The basic issue in this case is whether there exists "just cause" within the meaning of Section 231.36(1)(a), Florida Statutes, to terminate the professional services contract between the School Board of Gadsden County, Florida, and John C. Buckley. The School Board seeks such a termination on the basis of allegations that John C. Buckley engaged in various forms of inappropriate conduct during the course of a science fair trip. Briefly summarized, the allegations are that John C. Buckley (a) permitted students to smoke cigarettes, (b) purchased alcoholic beverages in the presence of a student, (c) consumed alcoholic beverages in the presence of students, (d) provided alcoholic beverages to students and permitted them to consume such beverages, and (e) inappropriately touched one or more female students. At the hearing, the parties presented the testimony of several witnesses, including the testimony of Respondent. Following the hearing, a transcript of the proceedings was filed and all parties thereafter filed timely proposed recommended orders. The parties' proposed recommended orders have been carefully considered during the formulation of this recommended order. All findings of fact prepared by the parties are specifically addressed in the appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order.Evidence insufficient to prove sexual misconduct by teacher; misconduct proved not sufficient to constitute ""misconduct in office""

Whether the Board refused to re-employ Ms. Smith as a teacher's aide for the 1985-1986 school year in retaliation for a Complaint that she filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations in January, 1983?Petitioner failed to prove her annual contract with school board not renewed because of her race.

This cause came on for consideration before the Hearing Officer on Respondent's motion to dismiss this proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner lacks standing to maintain this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, asserting that Petitioner is net a "party" within the meaning of Section 120.52 (10) Id), Florida Statutes.Petitioner lacks standing to challenge determination that sex offender treatment for him has been exhausted.

The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, James Guinn, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).Insufficient progress in mental health setting for sex offenders to warrant keeping him there. Recommended Order: remand Petitioner to committing court.

The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Donald Alvin Jones, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).Respondent has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Petitioner sex offender.

The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, William Thomas Massey, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).Respondent has exhausted all appropriate treatment for petitioner sex offender.