The Issue The issue for determination in these proceedings is whether the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, should discipline the Respondent, Warren Scott Jackman, under Section 633.351(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990), on an Administrative Complaint charging that he has pled nolo contendere to a felony charge.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Respondent has been certified as a firefighter, certificate #44701. On or about March 7, 1990, a two-count criminal information was filed against the Respondent in Case No. CF-90-0604 charging the Respondent with two counts of committing a lewd act in the presence of a child. The information alleged that, on two occasions, the Respondent did handle, fondle or make an assault in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner or knowingly commit a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a sixteen year old girl in that he did allow, permit or engage her to fondle, touch or rub his penis, but without committing sexual battery. On or about August 24, 1990, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges. Adjudication was withheld, but the Respondent was sentenced to one year of community control, followed by four years probation for each count, to be served concurrently.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance, enter a final order revoking the certification of the Respondent, Warren Scott Jackman, as a firefighter. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1989), the following rulings are made on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact (the Respondent not having filed any): Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Accepted and incorporated. 2.-3. Rejected, as stated, as contrary to facts found and the greater weight of the evidence. (The Respondent, not the Petitioner, was charged and entered the plea.) 4. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services Room 412, Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Warren Scott Jackman 1569 Churchill Court Lakeland, Florida 33801 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer, Insurance Commissioner and Fire Marshall The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact 13. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 11, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 5, 2009, the 2"4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 11, 2009 and the 3 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on October 30, 2009, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief F inancial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Orders of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-036-D1, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On February 11, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 2. On February 11, 2009, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On March 5, 2009, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $196,980.30 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 4. On March 16, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On March 11, 2009, the Department issued a 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $50,968.94 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. . 6. On March 26, 2009, the 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 7. The Employer requested a formal hearing on April 6, 2009. A copy of the Request for Hearing is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 8. On April 21, 2009, the request for formal hearing was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge. The matter was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros and given case number 09-2138. 9. On October 30, 2009, the Department issued a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $10,179.61 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 10. On October 30, 2009, the 3™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served on legal counsel for BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the 3" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit E” and incorporated herein by reference. 11. On November 9, 2009, BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. A copy of the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference. 12. On November 12, 2009, an Order Closing File was entered. The Order Closing File relinquished jurisdiction to the Department. A copy of the Order Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit G” and incorporated herein by reference.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondent should pay the administrative penalty, investigative costs, and attorney's fees, and undertake the corrective actions that are demanded by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection ("Department") in its Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (“NOV”).
Findings Of Fact The Department is the administrative agency of the state of Florida with the power and duty to protect Florida's air and water resources and to administer and enforce the provisions of chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder in Florida Administrative Code Title 62. Joshua Putnam is a natural person who is currently incarcerated in the Columbia County Correctional Institution. Mr. Putnam has been incarcerated since February 16, 2012, for the theft of diesel fuel. On or about January 20, 2012, Mr. Putnam discharged 25 to 50 gallons of diesel fuel onto the ground in the backyard of a residence located at 433 Lena Street, St. Augustine, Florida (“the property”). The discharge resulted in “contamination,” as defined in rule 62-780.200(9). Mr. Putnam has not initiated a site assessment or remediated the contamination. The property is owned by Tammy Putnam. She and the Department entered into a Consent Order. The Consent Order was not filed with DOAH, but it is reasonable to assume that the Consent Order addresses assessment and remediation of the contamination on her property. The Department states that it provided Mr. Putnam an opportunity to demonstrate that he is financially unable to assess and remediate the contamination, but the Department did not receive all the documentation it requested from Mr. Putnam. Mr. Putnam has not been employed for six or seven years and is currently unable to pay to clean up the contamination or to pay the administrative penalties. Mr. Putnam admitted liability and expressed his intent to remedy the situation as soon as he is released from prison. His current release date is May 5, 2015. While investigating this matter, the Department incurred $1,000 in costs.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 by committing unlawful employment practice (discrimination) on the basis of Petitioner's sex (female), National Origin (Hispanic), handicap when it terminated Petitioner from employment, or on the basis of sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact As noted above in the Preliminary Statement, the parties have entered into an Agreement of Settlement and Mutual and General Release. Their agreement, in pertinent part, includes the following: "DM, on the one hand, and JBF (under the name Joe Blasco Cosmetics), on the other hand, are parties to proceeding which took place before the State of Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, in Case No. 01- 2328, on about June 28, 2001, with respect to DM's claims of discrimination against JBE (the"Action"). Each of the parties hereto considers it to be in its best interest, and to its advantage, forever to settle, adjust, and comprise all claims and defenses which have been, or could have been, asserted in connection with the employment relationship, the Action, and/or in an other action or proceeding arising out of any employment or other relationship between the parties hereto. The terms of this Agreement are contractual, not a mere recital, and this Agreement is the result of negotiation between the parties, each of whom has participated in the drafting hereof, through each of the parties' respective attorneys. Diana Morales shall dismiss with prejudice Case No. 01-2328 pending before the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings. Diana Morales agrees to execute and file any and all documents necessary to dismiss her claim and advise any and all documents necessary to dismiss her claim and advise any investigative bodies, administrative bodies and/or courts that she has withdrawn, dismissed and resolved any and all claims with Joe Blasco Cosmetics, Joe Blasco Enterprises and/or Joe Blasco." The parties' stipulated settlement agreement constitutes an informal disposition of all issues in this proceeding.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the allegations in the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Petitioner. On the evening of July 13, 2010, the Respondent was observed driving erratically by Deputy Mark Buswell, an officer of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office. After observing the Respondent driving for a distance, Deputy Buswell executed a traffic stop, at which time he smelled the odor of alcohol on the Respondent. In response to Deputy Buswell's inquiry, the Respondent denied having consumed alcohol. Deputy Buswell asked the Respondent to step out of the truck and observed that the Respondent was unsteady on his feet and swaying. Deputy Buswell then administered a series of sobriety tests to the Respondent. Based on his observations, and his training and experience as a law enforcement officer, Deputy Buswell believed that the Respondent had been driving under the influence of alcohol. Deputy Buswell arrested the Respondent for DUI, a violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes (2010).1/ After the arrest, Deputy Buswell twice asked the Respondent to submit to a breath alcohol test, and, on both occasions, the Respondent declined to take the test. The Respondent had previously been arrested for DUI.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order permanently revoking the certification of Derek C. Floyd as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2012.
The Issue Whether respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: This discrimination case involves an allegation by petitioner, David Coleman, that he was denied employment by respondent, City of Jacksonville (City), because of his handicap. The City denies this allegation. A preliminary investigation by the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no probable cause that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. By way of background, petitioner has been employed by the City on four separate occasions, the last time as an employee in the mosquito control department in 1984. He was "released" the same year for "unacceptable leave." Since 1990, he has applied for at least twenty separate positions with the City. In conjunction with those and earlier efforts to obtain a job with the City, he has filed several job applications, including one in December 1987 and another in June 1992. Such applications are valid for a period of two years after they are signed and filed with the City. Therefore, if petitioner applied for a position with the City in March 1991, he did not have a valid job application on file. The petition for relief filed by Coleman describes the unlawful employment practice allegedly committed by the City as follows: unlawful hired or employment practice: with veteran preference that I have, and a handicap, which is alleged. The petition for relief does not describe the handicap. At hearing, however, petitioner contended he suffers from paranoia schizophrenia. Petitioner says that he applied for a job as a "traffic checker" with the City's engineering department in March 1991. City records reveal, however, that it has no such position called "traffic checker," and thus it hired no one for that job in 1991. It does have a position called "parking enforcement specialist," but since no description of the functions of that job is of record, it is unknown if the two positions are the same. Even so, City records do not show that petitioner made application for that position in March 1991. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, petitioner says that he interviewed for the position with an unidentified "supervisor," and he was told to prepare a resume, which he later gave to the interviewer's secretary. Thereafter, he made inquiry with the City's affirmative action office and learned that a veteran, not disabled, had been hired to fill the slot. Petitioner then brought this action charging the City with an unlawful employment practice. It is noted he has subsequently filed a second discrimination claim pertaining to another job application with the City. At hearing, petitioner contended that he suffers from paranoia schizophrenia. Other than his own assertion, however, no evidence was produced to confirm this disability, and as to this issue it is found that insufficient credible evidence exists to support a finding in petitioner's favor. The City admits that in one of petitioner's job applications filed with the City, petitioner attached a copy of a DD214 form reflecting that he was honorably discharged from the military. Also, the City acknowledges that in one of the applications is found a statement that petitioner had a 30 percent service related disability but the type of disability is not described. Whether the service related disability was still valid in March 1991 is not of record. Finally, petitioner's exhibit 1 is a copy of what purports to be a "statement of patient's treatment" from a VA outpatient clinic prepared in February 1985, but this document is hearsay, and in any event, is so dated as to have no probative value in this case. The more credible evidence shows that petitioner did not apply for the position of "traffic checker" or parking enforcement specialist in 1991. Moreover, petitioner had no valid application on file at that time, and there is no credible evidence as to who, if anyone, was hired to fill the position or what were the qualifications of the person hired. Even if one assumes an application was filed, the record is silent as to why petitioner's application may have been denied or, assuming he had a handicap, whether he could adequately perform the essential functions of the job. Given these considerations, and the lack of evidence to establish that petitioner is disabled with a handicap, it is found that the City did not commit an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5926 Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, subordinate, not supported by the evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commissioin Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Mr. David Coleman 1071 Ontario Street Jacksonville, FL 32205 Brian M. Flaherty, Esquire 600 City Hall 220 East Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner Amber Renae Baker has met her burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling her to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Amber Renae Baker was born on November 25, 1963. At the time of her conviction, she was 43 years of age. On March 28, 2006, Petitioner was charged with racketeering, in violation of Section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes, relating to her participation in her brother's escort service, which was in fact an organized prostitution ring. On April 16-20, 2007, Petitioner was tried before a jury in Escambia County, Florida, on one count of racketeering. She stood trial along with her brother, Dallas Baker, who was tried on a count of racketeering and for procuring a person under the age of eighteen for prostitution, and her mother, Mary Helen Baker, who was tried for racketeering as well. During the trial, Petitioner made a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State did not produce evidence that Petitioner knowingly participated in a pattern of racketeering activity, to wit: that the State of Florida did not produce any evidence that Petitioner knew that any of the women hired by her brother to provide escort services (a legal activity) was also providing prostitution services. Petitioner further argued that the State did not produce sufficient evidence that Petitioner intended to assist in perpetuating anything more than an escort service. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury convicted all three defendants on all charges. Petitioner was sentenced to thirty-four and one-half months of imprisonment. On September 22, 2008, the First District Court of Appeal issued an Opinion reversing the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal. Baker v. State of Florida, 990 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The District Court found, as a matter of law, that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that she agreed to secure another person for prostitution or otherwise violated Section 769.07, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was released from incarceration on October 9, 2008. By the time she was released, Petitioner had been incarcerated for 540 days. Petitioner has never been convicted of any other felony in any jurisdiction. From 1995 through at least 2005, Petitioner answered the telephone for her brother's escort service from 1:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. seven days a week, arranging dates for the callers with the women who worked for her brother. When a call came in, she would describe the different girls that were available by height, weight, hair color, and bra cup size. Then Petitioner would call the woman in whom the caller expressed interest and give her the customer's phone number. The woman would decide if she wanted to go. Petitioner quoted to the customer, as she describes the men who called to hire a woman, the price of $150 to $200 per hour. During the "date," Petitioner would call the woman every hour to ask her if she was alright. After the "date," the woman would bring the money to Petitioner at her brother's trailer where she lived and answered the telephone. She knew that each of the women who worked for her brother had and was required to have a "dance card," which is the slang term for an occupational license for an exotic dancer. Petitioner contends that she did not know that her brother, with her help and her mother's help, was operating a prostitution ring. She contends that she believed that the women were simply going on dinner dates and were being paid by the customer $150 to $200 per hour to accompany a man who was also paying for dinner. She contends that she also thought that sometimes the women were hired for topless dancing or to attend a bachelor party, which meant charging the customer for four hours. Petitioner did not testify at her criminal trial on the advice of her lawyer and of her co-defendant brother. Because she did not testify, the State was not able to offer two documents into evidence. Those documents are a letter she wrote to her mother before her arrest and the transcript of an interview of her after she was arrested. The typewritten letter is undated and was confiscated from her home by the police when they executed a search warrant upon arresting her. In the letter she complains bitterly about her mother not loving her as much as she loved Petitioner's brother. Primarily, though, she complains bitterly that she has worked in the business for years without being paid even minimum wage. The letter also contains the following statements: (1) "And you have never cared that I could lose my kids because of this business. . . ." and (2) ". . . but I am gonna [sic] be left in the dirt as usual answering phones that could cause me to lose my kids. " Those statements are contrary to Petitioner's position in this proceeding that she did not know she was answering the phones and scheduling appointments for prostitution. There would be no danger of having her children removed from her custody for working in a legitimate business answering telephones and scheduling appointments. Further, photographs admitted in evidence show the condition of the trailer where Petitioner lived with her children. The conditions are deplorable and clearly unsafe. Although not obvious in the photographs, Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she allowed dog feces to remain in the trailer without removing them. Yet, she does not appear to have been worried that her children would be removed from her custody for unsafe living conditions, only for her answering the telephone for the business. The recorded and transcribed interview of Petitioner was conducted on March 27, 2006, after her arrest. The following questions and answers are relevant to this inquiry: Q. Did girls ever try to talk about sex with you? People having sex or people wanting some weird things? A. They, a couple of them would try to start talking about some weird things and I would say, I don't want to hear it. Q. What kind of weird things? A. I don't know, like walking on hot dogs. (Laughing) Q. Walking on hot dogs? Were girls allowed to talk to you about, I mean, if a girl tried to talk to you about sex what would you do? A. I would just tell them I don't want to hear about it. * * * Q. Okay. Do you believe the girls were having sex for money? Did you have a pretty good idea they were having sex for money? A. Well, I guess that's what everybody assumes. Q. Did you assume it? A. No Audible Answer. Q. Is that a 'yes' A. Um, what else can you assume? * * * Q. Really? Okay. Is there anything that you can think about that you can tell me why you would believe or what would make you think that Dallas knew the girls were having sex for money? A. I don't know. I, that's the way it's done on t.v. Q. What's, what's how it's done on t.v.? A. Services. Q. That are involved in prostitution? A. I was hoping he wasn't doing it. Q. Really? Did you feel he was? A. I guess. Q. Yes? A. I said I guess. * * * Q. . . . can you think of any conversations you and your mother had about customers or the things they liked or anything like that? A. No, just made jokes about the hot dog thing. We thought that was funny. Q. Really? What did, what did, what did he want her to do after she walked on the hot dogs? A. Let him eat them from between her toes. * * * Q. Men with feet fetishes? Never heard nothing like that? A. I don't know, they would call and ask for somebody with pretty feet sometimes. Petitioner, who professes to have had "a little bit of college," may well have avoided direct conversation regarding the real services offered by her brother's "escort service," but it is evident by her statements both in the letter she wrote to her mother and in her transcribed interview that she in fact knew that sex was involved in the "dates" she arranged and that she was at risk answering the telephones because she was participating in an illegal activity. Petitioner contends that she was an unwilling participant in her brother's business and that she was coerced into answering the telephone for the business because her brother emotionally and physically abused her and threatened her with harm. Petitioner takes two approaches in supporting her position that she was coerced by her brother into answering the telephone. First, Petitioner testified in this proceeding that her brother abused her when she was a child by calling her names and years later by beating her. Interestingly, her letter to her mother describes her brother as a "lying, back stabbing, whore hopping, white trash dog. . . ." It appears that name- calling was not a one-way street in Petitioner's family. Similarly, in her recorded interview she explained that her brother "always beat her up," but then admitted the last time was 16 years earlier. She also explained that when he had recently started cussing at her, she "told him to go to hell." The dynamic between Petitioner and her brother does not suggest duress or coercion, as Petitioner alleges. Petitioner's other approach to proving duress in this proceeding (rather than in the criminal proceeding where it can constitute an affirmative defense) is by the affidavits admitted in evidence by stipulation of the parties. One affidavit is that of Petitioner, which alleges her brother continuously beat and threatened her, a version not consistent with her testimony at the evidentiary hearing in this cause. The other affidavit is from a psychologist with solid credentials who saw Petitioner twice after her release from prison. Petitioner's attorney referred her to him for a psychological evaluation. The affidavit is accompanied by the psychologist's report. Although the evaluation showed Petitioner to have "significant emotional problems," it was clear to the psychologist that Petitioner exaggerated her symptoms for the benefit of the evaluation, and her test profiles were, therefore, only marginally valid. Even with his awareness that Petitioner was not an accurate reporter as evidenced by his several references to Petitioner's obvious attempt to influence the evaluation, the psychologist opined that Petitioner needs extended treatment and medication. There is no evidence that Petitioner has followed his recommendations. The holding in Dixon v. United States, 548 U. S. 1 (2006), makes it clear that duress is an affirmative defense and that to invoke it, a defendant must admit the crime and then affirmatively prove that the defendant was coerced by threatened unlawful and imminent harm to commit the crime. In this proceeding, Petitioner argues, inconsistently, that she did not commit a crime and that she was forced to repeatedly perform the act which constituted the crime, i.e., arranging "dates" between customers and prostitutes over a period of approximately ten years. Petitioner does not make a credible witness. Her varying explanations given at different times to different persons undermine her credibility. The purpose of this proceeding is not to determine whether Petitioner is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of racketeering by participating in a prostitution ring, the determination that was made in her criminal trial and the test before the appellate court which overturned her conviction. Rather, in this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for her wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that she committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for her conviction and incarceration and that she did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice or accessory to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, she must prove her actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. A review of the appellate court opinion overturning Petitioner's conviction reveals that the State presented insufficient evidence that Petitioner knew of the unlawful nature of the "dates" she arranged. It is appropriate, therefore, that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. However, the inability or failure of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of the act or offense that served as the basis for the conviction and sentence and does not prove that she did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice or accessory to a person who committed the act or offense. The evidence which the State was prevented from offering at her trial by her decision not to testify-- Petitioner's letter to her mother and her statements during her recorded interview--and which, therefore, was not before the appellate court conflicts with Petitioner's testimony that she is innocent. That evidence is not verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's actual innocence, which is the quality of evidence the Statute requires in this proceeding. Further, Petitioner's statements to the psychologist and his conclusions regarding her mental health are not verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's actual innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying her guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of her innocence. Petitioner argues that since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” the definition should be the one found in Black's Law Dictionary. Petitioner's argument is not persuasive. The statutory scheme under which Petitioner seeks monetary compensation in this proceeding requires more than meeting a definition in a dictionary; it requires a certain quality and quantity of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence as did the appellate court when it reversed Petitioner's conviction and as does Black's Law Dictionary. Rather, the Statute seeks a determination of the factual sufficiency of the evidence by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. Based upon the evidence before the trial court, the appellate court found insufficient evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Based upon the evidence in this proceeding, including evidence not presented to the jury in Petitioner's criminal trial and, therefore, not reviewed by the appellate court, there is no verifiable and substantial evidence proving that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that she is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing her Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Nickolas P. Geeker Escambia County Circuit Judge M.C. Blanchard Judicial Building 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32502 Ernie Lee Magaha, Clerk of Court Escambia County M.C. Blanchard Judicial Building 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32502 Keith W. Weidner, Esquire Taylor, Warren & Weidner, P.A. 1823 North 9th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32503-5270 Russell Graham Edgar, Jr., Esquire State Attorney's Office Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32575-2726
