The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2010), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department?s Case Respondent is a certified corrections officer in the State of Florida, to whom Petitioner has issued certificate number 249713. On or about April 9, 2011, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Officer George Dodson of the Cottondale Police Department responded to a disturbance call at the Cottondale Villas at 3111 Willow Street in Cottondale, Florida. Officer Dodson found a group of people in the parking lot, including Respondent. There was a large amount of blood on the ground. Ms. Bradie had a cut on her hand that was wrapped in a cloth, and denied knowing how her hand was cut. Officer Dodson spoke to several people at the location, and the consensus was that Ms. Bradie had cut Mr. Marques White with a box cutter. None of the people with whom he spoke testified at hearing. No box cutters were found at the scene. Mr. White was not present at the scene. He returned at approximately 4:00 a.m., but was still bleeding and could not really speak. Officer Dodson did not take statements from anyone at the scene because, other than Ms. Bradie, all of them appeared to be intoxicated. He did recall Ms. Bradie saying she was struck in the face, but does not recall her face being swollen. The next day, Officer Dodson learned that Mr. White had returned to the hospital because of his injuries, which were serious. Pictures taken of Mr. White show a scar on his lip and arm, and a scar resulting from the performance of a tracheotomy. However, there is no evidence to indicate whether Mr. White had any of these scars prior to the incident, or that all of the injuries evidenced by the scars occurred as a result of Respondent?s actions. Officer Dodson was able to interview Mr. White on April 15, 2011, and a witness statement/affidavit was prepared on April 17, 2011. The statement of Mr. White is hearsay, and he did not testify. On April 15, 2011, Officer Johnson filed an affidavit/complaint and application for warrant against Ms. Bradie for aggravated battery. An information filed June 15, 2011, charged her with aggravated battery in violation of section 784.045(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony. A warrant for Ms. Bradie?s arrest was issued that same day. Ms. Bradie resigned her position at the Jackson Correctional Institution on June 27, 2011. Ms. Bradie entered a pretrial intervention program, and the charges against her were nolle prossed on February 25, 2013. Richard Johnson is an assistant warden at the Charlotte Correctional Institution. In April of 2011, he worked in the Inspector General?s Office at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Mr. Johnson investigated an administrative case against Respondent stemming from the April 2011 incident. He spoke to Mr. White, and recorded an interview with him. He did not speak with Ms. Bradie. In sum, Petitioner proved that on April 9, 2011, Respondent was present at an altercation at the Cottondale Villas. She had a cut on her hand, and there was a large amount of blood on the pavement. All of the other people present smelled of alcohol or admitted to drinking. Petitioner presented no testimony from anyone who was present during the altercation to describe the events leading to the charges against Respondent. Further, Petitioner presented no competent evidence regarding the item allegedly used to cut Mr. White, as there was no evidence regarding the discovery of any item found at the scene. Respondent?s Story Ms. Bradie testified on her own behalf. She is the only person who testified that was present during the altercation. She testified that she went to Cottondale Villas to pick up her child from her mother, who cared for the child while Ms. Bradie was at work. When she was leaving her mother?s apartment, she heard her brother, Lesidney, outside arguing with Marques White. According to Ms. Bradie, she put her baby in the car and told her brother to go inside, because Marques White was “not worth it.” This apparently angered Mr. White, who started arguing with her. Ms. Bradie?s mother came out of the apartment and tried to break up the argument. Mr. White swung around her mother in order to try to hit Lesidney, and continued arguing with both Ms. Bradie and her brother. A bystander, Marcus Bellamy, pulled Lesidney away from the argument. At that point, Marques White jumped on Ms. Bradie and started hitting her in the face. Ms. Bradie is five feet, one-inch tall. She testified that Mr. White had pushed her down to the ground. While she was close to the ground, she picked something up off the pavement and started swinging to try and get him off of her. While she believes she probably cut him in her effort to get free, she could not identify the object she picked up (which was never located) or say that all of his injuries were a result of her actions. There is no evidence that she deliberately tried to cut him at all, much less that she meant to cut his face. Ms. Bradie?s account of the events is the only evidence from a witness who was actually present at the scene, and her testimony was credible. The most persuasive and compelling testimony presented is that Ms. Bradie acted in self-defense. No evidence was present to rebut her testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ashley Bradie (Address of record) Jennifer Cook Pritt, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact On November 22, 1989, T. L. James & Company, Inc. was convicted of conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition. This is a public entity crime. T. L. James executed a Public Entity Crimes Affidavit on July 24, 1994. On the affidavit T. L. James disclosed the conviction. Pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes, the Department of management Services (DMS) shall investigate public entity crimes to determine if the convicted company should be placed on the convicted vendors' list. After receiving the affidavit from T. L. James, DMS conducted an investigation and discovered mitigating factors as defined and listed in Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. These factors are: payment of fines and damages totalling $600,000, cooperation with the officials criminally investigating and prosecuting the case, cooperation with DMS' investigation, instituting safeguards in the bid estimation process to prevent further irregularities, and providing full and accurate notice. All other facts stipulated to by the parties pursuant to the Joint Stipulation previously filed in this case are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for a real estate license may lawfully be denied based on her criminal history.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged, inter alia, with granting or denying real estate licenses. Certain administrative services are provided to the Commission by the Division of Real Estate (Division) of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department). Ms. Ellis, at the time of the hearing, was a 34-year- old female residing in Tallahassee, Florida. She is currently employed as a legal secretary and has held a commission as a notary public in Florida since 1997. On July 20, 2007, a DBPR 0010-2 Master Individual Application, prepared by Ms. Ellis, was received by the Department. The application sought a real estate sales associate license. In a letter dated August 7, 2007, the Department notified Ms. Ellis that her application was incomplete. Specifically, the letter noted that she had checked the "yes" block on the inquiry addressing criminal matters and requested additional information with regard to her involvement with the criminal justice system. The letter also requested matters, labeled "Questions 2, 3, and 4," that were not relevant to her application. In a letter dated October 23, 2007, Ms. Ellis responded to the demand for additional information. She provided the Department with letters of recommendation written by her father, Tallahassee attorney Vinson Barrett, and fellow legal secretary Adriana Bernstein. The gist of the letters was that she is a good worker, honest, an exemplary mother, trustworthy, and maintains good working relationships with her fellow workers. In a letter dated October 29, 2007, she provided additional documents illuminating her involvement with the criminal justice system. Despite her input, the Commission rejected her application at its November 14, 2007, meeting. Ms. Ellis did not attend this meeting. The Commission recited findings of fact using reference "keys" as follows: CRIMES IN APPLICATION Applicant's criminal record is revealed in application. * * * UNPERSUASIVE TESTIMONY Applicant's testimony or evidence in explanation/mitigation was unpersuasive. CRIMES RECENT Applicant's criminal history is recent in time. PATTERN OF CRIME Applicant's criminal history shows a pattern and practice of criminal behavior over an extended period of time. * * * The Commission made the following conclusions of law: * * * Failing to demonstrate: honesty, truthfulness, trustworthiness and good character, a good reputation for fair dealing, competent and qualified to conduct transactions and negotiations with safety to others. 475.17(1)(a), 475.181 F.S. Having engaged in conduct or practices which would have been grounds for revoking or suspending a real estate license. 475.17(1)(a), 475.181 F.S. * * * F. Found guilty of a course of conduct or practices which show applicant is so incompetent, negligent, or dishonest that money, property, and rights of others may not safely be entrusted to applicant. 475.25(1)(o), 475.181 F.S. * * * Applicant is subject to discipline under 475.25 (specify), 475.181 F.S. The Commission concludes that it would be a breach of its duty to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public to license this applicant and thereby provide him/her easy access to the homes, families, or personal belongings of the citizens of Florida. 455.201, F.S. A "Summary of Applicants, FREC Meeting: November 14, 2007" prepared for the Commission meeting in Ms. Ellis' case, is inaccurate, and unless read closely and supplemented with additional facts, would cause a reasonable person to believe that Ms. Ellis was convicted of four offenses. In fact, she was found guilty of two offenses, battery and stalking. Although it is apparent that the Commission once had rules in place that perhaps provided guidance in relation to the standards expected of an applicant's behavior, the rules have been repealed and new rules have not be adopted. The events giving rise to the findings recited by the Commission, relate to incidents arising from Ms. Ellis' interaction with law enforcement authorities while a resident of Tampa, Florida. Ms. Ellis moved into Ms. Lisa Nawrocki's home at East 99th Street, in Tampa during the latter part of 1998 with her two children. She and Ms. Nawrocki had a series of disputes with their neighbors. From late 1998 until October 1999, law enforcement was summoned by Ms. Ellis, Ms. Nawrocki, or their neighbors on 30 occasions. On January 31, 1999, Ms. Ellis was arrested for a battery precipitated by a dispute with one of her neighbors. She pleaded not guilty, but was found guilty of battery at a bench trial. She was sentenced on May 26, 1999, to one year of probation and community service. Ms. Ellis was also directed to attend an anger management class. Ms. Ellis alleged to the media that she and Ms. Nawrocki were victims of "hate" crimes. Ms. Ellis asserted to the media that their difficulties with their neighbors arose because she was a homosexual. Ms. Ellis was arrested again on August 25, 1999, as a result of a confrontation with neighbors. The neighbors were witnesses against Ms. Ellis in another case so she was charged with witness tampering. In order to avoid a trial and possible imprisonment, with attendant separation from her children, she pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of stalking and was sentenced to one year of probation on October 27, 1999. Because the latter offense was a violation of probation on the battery offense of January 31, 1999, her probation was revoked. She was sentenced to 30 days in jail. After serving six days in jail Ms. Ellis was released after promising the judge that she and Ms. Nawrocki would move out of their troubled neighborhood on East 99th Street, and relocate to Tallahassee, Florida. Ms. Ellis did in fact move to Tallahassee and has experienced no involvement with the criminal justice system since her move. Her probation, resulting from the battery conviction was successfully completed on March 7, 2000. Her probation resulting from the stalking charge, which was continued subsequent to her release from confinement, was successfully completed on May 15, 2001. All of the charges resulted from the neighborhood dispute that began late 1998 and ended with her departure from her neighborhood early in November 1999. There is no record of Ms. Ellis' involvement with the criminal justice system before or since these events. The period of the neighborhood dispute is insufficiently long to be termed as "a pattern and practice of criminal behavior over an extended period of time." Ms. Ellis' unrebutted testimony at the hearing was that since the end of 1999, she has been employed as a legal secretary in Tallahassee. Ms. Ellis testified that she works with confidential attorney-client matters and that she has maintained the accounts of law firms. Ms. Ellis' testimony at the hearing is supported by the written evidence of record, including a letter penned by Attorney Vinson Barrett, who stated that she was honest and trustworthy. Her testimony is deemed credible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission withdraw its Notice of Intent to Deny the Application of Dawn J. Ellis, if she is otherwise qualified, that the Commission certify to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation that Dawn J. Ellis has satisfied the applicable statutory and rule criteria for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn J. Ellis 3409 Cedarwood Trail Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Garnett Chisenhall, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite 802 - North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 S. W. Ellis, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's certification as a firefighter should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, James F. Mathis, is a certified firefighter. On April 7, 1997, Respondent pled guilty to the charge of unlawful sexual battery upon a child under the age of 16, contrary to Section 800.04(3), Florida Statutes. Respondent was sentenced to 180 days in jail, ten years' probation, no contact with the victim, no allowance for early termination of probation, admission to sex offender treatment, and payment of court costs. However, adjudication was withheld. Respondent presented evidence to show: the factual basis for the charge; his rehabilitation; the unlikelihood of a repeat offense; how his plea of guilty came to Petitioner's attention; Respondent's dedication and commitment to quality service as a firefighter; the quality of Respondent's service as a firefighter; and the desire of the Bayshore Fire Protection and Rescue Service District and the local community to have the benefit of Respondent's services as an employed firefighter. Petitioner did not contest Respondent's evidence but took the position that the evidence was irrelevant. As reflected in the Conclusions of Law, it is agreed that the evidence was irrelevant, and no additional findings are necessary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order revoking Respondent's certification as a firefighter. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrence F. Lenick, Esquire Post Office Box 430 Bonita Springs, Florida 34133 James F. Mathis 11260 Shirley Lane North Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
Findings Of Fact The facts stated in the Joint Stipulation of the parties to the extent set forth below are hereby adopted as findings of fact: On December 21, 1990, Petitioners, each of which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dean Foods Company ("Dean"), were each convicted of a one-count felony charge brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. On January 7, 1992, Respondent filed and Petitioners received notices of intent to each Petitioner pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)1, F.S. On January 28, 1992, Petitioners, pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)2, F.S., filed a petition, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S., requesting an order determining that it is not in the public interest for Petitioners to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Petitioners' convictions arose out of an investigation initiated by the Florida Attorney General into possible bid-rigging of school milk requirements contracts in Florida by dairies and distributors. In 1988, the Attorney General filed a civil action against these dairies and distributors, including Petitioners. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.c, F.S., establishes "[t]he degree of culpability of the person or affiliate proposed to be placed on the convicted vendor list" as a factor to be considered in the decision whether to place such person or affiliate on such list. The State of Florida's complaint alleged that the bid-rigging and contract allocation scheme began at least as early as 1978. According to the State's attorneys, the illegal activities actually started as early as the 1960's in southeastern Florida (McArthur Dairy's principal market area) and the 1970's in central and southwestern Florida (T.G. Lee Foods' principal market area). Dean purchased Petitioners in 1980. According to the State's attorneys, Jack Wells and James Clark, former sales managers at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods, respectively, participated in such conspiracies during the 1960's and 1970's and fraudulently concealed their efforts from the former owners of T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy, from Dean and from the school boards. Thus, Dean unknowingly bought into these on-going conspiracies. While the fact that Dean bought into these preexisting schemes was not a legal defense, it is relevant to the issue of culpability. This fact and Dean's early settlement offer were given favorable consideration by the State of Florida during settlement discussions. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.d, F.S., establishes "[p]rompt or voluntary payment of any damages or penalty as a result of the conviction" as a factor mitigating against placement on the convicted vendor list. Dean promptly paid on behalf of Petitioners all civil damages owed the State arising out of such activities. In a press release dated August 1, 1988, the Attorney General confirmed Dean's payment in full settlement of the charges brought by the State of Florida against Petitioners. A federal grand jury sitting in Tampa, Florida also investigated this matter. Dean and Petitioners cooperated fully with that investigation. Pursuant to plea and settlement agreements dated September 12, 1990, entered into by each of Petitioners with the United States Department of Justice, Dean and Petitioners agreed to a comprehensive settlement. Said settlement required that Petitioner plead guilty to a one-count criminal information and pay $1 million each in criminal penalties and $175,000 each in civil damages to the federal government. Such civil liabilities and criminal penalties were paid to the federal government, as reflected in a letter from the federal prosecutor to officials of the United States Defense Logistics Agency dated February 21, 1991, which letter appears as Exhibit A to the Memorandum submitted by Dean to the Defense Logistics Agency. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.e, F.S., establishes "[c]ooperation with state or federal investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners agreed to and did cooperate fully with the State of Florida in connection with its investigation. Petitioners also cooperated fully with the federal grand jury investigation. This cooperation was confirmed in the letter from the federal prosecutor referred to above, which states: We have found McArthur & T.G. Lee and their attorneys to have been most cooperative in this matter. We believe both the companies and their attorneys have shown a high degree of responsibility by agreeing to settle this matter in an expeditious manner. The negotiated settlement with these defendants resolves all matters relating to their operations in Florida. As a final point, we believe the early agreement by these companies and their counsel to settle this matter for a substantial sum gave the incentive for other corporate defendants to come forward and also offer substantial criminal and civil settlements. Several of those cases have now been favorably concluded. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.f., F.S., establishes "[d]isassociation from any other person or affiliate convicted of the public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Jack Wells and James Clark, the only individuals at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods implicated in the wrongdoing that give rise to the convictions in question, were terminated. The investigations conducted by the State of Florida and the Department of Justice disclosed no involvement or knowledge on the part of any other employee of Petitioners, Dean or any of Dean's other subsidiaries, as reflected in a letter form attorneys representing the State of Florida to Dean's attorney dated June 29, 1988. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.g, F.S., establishes "[p]rior or future self- policing by the person or affiliate to prevent public entity crimes' as a mitigating factor. All of Dean's subsidiaries, including Petitioners, have an active antitrust compliance program. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.k, F.S., establishes "demonstration of good citizenship" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners have been involved in civic and philanthropic affairs throughout the years. For example, T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have spearheaded fundraising events for Edgewood Children's Ranch, a non-sectarian foundation for the support of under-privileged and abused children. T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have also donated milk to the Ranch for a number of years. McArthur Dairy has made substantial contributions to organizations such as the University of Miami, and Miami Dade Junior College.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Homer Rozier has been certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. On February 17, 2003, Respondent was employed at the South Bay Correctional Facility. He resigned from that employment on or about July 16, 2003. On February 17, 2003, Chad Pelham was employed as a loss prevention officer at the Wal-Mart located in Clewiston, Florida. As a law enforcement officer certified by the State of Florida for the five years previous, Pelham had been trained in law enforcement techniques, including observation, and was qualified to perform store security duties. On that date, Respondent and his wife entered the Wal- Mart to shop. Since other Wal-Mart employees told Pelham they suspected that Respondent had stolen items from the store on previous occasions, Pelham and his partner followed Respondent and his wife, watching them as they shopped. Respondent and his wife selected some baby shoes from the shelf, removed the tags, and placed the shoes on their infant. They continued walking through the store, stopping to remove a bottle of water from the Wal-Mart cooler, and drinking the water as they shopped. Respondent and his wife proceeded to the houseware section. Respondent removed two wallpaper borders and a bathroom tumbler from the displays and hid them in his baby's diaper bag that he had in the shopping cart. In the deli department of the store Respondent and his wife obtained a bag of chicken. They ate the chicken as they walked through the store and then discarded the bag. In the electronics section of the store Respondent took two magazines related to certain electronic games, such as Nintendo X-box, and put them in his shopping cart. These magazines were sold by Wal-Mart for approximately $15 and $13. When Respondent was in the housewares section he placed the magazines under some towels (or rugs), concealing them. Respondent and his wife then proceeded to the cashier and paid for some of the merchandise they had taken. They did not pay for the chicken they had eaten or the water they had drunk or the baby shoes they had placed on their baby's feet. After paying for the items in their cart and having those items placed in blue Wal-Mart bags, Respondent and his wife left the register area as they would do to exit the store. They did not exit, however. Instead, carrying the Wal-Mart bags containing the items they had paid for, they split up, with Respondent returning to the housewares section and his wife returning to the groceries section. In the housewares section, Respondent retrieved the gaming magazines he had hidden under the towels (or rugs) and placed them in the Wal-Mart bags containing items that had been purchased. He then rejoined his wife in the grocery aisles where they placed some small items in the bags containing the items that they had purchased. They then proceeded to exit the store without returning to a cashier to pay for the items they had not purchased. After Respondent and his wife exited through the first of two sets of exterior doors, Pelham and his partner detained them. Pelham and his partner retrieved the merchandise Respondent and his wife had not paid for and contacted the City of Clewiston Police Department. Officer Demetrius Scruggs responded to the call, coming to the store and arresting Respondent for retail theft.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him and suspending his certification as a correctional officer for a period of 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Homer Rozier 633 Southwest Eighth Street, No. 5 Belle Glade, Florida 33430
