanee Street, MS 58, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. The letter to the Clerk requested a formal hearing in response to the Department's July 30th Notice of Intent and referred to three large appendices which were enclosed. The Resident Engineer at HNTB, Mr. Ralph Burrington, did not note that the documents were originals and filed them away. Mr. Burrington's normal procedure is to forward such documentation by facsimile to the Department's Casselberry office, but in this instance he feels he made a mistake. The package delivered to the Department's Tallahassee offices on Saturday, August 14, 1993, contained one signed photocopy of the requests for formal hearing for Project No. 97770-3305 addressed to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings, unsigned copies of the requests for formal hearing in Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306 addressed to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings, as well as copies of the request for time extension for Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306 and appendices. The documents were received by J. Lairscey on Monday, August 16, 1993, and were filed away until they were inspected on August 27, 1993, as a result of an inquiry by Ava Parker, a Department attorney. Sometime before August 27, 1993, Ava Parker, as a result of an inquiry from Gary Geddes, the Department's Program Manager, began to investigate whether White had filed its requests for hearing. Ms. Parker first checked with the Clerk of Agency Proceedings and was informed that nothing had been filed at that location. Ms. Parker then contacted Charles Peterson, the Department's Area Construction Engineer, to discern whether White had filed a request for hearing. Mr. Peterson searched his files and the Department's central files; he questioned various people in the Department's Tallahassee office and telephoned Ray Daniel in the Department's Casselberry office. Ray Daniel told Mr. Peterson that he had no knowledge concerning White's requests for hearing and no idea where they were. Mr. Daniel in fact knew at that time that White had delivered its requests for hearings to both Resident Engineers on August 13, based upon previous conversations with the Department's Resident Engineers and office staff. Mr. Peterson later discovered from Jimmy Lairscey that Mr. Lairscey had received the requests for hearing but they had been filed away. On Friday, August 27, 1993, Joe Lawrence, counsel for White, telephoned Ava Parker to discuss consolidation of the hearings and discovery. Ms. Parker advised White's counsel that no requests for hearing had been filed with the Clerk in response to the two Notices of Intent. Ms. Parker knew prior to her conversation with counsel for White that the requests had not been filed with the Clerk of Agency Proceedings, yet made no attempt to contact White or its counsel to notify them that the Clerk had not received the request. On Monday, August 30, 1993, copies of the requests for hearing were delivered to the Department's Tallahassee offices from counsel for White, via Federal Express addressed to Ava Parker and Clerk of Agency Proceedings, Florida Department of Transportation, 605 Suwanee Street, MS 58, Haydon Burns Building, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450. The documents were received by Ms. Parker who delivered the requests for hearing to the Clerk and they were stamped in by the Clerk of Agency Proceedings on that same date. The Clerk of Agency Proceedings' function is to docket and maintain a record of documents and to send a copy of any requests for hearing in contractor suspension cases to the legal section and to Jimmy Lairscey. The Department's standard procedure after receipt of requests for hearing and contract time extension is to have the documents reviewed by Jimmy Lairscey and the Project Resident Engineer to determine whether the time extension should be granted. The legal section then determines whether to send the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Department's purpose in soliciting a request for contract time extension in conjunction with its Notice of Intent to Suspend is to afford the contractor the opportunity to cure the delinquency. The Department, prior to taking action on the request for hearing, reviews the time extension request to determine whether it may obviate the need for further delinquency proceedings. The Department's Resident Engineers are primarily responsible for evaluating and making recommendations concerning time extension requests. It is generally after the Department makes a determination concerning the appropriateness of the request for contract time that it proceeds to act upon the request for hearing. The Department did not deny White's request for contract time extension until August 30, 1993, the same date that White's requests for hearing were docketed in by the Clerk. The Department's review, analysis and decision can take up to five months. The delay in docketing the requests for hearing did not, therefore, delay the process. There was no prejudice to the Department by White's delivery of its requests for hearing to the Department's Resident Engineers on August 13, 1993, rather than to the Clerk of Agency Proceedings. There was no harm to the Department by Jimmy Lairscey's receipt of White's requests for hearing on Monday August 16, 1993, rather than the Clerk receiving it on Friday, August 13, 1993. The Department was aware, prior to and on August 13, 1993, that White disputed the Department's determination of delinquency on State Project Nos. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306. The Department expected White to file requests for formal hearing challenging the Department's determination of delinquency on State Project No. 97770-3305 and 97770-3306. White had verbally notified the Department prior to August 13 that it was challenging the delinquency notices. No evidence established any prejudice or harm to the Department from the Clerk's receipt of White's requests for hearing on August 30, 1993 rather than August 13, 1993. White will be severely prejudiced if not afforded a hearing, and therefore automatically declared delinquent, because it will be precluded from bidding and acquiring much needed additional work. White's work is primarily for the Department, in all phases of highway construction. At the time of hearing White had Department contracts of approximately $100 million, which contracts carry over a several year period, and it employed approximately 500 people. No culpability or blame can be ascribed to either party in the series of gaffes surrounding the filing of White's requests for hearing. Mr. Keen, a novice to the process, thought he was doing the right thing by assuring timely filing with the Resident Engineers, who had always received other correspondence related to the Project. Mr. Daniel, who was immediately informed that the original documents were filed in the wrong place, did nothing to correct the error, but neither did he deliberately frustrate the process (as argued by White) since the message he received about some original legal documents was ambiguous. Mr. Lairscey had no idea that his packet was intended for the Agency Clerk; moreover, he had no idea who the agency clerk was. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any more than mere inconvenience to the Department, it is patently unfair to deny White its hearing on the merits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED that the Department enter its final order granting a formal hearing to White Construction Co., Inc. on the substantive issue of whether it should lose its qualification to bid. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. - 4. Adopted in substance in paragraph 2; otherwise rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 10; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 30. Adopted in paragraph 4. Except as to the conclusion that the notice was not filed with the clerk on August 13, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence, considering the testimony of Keen in its entirety. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 5, 8, 9, 10 and 12. Rejected as argument and conjective unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 5. Adopted in part in paragraphs 6-9, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 9; otherwise rejected as statement of testimony or unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. 16.-18. Adopted in paragraphs 14 and 19; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 21. Adopted in substance in paragraph 22. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 18. Adopted in substance in paragraph 20. Adopted in part in paragraphs 23-26; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 27 and 29. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 27.-28. Adopted in part in paragraph 36; otherwise rejected as argument or unnecessary. White clearly proved it will be severely prejudiced, even if it is not "put out of business". 29. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence (as to prejudice to the agency). 30.-31. Rejected as unnecessary. 32. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence; more commonly, the agency rules on the extension request first. Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraph 13. Adopted in paragraph 14. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in substance in paragraph 17. Rejected as unnecessary. 19. Adopted in paragraph 18. 20. Adopted in paragraph 19. 21.-22. Adopted in substance in paragraph 20. 23. Adopted in paragraph 21. 24. Adopted in paragraph 22. 25. Adopted in paragraph 23. 26. Adopted in paragraph 24. 27. Adopted in substance in paragraph 25. 28. Adopted in paragraph 26. 29. Adopted in paragraph 27. 30. Adopted in paragraph 28. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 29. Adopted in part in paragraph 30; otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence (as to being a "paper shuffler"). 34.-38. Adopted in paragraph 31. 39.-40. Adopted in paragraph 32. 41.-42. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in paragraph 34. Adopted in paragraph 35. Adopted in paragraph 36, except that the implication that the company will absolutely go out of business is rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Cummings, Lawrence and Vezina, P.A. 1600 S.E. 17th Street, Suite 304 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission was the state agency responsible for the training and certification or law enforcement and corrections officers in Florida. Respondent was certified as a Corrections Officer under certificate No. 48891 on August 8, 1991. On June 29, 1994, Respondent was employed as a Corrections Officer I at the Hillsborough Corrections Institute in Tampa and had been so employed for approximately three and a half years. On that day, officer Ricardo Sementilli, a policeman with the Tampa Police Department's narcotics bureau, with approximately six and a half years experience in law enforcement, was targeting a house in Carver City, a Tampa housing area, for suspected unlawful narcotics activity. In the course of his investigation, Officer Sementilli was using the services of a confidential informant, Penny DuFour. Ms. DuFour, herself a former drug user, had been working as an informant for the police in general and for Officer Sementilli in particular for almost two years. On this evening, he proposed to have Ms. DuFour make a controlled purchase of illegal drugs at this particular residence. As preparation for the controlled buy, Ms. DuFour was searched by Officer Keene, also of the Tampa Police Department, to insure that she did not have any narcotics or other contraband in her possession. None was found during this search which is a normal procedure of the Tampa Police Department as a part of a controlled purchase by a confidential informant. Officer Keene was assigned to the Police Department's Tactical Division in narcotics enforcement and had worked in that division for approximately five years. She was working with Sementilli on this operation because he was well known and she was unknown in the geographic area in which the buy was to be made. Pursuant to the officers' plan, Officer Sementilli drove Ms. DuFour and Officer Keene to the intersection of Laurel and Manhattan Streets in Carver City. At this point, Keene, who had binoculars with her, hid out of sight behind a wall at Jefferson High School in a position where she could see Ms. DuFour. When Keene was in place, DuFour was sent out from the police vehicle to approach the residence in question. Keene was able to keep DuFour in sight the entire time using the binoculars. As DuFour approached the residence in question, a red compact car, occupied by Mr. Sampson and the Respondent, drove up. Both DuFour and Keene indicated Mr. Sampson was in the passenger seat and Respondent, who was dressed in a law enforcement uniform, was driving. DuFour went up to the vehicle and leaned in the passenger window. She asked Mr. Sampson if he was "straight." By this she meant to ask if he had any narcotics on his possession. In response, Sampson said he did, reached under the passenger seat of the car, and pulled out a plastic baggie in which were several pieces of what appeared to be cocaine. He placed the baggie in his lap and from it extracted a small piece of the substance which he gave to DuFour in exchange for $20.00 in U.S. currency which DuFour had been given by Officer Sementilli. All during this time, the baggie was in plain view on Sampson's lap and Respondent could see what was happening. She was either looking at Sampson or looking out the window, and Ms. DuFour was of the opinion that Respondent was fully aware of what was going on though she did not say anything. It is so found. After she received the substance from Sampson and paid him for it, DuFour left the vehicle and returned to where Officer Keene was located without either stopping or speaking with anyone on the way. When she got to Keene, she handed over the substance she had received from Sampson and was searched to insure she had not hidden any additional contraband on her person. She had not. Sementilli performed a field test of the substance at the scene. The test indicated the substance DuFour had received from Sampson in the presence of the Respondent was cocaine. This tentative identification was subsequently confirmed by a laboratory analysis conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. No issue was raised as to chain of custody of the sample in question or as to its identification as cocaine. At the time the sale took place from Sampson to DuFour, the officers obtained the license tag number on the vehicle being driven by Respondent and from which Sampson made the sale. A subsequent check with the Department of Motor Vehicles revealed that the vehicle was owned by Louis Sales, Respondent's father. Approximately one month after the sale described above, the car was discovered at the home belonging to Mr. Sampson's mother. As the officers were attempting to impound the vehicle, Respondent approached them. Keene at that time identified Respondent as the driver of the vehicle at the time of the sale in issue here and placed her under arrest. However, criminal charges were not preferred against her. At hearing, Respondent indicated that on the day of the alleged sale, she had been driven to work in her father's car by her boyfriend, Mr. Sampson, who was without his own vehicle at the time. While at work, she was interrogated by facility investigators relative to an allegation that she was introducing contraband into the corrections facility. Because this upset her, she asked for and was give permission to leave work early, approximately 5:30 PM. She then contacted Mr. Sampson who picked her up in her vehicle at approximately 7:00 PM that evening. When Sampson and Respondent left the corrections facility, they drove to Carver City because Sampson said he had to run an errand in the area. At that time Carver City, located some 45 minutes from Plant City, where Respondent lived, was known as an area of high drug activity. It was not uncommon for many drug dealers to be operating on the streets of the community. Respondent knew that Mr. Sampson was a drug dealer. He would sometime sell drugs openly in front of her. She had been present on several other occasions when DuFour had purchased cocaine from Mr. Sampson. At the time she met Mr. Sampson, in December, 1993, notwithstanding she denied it, Respondent knew he had just recently been released from prison because he told her so. He had been convicted of escape and grand theft. Nonetheless, they developed a relationship during the course of which she admittedly began to suspect he was dealing drugs. She did not ask him if this was so, however, even though she knew that her knowing association with a drug dealer could place her certification in jeopardy. When she became convinced that Sampson was dealing drugs, Respondent still did not terminate the relationship, however, claiming she was afraid to do so. When she was arrested as a result of the instant sale, however, she finally broke off the relationship. As a result of the controlled buy in issue, Mr. Sampson was convicted of sale of cocaine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Sydell T. Sales, be found guilty of demonstrating less than good moral character, and that her certification as a corrections officer be placed on probation for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Miriam L. Sumpter, Esquire 2700 North MacDill Avenue Suite 208 Tampa, Florida 33607 A. Leon Lowry, II Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
